On a circular table are sitting $ 2n$ people, equally spaced in between. $ m$ cookies are given to these people, and they give cookies to their neighbors according to the following rule.

(i) One may give cookies only to people adjacent to himself.
(ii) In order to give a cookie to one's neighbor, one must eat a cookie.

Select arbitrarily a person $ A$ sitting on the table. Find the minimum value $ m$ such that there is a strategy in which $ A$ can eventually receive a cookie, independent of the distribution of cookies at the beginning.
1. **Numbering and Weight Assignment**:
   - Number the people \(0, 1, \ldots, 2n-1\) such that person \(A\) is numbered \(0\).
   - Assign weights to each person: the weight of person \(i\) is \(2^{-|i \mod 2n|}\).
   - Specifically, the weight of person \(0\) is \(1\), the weights of persons \(1\) and \(2n-1\) are \(1/2\), and the weight of person \(n\) is \(1/2^n\).

2. **Value of a Scenario**:
   - Define the value of a scenario as the sum of the product of the weight and the number of cookies held by each person.
   - To prove that \(m \geq 2^n\), consider giving all \(m\) cookies to person \(n\). The initial value of this scenario is \(\frac{m}{2^n}\).

3. **Operations and Value**:
   - Operations (giving cookies to neighbors) do not increase the value of the scenario.
   - If person \(A\) (person \(0\)) receives a cookie, the value of the scenario must be at least \(1\). Therefore, \(m \geq 2^n\) is necessary.

4. **Sufficiency of \(m = 2^n\)**:
   - Consider an arbitrary distribution of cookies such that there are \(x\) cookies not held by person \(n\).
   - Either persons \(1, \ldots, n-1\) have at least \(x/2\) cookies, or persons \(n+1, \ldots, 2n-1\) do. Without loss of generality, assume the former.
   - Delete persons \(n+1, \ldots, 2n-1\) and their cookies. The resulting value of the scenario is at least:
     \[
     \frac{2^n - x}{2^n} + \frac{x/2}{2^{n-1}} = 1
     \]

5. **Restated Problem**:
   - Suppose we have \(n+1\) people in a line numbered \(0\) through \(n\).
   - Define weights and value as before. If the value is at least \(1\), we need to show that person \(0\) can receive a cookie.

6. **Strategy**:
   - Make moves "towards \(0\)" (i.e., person \(i\) gives cookies to person \(i-1\) but never to \(i+1\)) until no more moves can be made.
   - These moves do not change the value of the scenario, so it remains at least \(1\).

7. **Contradiction**:
   - Suppose person \(0\) does not have a cookie. Since no more moves can be made, person \(0\) has no cookies, and persons \(1, \ldots, n\) have at most \(1\) cookie each.
   - The value of the scenario is at most \(1 - 2^{-n} < 1\), which is a contradiction.

Thus, the minimum value \(m\) such that there is a strategy in which person \(A\) can eventually receive a cookie, independent of the initial distribution, is \(2^n\).

The final answer is \(\boxed{2^n}\).