Tractable Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning through Behavioral Economics
Eric Mazumdar Kishan Panaganti Laixi Shi
A significant roadblock to the development of principled multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) algorithms is the fact that desired solution concepts like Nash equilibria may be intractable to compute. We show how one can overcome this obstacle by introducing concepts from behavioral economics into MARL. To do so, we imbue agents with two key features of human decision-making: risk aversion and bounded rationality. We show that introducing these two properties into games gives rise to a class of equilibria---risk-averse quantal response equilibria (RQE)---which are tractable to compute in \emph{all} $n$-player matrix and finite-horizon Markov games.  In particular, we show that they emerge as the endpoint of no-regret learning in suitably adjusted versions of the games. Crucially, the class of computationally tractable RQE is independent of the underlying game structure and only depends on agents' degrees of risk-aversion and bounded rationality.  To validate the expressivity of this class of solution concepts we show that it captures peoples' patterns of play in a number of 2-player matrix games previously studied in experimental economics. Furthermore, we give a first analysis of the sample complexity of computing these equilibria in finite-horizon Markov games when one has access to a generative model. We validate our findings on a simple multi-agent reinforcement learning benchmark. Our results open the doors for to the principled development of new decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms.
behavioral economics, risk-aversion, multi-agent reinforcement learning, quantal response, bounded rationality
By incorporating risk aversion and bounded rationality into agents' decision-making processes, we introduced a computationally tractable equilibria class for matrix and Markov games which aligns with observed human behaviors.