The Hidden Cost of Waiting for Accurate Predictions
Ali Shirali Ariel D. Procaccia Rediet Abebe
Algorithmic predictions are increasingly informing societal resource allocations by identifying individuals for targeting. Policymakers often build these systems with the assumption that by gathering more observations on individuals, they can improve predictive accuracy and, consequently, allocation efficiency. An overlooked yet consequential aspect of prediction-driven allocations is that of timing. The planner has to trade off relying on earlier and potentially noisier predictions to intervene before individuals experience undesirable outcomes, or they may wait to gather more observations to make more precise allocations. We examine this tension using a simple mathematical model, where the planner collects observations on individuals to improve predictions over time. We analyze both the ranking induced by these predictions and optimal resource allocation. We show that though individual prediction accuracy improves over time, counter-intuitively, the average ranking loss can worsen. As a result, the planner's ability to improve social welfare can decline. We identify inequality as a driving factor behind this phenomenon. Our findings provide a nuanced perspective and challenge the conventional wisdom that it is preferable to wait for more accurate predictions to ensure the most efficient allocations.
Algorithmic Decision Making, Prediction, Resource Allocation, Social Welfare, Limits of Prediction