



Produced by Merv McConnel, Christine P. Travers and the
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[Transcriber's note: Obvious printer's errors have been corrected.
Hyphenation and accentuation have been standardised, all
other inconsistencies are as in the original. The author's spelling
has been maintained.

Page 365, 299 mm. is probably an error for .299-in.

Page 399, "could reach effectively the trenches of the
Russians" should probably be "could reach effectively the trenches of the
Austrians".]




THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

  History of the European War from Official Sources

  Complete Historical Records of Events to Date,
  Illustrated with Drawings, Maps, and Photographs

  Prefaced by

  What the War Means to America
  Major General Leonard Wood, U.S.A.

  Naval Lessons of the War
  Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U.S.N.

  The World's War
  Frederick Palmer

  Theatres of the War's Campaigns
  Frank H. Simonds

  The War Correspondent
  Arthur Ruhl

  Edited by

  Francis J. Reynolds
  Former Reference Librarian of Congress

  Allen L. Churchill
  Associate Editor, The New International Encyclopedia

  Francis Trevelyan Miller
  Editor in Chieft, Photographic History of the Civil War

  P. F. Collier & Son Company
  New York


[Illustration: _A great French siege gun in action near the
much-contested battle field of Arras. During the terrific explosion the
gunners cover their ears._]


THE STORY OF THE GREAT WAR

  THE WAR BEGINS
  INVASION OF BELGIUM
  BATTLE OF THE MARNE
  CRACOW . WARSAW
  POLISH CAMPAIGN
  WAR IN EAST PRUSSIA


VOLUME II

P . F . Collier & Son . New York

  Copyright 1916
  By P. F. Collier & Son




CONTENTS


PART I.--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES

CHAPTER                                                             Page

        I. Attack on Belgium                                           9

       II. Siege and Capture of Liege                                 12

      III. Belgium's Defiance                                         23

       IV. Capture of Louvain--Surrender of Brussels                  27

        V. Coming of the British                                      33

       VI. Campaigns in Alsace and Lorraine                           38

      VII. Siege and Fall of Namur                                    45

     VIII. Battle of Charleroi                                        54

       IX. Battle of Mons                                             60

        X. The Great Retreat Begins                                   68

       XI. Fighting at Bay                                            79

      XII. The Marne--General Plan of Battle Field                    87

     XIII. Allied and German Battle Plans                             95

      XIV. First Moves in the Battle                                 101

       XV. German Retreat                                            111

      XVI. Continuation of the Battle of the Marne                   116

     XVII. Continuation of the Battle of the Marne                   119

    XVIII. Other Aspects of the Battle of the Marne                  126

      XIX. "Crossing the Aisne"                                      130

       XX. First Day's Battles                                       135

      XXI. The British at the Aisne                                  140

     XXII. Bombardment of Rheims and Soissons                        146

    XXIII. Second Phase of Battle of the Aisne                       149

     XXIV. End of the Battle                                         153

      XXV. "The Race to the Sea"                                     158

     XXVI. Siege and Fall of Antwerp                                 160

    XXVII. Yser Battles--Attack on Ypres                             168

   XXVIII. Attacks of La Bassee and Arras                            177

     XXIX. General Movements on the French and Flanders Fronts       181

      XXX. Operations Around La Bassee and Givenchy                  187

     XXXI. End of Six Months' Fighting in the West                   193


PART II.--NAVAL OPERATIONS

    XXXII. Strength of the Rival Navies                              196

   XXXIII. First Blood--Battle of the Bight                          208

    XXXIV. Battles on Three Seas                                     219

     XXXV. The German Sea Raiders                                    225

    XXXVI. Battle Off the Falklands                                  230

   XXXVII. Sea Fights of the Ocean Patrol                            237

  XXXVIII. War on German Trade and Possessions                       242

    XXXIX. Raids on the English Coast                                245

       XL. Results of Six Months' Naval Operations                   258


PART III.--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT

      XLI. General Characteristics of the Theatre of Warfare         261

     XLII. The Strategic Value of Russian Poland                     268

    XLIII. Austrian Poland, Galicia, and Bukowina                    272

     XLIV. The Balkans--Countries and Peoples                        275

      XLV. The Caucasus--The Barred Door                             286


PART IV.--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN

     XLVI. Serbia's Situation and Resources                          291

    XLVII. Austria's Strength and Strategy                           298

   XLVIII. Austrian Successes                                        301

     XLIX. The Great Battles Begin                                   305

        L. First Victory of the Serbians                             310


PART V.--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN

       LI. Results of First Battles                                  321

      LII. Serbian Attempt to Invade Austrian Territory              323

     LIII. Austria's Second Invasion                                 329

      LIV. End of Second Invasion--Beginning of Third                331

       LV. Preliminary Austrian Successes                            335

      LVI. Crisis of the Campaign--Austrian Defeat                   339

     LVII. The Fate of Belgrade                                      345

    LVIII. Attempts to Retake Belgrade                               348

      LIX. Serbians Retake the City--End of Third Invasion           353

       LX. Montenegro in the War                                     358


PART VI.--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

      LXI. Strength and Equipment of the Antagonists                 362

     LXII. General Strategy of the Campaign                          371

    LXIII. Austria Takes the Offensive                               376

     LXIV. A Cautious Russian Advance -- Russian Successes --
             Capture of Lemberg                                      379

      LXV. Dankl's Offensive and Retreat                             390

     LXVI. Battle of Rawa-Russka                                     395

    LXVII. Russian Victories--Battles of the San                     398

   LXVIII. Summary of Operations of September, 1914                  403

     LXIX. Investiture of Przemysl                                   405

      LXX. Austrian Retreat Begins                                   410

     LXXI. Fighting at Cracow                                        416

    LXXII. Austrians Again Assume the Offensive                      423


PART VII.--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN

   LXXIII. First Clash on Prussian Frontier                          430

    LXXIV. Advance of Russians Against the Germans                   435

     LXXV. Battle of Tannenberg and Russian Retreat                  438

    LXXVI. Second Russian Invasion of East Prussia                   446

   LXXVII. First German Drive Against Warsaw                         450

  LXXVIII. German Retreat from Russian Poland                        458

    LXXIX. Winter Battles of the Polish Campaign                     462

     LXXX. Winter Battles in East Prussia                            478

    LXXXI. Results of First Six Months of Russo-German
             Campaign                                                482


PART VIII.--TURKEY AND THE DARDANELLES

   LXXXII. First Moves of Turkey                                     493

  LXXXIII. The First Blow Against the Allies                         501

   LXXXIV. British Campaign in Mesopotamia                           506




LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS


  French Siege Gun at Arras                               _Frontispiece_

                                                           Opposite Page

  Bridge Destroyed by the Belgians at Liege                           14

  General Joffre                                                      78

  Germans Refortifying Antwerp                                       158

  Emden Aground After the Sydney's Victory                           222

  Wreck of the Bluecher in the North Sea Battle                       254

  Serbian Infantrymen on Their Way to the Front                      302

  General von Hindenburg                                             382

  Gerdauen, East Prussia, Destroyed in Russian Invasion              478




LIST OF MAPS


                                                                    Page

  Peace Distribution of Army Corps and Naval Stations of Belligerent
    Powers (_Colored Map_)                                _Front Insert_

  France, Pictorial Map of                                            11

  Belgium, Beginning of German Invasion of                            17

  Alsace-Lorraine, French Invasion of                                 51

  Battle of Mons and Retreat of Allied Armies                         71

  Battle of the Marne--Beginning on September 5, 1914                 89

  Battle of the Marne--Situation on September 9, 1914                 98

  Battle of the Marne--End of German Retreat and the Intrenched
    Line on the Aisne River                                          107

  Liege Fort, German Attack of                                       162

  Antwerp, Siege and Fall of                                         162

  Flanders, Battle Front in                                          173

  German and English Naval Positions                                 199

  War in the East--Relation of the Eastern Countries to Germany      263

  The Balkans, Pictorial Map of                                      293

  Serbian and Austrian Invasions                                     296

  Russia, Pictorial Map of                                           364

  Galicia, Russian Invasion of                                       367

  Battle of Tannenberg                                               440




[Illustration: Peace Distribution of Army Corps and Naval
Stations of Belligerent Powers.]




PART I--GREAT BATTLES OF THE WESTERN ARMIES




CHAPTER I

ATTACK ON BELGIUM


The first great campaign on the western battle grounds in the European
War began on August 4, 1914. On this epoch-making day the German army
began its invasion of Belgium--with the conquest of France as its
ultimate goal. Six mighty armies stood ready for the great invasion.
Their estimated total was 1,200,000 men. Supreme over all was the
Emperor as War Lord, but Lieutenant General Helmuth von Moltke, chief of
the General Staff, was the practical director of military operations.
General von Moltke was a nephew of the great strategist of 1870, and his
name possibly appealed as of happy augury for repeating the former
capture of Paris.

The First Army was assembled at Aix-la-Chapelle in the north of Belgium,
within a few miles of the Dutch frontier. It was under the command of
General von Kluck. He was a veteran of both the Austrian and
Franco-Prussian Wars, and was regarded as an able infantry leader. His
part was to enter Belgium at its northern triangle, which projects
between Holland and Germany, occupy Liege, deploy on the great central
plains of Belgium, then sweep toward the French northwestern frontier in
the German dash for Paris and the English Channel. His army thus formed
the right wing of the whole German offensive. It was composed of picked
corps, including cavalry of the Prussian Guard.

The Second Army had gathered in the neighborhood of Limbourg under the
command of General von Buelow. Its advance was planned down the valleys
of the Ourthe and Vesdre to a junction with Von Kluck at Liege, then a
march by the Meuse Valley upon Namur and Charleroi. In crossing the
Sambre it was to fall into place on the left of Von Kluck's army.

The German center was composed of the Third Army under Duke Albrecht of
Wuerttemberg, the Fourth Army led by the crown prince, and the Fifth Army
commanded by the Crown Prince of Bavaria. It was assembled on the line
Neufchateau-Treves-Metz. Its first offensive was the occupation of
Luxemburg. This was performed, after a somewhat dramatic protest by the
youthful Grand Duchess, who placed her motor car across the bridge by
which the Germans entered her internationally guaranteed independent
state. The German pretext was that since Luxemburg railways were German
controlled, they were required for the transport of troops. Preparations
were then made for a rapid advance through the Ardennes upon the Central
Meuse, to form in order upon the left of Von Buelow's army. A part of the
Fifth Army was to be detached for operations against the French fortress
of Verdun.

The Sixth Army was concentrated at Strassburg in Alsace, under General
von Heeringen. As inspector of the Prussian Guards he bore a very high
military reputation. For the time being General von Heeringen's part was
to remain in Alsace, to deal with a possibly looked for strong French
offensive by way of the Vosges or Belfort.

The main plan of the German General Staff, therefore was a wide
enveloping movement by the First and Second Armies to sweep the shore of
the English Channel in their march on Paris, a vigorous advance of the
center through the Ardennes for the same destination, and readiness for
battle by the Sixth Army for any French force which might be tempted
into Alsace. That this plan was not developed in its entirety, was due
to circumstances which fall into another place.

[Illustration: Pictorial Map of France.]

The long anticipated _Day_ dawned. Their vast military machine moved
with precision and unity. But there was a surprise awaiting them. The
Belgians were to offer a serious resistance to passage through their
territory--a firm refusal had been delivered at the eleventh hour. The
vanguard was thrown forward from Von Kluck's army at Aix, to break
through the defenses of Liege and seize the western railways. This force
of three divisions was commanded by General von Emmich, one of them
joining him at Verviers.

On the evening of August 3, 1914, Von Emmich's force had crossed into
Belgium. Early on the morning of August 4, 1914, Von Kluck's second
advance line reached Vise, situated on the Meuse north of Liege and
close to the Dutch frontier. Here an engagement took place with a
Belgian guard, which terminated with the Germans bombarding Vise. The
Belgians had destroyed the river bridge, but the Germans succeeded in
seizing the crossing.

This was the first actual hostility of the war on the western battle
grounds. With the capture of Vise, the way was clear for Von Kluck's
main army to concentrate on Belgian territory. By nightfall, Liege was
invested on three sides. Only the railway lines and roads running
westward remained open.




CHAPTER II

SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF LIEGE


A view of Liege will assist in revealing its three days' siege, with the
resulting effect upon the western theatre of war. Liege is the capital
of the Walloons, a sturdy race that in times past has at many a crisis
proved unyielding determination and courage. At the outbreak of war it
was the center of great coal mining and industrial activity. In the
commercial world it is known everywhere for the manufacture of firearms.
The smoke from hundreds of factories spreads over the city, often
hanging in dense clouds. It might aptly be termed the Pittsburg of
Belgium. The city lies in a deep, broad cut of the River Meuse, at its
junction with the combined channels of the Ourthe and Vesdre. It
stretches across both sides, being connected by numerous bridges, while
parallel lines of railway follow the course of the main stream. The
trunk line from Germany into Belgium crosses the Meuse at Liege. For the
most part the old city of lofty houses clings to a cliffside on the left
bank, crowned by an ancient citadel of no modern defensive value.
Whatever picturesqueness Liege may have possessed is effaced by the
squalid and dilapidated condition of its poorer quarters. To the north
broad fertile plains extend into central Belgium, southward on the
opposite bank of the Meuse, the Ardennes present a hilly forest,
stream-watered region. In its downward course the Meuse flows out of the
Liege trench to expand through what is termed the Dutch Flats.

Liege, at the outbreak of the war, was a place of great wealth and
extreme poverty--a Liege artisan considered himself in prosperity on $5
a week. It was of the first strategic importance to Belgium. Its
situation was that of a natural fortress, barring the advance of a
German army.

The defenses of Liege were hardly worth an enemy's gunfire before 1890.
They had consisted of a single fort on the Meuse right bank, and the
citadel crowning the heights of the old town. But subsequently the
Belgian Chamber voted the necessary sums for fortifying Liege and Namur
on the latest principles. From the plans submitted, the one finally
decided upon was that of the famous Belgian military engineer Henri
Alexis Brialmont. His design was a circle of detached forts, already
approved by German engineers as best securing a city within from
bombardment. With regard to Liege and Namur particularly, Brialmont held
that his plan would make passages of the Meuse at those places
impregnable to an enemy.

When the German army stood before Liege on this fourth day of August, in
1914, the circumference of the detached forts was thirty-one miles with
about two or three miles between them, and at an average of five miles
from the city. Each fort was constructed on a new model to withstand the
highest range and power of offensive artillery forecast in the last
decade of the nineteenth century. When completed they presented the form
of an armored mushroom, thrust upward from a mound by subterranean
machinery. The elevation of the cupola in action disclosed no more of
its surface than was necessary for the firing of the guns. The mounds
were turfed and so inconspicuous that in times of peace sheep grazed
over them. In Brialmont's original plan each fort was to be connected by
infantry trenches with sunken emplacements for light artillery, but this
important part of his design was relegated to the dangerous hour of a
threatening enemy. This work was undertaken too late before the onsweep
of the Germans. Instead, Brialmont's single weak detail in surrounding
each fort with an infantry platform was tenaciously preserved long after
its uselessness must have been apparent. Thus Liege was made a ring
fortress to distinguish it from the former latest pattern of earth
ramparts and outworks.

Six major and six minor of these forts encircled Liege. From north to
south, beginning with those facing the German frontier, their names ran
as follows: Barchon, Evegnee, Fleron, Chaudfontaine, Embourg, Boncelles,
Flemalle, Hollogne, Loncin, Lantin, Liers, and Pontisse. The armaments
of the forts consisted of 6-inch and 4.7-inch guns, with 8-inch mortars
and quick firers. They were in the relative number of two, four, two and
four for the major forts, and two, two, one and three for the minor
_fortins_, as such were termed. The grand total was estimated at 400
pieces. In their confined underground quarters the garrisons, even of
the major forts, did not exceed eighty men from the engineer, artillery
and infantry branches of the service. Between Fort Pontisse and the
Dutch frontier was less than six miles.

[Illustration: This bridge over the Meuse at Liege was blown up by the
Belgians to delay the German advance. The German army crossed on pontoon
bridges.]

It was through this otherwise undefended gap that Von Kluck purposed to
advance his German army after the presumed immediate fall of Liege, to
that end having seized the Meuse crossing at Vise. The railway line to
Aix-la-Chapelle was dominated by Fort Fleron, while the minor Forts
Chaudfontaine and Embourg, to the south, commanded the trunk line by way
of Liege into Belgium. On the plateau, above Liege, Fort Loncin held
the railway junction of Ans and the lines running from Liege north and
west. Finally, the forts were not constructed on a geometric circle, but
in such manner that the fire of any two was calculated to hold an enemy
at bay should a third between them fall. This was probably an accurate
theory before German guns of an unimagined caliber and range were
brought into action.

In command of the Belgian forts at Liege was General Leman. He had
served under Brialmont, and was pronounced a serious and efficient
officer. He was a zealous military student, physically extremely active,
and constantly on the watch for any relaxation of discipline. These
qualities enabled him to grasp at the outset the weakness of his
position.

If the Germans believed the refusal to grant a free passage for their
armies through Belgium to be little more than a diplomatic protest, it
would seem the Belgian Government was equally mistaken in doubting the
Germans would force a way through an international treaty of Belgian
neutrality. Consequently, the German crossing of the frontier discovered
Belgium with her mobilization but half complete, mainly on a line for
the defense of Brussels and Antwerp. It had been estimated by Brialmont
that 75,000 men of all arms were necessary for the defense of Liege on a
war footing, probably 35,000 was the total force hastily gathered in the
emergency to withstand the German assault on the fortifications. It
included the Civic Guard.

General Leman realized, therefore, that, without a supporting field
army, it would be impossible for him to hold the German hosts before
Liege for more than a few days--a week at most.

But he hoped within such time the French or British would march to his
relief. Thus his chief concern was for the forts protecting the railway
leading from Namur down the Meuse Valley into Liege--the line of a
French or British advance.

On the afternoon of August 4, 1914, German patrols appeared on the left
bank of the Meuse, approaching from Vise. They were also observed by the
sentries on Forts Barchon, Evegnee and Fleron. German infantry and
artillery presently came into view with the unmistakable object of
beginning the attack on those forts. The forts fired a few shots by way
of a challenge. As evening fell the woods began to echo with the roar of
artillery. Later, Forts Fleron, Chaudfontaine and Embourg were added to
the German bombardment. The Germans used long range field pieces with
powerful explosive shells. The fire proved to be remarkably accurate. As
their shells exploded on the cupolas and platforms of the forts, the
garrisons in their confined citadels began to experience that inferno of
vibrations which subsequently deprived them of the incentive to eat or
sleep. The Belgians replied vigorously, but owing to the broken nature
of the country, and the forethought with which the Germans took
advantage of every form of gun cover, apparently little execution was
dealt upon the enemy. However, the Belgians claimed to have silenced two
of the German pieces.

In the darkness of this historic night of August 4, 1914, the flames of
the fortress guns pierced the immediate night with vivid streaks. Their
searchlights swept in broad streams the wooded <DW72>s opposite. The
cannonade resounded over Liege, as if with constant peals of thunder. In
the city civilians sought the shelter of their cellars, but few of the
German shells escaped their range upon the forts to disturb them.

This exchange of artillery went on until near daybreak of August 5,
1914, when infantry fire from the woods to the right of Fort Embourg
apprised the defenders that the Germans were advancing to the attack.
The Germans came on in their customary massed formation. The prevalent
opinion that in German tactics such action was employed to hearten the
individual soldier, was denied by their General Staff. In their opinion
an advantage was thus gained by the concentration of rifle fire. Belgian
infantry withstood the assault, and counterattacked. When dawn broke, a
general engagement was in progress. About eight o'clock the Germans were
compelled to withdraw.

[Illustration: Beginning of German Invasion of Belgium.]

The first engagement of the war was won by the Belgians. It was reported
that the Belgian fire had swept the Germans down in thousands, but this
was denied by German authorities. Up to this time the German forces
before Liege were chiefly Von Kluck's vanguard under Von Emmich, his
second line of advance, and detachments of Von Buelow's army. On the
Belgian side no attempt was made to follow up the advantage. The reason
given is that the Germans were seen to be in strong cavalry force, an
arm lost totally in the military complement of Liege. The German losses
were undoubtedly severe, especially in front of Fort Barchon. This was
one of the major forts, triangular in shape, and surrounded by a ditch
and barbed wire entanglements. The armament of these major forts had
recently been reenforced by night, secretly, with guns of heavier
caliber from Antwerp. As they outmatched the German field pieces of the
first attack, presumably the German Intelligence Department had failed
in news of them. An armistice requested by the Germans to gather in the
wounded and bury the dead was refused. Thereupon the artillery duel
recommenced.

A hot and oppressive day disclosed woods rent and scarred, standing
wheat fields shell-plowed and trampled, and farm houses set ablaze. The
bringing of the Belgian wounded into Liege apprised the citizens that
their side had also suffered considerably. Meanwhile, the Germans were
reenforced by the Tenth Hanoverian Army Corps, from command of which
General von Emmich had been detached to lead Von Kluck's vanguard, also
artillery with 8.4-inch howitzers.

The bombardment on this 5th day of August, 1914, now stretched from Vise
around the Meuse right bank half circle of forts to embrace Pontisse and
Boncelles at its extremities. In a few hours infantry attack began
again. The Germans advanced in masses by short rushes, dropping to fire
rifle volleys, and then onward with unflinching determination. The
forts, wreathed in smoke, blazed shells among them; their machine guns
spraying streams of bullets. The Germans were repulsed and compelled to
retire, but only to re-form for a fresh assault. Both Belgian and German
aeroplanes flew overhead to signal their respective gunners. A Zeppelin
was observed, but did not come within range of Belgian fire. The
Belgians claim to have shot down one German aeroplane, and another is
said to have been brought to earth by flying within range of its own
artillery.

During the morning of August 5, Fort Fleron was put out of action by
shell destruction of its cupola-hoisting machinery. This proved a weak
point in Brialmont's fortress plan. It was presently discovered that the
fire of the supporting forts Evegnee and Chaudfontaine could not command
the lines forming the apex of their triangle. Further, since the Belgian
infantry was not in sufficient force to hold the lines between the
forts, a railway into Liege fell to the enemy. The fighting here was of
such a desperate nature, that General Leman hastened to reenforce with
all his reserve.

This battle went on during the afternoon and night of August 5, into the
morning of August 6, 1914. But the fall of Fort Fleron began to tell in
favor of the Germans. Belgian resistance perforce weakened. The
ceaseless pounding of the German 8.4-inch howitzers smashed the inner
concrete and stone protective armor of the forts, as if of little more
avail than cardboard. At intervals on August 6, Forts Chaudfontaine,
Evegnee and Barchon fell under the terrific hail of German shells. A way
was now opened into the city, though, for the most part, still contested
by Belgian infantry. A party of German hussars availed themselves of
some unguarded path to make a daring but ineffectual dash to capture
General Leman and his staff.

General Leman was consulting with his officers at military headquarters,
on August 6, 1914, when they were startled by shouts outside. He rushed
forth into a crowd of citizens to encounter eight men in German uniform.
General Leman cried for a revolver to defend himself, but another
officer, fearing the Germans had entered the city in force, lifted him
up over a foundry wall. Both Leman and the officer made their escape by
way of an adjacent house. Belgian Civic Guards hastening to the scene
dispatched an officer and two men of the German raiders. The rest of the
party are said to have been made prisoners.

The end being merely a question of hours General Leman ordered the
evacuation of the city by the infantry. He wisely decided it could be of
more service to the Belgian army at Dyle, than held in a beleaguered and
doomed city. Reports indicate that this retreat, though successfully
performed, was precipitate. The passage of it was scattered with arms,
equipment, and supplies of all kinds. An ambulance train was abandoned,
twenty locomotives left in the railway station, and but one bridge
destroyed in rear beyond immediate repair. After its accomplishment,
General Leman took command of the northern forts, determined to hold
them against Von Kluck until the last Belgian gun was silenced.

Early on August 7, 1914, Burgomaster Kleyer and the Bishop of Liege
negotiated terms for the surrender of the city. It had suffered but
slight damage from the bombardment. Few of the citizens were reported
among the killed or injured. On behalf of the Germans it must be said
their occupation of Liege was performed in good order, with military
discipline excellently maintained. They behaved at first fairly
impartial in establishing their rule in the city, and paid for all
supplies requisitioned. They were quartered in various public buildings
and institutions, probably to the number of 10,000. The German troops at
first seemed to present an interesting spectacle. They were mostly young
men, reported as footsore from their long march in new, imperfectly
fitting boots, and hungry from the lack of accompanying commissariat.
This is proof that the German's military machine did not work to
perfection at the outset. Later, alleged hostile acts by Belgian
individuals moved the German military authorities to seize a group of
the principal citizens, and warn the inhabitants that the breaking of a
peaceful attitude would be at the risk of swiftly serious punishment.
Precautions to enforce order were such as is provided in martial law,
and carried out in the beginning with some show of fairness. The Germans
appeared anxious to restore confidence and win a feeling of good will.

For some days after the capitulation of the city the northern forts
continued a heroic resistance. So long as these remained uncaptured,
General Leman maintained that, strategically, Liege had not fallen. He
thus held in check the armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow, when every
hour was of supreme urgency for their respective onsweep into central
Belgium and up the Meuse Valley. The Germans presently brought into an
overpowering bombardment their 11-inch siege guns.

On August 13, 1914, Embourg was stricken into ruin. On the same day the
electric lighting apparatus of Fort Boncelles having been destroyed, the
few living men of its garrison fought through the following night in
darkness, and in momentary danger of suffocation from gases emitted by
the exploding German shells.

Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, though its cupolas were
battered in and shells rained upon the interior, the commander refused
an offer of surrender. A little later the concrete inner chamber walls
fell in. The commander of Boncelles, having exhausted his defensive,
hoisted the white flag. He had held out for eleven days in a veritable
death-swept inferno.

Fort Loncin disputed with Boncelles the honor of being the last to
succumb. The experience of its garrison differed only in terrible
details from Boncelles. Its final gun shot was fired by a man with his
left hand, since the other had been severed. Apparently a shell exploded
in its magazine, and blew up the whole fort. General Leman was
discovered amid its debris, pinned beneath a huge beam. He was released
by his own men. When taken to a trench, a German officer found that he
was merely unconscious from shock.

When sufficiently recovered, General Leman was conducted to General von
Emmich to tender his personal surrender. The two had previously been
comrades at maneuvers. The report of their meeting is given by a German
officer. The guard presented the customary salute due General Leman's
rank. General von Emmich advanced a few steps to meet General Leman.
Both generals saluted.

"General," said Von Emmich, "you have gallantly and nobly held your
forts."

"I thank you," Leman replied. "Our troops have lived up to their
reputation. War is not like maneuvers, _mon General_," he added with a
pointed smile. "I ask you to bear witness that you found me
unconscious."

General Leman unbuckled his sword to offer it to the victor.

Von Emmich bowed.

"No, keep it," he gestured. "To have crossed swords with you has been an
honor."

Subsequently the President of the French Republic bestowed on Liege the
Cross of the Legion of Honor. To its motto in this instance might have
been added appropriately: Liege, the Savior of Paris. The few days of
its resistance to an overwhelming force enabled the Belgium army to
improve its mobilization, the British to throw an expeditionary army
into France, and the French to make a new offensive alignment. It will
forever remain a brilliant page in war annals. In a military estimate it
proved that forts constructed on the latest scientific principles, but
unsupported by an intrenched field army, crumple under the concentrated
fire of long-range, high-power enemy guns.

The fall of the northern and eastern Liege forts released Von Kluck's
army for its march into central Belgium. Meanwhile the Belgian army had
been concentrated on a line of the River Dyle, with its left touching
Malines and its right resting on Louvain. Its commander, General
Selliers de Moranville, made his headquarters in the latter city. The
Belgian force totaled 110,000 men of all complements. Whether this
included the reenforcement by the Liege infantry is uncertain.

During August 10 and 11, 1914, General Moranville threw forward
detachments to screen his main body in front of the German advance. On
the 11th a rumor that the French had crossed the Sambre, moved General
Moranville to extend his right wing to Eghezee, with the hope of getting
in touch with the Allies. That the French and British were hastening to
his support could not be doubted. They were already overdue, but
assuredly would come soon. That was the Belgian reliance, passing from
mouth to mouth among the Court, Cabinet Ministers, General Staff, down
to the factory toilers, miners, and peasants on their farms. The Sambre
report, like many others in various places, proved unfounded.




CHAPTER III

BELGIUM'S DEFIANCE


A view of the general situation in Belgium will assist in clearing the
way for swiftly following events. Germany had invaded Belgium against
the diplomatic and active protests of its Government. But the German
Government still hoped that the heroic resistance of Liege would satisfy
Belgian national spirit, and a free passage of German troops now be
granted. The German Emperor made a direct appeal to the King of the
Belgians through the medium of the Queen of Holland. From the German
point of outlook their victory could best be attained by the march
through Belgium upon Paris. The German Government asserted that the
French and British contemplated a similar breach of Belgian neutrality.
To their mind, it was a case of which should be on the ground first. On
the other hand, the Allies pronounced the German invasion of Belgium an
unprovoked assault, and produced countertestimony. The controversy has
continued to this day. But the war as it progressed has seen many
breaches of neutrality, and a certain resignation to the inevitable has
succeeded the moral indignation so easily aroused in its early stages.

Let us now glance at the condition of Belgium when war was declared. The
Belgians were an industrial and not a militant people. They had ample
reason to yearn for a permanent peace. Their country had been the
cockpit of Europe from the time of Caesar until Waterloo. The names of
their cities, for the most part, represented great historic battle
fields. Again and again had the ruin of conflict swept over their
unfortunately situated land. At all periods the Belgians were brave
fighters on one side or the other, for Belgium had been denied a
national unity. Doubtless, therefore, they welcomed the establishment of
their independent sovereignty and the era of peace which followed.
Historically, they had suffered enough, with an abundance to spare, from
perpetual warfare. Their minds turned hopefully toward industrial and
commercial activity, stimulated by the natural mineral wealth of their
soil. Thus the products of their factories reached all countries, South
America, China, Manchuria, and Central Africa, especially of later
years, where a great territory had been acquired in the Congo. The iron
and steel work of Liege was famous, Antwerp had become one of the chief
ports of Europe and growing into a financial power. But owing to the
confined boundaries of Belgium, there grew to be a congestion of
population. This produced a strong democratic and socialistic uplift
which even threatened the existence of the monarchy. Also, all that
monarchy seemed to imply.

The Belgians, doubtless with memories of the past, despised and hated
the display of military. Consequently it was only with difficulty, and
in the face of popular opposition, that the Belgium Government had
succeeded with military plans for defense, but imperfectly carried out.
Herein, perhaps, we have the keynote to Belgium's desperate resistance
to the German invaders. In the light of the foregoing, it is easily
conceivable that the Germans represented to the Belgians the military
yoke. They were determined to have none of it, upon any overtures or
terms. But they relied on France and England for protection, when common
prudence should have made the mobilization of an up-to-date army of
500,000 men ready for the call to repel an invader on either of the
frontiers, instead of the practically helpless force of 110,000.

The German General Staff did not believe the Belgians intended to raise
a serious barrier in their path. But with the crisis, democratic Belgium
united in a rush to arms, which recalls similar action by the American
colonists at the Revolution. Every form of weapon was grasped, from old
muskets to pitchforks and shearing knives. It was remarked by a foreign
witness that in default of properly equipped armories, the Belgians
emptied the museums to confront the Germans with the strangest
assortment of antiquated military tools.

As testimony of Belgian feeling, the Labor party organ "Le Peuple"
issued the following statement: "Why do we, as irreconcilable
antimilitarists, cry 'Bravo!' from the bottom of our hearts to all those
who offer themselves for the defense of the country? Because it is not
only necessary to protect the hearths and homes, the women and the
children, but it is also necessary to protect at the price of our blood
the heritage of our ancient freedom. Go, then, sons of the workers, and
register your names as recruits. We will rather die for the idea of
progress and solidarity of humanity than live under a regime whose
brutal force and savage violence have wiped outright."

The Belgian General Staff, foreseeing dire consequences from the
invading hosts, warned all to maintain as peaceful an attitude as
possible. In spite of the efforts of Belgian officials, severe penalties
were inflicted on the citizens.

On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, a German cavalry screen, thrown in
advance of the main forces, came in touch with Belgian patrols. A series
of engagements took place. The Germans tried to seize the bridges across
the Dyle at Haelen, and at Cortenachen on the Velpe, a tributary of the
former river, mainly with the object of outflanking the Belgian left
wing. The Belgians are said to have numbered some 10,000 of all arms,
and were successful in repulsing the Germans.

On August 13, 1914, similar actions were continued. At Tirlemont 2,000
German cavalry swept upon the town, but were beaten off. At Eghezee on
the extreme Belgian right--close to Namur and the historic field of
Ramillies--another brush with the Germans took place. Belgian cavalry
caught a German cavalry detachment bivouacked in the village. Sharp
fighting through the streets ensued before the Germans withdrew. In
spite of the warning of the Belgian General Staff, and similar advance
German notices, the citizens of some of these and other places began
sniping German patrols.

Meantime, moving over the roads toward Namur, toiled the huge German
42-centimeter guns. The German General Staff had taken to mind the
lesson of Liege. Each gun was transported in several parts, hauled by
traction engines and forty horses. Of this, with the advance of Von
Kluck and Von Buelow, the Belgian General Staff was kept in total
ignorance by the German screen of cavalry. So ably was this screen work
performed that the Belgians were led to believe the Germans had
succeeded in placing no more than two divisions of cavalry, together
with a few detachments of infantry and artillery, on Belgian soil. They,
in fact, regarded the German cavalry skirmishing as a rather clumsy
offensive.

As we have seen, the resistance of Forts Boncelles and Loncin at Liege
held back the main German advance from seven to ten days. Their fall
released into German control the railway junction at Ans. With that was
included the line from Liege up the left bank of the Meuse to Namur.
Also, another line direct to Brussels.

On August 15, 1914, the cavalry screen was withdrawn, and four German
army corps were revealed to the surprised Belgian line. In this
emergency, clearly their only hope lay with the French. In Louvain,
Brussels, and Antwerp, anxious questions lay on all lips. "Why do not
the French hasten to our aid? When will they come? Will the British fail
us at the twelfth hour?"

Eager watchers at Ostend beheld no sign of the promised transports to
disembark a British army of support in the day of overwhelming need.
About this time some French cavalry crossed the Sambre to join hands
with the Belgian right wing near Waterloo. But it was little more than a
detachment. The French General Staff was occupied with a realignment,
and had decided not to advance into Belgium until they could do so in
force sufficient to cope with the Germans. The Belgian General Staff saw
there was no other course but to fall back, fighting rear-guard actions
until the longed-for French army was heralded by the thunder of friendly
guns.

The Belgian army was thus withdrawn from the River Gethe to hold
Aerschot on its left stubbornly through August 14, 1914. Diest, St.
Trond, and Waremme fell before the German tidal wave without resistance.
Von Kluck's main army endeavored to sweep around the Belgian right at
Wavre, but was checked for a brief space.




CHAPTER IV

CAPTURE OF LOUVAIN--SURRENDER OF BRUSSELS


During August 17, 1914, the German center was hurled forward in
irresistible strength. The citizens of the villages in its path fled
precipitously along the roads to Brussels. At intersections all kinds of
vehicles bearing household effects, together with live stock, blocked
the way to safety. The uhlan had become a terror, but not without some
provocation. Tirlemont was bombarded, reduced, and evacuated by the
Belgian troops. The latter made a vigorous defensive immediately before
Louvain, but their weakness in artillery and numbers could not withstand
the overwhelming superiority of the Germans. They were thrust back from
the valley of the Dyle to begin their retreat on Antwerp, chiefly by way
of Malines. This was to elude a successful German envelopment on their
Louvain right. They retired in good order, but their losses had been
considerable.

This body was the Belgian right wing, which fell back to take up a
position before Louvain. Here it fought a well-sustained action on
August 19, 1914, the purpose of which was to cover the retreat of the
main army by way of Malines on Antwerp. The Belgian right wing thus
became a rear guard.

It withstood the German attack until the early morning of August 20,
1914, when, separated from the main body, the overpowering number of
German guns and men drove it back to a final stand between Louvain and
Brussels. If its losses had been heavy, the carrying away of the wounded
proved that it still maintained a fighting front. The retreat of the
main army on Antwerp was part of Brialmont's plan for the defense of
Belgium, since the position of Brussels was not capable of a strong
defense. By this time the main army was safely passing down the valley
of the Dyle to the shelter of the Antwerp forts, leaving the right wing
to its fate. Louvain thus fell to the Germans.

Toward noon of August 20, 1914, the burgomaster and four sheriffs
awaited at one of the city gates, the first German appearance. This
proved to be a party of hussars bearing a white flag. They conducted the
burgomaster to the waiting generals at the head of the advance column.
In token of surrender the burgomaster was requested to remove his scarf
of office, displaying the Belgian national colors. The German terms were
then pronounced. A free passage of troops through the city was to be
granted, and 3,000 men garrisoned in its barracks. In return, cash was
to be paid for all supplies requisitioned, and a guarantee given for the
lives and property of the inhabitants. The Germans further agreed to
maintain the established civil power, but warned that hostile acts by
civilians would be severely punished. These terms were in general in
conformity with the rules of war governing the military occupation of an
enemy city. The Germans put forward the claim that the hostile act of
any civilian places him in the same position as a spy, to be punished by
death.

The Germans entered Louvain with bands playing, and singing in a great
swelling chorus: "Die Wacht am Rhein" and "Hail to the War Lord." They
marched to quick time, but in passing through the great square of the
Gare du Nord broke into the parade goose step. In the van were such
famous regiments as the Death's Head and Zeiten Hussars. The infantry
wore heavy boots, which, falling in unison, struck the earth with
resounding blows, to echo back from the house walls. Thus cavalry,
infantry, and artillery poured through Louvain in a gray-green surge of
hitherto unimagined military might. This, for the latter part of the
20th and the day following.

At first the citizens looked on from the sidewalks in a spellbound
silence. Scarcely one seemed to possess the incentive to breathe a
whisper. Only the babies and very small children regarded the
awe-inspiring spectacle as something provided by way of entertainment.
For the rest of the citizens it was dumbfounding beyond human
comprehension. Cavalry, infantry, and artillery rolled on unceasingly to
the clatter of horses' hoofs, the tramp of feet, the rumble of guns, and
that triumphant mighty chorus. There was nothing of aforetime plumed and
gold-laced splendor of war about it, but the modern Teutonic arms on
grim business bent. Except for a curious glance bestowed here and there,
the German troops marched with eyes front, and a precision as if being
reviewed by the emperor. A few shots were heard to stir instant terror
among the citizen onlookers, but these were between the German advance
guard and Belgian stragglers left behind in the city. Presently the side
streets became dangerous to pedestrians from onrushing automobiles
containing staff officers, and motor wagons of the military train.
General von Arnim, in command, ordered the hauling down of all allied
colors, but permitted the Belgian flag to remain flying above the Hotel
de Ville. He promptly issued a proclamation warning all citizens to
preserve the peace. It was both placarded and announced verbally. The
latter was performed by a minor city official, ringing a bell as he
passed through the streets accompanied by policemen.

Toward evening of August 20, 1914, the cafes and restaurants filled up
with hungry German officers and men; every hotel room was occupied, and
provision shops speedily sold out the stores on their shelves. The
Germans at first paid in cash for everything ordered, and preserved an
attitude of nonaggression toward the citizens. But subconsciously there
ran an undercurrent of dread insecurity. At the outset a German officer
was said to have been struck by a sniper's bullet. Somewhat
conspicuously the wounded officer was borne on a litter through the
streets, followed by the dead body of his assailant. Very promptly a
news curtain was drawn down around the city, cutting it off from all
information of the world without. Artillery fire was heard. Presumably
this came from the last stand of the Belgian rear guard in a valley of
the hilly country between Louvain and Brussels. With sustained optimism
to the end, rumor had it that the artillery fire was that of French and
British guns coming to the relief of Louvain. Toward nightfall one or
two groups of alleged snipers were brought in from the suburbs and
marched to the place of execution.

The feeling of a threatened calamity deepened. Another warning
proclamation was issued ordering all citizens to give up their arms.
Further, everyone was ordered to bed at eight o'clock, all windows were
to be closed and all doors unlocked. A burning lamp was to be placed in
each window. On the claim that German soldiers had been killed by
citizens, the burgomaster and several of the city officials were secured
as hostages. A stern proclamation was issued threatening with immediate
execution every citizen found with a weapon in his possession or house.
Every house from which a shot was fired would be burned.

This was on August 22, 1914. By the evening of that day the German army
had passed through Louvain, estimated to the number of 50,000 men. Only
the 3,000 garrison remained in the city. Outwardly, the citizens resumed
their usual daily affairs as if with a sense of relief, but whispers
dropped now and then revealed an abiding terror beneath. Some time
during the next day or two the anticipated calamity fell upon Louvain.
The Germans without any proof insisted that sniping was going on, and
the military authorities seized this pretext to put into force their
threatened reprisal. The torch was thrown into convicted houses. Larger
groups of citizens were led to execution. Thereupon the "brute" passion
dormant in soldiers broke the bonds of discipline. Flames burst forth
everywhere. Beneath the lurid glow cast upon the sky above Louvain whole
streets stood out in blackened ruin, and those architectural treasures
of the Halles and the University, with its famous library, were
destroyed beyond hope of repair. Only the walls of St. Peter's Church,
containing many priceless paintings, remained.

Meanwhile, on the morning of August 20, 1914, the German army had swept
away the comparatively small Belgian rear-guard force before Brussels,
and advanced upon the capital. On the previous 17th the King of the
Belgians removed his Government to Antwerp. The diplomatic corps
followed. Mr. Brand Whitlock, the American Minister, however, remained.
In his capacity as a neutral he had assisted stranded Germans in
Brussels from hasty official and mob peril. He stayed to perform a
similar service for the Belgians and Allies. His success in these
efforts won for him German respect and the gratitude of the whole
Belgian nation.

A lingering plan for defending Brussels by throwing up barricades and
constructing wire entanglements, to be manned by the Civic Guard, was
abandoned in the face of wiser counsel. It would merely have resulted in
a bombardment, with needless destruction of life and property. Brussels
was defenseless.

In flight before the German host, refugees of all classes were streaming
into Brussels--young and old, rich and poor, priest and layman. Nearly
all bore some burden of household treasure, many some pathetically
absurd family heirloom. Every kind of vehicle appeared to have been
called into use, from smart carriages drawn by heavy Flemish horses to
little carts harnessed to dogs. Over all reigned a stupefied silence,
broken only by shuffling footfalls. Among them the absence of
automobiles and light horses would indicate all such had been
commandeered by the Belgian military authorities. Their cavalry was
badly in need of good light-weight mounts. At crossroads passage to
imagined safety was blocked by farm live stock driven by bewildered
peasants.

On Thursday morning, August 20, 1914, the burgomaster motored forth to
meet the Germans. His reception and the terms dictated by General von
Arnim were almost identically the same as at Louvain. The burgomaster
was perforce compelled to accept. The scene of the entry of the German
troops into Louvain was repeated at Brussels. There was the same
stolidly silent-packed gathering of onlookers on the sidewalks, the same
thundering triumphant march of the German host. Corps after corps,
probably of those who had fought at Liege, and subsequently passed
around the city on the grand sweep toward the French frontier. Moreover,
huge bodies of German troops were advancing up the valley of the Meuse
and through the woods of the Ardennes. As in Louvain, that night the
hotels, restaurants, cafes, and shops of Brussels were patronized by a
rush of trade which never before totaled such extent in a single day.
Bills of purchase were settled by the Germans in cash. The city was
promptly assessed a war indemnity of $40,000,000.

With the fall of Brussels, the first objective of the Germans may be
said to have been gained. But the right wing of Von Kluck's army was
still operating northward upon Antwerp. The Belgian army had escaped him
within the circle of Antwerp's forts, so that he detailed a force deemed
to be sufficient to hold the enemy secure. Then he struck eastward
between Antwerp and Brussels at Alost, Ghent, and Bruges. In his advance
he swept several divisions of cavalry, also motor cars bearing machine
guns. Beyond Bruges his patrol caught their first glimpse of the North
Sea, drawing in toward another much-hoped-for goal on the English
Channel.

But the Belgian army within security of Antwerp had not been routed. It
had retreated in good order, thanks to the resistance of its right-wing
rear guard. General de Moranville promptly reenforced it with new
volunteers to the extent of some 125,000 men. In addition, he drew upon
a fresh supply of ammunition, and new artillery well horsed. His
cavalry, however, were certainly no better and probably worse than that
with which his army had been complemented originally.

On August 23, 1914, obtaining information that the Germans were in
considerably inferior force at Malines, the Belgians began a vigorous
counteroffensive. General de Moranville drove the Germans out of Malines
on the day following. That was in the nature of a master stroke, for it
gave the Belgians control of the shortest railway from Germany into West
Flanders. Further, since Von Kluck had reached Bruges, and
reenforcements under General von Boehn had passed across the Belgian
direct line on Brussels, the great German right wing was in danger of
being caught in a trap. Von Boehn, therefore, was hurriedly detached
rearward to deal with the Belgian counteroffensive. But this deprived
Von Kluck of his needed reenforcements to overcome 2,000 British marines
landed at Ostend, that, together with the Civic Guard, had beaten back
German patrols from the place. Had the British now landed an army at
Ostend, Von Kluck, between the Belgian and British forces, would have
been in serious danger of annihilation. With the German right wing thus
crumpled, the whole of their offensive would have broken down. But the
British did not come, and so the Belgians were left to fight it out
single handed. This fighting went on for three weeks, with accurate
details lacking. Mainly it was upon the line Aerschot-Dyle
Valley-Termonde, with Antwerp for the Belgian base.

On August 24, 1914, a German Zeppelin sailed over Antwerp and dropped a
number of bombs. The Belgians thrust their right wing forward and
recaptured Alost. They advanced their center to a siege of Cortenburg.
Malines seemed secure. To the Belgians this was a historic triumph.
Famous for its manufacture of lace under the name of Mechlin, almost
every street contained some relic of architectural interest. The
Cathedral of St. Rombaut, the seat of a cardinal archbishop, held upon
its walls some of Van Dyck's masterpieces. Margaret of Austria had held
court in its Palais de Justice.

In this emergency, Von Boehn was heavily reenforced with the Third Army
Corps, reserves from the south, and 15,000 sailors and marines. His army
was now between 250,000 and 300,000 men. This placed overwhelming odds
against the Belgians. But for four days they fought a stubborn battle at
Weerde.

This was from September 13 to 16, 1914, and resulted in the capture of
the Louvain-Malines railway by the Germans. The Belgians had now fought
to the extremity of what could be expected without aid from the Allies.
The sole action left for them was to fall back for a defense of Antwerp.
Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German offensive had completed its
task on Belgian soil.




CHAPTER V

COMING OF THE BRITISH


We now come to the arrival of the British on the Continent. In using the
term British, it is expressly intended to comprise the united forces of
the British Isles.

On August 3, 1914, the British Government practically gave up hope that
war with Germany could be avoided, though it would appear to have
lingered until the ultimatum to Germany to vacate Belgian soil remained
unanswered. On that day the army was mobilized at Aldershot.

On August 5, 1914, Lord Kitchener was recalled at the outset from a
journey to Egypt, and appointed Minister of War. No more fortunate
selection than this could have been made. Above all else, Lord
Kitchener's reputation had been won as an able transport officer. In the
emergency, as Minister of War, the responsibility for the transport of a
British army oversea rested in his hands. On August 5, 1914, the House
of Commons voted a credit of $100,000,000, and an increase of 500,000
men to the regular forces. Upon the same day preparations went forward
for the dispatch of an expeditionary army to France.

The decision to send the army to France, instead of direct to a landing
in Belgium, would seem to have been in response to an urgent French
entreaty that Great Britain mark visibly on French soil her unity with
that nation at the supreme crisis. For some days previously British
reluctance to enter the war while a gleam of hope remained to confine,
if not prevent, the European conflagration, had created a feeling of
disappointment in France.

The British expeditionary army consisted at first--that is previous to
the Battle of the Marne--of two and a half army corps, or five
divisions, thus distributed: First Corps, Sir Douglas Haig; Second
Corps, General Smith-Dorrien; Fourth Division of the Third Corps,
General Pulteney. The Sixth Division of the Third Corps and the Fourth
Corps under General Rawlinson were not sent to France till after the end
of September, 1914. It contained besides about one division and a half
of cavalry under General Allenby. A British division varies from 12,000
to 15,000 men (three infantry brigades of four regiments each; three
groups of artillery, each having three batteries of six pieces; two
companies of sappers, and one regiment of cavalry). The force totaled
some 75,000 men, with 259 guns. The whole was placed under the command
of Field Marshal Sir John French, with Lieutenant General Sir Archibald
Murray, Chief of Staff.

Field Marshal French was sixty-two and was two years younger than Lord
Kitchener. His responsibilities were great, how great no one at the
beginning of the war realized his capabilities for the developing scope
of the task untried, but as a serious and courageous officer he fully
merited the honors he had already won.

By August 7, 1914, Admiral Jellicoe was able to guarantee a safe passage
for the British army across the English Channel. A fortunate
mobilization of the British Grand Fleet in the North Sea for maneuvers
shut off the German Grand Fleet from raiding the Channel. There was
nothing to criticize in the manner in which the Expeditionary Army was
thrown into France. Its equipment was ready and in all details fully
worthy of German military organization. From arms to boots--the latter
not long since a scandal of shoddy workmanship--only the best material
and skill had been accepted. Its transport proved the genius of Lord
Kitchener in that brand of military service. The railways leading to the
ports of embarkation, together with passenger steamships--some of them
familiar in American ports--were commandeered as early as the 4th of
August.

During the night of August 7, 1914, train after train filled with troops
steamed toward Southampton, and some other south-coast ports.
Complements were also embarked at Dublin, Avonmouth, and the Bristol
Channel. In the middle of the night citizens of small towns along the
route were awakened by the unceasing rumble of trains. They had no
conception of its import. They did not even realize that war had
actually burst upon the serenity of their peaceful lives. Each transport
vessel was placed in command of a naval officer, and guarded in its
passage across the channel by light cruisers and torpedo destroyers. The
transport of the whole Expeditionary Army was completed within ten days,
without the loss of a man and with a precision worthy of all military
commendation. But such secrecy was maintained that the British public
remained in ignorance of its passage until successfully accomplished.
American correspondents, however, were not yet strictly censored, so
that their papers published news of it on August 9.

On Sunday, August 9, 1914, two British transports were observed making
for the harbor of Boulogne. The weather was all that could be wished,
the crossing resembled a bank-holiday excursion. For some days
previously the French had taken a gloomy view of British support. But
French fishermen returning from Scotland and English ports maintained
confidence, for had not British fishermen told them the French would
never be abandoned to fall a prey to the enemy.

When the two advance British transports steamed into view, "Les
Anglais," at last everyone cried. At once a hugely joyful reversion of
feeling. The landing of the British soldiers was made a popular ovation.
Their appearance, soldierly bearing, their gentleness toward women and
children, their care of the horses were showered with heartfelt French
compliments. Especially the Scotch Highlanders, after their cautious
fashion, wondered at the exuberance of their welcome. For the brave
Irish, was not Marshal MacMahon of near-Irish descent and the first
president of the Third Republic? The Irish alone would save that
republic. Women begged for the regimental badges to pin on their
breasts. In turn they offered delicacies of all kinds to the soldiers.
For the first time in a hundred years the British uniform was seen on
French soil. Then it represented an enemy, now a comrade in arms. The
bond of union was sealed at a midnight military mass, celebrated by
English-speaking priests, for British and French Catholic soldiers at
Camp Malbrouch round the Colonne de la Grande Armee. The two names
recalled the greatest of British and French victories--Blenheim,
Ramillies, and Oudenarde, Ulm, Austerlitz, and Jena.

Meanwhile, officers of the French General Staff had journeyed to London
to confer with the British General Staff regarding the camping and
alignment of the British troops. Meanwhile, also, the British reserves
and territorials were called to the colors. The latter comprised the
militia, infantry and artillery, and the volunteer yeomanry cavalry,
infantry and artillery. The militia was the oldest British military
force, officered to a great extent by retired regular army men, its
permanent staffs of noncommissioned officers were from the regular army,
and it was under the direct control of the Secretary of State for War.
The volunteer infantry, artillery, and yeomanry cavalry were on a
somewhat different basis, more nearly resembling the American militia,
but the British militia were linked with regular-line battalions. The
reserves, militia and volunteers, added approximately 350,000
well-trained men for immediate home defense.

On Sunday, August 17, 1914, it was officially announced that the whole
of the British Expeditionary Army had landed in France. Conferences
between the British and French General Staffs resulted in the British
army being concentrated first at Amiens. From that point it was to
advance into position as the left wing of the united French and British
armies, though controlled by their separate commanders.

The French Fifth Army had already moved to hold the line of the River
Sambre, with its right in touch with Namur. Cavalry patrols had been
thrown forward to Ligny and Gembloux, where they skirmished with uhlans.
Charleroi was made French headquarters. It was the center of extensive
coal-mining and steel industry. Pit shafts and blast furnaces dominated
the landscape. Historically it was the ground over which Bluecher's
Fourth Army Corps marched to the support of the British at Waterloo. Now
the British were supporting the French upon it against their former
ally.

On Thursday, August 20, 1914, the British took up their position on the
French left. Their line ran from Binche to Mons, then within the French
frontier stretched westward to Conde. From Mons to Conde it followed the
line of the canal, thus occupying an already constructed barrier.
Formerly Conde was regarded as a fortress of formidable strength, but
its position was not held to be of value in modern strategy. Its forts,
therefore, had been dismantled of guns, and its works permitted to fall
into disuse. But the fortress of Maubeuge lay immediately in rear of the
British line. In rear again General Sordet held a French cavalry corps
for flank actions. In front, across the Belgian frontier, General
d'Amade lay with a French brigade at Tournai as an outpost.

Before proceeding to British headquarters, General French held a
conference with General Joffre, Commander in Chief of all the French
armies. Until the outbreak of the war, General Joffre was practically
unknown to the French people. He was no popular military idol, no
boulevard dashing figure. But he had seen active service with credit,
and had climbed, step by step, with persevering study of military
science into the council of the French General Staff. As a strategist
his qualities came to be recognized as paramount in that body. A few
years previously he had been intrusted with the reorganization of the
French army, and his plans accepted. Therefore, when war with Germany
became a certainty, it was natural the supreme command of the French
army should fall to General Joffre.




CHAPTER VI

CAMPAIGNS IN ALSACE AND LORRAINE


The French staff apparently had designed a campaign in Upper Alsace and
the Vosges, but the throwing of a brigade from Belfort across the
frontier on the extreme right of their line on August 6 would seem to
have been undertaken chiefly with a view of rousing patriotic
enthusiasm. French aeroplane scouts had brought in the intelligence that
only small bodies of German troops occupied the left bank of the Rhine.
Therefore the opportunity was presented to invade the upper part of the
lost province of Alsace--a dramatic blow calculated to arouse the French
patriotic spirit. Since the Germans had expended hardly any effort in
its defense, leaving, as it were an open door, it may have been part of
the strategic idea of their General Staff to draw a French army into
that region, with the design of inflicting a crushing defeat. Thus
French resistance in the southern Vosges would have been weakened, the
capture of Belfort, unsupported by its field army, a probability, and a
drive beyond into France by the German forces concentrated at
Neubreisach made triumphant. Doubtless the French General Staff fully
grasped the German intention, but considered a nibble at the alluring
German bait of some value for its sentimental effect upon the French and
Alsatians. Otherwise the invasion of Upper Alsace with a brigade was
doomed at the outset to win no military advantage.

On August 7, 1914, the French dispersed a German outpost intrenched
before Altkirch. Some cavalry skirmishing followed, which resulted in
the French gaining possession of the city. As was to be expected, the
citizens of Altkirch welcomed the French with enthusiasm. The following
morning the French were permitted an uncontested advance to Muelhausen.
That such an important manufacturing center as Muelhausen should have
remained unfortified within striking distance of the French frontier,
that the French entered it without being compelled to fire a shot, was a
surprise to every one with the probable exception of the German and
French General Staffs.

The citizens of Muelhausen repeated the joyous ovation bestowed on the
French troops in Altkirch. The French uniform was hailed as the visible
sign of deliverance from German dominion, and the restoration of the
lost province to their kindred of the neighboring republic. The climax
of this ebullition was reached in a proclamation issued by direction of
General Joffre. "People of Alsace," it ran, "after forty years of weary
waiting, French soldiers again tread the soil of your native country.
They are the pioneers in the great work of redemption. What emotion and
what pride for them! To complete the work they are ready to sacrifice
their lives. The French nation with one heart spurs them forward, and on
the folds of their flag are inscribed the magical names Liberty and
Right. Long live France! Long live Alsace!"

During August 8, 1914, some intermittent fighting went on in the
vicinity of Muelhausen, which seems to have given the French general in
command the impression that the Germans were not eager for a
counterattack. In turn the Germans may well have been puzzled that a
French brigade instead of an army was thrown into Upper Alsace for the
bait of Muelhausen. Possibly they waited a little for the main body,
which did not come.

Sunday, August 9, 1914, revealed the Germans in such overpowering
strength, that the French were left no other choice than to beat a
hasty retreat. They accordingly fell back upon Altkirch, to intrench a
few miles beyond their own border. Thus ended the French initial
offensive. In military reckoning it achieved little of value.

Meanwhile in the Ardennes on August 13, 1914, the German Crown Prince,
commanding the Fourth Army, advanced from Luxemburg into the southern
Ardennes and captured Neufchateau. His further objective was to break
through the French line somewhere near the historic ground of Sedan. But
at this point some change in the German plan seems to have taken place.
From the maze enveloping the opening events of the war, one can only
conjecture a reason which would move such an irrevocable body as the
German General Staff to alter a long-fixed plan. Probably, then, the
unanticipated strength of Belgian resistance foreshadowed the summoning
of reenforcements to Von Kluck's right wing of the whole German army. We
have seen, in fact, how he came to be near a desperate need at Bruges,
and only the heavy reenforcement of Von Boehn enabled that general to
deliver a final defeat to the Belgian field army at Weerde. Whatever the
cause of change of plan may have been, important forces attached to or
intended for the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and the crown prince
were withdrawn to support the armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow. These
forces went to form a unit under General von Hausen, a veteran of
Sadowa. This change left the Saxon army of the crown prince with hardly
sufficient strength for a main attack on the French line at Sedan, but
still formidable enough to feel its way cautiously through the Ardennes
to test the French concentration on the central Meuse's west bank. When
the German right had finally settled Liege, the Saxon army could then
join in the united great movement on Paris.

