Boosting Perturbed Gradient Ascent for Last-Iterate Convergence in Games
Kenshi Abe Mitsuki Sakamoto Kaito Ariu Atsushi Iwasaki
This paper presents a payoff perturbation technique, introducing a strong convexity to players' payoff functions in games. This technique is specifically designed for first-order methods to achieve last-iterate convergence in games where the gradient of the payoff functions is monotone in the strategy profile space, potentially containing additive noise. Although perturbation is known to facilitate the convergence of learning algorithms, the magnitude of perturbation requires careful adjustment to ensure last-iterate convergence. Previous studies have proposed a scheme in which the magnitude is determined by the distance from a periodically re-initialized anchoring or reference strategy. Building upon this, we propose Gradient Ascent with Boosting Payoff Perturbation, which incorporates a novel perturbation into the underlying payoff function, maintaining the periodically re-initializing anchoring strategy scheme. This innovation empowers us to provide faster last-iterate convergence rates against the existing payoff perturbed algorithms, even in the presence of additive noise.
Last-Iterate Convergence, Learning in Games, Noisy Feedback
This paper proposes a novel payoff-perturbed Gradient Ascent that achieves fast last-iterate convergence rates.