AI Sandbagging: Language Models can Strategically Underperform on Evaluations
Teun van der Weij Felix Hofstätter Oliver Jaffe Samuel F. Brown Francis Rhys Ward
Trustworthy capability evaluations are crucial for ensuring the safety of AI systems, and are becoming a key component of AI regulation. However, the developers of an AI system, or the AI system itself, may have incentives for evaluations to understate the AI's actual capability. These conflicting interests lead to the problem of *sandbagging* – which we define as *strategic underperformance on an evaluation*. In this paper we assess sandbagging capabilities in contemporary language models (LMs). We prompt frontier LMs, like GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus, to selectively underperform on dangerous capability evaluations, while maintaining performance on general (harmless) capability evaluations. Moreover, we find that models can be fine-tuned, on a synthetic dataset, to hide specific capabilities unless given a password. This behaviour generalizes to high-quality, held-out benchmarks such as WMDP. In addition, we show that both frontier and smaller models can be prompted or password-locked to target specific scores on a capability evaluation. We have mediocre success in password-locking a model to mimic the answers a weaker model would give. Overall, our results suggest that capability evaluations are vulnerable to sandbagging. This vulnerability decreases the trustworthiness of evaluations, and thereby undermines important safety decisions regarding the development and deployment of advanced AI systems.

See our code at https://github.com/TeunvdWeij/sandbagging
Alignment, AI safety, sandbagging, AI evaluations, AI governance, NLP, LLM
We demonstrate that language models have the capability to underperform on evaluations, and this might be hard to mitigate.