Early on the morning of August 15, 1914, a French detachment of half an
infantry regiment, thrown into Dinant, was surprised by a mobile Saxon
advance force of cavalry, infantry and artillery. Dinant lies across the
Meuse eighteen miles south of Namur. It is a picturesque ancient town,
the haunt of artists and tourists. In the vicinity are the estates of
several wealthy Belgian families, particularly the thirteenth-century
chateau of Walzin, once the stronghold of the Comtes d'Ardennes. A
bridge crosses the Meuse at Dinant, which sits mainly on the east bank
within shadow of precipitous limestone cliffs. A stone fort more
imposing in appearance than modern effectiveness crowns the highest
cliff summit overlooking Dinant. The Germans came by way of the east
bank to occupy the suburbs. They presently captured the fort and hoisted
the German flag. Meanwhile the French took possession of the bridge,
being at a considerable disadvantage from German rifle fire from the
cliffs. The solid stone abutments of the bridge, however, enabled the
French to hold that position until strong reenforcements arrived early
in the afternoon. While French infantry cleared the environs of Germans,
their artillery bombarded the fort from the west bank. Their shells
played havoc with the old fort defenses, soon compelling its evacuation
by the Germans. One of the first French artillery shells blew into
shreds the German flag flying triumphantly over the fort, thus depriving
the French of the satisfaction of hauling it down. Toward evening the
Germans retreated toward the Lesse, followed by the French. In previous
wars the forces engaged were of sufficient strength to designate Dinant
a battle, but with the vast armies of the present conflict it sinks to
the military grade of a mere affair. However, it is called by the French
the Battle of Dinant.

The troops which entered Alsace on August 7, 1914, to the number of
18,000 to 20,000, belonged to the army of the frontier.

This first army, which was under the orders of General Dubail, was
intrusted with the mission of making a vigorous attack and of holding in
front of it the greatest possible number of German forces. The general
in command of this army had under his orders, if the detachment from
Alsace be included, five army corps and a division of cavalry. His
orders were to seek battle along the line Saarburg--Donon, in the Bruche
Valley, at the same time possessing himself of the crests of the Vosges
as well as the mountain passes. These operations were to have as their
theaters: (1) the Vosges Mountains, (2) the plateau of Lorraine to the
northwest of Donon, and (3) the left bank of the Meurthe. This left bank
of the Meurthe is separated from the valley of the Moselle by a
bristling <DW72> of firs, which is traversed by a series of passages, the
defiles of Chipotte, of the Croix Idoux, of the Haut Jacques d'Anozel,
of Vanemont, of Plafond. In these passes, when the French returned to
the offensive in September, 1914, furious combats took place. The German
forces opposed to this first army consisted of five active army corps
and a reserve corps.

The first French army, after a violent struggle, conquered the passes of
the Vosges, but the conquest was vigorously opposed and took more time
than the French had reckoned on. As soon as it had become master of the
Donon and the passes, the first French army pushed forward into the
defile of Saarburg. At St. Blaise it won the first German colors, took
Blamont and Cirey (August 15, 1914), seized the defiles north of the
canal of the Marne and the Rhine, and reached Saarburg. Here a
connection was established with the army of Lorraine, which had
commenced its operations on the 14th. A violent battle ensued, known
under the name of the Battle of Saarburg. The left wing of the French
army attacked August 19, 1914; it hurled itself at the fortified
positions, which were copiously fringed with heavy artillery. In spite
of the opposition it made progress to the northwest of Saarburg.

On the 20th the attack was renewed, but from the beginning it was
evident that it could not succeed and that the duty intrusted to the
Eighth Army Corps of opening up the way for the cavalry corps could not
be accomplished. This army corps had gone through a trying ordeal as a
result of the bombardment by the heavy German artillery established in
fortified positions, covering distances all measured in advance, with
every group and French battery presenting a sure target and the action
of the French cannon rendered useless.

If the left wing of the First Army found itself checked, the center and
the right on the other hand were in an excellent position and were able
to advance. But at this point (August 21, 1914) the Second French Army
the army of Lorraine met a serious reverse in the region of Morhange
and was compelled to retreat. This retreat left the flank of the First
Army gravely unprotected, and as a consequence this army was also
obliged to fall back. This rear-guard movement was accomplished over a
very difficult piece of country down to the Baccarat-Ban de
Sapt-Provenchere line, south of the Col du Bonhomme. It was found
necessary to abandon the Donon and the Col de Sapt.

The task committed to the Second Army, that of Lorraine under De
Castlenau, was to protect Nancy, then to transfer itself to the east,
advancing later to the north and attacking in a line parallel to that
taken by the First Army on the Dieuze-Chateau Salins front in the
general direction of Saarbruecken. Its mission was therefore at once both
offensive and defensive: to cover Nancy and continue toward the west the
attack of the First Army.

After having repulsed, August 10 and 11, 1914, the strong German attacks
in the region of Spincourt and of Chateau Salins the Second Army took
the offensive and went forward almost without stopping during four days
of uninterrupted fighting. Penetrating into Lorraine, which had been
annexed, it reached the right bank of the Selle, cut off Marsal and
Chateau Salins, and pushed forward in the direction of Morhange. The
enemy fell back; at Marsal he even left behind enormous quantities of
ammunition.

As a matter of fact, he fell back on positions that had been carefully
fortified in advance and whence his artillery could bombard at an almost
perfectly accurate range. August 20, 1914, made a violent counterattack
on the canal of Salines and Morhange in the Lake district. The immediate
vicinity of Metz furnished the German army with a vast quantity of heavy
artillery, which played a decisive role in the Battle of Morhange. The
French retreated, and during this rear-guard movement the frontier city
of Luneville was for some days occupied by the Germans.

Thus the First and Second Armies failed in their offensive and saw
themselves obliged to retreat, but their retreat was accomplished under
excellent circumstances, and the troops, after a couple of days of rest,
found themselves in a condition again to take the offensive. The First
Army gave energetic support to the Second Army, which was violently
attacked by the Germans in the second week of August. The German attack,
which was first arrayed against Nancy, turned more and more to the east.

The battle, at first waged in the Mortagne basin, was gradually extended
to the deep woods on the left bank of the Meurthe and on to Chipotte,
Nompatelize, etc. The battles that have been named the Battle of
Mortagne, the Battle of the Meurthe, the Battle of the Vosges, all waged
by the First Army, were extremely violent in the last week of August and
the first two weeks of September. These combats partly coincided with
the Battle of the Marne; they resulted, at the end of that battle, in
the German retreat. The Second Army renewed the offensive August 25,
1914; it decisively checked the march of the German army and commenced
to force it back.

The instructions issued to General de Castelnau directed him everywhere
to march forward and make direct attacks. The day of August 25, 1914,
was a successful day for the French; everywhere the Germans were
repulsed. From August 26 till September 2, 1914, the Second Army
continued its attacks.

At this point the commander in chief having need of important forces at
his center and at his right relieved the Second Army of much of its
strength. This did not prevent it from engaging in the great Battle of
Nancy and winning it. It was September 4, 1914, that this battle began
and it continued till the 11th, the army sustaining the incessant
assaults of the Germans on its entire front advanced from Grand
Couronne. The German emperor was personally present at this battle.
There was at Dieuze a regiment of white cuirassiers at whose head it was
his intention to make a triumphal entry into Nancy. Heavy German
artillery of every caliber made an enormous expenditure of ammunition;
on the Grand Mont d'Amance alone, one of the most important positions of
the Grand Couronne of Nancy, more than 30,000 howitzer shells were fired
in two days. The fights among the infantry were characterized on the
entire front by an alternation of failure and success, every point being
taken, lost and retaken at intervals.

The struggle attained to especial violence in the Champenoux Forest. On
September 5, 1914, the enemy won Maixe and Remereville, which they lost
again in the evening, but they were unable to dislodge the French from
the ridge east of the forest of Champenoux. The Mont d'Amance was
violently bombarded; a German brigade marched on Pont-a-Mousson. The
French retook Crevic and the Crevic Wood.

On the 7th the Germans directed on Ste. Genevieve, north of the Grand
Couronne, a very violent attack, which miscarried. Ste. Genevieve was
lost for a time, but it was retaken on the 8th; more than 2,000 Germans
lay dead on the ground. The same day the enemy threw themselves
furiously on the east front, the Mont d'Amance, and La Neuvelotte. South
of the Champenoux Forest the French were compelled to retire; they were
thrown back on the ridge west of the forest. On the 9th a new
bombardment of Mont d'Amance, a struggle of extreme violence, took place
on the ridge west of the forest of Champenoux, the French gaining
ground. General Castelnau decided to take the direct offensive, the
Germans giving signs of great fatigue. On the 12th they retired very
rapidly. They evacuated Luneville, a frontier town, where they left a
great quantity of arms and ammunition. The French began immediately to
pursue them, the Germans withdrawing everywhere over the frontier.




CHAPTER VII

SIEGE AND FALL OF NAMUR


When the Germans occupied Brussels on August 20, 1914, we observed that
corps after corps did not enter the city, but swept to the south. This
was Von Kluck's left wing moving to attack the Allies on the Sambre-Mons
front. The forces which passed through Brussels were Von Kluck's
center, advancing south by east to fall in line beside the right wing,
which had mainly passed between Brussels and Antwerp to the capture of
Bruges and Ghent. The whole line when re-formed on the French frontier
would stretch from Mons to the English Channel--the great right wing of
the German armies.

Meanwhile, Von Buelow's second army had advanced up the valley of the
Meuse, with its right sweeping the Hisbaye uplands. Some part of this
army may have been transported by rail from Montmedy. Its general
advance in columns was directed chiefly upon the Sambre crossings. As
Von Kluck's wide swing through Belgium covered a greater distance, Von
Buelow's army was expected to strike the Allies some twenty-four hours
earlier. Its march, therefore, was in the nature of an onrush.

But Von Buelow was now in the full tide of fighting strength--an amazing
spectacle to chance or enforced witnesses. Well may the terrified
peasants have stood hat in hand in the midst of their ruined villages.
Any door not left open was immediately broken down and the interior
searched. Here and there a soldier could be seen carrying a souvenir
from some wrecked chateau. But for the most part everyone fled from
before its path, leaving it silent and abandoned. The field gray-green
uniforms were almost invisible in cover, in a half light, or when
advancing through mist. No conceivable detail seemed to have been
overlooked. Each man carried a complete equipment down to handy trifles,
the whole weighed to the fraction of an ounce, in carefully estimated
proportions.

But this was not enough. Waiting for each column to pass were men with
buckets of drinking water, into which the soldiers dipped their aluminum
cups. Temporary field post offices were established in advance, so that
messages could be gathered in as the columns passed. Here and there were
men to offer biscuits and handfuls of prunes. In methodical,
machine-like progress came the ammunition wagons, commissariat carts,
field kitchens, teams of heavy horses attached to pontoons, traction
engines hauling enormous siege guns, motor plows for excavating
trenches, aeroplanes, carriages containing surgeons, automobiles for
the commanders, and motor busses in which staff officers could be seen
studying their maps. On some of these vehicles were chalked
Berlin-Paris. No branch of the service was absent, no serviceable part
if it overlooked--not even a complement of grave diggers. It moved
forward always at an even pace, as if on parade, with prearranged
signals passed down the line when there was any obstacle, a descent or
bend in the road.

The tramp of many thousands cast into the atmosphere clouds of fine
dust, but even those in rear marched through it as if their lungs were
made of steel. No permission was granted to open out for the circulation
of air, though it was the month of August. It is safe to assert there
was not a single straggler in Von Buelow's army. At the first sign of it
he was admonished with a vigor to deter his comrades. Discipline was
severely maintained. At every halt the click of heels, and rattle of
arms in salute went on down the line with the sharp delivery of orders.

On Wednesday, August 12, 1914, the town of Huy, situated midway between
Liege and Namur, was seized. It possessed an old citadel, but it was
disarmed, and used now only as a storehouse. Some Belgian detachments
offered a slight resistance at the bridge, but were speedily driven off.
The capture of Huy gave the Germans control of the railway from
Aix-la-Chapelle to France, though broken at Liege by the still standing
northern forts. But they secured a branch line of more immediate
service, running from Huy into Central Belgium.

On August 15, 1914, Von Buelow's vanguard came within sight of Namur.
Before evening German guns were hurling shells upon its forts. Began
then the siege of Namur. Namur, being the second fortress hope of the
Allies--the pivot upon which General Joffre had planned to swing his
army into Belgium in a sweeping attack upon the advancing Germans--a
brief survey of the city and fortifications will be necessary. The
situation of the city is not as imposing as that of Liege. For the most
part it sits on a hillside declivity, to rest in the angle formed by the
junction of the Sambre and Meuse. It is a place of some historic and
industrial importance, though in the latter respect not so well known as
Liege. To the west, however, up the valley of the Sambre, the country
presents the usual features of a mining region--pit shafts, tall
chimneys issuing clouds of black smoke, and huge piles of unsightly
debris. While away to the north stretches the great plain of Central
Belgium, southward the Central Meuse offers a more picturesque prospect
in wooded <DW72>s rising to view-commanding hilltops. Directly east, the
Meuse flows into the precipitous cut on its way to Liege.

But in Belgian eyes the fame of Namur lay to a great extent in its being
the second of Brialmont's fortress masterpieces. Its plan was that of
Liege--a ring of outer detached forts, constructed on the same
armor-clad cupola principle. At Namur these were nine in number, four
major forts and five _fortins_. The distance between each fort was on
the average two and a half miles, with between two and a half to five
miles from the city as the center of the circumference.

Facing Von Buelow's advance, fort Cognelee protected the Brussels
railway, while the guns of Marchovelette swept the space between it and
the left bank of the Meuse. In the southwest angle formed by the Meuse,
forts Maizeret, Andoy and Dave continued the ring. Again in the angle of
the Sambre and Meuse forts St. Heribert and Malonne protected the city.
North of the Sambre, forts Suarlee and Emines completed the circle.

In the emergency Namur possessed one advantage over Liege. The
resistance of Liege gave Namur due warning of the German invasion, and
some days to prepare for attack. General Michel was in command of the
garrison of Namur, which comprised from 25,000 to 30,000 men. Doubtless
reports had come to him of the situation at Liege. He immediately set to
work to overcome the cause of the failure of Brialmont's plan at Liege,
by constructing trenches between the forts, protected by barbed wire
entanglements, and mines in advance of the German approach. As his
circumference of defense was less than that of Liege, his force promised
to be capable of a more prolonged resistance.

Besides the Allies were close at hand. Only eighteen miles separated
him from strong detachments of French infantry and artillery at Dinant.
As we have seen French cavalry had been thrown forward as far as
Gembloux on the road to Brussels, but ten miles to the northeast of
Namur. Somewhere between that place and Charleroi French Chasseurs
d'Afrique had advanced to occupy outpost positions. His position
appeared by no means hopeless--considerably better than the unsupported
field army at Liege. The armor of his forts was calculated to withstand
the 36-lb. shells of the heaviest German fieldpieces, but comparatively
slight damage was anticipated from the known heavier howitzers. If the
Germans purposed to assault Namur in mass formation, as they had done at
Liege, General Michel had every reason to feel confident he could
repulse them with tremendous losses.

But the Germans had learned a severely taught lesson at Liege. They had
no intention of repeating those tactics. Behind a remarkable screen of
secrecy, they managed to conceal from General Michel--as they did from
the Allies--the existence of their enormous siege guns. Whether they
brought into action at Namur their famous 42-centimeters, capable of
throwing a shell of high explosive power weighing 2,500 lbs., is
uncertain. In fact, it is still doubtful where they were first fired at
the allied enemy. Two are said to have assisted in the final destruction
of the northern forts of Liege, and two were seen rolling over the field
of Waterloo. The Germans remained silent upon the subject, and nothing
definite about their first discharge was disclosed. But unquestionably
their fire was capable of demolishing into ruin any fort on earth within
a short period. It is certain, however, the Germans brought against
Namur their 28-centimeter guns, and probably some of 21-centimeter
caliber. These artillery weapons were quite formidable enough to reduce
the Namur forts. The former threw a shell of 750 pounds from a range of
three miles--beyond the reach of the Namur guns. The latter projected
shells of 250 pounds. The Germans are said to have employed thirty-two
of the heavier caliber guns, and a large number of 21-centimeter.

Thus Namur was doomed before the bombardment commenced. Von Buelow's
left wing advanced up the Meuse north bank from Huy, some part of it
crossing to the south bank at Ardenne, where it came in touch with the
Saxon army.

At sundown of August 20, 1914, Von Buelow was in position before Namur,
three miles from its defenses. Darkness fell upon a hot and sultry
August atmosphere. Presently the flashes and boom of the German guns
began a bombardment of the trenches between forts Cognelee and
Marchovelette. It continued through the night. But the Belgian fortress
guns were outranged. It would have been a mere waste of ammunition to
reply. Neither could the Belgian infantry venture on a counterattack,
for the Germans were clearly observed in overwhelming strength. At the
outset the Germans devoted their efforts to clearing the trenches of the
Belgian infantry, leaving the forts for subsequent demolition. The
unfortunate Belgian infantry, therefore, could do nothing but fire
intermittent rifle volleys, without any effect upon the Germans. They
bravely bore this storm of shells for ten hours. Not a man who lifted
his head above the German machine gun-swept parapets but was not
instantly killed or wounded. Thus the majority of the officers were
killed, and the ranks within the trenches decimated.

Toward morning on August 21, 1914, the Belgians could stand the tornado
of death no longer. The demoralized troops fled from the trenches,
leaving the gap between forts Cognelee and Marchovelette open. The
Germans then opened fire on the forts. In comparison with the new German
siege howitzers, the old-fashioned Belgian guns proved to be weak
weapons. The tremendous pounding of the German shells not only smashed
the fort cupolas, and crumpled into ruin the interior stone and steel
protective armor, but quickly put the Belgian guns out of action. Thus
while fort Maizeret received some 1,200 German shells at the speed of
twenty to the minute, it was able to reply with only ten shots. Forts
Marchovelette and Maizeret were the first to fall. Seventy-five men of
the Marchovelette garrison were found dead amid its ruins--nearly its
total complement.

[Illustration: French Invasion of Alsace-lorraine.]

Early on Friday morning of August 21, 1914, forts Andoy, Dave, St.
Heribert and Malonne were subjected to a similar furious bombardment.
After three hours of the cannonade Andoy, Dave and St. Heribert
surrendered. During the morning the Germans thrust a force into the
southern angle of the Sambre and Meuse. Here the Belgian infantry
offered a vigorous resistance. It was hoped that the French at Dinant
would hasten to their relief. But Dinant was for the second time within
a few days the scene of conflict. Some 6,000 French Turcos and artillery
did arrive, but too late to be of use in helping to save Namur. Shells
now began to drop in the city while aeroplanes flung down bombs. A
thunderstorm rumbled in combination with the continuous roar of the
German guns. A panic took hold of the citizens. Distracted men, women
and children huddled together in spellbound terror, or sought the
shelter of their cellars. The more superstitious pronounced this to be
the end of all things, from the eclipse of the sun which darkened the
sky. Fort Malonne succumbed sometime during the afternoon of August 21,
1914.

As at Liege, with General Leman, so in Namur General Michel foresaw the
city and forts' fate was imminent. Only the northwest forts Suarlee,
Emines and Cognelee held out. The Belgians and French had been defeated
by the Germans in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse. The horizon
revealed no sign of a French army advancing. General Michel, therefore,
decided upon the evacuation of the city by the Belgian infantry. It was
successfully accomplished, though even more in the nature of a flight
than at Liege. But General Michel went with them, instead of remaining,
like General Leman, to fight the defense of his fortress to the last.

The retreating Belgians on August 22, 1914, had some adventurous
wandering before them. They had first to cut their way through a body of
German troops, then to become involved with a French force near
Charleroi. It took them seven days to reach Rouen by way of Amiens.
There they were embarked for sea transport to Ostend. At Ostend, they
joined the main Belgian army after its retreat from Antwerp.

On Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, the Germans began the bombardment of
Fort Suarlee. This fort repeated the heroic resistance of Fort
Boncelles at Liege. It held out until the afternoon of August 25. It was
apparently then blown up by the explosion of its own magazine, thus
again repeating the end of Fort Loncin at Liege. Meantime the Germans
had succeeded in reducing Forts Cognelee and Emines.

The Germans entered Namur on the afternoon of August 23, 1914. There
seems to have been some oversight in the plan, for the advance guard
found themselves under fire of their own guns directed upon the citadel
and the Grande Place. This, however, was speedily rectified. Their
behavior was much the same as at Louvain and Brussels. They marched in
with bands playing and singing patriotic songs. Proclamations were at
once issued warning the citizens not to commit any hostile act. The
inhabitants were far too cowed to contemplate anything but submission.
Good discipline was preserved. The city took fire that night probably by
deliberate design of the invaders. The citizens were induced to come
forth from their cellars and hiding places to reopen the cafes and
shops.

General von Buelow entered Namur on Monday morning August 24, 1914. He
was accompanied by Field Marshal Baron von der Goltz, recently appointed
Governor General of Belgium. Previous to the former Balkan War he had
been employed in reorganizing the Turkish army. An onlooker in Namur
thus describes the German Field Marshal:--"An elderly gentleman covered
with orders, buttoned in an overcoat up to his nose, above which gleamed
a pair of enormous spectacles."

General Michel attributed his defeat to the German siege guns. The fire
was so continuous upon the trenches that it was impossible to hold them,
and the forts simply crumpled under the storm of shells. But back of
General Michel's plea the allied Intelligence Departments lacked
efficiency or energy, or both, in not gaining more than a hint, at any
rate, of the enormous German siege guns until they were actually
thundering at the gates.




CHAPTER VIII

BATTLE OF CHARLEROI


Toward the end of the third week of August, 1914, the atmosphere of
every European capital became tense with the realization that a
momentous crisis was impending. It was known that the French-British
armies confronted German armies of equal, if not of superior strength.
In Paris and London the military critics wrote optimistically that the
Germans were marching into a trap.

The British army had arrived at the front in splendid fighting trim. It
was difficult to restrain the impetuous valor of the French soldiers.
The skies were bright and there was confidence that the Germans would
unquestionably meet with a crushing defeat. Let us glance at the line of
the French and British armies stretched along the Belgian frontier. It
ran from within touch of Namur up the right bank of the Sambre, through
Charleroi to Binche and Mons, thence by way of the coal barge canal just
within the French frontier to Conde. For the choice of a great battle
ground there was nothing particularly attractive about it in a military
sense.

There is evidence to show in an official communique from General Joffre
published on August 24, 1914, that it was intended to be merely the left
wing of a gigantic French battle offensive--on the adopted German
plan--from Conde to Belfort. "An army," runs the communique, "advancing
from the northern part of the Woevre and moving on Neufchateau is
attacking the German forces which have been going through the Duchy of
Luxemburg and are on the right bank of the Samoy. Another army from the
region of Sedan is traversing the Belgian Ardennes and attacking the
German forces marching between the Lesse and the Meuse. A third army
from the region of Chimay has attacked the German right between the
Sambre and the Meuse. It is supported by the English army from the
region of Mons."

These attacks comprised chiefly the battle of Dinant and cavalry
skirmishing, but the purpose of General Joffre was otherwise made plain
in throwing advance French troops across the Belgian frontier into Ligny
and Gembloux on the road to a recapture of Brussels. This we have
previously noted in another connection. The rout of the French army in
Lorraine, however, put an end to the grand Conde-Belfort offensive.

Thus the Namur-Conde line became a main defensive position instead of an
offensive left wing sweep through Belgium upon Germany. As such it was
well enough--if its pivot on the fortress of Namur held secure. Liege
had already proved its vulnerability, but it would seem that the French
General Staff joined with General Michel, the Commander of Namur, in
believing the Namur forts would give a better account. The French
General Staff were informed of the approximate strength of the advancing
armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow, and had nothing to fear from
inferiority in numbers. The staff never gave out the strength of their
forces, but there is reason for believing the great armies were nearly
equally matched after mobilization--about 1,200,000 men.

Let us now see what was developing in the Ardennes away to the French
right. It has been established that woods, particularly in summer, form
the best cover from the observation or attacks of airmen. The spreading,
leafy boughs are difficult to penetrate visually from a height of even a
few hundred feet, at least to obtain accurate information of what is
transpiring beneath.

French air scouts brought in correct information that they had seen the
armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince massed along the
southern Luxemburg and Belgian forest region. But under the foliage
there was another army unseen--that of General von Hausen. The French
moved their Fifth Army up to position on the line of the Sambre. They
advanced their Third Army, commanded by General Ruffey, upon Luxemburg,
and their Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary across the River
Semois to watch the Meuse left bank and gain touch with General
Lanzerac. General de Cary came from Sedan, throwing out detachments
upon the Meuse left bank. These operations were to confront the armies
of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince.

But the French apparently knew nothing of the movements of the army of
General von Hausen. Their air scouts either could not distinguish it
from the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and the crown prince, amid
the forest of the Ardennes, or they did not observe it at all. To the
army of General von Hausen there clings a good deal of mystery. When
last noted by us, previous to the minor battle of Dinant, it had been
formed by forces drawn from the armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and
crown prince. Ostensibly at that time, it was destined to support, as a
separate field force, the armies of Von Kluck and Von Buelow.

Possibly the Germans had begun to doubt how long Liege could hold out.
Von Kluck was compelled to mark time in his impetuous march on Central
Belgium. His losses had been heavy. Support in strength seemed urgent.
But this need passed as the Liege forts fell one after the other under
the fire of the German siege guns. General von Hausen was released for
action elsewhere. Thus we may assume, he was ordered to follow the
armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince down through the
Ardennes to strike the Meuse south of Namur. By this time he had been
substantially reenforced. Now under his command were the complete
Twelfth and Nineteenth Corps, and the Eleventh Reserve Corps. Also a
cavalry division of the Prussian Guard, with some other detachments of
cavalry. His Eleventh Reserve Corps were Hessians, the Twelfth and
Nineteenth Corps were Saxons. The latter two corps were regarded as
among the best in the German army. In the Franco-Prussian War they
fought with conspicuous bravery through every battle in which they were
engaged. They won the battle for Prussia at Gravelotte by turning the
French right and capturing St. Privat. They marched to Sedan under the
crown prince--subsequently the Emperor Frederick--to occupy the first
line in the hard fighting of the Givonne Valley. During the siege of
Paris they occupied a part of the German northern line, finally to march
in triumph into Paris. This infantry and cavalry of the Prussian Guard
stiffened Von Hausen's force into an army of battle strength.

We have thus two factors to bear in mind with regard to the French
defensive position at Charleroi--the resisting power of the Namur forts,
and the unknown, to the French, proximity of Von Hausen's army.

However substantial was the measure of reliance that the French General
Staff and General Michel placed on the Namur forts, evidently General
von Buelow regarded them as little more than passing targets for his
siege guns. He seemed to have made a comparatively simple mathematical
calculation of almost the number of shells necessary to fire, and the
hours to be consumed in reducing the Namur forts to masses of debris.

We can picture General von Buelow as he sat in the motor car with Marshal
von der Goltz--the old gentleman with an overcoat buttoned up to his
nose in August, and huge spectacles. Doubtless discussion ran mainly
upon the impending attack of their Second Army on the French right.
Emphasis would have been laid on the positions of the armies of the Duke
of Wuerttemberg and crown prince advancing away to their left upon the
forces of the French Generals Ruffey and de Cary. But there was
apparently a German gap here between Von Buelow's army and the armies of
the Duke of Wuerttemberg and crown prince, though we noticed previously
Von Buelow's army came in touch with Saxon troops half way between Huy
and Namur, when a detachment of Von Buelow's left wing was thrown across
the Meuse at Ardenne. This gap was faced by the French extreme right
resting on the southward Namur bend of the Meuse. It was possibly the
"trap" military critics of the moment foresaw for the Germans. Quite
likely the two German generals Von Buelow and Von der Goltz, chatting in
their motor car, referred to this gap, and it is hardly a stretch of
imagination to suggest a twinkle in the huge glasses of the old
gentleman in the August overcoat, when now and then the name of Von
Hausen was mentioned.

The German attack on the French right began early in the morning of
Friday, August 21, 1914. A party of German hussars crossed the Meuse,
rode through Charleroi, and trotted on toward the Sambre. At first they
were mistaken for a British cavalry patrol. Probably the populace in
Charleroi were not sufficiently familiar at that time with the British
hussar uniform to distinguish it from the German. In all armies hussar
uniforms bear a close resemblance. A French officer, however, presently
detected the situation. After a skirmish the German hussars were driven
off with the loss of a few killed and wounded. But the raid evidently
came out of the gap as a surprise to the French. The citizens were
promptly ordered to their homes. Barricades were raised in the streets,
and mitrailleuses were placed in sweeping positions. An artillery
engagement began at Jemappe, nine miles above Namur on the left bank of
the Sambre, between Von Buelow's vanguard and the main French right.
Later in the day Von Buelow's vanguard artillery had advanced to open
fire on Charleroi and Thuin, seven miles beyond.

On Saturday, August 22, 1914, Von Buelow attacked Charleroi in full
strength. As we have seen, he had already practically settled with
Namur. Their main assault on Saturday was delivered on the Sambre
bridges at Chatelet and Thuin, below and above Charleroi, respectively.
Sometime on Saturday they succeeded in crossing to turn Charleroi into
one of the most frightful street battle grounds in history. The conflict
raged for the possession of iron foundries, glass works, and other
factories. The thoroughfares were swept by storms of machine-gun fire.
Tall chimneys toppled over and crashed to the ground, burying defenders
grouped near under piles of debris. Desperate hand-to-hand encounters
took place in workshops, electric-power stations, and manufacturing
plants. The normal whir of machinery, now silent, was succeeded by the
crack and spitting of continuous rifle fire.

The French-Turco and Zouave troops fought with savage ferocity, with
gleaming eyes, using bayonets and knives to contest alleys and
passageways. House doors were battered in to reach those firing from
upper windows. Roofs and yard walls were scaled in chase of fleeing
parties. The Germans were driven out of Charleroi several times, only to
return in stronger force. Similarly with the French. With each change
of victors, the losing side turned to bombard with a torrent of
artillery shells the war-engulfed city.

At nightfall on August 22, 1914, Charleroi burst into flames. A dread
and significant glow fell upon the sky. Absent were the usual
intermittent flare of blast furnaces. The greater part of Charleroi had
become a heap of ruins. Those of its citizens still alive cowered in
holes or corners for shelter.

The battle of Charleroi went on throughout the night. Early on the
morning of Sunday, August 23, 1914, Von Hausen swept down through the
gap between the armies of Von Buelow and the Duke of Wuerttemberg. He
crossed the Meuse, drove from before him the French detachments watching
it, and advanced to attack the rear of the French right.

Von Hausen took the French at Charleroi completely by surprise. At the
moment they could comprehend neither where he came from nor the measure
of his strength. But he was in army force.

The French were compelled to withdraw their right from Charleroi. Von
Hausen seized the advantage to hurl his forces upon their rear, while
Von Buelow thundered in assault more vigorously than ever on the French
front. A powerful force was hurled upon them from an unexpected
direction. Presently the retreat of the French Fifth Army was threatened
by the two Saxon corps of Von Hausen's army, pressing on the French
right flank and rear. In this emergency the retirement of the French
Fifth Army appears to have been undertaken with spontaneous realization
of utmost danger. It gave way before the attacks of Von Buelow and Von
Hausen to move southward, leaving their British left wing without
information of defeat.




CHAPTER IX

BATTLE OF MONS


On Friday, August 21, 1914, the British force began to take position on
the French left, forming the line Binche-Mons-Conde. When finally
concentrated it comprised the First and Second Army Corps, and General
Allenby's cavalry division. The regiments forming the cavalry division
were the Second Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, Fourth Hussars, Sixth
Dragoon Guards, with a contingent of the Household Guards. The First
Army Corps was given the right of the line from Binche to Mons. It was
commanded by Sir Douglas Haig. He was a cavalry officer like the
commander in chief, and a comparatively young man for such a
responsibility, but had seen active service with credit. His corps was
comprised of six guards' battalions. The First Black Watch, Second
Munster Fusiliers, The Royal Sussex, North Lancashire, Northamptons,
Second King's Royal Rifles, Third West Surreys, The South Wales
Borderers, Gloucesters, First Welsh Regiment, Highland Light Infantry,
Connaught Rangers, Liverpools, South Staffords, Berkshires, and First
King's Royal Rifles. The First Irish Guards went into action for the
first time in its history.

The second corps extended from Mons to Conde, commanded by Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien. General Dorrien was a west of England man, and turning
fifty-six. He had seen active service in the Zulu War, Egypt, Sudan, the
Chitral Relief Force, and Tirah campaign. He had occupied the positions
of adjutant general in India, commander of the Quetta division, and
commander in chief at Aldershot. He was recognized as a serious military
student, and possessing the approval and confidence of Lord Kitchener.
The Second Corps was composed of Royal Irish Rifles, Wiltshires, South
Lancashires, Worcesters, Gordons, Royal Scots, Royal Irish, Middlesex,
Royal Fusiliers, Northumberland Fusiliers, Royal Scots Fusiliers,
Lincolns, Yorkshire Light Infantry, West Kent, West Riding, Scottish
Borderers, Manchesters, Cornwalls, East Surreys, and Suffolks. To the
rear Count Gleichen commanded the Norfolks, Bedfords, Cheshires, and
Dorsets. On the left of the Second Corps was stationed General Allenby's
cavalry.

In passing we may note that the commander in chief of the British forces
was a cavalry officer, the commander of the First Army Corps a cavalry
officer, and that the cavalry was in comparatively ample force. Von
Mackensen of the German force came from that branch of the service.
Cavalry officers are excellent soldiers, but their training as such is
not promising for the command of modern armies, mainly of infantry and
artillery, with other complements. In war much has changed since
Waterloo, with the value of cavalry retreating into the background as
aeroplanes sweep to the front for scouting and other purposes.

From Binche to Conde the line assigned to the British was approximately
twenty-five miles. Their force totaled some 75,000 men with 259 guns.
General French, therefore, had 2,500 men to the mile of front. This was
an insufficient force, as the usual fighting front for a battalion of a
thousand men in defense or in attack is estimated in all armies at about
425 yards. The British brigade of four battalions (4,000 rifles) covers
a half-mile front. General French's Third Army Corps having been
utilized elsewhere, he was compelled to use his cavalry in four brigades
as reserve.

Previous to the German attack on Charleroi, General Joffre still held to
his plan of a left-wing attack, or rather a counterattack after the
Germans were beaten. But battles were commencing on other fronts,
properly belonging to the general retreat, which made its execution
doubtful even in an hour of victory. The capture of Charleroi, of
course, dissipated it as a dream. That General French realized the
superiority in numbers of Von Kluck's advancing army both in infantry
and artillery is nowhere suggested. His airmen had merely brought in the
information that the attack would be in "considerable force." The French
Intelligence Service were led to believe and informed the British
commander that Von Kluck was advancing upon him with only one corps, or
two at the most. Some of General French's cavalry scouting as far
toward Brussels as Soignes, during the 21st and 22d, confirmed it. But
the British proceeded to prepare for attack immediately on taking
position. They set to work digging trenches.

While continuing their defensive efforts through Saturday, August 22,
1914, there floated to them a distant rumble from the eastward. Opinions
differed as to whether it was the German guns bombarding Namur, or a
battle in progress on the Sambre. For the most part British officers and
men had but a vague idea of their position, or the progress of the
fighting in the vicinity. Even the headquarters staff remained
uninformed of the desperate situation developing on the French right at
Charleroi.

The headquarters of the British army was at Mons. It lies within what is
known as "le Borinage," that is the boring district of Belgium, the
coal-mining region. In certain physical aspects it much resembles the
same territory of Pennsylvania. Containing one or two larger towns such
as Charleroi and Mons, it is sprinkled over with villages gathered near
the coal pits. Everywhere trolley lines are to be seen running from the
mines to supply the main railways and barge canals.

Formerly the people were of a rough, ignorant and poverty toiling type,
but of late years have greatly improved with the introduction of
organized labor and education. Previous bad conditions, however, have
left their mark in a stunted and physically degenerate type of
descendants from the mining population of those times. In contrast to
later comers they resemble a race of dwarfs. The men seldom exceed four
feet eight inches in height, the women and children appear bloodless and
emaciated.

The output of the Borinage coal field exceeds twenty million tons a
year. Its ungainly features of shafts, chimneys, and mounds of debris
are relieved in places by woodlands, an appearance of a hilly country is
presented where the pit mounds have been planted with fir trees. Apart
from its mining aspect, Mons is a city of historic importance. It
contains a Gothic cathedral and town hall of medieval architectural
note. It also, cherishes a special yearly fete of its own on Trinity
Sunday, when in the parade of the Limacon, or snail, the spectacle of
St. George and the Dragon is presented. With great pride the citizens
of Mons showed the British soldiers of occupation an ancient cannon,
claimed to have been used by their forefathers as an ally of the English
at Crecy.

Especially east of Mons, toward Binche, the British line ran through
this district. Several of the greatest European battles have been fought
in its vicinity--Ramilles, Malplaquet, Jemappe, and Ligny.

The night of Saturday, August 22, 1914, passed peacefully for the
British soldiers, still working on their trenches. But distant boom of
guns from the east continued to vibrate to them at intervals. Of its
portend they knew nothing. Doubtless as they plied the shovel they again
speculated over it, wondering and possibly regretting a chance of their
having been deprived of the anticipated battle.

Sunday morning, August 23, 1914, dawned brightly with no sign of the
enemy. In Mons and the surrounding villages the workmen donned their
usual holiday attire, women stood about their doors chatting, children
played in the streets. Church bells rung as usual summoning to public
worship. General French gathered his generals for an early conference.
General Joffre's message on Saturday morning, assured General French of
victory, and positively informed him that Von Kluck was advancing upon
him with no more than one or two army corps. In testimony of it, General
French thus wrote a subsequent official dispatch.

"From information I received from French headquarters, I understood that
little more than one or at most two of the enemy's army corps, with
perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position, and I was
aware of no outflanking movement attempted by the enemy" (Von Hausen's
advance on the right). "I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that
my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitering
operations. The observations of my aeroplanes seemed also to bear out
this estimate."

To General French, therefore, his position seemed well secured. In the
light of it he awaited Von Kluck's attack with confidence. Toward
mid-day some German aeroplanes swept up above the woods in front, and
circled over the British line. British marksmen at once fired on the
bodies and hawklike wings of the intruders.

Some tense interest was roused among the men as British aeroplanes rose
to encounter the German aircraft. It was the first real battle of the
sky they had witnessed. General French's cavalry patrols now brought
information that the woods were thick with German troops, some of them
deploying eastward toward their right at Binche.

At twenty minutes to one the first shots swept from the woods upon the
British line. Presently, Von Kluck's main attack developed with great
rapidity. The German artillery was brought to the front edge of the
woods to hurl a storm of shells on the British trenches. It was returned
with equal vigor. But very soon it became apparent to British commanders
along the line that the German artillery fire was in far greater volume
than what might be expected from two army corps, whose normal complement
would be some 340 guns. Instead it was estimated 600 German guns were
shortly brought into action.

The battle field was described by the Germans as "an emptiness." The
term is intended to emphasize that the old martial display and pomp has
completely gone. A grand advance upon each other, with trumpets
sounding, banners fluttering, brilliant uniforms, and splendid cavalry
charges, was impossible with long range weapons hailing storms of
bullets and shells of devastating explosive power. Cover was the all
important immediate aim of both attack and defense. In this respect as
we have seen, the German gray-green uniform assisted by rendering them
almost invisible within shelter of such woods as those before Mons. On
the other hand, the brown khaki shade of the British field
uniforms--originally designed for the same purpose on the sandy wastes
of Egypt and Northern India--became conspicuous upon a green background.

As the battle of Mons developed, the British line of the Conde Canal was
swept with German shrapnel. German shells, also, began bursting in the
suburbs of Mons and in the near-by villages. Sir Douglas Haig's right
thus came under strong fire. German aeroplanes assisted by dropping
smoke bombs over the British positions to give the angle of range for
their artillery. Thereupon fights above took place between British and
German airmen, while the armies beneath thundered shot and shell upon
each other. The Germans came on in massed formation of attack. The
British were accustomed to attack in open extended line, and their
shooting from any available cover was generally excellent. They could
not understand the German attack in such close order that they were
mowed down in groups of hundreds.

The German infantry rifle fire, breaking from the shelter of the woods
to encounter a stronger British fire than was anticipated, was at first
ineffective. As to the mass formation they depended upon overwhelming
reserves to take the places of those dead piled in heaps before the
British trenches. It was General Grant's "food for powder" plan of
attack repeated.

Thus the battle raged upon the entire length of the British line, with
repeated advances and retreats on the part of the Germans. Now and then
the bodies almost reached the British trenches, and a breach seemed in
certain prospect. But the British sprang upon the invaders, bayonet in
hand, and drove them back to the shelter of the woods. The Irish
regiments, especially, were considered invincible in this "cold steel"
method of attack, their national impulsive ardor carrying them in a fury
through the ranks of an enemy. But at Mons always the Germans returned
in ever greater numbers. The artillery increased the terrible rain of
shells. Pen pictures by British soldiers vividly describe the battle
somewhat conflictingly.

"They were in solid square blocks, standing out sharply against the
skyline, and you couldn't help hitting them. It was like butting your
head against a stone wall.... They crept nearer and nearer, and then our
officers gave the word. A sheet of flame flickered along the line of
trenches and a stream of bullets tore through the advancing mass of
Germans. They seemed to stagger like a drunken man hit between the eyes,
after which they made a run for us.... Halfway across the open another
volley tore through their ranks, and by this time our artillery began
dropping shells around them. Then an officer gave an order and they
broke into open formation, rushing like mad toward the trenches on our
left. Some of our men continued the volley firing, but a few of our
crack shots were told off for independent firing.... They fell back in
confusion, and then lay down wherever cover was available. We gave them
no rest, and soon they were on the move again in flight.... This sort of
thing went on through the whole day."

From another view we gather that "We were in the trenches waiting for
them, but we didn't expect anything like the smashing blow that struck
us. All at once, so it seemed, the sky began to rain down bullets and
shells. At first they went wide ... but after a time ... they got our
range and then they fairly mopped us up.... I saw many a good comrade go
out."

During the early part of the battle Von Kluck directed his main attack
upon the British right, with a furious artillery bombardment of Binche
and Bray. This was coincident with the crumpling of the French right at
Charleroi by the army of Von Buelow, and its threatened retreat by that
of Von Hausen. The retirement of the French Fifth Army, therefore, left
General Haig exposed to a strong flank attack by Von Kluck. Confronted
with this danger, General Haig was compelled to withdraw his right to a
rise of ground southward of Bray. This movement left Mons the salient of
an angle between the First and Second British Army Corps. Shortly after
this movement was performed, General Hamilton, in command of Mons, found
himself in peril of converging German front and flank attacks. If the
Germans succeeded in breaking through the British line beyond Mons, he
would be cut off and surrounded. General Hamilton informed his superior,
General French, of this danger, and was advised in return "to be careful
not to keep the troops in the salient too long, but, if threatened
seriously to draw back the center behind Mons."

A little after General French had sent General Hamilton this warning, he
received a telegram from General Joffre which he describes as "a most
unexpected message." General Joffre's telegram conveyed the first news
to General French not only that the French Fifth Army had been defeated
and was in retreat--the first intimation even that the French right at
Charleroi under General Lanrezac was in peril--but that at least three
German army corps were attacking the British. Doubtless the German
smashing of General Joffre's planned grand counterattack, after the
Germans were to be beaten, was disheartening as well as a sore
disappointment.

General French possessed 75,000 men. It was now disclosed that in front
Von Kluck was hurling upon him 200,000 men, Von Buelow was hammering on
his right, Von Hausen in pursuit of the French threatened his rear,
while some 50,000 Germans were enveloping his left. He had no option but
to order a retreat.

Dealing with the combined action of the French and British in this
critical period a French military writer says:

"The French armies of the center--that is to say, the Third and Fourth
Armies--had as their mission the duty of attacking the German army in
Belgian Luxembourg, of attempting to put it to flight and of crumpling
it up against the left flank of the German main body at the north. This
offensive on the part of the French center began on August 21, 1914. The
Third Army (General Ruffey) followed from the east to the west the
course of the Semoy, a tributary on the right of the Meuse. The Fourth
Army operated between the Meuse and the Lesse. The Germans occupied the
plateau which extends from Neufchateau to Paliseul. It is uncertain
territory, covered with heaths and thick woods, and lends itself poorly
to the reconnaissance work of aviators or cavalry patrols. There are no
targets for the artillery. The Germans had strongly fortified the
ground. The infantry of the Fourth Army which hurled itself against
these positions was thrown back; still fighting it fell back over the
Meuse. The pursuit by the Germans was punctuated by strong
counterattacks, which inflicted great losses on them. The Third Army was
similarly checked in its march on Neufchateau by the superior forces of
the crown prince and was thrown back on the Semoy. Thus the offensive
actions undertaken by the armies of the French center miscarried. Not
only were they unable to lend their aid to the armies of the left, but
they saw themselves obliged to retreat.

"The situation could only be reestablished by a victory on the part of
the Fifth French Army operating in conjunction with the army of General
French. This army, however, found itself in the presence of German
forces of great strength, consisting of the crack corps of the German
army. On the 22d the Germans at the cost of considerable losses
succeeded in passing the Sambre, and General Lanrezac fell back on
Beaumont-Givet, being apprehensive of the danger which threatened his
right. On the 24th the British army retreated, in the face of a German
attack, on to the Maubeuge-Valenciennes line. It appeared at first that
the British had in front of them at most an army corps, with perhaps a
corps of cavalry. They were apprised, however, about five o'clock in the
evening that three army corps were advancing against them, while a
fourth was marching against their left along the road from Tournai in a
turning movement. General French effected his retreat during the night
behind the salient of Mons. Threatened on August 24 by the strength of
the whole German army, he fled backward in the direction of Maubeuge."




CHAPTER X

THE GREAT RETREAT BEGINS


The German hosts now stood at the gates of France. It was a mighty
spectacle. The soldiery of the Kaiser which had swept their way into
Belgium, there to meet the unexpected resistance of the defenders of
King Albert, had reached their goal--the French frontier.

About the middle of August, 1914, General Joffre, assigned to the
British Expeditionary Force, commanded by Sir John French, the task of
holding Mons against the powerful German advance. The British force
formed the left wing of the line of front that stretched for some two
hundred miles close to the Belgian frontier. Extending from Arras
through the colliery towns of Mons and Charleroi, the extreme western
front of the armies was held by General D'Amade at Arras, with about
40,000 reserve territorial troops; by General French, with 80,000
British regulars, at Mons; by the Fifth French Army of 200,000
first-line troops, under General Lanrezac, near Charleroi; and by a
force of 25,000 Belgian troops at Namur. The total Allied troops in this
field of battle were thus about 345,000 men.

Opposed to them, on the north, were about 700,000 German troops, General
von Kluck farthest to the west, Generals von Buelow and von Hausen around
the Belgian fortress of Namur, Grand Duke Albrecht of Wuerttemberg in the
neighborhood of Maubeuge, and finally, on the extreme left of the German
line, the Army of the Moselle, under Crown Prince Wilhelm.

The position of the Allied armies was based on the resisting power of
Namur. It was expected that Namur would delay the German advance as long
as Liege had done. Then the French line of frontier fortresses--Lille,
with its half-finished defenses; Maubeuge, with strong forts and a large
garrison; and other strongholds--would form a still more useful system
of fortified points for the Allies.

The German staff, however, had other plans. At Liege they had rashly
endeavored to storm a strong fortress by a massed infantry attack, which
had failed disastrously until their new Krupp siege guns had been
brought up. These quickly demolished the defenses. These siege guns,
therefore, which had thus fully demonstrated their value against
fortifications soon brought about the total defeat of the French
offensive, and compelled the Allies to retreat from Belgium and northern
France. The Germans lost no time in investing Namur, and on Saturday, as
noted above, August 22, 1914, the fortress fell into the invaders'
hands.

On the same day, August 22, 1914, the Fifth French Army, under the lead
of General Lanrezac, was enduring the double stress of Von Buelow's army
thundering against its front, and Von Hausen's two army corps pressing
hard upon its right flank and rear, threatening its line of retreat.
Against such terrific odds the French line at Dinant and Givet broke,
exposing the flank and rear of the whole army; and by the evening of
that day, August 22, the passages of the River Sambre, near Charleroi,
had been forced, and the Fifth Army was falling back, contesting every
mile of the ground with desperate rear-guard action. The British,
meanwhile, defending the Mons position, were in grave danger of being
cut off, enveloped, and destroyed.

Sir John French had put his two army corps into battle array. He had
about thirty miles of front to defend, with Mons nearly in the center.

On Sunday afternoon, August 23, 1914, the full weight of the German
onset fell for the first time upon the British.

All that night the British were under the fire of German artillery.

Sir John French realized the danger of his Maubeuge-Jenlain position,
and on Monday evening, August 24, 1914, realizing the importance of
putting a substantial barrier, such as the Somme or the Oise, between
his force and the enemy, gave orders for the retirement to be continued
at five o'clock the next morning, August 25, 1914. He had decided upon a
new position about the town of Le Cateau, east of Cambrai. Before dawn,
August 25, 1914, the southward march over rough, hilly country was
resumed, and toward evening of August 25, 1914, after a long, hard day's
fighting march over the highroads, in midsummer heat and thundershowers,
the Guards Brigade and other regiments of the Second Corps, wet and
weary, arrived at the little market town of Landrecies. From Landrecies,
after an encounter with a German column, they marched south toward
Wassigny on Guise.

[Illustration: Battle of Mons and Retreat of Allied Armies.]

While the night attack on Landrecies was raging, the Germans, taxing
their men to the uttermost, marched four other corps through the tract
of country between the west side of the forest and the road from
Valenciennes to Cambrai. These corps were in a position along
Smith-Dorrien's front before dawn of Wednesday, August, 26, 1914, and in
the earliest hours of the morning it became apparent that the Germans
were determined to throw the bulk of their strength against the British
battalions which had moved up to a position south of the small town of
Solesmes, extending to the south of Cambrai. Thus placed, this force
could shield the Second Corps, now beginning its retreat under pressure
of the German army advancing from Tournai. These troops under General
Snow were destined to play an important part in the impending battle of
Le Cateau.

By sunrise the guns of the four German corps were firing from positions
facing the British left, and gray-green masses of infantry were pressing
forward in dense firing lines. In view of this attack, General
Smith-Dorrien judged it impossible to continue his retreat at daybreak.
The First Corps was at that moment scarcely out of difficulty, and
General Sordet--whose troops had been fighting hard on the flank of the
Fifth French Army, with General Lanrezac, against General von Buelow's
hosts--was unable to help the British, owing to the exhausted state of
his cavalry. The situation was full of peril; indeed, Wednesday bade
fair to become the most critical day of the retreat.

As the day of August 26, 1914, wore on, General von Kluck, abandoning
frontal attacks, began to use his superior numbers in a great enveloping
move on both flanks, and some of his batteries secured positions from
which they could enfilade the British line. Smith-Dorrien, having no
available reserves, was thus virtually ringed by enemy guns on one side
and by hostile infantry on all sides. "It became apparent," says Sir
John French's dispatch, "that if complete annihilation was to be
avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to
commence it about 3.30 p. m. The movement was covered with the most
devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had
suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the farther
retreat from the position assisted materially in the completion of this
difficult and dangerous operation. The saving of the left wing could
never have been accomplished unless a commander" (Sir Horace
Smith-Dorrien) "of rare coolness had been present to personally conduct
the operation."

This retirement foreshadowed the end of the battle. Worn out by repeated
repulses, the Germans had suffered too heavily to continue their attacks
or to engage in an energetic pursuit. According to General French's
estimate, the British losses during the trying period from August 23 to
August 26, 1914, inclusive, were between 5,000 and 6,000 men and the
losses suffered by the Germans in their pursuit and attacks across the
open country, owing largely to their dense formation, were much greater.
The Battle of Le Cateau gave the Germans pause. Further retreat of the
British could now be resumed in orderly array; for by now General Sordet
with his cavalry was relieving the pressure on the British rear, and
General D'Amade with his two reserve divisions from the neighborhood of
Arras was attacking General von Kluck's right, driving it back on
Cambrai. Disaster to the British forces was averted, though the peril of
German interposition between the Allied army and Paris would soon compel
still further withdrawals.

Covered by their gunners, but still under heavy fire of the German
artillery, the British began again to retire southward. Their retreat
was continued far into the night of August 26, 1914, and through the
27th and 28th; on the last date--after vigorous cavalry fighting--the
exhausted troops halted on a line extending from the French cathedral
town of Noyon through Chauny to La Fere. There they were joined by
reenforcements amounting to double their loss. Guns to replace those
captured or shattered by the enemy were brought up to the new line.
There was a breathing space for a day, while the British made ready to
take part in the next great encounter.

This fourth week in August marked a decisive period in the history of
the Great War. All the French armies, from the east to the west, as well
as the British army, were in retreat over their frontiers. To what
resolution had the French commander in chief come? That was the question
on every lip. What at that moment was the real situation of the French
army? Certainly the first engagements had not turned out as well as the
French could have hoped. The Germans were reaping the reward of their
magnificent preparation for the war. Their heavy artillery, with which
the French army was almost entirely unprovided, was giving proof of its
efficacy and its worth. The moral effect of those great projectiles
launched from great distances by the immense German guns was
considerable. At such great distances the French cannons of 75,
admirable as they were, could make no effective reply to the German
batteries. The French soldiers were perfectly well aware that they were
the targets of the great German shells while their own cannon could make
no parallel impression on the enemy.

The German army revealed itself as an extraordinary instrument of war.
Its mobility and accouterments were perfect. It had over a hundred
thousand professional noncommissioned officers or subofficers, admirably
suited to their work, with their men marching under the control of their
eye and finger. In the German army the active corps, as well as the
reserve corps, showed themselves, thanks to these noncommissioned
officers, marvelously equipped.

In the French army the number of noncommissioned officers by profession
totaled hardly half the German figures. The German army, moreover, was
much more abundantly supplied with machine guns than the French. The
Germans had almost twice as many, and they understood how to use them in
defense and attack better than the French. They had moreover, to a
degree far superior to that of the French, studied the use of
fortifications in the field, trenches, wire entanglements, and so on.
The Germans were also at first better trained than the French
reservists; they had spent longer periods in the German army, and their
reserve corps were almost equal to the active corps.

In the French army, on the other hand, an apprenticeship and training of
several weeks were required to give to the divisions of reserve their
full worth. At the end of two weeks, nevertheless, thanks to the
marvelous elasticity of the French soldier and the warlike qualities of
the race, the training was completed. At the beginning of the month of
September the reserve divisions fought with the same skill, the same
keenness, and the same swing as the active army corps.

Moreover, certain incompetencies had revealed themselves in the French
high command. These General Joffre attended to without the loss of an
instant. Every general that appeared to him incapable of fulfilling the
task allotted to him was weeded out on the spot, without considering
friendships or the bonds of comradeship, or intimacy that might be
between them.

As things were seen in Paris, all may be summed up in this formula: That
the German army was better prepared for war than the French army, for
the simple reason that Germany had long prepared for the war, because
she had it in view, a thing which could not be said of France. But the
French army revealed right from the beginning the most admirable and
marvelous qualities. The soldiers fought with a skill and heroism that
have never been equaled. Sometimes, indeed, their enthusiasm and courage
carried them too far. It mattered little. In spite of losses, in spite
even of retreat, the morale of the whole French army on the entire front
from Alsace to the Somme remained extraordinarily high.

The violation of Belgian neutrality and the passage of the German armies
through Belgium had been foreseen by the French General Staff, but
opinions differed in regard to the breadth of the turning movement
likely to be made by the German right wing in crossing Belgian
territory. Among French experts some were of opinion that the Germans
would confine themselves to the right bank of the Meuse, while others
thought that they would cross the Meuse, and make a much vaster turning
movement, thus descending on France in a direction due north and south.

If the violation of Belgian neutrality was no surprise to the French
Staff, it was nevertheless hardly expected that the Germans would be
able to put in line with such rapidity at the outset all their reserve
formations. Each army corps was supported by its reserve corps, which
showed itself as quick in mobilization and preparation as the active
corps.

Germany, while maintaining sufficient forces on the Russian front, was
still able to put in the field for its great offensive against France a
more numerous body of troops than would have been believed in France.
This permitted them to maintain in Alsace, in Lorraine, and in Belgian
Luxembourg armies as numerous as those which faced them on the French
side, and at the same time to mass the major part of their troops on the
right so as to pour into the valley of the Oise their chief invading
forces.

This explains why the French left, which was exposed to the offensive of
the German right, was obliged to make a rapid retreat, permitting the
German armies of General von Kluck and General von Buelow to advance with
all speed in the direction of Paris.

The French military staff, as soon as they perceived the danger that
threatened, proceeded to a new alignment of forces. As long as this
alignment of forces could not be effected the retreat had to continue.
As soon as it was accomplished, as soon as General Joffre had his armies
well in hand and the situation of his troops well disposed, he checked
the retreat, gave the signal for the offensive, and so followed the
great Battle of the Marne.

The German plan consisted, therefore, in delivering the main blow
through the medium of the right wing of the German forces, consisting of
the army of Von Kluck, the army of Von Buelow, and the army of Von
Hausen, which were to march with all speed in the direction of Paris.

What plan had the French staff in mind to oppose to this plan of the
Germans? Its plan aimed at checking and holding the greatest possible
number of Germans by a vigorous offensive in Alsace and Lorraine so as
to prevent them from joining the three first German armies which
threatened Paris. In support of this offensive of the armies of Alsace
and Lorraine, the central French armies attacked in the direction of the
Ardennes and Belgian Luxembourg with the object of checking the center
of the German armies and then turning toward the west so as to cooperate
in the offensive of the French forces which, aided by the British army
and the Belgian army, were fighting in Belgium.

The French armies, which are numbered from the right to the left--that
is, from the east to the west--comprised: A detachment of the Army of
Alsace that was dissolved toward the end of the month of August; the
First Army (General Dubail); the Second Army (General de Castelnau); the
Third Army (General Ruffey, replaced at the end of August, 1914, by
General Sarrail); the Fourth Army (General de Langle de Cary); the
Fifth Army (General Lanrezac, replaced in the last days of August, 1914,
by General Franchet d'Esperey). At the right of this army was stationed
the British army under the command of General French.

To what resolution did General Joffre come? On that memorable evening of
the 24th, and on that morning of the 25th, two alternatives presented
themselves before him. Should they, rather than permit the enemy to
invade the soil of France, make a supreme effort to check the Germans on
the frontier?

This first apparent solution had the evident advantage of abandoning to
the enemy no part of the national soil, but it had some serious
inconveniences. The attack of the German armies operating on the right
(Generals von Kluck, von Buelow, von Hausen) were extremely menacing. In
order to parry this attack it was necessary considerably to reenforce
the French left, and for that purpose to transfer from the right to the
left a certain number of army corps. That is what the military call, in
the language of chess players, "to castle" the army corps. But this
movement could not be accomplished in a few hours. It required, even
with all the perfection of organization shown by the French railways
during this war, a certain number of days. As long as this operation
from the right to the left had not been accomplished, as long as the
left wing of the French army and even the center remained without the
reenforcement of elements taken from the right, it would have been
extremely imprudent, not to say rash, for the French high command to
attempt a decisive battle. If General Joffre had risked a battle
immediately he would have been playing the game without all his trumps
in hand and would have been in danger of a defeat, and even of a decided
disaster, from which it might have been impossible to recover.

The second alternative consisted in drawing back and in profiting from a
retreat by putting everything in shipshape order to bring about a new
grouping of forces. They would allow the Germans to advance, and when
the occasion showed itself favorable the French armies, along with the
British army, would take the offensive and wage a decisive battle.

It was to this second decision that General Joffre came. As soon as on
August 25, 1914, he had made up his mind as to what the French retreat
was going to lead he gave orders for a new marshaling of forces and for
preparations with a view to the offensive.

General Joffre has made no objection to the publication of his orders in
detail from that date, August 25, 1914, down to the Battle of the Marne.
They constitute an eloquent and convincing document. The series of
orders were contained in the "Bulletin des Armees de la Republique
Francaise," June 6, 1915, Sunday. The first of these orders, dated
August 25, 1914, runs as follows:

"The projected offensive movement not having been found possible of
execution, the consequent operations will be so conducted as to put in
line, on our left, by the junction of the Fourth and Fifth Armies, the
British army, and new forces recruited from the eastern district, a body
capable of taking the offensive while other armies for the needed
interval hold in check the efforts of the enemy...."

The retreating movement was regulated so as to bring about the following
disposition of forces preparatory to an offensive:

"In the Amiens district a new grouping of forces, formed of elements
conveyed by rail (Seventh Corps, four divisions of reserve, and perhaps
another active army corps), brought together from August 27 to September
2, 1914. This body will remain ready to take the offensive in the
general direction of St, Pol-Arras or Arras-Bapaume."

The same general instructions of August 25, 1914, marks out the zones of
march, and says:

"The movement will be covered by the rear guards spread out at favorable
points of vantage so as to utilize every obstacle for the purpose of
checking, by brief and violent counterattacks in which the artillery
will play the chief part, the march of the enemy or at least to <DW44>
it."

                                                  (Signed)  J. JOFFRE.

[Illustration: General Joffre.]

The object of this maneuver is thus already on August 25, 1914, clearly
indicated; it looked not to a defensive, but to an offensive movement,
which was to be resumed as soon as circumstances appeared favorable.
Much is made clear in these orders of General Joffre, which are
characterized by perspicuity, foresight, and precision.

The retreat was effected; but it was only a provisional retreat.
Whenever an occasion presented itself to counterattack the enemy for the
purpose of delaying his advance, that occasion was to be taken advantage
of. And that is, in fact, what took place.

Two days later, on August 27, 1914, General Joffre brought together,
using army corps and divisions recruited elsewhere, a supplementary
army, the Ninth Army, which was detailed to take its place between the
Fourth and Fifth Armies. He intrusted its command to a general, who,
while commanding the Twentieth Corps, had distinguished himself by his
brilliant conduct in Lorraine, General Foch.

The establishment of the army of Manoury on the left of the French
armies so as to fall on the right flank of the Germans when they marched
on Paris; the establishment of a strong army under one of the best
French generals at the center for the purpose of encountering the main
weight of the German army; such were the two decisions of the French
commander in chief, taken on August 25 and 27, 1914, which contained in
germ the victory of the Marne, waged and won two weeks later.




CHAPTER XI

FIGHTING AT BAY


The forces of France also had been fighting to protect their retreat
southward in these August days of 1914. After the passages of the Sambre
were forced, during the great Mons-Charleroi battle, the Fifth French
Army was placed in very perilous straits by the failure of the Fourth
Army, under General Langle, to hold the Belgian river town of Givet.
Hard pressed in the rear by General von Buelow's army, and on their
right by General von Hausen commanding the Saxon Army and the Prussian
Guard, the Fifth Army of France had to retire with all possible speed,
for their path of retreat was threatened by a large body of Teutons
advancing on Rocroi.

On August 23, 1914, holding their indomitable pursuers in check by
desperate rear-guard action, with their two cavalry divisions under
General Sordet galloping furiously along the lines of the western flank
to protect the retiring infantry and guns, the Fifth Army unexpectedly
turned at Guise. At that point considerable reenforcements in troops and
material arrived, making the Fifth Army the strongest in France. It now
defeated and drove over the Oise the German Guard and Tenth Corps, and
then continued its retirement. But the left wing of the French army was
unsuccessful, and Amiens and the passages of the Somme had to be
abandoned to the invaders.

On Sunday, August 23, 1914, the Fourth Army, operating from the Meuse,
was heavily outnumbered by the Saxon army around the river town of
Dinant. They fell back, after furious fighting for the possession of the
bridges, which the French engineers blew up as the army withdrew
southward to the frontier. Soon after, at Givet, the Germans succeeded
in wedging their way across the Meuse. Some advanced on Rocroi and
Rethel, and other corps marched along the left bank of the Meuse,
through wooded country, against a steadily increasing resistance which
culminated at Charleville, a town on the western bank of the river.
There a determined stand was made.

On August 24, 1914, the town of Charleville was evacuated, the civilians
were sent away to join multitudes of other homeless refugees, and then
the French also retired, leaving behind them several machine guns hidden
in houses, placed so that they commanded the town and the three bridges
that connected it with Mezieres.

The German advance guards reached the two towns next day, August 25,
1914, which, as we know, witnessed the British retirement toward Le
Cateau. Unmolested, they rode across the three bridges into the quiet,
empty streets. Suddenly, when all had crossed, the bridges were blown
up behind them by contact mines, and the German cavalrymen were raked by
the deadly fire of the machine guns. Nevertheless, finding their foes
were not numerous, they made a courageous stand, waiting for their main
columns to draw nearer. Every French machine gunner was silenced by the
Guards with their Maxims; but when the main invading army swept into
view along the river valley, the French artillery from the hills around
Charleville mowed down the heads of columns with shrapnel. Still the
Teutons advanced with reckless courage. While their artillery was
engaged in a duel with the French, German sappers threw pontoon bridges
across the river, and finally the French had to retire. Between
Charleville and Rethel there was another battle, resulting in the
abandonment of Mezieres by the French.

The retreating army crossed the Semois, a tributary of the Meuse, which
it enters below Mezieres, and advanced toward Neufchateau; but they were
repulsed by the Germans under the Duke of Wuerttemberg. At Nancy on
August 25, 1914, there was another engagement between the garrison of
Toul and the army of the Crown Prince of Bavaria; after fierce
onslaughts the garrison was compelled to yield and retire. Finally, on
August 27, 1914, at Longwy, a fortified town near Verdun, the army of
the German crown prince succeeded in bursting into France after a long
siege, and marched toward the Argonne. Thus from the western coast
almost to Verdun there was a general Franco-British retreat.

On August 28, 1914, pressed by the German armies commanded by Von Kluck
on the west, by Von Hausen from Dinant and Givet, by Von Buelow from
Charleroi and Namur, the Allies were pushed back upon a line stretching
roughly from Amiens through Noyon-Le Fere to Mezieres; while their
forces east of the Meuse between Mezieres and Verdun were retreating
before Duke Albrecht of Wuerttemberg, and to the southeast of Verdun
before the Bavarians. All northern France was thus open to the invaders.

After the battle of Le Cateau, however, the Germans slackened their
pursuit for a very brief interval; partly because the terrific strain
of marching and fighting was telling upon them no less than upon the
Allies, partly because the engineers had blown up the bridges over every
river, canal, and stream, behind the retreating armies, and partly
because, under directions from the French commander in chief, General
Manoury was organizing a new force on the British left, a new Sixth
Army, mainly reserve troops, one corps of line troops, and General
Sordet's cavalry. On the right of the British were General Lanrezac's
troops; then, between Lanrezac's Fifth Army and the Fourth Army, came a
Ninth Army, under General Foch, formed of three corps from the south.

Counterattacks were ordered by the French general in chief, continued
during the entire retreat and had frequently brilliant results.

On August 29, 1914, a corps of the Fifth Army and of the divisions of
reserve attacked with success in the direction of St. Quentin with the
object of withdrawing the pressure on the British army. Two other corps
and a division of reserves joined issue with the Prussian Guard and the
Tenth Corps of the German army which debouched from Guise. This was a
very violent battle, known under the name of the Battle of Guise. At the
end of the day, after various fluctuations in the fight, the Germans
were thrown completely over the Oise and the entire British front was
relieved. The Prussian Guard on that occasion suffered great losses.

August 27, 1914, the Fourth Army under General de Langle de Cary
succeeded likewise in throwing the enemy across the Meuse as he
endeavored to secure a footing on the left bank. The success continued
on the 28th; on that day a division of this army (First Division of
Morocco under the orders of General Humbert) inflicted a sanguinary
defeat on a Saxon army corps in the region of Signy l'Abbaye.

Thanks to these brilliant successes, the retreat was accomplished in
good order and without the French armies being seriously demoralized; as
a matter of fact, they were actually put to flight at no point. All the
French armies were thus found intact and prepared for the offensive.

The right wing of the German army marched in the direction of Paris at
great speed, and the rapidity of the German onslaught obliged the French
General Staff to prolong the retreat until they were able to establish a
new alignment of forces. The new army established on the left of the
French armies, and intrusted to General Manoury, was not able to
complete its concentration in the localities first intended. In place of
concentrating in the region of Amiens it was obliged to operate more to
the south.

The situation on the evening of September 2, 1914, as a result of the
vigorous onward march of the German right, was as follows:

A corps of German cavalry had crossed the Oise and had reached Chateau
Thierry. The First German Army (General von Kluck), consisting of four
active army corps and a reserve corps, had passed Compiegne. The Second
Army (General von Buelow), with three active army corps and two reserve
corps, had attained to the region of Laon. The Third German Army
(General von Hausen), with two active army corps and a reserve corps,
had crossed the Aisne and reached Chateau Porcin-Attigny.

Farther to the east the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh German Armies,
making about twelve active army corps, four reserve corps, and numerous
Ersatz companies, were in contact with the French troops (Fourth and
Fifth Armies) between Vouziers and Verdun, the others from Verdun to the
Vosges. Such was the situation.

It may be seen, if a map is consulted, that the Fifth French Army,
commanded from August 30 by General Franchet d'Esperey, would have found
itself in grave peril following on the backward bending of the British
and French forces operating on its left, if the French had accepted the
challenge of a decisive battle. The French commander in chief resolutely
chose the alternative that obviated such a risk, that is, he decided on
a postponement of the offensive and the continuation of the retreat.

Already on September 1, 1914, he prescribed as the extreme limits of the
retreat the line running through Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine,
Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and the region north of Bar-le-Duc.
That line would have been reached had it been necessary. On the other
hand, it was his intention to attack before it was reached if the forces
could be offensively arrayed, allowing of the cooperation of the British
army and the army of Manoury on the left, and on the right that of the
divisions of reserve that had been held on the heights of the Meuse.

Meanwhile, late in the afternoon of August 29, 1914, the British
retirement began afresh, and 10,000 French troops also withdrew from the
Somme, blowing up the bridges as they went. Everywhere along the roads
were crowds of country folk and villagers with wagons and carts piled
high with household goods or carrying aged persons and children, all in
panic flight before the dreaded invaders, fleeing for refuge in Paris.
At various places these stricken multitudes joined the army ambulances,
taking the shortest routes. Rumors of the coming of the uhlans ran along
the straggling lines with tales of the grievous havoc and ruin which
these horsemen, vanguards of the German columns, had wrought in the
land. Hardly had the retirement begun, when a body of uhlans entered
Amiens and demanded from the mayor the surrender of the town. This was
formally given, and the civilians were ordered, on pain of death, not to
create the slightest disturbance and not to take part in any action,
overt or covert, against the soldiery. Afterward, cavalry, infantry, and
artillery took possession of the town on August 30, 1914. On the same
day a German aeroplane dropped bombs on Paris.

While retiring from the thickly wooded country south of Compiegne, the
British First Cavalry Brigade were surprised while dismounted and at
breakfast in the early morning of September 1, 1914. Moving figures on
the distant skyline first attracted the attention of those who had field
glasses, but in the dim light their identity was not at first revealed.
Suddenly all doubt was resolved by a rain of shells on the camp. Many
men and a large number of horses were killed. At once the order "Action
front!" rang out, and the remaining horses, five to a man, were hurried
to cover in the rear, while on the left a battery of horse artillery
went into instant action. The German attack was pressed hard, and the
battery was momentarily lost until some detachments from the British
Third Corps, with the guns of the artillery brigade, galloped up to its
support. Then they not only recovered their own guns, but also succeeded
in capturing twelve of the enemy's.

On the eventful day of September 3, 1914, the British forces reached a
position south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets. They had
defended the passage of the river against the German armies as long as
possible, and had destroyed bridges in the path of the pursuers. Next,
at General Joffre's request, they retired some twelve miles farther
southward with a view to taking a position behind the Seine. In the
meantime the Germans had built pontoon bridges across the Marne, and
were threatening the Allies all along the line of the British forces and
the Fifth and Ninth French Armies. Consequently several outpost actions
took place.

By the 1st of September, 1914, the day of the Russian victories at
Lemberg, Von Kluck's army had reached Senlis, only twenty-five miles
from Paris. Despite this imminent danger, the capital was remarkably
quiet and calm; every day, as fateful event crowded upon event, seemed
to renew the resolution and coolness of the population. It seemed
advisable, however, to transfer the seat of government for the time
being from Paris to Bordeaux, after assuring the defense of the city by
every means that could be devised.

The defenses of Paris consisted of three great intrenched camps, on the
north, east, and southwest, respectively. Of these the most important is
the last, which includes all the fortified area to the south and west of
the Seine. A railway over sixty miles in length connects all the works,
and, under the shelter of the forts, it could not only keep them
supplied with the necessary ammunition and stores, but also it could be
utilized to convey troops from point to point as they might be needed.
However, it was an open secret that even the outer and newer defenses
were not of any great strength. If the Germans broke through the
outlying circle of forts, the inner line would be of small value, and
the city itself would be exposed to long-range bombardment. Paris was
not ready for a siege, and if attacked it would speedily fall.

Early in the morning of September 3, 1914, President Poincare,
accompanied by all the ministers, left Paris, and was followed at noon
by the members of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, and the reserves
of the Banque de France. The higher courts were also transferred to
Bordeaux. The municipal authority was constituted by the president of
the City Council, and the Council of the Seine Department, who were
empowered to direct civil affairs under the authority of General
Gallieni as military governor, the prefect of Paris, and the prefect of
police.

On his appointment to the command, Gallieni did what he could to
strengthen the defenses. Trenches were dug, wire entanglements were
constructed, and hundreds of buildings that had been allowed to spring
up over the military zone of defense were demolished in order to leave a
clear field of fire. The gates of the city were barred with heavy
palisades backed by sandbags, and neighboring streets also were
barricaded for fighting. Certain strategic streets were obstructed by
networks of barbed wire, and in others pits were dug to the depth of a
man's shoulders. The public buildings were barricaded with sandbags and
guarded with machine guns.

But while Paris was preparing for siege and assault the French staff
were concentrating their efforts on making a siege impossible by a
decisive stroke against the German advance.

Hardly had the Government left the city when tidings arrived that
instead of marching on Paris, General von Kluck had swung southeastward
toward the crossing of the Marne. This news was obtained by the allied
flying corps, which had made daring flights over the enemy's line.




CHAPTER XII

THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD


On September 4, 1914, the bugler of Destiny sounded the "Halt!" to the
retreat of the armies of the Allies from the Belgian frontier. The
marvelous fighting machine of the German armies, perhaps the most superb
organization of military potency that has been conceived by the mind of
man, seemed to reach its limit of range. Success had perched upon the
German eagles, and for two weeks there had been a steady succession of
victories. Nevertheless the British and French armies were not crushed.
They were overwhelmed, they were overpowered, and, under stern military
necessity, they were forced to fall back.

Day after day, under the swinging hammer-head blows of the German drive,
the flower of the forces of the Allies had been compelled to break. A
little less generalship on the part of the defenders, or a little more
recklessness behind that smashing offensive might have turned this
retirement into a rout. Even as it was, the official dispatches reveal
that, while occasional and local retirements had been considered, such a
sweeping retreat was far from contemplated by Generals Joffre and
French. German official dispatches bear testimony to the intrepid
character of the defenders sullenly falling back and contesting every
inch of the way, as much as they do to the daring and the vivid bravery
of the German attackers who hurled themselves steadily, day after day,
upon positions hastily taken up in the retreat where the retirement
could be partly repaid by the heaviest toll of death.

The great strategical plan of the Germans, which had displayed itself
throughout the entire operations on the western theatre of war from the
very first gun of the campaign, came to its apex on this September 3,
1914. If the allied armies could develop a strong enough defense to halt
the German offensive at this point, and especially if they could develop
a sufficiently powerful counteroffensive to strike doubt into the
confident expectations of the armies of the Central Powers, then the
strategical plan had reached a check, which might or might not be a
checkmate, as the fortunes of war might determine. If, on the other
hand, the stand made by the Allies at this point should prove
ineffective, and if the counteroffensive should reveal that the German
hosts had been able to establish impregnable defenses as they marched,
then the original strategic plan of the attackers must be considered as
intact and the peril of France would become greatly intensified.

It is idle, in a war of such astounding magnitude, to speak about any
one single incident as being a "decisive" one. Such a term can only
rightly be applied to conditions where the opposing powers each have but
one organized army in the field, and these armies meet in a pitched
battle. None the less, the several actions which are known as the
Battles of the Marne may be considered as decisive, to the extent that
they decided the limit of the German offensive at that point. The German
General Staff, taking the ordinary and obvious precautions in the case
of a possible repulse, chose and fortified in the German rear positions
to which its forces might fall back in the event of retreat. These
prepared positions had a secondary contingent value for the Germans in
view of the grave Russian menace that might call at any moment for a
transfer of German troops from the western to the eastern front.

The Battle of the Marne stopped the advance of the main German army on
that line, forcing it back.

[Illustration: Battle of the Marne--Beginning on September 5, 1914.]

The scene of the battle ground is one of the most famous in Europe, not
even the plains of Belgium possessing a richer historical significance
than that melancholy plain, the Champagne-Pouilleuse, upon whose
inhospitable flats rested for centuries the curse of a prophecy, that
there would the fate of France be decided, a prophecy of rare
connotation of accuracy, for it refrained from stating what that fate
should be. Yet the historic sense is amplified even more by remembrance
than by prophecy, for in the territory confronting that huge arc on
which 1,400,000 German and Austrian soldiers lay encamped, awaiting what
even the German generals declared to be "the great decision," there
lies, on the old Roman road running from Chalons a vast oval mound,
known to tradition as "the Camp of Attila." In that country, a Roman
general, Aetius, leading a host of soldiers of whom many were Gauls,
broke a vast flood wave of the Huns as those savage Mongol hordes hurled
themselves against Rome's westernmost possession. On that occasion,
however, the Visigoths, under their King Theodoric, fought side by side
with the Gauls. Then, the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine and on the
banks of the Seine were brothers in arms, now, that same countryside
shall see them locked in deadly conflict.

The morale of tradition is a curious thing, and often will nerve a sword
arm when the most impassioned utterance of a beloved leader may fail.
There were few among the soldiers of France who forgot that in the south
of this same plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse was the home of Joan of Arc,
the Maid of Orleans, patriot and saint, and more than one French soldier
prayed that the same voices which had whispered in the ear of the virgin
of Domremy should guide the generalissimo who was to lead the armies of
France upon the morrow. Here, tradition again found old alliances
severed and new ones formed, for the Maid of Orleans led the French
against the English, while in the serried ranks awaiting the awful test
of the shock of battle, English and French soldiers lived and slept as
brothers.

The topography of the region of the battle field is of more than common
interest, for modern tactics deal with vaster stretches of country than
would have been considered in any previous war. This is due, partly, to
the large armies handled, partly to the terrific range of modern
artillery, and also to what may be called the territorial perceptiveness
which aeronautical surveys make possible to a general of to-day. While
war has not changed, it is true that a commander of an army in modern
campaign is compelled to review and to take into account a far larger
group of factors. A modern general must be capable of grasping increased
complexities, and must possess a synthetic mind to be able to reduce all
these complicating factors into a single whole. The first factor of the
battles of the Marne was the topographical factor, the consideration of
the land over which the action was to take place.

Let the River Marne be used as a base from which this topography can be
determined. The Marne rises near Langres, which is the northwest angle
of that pentagon of fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Langres, Dijon, and
Besancon), which incloses an almost impregnable recuperative ground for
exhausted armies. From Langres the Marne flows almost north by west for
about fifty miles through a hilly and wooded country, then, taking a
more westerly course, it flows for approximately seventy-five miles
almost northwest, across the Plain of Champagne, past Vitry-le-Francois
and Chalons, thence almost due westward through the Plateau of Sezanne,
by Epernay, Chateau Thierry, La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and Meaux to join
the Seine just south of Paris. In the neighborhood of Meaux, three small
tributaries flow into the Marne--the Ourcq from the north, and the Grand
Morin and Petit Morin from the east. The Marshes of St. Gond, ten miles
long from east to west and a couple of miles across, lie toward the
eastern borders of the Plateau of Sezanne, and form the source of the
Petit Morin, which has been deepened in the reclamation of the marsh
country.

Once more considering the source of the Marne, near Langres, it will be
noted that the River Meuse rises near by, flowing north by east to Toul,
and then north-northwest past Verdun to Sedan, where it turns due north,
flowing through the Ardennes country to Namur, in Belgium. To the east
of the Meuse lies the difficult forest clad hill barrier, known as the
Hills of the Meuse; to the east extends (as far as Triaucourt) the
craggy and broken wooded country of the Argonne, a natural barrier which
stretches southward in a chain of lakes and forests.

West of this impassible country of the Meuse and the Argonne lies the
plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse, which is almost a steppe, bare and open,
only slightly undulating, overgrown with heath, and studded here and
there by small copses of planted firs, naught but a small portion of the
whole being under cultivation. Between the Forest of the Argonne and
this great plain, which is over a hundred miles long from north to south
and forty miles in width, lies a short stretch of miniature foothills,
with upland meadows here and there, but crossed in every direction by
small ravines filled with shrubs and low second-growth timber. Here lies
the source of the Aisne, a river destined to live in history; and on the
farther side begins the great plain.

On the west of the plain of Champagne rises, 300 feet, with a curious
clifflike suddenness, the Plateau of Sezanne. The effect is as though a
geological fault had driven the original plateau from north to south
throughout its entire length, and then as though there had been a
general subsidence of the plain, giving rise to the clifflike formations
known as Les Falaises de Champagne, at the foot of which runs the road
from La Fere-Champenoise to Rheims.

The disposition and arrangement of the German forces is next to be
considered. It can be assumed that their objective was Paris. It is also
worthy of remembrance that the German tactical method has always favored
the envelopment of the enemy's flanks rather than a frontal attack
aiming to pierce the enemy's center, which latter was a favorite method
of Napoleon I to reach decision.

The tactical method of envelopment demands great numerical superiority,
and on account of the extreme extension of front necessitated is apt to
become dangerous as perforce the center is left weak. Attempts to
envelop, with which the observer is confronted again and again when
considering the military movements of the Central Powers on the western
battle front, were revealed on the morning of September 3, 1914, in the
position occupied by the German forces, and, correspondingly, in the
arrangement of the allied armies.

The German right, on September 3, 1914, and September 4, 1914, at which
time it was nearest to its desired goal of Paris, held the banks of the
Marne from Epernay to the banks of the little tributary the Ourcq, which
runs into the Marne from the north. This extreme right comprised the
Second Corps and the Fourth Reserve Corps, encamped on the western bank
of the little stream the Ourcq; while the Fourth Corps was given the
honor of the tip of the right, being camped on the Marne at La
Ferte-sous-Jouarre, supported by the Third Corps, the Seventh Corps and
the Seventh Corps Reserve. The Ninth Cavalry Division occupied an
advanced position west of Crecy and the Second Cavalry Division occupied
an advanced position near the British army, north of Coulommiers. These
troops constituted the First German Army, under the command of General
von Kluck.

The Allies' left, confronting this position, held strong reserves, and
by the nature of the ground itself, was well placed to prevent any
enveloping movement, dear to the German school of military tactics. It
rested securely on the fortress of Paris, believed by its constructors
to be the most fully fortified city in the world, and should the German
right endeavor to encircle the left wing of the Allies, should it
develop a farther westerly movement, it would but come in contact with
the outer line of those defenses and thence be deflected in such an
enormous arc as to thin the line beyond the power of keeping it strong
enough to resist a piercing attack at all points. Clearly, then, as long
as the extreme left of the Allies remained in contact with the defenses
of Paris, an enveloping movement was not possible on the easterly flank.

Facing the German extreme right, was the Sixth French Army, one of the
great reserves of General Joffre, which had been steadily building up
since August 29, 1914, with its right on the Marne and its left at Betz,
in the Ourcq Valley, encamped on the western side of that stream, facing
the Second and Fourth Corps of the Germans. The strengthening of that
army from the forces at Paris was hourly, and while three or four days
before it had been felt that the Sixth French Army was too weak to be
placed in so vital a point--that it should have been supplemented with
the Ninth Army--the results justified the French generalissimo's plans
and more than justified his confidence in the British Army, or
Expeditionary Force, which faced the tip of the German right wing drive
and was encamped on a line from Villeneuve le Comte to Jouy le Chatel,
the center of the British army being at a point five miles southeast of
Coulommiers. This army was under the command of General Sir John French.

The right center of the German line was held by General von Buelow's
army, consisting of the Ninth Corps, the Tenth Corps, the Tenth Reserve
Corps, and the Guard Corps. This army also was encamped upon the Marne,
stretching from the eastern end of General Von Kluck's army as far as
Epernay. This army thus held the Forests of Vassy but was confronted by
the marshes of St. Gond.

Confronting this right center was, first of all, General Conneau's
Cavalry Corps, which was in touch with the right wing of the British
army under Sir John French. Then, holding the line from Esternay to
Courtacon lay the Fifth French Army under General d'Esperey. Full in
face of the strongest part of the German right center stood one of the
strongest of General Joffre's new reserves, the Ninth Army under General
Foch, with the marshes of St. Gond in front of him, and holding a
twenty-mile line from Esternay, past Sezanne to Camp de Mailly, a
remarkably well-equipped army, very eager for the fray.

The hastily replenished corps, largely of Saxons, which had been General
von Hausen's army, lay next to General von Buelow, a little north of
Vitry, and as it proved, a weak spot in the German line. The left center
of the attacking force was under the command of the Duke of Wuerttemberg
and extended across the whole southern end of the plain of Champagne to
the upper streams of the Aisne south of St. Menhould. The extreme left
of this advanced line was the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, holding
the old line on the Argonne to the south of Verdun. In close relation to
this advanced line, but not directly concerned with the battles of the
Marne, were the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince, encamped in the
plateau of the Woevre, engaged largely in the task of holding open the
various lines of communication, while far to the south, in the vicinity
of the much battered little town of Mulhouse, lay the remains of the
decimated army of the Alsace campaigns under General von Heeringen.

Facing this left center came General Langle's Fourth French Army,
covering the southern side of the plain of Chalons, it lay south of
Vitry-le-Francois, and faced due north. On this army, it was expected,
the brunt of the drive would fall. At this point the French battle line
made a sharp angle, the Third French Army, commanded by General
Sarrail, occupying a base from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. It thus faced
almost west, skirting the lower edge of the Forest of Argonne. At the
same time it was back to back with the Second French Army, which covered
the great barrier of forts from Verdun to Toul and Epinal, while the
First French Army held the line from Epinal to Belfort.




CHAPTER XIII

ALLIED AND GERMAN BATTLE PLANS


So much for the actual disposition of the armies. The question of
preponderance of numbers, of advantages of position, and of comparative
fighting efficiency is the next factor with which to be reckoned. The
numbers were fairly evenly matched. About twelve days before this
fateful day of September 3, 1914, there were approximately 100 German
divisions as against seventy-five French, British, and Belgian
divisions. But, during those twelve days, French and British
mobilization advanced with hectic speed, while, at the same time,
Germany was compelled to transfer ten or perhaps fifteen of her
divisions to the eastern theater of war. It follows, therefore, that
there were about 4,000,000 soldiers in all the armies that confronted
each other in the week of September 3-10, 1914, of whom, probably,
3,000,000 were combatants.

An early estimate placed the German strength at 1,300,000 combatants,
and the Allies at about 1,700,000. A later French estimate put the
Germans at 1,600,000, with the Allies between 1,400,000 and 1,500,000.
The preponderance of efficiency of equipment lay with the Germans.

The plans of the German campaign at this time, so far as they can be
determined from the official orders and from the manner in which the
respective movements were carried out, were three-fold. The first of
these movements was the order given to General von Kluck to swirl his
forces to the southeast of Paris, swerving away from the capital in an
attempt to cut the communications between it and the Fifth French Army
under General d'Esperey. This plan evidently involved a feint attack
upon the Sixth French Army under General Manoury (though General Pare
took charge of the larger issues of this western campaign), coupled with
a swift southerly stroke and an attack upon what was supposed to be the
exposed western flank of General d'Esperey's army. The cause of the
failure of this attempt was the presence of the British army, as has
been shown in the alignment of the armies given above, and as will be
shown in detail later, in the recital of the actual progress of the
fighting. Important as was this movement, however, it was the least of
the three elements in General von Moltke's plan for the shattering of
the great defense line of the Allies.

The second element in this plan was, contrary to Germany's usual
tactics, the determination to attack the center of the French line and
break through. Almost three-quarters of a million men were concentrated
on this point. The armies of General von Buelow, General Hausen and the
Duke of Wuerttemberg were massed in the center of the line. There,
however, General Foch's new Ninth Army was prepared to meet the attack.
It will be remembered that, in the disposition of the troops, these
respective armies were facing each other across the great desolate
plain, the ancient battle ground. If the German center could break
through the French center, and if at the same time General von Kluck,
commanding the German right, could execute a swift movement to the
southeast, the Fifth French Army would be between two fires, together
with such part of the Ninth Army as lay to the westward of the point to
be pierced. This strategic plan held high promise, and it would have
menaced the whole interior of France southward from the plain of
Champagne, but even this second part of the plan, important as it was,
does not appear to have been the crucial point in the campaign.

The glory of the victory, if indeed victory it should prove, as the
successes of the previous two weeks had led the Germans to believe, was
to be given to the crown prince. With a great deal of trouble and with
far more delay than had been anticipated, the crown prince's army had at
last managed to get within striking distance of the forefront of the
great battle line. His forces occupied the territory north of Verdun to
a southern point not far from Bar-le-Duc. Here the German secret service
seems to have been as efficient, as it failed to be with regard to
conditions only fifty miles away. General Sarrail's army, which
confronted the army of the crown prince, was somewhat weak. It consisted
of about two army corps with reserve divisions. Nor could General Joffre
send any reenforcements. Every available source of reenforcements had
been drawn upon to aid the Sixth Army, encamped upon the banks of the
Ourcq, in order that Paris might be well guarded. No troops could be
spared from the Fifth and Ninth Armies, which had to bear the brunt of
the attack from the German center. General Sarrail, therefore, had to
depend on the natural difficulties of the country and to avoid giving
battle too readily against the superior forces by which he was
confronted. It was a part of the plan of the French generalissimo,
however, to feel the strength of the German center, and if it proved
that they could be held, to release several divisions and send them to
the aid of General Sarrail.

Subordinate to this contemplated attack by the crown prince, yet forming
a part of it, and, in a measure, a fourth element in the campaign, was
the double effort from the garrisons of Metz and Saarbruecken, combining
with the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince and the forces of General
von Heeringen. The Second French Army, therefore, could not come to the
aid of the Third, except in desperate need, for it was in the very
forefront of the attack on Nancy. If the German left could pierce the
French lines at Nancy and pour through the Gap of Lorraine, it would be
able to take General Sarrail's army in the rear at Bar-le-Duc, and would
thus completely hem it in, at the same time isolating Verdun, which,
thus invested in the course of time must fall, forming an invaluable
advanced fortress to the German advance.

[Illustration: Battle of the Marne--Situation on September 9, 1914.]

Before proceeding to the actual working out of this plan of campaign it
may be well to recapitulate it, in order that each development may be
clear. The German plan was to pierce the French line at three places, at
Meaux, at Bar-le-Duc and at Nancy. General von Kluck, at Meaux, would
cut off the Fifth and the Ninth Armies from communication with their
base at Paris, the Bavarian Crown Prince would weaken General Sarrail's
defense in the rear, and if possible come up behind him, and thus the
stage would be set for the great onrush of the Imperial Crown Prince,
who, with an almost fresh army, and with a most complete and elaborate
system of communications and supplies, should be able to crush the weak
point in France's defense, the army under General Sarrail. Such a
victory was designed to shed an especial luster upon the crown prince
and thus upon the Hohenzollern dynasty, a prestige much needed, for the
delays in the advance of the crown prince's army had already given rise
to mutterings of discontent. From a strategical point of view the plan
was sound and brilliant, the disposition of the forces was excellently
contrived, and the very utmost of military skill had been used in
bringing matters to a focus.

The French plan, is the next to be considered. From official orders and
dispatches and also from the developments of that week, it is clear that
General Joffre had perceived the possibility of such a plan as the
Germans had actually conceived. He had brought back his armies--and
there is nothing harder to handle than a retreating army--step by step
over northern France without losing them their morale. The loss of life
was fearful, but it never became appalling. The French soldiers had
faith in Joffre, even as their faith in France, and, while the Germans
had victories to cheer them on, the soldiers of the Allies had to keep
up their courage under the perpetual strain of retreat. The
administration had evacuated Paris. Everywhere it seemed that the
weakness of France was becoming apparent. To the three armies in the
field, those commanded severally by General Manoury, Sir John French,
and General Lanrezac, the generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements.
But he informed the French Government that he was not able to save the
capital from a siege. Yet, as after events showed, while these various
conditions could not rightly be considered as ruses upon General
Joffre's part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that he
understood and took full advantage of the readiness of the attacking
hosts to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory. The
first feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to the
German belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened and
thereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly.

The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre's decision not
to do the expected thing. With General Sarrail placed at the extremest
point of danger, it would have been a likely move to transfer the entire
British Expeditionary Force from the left wing to the weak point at
Bar-le-Duc. There is reason to believe that General von Kluck believed
that this had been done.

The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that of a
determination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive. Time after
time had the other generals implored their leader to give them leave to
take the offensive, and on every occasion a shake of the head had been
the reply. Sir John French had wondered. But when the French officers
found themselves in the region of the Marne, close to the marshes of St.
Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon had faced the Russians, they were more
content. It was familiar as well as historic ground. Even the youngest
officer knew every foot of that ground thoroughly. It was, at the same
time, the best point for the forward leap and one of the last points at
which a halt could be made.

The fourth part of the plan was the holding fast to the point of Verdun,
for thereby the communication of the armies of the Central Powers was
seriously weakened. It is to be remembered that this actual fighting
army of more than a million men depended for food and for ammunition
supplies upon the routes from Belgium and Luxemburg by way of Mezieres
and Montmedy, and the circuitous line to Brussels via St. Quentin. Had
Maubeuge fallen a little earlier the situation of the Central Powers
would have been less difficult, and both commissariat and ammunition
problems would have been easier of solution. But Maubeuge held out until
September 7, 1914, and by that time the prime results of the battles of
the Marne had been achieved. To this problem Verdun was the key, for
from Metz through Verdun ran the main line, less than one-half the
length of line to the Belgian bases of supplies, and, owing to the
nature of the country, a line that could be held with a quarter the
number of men. But Verdun stood, and General Joffre held the two armies
back to back, converging on the point at Verdun.

Such was the country over which the battles of the Marne were fought,
such were the numbers and dispositions of the several armies on each
side, and such, as far as can be judged, were the plans and counterplans
of the strategic leaders in the great conflict.




CHAPTER XIV

FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE


The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the German
extreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in a
southeasterly direction. It was a hazardous move, for it required
General von Kluck to execute a flank march diagonally across the front
of the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force. At this
time, according to the dispatches from Sir John French, the British army
lay south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets, defending the
passage of the river and blowing up the bridges before General von
Kluck.

On September 4, 1914, air reconnaissances showed that General von Kluck
had stopped his southward advance upon Paris, and that his columns were
moving in a southeasterly direction east of a line drawn through
Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. Meanwhile the French and British
generals more effectually concealed their armies in the forests, doing
so with such skill that their movements were unmarked by the German air
scouts. All that day General von Kluck moved his forces, leaving his
heavy artillery with about 100,000 men on the steep eastern bank of the
Ourcq and taking 150,000 troops south across the Marne toward La Ferte
Gaucher. He crossed the Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, all unconscious
that scores of field glasses were trained upon his troops.

Probably believing that the British army had been hurried to the aid of
General Sarrail, General von Kluck advanced confidently. Having
concealment in view, the commanders of the French army and the British
army between them had left a wide gap between the two armies. Through
one of these apparently unguarded openings a strong body of uhlan
patrols advanced, riding southward until they reached Nogent, south of
Paris, and seemingly with the whole rich country of central France laid
wide open to a sharp and sudden attack. Among the many strange features
of this series of the battles of the Marne this must certainly be
reckoned as one. Though possessing an unequaled military organization,
though priding itself on its cavalry scouts, though aided by aerial
scouts, and though well supplied with spies, yet the Allied armies, with
the age-old device of a forest, were able to cloak their movements from
this perfectly organized and powerful invading army. Much of the credit
of this may be assigned to the French and English aircraft, which kept
German scouting aircraft at a distance. But the Allied generals were
astounded at the result of their maneuver, which, as they admitted
afterward, was merely a military precautionary measure against the
discovery of artillery sites, and a device to keep the enemy in general
ignorance.

On Saturday, September 5, 1914, at the extreme north of the line of the
two armies facing each other across the Ourcq, an artillery duel began.
The offensive was taken by the French, and though in itself it was not
more striking than any of the artillery clashes that had marked the
previous month's fighting, it was significant, for it marked the
beginning of the battles of the Marne. The plans of General Joffre were
complete, but the actual point at which the furious contest should begin
was not yet determined. In the northern Ourcq section, however, the
realization by the French that they were actually on the offensive at
last, that the long period of retreat was over, could not be
restrained. The troops were eager to get to work with the bayonet, and
greatly aided by their field artillery, in which mobility had been
sacrificed to power, they quickly cleared the hills to the westward of
the Ourcq. By nightfall of September 5, 1914, the country west of the
Ourcq was in French hands. But to cross that river seemed impossible.
General von Kluck's heavy artillery had been left behind to hold that
position, and every possible crossing was covered with its own blast of
death.

Here General von Kluck's generalship was successful. It might have been
regarded as risky to leave 100,000 men to guard a river confronted by
250,000 picked and reenforced French troops. But General von Kluck's
faith in German guns and German gunnery was not ill-founded. This was
the first of the open-air siege conflicts, and the French army had no
guns which could be used against the German heavy artillery. Hence it
followed that the brilliant work of the Sixth French Army on this first
day of the battles of the Marne achieved no important result, for the
long-range hidden howitzers, manned by expert German gunners and well
supplied with ammunition, defied all attempts at crossing the little
stream of the Ourcq.

This first day's fighting on the Marne revealed one of France's chiefest
needs--heavy artillery. The French light quick-firing gun was a deadly
weapon, but France had neglected the one department of artillery in
which the Germans had been most successful--the use of powerful motor
traction to move big guns without slackening the march of an army.
General von Kluck's artillery was impregnable to the French. Indeed, the
Germans could not be dislodged from the Ourcq until the British
Expeditionary Force sent up some heavy field batteries. It was then too
late for the withdrawal from the Ourcq to be of any serious consequence
in determining the result along the battle front.

The afternoon of that day, when the Zouaves were driving the Germans
across the Ourcq with the bayonet and were themselves effectually
stopped by the German wall of artillery fire, General Joffre and Sir
John French met. At last the British commander received the welcome news
from the generalissimo that retreat was over and advance was about to be
begun.

"I met the French commander in chief at his request," runs the official
dispatch, "and he informed me of his intention to take the offensive
forthwith by wheeling up the left flank of the Sixth Army, pivoting on
the Marne, and directing it to move on the Ourcq; cross and attack the
flank of the First German Army, which was then moving in a southeasterly
direction east of that river.

"He requested me to effect a change of front to my right--my left
resting on the Marne and my right on the Fifth Army--to fill the gap
between that army and the Sixth. I was then to advance against the enemy
on my front and join in the general offensive movement. German troops,
which were observed moving southeast up the left bank of the Ourcq on
the Fourth, were now reported to be halted and facing that river. Heads
of the enemy's columns were seen crossing at Changis, La Ferte, Nogent,
Chateau-Thierry, and Mezy.

"Considerable German columns of all arms were seen to be converging on
Montmirail, while before sunset large bivouacs of the enemy were located
in the neighborhood of Coulommiers, south of Rebais, La Ferte-Gaucher,
and Dagny.

"These combined movements practically commenced on Sunday, September 6,
at sunrise; and on that day it may be said that a great battle opened on
a front extending from Ermenonville, which was just in front of the left
flank of the Sixth French Army, through Lizy on the Marne, Maupertuis,
which was about the British center, Courtacon, which was the left of the
Fifth French Army, to Esternay and Charleville, the left of the Ninth
Army under General Foch, and so along the front of the Ninth, Fourth,
and Third French Armies to a point north of the fortress of Verdun."

Sunrise on Sunday morning, on a summer day in sunny France, was the
setting for the grim and red carnage which should show in the next five
consecutive days that the German advance was checked, that the
southernmost point had been reached, and that for a long time to come it
would tax the resources of the invaders to hold the land that already
had been won. General Joffre had so arranged his forces that the most
spectacular--and the easiest--part fell to the British, and it was
accomplished with perfection of detail. But the honors of the battles of
the Marne lay with General Sarrail's army and with the "Iron Division of
Toul."

On the same morning, this special army order, issued by Sir John French,
was read to the British troops:

"After a most trying series of operations, mostly in retirement, which
have been rendered necessary by the general strategic plan of the allied
armies, the British forces stand to-day formed in line with their French
comrades, ready to attack the enemy. Foiled in their attempt to invest
Paris, the Germans have been driven to move in an easterly and
southeasterly direction with the apparent intention of falling in
strength upon the Fifth French Army. In this operation they are exposing
their right flank and their line of communications to an attack from the
combined Sixth French Army and the British forces.

"I call upon the British army in France to now show the enemy its power
and to push on vigorously to the attack beside the Sixth French Army.

"I am sure I shall not call upon them in vain, but that, on the
contrary, by another manifestation of the magnificent spirit which they
have shown in the past fortnight, they will fall on the enemy's flank
with all their strength and, in unison with the Allies, drive them
back."

As before, the day's fighting began with the efforts of the Sixth French
Army against the Ourcq. Before the Germans could be driven from the east
bank the few villages they occupied on the west bank had to be taken,
and as these were covered by heavy artillery from the farther bank, the
French loss of life was very severe. Yet these several combats--of which
there were as many as there were villages--were stationary. In every
case the Germans were compelled to cross the river; in every case the
artillery made it impossible for the French to follow them.

At dawn also every one of the French armies advanced, and within two or
three hours of sunrise found themselves engaged with the German front.
The spirited order to the troops issued that morning by General Joffre
had left no doubt in the minds of Frenchmen on the importance of the
issue. It read:

"At a moment when a battle on which the welfare of the country depends
is going to begin, I feel it incumbent upon me to remind you all that
this is no longer the time to look behind. All our efforts must be
directed toward attacking and driving back the enemy. An army which can
no longer advance must at all costs keep the ground it has won, and
allow itself to be killed on the spot rather than give way. In the
present circumstance no faltering can be tolerated."

Yet in spite of the powerful efforts of the French armies they were all
held in check, and General Sarrail was beginning to give way.

Though the fighting in the center had been stationary on this sixth of
September, 1914, it had been desperate. D'Esperey was facing the 150,000
men of Von Kluck's army, and the effect of the British attack on Von
Kluck's flank had not yet been felt. He more than held his own, but at
great cost. General Foch, with the Ninth Army, had a double problem, for
he was wrestling with General von Buelow to hold the southern edge of the
Sezanne Plateau, while General von Hausen's Saxon Army was trying to
turn his right flank. A violent attack, which, for the space of over two
hours seemed likely to succeed, was launched by the Duke of Wuerttemberg
against General Langle and the Fourth Army. The attack was repelled, but
the French losses were proportionately great. There could be no denial
that many such attacks could break through the line. General Sarrail's
army, fighting a losing game, showed marvelous stubbornness and
gameness, but even so, it could not resist being pushed south of Fort
Troyon, itself unable to support the battering it might expect to
receive when the German siege guns should be brought into place.

[Illustration: Battle of the Marne--End of German Retreat and the
Intrenched Line on the Aisne River.]

At every point but one the Germans had a right to deem the day
successful. The only reversal had been a minor one before the forest of
Crecy. Yet, of all the generals on that front Von Kluck alone was in a
position to see the gravity of the situation. The British had caught him
on the flank as he tried to pierce the left wing of General
d'Esperey's army, and if he should now retreat, that army could envelop
him and thus catch him between two fires.

Next morning, Monday, September 7, 1914, another glorious summer
morning, saw a resumption of the battle along exactly the same lines,
with the same persistent attack and defense along the eastern part of
the front, and with the British making full use of the blunder made by
the German right. General von Kluck had realized his plight, but, even
so, he had not secured an understanding of the size of the force that
was threatening his flank, and he sent as a reenforcement a single army
corps which had been intrenched near Coulommiers on the Grand Morin. The
British had three full army corps and were well supplied with cavalry
and artillery. Yet Coulommiers was Von Kluck's headquarters and
actually, when the Germans were driven back and the British troops
entered the town, Prince Eitel, the second son of the kaiser; General
von Kluck and his staff were compelled to run down to their motor cars
and escape at top speed along the road to Rebais, leaving their
half-eaten breakfast on the table, and their glasses of wine half
emptied. One of the most dramatic cavalry actions of this period of the
war took place shortly before noon, when one hundred and seventeen
squadrons of cavalry were engaged. In this action the British were
successful, but the German cavalry were tired and harassed, having been
severely handled the day before.

In this engagement between the British and the German right, all the
odds had been in favor of the British, and success meant merely the
grasping at opportunities that presented themselves. Still, by
constantly striking at General von Kluck's exposed flank, his frontal
attack of General d'Esperey was so weakened, that, toward evening at the
close of two days of continuous and very severe fighting, the Fifth
French Army was able to advance and hold the position from La
Ferte-Gaucher to Esternay. The ground gained was valuable but not
essential, yet it made a profound impression.

General d'Esperey's step forward was the Germans' step back. It meant
that the road to Paris was barred. How fully this was realized may be
seen from an order signed by Lieutenant General Tuelff von Tschepe und
Weidenbach and found in the house that had been occupied by the staff of
the Eighth German Army Corps when the victorious French entered
Vitry-le-Francois. The order was dated "September 7, 10:30 p. m." and it
read as follows:

"The object of our long and arduous marches has been achieved. The
principal French troops have been forced to accept battle, after having
been continually forced back. The great decision is undoubtedly at hand.
To-morrow, therefore, the whole strength of the German army, as well as
all that of our Army Corps, are bound to be engaged all along the line
from Paris to Verdun. To save the welfare and the honor of Germany I
expect every officer and man, notwithstanding the hard and heroic fights
of the last few days, to do his duty unswervingly and to the last
breath. Everything depends on the result of to-morrow."

Much did, indeed, depend on the result of the morrow, and for the third
day, again, it was General von Kluck's initial move that brought
disaster to the German side.

Why was it that Von Kluck, instead of marching directly on Paris, as
would have been expected, made a detour, having as his object not the
capital but the French army? It may be said in favor of it that the
decision taken by the German General Staff was in conformity with the
military doctrine of Napoleon. According to this doctrine, a capital,
whatever its importance, is never more than an accessory object,
geographical or political. What is of importance is the strategical
object. The strategical object is the essential, the geographical object
is only accessory. Once the essential object is attained, the accessory
object is acquired of itself. Once the French armies had been beaten,
thrown back, and dispersed, Von Kluck could return to the capital and
take it easily.

Conceive of him, on the other hand, attacking the capital with the army
of Manoury on his right, which constituted a serious menace to his left,
and in front of him the British army and the Fifth French Army; he might
have been caught as in a vise between these forces while all his
activity was being absorbed by his attack on the intrenchments around
Paris.

It has been said that if Von Kluck had won the French capital, as it
seemed he might, the French could not have gained the Battle of the
Marne, and the result of the war might have been very different. It was,
however, no mistake on the part of Von Kluck, no false maneuver on his
part, that determined the victory of the Marne. Von Kluck did exactly
what he ought to have done; the decision taken by the German General
Staff was exactly what it ought to have taken, and what was foreseen
during the whole course of the war.

It was on September 4, 1914, in the morning, that the observations made
by the French cavalry, as well as by British aviators and those of the
army of Manoury and the military government of Paris, made it clear that
the German right (Von Kluck's army) was bending its march toward the
southeast in the direction of Meaux and Coulommiers, leaving behind it
the road to Paris.

At this moment the Fifth French Army of the left was ready to meet the
German forces in a frontal attack, and it was flanked toward the
northwest by the British army and by General Manoury's army to the
northeast of the capital.

The disposition of forces aimed at in General Joffre's order of August
25 was thus accomplished; the French escaped the turning movement, and
they were in a position to counter with an enveloping movement
themselves. The wings of the French forces found support in their
maneuvering in their contact with the strongholds of Paris and Verdun.
Immediately the commander in chief decided to attack, and issued on the
evening of September 4 the series of general orders, which announced the
big offensive and eventually turned the tide of battle.




CHAPTER XV

GERMAN RETREAT


That morning of the 8th, then, saw General von Kluck in full retreat.
His frontal attack on General d'Esperey had failed and the Fifth French
Army had advanced. The British were at his flank, and besides, they had
been able to spare some of their heavy artillery to send to the Sixth
Army under General Maunoury, to enable him to cross the Ourcq. It is by
no means certain that even with this assistance could the Sixth Army
have silenced the terrible fire of those howitzers, but General von
Kluck dared no longer leave his artillery there, it must be taken with
him on his retreat, or become valuable booty. Leaving a few batteries to
guard the crossings of the river, the Ourcq division of the German right
retreated in good order, to rejoin their comrades who had been so
unexpectedly mauled by the British. The honor of this day was,
curiously, not to the victorious, but to the defeated army. Had General
von Kluck done nothing other than conduct his army in retreat as he did,
he would have shown himself an able commander. Sir John French and
General d'Esperey followed up their advantage. The artillery fire of the
British was good and in a running fight, such as this retreat, the light
field artillery of the French did terrible execution. The brunt of the
British fighting was at La Tretoire. General d'Esperey fought steadily
forward all day, driving the retreating army as closely as he could, but
proceeding warily because of General von Kluck's powerful
counterattacks. The fighting was continuous from the first break of
daylight until after dusk had fallen, and it was in the twilight that
the French Army at last carried Montmirail on the Petit Morin, a feat of
strategic value, since it exposed the right flank of Von Buelow's army,
exposed by the retreat of General von Kluck.

From this review of the forced retirement of General von Kluck, it will
be seen that the German right was compelled to sustain an attack at
three points, from the Sixth French Army on the banks of the Ourcq,
from the British army in the region of Coulommiers and from the Fifth
French Army near Courtacon. Each of these attacks was of a widely
different character. The result of this attack has been shown in the
summary of the three days (four days on the Ourcq) which resulted in the
British capture of Coulommiers and in the French capture of Montmirail.
This was General Joffre's counteroffensive, and it developed in detail
almost exactly along the lines that he had laid down.

The scene of the fighting across the west bank of the Ourcq was that of
a wide-open country, gently undulating, dotted with comfortable
farmhouses, and made up of a mosaic of green meadow lands and the
stubble of grain fields. The German heavy guns came into action as soon
as the French offensive developed. Tremendous detonations that shook the
earth, and which were followed by sluggish clouds of an oily smoke
showed where the high-explosive shells had struck. Already, by the
evening of the first day's fighting, there were blazing haystacks and
farmhouses to be seen, and the happy and smiling plain showed scarred
and rent with the mangling hand of war. On the 6th, a sugar refinery,
which had been held as an outpost by a force of 1,800 Germans, was set
on fire by a French battery. The infantry had been successful in getting
to within close range and as the invaders sought to escape from the
burning building, they were picked off one by one by the French
marksmen. The French infantry, well intrenched, suffered scarcely any
loss. It was in brilliant sunshine that the fire broke out, and the
conflagration was so fierce that the empty building sent up little
smoke. The flames scarcely showed in the bright light, and to the
onlooker, it seemed as if some rapid leprous disease was eating up the
building. The situation was horrible for the Germans, either to be
trapped and to perish in the flames, or to face the withering French
infantry fire without any opportunity to fight back. Less than 300 of
the occupants of the refinery won clear.

Wherever the forces met, the slaughter was great and terrible. In the
excitement and the eagerness of the first offensive, the French seemed
to have forgotten the lessons of prudence that the long retreat should
have ingrained into their memory, and they sought to take every village
that was occupied by the Germans with a rush. The loss of life was
greatest at a point four miles east of Meaux. There, on a sharp,
tree-covered ridge, the Germans had intrenched, and gun platforms had
been placed under the screen of the trees. An almost incessant hail of
shrapnel fell on these lines, and the French infantry charges were
repulsed again and again, with but little loss on the German line. But,
meantime, village after village had been attacked by the French and
carried with the bayonet, and on Sunday, September 6th, 1914, that part
of the battles of the Marne which dealt with the driving back of the
Germans to the line of the Ourcq, was in some of its feature like a
hand-to-hand conflict of ages long gone by. Yet, overhead aeroplanes
circled, on every side shells were bursting, the heavy smell of blood on
a hot day mingled with the explosive fumes, but the Zouaves and the
Turcos fought without ceasing and with a force and spirit that went far
to win for the French the cheering news that village after village had
been freed of the invaders.

When the night of that Sunday fell, however, on the line of the Ourcq,
the balm of darkness seemed to be almost as much a forgotten thing as
the blessedness of silence. There was no darkness that night. As the
Germans evacuated each village they set fire to it. The invaders
actually held their machine guns at work in the burning village until
the position was no longer tenable. The wind blew gustily that night,
and all the hours long, the Germans collected their dead, built great
pyres of wood and straw and cremated their comrades who had fallen on
the field of battle.

The next day, at this point, developed fighting of the same general
character. One of the most heroic defenses of General von Kluck's army
was that of the Magdeburg Regiment, which held its advanced post ten
minutes too long and consequently was practically annihilated. Although
the French had everywhere shown themselves superior with the bayonet and
at close infighting, even as the Germans had displayed an incredible
courage in advance under gunfire, and rightly held their heavy
artillery to be the finest in the world, in the melee around the colors
of the Magdeburg Regiment, there was nothing to choose for either side.
The lieutenant color bearer was killed, in the midst of a ring of dead,
and not until almost the whole regiment had been killed under the impact
of far superior numbers, were the tattered colors taken into the French
lines. It was on this day, Tuesday, September 8, 1914, that the British
army realizing that it had turned the flank of General von Kluck's
southern divisions sent its heavy batteries to the pressure on the banks
of the Ourcq.

A graphic picture of the artillery side of the fighting on the Ourcq was
given by one of the artillery officers detached from the British force.

"Meaux was still a town of blank shutters and empty streets when we got
there this morning," he wrote, "but the French sappers had thrown a
plank gangway across the gap in the ruined old bridge, built in A. D.
800, that had survived all the wars of France, only to perish at last in
this one.

"Smack, smack, smack, smack go the French guns; and then, a few seconds
later, four white mushrooms of smoke spring up over the far woods and
slowly the pop, pop, pop, pop, of the distant explosions comes back to
you. But now it is the German gunners' turn. Bang! go his guns, two
miles away; there is a moment of eerie and uncomfortable
silence--uncomfortable because there is just a chance they might have
altered their range--and then, quite close by, over the wood where the
battery is, come the crashes of the bursting shells. They sound like a
Titan's blows on a gigantic kettle filled with tons of old iron.

"At Trilport there is a yawning gap, where one arch of the railway
bridge used to be, with a solitary bent rail still lying across it. And,
among the wreckage of the bridge below, lying on its side and more than
half beneath the water, is the smashed and splintered ruin of a closed
motor car.

"Beyond the town was a ridge on which the French batteries were posted.
We could see the ammunition wagons parked on the reverse <DW72> of the
hill. More were moving up to join them.

"The village beyond, Penchard, was thronged with troops and blocked with
ambulance wagons and ammunition carts.

"Through the rank grass at the side came tramping a long file of dusty,
sweating, wearied men. They carried long spades and picks as well as
their rifles. They had come out of the firing line and were going back
to Penchard for food.

"Topping the next ridge ... the hill <DW72>s steeply down to the hamlet
of Chamvery, just below us. The battery which I mentioned just now is in
the wood on this side of it to our right. The Zouaves' firing line is
lying flat on the hillside a little way beyond the village, and behind
them, farther down the hill, are thick lines of supports in the cover of
intrenchments. It is a spectacle entirely typical of a modern battle,
for there is scarcely anything to see at all. If it were not for those
shells being tossed to and fro on the right there, and an occasional
splutter of rifle fire, one might easily suppose that the lines of
blue-coated men lying about on the stubble were all dozing in the hot
afternoon sun.

"Even when some of them move they seem to do it lazily, to saunter
rather than to walk.... It is only in the cinematograph or on the
comparatively rare occasions of close fighting at short range that men
rush about dramatically. For one thing, they are too tired to hurry; and
anyhow, what is the use of running when a shell may burst any minute
anywhere in the square mile you happen to be on?

"I walked with the company officers who were planning a fresh advance,
map in hand. They had gained the village in which we were that morning,
but at tremendous loss.

"'Out of my company of 220,' said one captain, 'there are only 100 left.
It's the same story everywhere--the German machine guns. Their fire
simply clears the ground like a razor. You just can't understand how
anyone gets away alive. I've had men fall at my right hand and my left.
You can't look anywhere, as you advance, without seeing men dropping. Of
our four officers, two are wounded and one dead. I am left alone in
command.'"

This hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of villages on the west
bank of the Marne, this heavy loss to the French troops by the German
artillery, and this sudden check at the Ourcq itself, until British
heavy batteries were sent, marks the character of what may be called the
battle of the Ourcq, the westernmost of the battles of the Marne. As
General von Kluck had divided his forces, in order to carry out the
attempt to pierce the left of General d'Esperey's army, the German
forces in the battle of the Ourcq were outnumbered almost three to one.
In spite of these odds against them, the extreme German right held for
four days the position it had been given to hold.




CHAPTER XVI

CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE


Remembering again the general outline of General von Kluck's plan, that
of executing a diagonal movement with 150,000 of his men to attack the
easternmost point of the Fifth Army, and possibly to envelop it by a
flank movement, the continuation of the Battle of the Marne may be
treated with more detail. This part is called by some the Battle of
Coulommiers.

In this battle there was as great a change in morale as in the battle of
the Ourcq. There, the French had been stirred to high endeavor by the
realization that the word to advance had at last been given. This also
operated in part on the British in the battle of Coulommiers, but, in
addition, there was another very important factor.

The dawn of that Sunday summer morning, September 6, 1914, was one of
great exhilaration for the British forces. The offensive was begun, the
time for striking back had come, and every column resounded with
marching choruses. The countryside was lovely, as had been all the
countryside through which the retreating armies had passed, gay with the
little French homesteads, flower decked and smiling, heavily laden
orchards, and rich grain fields, some as yet uncut, some newly stacked.
Women and children, with here and there an old man, ran along the line
of march ministering to the wants of their defenders. There was no need
for language, as courtesy and gratitude are universal, and the English
were fighting for "La Belle France." So the morning wore on.

Through the forested region of Crecy the British passed, and it has been
told hereinbefore how they surprised the two cavalry commands thrust out
as scouts by General von Kluck. But, as they reached the land that had
been occupied by the German hosts, the bearing of the men changed, even
as the country changed. The simple homes of the peasants were in ashes,
every house that had showed traces of comfort had been sacked or gutted
with fire. Between noon and three o'clock in the afternoon of that day
three burned churches were passed. The songs stopped. A black silence
fell upon the ranks. Bloody business was afoot.

It was in the middle of the afternoon, a slumbrous harvest afternoon,
that a big gun boomed in the distance, and the shell shrieked dolefully
through the air, its vicious whine ceasing with a tremendous sudden roar
as it burst behind the advancing British lines. On the instant, Sir John
French's batteries almost wiped out the German cavalry, and ten minutes
had not elapsed before the full artillery on both sides had begun a
terrific fire that was stunning to the senses. Under cover of their own
fire, the British infantry advanced and hurled themselves against the
outer line of General von Kluck's Second Army. The attack failed. The
British were driven back, but though the loss of life was sharp, it was
not great, as the British commander had but advanced his men to test out
the invader's strength. The British artillery was well placed, and under
its cover the British made a second advance, this time successful. The
Germans replied with a counterattack which was repulsed, but in that
forty minutes 10,000 men had fallen.

A dispatch has been quoted from a French soldier, showing the terrible
havoc caused by the German machine guns, and a letter from a German
officer, published in the "Intelligenzblatt" of Berne pays a like
tribute to the artillery of the Allies. Speaking of this very section of
the battle front, he wrote:

"We were obliged to retreat as the English were attempting a turning
movement, which was discovered by our airmen. [This refers to the
advance of the British First Army Corps under Sir Douglas Haig in the
direction of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, which, if it could have been
successfully carried out, would have meant the entire loss of General
von Kluck's southern army.] During the last two hours we were
continually exposed to the fire of the enemy's artillery, for our
artillery had all either been put out of action or had retreated and had
ceased to fire. [This dispatch was evidently, therefore, written toward
the end of the second day, on Monday, September 7, 1914, when General
von Kluck realized that his forward drive had failed and that he must
fall back.]

"The enemy's airmen flew above us, describing two circles, which means,
'there is infantry here.' The enemy's artillery mowed the ground with
its fire. In one minute's time I counted forty shells. The shrapnel
exploded nearer and nearer; at last it reached our ranks. I quickly
hugged a knapsack to my stomach in order to protect myself as best I
could. The shrieks of the wounded rang out on all sides. Tears came to
my eyes when I heard the poor devils moaning with pain. The dust, the
smoke, and the stench of the powder were suffocating.

"An order rang out, and bending as low as possible, we started up. We
had to pass right in the line of fire. The men began to fall like
ninepins. God be thanked that I was able to run as I did. I thought my
heart would burst, and was about to throw myself on the ground, unable
to continue, when your image and that of Bolli rose before my eyes, and
I ran on.

"At last we reached our batteries. Three guns were smashed to pieces,
and the gun carriages were burned. We halted for a few seconds to take
breath. And all the time that whistling and banging of the shells
continued. It is a wonder one is not driven mad."

Admiration cannot be withheld from General von Kluck for his splendid
fight at the battle of Coulommiers. He was out-generaled, for one thing,
because of his plan--or his orders--to strike a southeasterly blow; he
was outmaneuvered by the presence of a vastly larger British force than
he had any reason to expect, and he was outnumbered almost two to one.

Through the apple and pear orchards of La Tretoire the battle was
sanguinary; the British (reenforced on September 7, 1914, by some French
divisions) swept through the terrain in widely extended lines, for close
formation was not to be thought of with artillery and machine guns in
front. It was bitter fighting, and the German right contested every inch
of ground stubbornly. Once, indeed, it seemed that General von Kluck
would turn the tables. He rapidly collected his retreating troops, and
with unparalleled suddenness hurled them back upon the advancing First
Corps under Sir Douglas Haig. Aeroplane scouts decided the issue. Had
the British been compelled to await the onset, or had they been forced
to depend on cavalry patrols, there would have been no opportunity to
resist that revengeful onslaught. But no sooner had the Germans begun to
re-form than Sir Douglas Haig moved his machine guns to the front and
fell back a few hundred yards to a better position. This happened on
September 8, 1914, and may be regarded as the last offensive move made
by General von Kluck's army in the west. On that same day Coulommiers
was invested and Prince Eitel compelled to flee, and the battle of
Coulommiers was won.




CHAPTER XVII

CONTINUATION OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE


The third part of the battle of the Marne, called by some the Battle of
Montmirail, was not marked by special incident. General d'Esperey's part
was to hold firm, and this he did. Not only by reason of the British
assistance on the left, but also because the strong army of General Foch
to the right was a new army, of greater strength than was known to
General von Moltke and the German General Staff. The battle of
Montmirail was won by the steady resistance of the Fifth Army to the
hammer blows of the German right, and to the quick advantage seized by
General d'Esperey when the British weakened the flank of the force
opposing him. On September 8, 1914, General d'Esperey had not only held
his ground, but had driven General von Kluck back across the Grand Morin
River at La Ferte-Gaucher, and also across the Petit Morin at
Montmirail. Since the British had butted the Germans back from the Petit
Morin at La Tretoire, these three days of fighting in the battles of
Coulommiers and Montmirail had won the Allies advanced positions across
two rivers, and had so weakened the German right that it was compelled
to fall back on the main army and forego its important strategic
advantage on the east bank of the Ourcq River.

These three battles, Ourcq, Coulommiers, and Montmirail, constitute the
recoil from Paris, and at the same time they constitute the defeat of
what was hereinbefore shown to be one of the four fundamentals of the
great German campaign plan. With the situation thus cleared, so to
speak, one may now pass to the details of the second part of the German
plan, which was to engage the powerful Ninth and Fourth Armies, under
the command of Generals Foch and Langle, respectively, to break through
them, if possible, but at all hazards to keep them sufficiently menaced
to disable General Joffre from sending reenforcements therefrom to the
army of General Sarrail, on which the whole force of the army of the
crown prince was to be hurled.

The next section of the Allied armies, then, was General Foch's Ninth
Army, which encountered the German drive at Fere Champenoise, and which
resulted in the severe handling of General von Buelow's forces. With
characteristic perception of the difference between a greater and a
lesser encounter, General Foch called his share of the battles of the
Marne, the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond." This did not culminate
until Wednesday, September 9, 1914, so that the German retreat there was
one day later than the final retreat of General von Kluck.

The clash between the armies of General von Buelow and of General Foch
began, as did the battle wrath along the whole front, at dawn of that
fateful Sunday, September 5, 1914. General Foch, a well-known writer on
strategy, had devised his army for defense. He was well supplied with
the famous 75-millimeter guns, holding them massed in the center of his
line. His extreme right and left were mobile and thrown partly forward
to feel the attack of the invading army. But, in spite of all
preparations, General Foch found himself hard-set to hold his own on
September 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1914. The battle continued incessantly, by
night as well as by day, for the artillerists had found each other's
range. There was comparatively little hand-to-hand fighting at this
point, General Foch only once being successful in luring the Germans to
within close firing range. The results were withering, and General von
Buelow did not attempt it a second time. There seems reason to believe
that General von Buelow had counted upon acting as a reserve force to
General von Kluck during the latter's advance, and that, consequently,
he did not think it prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the
situation to westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fere
Champenoise on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th.

It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail on
the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Buelow's army
had been exposed by the advance of General d'Esperey and the retreat of
General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch, and despite the
danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile left like a great
tongue. That night the weather turned stormy, facilitating this move. At
one o'clock in the morning, the statement has been made, word reached
General Foch indirectly that air patrols had observed a gap in the
alignment of the German armies between General von Buelow's left and
General von Hausen's right.

During the darkness and the rain, therefore, General Foch had worked two
complete surprises on General von Buelow. He had enveloped the German
commander's right flank, and was safely ensconced there with General
d'Esperey's army behind him, since the latter had by now advanced to
Montmirail. At the same time he had thrust a wedge between Von Buelow and
General von Hausen, threatening General von Buelow's left flank as well.
The first was a seizure of an opportunity, executed with military
promptness, the second was a bold _coup_, and its risk might well have
appalled a less experienced general.

Considering the westernmost of these movements first, it will be seen at
once how the enveloping action brought about the "Affair of the Marshes
of St. Gond." General von Buelow's army was stretched in an arc around
the marshes, which, it will be remembered, have been described as a
pocket of clay, low-lying lands mainly reclaimed, but which become miry
during heavy rains. It was General von Buelow's misfortune, that, on the
very night that his flank was exposed, there should come a torrential
downpour. These same marshes had figured more than once before in
France's military history, and General Foch, as a master strategist, was
determined that they should serve again. When the rain came, he thanked
his lucky stars and acted on the instant.

When the morning of September 9, 1914, dawned, the left wing of General
Foch's army was not only covering the exposed flank of General von
Buelow's forces, but parts of it were two miles to the rear. Under the
driving rain, morning broke slowly, and almost before a sodden and
rain-soaked world could awake to the fact that day had come, General
Foch had nipped the rear of the flank of the opposing army, and was
bending the arc in upon itself. Under normal circumstances, such an
action would tend but to strengthen the army thus attacked, since it
brings all parts of the army into closer communication. But General Foch
knew that the disadvantages of the ground would more than compensate for
this, since the two horns of General von Buelow's army could not combine
without crossing those marshes, now boggy enough, and growing boggier
every second. The task was harder than General Foch anticipated, for the
same rainy conditions that provided a pitfall for the Germans were also
a manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers. But,
in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the flank broke
and gave way, and two entire corps from General von Buelow's right were
precipitated into the marshes. Forty guns were taken--to that time the
largest capture of artillery made by the Allies--and a number of
prisoners. Hundreds perished miserably, but General Foch held back his
artillery from an indiscriminate slaughter of men made helpless in the
slimy mud. Thus ended the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond," which
broke still further the German right wing.

Thanks to General Foch's further activities, General von Buelow had
troubles upon his left wing. When dawn of this same day of torrential
rain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that runs from Mareuil
to Fere-Champenoise, at which point lay the left of General von Buelow's
army, it witnessed a number of 75-millimeter guns on selected gun sites
commanding the right flank of the German right center. General Foch's
daring, the success of the maneuver, and the fact that the conduct of
all the French armies on that day and the day following seems to be with
the full cognizance of this venture, led inevitably to the conclusion
that those brilliant feats, conceived by General Foch, had been
communicated to General Joffre in time for the French General Staff to
direct the French armies to the right and left of General Foch to
cooperate with his action. Had General Foch been less ably supported,
his wedge might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides.
But General Foch's main army to the west kept General von Buelow busy,
and General Langle's army to the east fought too stubbornly for the Duke
of Wuerttemberg to dare detach any forces for the relief of General von
Buelow. General von Hausen's Saxon Army was weak, at best.

What were the forces that operated to make this particular point so weak
are not generally known. As, however, the divisions from Alsace were
much in evidence three or four days later, it is more than probable that
these divisions were intended for service at this point, and also to
reenforce General von Kluck's army, but that, by the quick offensive
assumed by General Joffre on the Ourcq, and, owing to the roundabout
nature of the German means of communication, these expected
reenforcements had not arrived. The German official dispatches point out
that General von Buelow's retreat was necessitated by the retreat of
General von Kluck. Of this there is no doubt, but even military
necessity does not quite explain why General von Buelow bolted so
precipitately. His losses were fearful, and the offensive of General
Foch rendered it necessary for the Germans to fall back on the Aisne.

The armies of the Duke of Wuerttemberg and of the crown prince may be
considered together, for they were combined in an effort to pierce the
French line near the angle at Bar-le-Duc. General Langle held on
desperately against the repeated attacks of the Duke of Wuerttemberg.
Ground was lost and recovered, lost again and recovered, and every
trifling vantage point of ground was fought for with a bitter intensity.
Though active, with all the other armies, on September 5 and 6, 1914, it
was not until September 7 that General Langle found himself strained to
his utmost nerve. If he could hold, he could do no more, and when night
fell on September 7, no person was more relieved than General Langle.
Yet the next day was even worse. Instead of slackening in the evil
weather, the German drive became more furious. The exhausted Fourth Army
fought as though in a hideous nightmare, defended their lines in a
sullen obstinacy that seemed almost stuporous, and countercharged in a
blind frenzy that approached to delirium. It was doubtful if General
Langle's army could hold out much longer. But, when General von Buelow
was compelled to retreat, when General Foch turned his attention to
General von Hausen's Saxon Army, and when General Joffre found himself
in a position to rush reenforcements and reserves to the aid of General
Langle, a new color was given to the affair. The defense stiffened, and
as rapidly as it stiffened, so much the more did it become patent that
the Duke of Wuerttemberg could not afford to be in an exposed position
far in advance of all the other attacking armies. Wednesday, September
9, 1914, revealed to the German center the need of falling back on the
crown prince's army, which was the pivot on which the whole campaign
swung.

Meantime, the crown prince's army had been steadily victorious. The weak
French army under General Sarrail had been pushed back, yielding only
foot by foot, back, back, along the rugged hill country of the Meuse. A
determined stand was made to protect the little fort of Troyon, ten
miles south of Verdun, for had the Germans succeeded in taking this,
Verdun would have been surrounded. No army and no generalship could have
done more than the Third Army and General Sarrail did, but they could
not hold their ground before Troyon. On September 7, 1914, the way to
Troyon was open, and the army of the crown prince prepared to demolish
it. Then came September 9, 1914, when the allied successes in the
western part of the Marne valley allowed them to send reenforcements.
Thus the Third Army was perceptibly strengthened and hope for Troyon
grew. One day more, certainly two days more, and nothing could have
saved Troyon, but with the whole German line in retreat, the army of the
crown prince could not be left on the advance.

Incredible though it may seem, when the army of the crown prince
besieging Troyon withdrew, that little fort was a mere heap of ruins.
There were exactly forty-four men left in the fort and four serviceable
guns. Even a small storming party could have carried it without the
least trouble, and its natural strength could have been fortified in
such wise as to make it a pivotal point from which to harry Verdun.

At the extreme east, on that ring of wooded heights known as the Grande
Couronne de Nancy, and drawn up across the Gap of Nancy, the Second
French Army, under General de Castelnau, successfully resisted the drive
of the Crown Prince of Bavaria. Great hopes had been placed on this
attack, and on September 7, 1914, the German Emperor had viewed the
fight at Nancy from one of the neighboring heights. Surely a victory for
the German arms might come either at the point where stood the German
Emperor or where led the crown prince. But the fortunes of war decided
otherwise. Far from losing at Nancy, the French took the offensive.
After an artillery duel of terrific magnitude, they drove the Bavarian
army from the forests of Champenous and took Amance. The line of the
Meurthe was then found untenable by the Germans, and on September 12,
1914, General de Castelnau reoccupied the town of Luneville, which had
been in the hands of the Germans since August 22, 1914.

With General von Kluck in retreat on September 7, 1914, General von
Buelow hastening to the rear on September 8, 1914, with the Duke of
Wuerttemberg falling back on September 9, 1914, and the Imperial Crown
Prince and the Bavarian Crown Prince retreating to an inner ring of
defense on September 10, 1914, the battles of the Marne may, in a
measure, be said to have concluded. As, however, the new alignments were
made mainly by reason of the topographical relationships of the Marne
and the Aisne Rivers and the territory contiguous thereto, it is perhaps
more in keeping with the movement to carry forward the German retreat
across the Marne as a part of the same group of conflicts.




CHAPTER XVIII

OTHER ASPECTS OF THE BATTLE OF THE MARNE


In dealing with a battle as important as that of the Marne points of
view are valuable. We therefore follow with an account of its general
course and description of its main features by a French military writer,
whose knowledge is based on information that is official.

"Before the German armies," he says, "became engulfed in the vast
depression that stretches from Paris to Verdun, General Joffre with
admirable foresight had brought together a powerful army commanded by
General Manoury and having as its support the fortified camp of Paris.
As soon as General von Kluck, turning momentarily from the road to the
French capital and bending his march to the southeast, laid bare his
right wing, General Joffre vigorously launched against his flank the
entire army of General Manoury. The brilliant offensive of this army
achieved success from the beginning; it threw back the German forces.
Von Kluck perceived the danger that threatened him, and the danger was
serious, for it only required that Manoury should advance a little
further and he would have been almost totally defeated. Resolutely,
energetically, and with a sang-froid to which homage must be rendered,
Von Kluck proceeded to circumvent this danger. He ordered back to the
north two of his army corps, recrossed the Marne, and threw himself with
intrepidity on Manoury.

"But the retreat of these two army corps allowed General French and
General Franchet d'Esperey both to drive forward vigorously. Something
resembling the phenomenon of a whirlwind then took place in the German
ranks. The British army made progress toward the north, the Fifth French
Army, commanded by General Franchet d'Esperey, did the same. General
Manoury, assisted by all the troops that General Gallieni was able
rapidly to put at his disposal, made headway against the furious
onslaught of Von Kluck. Thus the entire German right found itself in a
most critical situation. It could not overcome Manoury, who was
threatening its communications, and on the other hand it found itself
powerless to resist the victorious advance of Generals French and de
Franchet d'Esperey.

"It was the critical moment of the battle. The German General Staff
decided that there was only one method of putting an end to it, and that
was to direct against the army of General Foch in the center an
offensive so violent that the center would be pierced and the French
armies cut in two. If this attack succeeded it would free at once the
German right and separate into two impotent parts the entire French
military force. During the 7th, 8th, and 9th of September the Imperial
Prussian Guard directed to the compassing of that end all its energy and
courage. All in vain. General Foch not only checked the German
onslaught, but drove it back. Thus the French center was not pierced,
Von Kluck was not relieved, and he found himself in a position that grew
more and more critical. The general retreat of the German armies was the
inevitable result. To this decision the German General Staff came, and
on the evening of September 9 orders were given to all the armies of the
right and center to retire sixty kilometers to the rear. Thus the battle
of the Marne was won by the French."

The writer then goes on to say: "It was on September 5, toward the end
of the morning, that the general order of General Joffre, leading to the
great battle, reached the French armies. Each separate army immediately
turned and vigorously engaged in battle. The army of Manoury, the first
to get ready, sprang forward to the attack. It thrust back the German
forces which were at first inferior in number, and it attained on the
evening of the 5th the Pinchard--St. Soulplet--Ver front; but Von Kluck
threw two army corps over the Marne and hurled himself on Manoury. He
summoned from Compiegne all the reenforcements at his disposal, and he
placed all his heavy artillery between Vareddes and May-en-Multien.
During the day of September 6th Manoury made headway toward the Ourcq.
On the following day he advanced at a lesser pace on its left bank,
taking and then losing the villages of Marcilly and Chambry--murderous
struggles maintained amid terrible heat. General Gallieni, who followed
the battle with the utmost attention, hurriedly came to the assistance
of Manoury; he sent to him on the 7th and 8th the Seventh Division,
which had just arrived at Paris, half of the division being transferred
by rail, the other half by means of thousands of automobiles
requisitioned for the purpose. General Joffre likewise sent to Manoury
the Fourth Army Corps, recruited from the Third Army, though an almost
entire division of it was called for by the British to safeguard the
junction of forces.

"The day of September 8 turned out the most arduous for Manoury; the
Germans, making attacks of extreme violence, won some success. They
occupied Betz, Thury-en-Vallois and Nanteuil-le-Haudouin. Von Kluck
attacked all his force on the right, and it was at that time he who
threatened Manoury with an encircling movement. The Fourth French Army
Corps, sent forward at full speed by General Joffre and arriving at the
spot, had the order to allow itself to be killed to the last man, but to
maintain its ground. It maintained it. It succeeded toward evening in
checking the advance of the Germans. In a brilliant action the army of
Manoury took three standards. It rallied the main body of its forces on
the left and prepared for a new attack.

"During this time the British army, following on the retreat of part of
the forces of Von Kluck, was able to make headway toward the north. It
was the same with the Fifth French Army. The British, leaving behind it
on September 6 the Rosoy--Lagny line, reached in the evening the south
bank of the Great Morin. On the 7th and 8th they continued their march;
on the 9th they debouched to the north of the Marne below Chateau
Thierry, flanking the German forces which on that day were opposing the
army of Manoury. It was then that the German forces began to retreat,
while the British army, pursuing the enemy, took seven cannon and many
prisoners and reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval. The
British army continued till before Coulommiers, and after a brilliant
struggle forced the passage of the Little Morin. The Fifth French Army
under General Franchet d'Esperey made the same advance. It drove back
the three active army corps of the Germans and the reserve corps that it
found facing it. On September 7 it pressed forward to the
Courtacon--Cerneux--Monceaux--les--Provins--Courgivaux--Esternay line.
During the days that followed it reached and crossed the Marne,
capturing in fierce combats some howitzers and machine guns.

"General Foch showed admirable sang-froid and energy. At the most
critical moment, the decisive hour of the battle, he accomplished a
magnificent maneuver, which is known under the name of the _maneuver of
Fere Champenoise_. Foch noted a rift between the German army of Von
Buelow and that of Von Hausen. The German Guard was engaged with the
Tenth Division of the reserve in the region of the marshes of St. Gond.

"On September 9 Foch resolutely threw into this rift the Forty-Second
Division under General Grossetti, which was at his left, and his army
corps of the left. He thus made a flank attack on the German forces,
notably the Guard which had bent back his army corps on the right. The
effect produced by the flank attack of Manoury on the right of General
von Kluck's army was renewed here. The enemy, taken aback by this
audacious maneuver, did not resist and made a precipitate retreat. On
the evening of the 9th the game was thus lost to the Germans. Their
armies of the right and of the center were beaten and the retreat
followed. The Imperial Guard left in the marshes of St. Gond more than
8,000 men and almost all its artillery. Victory henceforth began to
perch on the Allied banners over all the vast battle field."

Such was this battle of seven days in which almost 3,000,000 men were
engaged. If it is examined in its ensemble, it will be seen that each
French army advanced step by step, opening up the road to the
neighboring army, which immediately gave it support, and then striking
at the flank of the enemy which the other attacked in front. The efforts
of the one were closely coordinated with the efforts of the other. A
deep unity of ideas, of methods, and of courage animated the whole
Allied line.




CHAPTER XIX

"CROSSING THE AISNE"


In order to gain a clear idea of what was involved in the feat of
"crossing the Aisne," which more than one expert has declared to be the
greatest military feat in river crossing in the history of arms, it is
well to look at the topography of that point, first in its relation to
the whole German line, and, second, in its relation to possible attack
in September, 1914.

The prepared positions on the Aisne to which the Germans fell back after
the battle of the Marne, were along a line of exceptionally strong
natural barriers. The line extends from a point north of Verdun, on the
heights of the Meuse, across the wooded country of the Argonne and the
plain of Champagne to Rheims, thence northwest to Brimont, crossing the
Aisne near its confluence with the Suippe, and from thence proceeding to
Craonne, whence it takes a westerly course along the heights of the
Aisne to the Forest of the Eagle, north of Compiegne. The eastern end of
this line has already been described in connection with the battles of
the Marne, and it is the western section of this line which now demands
consideration. Just as the River Marne was taken as a basis for the
consideration of the topography of the battles that centered round the
crossing of the Ourcq, Grand Morin, Petit Morin, and the Marne, so the
Aisne is naturally the most important determinant in the problems of its
crossing.

The River Aisne rises in the Argonne, southwest of Verdun. Through the
Champagne region its banks are of gradual <DW72>, but shortly after it
passes Rethel, on its westerly course, the configuration changes
sharply, and at Craonne the bluffs overlooking the river are 450 feet
high. It is easy to see what an inaccessible barrier is made by such a
line of cliffs. For forty miles this line of bluffs continues, almost
reaching to Compiegne, where the Aisne enters the Oise. Not only are the
banks of the Aisne thus guarded by steep bluffs, but the character of
those bluffs is peculiarly fitted for military purposes. For long
stretches along the north side the cliffs stand sheer and have spurs
that dip down sharply to the valley. The ridge, or the top of the bluff,
which looks from below like the scarp of a great plateau, lies at an
average of a mile or more from the stream. Many of these spurs jut out
in such a way that if fortified they could enfilade up and downstream.
To add to the military value of such a barrier the edge of the scarp is
heavily wooded, while the lower <DW72>s are steep and grassy, with small
woods at irregular intervals. Even from the high ground on the south
bank of the stream, the top of the plateau on the north cannot be seen,
and from below it is effectually cloaked.

Two tributaries are to be considered in this river valley which thus
forms so natural a post of defense. Both flow in from the south, the
Suippe, which joins the main stream at Neufchatel-sur-Aisne and the
Vesle, on which stands the ancient city of Rheims. This river joins the
Aisne a little over seven miles east of Soissons, which is itself twenty
miles east of Compiegne.

The line taken by the German armies for their stand was not the river
itself, but the northern ridge. At no place more than a mile and a half
from the river, it was always within gunfire of any crossing. Every
place of crossing was commanded by a spur. Every road on the north bank
was in their hands, every road on the south bank curved upward so as to
be a fair mark for their artillery. As the German drive advanced, a huge
body of sappers and miners had been left behind to fortify this Aisne
line, and the system developed was much the same along its entire
distance.

There were two lines of barbed-wire entanglements, one in the bed of the
stream which would prevent fording or swimming, and which, being under
water, could not easily be destroyed by gunfire from the southern bank.
Above this was a heavy chevaux-de-frise and barbed-wire entanglement,
partly sunk and concealed from view; in many places pitted and covered
with brushwood. Above this, following approximately a thirty-foot
contour, came a line of trenches for infantry, and fifty yards behind a
second line of trenches, commanding a further elevation of fifty feet.
Two-thirds of the way up the hill came the trench-living quarters, the
kitchens, the bakeries, the dormitories, and so forth, and the crest of
the hill bristled along its entire length with field guns, effectually
screened by trees. On the further side of the ridge, in chalk pits, were
the great howitzers, tossing their huge shells over the ridge and its
defenses into the river itself, and even on the south bank beyond.
Truly, a position of power, and one that the boldest of troops might
hesitate to attack.

It is quite possible that had the entire strength of the German position
been known, no attempt to cross would have been made, but there was
always a possibility that the counterchecks of the German army were no
more than the rear-guard actions of the three or four days immediately
preceding. Yet Sir John French seems to have expected the true state of
affairs, for he remarks in his dispatches:

"The battles of the Marne, which lasted from the morning of the 6th to
the evening of the 10th, had hardly ended in the precipitate flight of
the enemy when we were brought face to face with a position of
extraordinary strength, carefully intrenched and prepared for defense by
an army and staff which are thorough adepts in such work."

Yet it was evident that if the armies of the Allies were to secure any
lasting benefit from the battles of the Marne, they must dislodge the
invading hosts from their new vantage ground. It was obvious that the
task was one of great peril and one necessarily likely to be attended
with heavy loss of life. Sir John French, knowing the tactical value of
driving a fleeing army hard, determined on forcing the issue without
delay.

Before proceeding to recount in detail the events of that six days'
battle of the Aisne, which little by little solidified into an impasse,
it might be well to trace the new positions that had been taken by the
respective armies engaged in the struggle for the supremacy of western
Europe. General von Kluck, still in charge of the First German Army, was
in control of the western section from the Forest of the Eagle to the
plateau of Craonne. He had forced his men to almost superhuman efforts,
and by midnight of September 11 he had succeeded in getting most of his
artillery across the Aisne, at Soissons, and had whipped his infantry
into place on the heights north of the stream. That, with his exhausted
troops, he succeeded remains still a tribute to his power as a
commander. But the men were done. Further attack meant rout. His
salvation lay in his heavy field guns and howitzers, an arm of the
service in which the French army, under General Maunoury (and General
Pau, who had taken a superior command during the turning of the German
drive at the Marne), was notoriously weak. Still there was little
comfort there, for the British army was well supplied with heavy
artillery, and the Fifth French Army of General d'Esperey, also coming
up to confront him, was not entirely lacking in this branch of the
service.

General von Buelow's army was combined with that of General von Hausen,
who fell ill and was retired from his command. Against this combined
army was ranged the victorious and still fresh army of General Foch,
lacking two corps, which had been detached for reserves elsewhere. One
of these corps apparently went to the aid of General Sarrail, whose
stand was still a weak point in the Allies' line. General Sarrail,
however, was now better supported by the movement of General Langle with
the Fourth French Army, who advanced toward Troyon and confronted the
combined armies of the Imperial Crown Prince and the Duke of
Wuerttemberg. This released General Sarrail to his task of intrenching
and enlarging the defenses about Verdun, the importance of which had
become more poignant than ever before in the events of the past week.
The far eastern end of the line remained unchanged.

The credit for the crossing of the Aisne lies with the British troops.
The battles of the Marne had thrust Sir John French into a prominent
position, wherein he was able to achieve a much-desired result without
any great loss of life. But the battle of the Aisne was different. It
was a magnificent effort boldly carried out, and, as was afterward
learned, it could not have been successful had the onset been delayed
even one day.

General Maunoury's army, encamped in the forest of the Compiegne, was
again the first to give battle, as it had been in the battles of the
Marne. Using some heavy guns that had been sent on from Paris, in
addition to the batteries that had been lent him by the British, he
secured some well-planned artillery positions on the south bank, and
spent the morning in a long-range duel with the German gunners near
Soissons. The Germans had not all taken up their positions on the north
side of the Aisne on the morning of September 12, 1914, and the heavy
battery of the Fourth British Division did good service early in the
morning, dislodging some of these before it wheeled in line beside the
big French guns, in an endeavor to shell the trenches and level the
barbed-wire entanglements, that an opportunity might be made to cross.
But the results were not encouraging of success, for the reply from the
further shore was terrific. General von Kluck's army might be worn out,
but the iron throats of his guns were untiring, and he knew that huge
reenforcements were on the way.




CHAPTER XX

FIRST DAY'S BATTLES


That first day of the battle of the Aisne, September 12, 1914, which was
indeed rather preparatory than actual, was also marked by some unusually
brilliant cavalry work in General Allenby's division. The German line
was on the farther side of the Aisne, but all the hill country between
the Marne and the Aisne had to be cleared of the powerful rear guards of
the retreating German army, or perhaps it would be more correct to say
the advance guards of the new German line. Early in the morning the
cavalry under General Allenby swept out from the town of Braisne on the
Vesle and harried in every direction the strong detachments that had
been sent forward, driving them back to the Aisne. Over the high wooded
ridge between the Vesle and the Aisne the Germans were driven back, and
the Third Division, under General Hamilton, supported the cavalry in
force, so that, by the evening, General Hamilton's division was able to
camp below the hill of Brenelle, and even, before night fell, to get
their guns upon that height, from which they could reply to the German
batteries snugly ensconced upon the frowning ridge on the northern bank
of the Aisne.

The Fifth British Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, found itself in
a tight place at the confluence of the Vesle and Aisne Rivers, for at
that point lay a stretch of flat bottomland exposed to the German fire.
By a ruse, which returned upon their own heads, the Germans had
preserved one bridge across the Aisne, the bridge at Conde. This was
done as a lure to Sir Charles Fergusson's forces, but even more so it
was intended as a sallying point as soon as the German army deemed
itself in a position to attack again. The bridge was destined to figure
in the events of the great conflict when the grapple should come.

One of the most graphic of all the accounts of the fighting of that day
was from the pen of a major in the British field artillery, and it
presented in sharp and vivid colors how the field artillery joined with
the cavalry in clearing the German troops from the hills between the
Marne and the Aisne. He wrote:

"We got the order to go off and join a battery under Colonel ----'s
orders. We came en route under heavy shrapnel fire on the road. I gave
the order to walk, as the horses had hardly had any food for a couple of
days, and also I wanted to steady the show. I can't say I enjoyed
walking along at the head with old ---- behind me, especially when six
shrapnel burst right in front of us. We got there just in time, rushed
into action, and opened fire on a German counterattack at short range,
destroying the lot so far as I could see.

"We then moved slightly to another position to take on a valley, down
which they were attacking, and were at it the whole day, firing about
900 rounds into quantities of German attacks and counterattacks. They
cannot stand the shrapnel, and the moment I got one on them they turned
and bolted back to the wood.

"I got on to their trenches; one shell dropped in. [It would appear from
this that some of the advance guards of the new defense line were either
intrenching or occupying trenches made during the battles of the Marne,
probably the latter, or else the writer is speaking of the actions of
his battery on the 10th as well as the 12th before the invaders had
retreated across the Marne.] I was enfilading them, and they tore out of
the trenches, and so on, each trench in turn, and fell in hundreds.
Also, through the range finder, ---- saw I'd hit a machine gun, and they
had abandoned it and another. So it went all day, shells and bullets
humming around, but only one of my staff horses was hit. Our infantry
advancing and retiring--others advancing and coming back--Germans doing
likewise, a hellish din of shell fire, and me pouring in fire whenever I
could see them.

"At last I got six shrapnel into a wood and cleared a heap of them out
and got into them with shrapnel. It was awful! The sergeant major put
his hand up to his head and said: "Oh, sir, it's terrible!" That seemed
to settle them, and at last we saw the infantry advancing to their
positions without resistance.

"Now was my chance. I determined to get those machine guns if I could,
as otherwise the infantry would. So I left ---- in command and got the
trumpeter, sergeant major, and six men with six rifles, and went forward
'to reconnoiter,' as I reported to ---- after I had gone. It was a weird
ride, through thick black woods, holding my revolver ready, going in
front with the little trumpeter behind and the others following some way
in the rear. We passed some very bad sights, and knew the woods were
full of Germans who were afraid to get away on account of the dreaded
shell fire. We got in front of our infantry, who were going to fire at
us, but I shouted just in time.

"At last we came to the edge of a wood, and in front of us, about 200
yards away, was a little cup-shaped copse, and the enemy's trenches with
machine guns a little farther on. I felt sure this wood was full of
Germans, as I had seen them go in earlier. I started to gallop for it,
and the others followed. Suddenly about fifty Germans bolted out, firing
at us. I loosed off my revolver as fast as I could, and ---- loosed off
his rifle from the saddle. They must have thought we were a regiment of
cavalry, for, except for a few, they suddenly yelled and bolted. I
stopped and dismounted my lot to fire at them, to make sure that they
didn't change their minds.

"I waited for a lull, and mounted all my lot behind the bushes and made
them spring as I gave the word to gallop for cover to the woods where
the Welsh company was. There I got ----, who understands them (the
guns), and an infantryman who volunteered to help, and ---- and I ran up
to the Maxims and took out the breech mechanism of both and one of the
belts, and carried away one whole Maxim. We couldn't manage the other.

"We got back very slowly on account of the gun, and the men went wild
with excitement that we had got one gun complete and the mechanism and
belt of the other."

With such incidents the pursuit of the Germans across the Marne and to
the Aisne was replete, and so thoroughly did the advance French and
English troops scour that country that when the morning of September 13,
1914, dawned there was scarcely a German soldier left on the southern
side of the Aisne, west of Rheims.

The administration of the German armies meanwhile had been markedly
changed. In the turning movement on the Marne the plan was clearly
outlined, each commander had his instructions, and that was all. But
with the need for changes of plan there was need for a directing head,
and Field Marshal von Heeringen was sent in a hurry to take charge of
the Aisne. This placed both General von Kluck and General von Buelow into
subordinate positions. Field Marshal von Heeringen held a deserved
reputation as one of the most brilliant as well as one of the most
iron-willed of the German military leaders. He had been the backbone of
the crown prince's movement against Troyon, a movement which, given a
day or two longer, might have meant the capture of Verdun.

This was not the only factor that was framing up to give the German
armies a decided advantage. The essential factor of the Aisne was the
arrival of General von Zwehl and his guns. On September 13, 1914, at 6
a. m., Zwehl arrived in Laon, and in less than an hour he was in action
on the Aisne front. The story of General von Zwehl and his guns is
essential to an understanding of the causes that rendered the British
victory of the Aisne a barren and a fruitless victory at best.

The week of September 5-12, 1914, witnessed the entire series of the
battles of the Marne, which drove the Germans across the Marne and
across the Aisne, as well as a German victory which exerted almost as
powerful an influence in favor of the invaders as the check at the Marne
did for the defenders. This victory was the fall of Maubeuge. It is
going too far to say--as several military writers have done--that
General von Zwehl saved Germany, and that unless he had arrived as
opportunely as he did the "German retreat to the Aisne valley would have
been changed into a disastrous and overwhelming rout." But it is not
going too far to say that the successful holding of the Aisne line was
due to the victor of Maubeuge.

General von Zwehl was one of the iron-jawed battle-scarred warriors of
1870, a man with a will as metallic as his own siege guns, and a man
who could no more be deflected from his purpose than a shell could be
diverted in its flight. He had been set to reduce Maubeuge and he had
done so with speed and with thoroughness. Maubeuge was not protected by
open-air earthworks, but by a circle of armor-plate concrete forts. To
the mighty siege guns handled by General von Zwehl, these were no
trouble, for Von Zwehl had not only the heavy batteries attached to the
Seventh Army Reserve, but he also had a number of Von Kluck's guns and
the majority of General von Buelow's, neither of whom was expected to
need siege guns in the forward drive where mobility was an essential. In
addition to this, General von Zwehl also had the great siege train that
had been prepared for the reduction of Paris. What chance had Maubeuge
against such a potency?

On September 8, 1914, word reached General von Zwehl that the forward
drive had failed, that the main armies had been beaten back and that he
was to bring up his guns as rapidly as possible to cover the retreat. As
rapidly as he could, to General von Zwehl, meant but one thing--to get
there! He collected 9,000 reserve troops, which was almost immediately
swelled by another 9,000, and with a total of 18,000 troops he started
his siege trains for the town of Laon, where Field Marshal von Heeringen
had taken up his headquarters. The weather turned bad, rendering the
heavy guns extremely difficult to handle, but there could be no delay,
no explanations, to General von Zwehl. If a gun was to be brought it was
to be brought and that was all about it! Four days and three nights of
almost continuous marching is killing. The German commander cared
nothing for that. The guns must be kept moving. Could he get them there
on time? In the last twenty-four hours of the march, his 18,000 troops
covered 41 miles and they arrived in Laon at six o'clock in the morning
of September 13, 1914, and were in action an hour later. The problem,
therefore, before the English and French at the Aisne, was not the
carrying of the river against a disheartened and retreating army, but
the carrying of the river against a well-thought-out and forceful
plan--a plan, moreover, backed up by the most powerful artillery that
the world has ever seen.




CHAPTER XXI

THE BRITISH AT THE AISNE


In the battles of the Marne, the brunt of the fighting had been borne
mainly by the French armies, but the major part of work of the battle of
the Aisne was borne by the British Expeditionary Force. Sir John French
wasted no time. Saturday night, September 12, 1914, was a night of labor
for engineers and gunners. The bridge trains belonging to the First and
Second Army Corps were ordered to the edge of the river at daybreak, and
as soon as the first gleam of dawn appeared in the sky, the heroic
effort began.

At the risk of seeming a little detailed, in order to understand the
somewhat involved maneuvers by which the British won the crossing of the
Aisne, instead of dealing with the advance of the British army as a
unit, in the manner that was done in discussing the battles of the
Marne, their activities will be shown as army corps: the Third Army
Corps to the westward, under General Pulteney; the Second Army Corps,
under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, and the First Army Corps to the
eastward, under Sir Douglas Haig, all, of course, under the general
direction of Sir John French.

The British had no means of knowing what was in front of them. There was
only one way to find out--a way, alas, often costly, a way that in every
campaign costs thousands of lives apparently fruitlessly, and that is a
frontal attack. Down over the <DW72>s of the southern bank, into the
bright, smiling river valley, where the little white villages in the
distance were hiding their dilapidated state, marched the British army.
Not a sign of activity showed itself upon the farther shore. A summer
haze obscured objects at a distance, but, shortly before nine o'clock,
the German batteries opened fire with a roar that was appalling.

The Third Army Corps, after a brief artillery duel, advanced on Soissons
to cover the work of the engineers who were building a pontoon bridge
for the French troops. The German fire was deadly, yet though more than
half their men fell, the engineers put the pontoon bridge across. German
howitzer fire, from behind the ridge, however, soon destroyed the
bridge. The Turcos crossed the river in rowboats and had a fierce but
indecisive struggle in the streets of the medieval city. Meanwhile, with
the failure of the pontoon bridge at Soissons, General Pulteney struck
to the northeast along the road to Venizel. The bridge at that point had
been blown up, but the British sappers repaired it sufficiently to set
the Eleventh Brigade across, and even, despite the lurid hail of shot
and shell, four regiments gathered at Bucy-de-Long by one o'clock on
that Sunday, September 13, 1914. Over the heads of these courageous
regiments towered the great hill of Vregny, a veritable Gibraltar of
heavy guns with numerous machine guns along the wooded edge. There was
no protection, and no shelter against the terrible German Maxim fire, so
that the moment came when to attempt further advance meant instant
annihilation. Still, under cover of the success of the Eleventh Brigade
the engineers built a pontoon bridge at Venizel and the Twelfth Brigade
crossed to Bucy-de-Long, with a number of the lighter artillery. As
there was absolutely no shelter, to storm the height at that point was
impossible, and to remain where they were was merely to court sudden
death, so the Twelfth Brigade worked over the <DW72>s to the ravine at
Chipres, where they intrenched.

The task in front of the Second Army Corps was no less difficult. The
bridge at Conde was too strongly defended to be taken by assault, as Sir
Horace Smith-Dorrien speedily found out, so he divided his forces into
two parts, one of which was directed at the village of Missy, two and
one half miles west of Conde, while the other concentrated its attack on
a crossing at the town of Vailly, three miles east of Conde. Both
detachments made good their crossing, but the regiments that found
themselves near Missy also realized that hasty, very hasty intrenchment
was imperative, lest every one of them should be blown into kingdom come
before half an hour had passed by. During the night some troops were
rafted over, three men at a time, and these encamped near Missy. It was
a false move. For sixteen days thereafter the British troops had to
remain in their dugouts, a large part of the time without food or water.
To show a head above the trench was sudden death.

The regiments that crossed the river at Vailly found themselves in even
a worse plight. No sooner had they crossed than the bombardment began,
and the Germans knew every range in the place accurately. More than
that, the line of trenches was open to enfilade fire from a hidden
battery, which did not unmask until the trench was filled with soldiers.
This Eighth Brigade had to retire in disorder.

The Fifth Brigade, attached to the First Army Corps under Sir Douglas
Haig, an Irish and Scotch group of regiments, were the most successful
of all. The bridge at Pont Arcy had been destroyed, but still one of its
girders spanned the stream. It would have been tricky walking, even
under ordinary circumstances, but nerve racking to attempt, when from
every hill and wood and point of land, Maxims, machine guns and a steady
rifle fire are concentrated on the man crossing that one girder. By the
afternoon, the engineers attached to the First Army Corps had also
established a pontoon bridge, and the whole brigade crossed the river in
the evening and dug itself in.

Late on Sunday afternoon, however, a weak spot showed itself in the
German line and Sir John French threw the First Division of the First
Army Corps across the river near Bourg. Some of the infantry crossed by
a small pontoon bridge and a brigade of cavalry started to follow them.
When they were in mid-stream, however, a terrific storm of fire smote
them. The cavalry pushed on, but could not ride up the hill in the teeth
of the bombardment. The infantry were eager to go, but nothing was to be
gained by the move, so the cavalry returned over the pontoon, by a most
extraordinary occurrence not having lost a single member in the three
hours it had been scouting on the hostile side of the Aisne. The
infantry intrenched themselves solidly to await the morning.

The main forces of the First Division were especially lucky. Using the
canal aqueduct they made their way toward Bourg, and drove the Germans
back toward the main ridge.

More than three-quarters of the summit of the ridge had been won, the
entire Second Infantry Brigade was across, the Twenty-fifth Artillery
Brigade was across, ready to support, and General Bulfin, instead of
tiring his men by making them intrench there, ordered them to rest,
throwing their outposts in front of the hamlet of Moulins.

This ended the first day's fighting on the battle of the Aisne. Of the
Third Army Corps, a small body of men had reached Chipres. There they
had been joined by a small force from the Second Army Corps. In the
First Army a strong detachment dug itself in not far from Pont d'Arcy.
The incomparably superior position of the Germans, their huge numbers,
their possession of innumerable guns, made even this shaky tenure
dangerous, though all held on. Sir John French had tested and found out
the German strength and the result was not encouraging.

Although this repulse of the British army at every point was a decided
victory for the German gunners, Field Marshal von Heeringen had been
impressed by two things: the courage of the British attacking army, and
the destructiveness of the French artillery on the south bank of the
river. The German commander withdrew all his men from the advanced
trenches on between the ridge and the river, keeping, however, strongly
intrenched detachments of riflemen at all commanding points with
powerful artillery as their support.

Sunday night was a veritable pandemonium of destruction and tumult. All
night long, without cessation, the batteries of both sides, knowing
exactly their opponents' range, fired perpetually. All night long
searchlight bombs were thrown. All night long, golden and red and yellow
streams of flame or the sudden jagged flash of an explosion lit up the
black smoke of burning buildings and fields in the valley, or showed the
white puff-like low clouds of the bursting shrapnel. Not for an instant
did the roar diminish, not for a second was the kindly veil of night
left unrent by a fissure of vengeful flame. Yet, all night long, as
ceaselessly as the great guns poured out their angry fury, so did men
pour out their indomitable will, and in that hell light of battle flame
engineers labored to construct bridges, small bodies of troops moved
forward to join their comrades in the trenches who had been able to
make a footing the day before, and all night long, those ghastly yet
merciful accompaniments of a battle field--the ambulance corps--carried
on their work of relief. The searchlights swept up and down the valley,
like great eyes that watched to give direction to the venom of war.

At three o'clock in the morning of Monday, September 14, 1914, two
regiments were sent to capture a sugar factory strongly held by the
enemy. That sugar factory became a maelstrom. Three more regiments had
to be brought up and finally the guards, and even thus heavily
overpowered, the Germans successfully defended it until noon. They sold
their lives dearly--those defenders. That sugar factory stood on that
Monday as did Hogoumont at Waterloo. It delayed the advance of the
entire First Corps, but at four o'clock in the afternoon, Sir Douglas
Haig ordered a general advance. The last afternoon and evening scored a
distinct success for the English arms, and when at last it grew
absolutely too dark to see, that corps held a position stretching from
Troton to La Cour de Soupir. Its chief importance, however, was that it
gave the Allies a strongly intrenched position on the plateau itself.

It was of this day's fighting that, almost a month later, Sir John
French was able to say in his official dispatches:

"The action of the First Corps on this day under the direction and
command of Sir Douglas Haig was of so skillful, bold, and decisive a
character that he gained positions which alone have enabled me to
maintain my position for more than three weeks of very severe fighting
on the north bank of the river."

The offensive of this entire movement was intrusted to the First Corps.
The artillery strength of the armies of General von Kluck and Von Buelow
was such that it was almost impossible for the Second and Third British
Army Corps to assail them by a charge up the bluff. But, meantime, the
French had not been idle. On September 13, 1914, General d'Esperey's
Fifth Army crossed the Aisne east of Bourg, and on the following day
commenced the assault on the Craonne plateau.

The next day, Tuesday, September 15, 1914, was a day of several small
victories for the Germans. General von Zwehl was hard hitter and a
quick hitter. Having disposed of his artillery where he thought it could
be of the most use, he aided Field Marshal von Heeringen with counsels
of counterattack, counsels that the Field Marshal fully indorsed. The
Sixth French Army under General Manoury, at the extreme west of the
line, was the chief point of attack. Though well placed on a strong
position at Nampcel, the Germans drove the French before them like
clouds before the wind, recaptured the spurs, forced the French backward
through the Morsain ravine and back to their original crossing place of
the Aisne between Viv and Fontenoy.

The Third Corps of the British suffered heavy loss of life without any
opportunity to retaliate, for it was too thoroughly and completely
dominated by the guns of Vregny.

The lull of Wednesday, September 16, 1914, was a foretaste of the
deadlock which was gradually forming. The French Fifth Army had been
compelled to abandon all idea of a direct attack upon the Craonne
plateau, the natural position being far too strong. The Second and Third
Corps of the British army could do nothing. Sir John French, though
eager to push the advantage, secured by his position on the heights, was
well aware that such a move was not possible unless the entire French
line was ready to cooperate with him, for, if he tried to drive down
upon the ridge of the Aisne, or, for that matter, tried to flank it, the
line of the Duke of Wuerttemberg would bend back upon him and nip him in
a way which would render escape difficult.

A sudden recrudescence of activity on the western front gave rise to the
hope that the deadlock might yet be avoided, that the two great armies
might come to handgrips again. Bolstered up by reenforcements, General
Manoury checked the German attack and regained all the ground that had
been lost. Concentrating on the need of driving the invaders out of the
quarries of Autreches, the French succeeded. This eased the western end
of the line, and the Second and Third British Army Corps were left in
peace.

Friday, September 18, 1914, is again a date of moment, not because
anything of importance was transacted, but because nothing was
transacted. It was a day of realizations. It was a day that convinced
the Allies that the German positions could not be broken down by frontal
attack, just as the battles of the Marne had convinced the Germans that
the road to Paris was not yet open. The six days from September 12 to 18
had revealed beyond preadventure that the German line along the ridge of
the Aisne was not merely a convenient halting place for a rear-guard
action, but that it was formed of lines of strong fortifications, almost
impregnable and absolutely beyond the hope of storming. The forces were
too evenly balanced for any concerted action to produce a desired
effect, the possession of air scouts eliminated any question of a
surprise. In other words, the conclusion was borne in upon the Allies
with full force that, much as the German plan had failed at Marne, so
had the Allies' plan failed at Aisne. The crossing of the Aisne, the
winning of the heights by Sir Douglas Haig were victories--not only
that, but they were full of that glory which goes with successful
daring--yet they led nowhere. The plan of the Allies must be abandoned
and a new one formed. This decision of a change of strategical plan,
then, closed the Allies' frontal attack upon the position of the Central
Powers on the ridge of the Maise, and marks the end of the first phase
of the battle of the Aisne.




CHAPTER XXII

BOMBARDMENT OF RHEIMS AND SOISSONS


To be considered almost as a part of the advance upon the Aisne were the
bombardments of Soissons and of Rheims, the former being a part of the
first phase of the Aisne battles, the second belonging to the second
phase. Soissons, it will be remembered, lies at the western end of the
high bluffs that form a bank to the River Aisne for over fifty miles. It
is on the high road between Rheims and Compiegne, and on the south side
of the Aisne, and consequently returned into French hands on September
13, 1914. No sooner did the French armies enter the little town,
however, than Soissons, dominated by the twin towers of its ancient
cathedral, became a target for the concentrated fire of the Germans,
whose artillery, it will be remembered, had been supplemented that
morning by the huge guns brought on from Maubeuge by the magnificent
forced marches of General von Zwehl. By noon the lower half of that once
lovely city was in flames. On every hand walls collapsed as though they
had been made of pasteboard. Women and children were buried beneath the
ruins or blown to pieces as they fled into the streets. One of the
towers of the cathedral was damaged, and there was not a corner of the
town that was safe from fire. The French batteries tried to cover the
city and silence the batteries opposing them on the north front of the
river, but the odds were too great.

All day long, and throughout the greater part of every night, for the
first three days of the battle of the Aisne, September 13, 14, and 15,
1914, the bombardment of Soissons was continual, and, in addition to
being a wreck, the town became a shambles.

Closely allied to the Soissons bombardment, and occurring simultaneously
with the battle of the Aisne, was the series of engagements occurring in
the quarries around Autreches and Coucy-le-Chateau, fought by advanced
bodies in front of the right wing of the German army encamped on the
ridge of the Aisne. These engagements developed the illuminating fact
that during times of peace German capital had been invested in these
quarries and with their usual intrigue the Germans had fortified these
quarries, so that they were veritable fortresses, and indeed, formed a
continuation of that line of defense the crowning point of which was the
Aisne cliff near the plateau of the Craonne. During the days when the
British First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, was performing the
astounding feat of crossing the Aisne and holding the land thus gained
against a veritable tempest of counterattack, these stone quarries were
taken and lost again every few hours. The French infantry of General
Manoury's army, far less exhausted than the harassed regiments of
General von Kluck's forces, found little difficulty in forcing the
Germans back from Autreches, but, no sooner were they well established,
than the roar of the combined guns of General von Kluck and General von
Zwehl would make the position untenable, and under cover of that
appalling rain of death, the German infantry would creep back to
reoccupy the positions from which they had been ousted by the bayonets
only a few hours before. It was the German tactics of machine vs. men, a
direful and cruel battle plan to the opposing forces.

Upon the day that the advance of the British definitely stopped, or, in
other words, when General Joffre and Sir John French realized that
further effort against the defenses of the Germans on the ridge beyond
the Aisne would only mean loss of life to no gainful purpose, the
bombardment of Rheims began. The old city had suffered severely during
the German advance upon the Marne. Still, it had not been pillaged, and
when the Germans retreated across the Aisne the old city held much of
its glory unimpaired. Still the flawless beauty of Rheims Cathedral
stood guard over the ancient city.

Then on September 18, 1914, the shelling of the city began and a
bombardment of the most terrific character continued for ten days.
Rheims Cathedral, which the French declared was outside the zone of
direct fire and was used as a hospital with the Red Cross flag flying,
and which the Germans asserted to have been used for a signal station
and to have been surrounded by gun stations, was said to have been
demolished by the German guns. This act created a sensation throughout
the world, for Rheims Cathedral was like a gem from Paradise, regarded
by most art lovers as one of the most beautiful buildings in the world.
Every civilized country was shaken with grief when the news of the
disaster to Rheims Cathedral was published.

The Germans were apparently unmoved by the world's indignation. They
claimed to have acted only from "military necessity," which, according
to the old brutal theory, still regarded by the Huns, knows no law. In
an inspired article written by Major General von Ditfurth, in the
"Hamburger Nachrichten," this latter point is emphasized. He wrote:

"It is of no consequence if all the monuments ever created, all the
pictures ever painted, and all the buildings ever erected by the great
architects of the world were destroyed, if by their destruction we
promote Germany's victory over her enemies.... The commonest, ugliest
stone placed to mark the burial place of a German grenadier is a more
glorious and perfect monument than all the cathedrals in Europe put
together.

"Let neutral peoples and our enemies cease their empty chatter, which is
no better than the twittering of birds. Let them cease their talk about
the cathedral at Rheims and about all the churches and castles of France
which have shared its fate. These things do not interest us."

Opinions have differed concerning Von Ditfurth's appraisal of the
comparative values of Rheims Cathedral and the tombstone of a German
grenadier, but even the champions of military necessity were glad to
learn later that the cathedral still stood, though much damaged. There
was military excuse for the bombardment of the city of Rheims. But the
cathedral was by far the most conspicuous object in the Rheims
landscape. It was optional with the Germans to spare it except for some
casual shell that missed its aim. On the contrary they chose the great
church as a special target, as evidenced by repeated damage to the
cathedral and by the destruction of buildings all about it by shell
fire. This was certainly not military necessity, though the city of
Rheims had a place in the new strategical plan developed by Field
Marshal von Heeringen upon the collapse of the drive on Paris, which was
foiled by the battles of the Marne.




CHAPTER XXIII

SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE


The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors. One,
the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense against any
force that could be brought up against it by the Allies. It meant the
ability to hold strongly fortified positions against all odds. The
history of the trenches that winter, of which more will be said later,
reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded, aided by the iron
craft of the old Prussian fighter General von Zwehl.

The other factor depended on the vexed question of means of
communication. There was no cross-country railway linking the eastern
German wing to the western German wing. As has been previously remarked,
all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout way. Verdun was a
desired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen was wise enough to know
that if the crown prince's effort against General Sarrail had failed, if
the Third French Army had secured heavy reenforcement, and if it had
been left unmolested for a week, the outer ring of defenses around
Verdun would, by that time, have become so amazingly strengthened that
direct or frontal attack would be impossible, while the flanking attack
had failed. It was vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that
the establishment of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun
might pass into the hands of the invaders.

On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running through
Rheims, Rethel, Mezieres to the great war depot, Coblenz on the Rhine. A
branch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave communication to the
eastern wing. All the links of this were in German hands, except Rheims,
and if that railroad center could be secured, the importance to the
German advance would be enormous. Under such circumstances, it can
scarcely be held that Rheims was not necessarily a point, the attack of
which was due to military necessity.

The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the Aisne
by the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the direct
leadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon the open
country between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims. It was at this
point that the German commander in chief of this section of the battle
line intended to deliver a crushing blow by which might be regained the
prestige secured at Charleroi and lost again at the Marne.

Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims should
not have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so once, though
the fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of bringing these
points of natural defense up to the highest degree of modern efficiency,
the French had dismantled them entirely, so as to make Rheims with its
glorious cathedral an open town, safe from bombardment. It was,
according to the rules of war, safe from bombardment, but only in the
event of its not being defended. General Foch did not dare to take this
stand. He knew, as well as did General von Heeringen, the strategic
value of Rheims as railroad center, and accepted the issue of battle.

In the falling back of the several German armies from the Marne to the
Aisne, the Germans had kept possession of the chief forts of the
district around Rheims. No strong effort had been made to dislodge them,
for the forward movement of the Allies had been directed against the
fortified heights of the Aisne, facing the Soissons-Craonne defense. It
will be remembered that the armies of General Foch and Langle,
especially the latter, had taken no part in the first phase of the
Battle of the Aisne, but had stubbornly thrown back the armies of the
Duke of Wuerttemberg, which had combined with those of the crown prince.
The right wing of this large conjoined army had held the fort sites
around Rheims and especially they had made full use of the chief fort on
the wooded heights of Nogent l'Abbesse, a trifle less than half a mile
from the cathedral city and therefore within easy destructive shelling
range. The heavy artillery was planted here, the infantry intrenched
around it, and strong defense trenches were established along the River
Suippe that runs into the Aisne near Berry-au-Bac.

On Friday, September 18, 1914, the first movement of the second phase
was begun, when the Germans launched a sharp counterattack on the French
center. This was the first German offensive movement since their retreat
from the Marne, and it was powerful and well handled. General Foch fell
back into defensive positions, but had much ado to hold his own. He
evaded giving battle around Rheims and took up a position at Souain,
which he held with the jaunty obstinacy he had displayed so often in the
retreat through northern France. It was obvious that he could not hold
out long, but by clever generalship, and especially by an
extraordinarily brilliant use of the cavalry arm, he held off the army
for that day. That night strong reenforcements came to his aid, and on
September 19, 1914, the balance of the forces was more nearly equal.

On September 19, 1914, therefore, the situation of the armies was much
as follows: The Germans, acting under the general command of Field
Marshal von Heeringen, controlled Rheims under the gunfire of their
heavy artillery from two points, the heights of Nogent l'Abbesse to the
southeast of Rheims, and the hill of Brimont a little over half a mile
to the northeast. Their right flank was covered by the powerful defenses
of the Aisne and the guns of the Craonne plateau, their left flank was a
series of intrenchments along the river Suippe, which merged into the
second line of defense of the main army under the Duke of Wuerttemberg.

On the other side of Rheims, or to the west of the cathedral city, the
Allies also held two heights, one at Pouillon, between the Aisle and the
Vesle, and therefore to the northwest of the city, and the other on a
sharp steep, known as the Mountain of Rheims, near Verzenay, on the
south side of the river. This was therefore west and a little south of
Rheims. But, and herein lies the question that has so often arisen in
the discussion of the comparative strength of the two armies--especially
without the British batteries--the French lacked heavy long-range
artillery. They had no such howitzers as those of the German forces.
Thus the Germans could shell Rheims to their hearts' content, and the
Allies could not silence that gunfire from their own fortified
positions. Once more, then, it became a battle between infantry and
artillery, between men and machines.

This time, however, the advance was not favorable to the Germans. Their
heavy artillery commanded Rheims, but it did not command the French line
to the west of Rheims. The invaders performed prodigies of valor. Again
and again they hurled themselves against the French line. But General
Foch's troops were well supplied with that terrible engine of
destruction--the French 3-inch fieldpiece, known, as the 75-mm., an
extremely powerful gun for its caliber.

In four successive night attacks on September 19-20, 1914, the heaviest
onset was made. Supported by a terrific gunfire, directed with the long
pointing fingers of searchlights, the German infantry, invigorated by a
week's rest, rolled up in gray-clad tidal waves against the French line.
General Foch had known how to post his defense, and within twenty-four
hours he had made the line between Pouillon and the Mountain of Rheims
almost as strong as the German line between Brimont and Nogent
l'Abbesse. Poor Rheims lay between, wide open to the eruption of
destruction that belched from the throats of the German howitzers.




CHAPTER XXIV

END OF THE BATTLE


After September 22, 1914, there was a lull in the fighting at Rheims,
and as afterward appeared, this was due mainly to another change of plan
on the part of the German Staff. But it was no part of General Foch's
intentions to leave the bombardment of the cathedral unrevenged. He had,
indeed, caused an unparalleled slaughter on the night of September 19,
1914, as has been stated, but his troops were avid for reprisal and the
French strategist knew well how dangerous it is to allow an army, eager
for action and revenge, to eat its heart out vainly. He was too wise to
run the risk of a countercharge, but four days later his opportunity
came, and he took advantage of it to the full.

At dawn on September 26, 1914, a detachment of 15,000 Germans, including
all that remained of the famous Prussian Guards Corps, that same body
that had fought so marvelously on many occasions, and which had suffered
the most cruelly in the affair of the marshes of St. Gond, made a sortie
from the base line at Nogent l'Abbesse to destroy the railway line
between Rheims and Verdun, this line was, indeed, the principal link of
communication to that all-important fortress that protruded its
bristling salient into the heart of the German position. A French
aviator, who had climbed into his machine when it was yet dark, in order
to do a little daybreak scouting before the light should be sufficiently
bright to make him an easy target, saw this movement and reported it
immediately to General Foch. That commander, who knew how to use
cavalry, ordered a regiment at the gallop to occupy the village of
Auberive, on the Suippe, and there harry the advancing column
sufficiently to give him time to bring up the light artillery and to
bring into action a large body of infantry encamped at Jouchery, five
miles away.

Before six o'clock, the cavalry were in Auberive. The men worked like
fiends. The streets were rapidly barricaded, machine guns hoisted to
roofs and other points where they might command a wide sweep of fire.
Then the cavalry rode forward to meet the advancing column. Not knowing
what might be in front of him, the German commander halted, awaiting
reports from his air scouts. The halt was but three-quarters of an hour,
but that was of vast importance. The scouts reported only a regiment of
cavalry ahead, but a powerful detachment of French artillery on the road
from Jouchery. The German leader detached 2,000 of the Death's Head
Hussars, his crack cavalry, to cut off, or at all events to delay, the
French guns. He was aware that the artillery would have no anticipation
of this and, in the surprise, the guns might be captured. Meantime, he
hurried his advance to Auberive, captured the village, though after
another hour's delay, caused by the resistance of the cavalry, who
retreated to St. Hilaire.

Meantime, at St. Hilaire, the surprise charge of the Death's Head
Hussars was launched. It was scarcely a question of minutes, it was
rather a matter of seconds. But the French artillery knew their light
fieldpieces as thoroughly as the Germans were masters of the heavy guns.
In less than two minutes the artillery teams were unharnessed, the guns
were in position and the gunners took their places when the Hussars were
so near the voices of their leaders could be heard. Thirty seconds
earlier, and the Hussars would have been in among the guns and made a
notable capture. There was just time enough for a man to breathe twice,
when the order came to fire. The Hussars were at less than a hundred
yards' range. As the shrapnel burst, the front squadrons seemed to
stumble and fall. The ranks were so near that the change from living
human beings into mangled pieces of flesh and rags could clearly be
seen. More than one veteran gunner felt squeamish at the sight. But the
rear squadrons, though their horses' hoofs were squelching in the blood
of their comrades of a moment before, never blenched or faltered but
swept on at a thundering gallop. Again the guns spoke, and again. That
was all. Amid the vines, here and there a writhing figure could be seen,
or a wounded horse endeavoring to rise, and here and there a straggler
striving to escape. It was level open country; twice again the guns
roared, five rounds in all, and all movement ceased. The engagement had
lasted less than five minutes and of those two thousand splendid
horsemen not one escaped. The French artillerists picked up the wounded
and sent them back to Rheims to receive nursing and care, and then
hurried on to the action whither they were bound when surprised by the
Hussars.

The infantry of the Germans and of the French were now coming to hand
grips. A battalion of Zouaves was creeping round to attack the advancing
column in the rear. The German commander at Nogent l'Abbesse learned
from his air scouts what was happening. He saw the peril of the
advancing column, that it was almost surrounded, and he threw further
columns into the fray, to cover the retreat. The sortie on the railway
had now become impossible. General Foch had moved too quickly. But, even
so, the peril was great, for the German force was almost cut off. It
meant the loss of 15,000 men and artillery, or it meant the sacrifice of
some one corps to cover the retreat. The latter course was chosen.

Three thousand of the Guards Corps, the flower of the Prussian Army,
were sent like a catapult at the gap in the French line, immediately in
front of Rheims. Five times they charged, and with such heroic daring
and such penetrative energy that General Foch did not dare break from
his position. As they came up for the fifth assault, a wild cheer of
admiration broke out along the French line. But the rifles spoke
steadily, none the less for that. After the fifth assault, barely a
hundred men were left, nearly all wounded. They reversed rifles, a sign
of surrender, and in all honor they were received by General Foch, who
conducted them to the hospital in the rear. They lived up to the full
the most heroic traditions of the old Prussian corps and they saved that
whole German force from destruction. Still, with the annihilation of the
Death's Head Hussars and the remainder of the Prussian Guards Corps on
the same day, the forces under General Foch felt that in part Rheims had
been avenged.

The other section of this second phase of the Aisne consisted of the
trench warfare, which solidified from September 19 to October 6, 1914,
under conditions of extreme difficulty and more than extreme discomfort.
It was practically the establishment of a trench campaign that lasted
all winter, and revived the centuries-old fortress warfare, applying it
under modern conditions to field fortifications. The French during that
winter on the Aisne never quite succeeded in rivaling the mechanical
precision of the German movements; the Germans, on the other hand, never
showed themselves to possess the emotional fervor of the French with the
bayonet.

In many places German and Allies' trenches almost touched each other.
The first two weeks at the Aisne were one continual downpour, and the
foundation of that ground is chalk. On the sides of the plateau of
Craonne, after two weeks' rain, the chalky mud seemed bottomless. "It
filled the ears and eyes and throats of our men," wrote John Buchan, "it
plastered their clothing and mingled generously with their diet. Their
grandfathers, who had been at Sebastopol, could have told them something
about mud; but even after India and South Africa, the mire of the Aisne
seemed a grievous affliction." The fighting was constant, the nervous
strain exhausting, and the cold and wet were even harder to bear. There
had as yet been no time to build trenches with all conveniences, such as
the Germans possessed on the crest of the ridge, and the trenches of
the Allies were a chilled inferno of woe.

A stretch of waste ground lay between the trenches, and often for days
at a time the fire was too heavy to rescue the wounded or bring in the
dead. The men in the trenches, on either side, were compelled to hear
the groans of the wounded, lying in the open day after day, until
exhaustion, cold and pain brought them a merciful release. In letters
more than one soldier declared that the hardest thing to bear was to
hear a fellow comrade shrieking or groaning in agony a few steps away
for hours--even days at a time--and to be able to do nothing to help.
The stench from the unburied bodies was so great that officially all the
tobacco for the whole battle front was commandeered and sent to the
trenches under the plateau of Craonne and on the hill to the westward,
where the British First Army Corps was placed. Such, for the two weeks
between September 22, 1914, and October 6, 1914, was the trench warfare
during the second phase of the battle of the Aisne, a condition never
after repeated in the war, for such a feat as the crossing of the Aisne
could scarcely be duplicated. It was gallant, it was magnificent, and it
was costly--the British casualty list for September 12 to October 6,
1914, being, killed, wounded and missing, 561 officers and 12,980
men--but it was useless, and only served to give the Allies a temporary
base whereby General Foch was successful in checking the German attempt
to capture the Rheims-Verdun railway. It was a victory of bravery, but
not a victory of result.

During all these operations the Belgian army, now at Antwerp, had
harassed the German troops by frequent sorties. The capture of the city
was at once undertaken by the German Staff, following the stalemate
created by the operations at the Aisne.




CHAPTER XXV

"THE RACE TO THE SEA"


The Germans, having failed in their first enveloping movement, attempted
a second after the battle of the Marne. They tried to repeat their
maneuver of August, endeavoring to overwhelm the French left; while the
French, on their side, tried to overwhelm the German right. Each of
these armies, by a converging movement, gradually drew its forces toward
the west. No sooner did the Germans bring up a new corps on their right
than the French brought up another on their left. Thus the front of the
battle ascended more and more to the west and north until arriving at
the sea it could go no farther. This is what has been called by French
military critics "The Race to the Sea." In this race to the sea the
Germans had a great advantage over the French. A glance at the map is
enough to make it understood. The concave form of the German front made
the lines of transportation shorter; they were within the interior of
the angle, while the French were at the exterior. On the German side
this movement drew into the line more than eighteen army corps, or
twelve active corps, six reserve corps, and four cavalry corps.

[Illustration: These German soldiers are dragging a great siege gun into
position for use in refortifying the city of Antwerp.]

On the French side it resulted in the posting of the army of Castelnau
on the left of Manoury's army, in the deployment of the army of General
de Maud'huy to the left of the army of Castelnau, in the transference of
the British army to the left of the army of Maud'huy, in the relegation
of the army of Urbal to the left of the British army, the army of Urbal
being later flanked by the Belgian army which came out of Antwerp. In
order to accomplish this new and extended disposition of forces the
French General Staff was compelled to reduce to their extreme limits the
effective strengths of the armies of the east and of the Oise, and as a
result to make the maximum use of the means of transport. In this it
succeeded. When the great battle of Flanders was waged toward the end of
October, the Germans, trying to turn the French left and to pierce it,
found themselves facing considerable French forces, which, allied with
the British and Belgian armies, completely barred the passage against
them.

From the 15th of September, 1914, it was clear that the Germans were
making a great effort to try and overwhelm the French left. General
Joffre parried the attack, reenforcing at first the army of Manoury by
an army corps, then transferring to the left of the army of Manoury the
entire army of Castelnau that was in Lorraine. A corps of cavalry and
four territorial divisions commanded by General Brugere received the
order to establish itself on both banks of the Somme and protect the
detraining of the army of Castelnau.

From September 21 to September 26, 1914, all the French forces that had
newly arrived were engaged in the Lassigny-Reye-Peronne region. They
succeeded in withstanding, not without difficulty, the German attack,
but they could not advance. The Germans determinedly and unweariedly
continued to mass new forces on their right. On the left of the army of
Castelnau it was therefore necessary to establish a new army. It was
established on September 30, 1914, under the command of General
Maud'huy. From the first days of October this army waged violent
conflicts in the region of Arras and of Lens. It found facing it two
German cavalry corps, the Guard, four active army corps, and two reserve
corps.

General Joffre continued without intermission to send new forces to the
left. On October 4, 1914, he called on General Foch in the north and
charged him with the duty of coordinating the action of all the armies
in that region: those of De Castelnau, Maud'huy, and the territorial
divisions. At the beginning of October the British army, which was
posted on the Aisne, was transferred to the left of the French armies
and replaced by the armies of Manoury and d'Esperey. The Belgian army,
issuing from Antwerp on October 9, 1914, effected its retreat, covered
by the British naval forces and 6,000 French marines. It took its place
on the Yser Canal between Nieuport and Dixmude.

The Germans continuing their efforts to turn the French left, it was
found necessary again to strengthen that left considerably; and new
French army corps were transferred to Flanders and Belgium. It was a new
French army that was established and the command of it was intrusted to
General d'Urbal. It consisted at first of two divisions of territorials
and four divisions of cavalry of the corps of General de Mitry, along
with a brigade of naval fusiliers. But from October 27 to November 11,
1914, it received considerable reenforcements.

During the second week in November the German attack revealing its
purpose more clearly, General Joffre sent four more battalions of
chasseurs and four more brigades of infantry. The reenforcements sent to
the French army of the north totaled as a result five army corps, a
division of cavalry, a territorial division, sixteen cavalry regiments,
and more than sixty pieces of heavy artillery.




CHAPTER XXVI

SIEGE AND FALL OF ANTWERP


The siege of Antwerp began on September 29, 1914, and in less than two
weeks, October 10, 1914, this historic city, one of the most important
trade centers of the world and one of the strongest fortresses in
Europe, was forced to capitulate, though it had always been believed to
be impregnable.

During the latter part of September, 1914, the forces of the
belligerents were driving northward in that memorable race for the
Channel in which both sides had the same object; each was trying to be
the first to turn the other's front and crumble his line.

At the same time the German forces, then in the vicinity of Brussels,
under the command of General von Beseler, pushed toward Antwerp, on
which the Belgian army had fallen back to make its last stand. This move
was necessary in order to cut off all danger of rear attacks which would
menace General von Kluck's drive to the coast, a movement which had
reached Douai on October 1, 1914.

The German General Staff had decided to take Antwerp at all cost.
General von Beseler on the last day of September, 1914, reached a point
within range of Antwerp's farthest outer forts.

In order to understand the record of the following successive steps in
the siege of Antwerp, a description of this city's position and the
location of its double circle of forts is necessary. Antwerp was
considered one of the most formidable strongholds in the world. The
elaborate defenses of Antwerp evolved from the original fortifications
of thirty years ago through continual additions. The location of the
city offers very many natural advantages for its defense, and the
engineering genius controlling the work made full use of these
opportunities. From the north Antwerp has access to the sea by the river
Scheldt, of which the arm nearest to the city is narrow, with six strong
forts on each bank, including the citadel.

[Illustration: Liege Forts, Showing German Attack.]

[Illustration: Siege and Fall of Antwerp.]

Any armies approaching from the south must cross the rivers Rupel and
Nethe, which practically, in the shape of a semicircle, swing around the
city to the south at a distance varying from about six to twelve miles.
Within this circle of flowing water, and about two miles from the city,
is another circle, formed by twelve powerful forts. At a point almost
due east from the center of the city and commanding the railroad to
Holland, by way of Turnhout, is located the first of eight forts,
designated by numbers. From there they swing to the south and west, with
fort eight very close to the Scheldt and directly south to the village
of Hoboken. On the other side of the river are Forts de Cruibeke and
Zwyndrecht, the latter commanding the railroad to Ghent. Further north
and right on the banks of the Scheldt are Forts St. Marie, la Perle, and
St. Philip, the first two on the left bank and the last on the right,
all three opposite the new harbor and docks. In the northeast Fort de
Merkem guards the railroad to Rotterdam. Outside of this circle and in
the south, outside of the Nethe-Rupel line, there is another complete
circle of nineteen even stronger forts, at a distance from the city
varying between five and ten miles. Starting again in the east--due east
from fort one--and swinging south, these forts are named: Oeleghem,
Broeckem, Kessel, Lierre, Koningshoyckt, Wavre St. Catherine,
Waelhem--the last two only a few miles north of Malines--Breendonck,
Liezel, Bornem, Rupelmonde, Haesdonck, Doel, Blauwgaren--the last two
guarding the Scheldt at the point of its entrance into Holland, one on
each bank--Stabroek, Ertbrand, Brasschaet, Schooten, and Gravenwezel.
Between these outer forts there were redoubts of considerable strength,
which were armed with 4-inch guns. The forts of the inner ring are
placed at regular intervals of 2,200 yards and at a distance of about
3,500 yards from the enceinte of the city, which itself had powerful
defenses as well.

Add to these defenses the important fact that the entire district
surrounding Antwerp was subject to inundation to such a depth that all
approach to the city could be made impracticable to an enemy force with
heavy cannon and ammunition. Military authorities held Antwerp to be of
incomparable strength and as nearly impregnable as engineering genius
could make it.

During the latter part of September, 1914, several of the outer forts
were subjected to bombardment, and many of these had become useless as
defenses.

General von Beseler's advance was still barred by the river Nethe, upon
the opposite bank of which the defense was concentrated. During the
engagements which now ensued the German aircraft kept the commanders
advised as to conditions behind the enemy's lines, now and then dropping
bombs, apparently doing considerable damage.

On October 2, 1914, General von Beseler scattered from "Taube"
aeroplanes a number of printed papers over the entire district. These
circulars contained a proclamation to the Belgian soldiers, advising
them to stop fighting for England and Russia and to return home to their
wives and children, as Germany was ready to help and befriend them.

The Belgian Government, which had established itself in Antwerp after
the occupation of Brussels, decided to leave the city as soon as
possible. Two small steamers were ordered to be held in readiness. The
foreign legations also decided to go with the Government.

Throughout this day a steady fire was kept up on the nearest outer
forts, but the Belgian soldiers contested every inch of ground against
the German advance. This fighting continued throughout the entire day
following, during which two of the minor outer forts were silenced.

Rapid progress by the Germans was very difficult owing to the peculiar
conformation of the course of the river Scheldt at the point of attack.
This made especially difficult the laying of concrete foundations for
the heavy guns.

The first detachment of British troops, numbering about 8,000 marines,
reached Antwerp on October 3, 1914. This buoyed up the spirits of the
Belgian soldiers and redoubled their efforts. Under cover of the
continuous fire of their guns, the Germans made determined efforts to
cross the river Nethe at Waelhem. Desperate fighting, which lasted all
night and until early in the morning of October 4, took place. This
attempt, however, failed. Later in the day the Germans succeeded in
putting a pontoon bridge in place. Troops in solid masses hurried
across; but as they reached the other side some well-directed shots from
the Belgian guns blew the pontoon bridge to pieces, killing many.

Throughout the night of October 4, 1914, and the day and night of
October 5, the battle raged about Lierre with savage ferocity. The
British marines had by this time relieved the Belgians. The German fire,
however, compelled the defenders to draw back a considerable distance.

At four o'clock in the morning of October 6, 1914, the Germans succeeded
in crossing the river in force, and now the defenders were obliged to
give way, as the outer forts had ceased to afford them any protection.
Late in the afternoon the members of the Belgian Cabinet and their
official families went aboard one steamer, while the French and British
Legations boarded another, both sailing early on October 7.

The Belgian troops had begun to withdraw the evening before. All the
defending forces now hastened their retreat. The actual evacuation had
indeed begun. Time was taken, however, to put out of commission some
thirty steamships lying at their docks and to set afire all the large
oil tanks on the west side of the river Scheldt. The streets in Antwerp
presented scenes of almost indescribable confusion. Even before the
bombardment had been long in operation almost the entire civil
population became panic-stricken. Hither and thither, wherever the crowd
drifted, explosions obstructed their paths; fronts of buildings bent
over and fell into the streets, in many cases crushing their occupants.
Although the burgomaster had issued a proclamation advising the people
to remain calm--indoors, if possible--nothing could stop the stampede.

The defending troops withdrawing through the city from the firing line
destroyed everything that might possibly be of use to the enemy. The
suburbs of Antwerp seemed to be ablaze in every direction; the village
of Waerloos had been burning for some days; Contich, Duffel, and Lierre
also, and Have, Linth, and Vieux Dieu had been destroyed by shell fire.
Mortsel was practically obliterated by the Belgians clearing the range
for the guns of the inner forts. In the preparation for defense the
Belgians destroyed upward of ten thousand buildings within a radius of
twenty miles.

The exodus of the civil population began in earnest on October 8, 1914.
Some of the streets in the heart of the city were choked with people,
while other streets in the same vicinity were dead and deserted. The
withdrawal of the troops was well screened from the German guns, but
their retreat to the west had been cut off to a great extent, and
Holland was now the only refuge for many. The Germans did not use their
heaviest guns and high-explosive shells in bombarding the city.

During this terrible time, in utter darkness and confusion, crowds
amounting to many thousands--men, and women with babies, and children of
all ages--streamed through the streets that led to the quays or to the
turnpike to Holland. All sorts of vehicles, from dogcarts to motor
trucks, the former drawn by dogs, men, and horses, carried the
belongings of the fugitives that could not be carried away in person.

The bombardment continued with varying severity throughout October 8,
1914. As the Germans drew nearer to the city all the inner forts on the
south and east sides of the circle took part in replying to the
cannonade. Some of these forts--notably two, three, four, and five--were
badly battered. By afternoon the city seemed deserted--nothing but
debris of fallen buildings and wreckage met the eyes, and a small
remnant of the population was still struggling for escape.

Along all the wayside immense crowds of men, women, and children
gathered. The railway stations were choked with struggling humanity.
Their condition was pitiable. These scenes continued all day and
throughout the entire night.

On the morning of October 9, 1914, the struggle to get away continued.
Long lines formed on the quay where it had been reported that two boats
would leave for Ostend by eleven o'clock, and all those that could pay
struggled to get their passage booked. There were between 35,000 and
40,000 people on the quays, every one buoyed up by the hope that safety
was in sight at last. But the boats failed to sail and a murmur of
disappointment rose from this vast multitude of unfortunates.

However, there were other means of escape available, such as tugboats,
plying between Flushing, Rotterdam, and other adjacent points in
Holland. These tugs had no great accommodations for passengers and
comparatively few people escaped by this means. No trains were scheduled
to run and in despair the crowds started to cross the bridge and make
for the road to the Dutch frontier. Altogether from 150,000 to 200,000
of the population of the city escaped by one means or another.

During a continuous bombardment of twelve hours the cathedral stood
unharmed. The southern part of Antwerp was a desolate waste of ruins. In
some streets all the homes were ablaze, the flames leaping hither and
thither with the wind. The great oil tanks burning fiercely on the
opposite bank of the River Scheldt were fired upon by some well-directed
shots to check the blaze, a huge black volume of thick smoke now rising
from the flames. To add to the difficulties and confusion the water
supply had been cut off during the early stages of the bombardment
through the destruction of the city's waterworks which were located in
one of the suburbs to the south, and the consequences threatened to
become alarming. Everywhere fires were burning.

This was the tragic scene when the German army entered the conquered
city of Antwerp on October 10, 1914. It is probable that a large part of
the city would have been burned, if the Germans had not entered in time
to check the conflagration. Without loss of time, forces were put to
work fighting the fires and clearing the streets, propping up unsafe
buildings and making order out of chaos, generally with good results. As
soon as the bombardment had ceased proclamations were pasted on walls
and houses throughout the city urging everyone to surrender any arms in
their possession and begging for a calm demeanor when the German troops
pass through the streets.

About noon on October 10, 1914, a patrol of cyclist-mounted police
escorted the burgomaster to the gate of the city to receive the German
forces. When they entered order was restored without delay. Soldiers
were immediately detached from their special command and formed into
gangs under competent foremen and all put to work at once each according
to his trade, fitness or adaptability. The forts that had been
dismantled were hastily patched up and new guns mounted for emergency
use.

On October 11, 1914, Field Marshal von der Goltz, the Governor General
of Belgium, came from Brussels and made a tour of inspection of the
double girdle of forts. Upon examination it was found that the actual
damage done to the city by the bombardment was comparatively slight.

During the last days of Antwerp's reign of terror fully 300,000
fugitives sought shelter in Bergen-op-Zoom about twenty-five miles
northward across the Dutch frontier. Most of these were in a condition
almost indescribable, ragged, travel-worn, shoeless, and bespattered and
hungry. Few had money; valuables or other resources. All they owned they
carried on their backs or in bundles. The little Dutch town of
Bergen-op-Zoom with but 15,000 inhabitants was swamped; but the
Hollanders did their best to meet this terrible pressure and its
citizens went without bread themselves to feed the refugees. Slowly some
sort of order was organized out of the chaos and when the Dutch
Government was able to establish refugee camps under military
supervision the worst was over. A majority of this vast army was by
degrees distributed in the surrounding territory where tent
accommodations had been completed. The good Hollanders provided for the
children with especial care and sympathy. They supplied milk for the
babies and children generally. Devoted priests comforted many; but
military organization prevailed over all. Among the thousands of these
poor refugees that crossed the frontier at Maastricht and besieged the
doors of the Belgian consul there was no railing or declaiming against
the horror of their situation. The pathos of lonely, staring, apathetic
endurance was tragic beyond expression.




CHAPTER XXVII

YSER BATTLES--ATTACK ON YPRES


A large part of the Belgian forces with some of the English marines were
forced across the Dutch border, where they were promptly disarmed and
interned, while the remnants of these forces retreated toward the west
by way of St. Nicolas and reached Ostend on October 11 and 12, 1914,
with greatly reduced numbers. Many were cut off and captured by the
German forces, which entered Ghent on October 12, and pressed on to
Ypres in one direction and to Lille in another. Next day, the
thirteenth, they approached Ostend, forcing these Belgians who had
managed to get through, to evacuate.

Bruges was occupied by the German forces on October 14, 1914, and other
detachments appeared in Thielt, Daume, and Esschen on the same day, thus
getting under their control the entire Kingdom of Belgium, with the
exception of the northwestern corner, north of Ypres, to the coast of
the channel. For Ostend, too, had fallen into their hands by October 15,
after the English and Belgian troops had been taken away by an English
fleet; the Belgians were transported to France where they were
re-formed while the English marines were sent back to England.

In the meantime the Germans were drawing on reenforcements from the
Vosges and the Champagne districts and every day their numbers
increased. West Flanders was swarming with German cavalry, and about
this time they were as far west as Hazebrouck and Cassel, and only
twenty-five miles distant from Dunkirk.

By October 20, 1914, the allied line was in position from Albert to the
sea, a little short of 100 miles, eighty as the crow flies. From south
to north the allied front was commanded by General Maud'huy from Albert
to Vermelles; General Smith-Dorrien from Vermelles to Laventie, opposite
Lille; General Poultney, from Laventie to Messines; General Haig from
Messines to Bixschoote; General de Mitry had French and Belgian mixed
troops defending the line from Bixschoote to Nieuport and the sea,
supported by an English and French fleet.

For days this fleet under the British Admiral Hood had shelled the coast
defenses under General von Beseler's command. As the naval guns had a
far better range than General von Beseler's artillery, it was an easy
matter to hold the coast at Nieuport Bains, and even six miles inland
without subjecting any of the ships to the fire of the German guns.

On the German side General von Buelow held the front against General
Maud'huy, the Bavarian Crown Prince against General Smith-Dorrien, while
the Duke of Wuerttemberg commanded the forces on the balance of the line
to the sea. It is estimated that upward of thirty army corps covered the
German front.

Throughout the balance of October, 1914, and well into November, 1914, a
great many different actions and some of the heaviest fighting of this
period took place all along this line. On the 21st the new German
formations pressed forward in great force all along the line. On the
south of the Lys the Germans assaulted Violaines. On the north of the
Lys in the English center a fiercely contested action took place near La
Gheir, which village the Germans captured in the morning. The German
Twenty-sixth Reserve Corps pressed on to Passchendale, where they met
with stout resistance from the English-Belgian forces.

On October 22, 1914, the Germans attacked from the La Bassee region and
gained several small villages. Both Allies and Germans suffered immense
losses. Much of the slaughter was due to the point-blank magazine fire
and the intermittent shrapnel explosions from both sides.

The most savage fighting was kept up all along the line, but no
advantage accrued to either side until Friday, October 28, 1914, when
the Germans succeeded in crossing the Yser at St. George and forcing
their way two miles to Ramscapelle, retaken on the 30th by General
Grossetti. This was accomplished by General von Beseler's troops,
opposing the mixed troops of the Belgian and French. On that night
fourteen separate attacks were made by the Germans on Dixmude and they
were repulsed each time.

On October 24, 1914, about 5,000 German troops crossed the canal at
Schoorbakke and next day there were more to come, so for the moment it
looked as though the allied line on the Yser had been broken. The
struggle at this point continued until October 28, during which time the
Allies contested every inch of ground. The kaiser was with the Duke of
Wuerttemberg on this day, expecting every moment that his great design to
break through the lines and drive his forces to Dunkirk and Calais would
be accomplished.

At the crisis the Belgians broke down the <DW18>s and flooded the country
for miles around. Heavy rains during the last weeks had swelled the
Yser. The Belgians had dammed the lower reaches of the canal; the Yser
lipped over its brim and spread lagoons over the flat meadows. Soon the
German forces on the west bank were floundering in a foot of water,
while their guns were waterlogged and deep in mud. The Germans did not
abandon their efforts. The kaiser called for volunteers to carry
Ramscapelle--two Wuerttemberg brigades responded--and gained the place,
but at terrible loss.

On the 30th of October, 1914, again the Wuerttembergers advanced to the
attack. They waded through sloppy fields from the bridgeheads at St.
George and Schoorbakke, and by means of table tops, boards, planks and
other devices crossed the deeper <DW18>s. So furious was the attack
pressed home that they won the railway line and held their ground. They
were to do some severe fighting, however, for next day French-Belgian
and African mixed troops fought fiercely to drive the Germans back but
failed.

Seeing their success in partially flooding the battle field, the
Belgians made more breaches in the dams, and, opening the sluices in the
canal, threw a flood of water greater still over the area occupied by
the Germans. In seething brown waves the water rose up to the high
ground at the railway near Ramscapelle. The Germans were caught in this
tide and scores of them were drowned. Many escaped, some struggled to
land on the Allies front and were made prisoners.

Sir John French summarized part of the fighting in Flanders, after the
capture of Antwerp, in the following official report: "The Second Corps
under General Smith-Dorrien was opposed by overpowering forces of
Germans, but nevertheless advanced until October 18, 1914, when the
German opposition compelled a reenforcement. Six days later the Lahore
Division of the Indian Army was sent to support the Second Corps. On
October 16, Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had covered the retreat of the
Belgian army from Antwerp, with two divisions of English cavalry and two
divisions of French infantry, was stationed on the line east of Ypres
under orders to operate over a wide front and to keep possession of all
the ground held by the Allies until the First Army Corps could reach
Ypres.

"General Rawlinson was opposed by superior forces and was unable to
prevent the Germans from getting large reenforcements. With four
divisions holding a much wider front than their size justified he faced
a rather awkward situation, as the enemy was massed from the Lys.

"The shattered Belgian army and the weary French troops advanced to
check the Germans--but in vain. Sir Douglas Haig with the First Army
Corps was sent to recapture Bruges on October 19, 1914, while the
Belgian army intrenched along the Yser Canal. General Haig failed--owing
to bad roads. October 21 brought the most severe attack made on the
First Corps at Ypres, in the checking of which the Worcestershire
Regiment did good work. This day marked the most critical period in the
battle which resulted in the recapture of the village of Gheluvelt."

South of Dixmude is one of the most historic and quaintly attractive
cities of Belgium, Ypres. It is situated on a tributary of the Yser
called the Yperlee, and a railway runs through it from Roulers to the
main Lille--St. Ower line at Hazebrouck and a very important canal runs
from the Yser in the north to the Lys at Comines.

The allied lines were held by the British First and Third Corps and
several cavalry divisions, at this point all under the chief command of
General Haig, while the Bavarian Crown Prince directed the movements of
the German forces. On October 20, 1914, the allied line stretched--a few
miles to the northeast of Ypres--from Bixschoote to the crossroads a
mile and a half northwest of Zonnebeke. The cavalry only were kept busy
during this day, while the other forces were making elaborate
preparations for the main drive. The great attack was delivered October
21 against the point of the salient between Zonnebeke and Besselaere.
The allied line on the left was so much exposed that the Twenty-second
Brigade was enfiladed by the Germans at the very beginning, and in the
center the Germans pierced the line held by the Royal Scots Fusiliers,
with the Yorkshires on the extreme right. The fierce assaults from both
sides ended in a draw for this day.

On October 22, 1914, the fighting was most severe all day; but later in
the day the most violent assault of all was made by the Germans upon the
First Brigade on the left. There the trenches were held by the Camerons,
north of Pilkem on the Langemarck--Bixschoote road. Here the Germans
broke the line and succeeded in capturing part of the Camerons--the
famous Red Tartans. Further south, the Royal Scots Fusiliers were
obliged to give way. The Germans pressed hard in the vicinity of
Hollebeke which point opened a clear road to Ypres; but here the allied
forces stood their ground. Still farther south the Essex Regiment and
the Lancashire Fusiliers fought savagely, but were driven back upon
Armentierre when night fell.

[Illustration: Battle Front in Flanders.]

Early Friday morning, October 23, 1914, the Allies made a desperate
assault upon the trenches lost by the Camerons on the previous day. The
fighting culminated in a savage bayonet attack which resulted in the
recapture of these trenches by the British composed of the King's Royal
Rifles, the Royal West Surrey Regiment and the Northamptons.

On October 24, 1914, the Germans advanced upon the allied extreme left;
but were successfully repulsed between Zonnebeke and Poelcapelle. Later
in the day the Germans renewed their attack and compelled the allied
troops to retire some distance.

The advance on the allied left was continued on Sunday, October 25,
1914. Repeatedly the Germans succeeded in piercing the allied lines; but
at one time, even though they had broken through, a momentary lack of
reserves compelled them to retreat to avoid capture. A savage enveloping
attack was made during the night, north of Zandvoorde, where again the
Germans broke through the allied lines, but were unable to maintain
their advantage through failure of reenforcements to come up in time.
The Leicester Brigade were shelled out of their trenches and were
obliged to fall back to the south of the River Lys.

During the following three days--October 26, 27, 28, 1914--artillery
fire was resorted to and desultory fighting and skirmishes along the
entire line resulted in no noteworthy advantage to either belligerent.

Thursday, October 29, 1914, opened with clear and bracing weather which
promised to continue throughout the day. The German attack which had
been preparing for the past three days now broke like an irresistible
wave upon the salient of the Gheluvelt crossroads, where the British
First Corps was stationed. The first division was driven back from its
trenches and after that the line swayed forward and backward for hours,
but by two o'clock in the afternoon the position remained unchanged.

With the coming of the dawn on October 30, 1914, the fighting was
resumed with even more savage determination on both sides. The hottest
engagement centered about the ridge of Zandvoorde. German artillery fire
cleared the allied trenches, burying many of the British soldiers alive
under mountains of earth and debris. This forced the line to retreat a
full mile to Klein Zillebeke to the north. The kaiser witnessed this
engagement and by his presence cheered the German soldiers on to the
most desperate fighting.

On the following day October 31, 1914, the crisis came. The fighting
began along the Menin-Ypres road early in the morning and advanced with
great violence upon the village of Gheluvelt. The First and Third
Brigades of the First Division were swept back and the First Coldstream
Guards were wiped out as a unit. The whole division was driven back from
Gheluvelt to the woods between Veldhoek and Hooge. The allied
headquarters at Hooge were shelled. General Lomas was wounded and six of
the staff officers were killed.

The Royal Fusiliers who desperately stuck to their trenches fighting
savagely were cut off and destroyed. Out of a thousand but seventy
soldiers remained. Between two and three o'clock there occurred the most
desperate fighting seen in the battle of Ypres. At 2:30 o'clock in the
afternoon the Allies recaptured Gheluvelt at the point of the bayonet
and by evening the Allies had regained their position. Ypres had not
been captured by the Germans by this time, but they had secured their
position in all the suburbs of Ypres and had that city at their mercy,
provided allied reenforcements ordered up did not obstruct their path.

The fighting still continued for part of November, 1914, but for the
month of October no definite result was to be recorded.

At Ypres, on November 2, 1914, the Germans captured 2,300 English troops
and many machine guns. Dixmude was stormed by the Germans on the 10th of
November, and they crossed the Yser Canal, capturing the Allies position
west of Langemark, also driving them out of St. Eloi. Snow and floods
interfered with the fighting along the battle front. Ypres was bombarded
on several occasions and was repeatedly set on fire.

November 11, 1914, was another day of severe fighting. At daybreak the
Germans opened fire on the allied trenches to the north and south of
the road from Menin to Ypres. After a furious artillery fire the Germans
drove their men forward in full force. This attack was carried out by
the First and Fourth brigades of the Prussian Guard Corps which had been
especially selected to capture Ypres if possible, since that task had
proved too heavy for the infantry of the line. As the Germans surged
forward they were met by a frontal fire from the allied lines, and as
they were moving diagonally across part of the allied front, they were
also attacked on the flank by the English artillery. Though the
casualties of the Germans were enormous before they reached the English
lines, such was their strength and the momentum of the mass that, in
spite of the splendid resistance of the English troops, the Germans
succeeded in breaking through the allied lines in several places near
the road. They penetrated some distance into the woods behind the
English trenches, where some of the bloodiest fighting of the entire war
took place.

On November 12, 1914, comparative quiet reigned and with the exception
of artillery duels and some desultory fighting no results were obtained
on either side. The British report makes this comment on this attempt
upon Ypres: "Their (the Prussian Guard Corps') dogged perseverance in
pursuance of their objective claims admiration.

"The failure of one great attack, heralded as it was by an impassioned
appeal to the troops made in the presence of the emperor himself, but
carried out by partially trained men, has been only the signal for
another desperate effort in which the place of honor was assigned to the
corps d'elite of the German army.

"It must be admitted that the Guard Corps has retained that reputation
for courage and contempt of death which it earned in 1870, when Emperor
William I, after the battle of Gravelotte, wrote: 'My Guard has formed
its grave in front of St. Privat,' and the swarms of men who came up
bravely to the British rifles in the woods around Ypres repeated the
tactics of forty-four years ago, when their dense columns, toiling up
the <DW72>s of St. Privat, melted away under the fire of the French."

Ypres was now but a name. Nothing but a mass of ruins reminded the world
of its previous quaint splendor. For Ypres had been rich in historic
buildings and monuments of past days.

With the fall of Antwerp the Germans had made every effort to push
forward strong forces toward the west and had hastened to bring up new
army corps which had been hurriedly organized, their object being to
drive the Allies out of Belgium and break through to Dunkirk and Calais.
Altogether they collected 250,000 fresh men. Eventually the Germans had
north of La Bassee about fourteen corps and eight cavalry divisions, a
force of 750,000 men, with which to attempt to drive the Allies into the
sea. In addition there was immensely powerful armament and heavy siege
artillery, which also had been brought up from around Antwerp. But in
spite of these strong forces it became clearly evident by the middle of
November that the attempt to break through to Calais had failed for the
time being. The flooding of the Yser marks the end of the main struggle
for Calais. The battle fronts had shifted. Between them there was a mile
or two of mud and water. The Belgians had lost a quarter of their
effectives. The Germans had evacuated the west bank of the Yser and were
obliged to return to the point from which they had started.




CHAPTER XXVIII

ATTACKS ON LA BASSEE AND ARRAS


While the engagement on the Yser was in progress in October, 1914,
fierce fighting was kept up in the second section of the battle front,
pivoting on Givenchy to the south and running east to the north of the
La Bassee-Lille road. In this section the forces of the Crown Prince of
Bavaria opposed the troops under the command of General Smith-Dorrien.

From October 1 to 3, 1914, considerable fighting went on in the flats
east of Arras between Lens and the River Scarpe. This resulted in the
retirement of the Allies on the 4th. The Germans began to bombard Arras,
keeping it up until the 6th, when their attempt to take the city next
day was successfully repulsed. On October 8, the Germans, then holding
Douai and Lens, were shelling Lille, then held by the British
territorials. For the next two weeks artillery duels alternated with
trench fighting and skirmishing.

The main attack at La Bassee covered fully ten days, lasting from
October 22, 1914, to November 2, 1914. The first severe fighting came as
has already been mentioned, on October 22, 1914. The British were driven
out of the village of Violaines, which is situated on the road between
Lorgies and Givenchy, and General Smith-Dorrien was compelled to retreat
to the village of Faugissant, to the south of Lavantie.

On October 24, 1914, the Germans attacked heavily along the entire line,
and the First Gordon Highlanders were driven out of their trenches. For
three days the most savage fighting continued, resulting in the capture
of Neuve Chapelle by the Germans on October 27, which was defended by
East Indian troops. The fighting was desperate on both sides and became
much confused, as units here and there had succeeded in breaking through
their respective opponents' lines. All of this day and the next, October
28, this struggle continued, but the Germans maintained the ground they
had won, forcing the allied forces to retire in order to re-form their
lines.

On October 29, 1914, the Germans attacked at Festubert, and gained
several of the allied trenches after a severe struggle lasting
throughout the day. Again the Germans maintained their new position,
compelling the Indian troops to retire to the defense of the La Bassee
gate, where they were joined by several British brigades and the Second
Corps Artillery.

October 30, 1914, was consumed in continuous artillery duels, which held
the lines while the troops enjoyed much needed rest.

On October 31, 1914, the Indian forces were again savagely attacked by
the Germans whose machine guns enfiladed them in their trenches. This
attack has become noted for the great loss of British officers
commanding the Hindus.

Concurrent with this fighting the Germans also made the most savage
onslaughts further south, with the object of capturing Arras. The main
attack against this important French city began on October 20, 1914, and
lasted six days until the evening of October 26. The Germans in having
possession of Lens had a great advantage, as they were thereby enabled
to threaten the allied left center, which was stationed to the west of
Lens; for, just south from the town, ran a railway which connected with
the main line three miles east of Arras, called the Arras--Douai--Lille
line. This gave the Germans a perfect system of lateral communications.

The German general, Von Buelow, commanding the Prussian Guard Corps led
the attack on October 24, 1914, when he pushed his forces, fighting for
every inch of the ground, to within gun range of the city of Arras. All
day the most desperate fighting continued and had not General Maud'huy
received the reenforcements which hurriedly came up just when needed the
northern gates of Arras would have been gained by the Germans, who were
held back in a position near enough, however, to subject Arras to
another bombardment and the shell fire from this position rained upon
Arras to the end of the month and some six days into November.

From the date of the entry of the French into Alsace on August 7, 1914,
the battle front in France extended from the Swiss frontier, north
through western Alsace, thence in a northwesterly direction to a point
where the line met the front of the German forces advancing on Paris.

On October 1, 1914, this battle front extended in an unbroken line from
Switzerland to the city of Douai in northeastern France. The Crown
Prince of Bavaria commanded in the first section from Alsace to midway
between Nancy and Verdun; the Crown Prince of Prussia directed the
Verdun section reaching from west of Thiaucourt to Montfaucon; the Duke
of Wuerttemberg to Massiges; General von Hausen thence to Bery-au-Bac;
General von Buelow to a point directly north of Soissons; General von
Kluck in a northwesterly direction to a point west of Noyon and onward
to the north and northeast to Douai, which is about fifteen miles
northeast of Arras, from which point north the campaign has been
described. The French army opposing this German front was under the
supreme command of General Joffre. The commanding officers in the
various sectors of this front were being continually changed, making it
difficult to name the commanders in each sector, except when some more
or less noteworthy engagement had taken place along the line. The battle
front here described did not materially change throughout the months of
October, 1914, to February 1, 1915. Continual engagements took place
along this entire front--a gain of a few yards here balanced by a loss
of a like distance elsewhere.

Both belligerents had securely intrenched themselves. The pickax and
spade were far more in use than the rifle, so that now cold weather
coming on, the soldiers on both sides of the front were able to make the
trenches quite comfortable. In many instances they laid down plank
floors and lined the walls with boards, put up stoves, constructed
sleeping bunks and tables, stools and benches, and even decorated the
rooms thus evolved with anything suitable for the purpose. Pictures and
photographs from home were the favorite decorations. All this was
impossible for their brethren in the north and in Flanders, where the
activities of the conflict subjected the soldiers to continual changes
and removals.

The main objective of the Germans was the French fortresses Belfort,
Epinal, Toul, and Verdun, for these obstructed the march to Paris. The
continual onslaughts and counterassaults made upon this line left it
practically unchanged during the month of October, 1914, in which time
no engagements worthy of the name "battle" occurred. The fighting in the
north had been so desperate that it completely obscured the activities
on the entire line to the south.

The net gains during the months of October and November, 1914, for
either belligerent were practically nil. From Belfort in the south to
Arras in the north the advance or retreat in any given section was but a
matter of yards; a ridge, a farm, a hill, or other choice gun position,
the farther bank of a rivulet or stream or canal occupied or
captured--here by the French, there by the Germans--generally proved to
be but temporary possessions and wasted efforts.

It was incidents such as these that made up the record of events along
this line. During all this time the military aeroplanes were busy
dropping explosives upon the enemy's lines, and extending their
operations far to the rear, circling above the larger towns and cities,
doing considerable damage in many places. But this was not the only
purpose of these daring sky pilots; for the principal object in flying
over the adversary's country was to make observations and report
movements of troops. In this respect the aeroplane had done immense
service throughout the campaign.




CHAPTER XXIX

GENERAL MOVEMENTS ON THE FRENCH AND FLANDERS FRONTS


We have seen that at the end of November, 1914, Ypres was still in the
Allies' hands, though the Germans were exerting a fierce pressure in
that region, and were gradually, even if very slowly, getting closer and
closer to it.

At the beginning of December, 1914, the Germans drew their forces close
up to Ypres, so closely in fact that they could bring into play their
small-caliber howitzers, and before many hours Ypres was in flames in
many places. The allied forces fought fiercely to compel the Germans to
withdraw. Hand-to-hand fighting, bayonet charges, and general confusion
was the order of the day. Thousands of men would creep out of their
holes in the ground and crawl, availing themselves of whatever covering
presented itself, to some vantage point and there stand up as one man
and charge directly into the adversary's ranks.

All this was part of the general scheme worked out miles from the spot
where the conflict was going on. There in some quaint little town
occupying some out-of-the-way house was the General Staff. The rooms
were filled with officers; the walls were hung with large and small
field and detail maps, upon which were plainly marked the name of every
commanding officer and the forces under his command. Every detail of the
armies' strength--names of the commanders, and any other detail was
plainly in view.

It was here decided to turn the entire command of the allied forces
along the Yser over to the British to avoid confusion. It was well that
this was done just at this time, for on December 3, 1914, the Germans
made a fierce onslaught along the entire front of thirteen miles between
Ypres and Dixmude, bringing into use a great number of stanch rafts
propelled by expert watermen, thus carrying thousands of the German
forces over and along the Ypres River.

Again the belligerents came to a hand-to-hand conflict, and so well
directed was the allied counterattack that no advantage to the Germans
was obtained. For three days this severe fighting continued. The
struggle was most sharp between Dixmude and the coast at Westende, where
the Germans hoped to break through the allied lines, and thus crumple up
their entire front, making a free passage.

On December 7, 1914, the French captured Vermelles, a minor village a
few miles southwest of La Bassee. This little village had been the
center of a continuous struggle for mastership for nearly two months. At
last the French occupied this rather commanding point, important to the
Allies, as it afforded an excellent view over a wide stretch of country
occupied by the Germans.

The German Staff headquarters were removed from Roulers, which is about
twelve miles distant from Ypres, on December 8, 1914, from the vicinity
of Ypres, while their own forces had been concentrated upon Dixmude,
twelve miles to the north. This town had suffered severely before, but
the allied forces using what shelter they could improvise, were doing
considerable damage from this point. Therefore the Germans began to
bombard the place.

On December 9, 1914, the Germans succeeded in gaining slightly toward
Ypres. Farther north they were by this time also in a position to take
Furnes under fire. This town lies on the frontier between Belgium and
France, in the path of some of the most savage onslaughts on the part of
the Germans to break through the allied lines in order to reach the
channel towns of Dunkirk and Calais.

On December 10, 1914, the allied forces made an ineffectual attack on
Roulers, which the German General Staff had just left. South of Ypres
the allied forces made a severe attack upon the town of Armentieres,
about eight miles from Ypres, but gained no permanent advantage.

During this time the Germans had also so far succeeded in consolidating
their positions in the neighborhood of Ostend, that they could put their
heavy guns in position near the shores of that famous watering place.
This was a very necessary precaution to meet the attacks of English
gunboats, and even larger cruisers that were patrolling that coast.

On December 12, 1914, the severest fighting was along the Yser Canal,
which was crossed and recrossed several times.

On December 13, 1914, the Allies succeeded in repulsing the Germans on
the River Lys, where for three days the Germans had inaugurated a hot
offensive. These engagements were exact counterparts of the fighting at
other points in Flanders, where both opponents were apparently well
matched, and where advantages were won and lost in rapid succession.

There was severe fighting also on December 14, 1914, extending along the
entire front in Flanders from Nieuport to below Ypres. In the north the
Germans made severe onslaughts, all more or less held up or repulsed by
the Belgians, French, and English. The fighting was hottest near
Nieuport, where the Allies made some small temporary gains. Besides the
three armies participating in the conflict, the British fleet also took
part in bombarding the German coast positions. Three British barges
equipped with naval machine guns entered the River Yser in order to
cooperate in the fighting. These boats took the two villages
Lombaertzyde and St. Georges.

In this action some of the heaviest fighting was done by the French
marines. Some slight advantages were also gained by the Allies in the
neighborhood of St. Eloi and Klein Zillebeke.

Following these minor successes, attack was made upon the German lines
on the west side of Wytschaete, a village which the Germans had
succeeded in holding during the great battle of Ypres. To the west of
this village is a wood called the Petit Bois, and to the southwest is
the Maedelsteed spur, an eminence on hilly ground. From both of these
places the Germans covered the village, prepared to hold it against all
comers.

Major Duncan, commanding the Scots, and Major Baird leading the Royal
Highlanders, attacked the Petit Bois, and in the flare of terrible
machine gun and rifle fire, carried a trench west of the woods, while
the Gordon Highlanders advanced upon the spur, taking the first trench.
They were, however, obliged to fall back to the position from which they
had started, with no advantage gained. This engagement at Wytschaete
gave a good illustration of the difficulty of fighting in heavy, winter
ground, devoid of cover, and so waterlogged that any speed in advance
was next to impossible. Just prior to the battle the ground had thawed,
and the soldiers sank deep into the mud at every step they took.

On December 15, 1914, the Germans attacked a little to the south of
Ypres, but no definite result was obtained. On the following day the
Allies replied by an onslaught at Dixmude with a similar result. The
Germans attempted to turn and strike at Westende the next day.

Roulers was temporarily occupied by the Allies on December 18, 1914, and
in another location, about twenty-five miles farther southwest, in the
neighborhood of Givenchy, the Allies' Indian troops were put to the
test. The attack was launched on the morning of the 19th.

The Lahore and the Meerut divisions both took part. The Meerut division
succeeded in capturing a trench; but a little later on a counterattack,
launched by the Germans, forced the Indians back. The Lahore division,
including the First Highland Light Infantry and the Fourth Gurkhas, took
two lines of the enemy's trenches with hardly any casualties. These
captured trenches were at once occupied, and when they were full to
capacity, the Germans exploded the previously prepared mines, and blew
up the entire Hindu force.

At daylight on the morning of December 20, 1914, the Germans commenced a
heavy artillery fire along the entire front. This was followed by an
infantry charge along the entire line between Givenchy and La Quinque
Rue to the north. The defense of Givenchy was in the hands of the India
Sirhind Brigade, under General Brunker. At ten o'clock the Sirhinds
became confused and fled, enabling the Germans to capture Givenchy. The
Fifty-seventh Rifles and the Ninth Bhopals were stationed north of La
Bassee Canal and east of Givenchy, and the Connaught Rangers were
waiting at the south of the canal. The Forty-seventh Sikhs were sent to
support the Sirhind Brigade, with the First Manchesters, the Fourth
Suffolks, and two battalions of French Provincials, the entire force
being under command of General Carnegy. All these mixed forces now
essayed a combined counterattack in order to recover the ground lost by
the Sirhind Brigade, but this failed.

The Allies called up reserves and re-formed the ranks broken by that
day's reverses. With the Seventh Dragoon Guards under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel Lempriere, they began another attack. This, too,
failed. When the Sirhind Brigade fell back, the Seaforth Highlanders
were left entirely exposed. The Fifty-eighth Rifles went to the support
of their left. Throughout the entire afternoon the Seaforths had made
strenuous efforts to capture the German trenches to the right and left
of their position. Upon the arrival of the Fifty-eighth the fighting
redoubled in ferocity, but no advance was made. Finally word was given
to retreat. The Allies lost heavily in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

The First Brigade was detached, and by midnight it had reached Bethune,
about five miles west of Givenchy. Sir Douglas Haig was ordered to move
also, the entire First Division in support of the exhausted Indian
troops.

Action was begun on December 20, 1914, early in the afternoon by a
simultaneous attack, and was continued until nightfall without
important results. The next morning General Haig in person took the
command, but little ground was gained.

While this contest was in progress around Givenchy, the Germans took
possession of the city of Arras, ten miles to the south.

Between December 23 and 30, 1914, the Belgian army, strongly reenforced
by French troops, began a series of violent attacks upon the German
lines; but the Germans replied by a ceaseless bombardment of Nieuport,
which is about a mile inland. No results of importance were obtained on
either side.

The last week of December, 1914, bore a relieving holiday aspect, for it
seemed as though by general consent the carnival of blood was to be
considered not consonant with the solemnity of the season. But for all
that the French succeeded in blowing up some German trenches with a new
howitzer they were anxious to try out, and the Belgian-French forces
retook St. Georges in northern Flanders.

St. Georges had been held by the Germans for some time; the village
stands on the right hand of the Yser, and it was the only position they
retained on that side of the river. It seems from the very ease with
which the village was taken that the Germans felt their position there
untenable, and withdrew to their own side of the river in order to enjoy
a quiet Christmas with their comrades, whose singing of Christmas songs
was forever being wafted over that river of blood. Although the general
action continued on both sides, no serious battles are to be recorded in
Flanders for the balance of the year 1914.




CHAPTER XXX

OPERATIONS AROUND LA BASSEE AND GIVENCHY


On the whole, the results obtained during the first days of 1915 on the
Belgian battle front favored the Germans. Of this front the Belgians
held but three miles more or less, and the British were defending a line
of about twenty miles, while the French covered the balance of about
twelve miles, all of which included about the entire front in Flanders
from the dunes at Nieuport on the Channel to Armentieres in the south, a
line--by no means straight--about thirty-five miles in length.

Activities along the extended front in the Champagne district having
proved successful for the German forces to a considerable extent, the
General Staff turned its attention now to the La Bassee region.

There was good tactical reason for this move, because the British were
seriously threatening the position, straddling La Bassee Canal where it
flows between Cuinchy and Givenchy, and there was danger that they might
capture La Bassee, where the Germans held a salient of considerable
strategical importance, as it covered their line of communication to the
south.

Previous successful operations by the British at Richebourg and
Festubert north of Givenchy, and at Vermelles, south of Cuinchy,
evidently prompted the Germans to attempt a counterattack. Besides it
was desirable for the Germans to test the strength of the Allies at this
point, and to do this with some measure of success the Germans massed a
considerable force for this purpose.

Beginning about January 14, 1915, the British met with varying and minor
successes and defeats in this region, but no noteworthy action had taken
place for upward of ten days, until January 25, under the eye of the
German Kaiser, the principal attack, which had been carefully planned,
took place.

On the morning of January 25, 1915, a demonstration along the front
from Festubert to Vermelles and as far north as Ypres and Pervyse was
inaugurated.

The Germans began to shell Bethune, which was within the allied lines
about eight or nine miles west of La Bassee. An hour later, in the
neighborhood of nine o'clock, following up heavy artillery fire, the
Fifty-sixth Prussian Infantry and the Seventh Pioneers advanced south of
the canal, which runs eastward from Bethune, where the British line
formed a salient from the canal forward to the railway near Cuinchy, and
thence back to the Bethune and La Bassee road where the British joined
the French forces.

This salient was occupied by the Scots and the Coldstream Guards. The
Germans were obliged to advance by the road, as the fields were too soft
for the passage of the troops; even the roads were in a terrible
condition, deep ruts and thick, sticky mud greatly retarding the onward
march of the German forces. But the Allies fared little better in this
respect. In fact the entire engagement was fought out in a veritable sea
of mud and slush.

Well-directed artillery fire by the Germans blew up the British trenches
in this salient, and the Germans at once penetrated the unsupported
British line. The Germans also had the advantage of an armored train,
which they ran along the tracks from La Bassee almost into Bethune,
sufficiently close to throw considerable shell fire into this town.

The Germans advanced in close formation, throwing hand grenades. They
came on so rapidly and with such momentum that the Guards, trying in
vain to stem the tide with the bayonet, were overwhelmed, and the
British, in spite of desperate resistance, were forced back step by
step.

At some points the distance between the trenches was so small that it
was utterly impossible to stop the onrush from one trench to the other.
The Germans swept and broke through the British lines, treading their
fallen opponents under foot as they advanced. At this point the British
turned and fled, as there was no hope of successful resistance.

As the great momentum forced the German advance through the allied
lines into the open field beyond and was joined by a heavy column, which
had debouched from the vicinity of Auchy, British guns opened a
murderous fire and inflicted terrible slaughter upon these ranks.

The Coldstream and the Scots Guards retreated to their second line of
defense, where they joined others of their command held in reserve
there. Once again they turned to meet the oncoming Germans, and again
were forced to give way, leaving the Germans in possession of all the
ground previously gained. The remnants of the Guards retreated until
they were met by the London-Scottish regiment sent to reenforce them.
Here they halted while a counterattack was being organized by the First
Royal Highlanders, part of the Camerons, and the Second King's Rifle
Corps which also came up.

At one o'clock on January 25, 1915, and with the cooperation of the
French on their right, this rapidly improvised force moved forward,
making unobstructed progress on their wings by the canal and the road.
For some reason their center was delayed and held back. When they did
finally arrive and pressed forward with a rush to meet the German
forces, who were ready to receive them, the impact was fearful, and the
casualties on both sides enormous; but no gains were made by the Allies,
and the Germans held the ground they had won. At the height of the
battle the Second Royal Sussex rushed into the fray in support of their
hard-pressed comrades, but all to no purpose, for these as the others
were forced back to the rear of their starting point with but a fraction
of their forces remaining to report the events of the day.

While this terrible slaughter was in progress, the French left on the
other side of La Bassee road, which separated the Allies at this point,
had been attacked by the right of the German line, and driven back to a
considerable distance, but not as far back as the British, so that the
French left was in advance of the British right and badly exposed to
flank attack from the northward.

This obliged the entire allied forces to retreat some distance farther
to the rear, and as night came on and the severity of the action had
ceased, the Allies had an opportunity to realign their positions and
somewhat strengthen the same by the First Guard Brigade which now came
up, showing the terrible suffering to which they had been subjected.
Finally, however, it was found advisable to withdraw the Guard
altogether and replace them by the First Infantry Brigade.

Now the German tactical idea became clear. It was to force the British
to concentrate on the exposed line between Festubert and Givenchy, north
of the canal, and then to turn the British right by the German forces in
their new position just south of the canal, thus calling for
simultaneous action on both sides of the canal.

The Germans delivered an equally severe attack upon the allied position
in the village of Givenchy, about a mile north of the canal, which
bounded the scene of the attack just described. As in the other attack,
the Germans opened action by severe artillery fire, using high-explosive
shells, and after due preparation, at about 8.15 in the morning, the
infantry advanced, as is customary with the Germans, in close formation.
The British met this advance by somewhat weak artillery fire, which, it
was afterward explained was due to continued interruption of the
telephonic communications between the observers and the batteries in the
fight. However, as it was, this fire, added to the machine gun and rifle
fire from the trenches, served to turn the German advance from their
original direction, with the result that they crowded together in the
northeast corner of Givenchy after passing over the first-line trenches
of the Allies' front. Their momentum carried the Germans far into the
center of the village, with remarkably few casualties considering the
murderous fire to which they had been subjected throughout their
impetuous advances.

In the village of Givenchy, however, the Second Welsh Regiment and the
First South Wales Borderers, which had been stationed there and held in
reserve, gave the Germans a warm reception, and when the First Royal
Highlanders came up they delivered a fierce counterattack. In this they
were supported by the fire of the French artillery, which assistance,
however, proved costly to the Allies, as the French fire and bursting
shells killed friend and foe alike. Street fighting became savage, amid
the explosions of shells sent to enliven the occasion by the French.
This concluded the action for the day and when the smoke cleared away
both sides found their position comparatively little changed and nothing
but the thinned ranks of the combatants reminded the observer that the
most severe kind of fighting had taken place for the best part of a day.

The following day, January 26, 1915, the action was resumed, and the
attack opened along the Bethune and La Bassee road. This soon died out,
as though by general consent, each side reoccupying their position of
the previous evening.

But on Friday, January 29, 1915, early in the morning, the Germans again
opened with severe artillery fire which directed its attention
particularly to the British line, where the First Army Corps lay between
La Bassee Canal and the Bethune road near Cutchy. After an hour's
shelling the Germans sent one battalion of the Fourteenth Corps toward
the redoubt, and two battalions of the same corps were sent to the north
and south of this redoubt. Now upon this point and to the north of it
stood the Sussex Regiment and to the south of it the Northamptonshire
Regiment. The attack was severe, but the defense was equal to it and the
net results were summed up in the casualty lists on both sides. An
attack upon the French, south of Bethune, on the same day met with like
results. The great German objective was to open another road to Dunkirk
and Calais, and had they been successful in the engagements of the past
few days it is probable that they would have succeeded.

To the north in the coast district the Belgians had succeeded in
flooding a vast area, which served for the time to separate the
combatants for a considerable distance, obliging the Germans to resort
to rafts, boats and other floating apparatus to carry on a somewhat
haphazard offensive and resulting in nothing more than a change from
gunfire slaughter to drowning. The immense inconvenience attendant to
this mode of warfare decided the Germans to drain this area and they
succeeded in doing this by the end of January, 1915.

On the other hand the Belgians captured two German trenches in the north
on January 17, 1915, and the British sent a force to attack Lille on
January 18. The Belgian trenches were reoccupied by the Germans and the
Lille attack was successfully repulsed.

Then, for a week, there was nothing of importance until January 23,
1915, when the Germans made a strong attack upon Ypres which was
repulsed. On January 24 the Germans recaptured St. Georges and bombarded
a few of the towns and villages harboring allied troops.

The Belgians continued in their endeavor to flood the German position
along the Yser, on January 25, 1915, and succeeded in obliging their
opponents to vacate for a time at least, and on the last day of January
allied forces consisting of Zouaves, Gurkhas and other Indian companies
made an attack upon the German trenches upon the dunes at Lombaertzyde,
gaining a temporary advantage at an expense of considerable loss in
casualties.

In reviewing the activities during the month of January, 1915, the
disagreeable state of the weather must be taken into consideration; this
resulted in terrible suffering, to which the battling forces were
subjected during the actual fighting and even more so while at rest,
either on the open field or in the questionable comfort of an
inhospitable and leaky trench.

While every effort was made by the respective General Staffs to supply
their fighting troops with such comforts as were absolutely necessary to
keep body and soul together and in trim for the next day's work, little
could be accomplished and it is a marvel how these poor soldiers did
withstand the rigorous weather which blighted the prospect of victory,
so dear to all who wear a uniform.




CHAPTER XXXI

END OF SIX MONTHS' FIGHTING IN THE WEST


There were few military movements on the French battle front during
December, 1914, along the Aisne, the Oise and in the northern Champagne.
The fighting was mostly artillery duels and skirmishes by separate
units. In the Argonne, however, the Crown Prince of Germany was active
and there, as well as along the Moselle and on the heights of the
Vosges, many engagements were fought out resulting in varying advantages
to either opponent. Both sides had been strongly intrenched and the
ground was covered by snow to great depths, making progress impossible
except upon skis and snowshoes.

On December 3, 1914, the French captured Burnhaupt, a hill east of
Muelhausen in Upper Alsace, only to give up their advantage after a
German counterattack. On December 16 the Germans attacked in the Woevre
region and in Alsace; but were repulsed the following day. On December
31, 1914, the French attacked Steinbach in Alsace, but were driven out
again.

The New Year of 1915 opened gently along the battle front in France
below Arras. The first large movement in 1915 began on January 8, at
Soissons. This city lies on both banks of the river Aisne and was in the
possession of the French. The French forces attacked during a drenching
rain, pushing up the rising ground to the north with their heavy guns,
regardless of the soft ground which rapidly turned to deep mud and
slush. They succeeded in carrying the first line of German trenches on a
front a mile wide, thus gaining the top of the hill, which gave them an
excellent position for their artillery. The next day the Germans
counterattacked, but failed to dislodge the French.

Nothing occurred on Sunday, January 10, 1915, but on Monday, about noon,
January 11, the Germans came on with great force. The delay on the part
of the Germans was due to their awaiting reenforcements then on the road
to Soissons. For four days there had been a steady downpour of rain
which had not even stopped at this time. The River Aisne was much
swollen and some of the bridges had been carried away, cutting off all
supplies for the French, who were slowly giving way but fighting
desperately.

On January 12, 1915, and on the 13th the French were driven down the
<DW72>s in a great rush. This predicament was a terrible one--the
onrushing Germans 500 feet in front of them and the swollen river making
successful retreat impossible, with the ground between almost impassable
with mud and slush. French reserves had improvised a pontoon bridge
across the Aisne at Missy, in the rear of their now precarious position.
This bridge was just strong enough to carry the men and ammunition; but
not the heavy guns. The retreat turned into a rout--a general stampede
for the bridge and river.

The slaughter was terrible, the river swollen as it was seemed choked
with floating soldiers. The few who safely got across the bridge and
those who were successful in reaching the farther bank of the Aisne
alive, reached Soissons eventually. The German gain in prisoners and
booty was enormous and their gain in ground advanced their line a full
mile, on a front extending five miles to Missy and a little beyond. The
Germans strongly intrenched their new position without loss of time.

Farther along this front, in the neighborhood of Perthes, a less
important engagement took place. The Germans, under General von Einem,
opposed General Langle de Cary and his French forces. The results of
this engagement were negligible.

On January 18, 1915, a savage attack by the Germans was successfully
repulsed at Tracy-le-Val and on the 19th the French made an assault upon
the German position at St. Mihiel, in the Verdun section without gaining
any ground. Farther north on this section the French pressed on and
gained a little ground near the German fortress Metz; but the very
vicinity of this fortress counterbalanced this gain.

On January 21, 1915, the Germans recaptured the Le Pretre woods near St.
Mihiel, and next day the belligerents fought a fierce engagement in the
Vosges without advantage to either side. Prince Eitel, the second son
of the Kaiser, commanded an attack upon Thann in Alsace on January 25,
1915, but was repulsed by the French defenders.

On January 28, 1915, the Germans made some gains in the Vosges and in
Upper Alsace, but in their attempt to cross the River Aisne on the 29th
they were unsuccessful.

January 30, 1915, brought some successes to the Germans in the Argonne
forest, where throughout the month the most savage fighting was going on
in thick underbrush and from tree tops.




PART II--NAVAL OPERATIONS




CHAPTER XXXII

STRENGTH OF THE RIVAL NAVIES


Sea fights, sea raids, and the hourly expectation of a great naval
battle--a struggle for the control of the seas between modern
armadas--held the attention of the world during the first six months of
the Great War. These, with the adventures of the _Emden_ in the waters
of the Far East, the first naval fight off Helgoland, the fight off the
western coast of South America, the sinking of the _Lusitania_, and the
exploits of the submarines--held the world in constant expectancy and
threatened to involve neutral nations, thus causing a collapse of world
trade and dragging all the peoples of the earth into the maelstrom of
war.

This chapter will review the navies as they gather for action. It will
follow them through the tense moments on shipboard--the days of watching
and waiting like huge sea dogs tugging at the leash. Interspersed are
heroic adventures which have added new tales of valor to the epics of
the sea.

The naval history of the great European conflict begins, not with the
first of the series of declarations of war, but with the preliminary
preparations. The appointment of Admiral von Tirpitz as Secretary of
State in Germany in 1898 is the first decisive movement. It was in that
year that the first rival to England as mistress of the world's seas,
since the days of the Spanish Armada, peeped over the horizon. Two years
before the beginning of the present century, Von Tirpitz organized a
campaign, the object of which was to make Germany's navy as strong as
her military arm. A law passed at that time created the present German
fleet; supplementary laws passed in 1900 and 1906 through the Reichstag
by this former plowboy caused the German navy to be taken seriously, not
only by Germans but by the rest of the world. England, jealous of her
sea power, then began her maintenance of two ships for each one of her
rival's. Germany answered by laying more keels, till the ratio stood
three to two, instead of two to one.

Two years before the firing of the pistol shot at Sarajevo, which
precipitated the Great War, the British admiralty announced that
henceforth the British naval base in the Mediterranean would be
Gibraltar instead of Malta. Conjectures were made as to the significance
of this move; it might have meant that England had found the pace too
great and had deliberately decided to abandon her dominance of the
eastern Mediterranean; or that Gibraltar had been secretly reequipped as
a naval base. What it did mean was learned when the French Minister of
Marine announced in the following September that the entire naval
strength of France would thereafter be concentrated in the
Mediterranean. This was the first concrete action of the _entente
cordiale_--the British navy, in the event of war, was to guard the
British home waters and the northern ports of France; the French navy
was to guard the Mediterranean, protecting French ports as well as
French and British shipping from "the Gib" to the Suez.

What was the comparative strength of these naval combinations when the
war started?

From her latest superdreadnoughts down to her auxiliary ships, such as
those used for hospital purposes, oil carrying and repairing, England
had a total of 674 vessels. Without consideration of ages and types this
total means nothing, and it is therefore necessary to examine her naval
strength in detail. She had nine battleships of 14,000 tons displacement
each, built between 1895 and 1898--the _Magnificent_, _Majestic_,
_Prince George_, _Jupiter_, _Caesar_, _Mars_, _Illustrious_, _Hannibal_,
and _Victorious_--with engines developing 12,000 horsepower that sent
them through the water at 17.5 knots, protected with from nine to
fourteen inches of armor, and prepared to inflict damage on an enemy
with torpedoes shot from under and above the water, and with four
12-inch guns, twelve 6-inch guns, sixteen 3-inch guns, and twenty guns
of smaller caliber but of quicker firing possibilities.

Her next class was that of the _Canopus_--the _Goliath_, _Vengeance_,
_Ocean_, _Albion_, and _Glory_--2,000 tons lighter than the first class
named above, but more modern in equipment and construction, having been
built between the years 1900 and 1902. Their motive power was heavier,
being 13,500 horsepower, and their speed was almost a knot faster.
Increase in the power of naval guns had made unnecessary any increase in
the thickness of their armor, and consequently ranged from 6 to 12
inches in thickness. Their armament was about the same as that of the
older class, but each carried two more torpedo tubes.

[Illustration: Map of German and English Naval positions.]

Discussion in naval circles throughout the world turned then to the
question of whether it were better to build heavier ships with heavier
armament, or to build lighter and faster ships designed to "hit and get
away." The British authorities inclined toward the former view, and
between 1901 and 1904 the British navy was augmented with the
_Implacable_, _London_, _Bulwark_, _Formidable_, _Venerable_, _Queen_,
_Irresistible_, and _Prince of Wales_--each of the heretofore unheard-of
displacement of 15,000 tons. In spite of their size they were
comparatively fast, having an average speed of 18 knots; they did not
need, and were not equipped with heavier armor, having plates as thin as
3 inches and as thick as 12. They were built to "take punishment," and
therefore they had no greater armament than the vessels previously
named. The naval program of 1908 and 1904 also included the _Duncan_,
_Albemarle_, _Russell_, _Cornwallis_, and _Exmouth_, each 1,000 tons
lighter than the ships of the _Implacable_ type, but with the same
equipment, defensive and offensive, and of the same speed. And in the
same program, as if to offset the argument for heavier and stronger
ships, there were included the lighter and faster ships, _Swiftsure_ and
_Triumph_, displacing only 11,500 tons, but making 19 knots. Their speed
permitted and necessitated lighter armor--10 inches through at the
thickest points--and their armament was also of a lighter type, for
their four largest guns were capable of firing 10-inch shells.

Germany was becoming a naval rival worthy of notice, and the insular
position of England came to be a matter of serious concern by 1906.
Britain has never considered the building of land forts for her
protection--her strength has always been concentrated in floating war
machines. She now began to build veritable floating forts, ships of
16,350 tons displacement. By the end of 1906 she had ready to give
battle eight ships of this class, the _King Edward VII_, _Commonwealth_,
_Dominion_, _Hindustan_, _Africa_, _Hibernia_, _Zealandia_, and
_Britannia_. Speed was not sacrificed to weight, for they were given a
speed of 18.5 knots, developed by engines of 18,000 horsepower. Their
thinnest armor measured 6 inches, and their heavy guns were protected
with plates 12 inches thick. The 12-inch gun was still the heaviest
piece of armament in the British navy, and these eight ships each
carried four of that measurement, as well as four 9.2-inch guns, ten
6-inch guns, fourteen rapid-fire guns of 3 inches, two machine guns, and
four torpedo tubes.

Now that it was seen that ships of enormous displacement could also be
swift, England committed herself to the building of ships of even
greater size. In 1907 came the first of the modern dreadnoughts,
so-called from the name which was given to the original ship of 17,900
tons displacement. The _Dreadnought_ made the marvelous speed (for a
ship of that size) of 21 knots, which she was enabled to do with turbine
engines of 23,000 horsepower. Her armor measured from 8 to 11 inches in
thickness, and her great size enabled her to carry as high as ten
12-inch guns. Her minor batteries were strong in proportion.

Then, as if taking her breath after a stupendous effort, England in the
following year built two ships of 16,000 tons displacement, the _Lord
Nelson_ and the _Agamemnon_, with speed, armor, and armament much lower
than those of the _Dreadnought_. But having taken a rest, Britain was
again to make a great effort, launching in 1909 the _Temeraire_,
_Superb_, and _Bellerophon_, monsters displacing 18,600 tons. With
engines of 23,000 horsepower that could drive them through the seas at
21 knots, ready to ward off blows with armor from 8 to 11 inches thick,
firing at the same time volleys from ten 12-inch guns down to sixteen
4-inch rapid firers.

Naval architecture had now taken a definite turn, the principal feature
of which was the tremendous size of the destructive floating machines.
England, a leader in this sort of building, in 1910 built the
_Vanguard_, _Collingwood_, and _St. Vincent_, each displacing 19,250
tons. Nor were they lacking in speed, for they made, on an average, 21
knots. The 20,000-ton battleship was then a matter of months only, and
it came in the following year, when the _Colossus_, _Hercules_, and
_Neptune_ were launched. It was only in the matter of displacement that
these three ships showed any difference from those of the _Vanguard_
class; there were no great innovations either in armament or armor. But
in the same year, 1911, there were launched the _Thunderer_, _Monarch_,
_Orion_, and _Conqueror_, each of 22,500 tons, and equipped with armor
from 8 to 12 inches thick, for the days of 3-inch armor on first-class
warships had gone forever. These had a speed of 21 knots, and were the
first British ships to have anything greater than a 12-inch gun. They
carried as a primary battery ten 13.5-inch guns, and sixteen 4-inch
guns, along with six more of small caliber as their secondary battery.

In 1912 and 1913 there was only one type of warship launched having
23,000 tons displacement with 31,000 horsepower, a half a knot faster
than previous dreadnoughts, and carrying, like the previous class, ten
13.5-inch guns, along with some of smaller caliber. The ships of this
class were the _King George V_, _Ajax_, _Audacious_, and _Centurion_.

The year 1914 saw even more terrible machines of death launched. Two
types were put into the water, the first that of the _Iron Duke_ class,
of which the other members were the _Benbow_, _Emperor of India_, and
_Marlborough_. They showed great improvement in every point; their speed
was 22.5 knots, their displacement 25,000 tons, and their torpedo tubes
five. Like their immediate predecessors, they carried a primary battery
of ten 13.5-inch guns, along with the smaller ones, and their armor
measured from 8 to 12 inches in thickness. The second type of the year
was that of the _Queen Elizabeth_ and _Warspite_ class. They surpassed
all the warships when they were built. Their speed for their size was
the greatest--25 knots. They had the largest displacement among
warships--27,500 tons; they had the thickest armor, ranging from 8 to
13.5 inches; they had the most improved form of engines--oil burners,
developing 58,000 horsepower; and most marvelous of all was their
primary battery, which consisted of eight 15-inch guns. The largest gun
yet made had been the 16-inch gun, for use in permanent position in land
forts, and, with the German army, for a mobile force. It now was shown
that the modern warship could carry a gun as heavy as any on land. There
were in the course of construction when the war broke out eight more
such monsters, the _Malaya, Valiant_, and _Barham_, sister ships of the
_Queen Elizabeth_, and the _Royal Oak_, _Resolution_, _Royal Monarch_,
_Ramillies_, and _Renown_, each of 29,000 tons displacement, but having
the same armament as the _Queen Elizabeth_. All of these were hastened
to completion as soon as war was declared.

At the time of the declaration of war England had, in addition to these
greatest ships, a number of supporting ships such as the ten battle
cruisers, _Indomitable_, _Invincible_, _Indefatigable_, _Inflexible_,
_Australia_, _New Zealand_, _Queen Mary_, _Princess Royal_, _Lion_, and
the _Tiger_. Their displacements ranged from 17,250 to 28,000 tons, and
their speeds from 25 to 30 knots, the last being that of the _Tiger_.
Their speed is their greatest feature, for their armament and batteries
are much lighter than those of the first-line ships.

Next, there were ready thirty-four high-speed cruisers of quite light
armament and armor. There were six of the _Cressy_ type, four of the
_Drake_ type, nine of the same type as the _Kent_, six of the same class
as the _Antrim_, six like the _Black Prince_, three of the same class as
the _Shannon_, together with seventeen heavily protected cruisers, of
which the _Edgar_ was the prototype. The rest of the British navy needs
no detailed consideration. It consisted at the outbreak of the war of 70
protected light cruisers, 134 destroyers, and a number of merchant ships
convertible into war vessels, together with submarines and other small
ships.

The navy of France stood fourth in the list of those of the world powers
at the time the war started. There were eighteen old vessels, built
between 1894 and 1909, including the _Carnot_ class (corresponding to
the British ship _Magnificent_), the _Charlemagne_, _Bouvet_, _Suffren_,
_Republique_, and _Democratie_ classes. The most modern of these types
displaced no more than 14,000 tons, made no more than 18 knots, and
carried primary batteries of 12-inch guns.

Some improvement was made in the six ships of the _Danton_ class which
were built in 1911 and 1912. They displaced 18,000 tons, had armor from
9 to 12 inches thick and carried guns of 12-inch caliber. They
correspond to the British ship _Temeraire_. In 1913 and 1914 were
launched the _Jean Bart_, _Courbet_, _Paris_, and _France_ of the
dreadnought type, but much slower and not so heavily armed as the
British ships of the same class. In eight ships which were incomplete
when war was declared the matter of speed received greater attention,
and they are consequently faster than the older vessels of the same
type. It is in the nineteen French armored cruisers--France has no
battle cruisers--that the French showed better efforts as builders of
speedy ships, for they made 23 knots or more. In the list of French
fighting ships there are in addition two protected cruisers, the
_D'Entrecasteaux_ and the _Guichen_, together with ten light cruisers.
But the French "mosquito fleet," consisting of destroyers, torpedo boats
and submarines, is comparatively large. Of these she had 84, 135, and
78, respectively.

After the Russo-Japanese War the battle fleets of Russia were entirely
dissipated, so that when the present conflict came she had no ships
which might have been accounted worthy aids to the navies of England and
France. In so far as is known, her heaviest ships were the _Andrei
Pervozvannyi_ and the _Imperator Pavel I_, each displacing only 17,200
tons, and of the design of 1911.

Against these fighting naval forces of the allied powers were ranged the
navies of Germany and Austria-Hungary. The former had, at the outbreak
of hostilities, 36 battleships, 5 battle cruisers, 9 armored cruisers,
and 48 cruisers. Instead of giving attention to torpedo boats she gave
it to destroyers, of which she had 130. And of submarines she had 27.

In detail her naval forces consisted, first, of the _Kaiser Friedrich
III_, _Kaiser Karl der Grosse_, _Kaiser Barbarossa_, _Kaiser Wilhelm
II_, and _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, all built as a result of the first
agitation of Von Tirpitz, between the years 1898 and 1901. They each
displaced 10,614 tons, had a speed of 18 knots, required 13,000
horsepower, were protected with from 10 to 12 inches of armor, and
carried four 9.4-inch guns, fourteen of 5.9 inches, twelve of
3.4-inches, and twenty of smaller measurement. Roughly they corresponded
to the British ships of the _Canopus_ class, both in design and time of
launching.

Following this class came that of the _Wittelsbach_, including also the
_Wettin_, _Zaehringen_, _Mecklenburg_, and _Schwaben_, built between 1901
and 1903, displacing 11,643 tons, making 18 knots, protected with from 9
to 10 inches of armor and carrying a primary battery of four 9.4-inch
guns, eighteen 5.9-inch guns, and a large secondary battery. The similar
type in the British navy was the _Canopus_--for England was far ahead of
Germany, both in the matter of displacement and primary battery. During
the same years England had launched ships of the type of the
_Implacable_.

In 1904 came the German ships _Hessen_, _Elsass_, and _Braunschweig_,
and in 1905 and 1906 the _Preussen_ and _Lothringen_. They were well
behind the English ships of the same years, for they displaced only
12,097 tons, made 18 knots, carried armor of from 9 to 10 inches in
thickness, and a primary battery of four 11-inch guns, fourteen 6.7-inch
guns, and twelve 3.4-inch guns, together with rapid firers and other
guns in a secondary battery. England at this time was putting 12-inch
guns in the primary battery of such ships as the _King Edward VII_.

Still Germany kept up the race, and in 1906, 1907, and 1908 launched the
_Hannover_, _Deutschland_, _Schlesien_, _Schleswig-Holstein_, and
_Pommern_, with 12,997 tons displacement, 16,000 horsepower, a speed of
18 knots, and only 11-inch guns in the primary batteries. Whereas
England, at the same time, was building ships of the dreadnought type.

Next came four ships of the _Vanguard_ class--the _Westfaelen_, _Nassau_,
_Rheinland_, and _Posen_, built in 1909 and 1910. Their heaviest guns
measured 11 inches, while those of the English ships of the same class
measured 12 inches. The displacement of these German fighting ships was
18,600 tons. In point of speed they showed some improvement over the
older German ships, making 19.5 knots. Germany, like England, was now
committed to the building of larger and larger ships of the line. The
_Helgoland_, _Thueringen_, _Oldenburg_, and _Ostfriesland_, which were
put into the water in 1911 and 1912, were consequently of 22,400 tons
displacement, with a speed of 20.5 knots and carrying twelve 12-inch
guns, fourteen 5.9-inch rapid-fire guns, fourteen 3.9-inch rapid-fire
guns, a few smaller guns, and as many as six torpedo tubes.

While England was maintaining her "two to three" policy, and while the
United States stood committed to the building of two first-class
battleships a year, Germany, in 1913, put five of them into the water.
These were the _Koenig Albert_, _Prinz Regent Luitpold_, _Kaiserin_,
_Kaiser_, and _Friedrich der Grosse_, each capable of speeding through
the water at a rate of 21 knots, displacing 23,310 tons and carrying an
armament of ten 12-inch guns, fourteen 5.9-inch guns, and a large number
of rapid-fire guns of smaller measurement. Their armor was quite heavy,
being 13 inches thick on the side and 11 inches thick where protection
for the big guns was needed.

The largest ships in the German navy which were launched, fitted, and
manned at the time that the war began, were those which were built in
1914 and which had a displacement of 26,575 tons. These ships were the
_Koenig_, _Grosser Kurfuerst_, and the _Markgraf_. The corresponding type
in the British navy was that of the _Iron Duke_, built in the same year.
The British ships of this class were 1,000 tons lighter in displacement,
a bit faster--making 22.5 knots to the 22 knots made by the German
ships--and their armament was not so strong as that of the German type,
for the German ships carried ten 14-inch guns, whereas the English
carried ten 13.5-inch guns.

In addition to these first-class battleships, Germany had certain
others, individual in type, such as the _Von der Tann_, _Moltke_,
_Goeben_, _Seydlitz_, _Derfflinger_, _Fuerst Bismarck_, _Prinz Heinrich_,
_Prinz Adalbert_, _Roon_ and _Yorck_, _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_,
_Bluecher_, _Magdeburg_, _Strassburg_, _Breslau_, _Stralsund_, _Rostock_,
and _Karlsruhe_. These may be reckoned as scout cruisers, for they
showed much speed, the fastest making 30 knots and the slowest 19 knots.
The oldest dates from 1900, and the newest from 1914. Germany had, also,
thirty-nine more fast protected cruisers which were designed for scout
duty.

In destroyers she was well equipped, having 143 ready for service when
war was declared. Her twenty-seven submarines were of the most improved
type, and much about their construction and armament she was able to
keep secret from the rest of the world. It is probable that even their
number was greater than the intelligence departments of foreign navies
suspected. The best type had a speed on the surface of 18 knots and
could travel at 12 knots when submerged. The type known as _E-21_, of
the design of 1914, measured 213 feet 8 inches in length and had a beam
of 20 feet.

Austria, though not renowned for her naval strength, had certain units
which brought up the power of the Teutonic powers considerably. She had
nine first-class battleships, the _Erzherzog Karl_, _Erzherzog Ferdinand
Max_, _Erzherzog Friedrich_, _Zrinyi_, _Radetzky_, _Erzherzog Franz
Ferdinand_, _Teggethoff_, _Prinz Eugen_, and _Viribus Unitis_. These, at
the time Austria went to war, ranged in age from nine years to one year,
and varied in displacement from 10,000 tons to 20,000 tons. The largest
guns carried by any of them measured 12 inches, and the fastest, the
_Prinz Eugen_, made 20 knots. Of secondary importance were the
battleships _Kaiserin Maria Theresia_, _Kaiser Karl VI_, and _St.
Georg_. The register of battleships was supplemented with ten light
cruisers of exceptionally light displacement, the highest being only
3,966 tons. Scouting was their chief function. Austria had, also, 18
destroyers, 63 torpedo boats, and 6 submarines.

Such were the respective strengths of the opponents on that day in July,
1914, when the Crown Prince of Austria-Hungary lost his life. For ten
years the officers of the navy created by the German Admiral von Tirpitz
had at all dinners come to their feet, waved their wine glasses and had
given the famous toast "Der Tag"--to the day on which the English and
German naval hosts would sally forth to do battle with each other. "Der
Tag" found both forces quite ready, though the British naval authorities
stole a march on their German rivals in the matter of mobilization.

It had been the custom for years in the British navy to assemble the
greater part of the British ships during the summer at the port of
Spithead, where, decorated with bunting, with flags flying, with
visitors in holiday spirit, and with officers and men in smart dress,
the vessels were reviewed by the king on the royal yacht.

But in the eventful year of 1914, perhaps by accident, perhaps by
design, for the truth may never be known, the review had a different
aspect. There was no gaiety. The number of ships assembled this time was
greater than ever before--216 actual fighting ships passed slowly before
the royal yacht--there were no flags, no bunting, no holiday crowds, no
smart dress for officers and men. Instead, the fleet was drawn up ready
for battle, with decks cleared, guns uncovered, steam up, and magazines
replenished. During the tense weeks in which the war clouds gathered
over southern Europe this great fighting force remained in the British
home waters, and when, at fifteen minutes after midnight on August 4,
"Der Tag" had come, this fleet sailed under sealed orders. And
throughout the seven seas there were sundry ships flying the Union Jack
which immediately received orders by cable and by wireless.

Of the disposition of the naval forces of Germany less was known. Her
greatest strength was concentrated in the North Sea, where the island of
Helgoland, the Gibraltar of the north, and the Kiel Canal with its exits
to the Baltic and North Seas, furnished excellently both as naval bases
and impenetrable protection. Throughout the rest of the watery surface
of the globe were eleven German warships, to which automatically fell
the task of protecting the thousands of ships which, flying the German
red, white, and black, were carrying freight and passengers from port
to port.

The first naval movements in the Great War occurred on the morning of
August 5, 1914. The British ship _Drake_ cut two cables off the Azores
which connected Germany with North and South America, thus leaving these
eleven German fighting ships without communication with the German
admiralty direct. And the war was not a day old between England and
Germany before the German ship _Koenigin Luise_ was caught sowing mines
off the eastern English ports by the British destroyer _Lance_.




CHAPTER XXXIII

FIRST BLOOD--BATTLE OF THE BIGHT


The Germans had taken heed of the value of mines from lessons learned at
the cost of Russia in the war with Japan, and set about distributing
these engines of destruction throughout the North Sea. The British
admiralty knowing this, sent out a fleet of destroyers to scour home
waters in search of German mine layers.

About ten o'clock on the morning of August 5, 1914, Captain Fox, on
board the _Amphion_, came up with a fishing boat which reported that it
had seen a boat "throwing things overboard" along the east coast. A
flotilla, consisting of the _Lance_, _Laurel_, _Lark_ and _Linnet_, set
out in search of the stranger and soon found her. She was the _Koenigin
Luise_, and the things she was casting overboard were mines. The _Lance_
fired a shot across her bow to stop her, but she put on extra speed and
made an attempt to escape. A chase followed; the gunners on the British
ship now fired to hit. The first of these shots carried away the bridge
of the German ship, a second shot missed, and a third and fourth hit her
hull. Six minutes after the firing of the first shot her stern was shot
away, and she went to the bottom, bow up. Fifty of her 130 men were
picked up and brought to the English shore.

The first naval blood of the Great War had been drawn by Britain on
August 5, 1914. The _Koenigin Luise's_ efforts had not been in vain. She
had posthumous revenge on the morning of August 6, when the _Amphion_,
flagship of the third flotilla of destroyers, hit one of the mines which
the German ship had sowed. It was seen immediately by her officers that
she must sink; three minutes after her crew had left her there came a
second explosion, which, throwing debris aloft, brought about the death
of many of the British sailors in the small boats, as well as that of a
German prisoner from the _Koenigin Luise_.

All the world, with possibly the exception of the men in the German
admiralty, now looked for a great decisive battle "between the giants"
in the North Sea. The British spoke of it as a coming second Trafalgar,
but it was not to take place. For reasons of their own the Germans kept
their larger and heavier ships within the protection of Helgoland and
the Kiel Canal, but their ships of smaller type immediately became
active and left German shores to do what damage they might to the
British navy. It was hoped, perhaps, that the naval forces of the two
powers could be equalized and a battle fought on even terms after the
Germans had cut down British advantage by a policy of attrition.

A flotilla of German submarines on August 9 attacked a cruiser belonging
to the main British fleet, but was unable to inflict any damage. The
lord mayor of the city of Birmingham received the following telegram the
next morning: "Birmingham will be proud to learn that the first German
submarine destroyed in the war was sunk by H. M. S. _Birmingham_." Two
shots from the British ship had struck the German _U-15_, and she sank
immediately.

The German admiralty, even before England had declared war, suspected
that the greatest use for the German navy in the months to come would be
to fight the British navy, but they ventured to show their naval
strength against Russia beforehand. Early in August they sent the
_Augsburg_ into the Baltic Sea to bombard the Russian port of Libau, but
after doing a good bit of damage the German ship retired. It is probable
that this raid was nothing more than a feint to remind Russia that she
continually faced the danger of invasion from German troops landed on
the Baltic shores under the cover of German ships, and that she must
consequently keep a large force on her northern shores instead of
sending it west to meet the German army on the border.

Among the German ships which were separated from the main fleet in the
North Sea, and which were left without direct communication with the
German admiralty after the cutting of the cables off the Azores by the
_Drake_, were the cruisers _Goeben_ and _Breslau_. When England declared
war these two German ships were off the coast of Algeria. Both were very
fast vessels, having a speed of 28 knots, and they were designed to go
6,000 knots without needing replenishment of their coal bunkers.

On the morning of August 5, after having bombarded some of the coast
cities of Algeria they found themselves cut off on the east by a French
fleet and on the west by an English fleet, but by a very clever bit of
stratagem they escaped. The band of the _Goeben_ was placed on a raft
and ordered on a given moment to play the German national airs after an
appreciable period. Meanwhile, under the cover of the night's darkness
the two German ships steamed away. After they had a good start the band
on the raft began to play. The British patrols heard the airs and
immediately all British ships were searching for the source of the
music. To find a small raft in mid-sea was an impossible task, and while
the enemy was engaged in it the two Germans headed for Messina, then a
neutral port, which they reached successfully. The Italian authorities
permitted them to remain there only twenty-four hours.

Before leaving they took a dramatic farewell, which received publicity
in the press of the whole world, and which was designed to lead the
British fleet commanders to believe that the Germans were coming out to
do battle. Instead, they headed for Constantinople. They escaped all the
ships of the British Mediterranean fleet with the exception of the
cruiser _Gloucester_. With this ship they exchanged shots and were in
turn slightly damaged, but they reached the Porte in seaworthy
condition, and were immediately sold to the Turkish Government, which
was then still neutral. The crews were sent to Germany and were warmly
welcomed at Berlin. The officers responsible for their escape were
disciplined by the British authorities.

Both Germany and England, the former by means of the eleven ships at
large, and the latter by means of her preponderance in the number of
ships, now made great efforts to capture trading ships of the enemy.
When England declared war there was issued a royal proclamation which
stated that up to midnight of August 14 England would permit German
merchantmen in British harbors to sail for home ports, provided Germany
gave British merchantmen the same privilege, but it was specified that
ships of over 5,000 tons would not receive the privilege because they
could be converted into fighting ships afterward. But on the high seas
enemy ships come upon were captured.

The German admiralty on August 1 had issued orders to German merchantmen
to keep within neutral ports, and by this means such important ships as
the _Friedrich der Grosse_ and the _Grosser Kurfuerst_ eluded capture. In
the harbor of New York was the _Kronprinzessin Cecilie_, a fast steamer
of 23.5 knots. She left New York on July 28 carrying a cargo of
$10,000,000 in gold, and was on the high seas when England declared war.
Naturally she was regarded by the British as a great prize, and the
whole world awaited from day to day the news of her capture, but her
captain, showing great resourcefulness, after nearly reaching the
British Isles, turned her prow westward, darkened all exterior lights,
put canvas over the port holes and succeeded in reaching Bar Harbor,
Me., on the morning of August 5.

Similarly the _Lusitania_ and the French liner _Lorraine_, leaving New
York on August 5, were able to elude the German cruiser _Dresden_, which
was performing the difficult task of trying to intercept merchantmen
belonging to the Allies as they sailed from America, while she was
keeping watch against warships flying the enemies' flags. Still more
important was the sailing from New York of the German liner _Kaiser
Wilhelm der Grosse_. This ship had a speed of 22.5 knots and a
displacement of 14,349 tons. During the first week of the war she
cleared the port of New York with what was believed to be a trade
cargo, but she so soon afterward began harassing British trading ships
that it was believed that she left port equipped as a vessel of war or
fitted out as one in some other neutral port. The continued story of the
German raids on allied trading ships must form a separate part of this
narrative. It was only a month after the outbreak of hostilities that
the fleets of the allied powers had swept clean the seven seas of all
ships flying German and Austrian flags which were engaged in trade and
not in warlike pursuits.

The first naval battle of the Great War was fought on August 28, 1914.
"A certain liveliness in the North Sea" was reported through the press
by the British admiralty on the 19th of August. Many of the smaller
vessels of the fleet of Admiral von Ingenohl, the German commander, such
as destroyers, light cruisers, and scouting cruisers, were sighted.
Shots between these and English vessels of the same types were exchanged
at long range, but a pitched battle did not come for still a week.
Meanwhile the British navy had been doing its best to destroy the mine
fields established by the Germans. Trawlers were sent out in pairs,
dragging between them large cables which cut the mines from the
sea-bottom moorings: On being loosened they came to the surface and were
destroyed by shots from the trawlers' decks.

On the 28th of August came the battle off the Bight of Helgoland. The
island of Helgoland had been a British possession from 1807 till 1890,
when it was transferred to Germany by treaty. It was seen immediately by
the Germans that it formed an excellent natural naval base, lying as it
does, thirty-five miles northwest of Cuxhaven and forty-three miles
north of Wilhelmshaven. They at once began to augment the natural
protection it afforded with their own devices. Two Zeppelin sheds were
erected, concrete forts were built and 12-inch guns were installed. The
scene of the battle which took place here was the Bight of Helgoland,
which formed a channel eighteen miles wide some seven miles north of the
island and near which lay the line of travel for ships leaving the ports
of the Elbe.

British submarines which had been doing reconnaissance work on the
German coast since August 24 reported to the British commander, Admiral
Jellicoe, that a large force of German light cruisers and smaller craft
were lying under the protection of the Helgoland guns, and he
immediately arranged plans for leading this force away from that
protection in order to give it battle. Briefly the plans made provided
that three submarines were to proceed on the surface of the water to
within sight of the German ships and when chased by the latter were to
head westward. The light cruisers _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ were
detailed to run in behind any light German craft which were to follow
the British submarines, endeavoring to cut them off from the German
coast, and these two vessels were backed by a squadron of light cruisers
held in readiness should the first two need assistance. Squadrons of
cruisers and battle cruisers were detailed to stay in the rear, still
further to the northwest, to engage any German ships of their own class
which might get that far.

It was at midnight on August 26 that Commodore Keyes moved toward
Helgoland with eight submarines accompanied by two destroyers. During
the next day--August 27--this force did nothing more than keep watch for
German submarines and scouting craft, and then took up its allotted
position for the main action. The morning of the 28th broke misty and
calm. Under half steam three of the British submarines, the _E-6_,
_E-7_, and _E-8_ steamed toward the island fortress, showing their hulls
above water and followed by the two detailed destroyers.

The mist thickened. Still more slowly and cautiously went the British
submersibles, and while they went above water, five of their sister
craft traveled under the surface. Here was the bait for the German ships
under Helgoland's guns. Would they bite?

The Germans soon gave the answer. First there crept out a German
destroyer which took a good look at the situation and then gave wireless
signals to some twenty more of her type, which soon came out to join
her. The twenty-one little and speedy German boats bravely came out and
chased the two British destroyers and three submarines, while a German
seaplane slowly circled upward to see if the surrounding regions
harbored enemies. Presumably the airman found what he sought for he
soon flew back to report to Helgoland. The peaceful aspect of the waters
to the east of the island immediately changed, as a squadron of light
cruisers weighed anchor and put out after the retiring Britishers.

Before a description of the fighting can be given it is necessary to
understand the plan of the fight as a whole. Assuming that the page on
which these words are printed represents a map of the North Sea and that
the points of the compass are as they would be on an ordinary chart, we
have the island of Helgoland, half an inch long and a quarter of an inch
wide, situated in the lower right-hand corner of this page, with about
half an inch separating its eastern side from the right edge of the page
and the same distance separating it from the bottom. The lower edge of
the page may represent the adjoining coasts of Germany and Holland, and
the right-hand edge may represent the coast of the German province of
Schleswig and the coast of Denmark.

At seven o'clock on the morning of August 28 the positions of the
fighting forces were as follows: The decoy British submarines were
making a track from Helgoland to the northwest, pursued by a flotilla of
German submarines, destroyers, and torpedo boats, and a fleet of light
cruisers. On the west--the left edge of the page, halfway up--there were
the British cruisers _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ accompanied by flotillas,
and steaming eastward at a rate that brought them to the rear of the
German squadron of light cruisers, thus cutting off the latter from the
fortress. In the southwest--the lower left-hand corner of the
page--there was stationed a squadron of British cruisers, ready to close
in when needed; in the northwest--the upper left-hand corner of the
page--there were stationed a squadron of British light cruisers and
another of battle cruisers, and it was toward these last two units that
the decoys were leading the German fleets.

The _Arethusa_ and _Fearless_ felt the first shock of battle, on the
side of the British. The German cruiser _Ariadne_ closed with the
former, while the latter soon found itself very busy with the German
cruiser _Strassburg_. For thirty-five minutes--before the _Fearless_
drew the fire of the _Strassburg_--the two German vessels poured a
telling fire into the _Arethusa_, and the latter was soon in bad
condition, but she managed to hold out till succored by the _Fearless_,
and then planted a shell against the _Ariadne_ which carried away her
forebridge and killed her captain. The scouting which had been done by
the smaller craft of the German fleets showed their commanders that
there were other British ships in the neighborhood besides the two they
had first engaged, and it was thought wiser to withdraw in face of
possible reenforcement of the British, consequently the _Strassburg_ and
_Ariadne_ turned eastward to seek the protection of the fortress. The
_Arethusa_, a boat that had been in commission but a week when the
battle was fought, was in a bad way; all but one of her guns were out of
action, her water tank had been punctured and fire was raging on her
main deck amidships. The _Fearless_ passed her a cable at nine o'clock
and towed her westward, away from the scene of action, while her crew
made what repairs they could.

The flotillas of both sides had meanwhile been busy. At the head of the
squadron of German destroyers that came out of the waters behind
Helgoland was the _V-187_. Without slacking speed she steamed straight
for the British destroyers, her small guns spitting rapidly, but she was
outnumbered by British destroyers, which poured such an amount of steel
into her thin sides that she went under, her guns firing till their
muzzles touched the water and her crew cheering as they went to their
deaths. A few managed to keep afloat on wreckage, and during a lull in
the fighting, which lasted from nine o'clock till ten, boats were
lowered from the British destroyers _Goshawk_ and _Defender_ to pick up
these stranded German sailors.

The commanders of the German fleet, perceiving these small boats from
afar, thought that the British were resorting to the old principle of
boarding, and the German light cruiser _Mainz_ came out to fire upon
them. Two of the British small boats had to be abandoned as their mother
ships made off before the oncoming German. They were in a perilous
position, right beneath the guns of the fortress. But now a daring and
unique rescue took place. The commander of the British submarine _E-4_
had been watching the fighting through the periscope of his craft, and
seeing the helpless position of the two small boats, he submerged, made
toward them, and then, to the great surprise of the men in them, came up
right between them and took their occupants aboard his boat.

Repairs had been made on the _Arethusa_ which enabled her to go into
action again by ten o'clock. Accompanied again by two light cruisers of
ten four-inch guns and the _Fearless_, she turned westward in answer to
calls for assistance from the destroyers _Lurcher_ and _Firedrake_,
which accompanied the submarines and which reported that they were being
chased by fast German cruisers. Suddenly the light cruiser _Strassburg_
again came out of the mist and bore down on the British cruisers. Her
larger guns were too heavy and had too long a range for those of the
British craft, and the latter immediately sent out calls which brought
into action for the first time certain ships belonging to the squadron
of British light cruisers, which had been stationed to the
northwest--the upper left-hand corner of the page.

The vessels which answered the calls were the light cruisers _Falmouth_
and _Nottingham_ with eight eight-inch and nine six-inch guns
respectively, but before arriving the _Strassburg_ still had time to
inflict more damage on the _Arethusa_. The cruisers _Koeln_ and _Mainz_
joined the _Strassburg_, and the British vessels were having a bad time
of it when their commander ordered the _Fearless_ to concentrate all
fire on the _Strassburg_. This, and a concentrated fire from the
destroyers, proved too strong for her and she turned eastward,
disappearing in the mist off Helgoland. The _Mainz_ then received the
attention of all available British guns, including the battle cruiser
_Lion_, and soon fire broke out within her hold. Next her foremast,
slowly tottering and then inclining more and more, crashed down upon her
deck, a distorted mass. Following that came down one of her funnels. The
fire which was raging aboard her was hampering her machinery, and her
speed slackened; the moment to strike with a torpedo had come, and one
of these "steel fishes" was sent against her hull below water. In the
explosion which followed one of her boilers came out through her deck,
ascended some fifty feet and dropped down near her bow; her engines
stopped, and she began to settle slowly, her bow going down first.

It was now noon. From behind the veil of the surrounding mist came the
_Falmouth_ and _Nottingham_, which with the guns in their turrets
completely finished the hapless _Mainz_, and their sailors openly
admired the bravery of her crew, which, while she sank, maintained
perfect order and sang the German national air.

There was yet the _Koeln_ with which the _Arethusa_ had to do battle. But
by now the heavy British battle cruisers _Lion_ and _Queen Mary_ had
also come down from the northwest to take part in the fighting, and
letting the _Arethusa_ escape from the range of the light cruiser
_Koeln_, they went for the German, which, overpowered, fled toward
Helgoland. While the chase was on the _Ariadne_ again made her
appearance and came to the aid of the _Koeln_, but the light cruiser
_Ariadne_ carried no gun as effective in destructive power as the
13.5-inch guns of the _Lion_, and she, too, had to seek safety in
flight. The British ships then finished the _Koeln_; so badly was she hit
that when the British small boats sought the spot where she quickly sank
they found not a man of her crew afloat. Every man of the 370 of her
crew perished.

The afternoon came, and with its advent the mist, which had kept the
guns of Helgoland's forts out of action, had cleared off the calm waters
of the North Sea. By the time the sun had set only floating wreckage
gave evidence that here brave men had fought and died. By evening the
respective forces were in their home ports, being treated for their
hurts. The Germans had lost the _Mainz_, _Koeln_, and _Ariadne_, and the
_Strassburg_ had limped home. The loss in destroyers and other small
craft in addition to that of the _V-187_ was not known. The loss on the
British side had not entailed that of a large ship, but the _Arethusa_
when she returned to her home port was far from being in good condition,
and some of the smaller boats were in the same circumstances.

Admiral von Ingenohl was committed more strongly than ever, as a result
of this engagement, to the belief that the best policy for his command
would be to keep his squadrons within the protection afforded by
Helgoland and that the most damage could be done to the enemy by picking
off her larger ships one by one. In other words, he again turned to the
policy of attrition. He immediately put it into force.

On the 3d of September the British gunboat _Speedy_ struck a mine in the
North Sea and went down. It was only two days later that the light
cruiser _Pathfinder_ was made the true target of a torpedo fired by a
German submarine off the British eastern coast, and she, too, went to
the bottom. But the British immediately retaliated, for the submarine
_E-9_ sighted the German light cruiser _Hela_ weathering a bad storm on
September 13 between Helgoland and the Frisian coast. A torpedo was
launched and found its mark, and the _Hela_ joined the _Koeln_ and
_Mainz_. Up to this point the results of attrition were even, but the
Germans scored heavily during the following week.

On September 22 the three slow British cruisers _Cressy_, _Hogue_, and
_Aboukir_ were patrolling the waters off the Dutch coast, unaccompanied
by small craft of any kind, when suddenly, at half past six in the
morning, the _Aboukir_ crumpled and sank, the victim of another
submarine attack. But the commander of the _Hogue_ thought she had been
sunk by hitting a mine, and innocently approached the spot of the
disaster to rescue such of the crew of the _Aboukir_ as were afloat. The
work of mercy was never completed, for the _Hogue_ itself was hit by two
torpedoes in the next few moments, and she joined her sister ship. The
commander of the _Cressy_, failing to take a lesson from what he had
witnessed, now approached, and his ship was also hit by two torpedoes,
making the third victim of the German policy of attrition within an
hour, and Captain Lieutenant von Weddigen, commander of the _U-9_, which
had done this work, immediately became a German hero.




CHAPTER XXXIV

BATTLES ON THREE SEAS


So stood the score in the naval warfare in the North Sea at the end of
the second month of the Great War. But while these events were taking
place in the waters of Europe, others of equal import had been taking
place in the waters of Asia. On August 23, 1914, Japan declared war on
Germany and immediately set about scouring the East for German craft of
all kinds.

Japan brought to the naval strength of the Allied powers no mean unit.
Hers was the only navy in the world which had seen the ultramodern
battleships in action; the Russian navy which had had the same
experience was no more. Eight of her first-class battleships were, at
the time of her entrance into the Great War, veterans of the war with
Russia. The _Fugi_, _Asahi_, _Kikasa_, and _Shikishima_ had gone into
the former war as Japanese ships, and the remaining four had gone into
it as Russian ships, but had been captured by the Japanese. These were
the _Hizen_, _Sagami_, _Suwo_, and _Iwami_. Their value was not great,
for the _Fugi_ had been launched as far back as 1896. Nevertheless she
carried 12-inch guns and displaced 12,300 tons. But her speed was only
17 knots at the most. She had been built in England as had the _Asahi_
and _Shikishima_, which were launched in 1900 and 1901. They also
carried 12-inch guns and had a speed of 18.5 knots. Their tonnage was
15,000. Admiral Togo's former flagship, the _Mikasa_, was also of the
predreadnought type, having been built in 1900, and carrying a main
battery of 12-inch guns. Her speed was 18.5 knots.

Of the former Russian ships the rechristened _Iwami_ was of French
build, protected with Krupp steel armor to the thickness of 7.5 inches.
Her displacement was 13,600 tons, and her speed 18 knots. Like the other
ships of this class in the Japanese navy, she carried a main battery of
12-inch guns. The _Hizen_ was an American product, having been built by
Cramps in 1902. Her displacement was 12,700 tons, made a speed of 18.5
knots, was also protected with Krupp steel and carried four 10-inch
guns. She was a real veteran, for she had undergone repairs necessitated
by having been torpedoed off Port Arthur and had been refloated after
being sunk in later action there. The _Sagami_ and the _Suwo_ had been
built in 1901 and 1902. They displaced 13,500 tons, had a speed of 18.5
knots, and carried as their heaviest armament 10-inch guns.

In addition to these eight ships Japan had also nine protected cruisers,
all of the same type and all veterans of the war with Russia. They were
of such strength and endurance that the Japanese admiralty rated them
capable of taking places in the first line of battle. These were the
_Nisshin_ and _Kasuga_, purchased from Italy and built in 1904,
displacing 7,700 tons, and making a speed of 22 knots; the _Aso_, French
built and captured from the Russians, and of the same design and
measurements as the other two; and the protected cruisers _Yakumo_,
_Asama_, _Idzumo_, _Tokiwa_, _Aguma_, and _Iwate_, built before the war
with Russia, slightly heavier than their sister ships but not as fast.
None of this type has been added to the Japanese navy since 1907. Japan
has, instead, given attention to scouting cruisers, with the result that
she possessed three excellent vessels of this class, the _Yahagi_,
_Chikuma_, and _Hirato_, with the good speed of 26 knots and displacing
5,000 tons. They were built in 1912. And not so efficient were the other
ships of similar design, the _Soya_, built in America, _Tone_ and
_Tsugaru_.

The veteran Japanese navy was supplemented with 52 destroyers and 15
submarines, all built since the war with Russia, and a number of heavier
vessels. Among the latter were the first-class battleships _Kashima_ and
_Katori_, completed in 1906, and displacing 16,400 tons. Their heavy
guns measured 12 inches, and they made a speed of 19.5 knots. There were
also the vessels _Ikoma_ and _Tsukuba_, individual in type, with
corresponding kinds in no other navy, and which might be called a cross
between an armored cruiser and battle cruiser. Though displacing no more
than 13,766 tons, they carried four 12-inch guns, and made the
comparatively low speed of 20.5 knots. In 1909 and 1910 the Japanese
added two more ships of this kind to their navy, the _Ibuki_ and
_Kurama_, slightly heavier and faster and with the same armament.

The dreadnought _Satsuma_ also came in 1910--a vessel displacing 19,400
tons, but making a speed of only 18.2 knots, and with an extraordinarily
heavy main battery consisting of four 12-inch guns and twelve 10-inch
guns. The _Aki_, launched in 1911, was 400 tons heavier than the
_Satsuma_, and was more than 2 knots faster, and her main battery was
equally strong. The dreadnoughts _Settsu_ and _Kawachi_, completed in
1913 and 1912 respectively, displaced 21,420 tons, but were able to make
not more than 20 knots. At this time the Japanese admiralty, perhaps on
account of lessons learned in the war with Russia, was building
dreadnoughts with less speed than those in the other navies, but with
much heavier main batteries. These two vessels carried a unique main
battery of twelve 12-inch guns, along with others of smaller
measurement. What the dreadnoughts lacked in speed was made up in that
of four battle cruisers launched after 1912. These were the _Kirishima_,
_Kongo_, _Hi-Yei_, and _Haruna_, with the good speed of 28 knots. Their
displacement was 27,500 tons, and they carried in their primary
batteries eight 14-inch guns and sixteen 6-inch guns.

At the time Japan entered the war she had in building four
superdreadnoughts with the tremendous displacement of 30,600 tons. These
vessels, the _Mitsubishi_, _Yukosaka_, _Kure_, and _Kawasaki_, had been
designed to carry a main battery of the strength of the U.S.S.
_Pennsylvania_, and to have a speed of 22.5 knots.

The first move of the Japanese navy in the Great War was to cooperate
with the army in besieging the German town of Kiaochaw on the Shantung
Peninsula in China, but the operation was soon more military than naval.
Japanese warships captured Bonham Island in the group known as the
Marshall Islands, and, having cleared eastern waters of German warships,
scoured the Pacific in such a manner as to chase those which escaped
into the regions patrolled by the British navy.

The German vessels which made their escape were among the eleven which
were separated from the rest of Germany's navy in the North Sea at the
outbreak of hostilities. They were, with the exception of the
_Dresden_, the _Leipzig_, _Nuernberg_, _Scharnhorst_, and _Gneisenau_. It
was weeks before they were first reported--on September 22 at the harbor
of Papeete, where they destroyed the French gunboat _Zelie_, and after
putting again to sea their location was once more a mystery.

On the evening of November 1 a British squadron consisting of the
vessels _Good Hope_, _Otranto_, _Glasgow_, and _Monmouth_, all except
the _Good Hope_ coming through the straits, sighted the enemy. The
British ships lined up abreast and proceeded in a northeasterly
direction. The Germans took up the same alignment eight miles to the
westward of the British ships and proceeded southward at full speed.
Both forces opened fire at a distance of 12,000 yards shortly after six
o'clock off Coronel near the coast of Chile. The _Gneisenau_ was struck
by a 9.2-inch shot from the _Good Hope_. The _Scharnhorst_ and
_Gneisenau_ picked the _Good Hope_ as their first target, but finding
that they could do no damage at that range and that they were safe from
the fire of the British ship, they came to within 6,000 yards of her.
Her fire in reply was augmented by that of the _Monmouth_. Excellent aim
on the part of the Germans soon had the _Good Hope_ out of action, and
fire broke out aboard her. Soon after general action her magazine
exploded.

The _Monmouth_ then received the brunt of the fire from the German
ships, and came in for more than her share of the destructive fire,
being put virtually out of action, and at the same time there occurred
an explosion on board the _Good Hope_ and she sank immediately, carrying
Admiral Cradock to his death.

There remained of the British force only the _Otranto_--a converted
liner and not really a battleship of the line--the _Glasgow_ and the
hopelessly disabled _Monmouth_ to continue the fight with an efficient
German force. The British commander ordered the former two to get away
by making speed, but the officer in charge of the _Glasgow_, paying no
heed to the order, kept in the fight.

[Illustration: The famous German raider "Emden" beached on one of the
Cocos Islands after being wrecked by the "Sydney's" shells.]

Dusk was then coming on and the _Glasgow_ sought to take advantage of it
by getting between the German ships and the limping _Monmouth_,
concealing the latter from them with her smoke. But the Germans had now
come to within 4,500 yards. To escape possible attack from torpedoes
the German ships spread out their line, but perceiving that such a
danger was not present, they again closed in to finish the crippled
British ships. All of the German ships now went for the _Glasgow_, and
she had to desert the _Monmouth_, which first sailed northward, in bad
condition, and later made an attempt to run ashore at Santa Maria, but
was unable to do so.

The inevitable "if" played its part in the battle. When the British
fleet first went after the Germans it had as one of its units the
battleship _Canopus_. But her speed was not up to that of the other
ships, and she fell far to their stern. By the time the action was on
she was too distant to take part in it. No attempt was made to go
together owing to the slowness of the battleship. The _Canopus_ was
never in the action at all, being 150 miles astern. Had Cradock not
desired to he need not have taken on the action but retired in the
_Canopus_. The setting of the sun also played its part; if daylight had
continued some hours more the British squadron might have held out till
the _Canopus_ brought up, for the almost horizontal rays of the sun were
in the eyes of the German gunners. But as it dropped below the watery
horizon it left the British ships silhouetted against a clear outline.
The _Canopus_ did not get into the fight, and the greatest concern of
the _Glasgow_ as she steamed off was to warn the British battleship to
keep off, for of less speed than the German ships, and outnumbered by
them, her appearance meant her destruction. The _Glasgow_, later joined
by the _Canopus_, arrived in battered condition at the Falkland Islands.
The _Monmouth_, after the main action was over, was found and finished
by the German squadron and went down. Seventy shots were fired at her
when she lay sinking, on fire and helpless, and unable to fire her guns.
Germany had evened the score in the second battle between fleets.

The _Dresden_ after the Falkland action took refuge in Fiordes of Terra
del Fuego and after being there for a couple of months proceeded to the
head of the Island of Juan Fernandez where she was found by the
_Glasgow_, _Kent_ and auxiliary cruiser _Orama_ and was destroyed.

Most remarkable had been the career of the German third-class cruiser
_Nuernberg_, which had joined the other German ships that went to make up
the German squadron which fought in this battle off Coronel. This
vessel, on the day after Germany and England went to war, was lying near
Yap, an island in the Pacific, that had been, until captured by the
Japanese, the wireless station of most importance to the Germans in the
Pacific Ocean. She immediately, after being apprised that she was part
of a navy engaged in a war, set sail and was not reported again until
the 7th of September, when she appeared at Fanning Island, a cable
station maintained by Britain, and from which cables run to Vancouver to
the east and Australia to the west. Here she hid her identity by
entering the harbor flying the tricolor of France and appearing as
though she was making a friendly visit. Officials on the island, happy
to think they would have such a visitor, saw two cutters leave the
warship.

Great was the surprise of those watching events from the shore when they
saw the French flag lowered from the masthead of the visitor and in its
place the German naval ensign run up. The cutters were just about
reaching knee-deep water at the shore when this surprise came, and it
was augmented when, with the protection of the guns of the vessel, the
men in these cutters showed themselves to be a hostile landing party.

Her presence was not reported to the rest of the world for the good
reason that she cut all cables leading from the island. All the British
men there were put under guard, and after damaging all cable instruments
she could find, the _Nuernberg_, accompanied by a collier that had come
with her, again took to the high seas.

She next turned up at the island of St. Felix, 300 miles west of the
Chilean coast, but did not come to the harbor. During the night of
October 14 the inhabitants of that island saw the flash and heard the
roar of an explosion miles out to sea, and for a number of days later
they picked up on their beach the wreckage of what must have been a
collier. As has been related in preceding paragraphs, the _Nuernberg_
took part in that fight. The end of her career came in the battle off
the Falkland Islands, which will be dealt with later.




CHAPTER XXXV

THE GERMAN SEA RAIDERS


While British men-o'-war were capturing German merchantmen and taking
them to British ports, the German raiders which were abroad were earning
terrifying reputations for themselves because the enemy merchantmen with
which they came upon had to be destroyed on the high seas, for there
were no ports to which they could be taken. Prominent among these was
the _Koenigsberg_, a third-class cruiser. When the war came she was in
Asiatic waters and immediately made the east coast of Africa her "beat."
While patrolling it she came upon two British merchant ships, and after
taking from their stores such supplies as were needed she sent them to
the bottom. On September 20, 1914, she made a dash into the harbor of
Zanzibar and found there the British cruiser _Pegasus_, which on account
of her age was undergoing a complete overhauling. She was easy prey for
the German ship, for besides the fact that she was stationary her guns
were of shorter range than those of her adversary. Shell after shell
tore into her till she was battered beyond all resemblance to a fighting
craft. But her flag flew till the end, for though it was shot down from
the masthead, two marines held it aloft, one of them losing his life.
And when the _Koenigsberg_, her task of destruction complete, sailed off,
the lone marine still held up the Union Jack. The British ships in those
waters made a systematic hunt for her and located her at last, on the
30th of October. She was hiding in her favorite rendezvous, some miles
up the Rufigi River in German East Africa. The ship which found her was
the _Chatham_, a second-class cruiser, with a draft much heavier than
that of the _Koenigsberg_, and the difference gave the latter a good
advantage, for she ran up the river and her enemy could not follow. Nor
could the English ship use her guns with much effect, for the gunners
could not make out the hull of the German ship through the tropical
vegetation along the river banks. All that the British ship could do
was to fire shells in her general direction and then guess what effect
they had. But to prevent her escape, colliers were sunk at the mouth of
the river. She had come to as inglorious an end as her victim, the
_Pegasus_.

The account of another raider, the _Kronprinz Wilhelm_, which left New
York on the evening that England declared war, with her bunkers loaded
with coal and other supplies for warships, has already been related. The
mystery concerning this sailing was cleared up when she was caught
coaling the _Karlsruhe_ in the Atlantic. Both ships made off in safety
that time, and soon after a British cruiser reported that she had been
heard in wireless communication with the _Dresden_. Thereafter the fate
of this ship remained a mystery till she put in at Hampton Roads on
April 11, 1915.

Most spectacular was the career of the _Emden_, a third-class cruiser,
which sailed from Japanese waters at the same time as the _Koenigsberg_.
Through the ability of her commander, Captain Karl von Mueller, she
earned the soubriquet "Terror of the East," for by using a clever system
of supply ships she was able to raid eastern waters for ten weeks
without making a port or otherwise running the risk of leaving a clue by
which British ships might find her. Her favorite occupation was that of
stopping enemy merchantmen which she sank. But her captain always
allowed one--the last one--of her prizes to remain afloat, and in this
he sent to the nearest port the officers, passengers, and crews of those
that were destroyed. At times he used prizes as colliers, putting them
under command of his petty officers.

By way of diversion, Captain von Mueller steamed into the harbor of
Madras in the Bay of Bengal and opened with his guns on the suburbs of
the town, setting on fire two huge oil tanks there. The fort there
returned the fire, but the _Emden_ after half an hour sailed away
unharmed. She had been enabled to come near the British guns on shore by
flying the French flag, which she continued to display until her guns
began to boom. She then left the waters of Bengal Bay, but not before
she had ended the journey of $30,000,000 worth of exports to India, and
had sent to the bottom of the sea some $15,000,000 worth of imports.
Twenty-one steamers had been her victims, their total value having been
about $3,250,000, and their cargoes were worth at least $15,000,000.
Very expensive the British found her, and they were willing to go to any
length to end her career. They curtailed her activities somewhat when
the _Yarmouth_ captured the converted liner _Markomannia_, which was one
of her colliers, and recaptured the Greek freighter _Pontoporos_, which
had been doing the same duty. This took place off the coast of Sumatra.

But Von Mueller was undaunted, even though his coal problem was becoming
serious. He knew that the _Yarmouth_ had sailed from Penang near Malacca
and that she was not at that base, since she was searching for his own
vessel. He therefore conceived the daring exploit of making a visit to
Penang while the _Yarmouth_ was still away. He came within ten miles of
the harbor on the 28th of October, and disguised his ship by erecting a
false funnel made of canvas upheld by a wooden frame, much like
theatrical scenery. This gave the _Emden_ four funnels, such as the
_Yarmouth_ carried. Coming into the harbor in the twilight of the dawn,
she was taken by those on shore to be the British ship, not a hostile
gun ready for her.

Lying in the harbor was the Russian cruiser _Jemchug_ and three French
destroyers and a gunboat. The watch on the Russian ship questioned her,
and was told by the wireless operator on the _Emden_ that she was the
_Yarmouth_ returning to anchor. By this ruse the German ship was enabled
to come within 600 yards of the Russian ship before the false funnel was
discovered. Fire immediately spurted from the Russian guns, but a
torpedo from the _Emden_ struck the _Jemchug's_ engine room and made it
impossible for her crew to get ammunition to her guns. Von Mueller poured
steel into her from a distance of 250 yards with terrible effect. The
Russian ship's list put many of her guns out of action, and she was
unable to deliver an effective reply. Another torpedo from the _Emden_
exploded her magazine. Fifteen minutes after the firing of the first
shot the Russian had gone to the bottom.

Von Mueller now put the prow of the _Emden_ to sea again, for he feared
that both the _Yarmouth_ and the French cruiser _Dupleix_ had by then
been summoned by wireless. Luck was with him. Half an hour after leaving
the harbor he sighted a ship flying a red flag, which showed him at once
that she was carrying a cargo of powder. He badly needed the ammunition,
and he prepared to capture her. But this operation was interrupted by a
mirage, which caused the small French destroyer _Mosquet_ to appear like
a huge battleship. When he discovered the truth, Von Mueller closed with
the Frenchman, who came to the rescue of the _Glenturret_, the powder
ship. Destroyer and cruiser closed for a fight, the former trying to get
close enough to make work with torpedoes possible, but the long range of
the _Emden's_ guns prevented this, and the _Mosquet_ was badly damaged
by having her engine room hit. Soon she was in a bad way, and Von Mueller
ordered his guns silenced, thinking the destroyer would now give up the
fight. But the Frenchman was valiant and refused to do so; he let go
with two torpedoes which did not find their mark, and was immediately
subjected to a withering fire, which caused his ship to sink, bow first.

One of the destroyers which had been in the harbor now came out to take
issue with the _Emden_, but it was the business of the latter to
continue destroying merchant ships and not to run the risk of having her
career ended by a warship, so she immediately put off for the Indian
Ocean. A storm which then came up permitted her to make a better escape.

It was not until the 9th of November that the world at large heard more
of her, and it proved to be the last day of her reign of terror. There
was a British wireless and cable station on the Cocos (Keeling) Isles,
southwest of Java, and Von Mueller had determined to interrupt the
communication maintained there connecting India, Australia, and South
Africa. Forty men and three officers, with three machine guns, were
detailed by him as a landing party to destroy instruments and cut the
cables. But such a thing had been partially forestalled by the British
authorities, who had set up false cable ends. These were destroyed by
the deceived Germans. When the _Emden_ had first made her appearance the
news had been sent out by the wireless operator on shore, not knowing
what ships would pick up his calls.

This time luck was against Von Mueller, for it so happened that a convoy
of troop ships from Australia was passing within one hundred miles. They
were accompanied by the Australian cruisers _Melbourne_ and _Sydney_.
The latter was dispatched to go to the Cocos Islands, and by getting up
a speed of 26 knots she reached them in less than three hours. Von
Mueller knew that escape by flight was impossible, for his ship had been
weeks at sea; her boilers were crusted, her machinery badly in need of
repair, and she had not too much coal. He therefore decided to give
battle, and went straight for the _Sydney_ at full speed. His object was
to meet her on even terms, for her advantage was that her guns had much
greater range than those of the _Emden_. If he could get close enough he
might be able to use his torpedo tubes. But Captain Glossop of the
_Sydney_ saw through this maneuver and maintained good distance between
the two ships. About the first shot from the _Emden_ killed the man at
the range finder on the fore bridge of the _Sydney_. Captain Glossop was
standing within a few feet of him at the time.

The replies from the Australian ship were fatal. The foremost funnel of
the _Emden_ crumpled and fell; her fire almost ceased, and then she
began to burn; the second funnel and the third fell also; there was
nothing left but to beach her, which Von Mueller did, just before noon.
While she lay there helpless the _Sydney_ shot more steel into her,
leaving her quite helpless, and then went off to chase a merchant ship
which had been sighted during the fighting and which, when caught,
proved to be the British ship _Buresk_, now manned by Germans and doing
duty as collier to the _Emden_. Returning to the latter, Captain Glossop
saw that she still flew the German flag at her masthead. He signaled
her, asking whether she would surrender, but receiving no reply after
waiting five minutes he let her have a few more salvos. The German flag
came down and the white flag went up in its place. The _Jemchug_ had
been avenged, and the terribly costly career of the _Emden_ brought to
an end. Von Mueller was taken prisoner, and on account of his valor was
permitted to keep his sword. But the landing party, which had cut the
false cables, was still at large. The adventures of these three officers
and forty men form a separate story, which will be narrated later.




CHAPTER XXXVI

BATTLE OFF THE FALKLANDS


The defeat of the British squadron back in the first week of November
had sorely tried the patience of the British public, and the admiralty
felt the necessity of retrieving faith in the navy. Von Spee was still
master of the waters near the Horn, and till his ships had again been
met the British could not boast of being rulers of the waves.
Consequently Admiral Fisher detailed the two battle cruisers
_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ to go to the Falkland Islands. They left
England November 11, 1914, and on the outward journey met with and took
along the light cruisers _Carnarvon_, _Kent_, and _Cornwall_, the
second-class cruiser _Bristol_, and the converted liner _Macedonia_. The
_Canopus_ and the _Glasgow_, now repaired, all joined the squadron,
which was commanded by Admiral Sturdee. The vessels coaled at Stanley,
Falkland Islands, and while so engaged on December 8 were warned by a
civilian volunteer watcher on a near-by hill that two strange vessels
had made their appearance in the distance. British naval officers
identified them and other vessels which were coming into view as the
ships of Von Spee's squadron, the one which had been victorious off
Coronel.

During the interval that had elapsed since that engagement these German
ships had not been idle. Von Spee knew that the _Glasgow_ had gone to
the Falklands and that there were important wireless stations there, but
he put off going after those prizes and picked up others. The _Nuernberg_
had cut communication between Banfield and Fanning Islands. Two British
trading ships had fallen victims to the _Dresden_, and four more had
met the same end at the hands of the _Leipzig_. For coal and other
supplies Von Spee had been relying on the Chilean ports, but now came
trouble between him and the port authorities, for England was accusing
the South American nation of acting without regard to neutrality. It was
for this reason that Von Spee turned southward to take the Falkland
Islands. The world at large, and of course Von Spee, had no knowledge of
the ships which had set out from Plymouth for the Falklands on the
eleventh of the month, so he approached in full expectation of making
not only a raid but for occupation. He knew that he would have to
exchange shots with the _Glasgow_ and perhaps some small ships, and he
believed the islands weakly defended by forts, but there was nothing in
that to defer his attack. The result--the lookout near Stanley had
reported the oncoming warships _Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, followed
by the rest of the German squadron. German guns were trained on the
wireless station, and great was the surprise of the unfortunate Von Spee
and his officers when there was heard the booming of guns which they
knew immediately must be mounted on warships larger than their own.
Their scouting had been defective, and the presence of the _Inflexible_
and _Invincible_ had till then not been discovered. They then reasoned
that these were the guns of the _Canopus_--a critical and fatal error.

The _Canopus_ from behind the hills fired on the German ships in an
endeavor to protect the wireless station. Beyond the range of her guns
hovered the lighter German cruisers _Dresden_, _Leipzig_, and _Nuernberg_
to await the outcoming of the _Glasgow_. Both the _Gneisenau_ and
_Scharnhorst_ concentrated their fire on the _Canopus_, and when the
_Glasgow_, accompanied by the _Carnarvon_, _Cornwall_, and _Kent_, made
her appearance it did not change the battle formation of the Germans,
for the _Canopus_ was still the only large vessel they were aware of.
Now the _Leipzig_ came nearer in order to take up the fight with the
lighter British ships. By nine in the morning the German ships were
drawn out in single file, running parallel with the shore in a
northeasterly direction. At the head of the line was the _Gneisenau_,
followed by the _Dresden_, _Scharnhorst_, _Nuernberg_, and _Leipzig_, in
that order. They thought that this would entice what they believed to be
the whole of the British force present into coming out for a running
fight, and in which the old _Canopus_ would be left behind to be
finished after the lighter vessels were done for. But all this time the
_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ were silent with their guns, though there
was bustle enough aboard them while their coaling was being hurried.

By ten o'clock these two larger ships were ready with steam up and decks
cleared, and they came out from behind the hill. Von Spee saw that
discretion was the better part of valor and gave orders for his ships to
make off at full speed. For a time the two squadrons kept parallel to
each other at a distance of twelve miles, with the British squadron--the
_Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ leading--north of the German ships. The
_Baden_ and _Santa Isabel_, two transports that had been part of the
German squadron, were unable to keep up with the others and headed
south, pursued by the _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_. The two British battle
cruisers were faster than any other ships in either squadron, and while
pulling up on the German ships were in danger of pulling away from their
own ships. To avoid the latter, Admiral Sturdee kept down their speed
and was content with taking a little longer to get within gun range of
Von Spee's ships. By two o'clock the distance between them was about
16,000 yards; the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ had now left the rest of
the British squadron far behind and took issue with the _Scharnhorst_
and _Gneisenau_ respectively. The remaining British ships, with the
exception of the _Carnarvon_, gave attention to the three lighter German
cruisers and the _Eitel Friedrich_, which had broken from the first
formation and were now pointing southeast.

Von Spee ordered the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ to turn broadside to
the enemy. Shells were falling upon the German ships with fair accuracy,
but their return fire could do little damage to the British ships,
because the range was a little too great for the German 8.2-inch guns.
Those of the _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ were of the 12-inch type.

All four ships were belching forth heavy black smoke that hung low over
the water after it left the funnels. A moderate breeze carried it
northward, and Von Spee moved his ships this way and that till his smoke
blew straight against the guns of the British ships, making it almost
impossible for the British gunners to take aim and note effect. But the
superior speed of the two British battle cruisers stood them in good
stead, and their commanders brought them up south of the enemy--on their
other side. It was now the German gunners who found the smoke in their
faces, and the advantage was with the British.

By three o'clock in the afternoon fire had broken out on the
_Scharnhorst_ and Von Spee replied to Sturdee's inquiry that he would
not quit fighting, though some of his guns were out of action and those
which still replied to the Britisher did now only at intervals. There
was evidently something wrong with the machinery that brought shells and
ammunition to her guns from out of her hold, the fire probably
interfering with it. A 12-inch shell cut right through her third funnel
and carried it completely off the ship. She turned so that she could
bring her starboard guns into action, and they did so feebly. The fire
on board her grew worse and worse, and it could be seen blood-red
through holes made by the shells from the _Invincible_ whenever her hull
showed through the dense clouds of escaping steam that enveloped her.
Just at four o'clock she began to list to port, thus having her
starboard guns put out of action, for they pointed toward the sky, and
the shells which came from them described parabolas, dropping into the
water at safe distance from the English ship. More and more she listed,
till her port beam ends were in the cold waters of the South Atlantic,
and while in that position she sank some fifteen minutes later.

Meanwhile the duel between the _Gneisenau_ and _Inflexible_ had been
going on. A 12-inch shell from one of the British cruisers struck one of
the after gun turrets of the _Gneisenau_ and swept it overboard. The
German ship used the sinking _Scharnhorst_ as a screen and tried to take
on both British ships. Still she was able to plant some effective shells
against the _Invincible_ as a final reply. By half-past five she was
listing heavily to starboard and her engines had stopped. The British
ship, thinking she was surely done for, ceased firing at her and watched
her for ten minutes, while a single gun on board of her fired at
intervals. The three ships _Carnarvon_, _Inflexible_, and _Invincible_
now closed in on her and punished her till the flag at her stern was
hauled down. But the ensign at her peak continued to fly. Just at six
o'clock, with this color still in position, she suddenly heeled to
starboard, while the men of her crew made hastily up her slanting decks
and then climbed over on to the exposed part of her upturned port side.
Many of these unfortunate men had time to jump into the sea, but others
were caught when she suddenly disappeared beneath the surface.

There remained the task of picking up her survivors, but they were not
numerous, for the shock of the cold water killed a large number. Having
picked up those whom they could, the three British ships signaled the
news of their victories to the distant cruisers which were fighting it
out with the _Dresden_, _Leipzig_, _Nuernberg_, and _Eitel Friedrich_.

These lighter German cruisers had left the line of battle and had turned
southward at just about the time that the action between the
_Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ and _Inflexible_ and _Invincible_ began.
They started off with the _Dresden_ at the foremost point of a triangle
and with the other two at the two remaining points. The _Glasgow_,
_Cornwall_, and _Kent_ went after them, while the _Carnarvon_, because
her speed was not high enough to accompany them, remained with the
battle cruisers. The _Glasgow_ drew up with the German ships first, and
at three o'clock began to fire on the _Leipzig_ at a distance of 12,000
yards. As in the other action of that afternoon, the British ship took
advantage of the fact that her guns had longer range, and she drew back
from the German ships so that their guns could not reach her, though her
own shells began to fall upon their decks. It was her object to keep
them busy until she could be joined by her accompanying ships.

[Illustration: Plan--Vice Admiral Sir Doveton Surdee's Action off the
Falkland Islands. Dec 8, 1914.]

The _Cornwall_ by four o'clock was also near enough to the _Leipzig_ to
open fire on her, and three hours later the German cruiser was having a
time of it with a large fire in her hold. British faith in heavy
armament with long range had again been vindicated. There was something
of human interest in this duel between the _Glasgow_ and the
_Leipzig_. In their previous meeting, off Coronel, the German ship had
had all the better of it and now the men of the British ship were out
for revenge. Consequently the _Glasgow_ signaled to the other British
ships: "Stand off--I can manage this myself!" By eight o'clock in the
evening the _Glasgow_ had her in bad condition, and the _Carnarvon_ came
up to assist in raking her till there was nothing left but a mass of
wreckage on her decks. But her flag was still flying and the British
ships kept circling around her, thinking she still wished to fight, but
not coming near enough to permit the use of her torpedo tubes. Miserable
was the plight of the _Leipzig's_ crew, for the two hundred men who were
still alive were unable to get to her flag on account of the fire aboard
her, and they had to remain inactive while the _Carnarvon_ and _Glasgow_
poured round after round into their ship. Only twelve remained alive at
nine o'clock, when she began to list to port. Slowly more and more of
the under-water part of her hull showed above the sea, and she continued
to heel until her keel was right side up. In this position she sank, a
large bubble marking the spot.

When the _Nuernberg_ left the line of German ships at one o'clock, it was
the British cruiser _Kent_ that went after her, a vessel more heavily
armed than the German ship, yet about a knot slower. But by hard work on
the part of the engineers and stokers of the _Kent_ she was able, by
five o'clock, to get within firing distance of the _Nuernberg_. By a
strange trick of fate the _Kent_ was sister ship to the _Monmouth_ which
had fallen victim to one of the _Nuernberg's_ torpedoes in the battle off
Coronel. Here, too, was a duel with human interest in it. In their
desire for revenge, the men of the _Kent_ made fuel of even her
furniture in order to speed up her engines. Her 6-inch guns now began to
strike the German ship, and soon a fire broke out aboard her. She could
have ended the German vessel by keeping a fire upon her while remaining
too distant to be within range of the _Nuernberg's_ 4-inch guns, but dusk
was gathering and an evening mist was settling down upon the water.
Consequently the _Kent_ drew nearer to her adversary. The firing of the
_Nuernberg_ was then effective and more than twenty of her shells took
good effect on the British ship. It was only through prompt action on
the part of her crew that her magazine was kept from exploding, for a
shell set fire to the passage leading to it.

By seven o'clock in the evening the _Nuernberg_ was practically "blind,"
for the flames from the fire that was raging on her had reached her
conning tower. A member of her crew hauled down her flag, and the
_Kent_, thinking that the fight was over, came close to her. While
within a few hundred yards of her, however, she was greeted with new
firing from the German cruiser. But this ceased under a raking from the
_Kent's_ starboard guns, and once again the flag of the _Nuernberg_,
which had been run up on resumption of shooting, was hauled down.
Members of her crew then had to jump into the sea to escape death from
burning--the fire was quenched only when she went down at half past
seven. The overworked engineers and stokers of the _Kent_ were rewarded
for their hard work by being permitted to come on deck to watch the
_Nuernberg_ go down, and all were soon engaged in helping to save the
lives of the German sailors in the water. Just as the red glow of the
sinking _Nuernberg_ was dying down a large four-masted sailing ship, with
all sails set, came out of the mist, her canvas tinged red by the
flames' rays. Silently she went by, disappearing again into the mist, a
weird addition to an uncanny scene.

Chasing the various units of the broken line of German ships had taken
the British ships miles from each other, but after ten o'clock they
began to reach each other by wireless signals and all made again for
Stanley. It was not until the afternoon of the next day, however, that
word came from the _Kent_, for her pursuit had taken her farther than
any of the other British ships.

The _Bristol_ and _Macedonia_ had made good in their pursuit of the
_Santa Isabel_ and _Baden_, but in going after the _Dresden_ the
_Bristol_ was not successful; the German ship got away in the rainstorm
which came up during the evening, and the _Bristol_, which had hurried
out of the harbor at Stanley not quite ready for battle, was unable to
keep on her trail. The fast _Eitel Friedrich_, which as a merchant ship
converted into a man-o'-warsman had greater speed than any of the ships
on either side, was able to get away also. These two German ships now
took up their parts as raiders of allied commerce, and were not
accounted for till months later. There was now on the high seas no
German squadron.




CHAPTER XXXVII

SEA FIGHTS OF THE OCEAN PATROL


There were some minor naval operations in the waters of Europe which
have been neglected while larger actions elsewhere were recorded. During
the month of September, 1914, the British admiralty established a
blockade of the mouth of the River Elbe with submarines, and the German
boats of the same type were showing their worth also. On August 28,1914,
the day after the raid on Libau by the German cruiser _Augsburg_, the
date of the battle of the Bight of Helgoland, the two Russian protected
cruisers _Pallada_ and _Bayan_, while patrolling the Russian coast in
the Baltic Sea, were attacked by German submarines. Surrounded by these
small craft, which made poor targets, the two Russian ships sought to
escape by putting on full speed, but the former was hit by a torpedo and
sank. The other got away.

All of the Allies, with the exception of France, had by the beginning of
September, 1914, suffered losses in their navies. The navy of the
republic was engaged in assisting a British fleet in maintaining
supremacy in the Mediterranean, and kept the Austrian fleet bottled up
in the Adriatic Sea. French warships bombarded Cattaro on September 10,
1914, to assist the military operations of the Montenegrin Government.
These ships then proceeded to the island of Lissa and there destroyed
the wireless station maintained by Austria. The Austrian navy made no
appearance while the allied fleets scoured the lower coast of Dalmatia,
bringing down lighthouses, destroying wireless stations, and bombarding
the islands of Pelagosa and Lesina. On the 19th of September, 1914,
they returned to Lissa and landed a force which took possession of it,
thus establishing a new naval base against the Central Powers' navies.

Duels between pairs of ships took place in various seas. The career of
the raider _Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse_, a fast converted liner, was
ended by the British ship _Highflyer_, a cruiser, near the Cape Verde
Islands, on August 27, 1914, after the former had sunk the merchantman
_Hyades_ and had stopped the mail steamer _Galician_. The greater speed
of the German vessel was of no advantage to her, for she had been caught
in the act of coaling. What then transpired was not a fight, for in
armament the two were quite unequal. She soon sank under the
_Highflyer_'s fire, her crew having been rescued by her colliers.

The next duel took place between the _Carmania_ and _Cap Trafalgar_,
British and German converted liners, respectively. They met on September
14,1914, in the Atlantic off South America. In view of the fact that at
the beginning of the war these two ships had been merchantmen and had
been armed and commissioned after the outbreak of hostilities, this
engagement was something of the nature of those between privateersmen in
the old days. In speed, size, and armament they were about equal. For
nearly two hours they exchanged shots between 3,000 and 9,000 yards, and
markmanship was to determine the victory. The shots from the _Carmania_
struck the hull of the other ship near the water line repeatedly, and
the British commander was wise enough to present his stern and bow ends
more often than the length of the _Carmania_'s sides. At the end of the
fight the German ship was afire and sank. Her crew got off safely in her
colliers, and the British ship made off because her wireless operator
heard a German cruiser, with which the _Cap Trafalgar_ had been in
communication, signaling that she was hastening to the liner's aid.

Only two days before this the British cruiser _Berwick_ captured the
converted liner _Spreewald_ in the North Atlantic, where she had been
trying to interrupt allied commercial vessels.

Germany kept up her policy of attrition by clever use of submarines and
mines. The British battleship _Audacious_, while on patrol duty off the
coast of Ireland in the early days of the war, met with a disaster of
some sort and was brought to her home port in a sinking condition. The
rigors of the British censorship almost kept the news of this out of the
British papers and from the correspondents of foreign papers. It was
reported that she had struck a mine, that she had been torpedoed, and
that she had been made the victim of either a spy or a traitor who
caused an internal explosion. The truth was never made clear. Rumors
that she had gone down were denied by the British admiralty some months
later, when they reported her repaired and again doing duty, but this
was counteracted by a report that one of the ships that was completed
after the start of hostilities had been given the same name.

About the sinking of the _Hawke_ there was less conjecture. This vessel
had gained notoriety in times of peace by having collided with the
_Olympic_ as the latter left port on her maiden voyage to New York. On
the 15th of October, 1914, while patrolling the northern British home
waters she was made the target of the torpedo of a German submarine and
went down, but the _Theseus_, which had been attacked at the same time,
escaped.

Four German destroyers were to be the next victims of the war in
European waters. On October 17,1914, the _S-115_, _S-117_, _S-118_, and
_S-119_ while doing patrol duty off the coast of the Netherlands, came
up with a British squadron consisting of the cruiser _Undaunted_ and the
destroyers _Legion_, _Lance_, and _Loyal_. An engagement followed, in
which damage was done to the British small boats and the four German
destroyers were sunk. Captain Fox, senior British officer, had been on
the _Amphion_ when she sank the _Koenigin Luise_ and had been rescued
after being knocked insensible by the explosion of the mine that sent
the _Amphion_ to the bottom.

The exploit of Lieutenant Commander Horton in the British submarine
_E-9_ when he sank the _Hela_ has already been narrated. The same
commander, with the same craft, during the first week of October, 1914,
proceeded to the harbor of the German port of Emden, whence had sailed
many dangerous German submarines and destroyers that preyed on British
ships. He lay submerged there for a long period, keeping his men amused
with a phonograph, and then carefully came to the surface. Through the
periscope he saw very near him a German destroyer, but he feared that
the explosion of a torpedo sent against her would damage his own craft,
so he allowed her to steam off, and when she was 600 yards away he let
go with two torpedoes. The second found its mark, and the _S-126_ was no
more. He immediately went beneath the surface and escaped the cordon of
destroyers which immediately searched for him. By October 7 the _E-9_
was back in Harwich, its home port.

On the 31st of October, 1914, the cross-channel steamer _Invicta_
received the S. O. S. signal and went to rescue the crew of the old
British cruiser _Hermes_, which had been struck by two torpedoes from a
German submarine near Dunkirk. All but forty-four of her men were saved.

The next victim of a German submarine was the gunboat _Niger_, which, in
the presence of thousands of persons on the shore at Deal, foundered
without loss of life on November 11, 1914. But one of the German
submarines was to go to the bottom in retaliation. On the 23d of
November the _U-18_ was seen and rammed off the Scotch coast, and some
hours later was again seen near by. This time she was floating on the
surface and carrying a white flag. The British destroyer _Garry_ brought
up alongside of her and took off her crew, just as she foundered.

Three days later the _Bulwark_, a British battleship of 15,000 tons and
carrying a crew of 750 officers and men, was blown up in the Thames
while at anchor at Sheerness. It was never discovered whether she was a
victim of a torpedo, a mine, or an internal explosion. It is possible
that a spy had placed a heavy charge of explosives within her hull. Only
fourteen men of her entire complement survived the disaster.

It was in November, 1914, also, that the sometime German cruisers
_Goeben_ and _Breslau_, now flying the Turkish flag, became active
again. As units in a Turkish fleet they bombarded unfortified ports on
the Black Sea on the first day of the month. Retaliation for this was
made by the Allies two days later when a combined fleet of French and
English battleships bombarded the Dardanelles forts, inflicting a
certain amount of damage.

On the 18th of November, 1914, the _Goeben_ and _Breslau_ engaged a
Russian fleet off Sebastopol. The composition of this Russian fleet was
never made public by the Russian admiralty, but it is known that the
Russian battleship _Evstafi_ was the flagship. She came up on the
starboard side of the two German ships and opened fire on the nearer,
the _Goeben_, at a distance of 8,000 yards. The latter, hit by the
Russian 12-inch guns was at first unable to reply because the first
shots set her afire in several places, but she finally let go with her
own guns and after a fourteen-minute engagement she sailed off into a
fog. Her sister ship the _Breslau_ took no part in the exchange of
shots, and also made off. The damage done to the _Goeben_ was not enough
to put her out of commission; the _Evstafi_ suffered slight damage and
had twenty-four of her crew killed.

The British submarine commander, Holbrook, with the _B-11_ upheld the
prestige of this sort of craft in the British navy. He entered the
waters of the Dardanelles on the 13th of December, 1914, and submerging,
traveled safely through five lines of Turkish mines and sent a torpedo
against the hull of the Turkish battleship _Messudiyeh_. The _B-11_
slowly came to the surface to see what had been the result of her
exploit, and her commander, through the periscope saw her going down by
the stern. It was claimed later by the British that she had sunk, a
claim which was officially denied by the Turks. Her loss to Turkey, if
it did occur, was not serious, for she was too old to move about, and
her only service was to guard the mine fields. The _B-11_ after being
pursued by destroyers again submerged for nine hours and came
successfully from the scene of the exploit.




CHAPTER XXXVIII

WAR ON GERMAN TRADE AND POSSESSIONS


With the exceptions of the deeds done by the German sea raiders the
remaining naval history of the first six months of the war had to do for
the most part with British victories. When Von Spee's squadron, with the
exception of the light cruiser _Dresden_, which was afterward sunk at
the Island of Juan Fernandez, was dispersed off the Falkland Islands
there was no more possibility of there being a pitched fight between
German and British fleets other than in the North Sea.

England began then to hit at the outlying parts of the German Empire
with her navy. The cruiser _Pegasus_, before being destroyed by the
_Koenigsberg_ at Zanzibar on September 20, 1914, had destroyed a floating
dock and the wireless station at Dar-es-Salaam, and the _Yarmouth_,
before she went on her unsuccessful hunt for the _Emden_, captured three
German merchantmen.

As far back as the middle of August, 1914, the capture of German Samoa
had been planned and directed from New Zealand. On the 15th of that
month an expedition sailed from Wellington, and in order to escape the
_Gneisenau_ and _Scharnhorst_, went first to French New Caledonia, where
the British cruisers _Psyche_, _Philomel_, and _Pyramus_ were met with.
On the 23d of the month, this force, which was augmented by the French
cruiser _Montcalm_ and the Australian battleships _Australia_ and
_Melbourne_, sailed first for the Fiji Islands and then to Apia on Upolu
Island off Samoa. They reached there on the 30th. There was, of course,
no force on the island to withstand that of the enemy, and arrangements
for surrender of the place were made by signal. Marines were sent
ashore; the public buildings were occupied, the telegraph and telephone
wires cut, the wireless station destroyed and the German flag hauled
down, to be replaced by the Union Jack. The Germans taken prisoners were
rewarded for the kind treatment they had accorded British residents
before the appearance of this British force, and were sent to New
Zealand.

The next German possession to be taken was that in the Bismarck
Archipelago. It was known that there was a powerful wireless station at
Herbertshoehen, the island known as New Pomerania. A small landing party
was put ashore on the island in the early morning of September 11, 1914,
and made its way, without being discovered, to the town. The surprised
inhabitants were too frightened to do anything until this party left to
go further on to the wireless station. By that time it met with some
resistance, but overcame it. A few days later another landing party had
captured the members of the staff of the governor of New Pomerania,
together with the governor himself, at Bougainville, Solomon Islands,
whence they had fled. The wireless stations on the island of Yap, in the
Carolines, and on Pleasant Island were destroyed during the following
month.

Perhaps the strangest operations of naval character ever performed were
the inland "sea" fights in Africa. The great Nyassa Lake in Africa was
the scene of this fighting. With its entire western shore in British
possession and with a goodly part of its waters within the territory of
German East Africa, it was not unnatural that fighting should take place
there. Both countries maintained small armed vessels on the lake. The
British ship _Gwendolen_, a 350-ton craft, had been built on the Clyde
and had been sent to Nyassa Lake in sections and there assembled and
launched in 1898. During August she fought with a German ship and
captured it. The fighting on the lake could not, however, determine the
success of the military operations taking place in those regions.

The preponderance of British naval strength was beginning to tell
severely upon German trade by the end of 1914, and her boast that
through her navy she would starve out Germany aroused the German
Government greatly. In answer to these British threats, Grand Admiral
von Tirpitz, German Secretary of Marine, in an interview given to an
American newspaper correspondent, hinted that Germany's retaliation
would be a war on British merchant ships by German submarines.

The interview at the time aroused but mild comment; the idea was a new
one, and the question immediately arose as to whether such action would
be within the limits of international law. For the time being, however,
Von Tirpitz's words remained nothing more than a threat. It was not
until months later that the threat was made good, and the consequences
must form a separate part of this narrative.

The seaplane, the newest naval machine at the time, and as yet an
untried factor, was to see maiden service first at the hands of the
British, when on the 25th of December a raid on Cuxhaven was made. Seven
naval seaplanes attacked a fleet of German cruisers and destroyers lying
off Schilling Roads near the German port. The men who thus made history
in aviation were Francis E. T. Hewlett, son of the famous novelist,
accompanied by seven pilots. A naval force consisting of a light
cruiser, a flotilla of destroyers and another of submarines brought up
near Helgoland during the morning. When this naval force was first
discovered by the lookouts on Helgoland, there immediately appeared
approaching from the German base two Zeppelins and a number of German
seaplanes, together with some submarines. Meanwhile, from the decks of
the British craft there went up the seven British seaplanes.

In order to give them a place for landing after they returned from their
raid, it was necessary for the British ships to remain in the vicinity
for three hours. The _Undaunted_ and _Arethusa_, with the rest of the
British force, had to "dance" about, dodging the submarines which were
attacking them from beneath the surface of the water and the aircraft
hovering over them. Bombs dropped from the latter failed to find their
targets, and by swift maneuvering the torpedoes shot at them were also
caused to go far wide of the mark.

The British airmen dropped their bombs on points of military importance
at Cuxhaven, but their effect was kept secret by the German authorities.
Six of the seven returned to the squadron and were picked up by
submarines. Three of the seaplanes were wrecked and had to be abandoned.
Fog not only prevented the British airmen from doing their best work,
but it kept the marksmen on the German aircraft also from hitting the
ships on the waters beneath them. This raid had been made in answer to
a great outcry that had gone up from the British public after German
warships had raided the eastern coast of England.




CHAPTER XXXIX

RAIDS ON THE ENGLISH COAST


During the first days of November, 1914, the Germans planned and carried
out a general surprise for the British navy. After the battle in the
Bight of Helgoland, back in August, the British thought that Germany
would continue to keep her navy within the protection of her coast
defenses, perhaps forever. But such was not her intention.

On the afternoon of November 2, 1914, there gathered off some part of
Germany's northern shore a squadron consisting of the battle cruisers
_Von der Tann_, _Seydlitz_, and _Moltke_, the protected cruisers
_Kolberg_, _Strassburg_, and _Graudenz_, the armored cruisers _Yorck_
and _Bluecher_, together with some destroyers. The slowest of these
vessels could make a speed of 25 knots, and the fastest, the _Graudenz_
and _Moltke_, could make 28 knots. The guns of the _Bluecher_ were the
heaviest in the squadron, those of her primary battery being 12-inch
cannon. Ten-inch guns were on the decks of the other ships.

The first that the rest of the world knew of the gathered force was at
evening, November 2, 1914, when a fleet of British fishermen hailed them
with friendly signs, thinking them British ships, not far from Lowestoft
some time after six o'clock. The fishermen started at once for their
home ports in order to apprise the British authorities, but they had not
gone far when the news was flashed to the British admiralty office from
the wireless room of the British gunboat _Halcyon_. But only the first
few words of the warning were able to get through, for the wireless
operators on the German ships "jammed" their keys, and a few shots from
the German guns were sufficient to bring down the wireless apparatus of
the gunboat as well as one of her funnels. She turned off and made for
her home port to report the news some hours later.

It was only ten miles from the British shores that the _Halcyon_ had
sighted the German ships, but they were able, nevertheless, to elude all
British warships in those regions and proceeded to Yarmouth, firing at
the wireless station, the naval yards, and the town itself. Fearing
mines near the coast, the German commander did not attempt to come in
too close, with the result that many of the German shots fell short,
and, in spite of the fact that the bombardment lasted for nearly half an
hour, the damage done by them was not great.

The inhabitants of the towns of Lowestoft and Yarmouth were asleep in
the early hours of the morning when they first heard the booming of the
German guns. In the darkness of the British winter they hurriedly went
down to the water front, where, far out at sea, they could make out
faintly the hull of but one vessel, but the red flashes from the booming
guns showed that other ships were present. The crowds on the shore
watched two British destroyers and two submarines, which had been lying
in the harbor, put out after the German force. The latter by that time
had started off, dropping in its wake a number of floating mines. This
strategy resulted in the loss of the submarine _D-5_, which hit one of
the mines and sank immediately. The German cruiser _Yorck_ was claimed
by the British to have hit a mine also, with the result that she sank
and carried down with her some 300 of her crew. This was denied later by
the German admiralty, and like all such controversies must remain a
secret with the officials of both Governments.

Judged by material effects, this raid was a failure. But in view of the
fact that the Germans had shown that a squadron could actually elude the
large number of British warships patrolling the North Sea, and was
actually able to strike at the British coast, it was a moral victory for
Germany.

"We must see clearly that in order to fight with success we must fight
ruthlessly, in the proper meaning of the word." These were the words of
Count Reventlow, when he heard the news of the defeat of the German
squadron commanded by Von Spee off the Falkland Islands. As a result,
and in revenge for this defeat, the German admiralty planned a second
raid on the coast towns of England. The towns chosen for attack this
time were Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby. The first of these was a
city of 100,000 persons, and its principal business was shipbuilding.
Scarborough was nothing more than a seaside resort, to which each summer
and at Christmas were attracted thousands of Englishmen who sought to
spend their vacations near the water. Whitby, though it had some
attractions for holiday crowds, such as a quaint cathedral, was at most
nothing more than a home port for a number of fishing boats.

It was brazenly claimed later by the Germans that these three towns,
according to definitions in international law, were fortified ports, and
consequently open to attack by hostile forces. In reply the British
claimed that there was nothing in any of the three which could bring
them into that category. This controversy is still another which the war
developed. There is, however, the fact that the information which the
German Government had obtained about them, and which it made public,
must necessarily have been less comprehensive than that supplied to the
world at large by the British authorities. Guidebooks, as well as
tourists who have visited the place, reported that an old castle stood
in Scarborough which in past centuries had been a fort, but which at the
outbreak of the war was nothing more than a show place. The only gun in
place at the castle was an obsolete piece that had seen service in the
Crimean War. Whitby, in times of peace, at least, had not even such
"armament."

It was on the 16th of December, 1914, that this second raid took place.
Over the North Sea there hung a light mist. The German admiralty did not
afterward make public the names of the cruisers which participated in
this expedition, but they are believed to have been the _Derfflinger_,
_Bluecher_, _Von der Tann_, _Seydlitz_, and _Graudenz_. It was at eight
o'clock in the morning that the residents of the three English towns
first heard the booming of the German guns, and coast guards near by
were able, with the aid of very strong glasses, to make out the hulls of
the attacking cruisers some miles out to sea. It was not thought
possible that the Germans could again elude the British ships on patrol
in these waters, and the guards therefore thought that the firing came
from ships flying the Union Jack and tried to signal to them. But they
came to realize the truth when they received no answering signals.

As it was not known but that the Germans would make an attempt to land,
the guards in the obsolete fort at Hartlepool took their positions and
two small patrol boats in the harbor made ready to give what resistance
they could. These, the _Doon_ and the _Hardy_, drew the fire of the
German guns, and, seeing it was impossible to withstand the German fire,
they made off and escaped. This time the Germans were better informed
about the conditions they dealt with, and evidently had no fear of
mines, for they came to within two miles of the shore. The forts on
shore were bombarded and private houses near by were hit by German
shells, killing two women who lived in one of them. The forts tried to
reply to the German guns, but those of the English battery were by no
means modern, and firing them only served to further convince the
Germans that the place was fortified; they inflicted no damage on the
German ships.

The lighthouse was the next target chosen by the Germans, one of their
shells going right through it, but leaving it standing. Within fifty
minutes 1,500 German shells were fired into the town and harbor. While
two of the three cruisers which were engaged in bombarding drew off
further to sea and fired at Hartlepool, the third remained to finish the
battery on shore, but in spite of the fact that it was subjected to long
and heavy firing, it was not so terribly damaged. Many of the shells
from the other two ships went over the towns entirely and buried
themselves in the countryside that heretofore had been turned up only by
the peaceful plow. Other shells did havoc in the business and
residential sections of Hartlepool and West Hartlepool, bringing down
buildings and killing civilians in them as well as on the streets.

At about the same hour the coast guards near Scarborough reported the
approach of foreign ships off the coast, and then telephoned that the
strangers were German cruisers and that they had begun to bombard the
town. A German shell destroyed the shed from which the telephone message
had come and the warnings from it ceased. It was seen by those on shore
that the attack here was being made by four ships, two of them cruisers
and two of them mine layers, only 800 yards out in the water. This time
they were not handicapped by the fact that they had to stand out so far
from shore, and it was a surprise to the natives to see ships of such
draft come so close to land--a fact which convinced the British
authorities that spies had been at work since the first raid, sending to
the German admiralty either charts or detailed descriptions of the
region.

The castle was badly damaged by their fire; the town itself came next,
the Grand Hotel coming in for its share of destruction. They did little
injury to a wireless station in the suburbs, but hit quite a number of
residences, the gas and water works.

Half an hour afterward the two cruisers which had fired upon Scarborough
appeared off Whitby and began to fire at the signal station there. In
the ten minutes that the bombardment of Whitby lasted some 200 shells
fell into the place. This time the fact that the German ships came close
to the shore worked against them, for there are high cliffs close to the
water at the spot and it was necessary for the German gunners to use a
high angle, which did not give them much chance to be accurate. The
German ships next turned seaward and made for their home ports.

The scenes enacted in the three towns during the bombardment and
afterwards were tragic. Considering the fact, however, that the persons
under fire were civilians, many of them women and children, their
coolness was remarkable. They did not know what should be done, for the
thought of bombardment was the last thing that had come into the minds
of the authorities when England went to war, and as a result no
instructions for such an emergency had been issued by the authorities.
Some thought it best to stay within doors, some thought it best to go
into the streets. In Hartlepool a large crowd gathered in the railway
station, some fully dressed, some only in night clothes.

Many of the women carried babies in their arms and were followed by
older children who clung to their skirts. Policemen led this crowd out
of the station and started them along a street which would bring them
out into the country, but while they were passing the library they were
showered by the stone work as it fell when hit by the German shells. One
shell, striking the street itself, killed three of the six children who
were fleeing along it in company with their mother. Many other persons
met deaths as tragic either within their own homes or on the streets.
St. Mary's Catholic Church as well as the Church of St. Hilda were
damaged, as were the shipyards and the office of the local newspaper.
The destruction of the gas works left the town in almost complete
darkness for many nights afterward. The authorities issued a
proclamation ordering all citizens to remain indoors for a time, and
then began to count the number of dead and injured. The first estimate
gave the former as 22 and the latter as 50, but subsequent reckoning
showed that both figures were too low.

In Scarborough most of the inhabitants were still in bed when the
bombardment started and for a few minutes did not become excited,
thinking the booming of the guns was the sound of thunder. But when the
shells began to drop on their houses they knew better. Many were killed
or wounded while they hastily got into their clothes. One shell hit St.
Martin's Church while communion was being held. Here, too, the railway
station was made the objective of many refugees, and the police did what
they could to send the women and children out of range of fire by
putting them on trains of extra length. As in all such scenes there were
humorous sides to it. One old workman, while hurrying along a street was
heard to say: "This is what comes of having a Liberal Government." In
all, about 6,000 people left the town immediately and did not return for
some days.

Similar were the scenes enacted in Whitby when the turn of that town
came. Only two persons were killed in that town, while thirteen
casualties were reported from Scarborough.

The raid immediately became the subject for discussion in the newspapers
of every country on the globe. In England it was bitterly denounced, and
the term "baby killers" was applied to the men of the German navy. In
Germany it was justified on the ground that the German admiralty had
information and proof that the bombarded cities were fortified, and
therefore, under international law, subject to bombardment. Nor did the
German journalists lose the opportunity to declare that Great Britain no
longer ruled the waves nor to show pride over the fact that their fleet
had successfully left the German coast and had successfully returned to
its home port. The war, they said, had been brought to England's door.

The year 1914 ended gloomily for the British public; nothing could have
disappointed them more than the failure to catch the Germans. Nor did
the new year open brightly for Britain, for on the first day of January,
1915, there came the news of disaster to the _Formidable_, sister ship
to the _Bulwark_. The lesson of the _Hogue_, _Cressy_, and _Aboukir_ had
not been learned, for this ship went down under the same circumstances.
While patrolling near Torbay during a night on which there was a bright
moon and a calm sea, this ship, in company with seven other large ships
unaccompanied by a "screen" of destroyers, was hit by a torpedo fired
from a German submarine. Most of her crew were asleep when the torpedo
struck and damaged the engine room so much that no lights could be
turned on. In the darkness they hurried to the deck, which was slanting
from her list. In obedience to orders issued by the admiralty after the
sinking of the _Cressy_ and the ships with her, the rest of the fleet
immediately sailed away from the scene, so that no more of them would be
hit. Only a light cruiser stood by the sinking _Formidable_. A second
torpedo struck her and this had the effect of letting water into her
hold on the side which was slowly coming out of the water. She took a
position with even keel after that, and this fact enabled most of her
crew to get off safely before she sank.

Once more the Germans were to attempt a raid on the coast cities of
England. The date of this third attempt was January 24, 1915. This time
the British were a bit better prepared, for a squadron of battle
cruisers, consisting of the _Lion_, _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, _New
Zealand_, and _Indomitable_, put out from a port in the north of England
at about the same time that the Germans left their base. All of these
ships, with the exception of the last named, were quite fast, having
speeds of from 25 to 28.5 knots; they were at the same time carrying
heavy armament--13.5-inch guns in the main batteries. In company with
them went four cruisers of what is known in England as the "town class";
these were the _Nottingham_, _Birmingham_, _Lowestoft_, and
_Southampton_, together with the three light cruisers _Arethusa_,
_Aurora_, and _Undaunted_, and a squadron of destroyers. The German
fleet which was engaged in this raid consisted of the _Seydlitz_,
_Moltke_, _Derfflinger_, and _Bluecher_, in company with a fleet of
destroyers. The German ships were not quite as fast as the English
ships, nor did they carry guns of such range or destructive power as
their British opponents.

Early in the first hours of January 24, these two forces, unknown to
each other were steaming head on, the Germans taking a course leading
northwest and the English a course leading southeast. At twenty minutes
past seven in the morning the _Aurora_ first sighted the enemy and
engaged him immediately with her two 6-inch guns, sending at the same
time word of her discovery to Admiral Beatty. Admiral Hipper, the German
commander, as soon as he knew the enemy had sighted him, turned about
and started to steam in a southeasterly direction.

In view of the results of this battle, it is best to go into the matter
of the tactics involved. Tactics may be of two kinds--spontaneous or
premeditated. When two hostile fleets meet on the high sea far from the
base of either, the object of each is the complete destruction of the
other, and the tactics employed are spontaneous. Such an action was that
off Coronel. But on a closed sea such as the North Sea spontaneous
tactics can rarely be used, for the reason that naval bases are too
near, and from these there may slyly come reenforcements to one or the
other or to both of the fighting fleets, making the arrangement of traps
an easy matter. This is particularly true of the North Sea, on which it
is possible for a fleet to leave Cuxhaven early in the evening and to be
at Scarborough early the following morning. In addition, sailing is
restricted because an unusually large portion of its waters is too
shallow to permit of the passage of large ships.

The Germans on this occasion had arranged a trap. They knew that after
making two successful raids on the English coast the British would keep
even a closer watch for them. When they sailed from their base, it was
with the expectation of meeting a hostile force, as was undoubtedly
their expectation on the first two raids. But they did not intend to
fight matters out on high waters. What they wanted to do was to get the
British involved in a good running engagement, steering a southeasterly
course the while and luring the British ships within striking force of a
waiting fleet of superdreadnoughts and perhaps land guns and mines. This
explains why Admiral Hipper turned stern as soon as he got into touch
with the enemy.

There was a distance of fourteen miles between the two fleets when the
_Lion_ got her heavy guns into action. The German line was off her port
(left) bow. At the head of that line was the _Moltke_, and following her
came the _Seydlitz_, _Derfflinger_, _Bluecher_, and the destroyers in the
order given. At the head of the British line was the _Lion_, followed by
the _Tiger_, _Princess Royal_, _New Zealand_, and _Indomitable_ in the
order named. The other cruisers and the destroyers of the British fleet
brought up the rear. In the chase which followed the Germans were
handicapped by the fact that the _Bluecher_ was far too slow to be
brought into action, which meant that either the other ships must leave
her behind to certain destruction or that they must slow down to keep
with her. They chose the latter course, while her stokers did their best
to increase her speed. In the English fleet there was the same trouble
with the _Indomitable_, but inasmuch as the British were the pursuers
and had a preponderance in ships and in the range of their guns, this
did not matter so much to them. But the stokers of the _Indomitable_
worked as hard, if not harder, than those of the _Bluecher_.

By half past nine the two forces were seven miles apart and the battle
was on. It is necessary here to give certain facts about gunnery on a
large modern battleship. Firing at a range of seven miles means a test
of mathematics rather than of the mere matter of pointing guns. At that
distance the target--the ship to be hit--is barely visible on the sky
line on the clearest and calmest sea. If a hole the size of the head of
a pin be made in a piece of cardboard and the latter be held about a
foot and a half from the eye, the distant ship will just about fill the
hole.

The guns on the modern battleships are not "laid"; that is, they are not
aimed as were the cannon of past days or the rifle of to-day. It is set
toward its target by two factors. The first is known as "traverse,"
which means how far to the left or right it must be pointed in a
horizontal plane. The second factor is "elevation"--how far up or down
it must be pointed in a vertical plane. The latter factor determines how
far it will throw its projectile, and up to a certain point the higher
the gun is pointed the further will go the shell. A certain paradox
seems to enter here. It is a fact that a distant ship presents a target
more easily hit if its bow or stern is toward the gunner. If it presents
a broadside there is the danger that the shells will go either beyond
the ship or will fall short of it, for the greatest beam on a warship is
not much more than 90 feet. If the bow or stern is toward the gunner he
has a chance of landing a shell on any part of the 600 or more feet of
the ship's length. The first firing in a battle at a distance is known
as "straddling," by which is meant that a number of shots are sent
simultaneously, some falling short, some falling beyond the target, and
some hitting it.

[Illustration: The german cruiser "Bluecher" turning on her side as she
sank in the North Sea battle of January 24. 1915. The other vessels of
the German squadron escaped.]

The man who really "aims" the gun never sees what he is shooting at. At
some point of vantage on his ship one of the officers observes the enemy
and reports to the chief gunner the distance, the direction, and the
effect of the first shots. The gunnery officer then makes certain
calculations, taking into consideration the speed of his own ship and
the speed of the enemy ship. He knows that at a given moment his target
will be at a given point. He knows also just how fast his shells will
travel and makes calculations that enable him to place a shell at that
point at just the right second. In this battle the shells of the British
ship took about twenty seconds to go from the mouths of the guns to the
German hulls. And they made a curve at the highest point of which they
reached a distance of more than two miles; and most wonderful of all was
the fact that at the beginning of the firing a man standing on the deck
of one of the German ships could not even see the ship which was
firing the shells at her, though the weather was very clear.

By a quarter to ten o'clock the _Lion_ had come up with and had passed
the slow _Bluecher_, firing broadsides into her as she went by. The
_Tiger_ then passed the unfortunate German ship, also letting her have a
heavy fire, and then the _Princess Royal_ did likewise. Finally the _New
Zealand_ was able to engage her and later even the slow _Indomitable_
got near enough to do so. By that time the _Bluecher_ was afire and one
of her gun turrets, with its crew and gun, had been swept off bodily by
a British shell.

Meanwhile the _Lion_, _Tiger_, and _Princess Royal_ kept straight ahead
till they were able to "straddle" even the leading ship of the enemy's
line. The _Tiger_ and _Lion_ poured shells into the _Seydlitz_, but were
unable to do much damage to the _Moltke_. While they were thus engaged
the _Princess Royal_ singled out the _Derfflinger_ for her target. The
light British cruiser _Aurora_, _Arethusa_, and _Undaunted_ were far
ahead of the rest of the British fleet and were firing at the _Moltke_,
but thick black smoke which poured from their funnels as their engines
were speeded up got between the gunners of the _Lion_ and their target,
the _Moltke_, completely obscuring the latter. As a result the three
light British cruisers were ordered to slow down and to take positions
to the rear.

By eleven o'clock there were fires raging on both the _Seydlitz_ and the
_Derfflinger_, and Admiral Hipper decided to try to save his larger
ships by sacrificing the destroyers that accompanied them. Consequently
the German destroyers put their bows right toward the large British
ships and charged, but the fire which they drew was too much for them
and they gave up this maneuver.

The British destroyer _Meteor_, which had been maintaining a perilous
position between the battleships, then attempted to torpedo the
_Bluecher_, which had fallen far to the rearward to be abandoned by the
rest of the German fleet. Badly damaged as the _Bluecher_ was, the crew
of one of her guns managed to get in some final shots, one of them
nearly ending the career of the British destroyer. The _Arethusa_ had
also come up and prepared to launch a torpedo. Cruiser and destroyer
torpedoed her at about the same moment, and later, while within 200
yards of the sinking German ship the _Arethusa_ sent another torpedo at
her. She now began to list, although not greatly damaged, on her port
side till her keel showed. Her crew showed remarkable bravery.

The men lined up as though at a review and began to sing the German
national airs, intending to go to their deaths in that formation. But an
officer on the _Arethusa_ shouted to them through a megaphone to jump
while they could to save their lives. This had a psychological effect,
and as the starboard side of her hull slowly came up her men were seen
scrambling on it from behind her taffrail and creeping down toward her
keel. Some of them almost walked into the water while she was in that
position. Her guns were pointing toward the sky, one of them slowly
revolving. Finally, when she was completely upside down she went under.
Many of her crew were picked up by British small boats, and her captain,
who was one of them, was taken to England, where he died later from the
results of this experience and was buried with full naval honors.

The German destroyers had meanwhile come between their own cruisers and
those of the enemy and emitted volumes of heavy smoke, which they hoped
would form an effective screen between the former and the gunners on the
latter. Admiral Hipper then ordered all of his ships to turn northward,
in the hope of getting away behind this screen, but the British admiral
anticipated this maneuver and changed the course of his ships so that he
again had the German ships in view after both fleets had driven through
the smoke.

The _Lion_ of the British fleet was chosen as the target for the German
ships, and by keeping a concentrated fire upon her were able to do
considerable damage. One shell penetrated the bow of the _Lion_ as it
was partly lifted out of the water on account of the great speed she was
making; this shot hit her water tank and made it impossible for her to
use her port engine from that time on. She slowed down. When she fell
out of the line it was necessary for Admiral Beatty to leave her, and he
transferred his flag to the destroyer _Attack_. But all of this took
time and it was quite long before he was able to rejoin his leading
ships. By twenty minutes past twelve he had got aboard the _Princess
Royal_.

Rear Admiral Moore automatically took up command of the British fleet
while his senior officer was making these changes. It is not known what
Admiral Moore's orders had been, but it is known that he suddenly
ordered all ships to cease firing and allowed the German warships to
proceed without further engaging them. By the time that Admiral Beatty
was again on a battle cruiser the action was virtually over. The
_Indomitable_ passed a cable to the crippled _Lion_ and towed the latter
home, the rest of the British fleet keeping to the rearward to be ready
for possible resumption of fighting.

Much criticism was made by the British press and by laymen on account
of the sudden termination of the fight, and there was great complaint in
England because the career of all the raiding German ships had not been
brought to an end. But when the engagement ended the opposing fleets
were within seventy miles of Helgoland, and the German admiralty had
ready a fleet of dreadnoughts and another of battle cruisers to engage
the British ships when they got within striking distance. By ending the
fight when he did the British commander chose not to be led into this
trap. Nor was there dissatisfaction in England alone. In Germany the
complaint was that the ruse had not worked, and not long afterward
Admiral von Ingenohl was replaced as commander of the High Sea Fleet by
Admiral von Pohl. None of the blame for the failure was laid at the door
of the officer who had actually been engaged in the fighting--Admiral
Hipper--which showed that his senior officers had considered the
engagement as part of a larger action.




CHAPTER XL

RESULTS OF SIX MONTHS' NAVAL OPERATIONS


The first six months of naval operations in the Great War came to a
close without battle between the main fleets of the navies of the
warring nations. The British navy had kept open communication with the
Continent, allowing the Expeditionary Force, as well as later military
contingents, to get to the trenches in Flanders and France. It had, in
addition, made possible the transportation of troops from Canada and
Australia. The ports of France were open for commerce with America,
which permitted the importation of arms and munitions, and the same
privilege had been won for the ports in the British Isles.

The northern ports of the Central Powers were closed to commerce with
all but the Scandinavian countries, and the oversea German possessions,
where they were accessible to naval attack, had been taken from her. The
German and Austrian flags had been swept from the seven seas, with the
exception of those on three or four German cruisers that now and then
showed themselves capable of sinking a merchantman.

In the four engagements of importance which had been fought by the end
of January, 1915, the British had been the victors in three--the battles
of the Bight of Helgoland, the Falkland Islands, and the third German
raid of January 24, 1915--the Germans had been victors in one--the fight
off Coronel.

British and other allied ships were unable to inflict damage on the
coast defenses of Germany, but the latter in two successful raids had
been able to bombard British coast towns, offsetting in a way the loss
of oversea dominions.

Great Britain, after six months of naval warfare had lost three
battleships, the _Bulwark_, _Formidable_, and _Audacious_;[1] the five
armored cruisers _Aboukir_, _Cressy_, _Hogue_, _Monmouth_, and _Good
Hope_; the second-class cruisers _Hawke_ and _Hermes_; the two
third-class cruisers _Amphion_ and _Pegasus_; the protected scout
_Pathfinder_ and the converted liner _Oceanic_; losses in destroyers and
other small vessels were negligible.

         [Footnote 1: The British admiralty did not clear up the
         mystery of her disaster.]

Germany had lost no first-class battleships, but in third-class cruisers
her loss was great, those that went down being the eleven ships
_Ariadne_, _Augsburg_, _Emden_, _Graudenz_, _Hela_, _Koeln_,
_Koenigsberg_, _Leipzig_, _Nuernberg_, _Magdeburg_, _Mainz_, and the
_Dresden_; she lost, also, the four armored cruisers _Bluecher_,
_Scharnhorst_, _Gneisenau_, and _Yorck_; the old cruiser _Geier_
(interned); the three converted liners _Spreewald_, _Cap Trafalgar_, and
_Kaiser Wilhelm_; and the mine layer _Koenigin Luise_.

The German policy of attrition had not taken off as many ships as had
been lost by Germany herself, and, as England's ships so far outnumbered
her own, it may well be said that the "whittling" policy was not
successful. She made up for this by having still at large the cruiser
_Karlsruhe_ which damaged a great amount of commerce, and by the
exploits of her submarines, far outshining those of the Allies.

Russia had lost the armored cruiser _Pallada_, and the _Jemchug_, a
third-class cruiser, and the losses of the French and Austrian navies
were not worth accounting. With regard to interned vessels both sides
had losses. While the Germans were unable to use the great modern
merchantmen which lay in American and other ports, and had to do without
them either as converted cruisers or transports, the Allies were forced
to detail warships to keep guard at the entrance of the various ports
where these interned German liners might at any moment take to the high
seas.

In naval warfare the number of ships lost is no determining factor in
figuring the actual victory--the important thing being the existence or
nonexistence of the grand fleets of the combatants after the fighting is
finished. Viewed from such an angle, the fact that the Allies had left
no German ships at large other than those in the North Sea, cannot
entitle them to victory at the end of the first six months of war. So
long as a German fleet remained intact and interned in neutral ports,
naval victory for the Allies had not come, though naval supremacy was
indicated.

The fact was apparent, moreover, that while the Central Powers were
being deprived of all their trade on the seas, the world's commerce
endangered only by submarines was remaining wide open to the Allies.




PART III--THE WAR ON THE EASTERN FRONT




CHAPTER XLI

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE THEATRE OF WARFARE


World war--the prophecy of the ages--now threatened the foundations of
civilization. Whether or not the modern era was to fall under the sword,
as did the democracy of Greece and the mighty Roman Empire, was again to
be decided on battle grounds that for seventy centuries have devoured
the generations. The mountain passes were once more to reverberate with
the battle cry--the roar of guns, the clank of artillery, the tramp of
soldiery. The rivers were to run crimson with the blood of men; cities
were to fall before the invaders; ruin and death were to consume
nations. It was as though Xerxes, and Darius, and Alexander the Great,
and Hannibal, and all the warriors of old were to return to earth to
lead again gigantic armies over the ancient battle fields.

While the war was gaining momentum on the western battle grounds of
Europe, gigantic armies were gathering in the East--there to wage mighty
campaigns that were to hold in the balance the destiny of the great
Russian Empire, the empire of Austria, the Balkan kingdoms--Serbia,
Montenegro, Rumania, Bulgaria. The Turks were again to enter upon a war
of invasion. Greece once more was to tremble under the sword. Even Egypt
and Persia and Jerusalem itself, the battle grounds of the Assyrians,
the Babylonians, and the Trojans, the bloody fields of paganism and
early Christianity, were all to be awakened by the modern trumpets of
war.

Before we enter upon these campaigns in the East it is well to survey
the countries to be invaded, to review the battle lines and travel in
these pages over the fighting ground.

The eastern theatre in the first six months of the war, from August 4,
1914, to February 1, 1915, includes the scenes of the fighting in the
historic Balkans and in the Caucasus. But the eastern front proper is
really that region where the Teutonic allies and the Russians opposed
each other, forming a fighting line almost a thousand miles long. It
stretches from rugged old Riga on the shores of the Baltic Sea in the
far north, down through Poland to the Carpathian Mountains, touching the
warm, sunlit hills on the Rumanian frontier. When the total losses of
the Great War are finally counted it will probably be found that here
the heaviest fighting has occurred.

This is the longest battle line in the world's history. Partly on
account of its great length, and partly because of the nature of the
country, we see the two gigantic forces in this region locked together
in their deadly struggle, swaying back and forth, first one giving way,
then the other. This was especially the case in the northern section,
along the German-Russian frontier.

[Illustration: The War in the East--The Relation of the Eastern
Countries to Germany.]

As we view the armies marshaling along this upper section, along the
Baltic shore, southward, including part of East Prussia as well as
Baltic Russia, we look upon the ancient abode of the Lithuanians,
supposed to be the first of the Slavic tribes to appear in Europe.
Hardly any part of Europe has a more forbidding aspect than this region.
There the armies must pass over a flat, undulating country, almost as
low in level as the Baltic, and therefore occupied in large part by
marshes and lagoons through which they must struggle. In all parts the
soil is unproductive. At one time it was a universal forest: thick,
dark, and dank. A century ago, however, Catherine the Great distributed
large areas of this comparatively worthless land among her favorites and
courtiers. In this way a certain percentage was reclaimed, and with the
incoming of the sunlight more favorable conditions for human life were
established. Yet even now it is very thinly settled.

Through this region the armies must cross big rivers: the Oder, Dvina,
Warthe, Vistula, Pregel, and Niemen, northward and northeastward. Just
above or eastward of that point, where the German-Russian frontier
touches the shore, the Baltic curls into a dent, 100 miles deep, forming
the Gulf of Riga. Near the southern extremity of this gulf, eight miles
from the mouth of the Dvina, is the city of Riga, ranking second only to
Petrograd in commercial importance as a seaport, and with a population
of about 300,000.

As the armies move across the frontier they come to a vast domain
projecting into this marsh country, like a great, broad tongue licking
the shore of the Baltic; this wide strip of German territory is East
Prussia--a country to be beleaguered. Not far below the tip of this
tongue, about five miles from the mouth of the Pregel River in the
Frische Haff, and about twenty-five miles from the seacoast, is situated
another embattled stronghold--the city of Koenigsberg which, since 1843,
has been a fortress of the first rank. These two cities in the following
pages will be the immediate objectives of the enemy forces operating on
this section of the eastern front.

It will be obvious why the lines of battle were less permanently fixed
here than in the more solid and mountainous sections of northern France.
Railroads and fairly well-laid highways do indeed traverse these swamps
in various parts, especially in German territory, but trenches could not
be dug in yielding mire. In yet another feature were the military
operations hampered by the nature of the terrain here; the use of heavy
artillery.

We have seen that one of the chief causes of success attending German
attacks in the other theatres of the war has been their use of heavy
guns. But in the fighting before Riga, we shall see when the Germans
seemed on the point of taking that city their heavy artillery was so
handicapped that it was rendered practically useless. Being restricted
by the marshes to an attack over a comparatively narrow front, they were
compelled to leave their heavy guns behind on firmer soil. The guns
which they could take with them were matched by the Russians; the
fighting was, therefore, almost entirely limited to infantry
engagements, in which the Russians were not inferior to the Germans.
Thus, we shall find the German advance on Riga was stopped before it
could attain its object.

In studying the fighting in this part of the eastern front, it will be
seen why the Germans were more successful below Riga, and why the
Russians were compelled to evacuate Vilna. Here is a broad rise,
something like the back of a half-submerged submarine, which seems to
cross the country, where the land becomes more solid. The armies must
move, instead of through marshes, along innumerable small lakes, most of
the lakes being long and narrow and running north and south, with a
fairly thick growth of timber among them, mostly pine and spruce and
fir. In character this section is rather similar to parts of Minnesota.
There are two cities to be conquered in this drier region, Dvinsk, and,
further south, Vilna, once the chief city or capital of the Lithuanians.
We shall see the Russians thrust back from Koenigsberg, and the heavy
fighting shifted over to this section; yet even here, where the huge
guns of the Germans could find footing, the terrain was not suited to
trench warfare, and every arrival of reenforcements on either side would
swing the lines back or forth.

In studying the military movements in a country of this character,
special attention must be paid to the railway lines. Railways, and more
especially those running parallel to the fronts, are absolutely
necessary to success. In looking, therefore, for a key to the object of
any particular movement, the first step must be a close study of this
railroad situation.

We find from Riga to the fortress of Rovno there is a continuous line of
railroad, running generally north and south and passing through Dvinsk,
Vilna, Lida, Rovno, and thence down through Poland to Lemberg. Every
effort of the Russian armies in the succeeding chapters will be made to
keep to the westward of and parallel to this line, and for a very good
reason.

Feeding into this great north and south artery are the branch lines from
Petrograd to Dvinsk; from Moscow to the junction at Baranovitschi; from
Kiev to Sarny. Aside from these three important branch lines, there are
a few other single-track off-shoots, but from a military point of view
they are of no importance.

This line was the main objective (short of capturing Riga itself) of the
German operations. This line proves especially vital to the Russians,
for nowhere east of it is there another such line which could be used
for the same purpose.

If, in the campaigns to be described, this railroad falls into Russian
hands, it gives every facility for strengthening or reenforcing any part
of the Russian front where German pressure becomes excessive. It is, in
addition, a solution to the difficult problem of transportation of
supplies. To use a military term, it gives the Russian army a mobility
not possessed by the enemy because of a lack of similar facilities.

But should this railroad be taken by the Germans, the advantage would
immediately be reversed. And if once the Russian lines were driven back
beyond the railroad, a division of their forces would be forced upon
them; their armies would be obliged to group themselves beside the three
east and west branches already mentioned, for only by these three
systems could their forces be supplied, lateral communications being
absolutely lacking. And this is the key to the fighting, not only in the
northern section of the front, but all along the line, down to Galicia.
Naturally, only the Russian railroads need be considered, for in the
first months of the war the Germans are the invaders in the northern
half of the eastern front, except for a few short periods in the
beginning. Compared to the German railway lines near the frontier, the
Russian lines are very few.

There are two distinct railway lines running from Germany into East
Prussia, with innumerable branches leading to all points of the Russian
frontier, laid especially for military purposes. It was along these that
we shall witness the German forces rushed from Belgium to drive back the
first Russian advance. But, of course, the moment the Germans enter
Russian territory they have no advantage over the Russians, since even
their wonderful efficiency does not enable them to build railroads as
fast as an army can advance. Hence, we observe their efforts to gain
possession of the Russian railroads.

We come now to the central part of the eastern front. Here, just below
East Prussia, Russian Poland projects into German territory in a great
salient, about 200 miles wide and 250 long, resembling a huge bite in
shape.

This land is a monotonous, wind-swept plain, slightly undulating, its
higher parts not even 500 feet above sea level. To the northward and
eastward it descends gradually into the still lower lands of East
Prussia and White Russia, but in the south it lifts into the foothills
of the Carpathian Mountains.

Gigantic armies are to move over this plateau, timbered in parts with
oak, beech, and lime, and in some sections deeply cut by small rivers
and streams forming fissures, some narrow and craggy, others broad and
sloping with marshy bottoms. Toward the south the soldiers must cross
narrow ravines in all directions, often covered with wild, thick
undergrowth. The chief river is the Vistula, which enters by the
southern boundary and flows first north, then northwest, skirting the
plateau region at a height of 700 feet, finally making its exit near
Thorn, thence on to the Baltic through East Prussia. Its valley divides
the hilly tracts into two parts: Lublin heights in the east and the
Sedomierz heights to the westward. Picture in your mind the great armies
approaching these ridges, the most notable of which is the Holy Cross
Mountains, rising peaks almost 2,000 feet above sea level.

The fighting forces in the northeast, where the plain <DW72>s gradually
into the Suwalki Province, must pass over a country dotted with lakes
and lagoons, which farther on take on the character of marshes, stagnant
ponds, peat bogs, with small streams flowing lazily from one to the
other. Here and there are patches of stunted pine forests, with
occasional stretches of fertile, cultivated soil. Throughout this
section many rivers flow along broad, level valleys, separating into
various branches which form many islands and, during the rainy seasons,
flood the surrounding country.

Farther west the armies pass through broad valleys or basins, once the
beds of great lakes, whose rich, alluvial soil give forth abundant crops
of cereals. Here, too, flows the Niemen, 500 miles in length, watering a
basin 40,000 square miles in area and separating Poland from Lithuania.
It advances northward in a great, winding pathway, between limestone
hills covered with loam or amid forests, its banks rising to high
eminences in places, past ruined castles built in the Middle Ages. In
the yellowish soil along its banks grow rich crops of oats, buckwheat,
corn, and some rye. Naturally such a section would be thickly populated,
not only on account of the fertile soil, but because the Niemen, like
the Vistula, is one of the country's means of communication and
transportation. As many as 90,000 men earn their livelihoods in
navigating the steamers and freight barges passing up and down this
great waterway. At Yurburg the Niemen enters East Prussia on its way to
the Baltic.




CHAPTER XLII

THE STRATEGIC VALUE OF RUSSIAN POLAND


It is in the southern part of Russian Poland, among the foothills of the
Carpathians, that the armies come into possession of its mineral
resources, a fact which will have some influence on the German military
movements in this region. Up in the Kielce hills copper has been mined
for 400 years, though the value of these mines has decreased on account
of the much greater quantity found in America. A hundred years ago the
Kielce mines produced nearly 4,000 tons of copper a year. Brown iron ore
is also found here in deposits 40 per cent pure, while there are also
veins of zinc sometimes 50 feet thick, yielding ore of 25 per cent
purity. Sulphur, one of the ingredients for the manufacture of
explosives, is found at Czarkowa in the district of Pinczow. In the
southwest, in Bedzin and Olkuz, there are coal deposits about 200
square miles in area. In the southern districts wheat is also grown in
some abundance.

The military value of this country is further enhanced by political
conditions. Like the greater part of Galicia to the southward, it is
peopled by the Poles, who form one of the important branches of the
great Slavic family. At one time Poland was a kingdom whose territory
and possessions spread from the Carpathians up to the Baltic and far
into the center of Russia, ruling its subject peoples with quite as much
rigor as the Poles have themselves been ruled by Russia and Germany.

Poland is a seat of conquest in the Great War. For not much over a
hundred years ago what remained of this old kingdom was divided among
the three great powers: Prussia, Austria, and Russia. Austria, on the
whole, has been much the best master. Germany tried in various ways to
Germanize her subjects in German Poland, thereby rousing their bitter
hatred. Russia was no less autocratic in attempting to extinguish the
spirit of nationality among the Poles under her rule. But, naturally,
the fact remains that between the Poles and the Russians there are still
ties of blood. In moving westward, by this route Russia would be moving
among a race who, in spite of all they had suffered at the hands of the
Czar, still would naturally prefer Slav to Teuton.

We shall soon stand with the invading armies in the center of Russian
Poland, and enter the great city of Warsaw. This conquered citadel with
more than 400,000 inhabitants, is situated on the Vistula. It was, next
to Paris, the most brilliant city of Europe in the early part of last
century. But under Russian influence it became a provincial town in
spirit, if not in size. It once had the character of prodigal splendor;
within late years it became a forlorn, neglected city, not the least
effort being made by the Russian authorities to modernize its appearance
and improvement. From a sanitary point of view it became one of the
least progressive cities of Europe. And yet, as the armies march into
the capital, there are still signs of the city's past glory: over thirty
palaces rear their lofty turrets above the tile roofs of the houses,
among them the palace of the long-dead Polish kings.

However, from a military point of view, Warsaw maintained great
importance in the Great War. It is at this time one of the strongest
citadels of Europe, and around it lies the group of fortresses called
the Polish Triangle. The southern apex is Ivangorod on the Vistula; the
eastern, Brest-Litovsk; the northern being Warsaw itself. To the
northwest lies the advanced fort of Novo Georgievsk. This triangle is a
fortified region with three fronts: two toward Germany and one toward
Austria, and the various forts are fully connected by means of
railroads.

It would appear, therefore, that Russian Poland would offer excellent
conditions for an army on the defensive. And this is quite true, the
Vistula, especially, serving as a screen against the attacking armies
from the west. As a matter of fact, it would have been extremely
difficult to take Warsaw by a frontal attack. Warsaw's weakness lay in
the north in the swamp regions.

One of the greatest dangers in all wars, against which a military
commander has to guard his army, is that of being flanked. The road or
roads leading from the rear to the base of supplies, along which not
only food supplies for the soldiers, but, quite as important,
ammunition, is brought up, either in wagons, automobiles, or in railroad
trains, are the most sensitive part of an army's situation. Unless they
are very short--that is, unless an army is very close to its base of
supplies--it is impossible to guard these lines of communication
adequately. Therefore, if the enemy is able to break through on either
side of the front, there is great danger that he may swing his forces
around and cut these lines of communication. The army that is thus
deprived of its sources of supply has nothing left then but to
surrender, sometimes even to inferior forces. Sometimes, of course, if
the army is within the walls of a fortified city and is well supplied
with food and ammunition, it may hold out and allow itself to be
besieged. This may even be worth while, for the sake of diminishing the
enemy's strength to the extent of the forces required for besieging,
usually many times larger than the besieged force. But in the case of
Warsaw we shall see that that would not have been a wise plan; hardly
any food supply that could have been laid by would have maintained the
large civil population, and the big guns of the Germans would soon have
battered down the city's defenses.

This the Russians realized from the very beginning. As is well known
now, Russia had never intended to hold Poland against the Teutons. Her
real line of defense was laid much farther back. It was only on account
of the protest of France, when the two Governments entered into their
alliance, that any fortifications at all were thrown up in Poland. A
real line of defense must be more or less a straight line, with no
break. And the marshes in the north, as well as the tongue of East
Prussia projecting in along the shores of the Baltic toward Riga made
that impossible. Russia's real line of defense was farther east, along
the borders of Russia proper and along the line of railroad already
referred to. By studying this territory east of Poland it will become
obvious why Russia should prefer this as her main line of defense
against a German invasion.

As we witness the armies moving along what was once the frontier between
Poland and Russia proper we shall find the plain of Poland dips into a
region which apparently was once a vast lake which drained into the
Dnieper, but the outlet becoming choked, this stagnant water formed into
those immense morasses known as the Pripet Marshes, forming over
two-fifths of the whole province of Minsk and covering an area of over
600 square miles. Even when more than 6,000,000 acres have been
reclaimed by drainage, the armies found some of these marshes extending
continuously for over 200 miles. In the upper Pripet basin the woods
were everywhere full of countless little channels which creep through a
wilderness of sedge. Along the right bank of the Pripet River the land
rises above the level of the water and is fairly thickly populated.
Elsewhere extends a great intricate network of streams with endless
fields of bulrushes and stunted woods. Over these bogs hang unhealthy
vapors, and among the rank reeds there is no fly, nor mosquito, nor
living soul or sound in the autumn.

Not even infantry could pass over this region--not to consider cavalry
or artillery, save in the depth of a cold winter when the water and mire
is frozen. Even then it would be impossible to venture over the ice
with heavy guns. An invading army must, therefore, split in two parts
and pass around the sides, and nothing is more dangerous than splitting
an army in the face of the enemy. It is behind these vast marshes that
we shall find the Russians planned to make their first determined stand.

Here, too, the Russians expected to have the advantage of being
surrounded by their own people, for this is the country of the White
Russians, so called on account of their costumes. Here the purest Slavic
type is preserved; they have not blended with other stocks, as the Great
Russians with the Finns and the Little Russians, farther south, with the
Mongols. For a while this territory was subject to the kings of Poland,
who oppressed its inhabitants most barbarously, from the effects of
which they have not even fully recovered. To-day White Russia is one of
the poorest and most backward parts of the empire. And even yet the
great bulk of the landlords are Poles.




CHAPTER XLIII

AUSTRIAN POLAND, GALICIA AND BUKOWINA


Let us now pass ahead of the armies into the southern section of the
eastern front. Here we have to consider only Austrian Poland, Galicia
and Bukowina, for here there is much less swaying back and forth, the
Russians maintaining their lines much more steadily than farther north.
This section is an undulating terrace which <DW72>s down to the Vistula
and the Dniester; behind rise the Carpathian ranges, forming the natural
frontier between the broad, fertile plains of Hungary and Russia. Here
the population is quite dense, there being 240 inhabitants to the square
mile. Nearly half of the total area is in farm lands, about one-fourth
woodland, and the rest mostly meadow and pasture, less than a quarter of
one per cent being lake or swamp. Rich crops of barley, oats, rye,
wheat, and corn are grown here, while the mineral resources include
coal, salt, and petroleum, the latter especially being important in
modern warfare on account of the great quantities of fuel necessary for
motor carriages.

Here, in Galicia, we shall witness the conquests of the important city
of Lemberg--with its 160,000 population--fourth in size of all Austrian
cities, only Vienna, Prague, and Triest being larger. Further in toward
the mountains we shall see the storming of the strongly fortified city
of Przemysl (pronounced Prshemisel), also important as the junction of
the network of railroads that the Austrians had built throughout the
country, including several lines passing over the Carpathians into
Hungary. And farther west still we shall look upon the invasion of the
old Polish city of Cracow, also strongly fortified. This section is
especially rich in industries, mines, and agriculture.

Here, too, are staged many of the battles of the rivers--parallel with
the mountain ranges flows the Dniester in a southeasterly direction,
into which, flowing down from the north and running parallel with each
other, empty the Gnila Lipa, the Zlota Lipa, and the Stripa, all of
which figure prominently in the war movements, for each of these is
crossed several times by both armies engaged at bloody costs.

As will be noted by reading the chapters on the fighting on the eastern
front, here, as in East Prussia, the Russians make a determined advance
and actually succeed in conquering this territory from the Austrians. At
one time we find them even in possession of all except one of the chief
passes in the Carpathians and threatening to overrun the plains of
Hungary. To hold Russian Poland it was necessary that they should have a
firm grip of East Prussia and Austrian Poland, thus protecting the
flanks of their center. Had they been able to hold their grip, then they
could have straightened out their entire line from north to south, and
Warsaw would have been safe. But we shall see both their extremities
driven back; therefore Warsaw was in danger, in spite of its
fortifications.

That the Austrians should have allowed themselves to be thrust back over
the Carpathians is one of the surprises of the early stages of the war.
For these mountains are only second in size in all Europe to the Alps
themselves, forming the eastern wing of the great European mountain
system. They are about 800 miles long and nearly 250 miles wide in
parts. Some of the higher peaks reach 8,000 feet above sea level.

Imagine the vision of an army marching along the roads from the
foothills to the mountains leading through mysterious, shadowy spruce
forests, where the soil is covered with rich carpets of moss. Foaming
streams ripple in among the moss-covered bowlders. Then the paths emerge
on the cheerful, emerald-green pastures of the <DW72>s, alive with the
flocks of goats, sheep and cattle, attended by their shepherds. A little
farther and the whole scenery changes, and the armies approach
tremendous mountains of solid granite, ominously dark, shining like
hammered iron, rising abruptly from the stone debris and black patches
of mountain fir, and towering bluffs and crags seem to pierce the sky
with their sharp peaks, bastions and jagged ridges, like gigantic
fortresses. Clouds of white mist, driven and torn by gusts of wind,
cling to the precipitous walls, and masses of eternal snow lie in the
many fissures and depressions, forming large, sharply outlined streaks
and patches.

The Magyars inhabit the great central plains of Hungary which
constitutes ethnologically a vast island of Magyars in a sea of Slavs.
The Carpathian <DW72>s on the Hungarian side of the ranges, including the
mounts of the Tatra--with the exception of the Zips district, which is
peopled with German-Saxon colonists--are inhabited, in their western
parts, by two million Slovaks, in the eastern parts by half a million
Ruthenians or Little Russians, and on the Transylvanian side by nearly
three million Rumanians. The border lines between these Rumanians and
the Magyars and between the Hungaro-Slav groups (Slovaks and Ruthenians)
and the Magyars lie far down within the borders of the great central
Hungarian plains. This line at one point extends to within a few miles
of the Hungarian capital of Budapest.




CHAPTER XLIV

THE BALKANS--COUNTRIES AND PEOPLES


This survey of the fighting ground in eastern Europe brings us now to
the "cockpit of the war." From a military point of view, as well as from
the political, the Balkan theatre is of equal importance with other big
fronts in Europe. It is the gateway to the Orient for central Europe.
Here the armies engaged are numbered only by the hundred thousands, none
reach a million. But from the point of view of human interest and
political intrigue it is by far the most picturesque. Here the hatred
between the combatants is most bitter; indeed so bitter that when it
burst into flame a mad whirlwind of passion swept over half the world.
For here the great conflagration began.

A map of the Balkan Peninsula is almost, on the face of it, a full
explanation of the causes of the war. The military campaigns, studied in
connection with their physical environment, explain all the diplomatic
intrigues of the past fifty years, for they are the intrigues themselves
translated into action.

Geographically speaking, the Balkan nations are those situated in the
big peninsula of southern Europe which lies below the Danube River and
the northern border of Montenegro. Some authorities, however, include
Rumania, and others even bring in Austria's Slavic provinces, Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

The most noticeable feature of this vast war-ridden region is its
mountains. Those same Carpathian Mountains, which form the natural
boundary between the land of the Magyars and the Russian plains, take a
sudden turn westward at the Rumanian frontier, then sweep around in a
great semicircle, forming a shape resembling a scythe, the handle of
which reaches up into Poland, the blade curling around within the Balkan
Peninsula. Behind the handle, and above the upper part of the blade,
stretch the broad plains of Hungary, through which flows the great
Danube, the largest river in Europe next to the Russian Volga--a river
which flowed with blood during the Great War. Just in the middle of the
back of the blade this great river bursts through the mountain chain,
swirling through the famous Iron Gate into the great basin within the
curved blade. On the south of its farther course to the Black Sea lie
the plains of northern Bulgaria.

The curving chain of mountains below the Iron Gate is the Balkan Range.
But excepting for the plains of Thrace, lying south of the Balkans, over
toward the Black Sea and above Constantinople, the rest of the peninsula
is almost entirely one confused tangle of craggy mountains, interspersed
throughout with small, fertile valleys and plateaus. This roughness of
surface becomes especially aggravated as one passes westward, and over
toward the Adriatic coast, from Greece up into the Austrian province of
Dalmatia, the country is almost inaccessible to ordinary travelers.

What is the political value of this beleaguered domain? The broad,
significant fact is that any road from western Europe to the Orient must
pass through the Balkan Peninsula, and that these mountains almost block
that road. From north to south there is just one highway, so narrow that
it is really a defile.

This road stretches from the seat of the war at Belgrade on the Danube
down a narrow valley, the Morava, thence through the highlands of
Macedonia into the Vardar Valley to Saloniki, on the AEgean Sea. At Nish,
above Macedonia, another road branches off into Bulgaria across the
plains of Thrace and into Constantinople. This was the road by which the
Crusaders swarmed down to conquer the Holy Land. This was the road by
which, hundreds of years later, the Moslems swarmed up into the plains
of Hungary and overran the south of Europe, until they were finally
checked outside the gates of Vienna. Nothing is more significant of the
terror that these marching hosts inspired than the fact that, with the
exception of a few larger towns, the villages hid themselves away from
this highway in the hills.

Bear clearly in mind that in the existence of this narrow way to the
Orient lies the key not only to the causes of the war, but to the
military campaigns that we shall follow in this region. For it is the
Teutons who would in the Great War, like the Crusaders of old, pass down
this highway and again conquer the East, though in this case their
object is trade, and not the Holy Sepulcher.

To secure the pathway through this strategic country it also is
necessary to have control of the territory on all sides, and this is
quite as true in a political as in a military sense. To secure their
pathway up into Europe the Turks once conquered all the peoples in the
Balkans, except those inhabiting the mountains over on the Adriatic: the
Montenegrins and a small city called Ragusa, just above Montenegro in
Dalmatia. It is not at all peculiar that just here, in almost the same
locality, the Teutons should meet with the first and strongest
resistance.

A study of the territory in which the first fighting of the war occurred
will explain the foregoing calculations. It will be observed that
Austrian territory runs down past the eastward turn in the Danube, along
the frontier of Montenegro, until it narrows gradually into a tip at
Cattaro, just below Cettinje, the Montenegrin capital. This land is
composed of the three provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia. All
this territory is inhabited by the same race that peoples Serbia and
Montenegro--the Serbs. In fact, the Slavic population reaches up all
along the coast to Trieste, and even a little beyond. For this reason it
is in this direction that we shall see the Serbians and the Montenegrins
invade Austrian territory, after their initial success in repulsing the
Austrian invasion.

The objectives of the brief campaign soon to be considered were
Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia, and Ragusa, the famous little seaport
on the Adriatic. Ragusa is of especial interest on account of its
remarkable history. In the Middle Ages it was the most important seaport
in that part of the world. Its ships sailed over all the Mediterranean
and from them is derived the word "argosy," signifying a ship laden with
wealth. Again and again the Turks attempted to conquer this little
state, which was at that time a republic, but always the Ragusans beat
off the enemy. For the country about is so rocky, so rough, that the
city was easily defended, especially in that time when nearly all
fighting was hand to hand.

The first and foremost word in the Great War--the key word--is Sarajevo.
Here is the scene of the assassination of the Crown Prince of Austria,
which was at least the final cause of the war. As we enter it we find a
population of about forty thousand, half of which are Mohammedans. It is
a large, straggling town, situated in a narrowing valley overtopped by
steep hills on either side, which close in a narrow gorge in the east
and broaden into a plain on the west. It was to the eastward, however,
that we shall find the heavy fighting along the Austro-Serbian frontier.

The armies along the Danube will soon command our attention. As they
follow the river toward Belgrade, the capital of Serbia, it is no longer
the "Blue Danube" of the famous German song. Here, in fact, it is a
broad, mud- river, dotted with a number of low islands along its
center. Belgrade, where the first shots of the war were fired, is
located on rather high ground, backed by a semicircle of low hills in
its rear. But opposite all is flat and, in places, marshy. Modern guns
could, of course, keep up an effective fire across the river at this
point, as in fact they did before the actual invasion of Serbia began,
but the conditions for a crossing are not favorable. It was from the
west, from the Bosnian side, that the actual attack was made.

Just below Belgrade the river Save, shallower and narrower, empties into
the Danube, forming the frontier westward, past Shabatz, to Ratcha,
where the Drina, flowing down from the Macedonian highlands northward,
joins it, forming the western frontier between Bosnia and Serbia.

The Drina, where much fighting occurs, is no ordinary waterway, no mere
mountain stream, though it lies in a mountainous country. Before
reaching its junction with the Save it is fed by many important
tributaries. Ever swift, often torrential, it has washed out a bed of
imposing width, and by a constant cutting out of new courses has created
a series of deltas. It was one of the largest of these islands, that of
Kuriachista, between Losnitza and Leschnitza, that the Austrians chose
as a base for their first invasion. From this point up and around to
Shabatz lies the bloody field of the Austro-Serbian battles.

A description of this section, in brief at least, is necessary to an
understanding of the three Austrian invasions made here, and all three
of which failed disastrously. North and west of Shabatz lies the great
plain of Matchva, bounded on its east and north by the Save and by the
Drina on the west. It is a rich, fertile land, but much broken up by
woodland. To the southeast a rolling valley is divided by the River
Dobrava, while due south the Tzer Mountains rise like a camel's back out
of the plain and stretch right across from the Drina to the Dobrava. The
southern <DW72>s of Tzer are less abrupt than those on the north and
descend gradually into the Leschnitza Valley, out of which rise the
lesser heights of the Iverak Mountains. Both these ranges are largely
covered by prune orchards, intersected with some sparse timber.

This is a region of natural fortifications. Descending southward again,
the foothills of Iverak are lost in a chain of summits, which flank the
right bank of the Jadar River, that tributary of the Drina River from
which the first big battle takes its name.

From the left bank of the Jadar, from its junction with the Drina to
Jarebitze, a great rolling level stretches south until the high Guchevo
Mountains, stretching in southeasterly direction, rise abruptly and hide
the Bosnian hills from view. From there, southward, the country is
extremely mountainous, even the highways being blasted out of the sides
of the precipitous mountains along the innumerable ravines through which
run watercourses which, though almost dry in summer, burst into
torrential streams after the snows begin to melt in the higher
altitudes.

Naturally in such a country roads are of prime importance in military
operations. A few built and maintained by the state are in excellent
condition and practicable in all sorts of weather. But for the rest
communications consist of bridle paths and trails over the mountains.

As has been stated, the great highway from Belgrade to Saloniki is the
key to all military operations in the Balkans; nor is this case any
exception. A study of the map will show how this big, underlying fact
entered into the plans of the first three attempts at invading Serbia.
Naturally, had facilities been convenient at Belgrade, that would have
been the point from which to advance. The next possible point was over
the Drina, because it was not so wide or so deep.

Bosnia and Herzegovina at the beginning of the war were sparsely served
by railroads. But for the purpose of an invasion of Serbia the lines
running to Tuzla in the north and to Vishegrade and Uvatz in the south
were of much strategic importance. Moreover, unlike the Hungarian plain
opposite Belgrade, the country is so mountainous and well wooded that
great bodies of troops could be moved about without being observed. We
now come to the main reason why this point was chosen, next to Belgrade.
Though we shall see that they did not reach it at their first attempt,
there is no doubt that the main objective of the Austrians was the
little town of Valievo, lying some distance back from the Jadar and the
field of battle. For at Valievo is the terminus of a light railway which
joins with the main line running from Belgrade down to Saloniki. The
Teutons were in a hurry to open this highway, for it meant opening a
means of communication with the Turks, who were to become, and later did
become, their active allies. These are political matters of significance
here insomuch as they explain the special importance of the railway from
Belgrade south along the ancient highway of the Crusaders.

Before following this route farther south, a few words should be devoted
to Montenegro. Between Serbia and Montenegro lies the Sanjak of
Novibazar. This small territory nominally belonged to Turkey before the
Balkan War, but it was in fact garrisoned by Austrian troops, the civil
administration being left to the Turks. Austria had gone to special
trouble to establish this arrangement, so that it might have a wedge
between the territories of the two little Serb nations. Anticipating
this war long ago, Austria had counted on having a large enough force in
Novibazar to prevent a union of the two armies. But, when it actually
came, she was in no position to prevent it, so much of her strength
being required to meet the Russians.

Montenegro is the natural refuge of the Serbs. Whenever in the past they
were especially hard pressed by the Turks, they would flee to the
mountain fastnesses of Tzherna Gora, the Black Mountain, for here
military operations, even in this day of modern artillery, are
absolutely impossible, and when it came to mountain guerrilla fighting,
the Turks were no match for the Serbs. Thus it was that the Serbs were
able to preserve their old traditions, their language and the best blood
of their race. And it may be said that to a slightly lesser extent
Ragusa served the same purpose.

The Montenegrins are born fighters and die fighters. From one end to the
other Montenegro is one wilderness of mountain crags and towering
precipices, traversed only by foot trails. Here and there a shelf of
level soil may be found, just enough to enable people to grow their own
necessities. The capital of this rocky domain, high up among the crags
and overlooking the Adriatic, is Cettinje, which was to be stormed and
conquered by the Teutons. The main street, about 150 yards long,
comprising two-thirds of the town, is so broad that three or four
carriages may be driven abreast down the length of it. It is composed
entirely of one and two story cottages. A few short streets branch off
at right angles, and in these is all of Cettinje that is not comprised
in the main street. The king inhabited a modest-looking, brown edifice
with a small garden attached. Overlooking the capital is Mt. Lovcen, on
top of which the Montenegrins planted guns to defend any attack that
might be made against them.

South of Montenegro and north of Greece lies another country of
instinctive fighters. It is similar in physical aspect, but very
different in its population. This is the land of the Albanians, whom the
Turks conquered by force of arms, like all the rest of the Balkan
peninsula. They are a distinct race by themselves; it is supposed that
they are the descendants of the ancient Illyrians, those wild tribes of
whom the ancient Greeks wrote. Nor is this unlikely, for in such a
country as theirs the inhabitants are most likely to remain pure from
generation to generation.

Returning for a few moments to Belgrade, we now may resume our course
down the ancient highway toward Saloniki. Down the Morava Valley passes
the railroad, after which it passes within a few miles of the Bulgarian
frontier, near Kustendil; dangerously near the frontier of a possible
enemy, but especially perilous in this war in which the Serbians would
naturally endeavor to retreat toward her ally, Greece.

Just below Vranya the railroad enters what was, before the two Balkan
Wars, the Turkish territory of Macedonia. This region down to within
sixty miles of Saloniki was reconquered from the Turks by the Serbs,
having been Serb inhabited since early in the Christian era as shown by
historical record. As early as 950 Constantin Porphyrogenitus writes of
its inhabitants as Serbs, from whom, he says, the town of Serbia on the
Bistritza River near Saloniki took its name. Throughout this region
there are so many mountain ranges that it would be impossible to name
them all. Nowhere has blood been more continuously shed than here, and
nowhere in Europe is the scenery more beautiful.

Especially impressive is that section around Monastir, toward the
frontier of Albania and away from the main line of the railroad. Here,
not more than a day's walk from the city of Monastir, or Bitolia, as its
Slavic inhabitants call it, is Lake Prespa, a small sheet of
crystal-clear water in which are reflected the peaks and the rugged
crags of the surrounding mountains. Through a subterranean passage the
waters of this mountain lake pass under the range that separates it from
the much larger lake, Ochrida, the source of the bloody Drina.

The people of these mountains are Serbs, almost to Saloniki. Uskub,
whose ancient Serb name is Skoplya, was the old Serb capital, and there
the Serb ruler Doushan was crowned emperor in 1346.

For the past five hundred years these Macedonians have been used to all
the ways of guerrilla fighting. Roaming through their mountains in small
bands they have harassed the Turkish soldiers continuously.

The Bulgarian ruler Ferdinand had through many years by means of
committees and church jugglery striven to Bulgarize this population,
preparatory to the contemplated seizure of the territory which he has
now been able with the help of the Germanic powers to accomplish. But in
reality the Bulgar population in what was European Turkey was found only
eastward of the Struma in Thracia including Adrianople. Those regions
formed the ample and legitimate field of ambition for the unification of
the Bulgars.

When hostilities broke out in 1914, when Serbia was defending herself
against the Austrians, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria, the secret ally by
treaty of Austria, did everything possible to forward his designs
against the Serbs and sent armed Bulgar bands into Serb Macedonia.

Shortly below the city of Monastir in the west begins the Greek
frontier, running over eastward to Doiran, where it touches the
Bulgarian frontier. Here the railroad, coming down along the Vardar
River, emerges into the swamp lands and over them passes into the city
of Saloniki.

Here is the old territory of Philip of Macedon, the father of the
conqueror. For some forty or fifty miles these swamps stretch out from
Saloniki, overshadowed by Mt. Olympus on their southern edge. While not
quite so extensive as the Pinsk Swamps, they are quite as impassable,
from a military point of view. In the center of this region of bulrushes
and stunted forests is an open sheet of shallow water, Lake Enedjee.

Nearly all this swamp land is submerged, but here and there are small
islands. For some years the Turkish soldiers garrisoned these islands
during the mild winter months, living on them in rush huts. In the
summer they would withdraw into the near-by foothills. But one summer
several hundred Comitajis descended into the swamps and took possession.

The stunted forests and the bulrushes here are traversed by a maze of
narrow waterways, just wide enough for a punt to pass along. When the
soldiers returned in the fall, they started out for their islands in
strings of punts. Presently they were met by volleys of bullets that
seemed to come from all directions out of the bulrushes. Some, in their
panic, leaped out into the shallow water and sunk in the mire. The rest
retired.

For years the Turkish soldiers attempted to drive the Comitajis out of
the swamp. First they surrounded it, watching all possible landing
places, but the outlaws had supplies smuggled in to them by the
peasants. Then the Turks began bombarding with heavy cannon, which, of
course, was futile, since they could not distinguish the points at which
they were firing. And finally they gave up molesting the Comitajis, who
continued making the swamps their headquarters until the Young Turks
came into power. Then, believing that a constitutional Macedonia was
finally to be granted them, all the Comitajis laid down their arms.

It is a peculiar fact that Saloniki, one of the largest cities on the
peninsula, with a population considerably over a hundred thousand,
should represent none of the national elements of the country. For
though Bulgars, Turks, Greeks, and Serbs may be found there, an
overwhelming majority, nearly 90,000 of the people, are Spanish Jews.

Walking along the streets, it would be easy to imagine oneself in Spain
or in Mexico; on all sides the shouts of peddlers, the cries of cabmen,
the conversation of pedestrians, are in Spanish. With a knowledge of
that language the stranger may make his way about as easily as in his
own native country. These are the descendants of the Jews who were
driven out of Spain by Torquemada and his Spanish Inquisition and were
so hospitably received by the Sultan of Turkey.

Saloniki, where we shall witness severe battles, is situated at the head
of the gulf by the same name, an inlet of the AEgean Sea. It is a
well-fortified city, built on the water's edge, but surrounding it is
high land commanding the surrounding country. Added to that, the swamp
region is another protection from an enemy coming from inland. Its
seaward forts, however, are, or were, obsolete and would probably
crumble before the fire of modern naval guns.

Stretching down the eastern shore of the Gulf is a peninsula on which is
the famous Mt. Athos, that very peculiar community of celibate monks.
Here, in the Holy Mountain, as the Slavs call it, there are monasteries
representing all the various denominations of the Greek Orthodox Church:
Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Russian, each swarming with hundreds of
monks, who pass their time in idleness. Not only are women forbidden to
enter this domain, but even female dogs or cats are kept out.

Across this upper end of the AEgean, from Mt. Athos, is the Bulgarian
port, Dedeagatch, to which runs a branch of the main railway from Sofia
to Constantinople. The country here is low and swampy, the port itself
being little more than a boat landing.

Just below this point, across the Gulf of Saros, is the peninsula of
Gallipoli, where a critical phase of the war was fought. It is somewhat
like the blade of a scimitar, covering the entrance to the Sea of
Marmora. Between this strip of land and the coast of Asia Minor is a
narrow strait, the outer mouth of which is called the Dardanelles, the
inner gateway being the famous Hellespont. Here it was that Xerxes
crossed over on a bridge of boats at the head of his Persian army to
invade Greece, only to meet disaster at Thermopylae, and here Alexander
of Macedonia crossed over to begin his march of conquest which was to
extend his power as far as India. And about this narrow strait is
centered the ancient Greek myth about Hero and Leander, which inspired
Byron to swim across from Asia to Europe.

How well the Turks have fortified this approach to their capital is well
enough indicated in the story of the operations of the allied fleets in
their attempt to force the passage.

From the Hellespont to Constantinople is a sail of forty miles, along a
coast steep and rugged, destitute of any harbor or even a beach where a
boat might land. Nor is there a more beautiful sight than that which is
presented on approaching the Turkish capital from this direction,
especially of an early morning. Against the dawn in the East are
silhouetted the minarets and domes and the palace roofs of the city;
then, as the light increases, the white buildings are distinguished more
clearly through a purple mist that rises from the waters, until the ship
enters the Bosphorus, gliding past the shipping and the boat traffic
along the shore of the harbor. The beauties of the Bosphorus have been
described in every book of travel that has ever included this section of
the world in its descriptions: it is undoubtedly the most beautiful
waterway that may be found in any country.

Emerging into the Black Sea from the Bosphorus, one strikes the
Bulgarian coast not far above that neck of land on which Constantinople
is built. Along this stretch of coast up to the mouth of the Danube
there are two harbors, Varna and Burgas. Each is terminus of a branch
railroad leading off from the Nish-Sofia-Constantinople line. Behind
Burgas lie the level tracts of Eastern Rumelia, or Thrace, as that part
of the country is still called. But Varna is above the point where the
Balkan Range strikes the coast, all of which is steep and rocky.

Above Varna begins the Delta of the Danube, up which steamers and
heavily laden barges sail continuously, but here also begins the neutral
territory of Rumania, the Dobruja, the richest section of the Danube
basin, which was ceded to Rumania by Bulgaria after the Second Balkan
War.




CHAPTER XLV

THE CAUCASUS--THE BARRED DOOR


We now come to that section of the eastern theatre of the war which
received the least extended notice in printed reports--the barred
doorway between Europe and Asia,--the Caucasus. Not because the fighting
there was less furious, but because the region was less accessible to
war correspondents. The struggle was in fact quite as bloody and even
more savage and barbarous here than elsewhere, for on this front Russ
meets Turk, Christian meets Moslem, and where they grapple the veneer of
chivalry blisters off.

Here again, as in Galicia, we come to a natural frontier, not only
between two races, but between two continents. For here, crossing the
isthmus between the Black Sea and the Caspian, stretches a mountain
range over seven hundred miles in length, rising abruptly out of the
plains on either side. These are the Caucasus Mountains, forming the
boundary between Europe and Asia.

The higher and central part of the range (which averages only from sixty
to seventy miles in width) is formed of parallel ridges, not separated
by deep and wide valleys, but remarkably connected by elevated plateaus,
which are traversed by narrow fissures of extreme depth. The highest
peaks are in the most central chain; Mt. Elburz, attaining an elevation
of 18,000 feet above the sea, while Mt. Kasbeck reaches a height of more
than 16,000 feet, and several other peaks rise above the line of
perpetual snow. The outlying spurs and foothills of this chain of lofty
mountains are of less extent and importance than those of almost any
other mountain range of similar magnitude, subsiding, as they do, until
they are only 200 feet high along the shores of the Black Sea. Some
parts are almost entirely bare, but other parts are densely wooded and
the secondary ranges near the Black Sea are covered by magnificent
forests of oak, beech, ash, maple, and walnut.

This range is an almost impassable wall across the narrow isthmus which
joins Europe and Asia, and the Gorge of Dariel is the gateway in this
wall through which have come almost all the migrating races that have
peopled the continent of Europe. As is well known, the white peoples of
Europe have been classified as the Caucasian race, because they were all
supposed to have passed through this gateway originally. Apparently each
of these oncoming waves of barbaric humanity, bursting through the great
gateway, must have left behind some few remnants of their volume, for
nowhere in the world, in so limited an area, is there such a diversity
and mixture of peoples. In the words of one writer, who speaks with
authority on this region, the Caucasus is "an ethnological museum where
the invaders of Europe, as they traveled westward to be manufactured
into nations, left behind samples of themselves in their raw condition."

Here may be found the Georgians, who so long championed the Cross
against the Crescent, the wild Lesghians from the highlands of
Daghestan; the Circassians, famed for the beauty of their women;
Suanetians, Ossets, Abkhasians, Mingrelians, not to enumerate dozens of
other tribes and races, each speaking its own tongue. It is said that
over a hundred languages are spoken throughout this region; seventy in
the city of Tiflis alone.

The scenery of the mountains themselves is unparalleled in grandeur
except by the Himalayas and offers many a virgin peak to the ambitious
mountain climber. Here may be found the ibex, the stag, the wild boar,
the wild bull and an infinite variety of feathered game. The animal life
of the mountains has, in fact, become more abundant of late years on
account of the high charges for hunting licenses fixed by the Russian
Government. Wolves are so plentiful that in severe winters they descend
to the lowlands in great packs and rob the flocks before the very eyes
of the shepherds.

The most important mineral resources of the region are the oil wells;
here, in fact, around Batum, are situated some of the most important oil
fields in the world. Of manganese ore, an essential of the steel
industry, the Caucasus furnishes half of the world's supply, which is
exported from the two ports of Poti and Batum. Its mineral wealth seems
to be practically unlimited, copper, zinc, iron, tin, and many other
metals being found throughout the region, in most cases in exceedingly
rich deposits. The agricultural resources are not so important,
especially from a military point of view, though vast quantities of
sheep are raised in the highlands in the spring and summer, the flocks
being driven down into the plains to the south in winter.

One of the outstanding features of Russian occupation is the great
Georgian military road which has been built across the mountains of
recent years and maintained by the Government. Its engineering is
masterly; here and there it passes close to or under vast overhanging
lumps of mountainside. Everywhere the greatest care has been taken of
this most important military highway, Russia's avenue into that country
she coveted and fought for so long. Beginning at Vladikavkaz, it runs
through Balta, Lars, thence through the famous Gorge of Dariel, the
"Circassian Gates," the dark and awful defile between Europe and Asia.
The gorge is what the geologists call a "fault," for it is not really a
pass over the mountain chain, but a rent clear across it. Seventy years
ago it was almost impassable for avalanches or the sudden outbursts of
pent-up glacial streams swept it from end to end, but the Russians have
spent over $20,000,000 on it and made it safe. In 1877, during the
Russo-Turkish War, nearly all the troops and stores for carrying the war
into Turkey and Asia came by this road.

Its importance has since been lessened to a certain degree, for there is
now direct railway communication from Moscow to Baku, at one end of the
Trans-Caucasian Railway, and therefore to Kars itself, via Tiflis; and
equally from Batum to Kars at the other end to which military steamers
can bring troops and supplies from Odessa and Novorossik in the Black
Sea.

The most important city in this region is Tiflis, the "city of seventy
languages." It may, indeed, be called the modern Babel. As seen from the
mountains, it lies at the bottom of a brown, treeless valley, between
steep hills, on either side of the River Kura.

It is a point of great importance to modern Russia. It forms, to begin
with, the end of the great military road across the mountains which, in
spite of the railways, is still the quickest way to Europe for an army
as well as for travelers, and all the mails come over it by express
coaches. From Tiflis a railway runs to Kars, a strong frontier on the
Persian frontier.

Tiflis has been much developed under the Russian Government. In the
modern section of the city the streets are wide and paved and lighted by
electricity and the stores are large and handsome while electric
railways run in all directions. In the older parts of the city, however,
the houses remain as they were built centuries ago, divided out into the
many quarters devoted to the residences of the many races and
nationalities that compose the population of Tiflis. Between most of
them is bitter enmity and prejudice, even among those of the two great
religious faiths, Christians and Mohammedans. It is this diversity of
interests, which extends throughout all the section down into Persia,
which has so complicated the situation on this front. For not only are
the two military forces fighting here, but wherever governmental
authority is momentarily relaxed, there these mutual animosities flare
up into active expression and the most barbarous features of warfare
take place, such as the massacres of the Armenians by the Mohammedans.
Neither Turkey nor Russia has been especially eager to suppress these
bitter feuds, even in time of peace. In time of war there is nothing to
restrain them, and the whole region is swept by carnage infinitely more
hideous than legitimate warfare.

We have now passed over the entire theatre of the battles on the Eastern
frontiers of the war in Europe. The battle grounds are familiar to us.
In the succeeding chapters we will follow the armies over this
war-ridden dominion and watch the battle lines as they move through the
war to its decisive conclusion.




PART IV--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN




CHAPTER XLVI

SERBIA'S SITUATION AND RESOURCES


The first great campaign on the southeastern battle grounds of the Great
War began on July 27, 1914, when the Austrian troops undertook their
first invasion of Serbia. They crossed the Serbian border at Mitrovitza,
about fifty miles northwest of Belgrade, driving the Serbians before
them. The first real hostilities of the war opened with the bombardment
of Belgrade by the Austrians on July 29, 1914--six days before the
beginning of the campaigns on the western battle fields.

We are now familiar with the theatre of war as described in the
preceding chapters, and will now follow the first Austrian armies into
Serbia.

A stubborn fight excites the admiration of all observers, regardless of
the moral qualities of the combatants. So, wherever our sympathies may
lie, considering the war as a whole, there can be no doubt that the
defense which the Serbians made against the first efforts of the
Austrians to invade their country will stand out in the early history of
the war as one of the most brilliant episodes of that period of the
general struggle. Like a mighty tidal wave from the ocean the Austrian
hosts swept over the Serbian frontier in three furious successive
onslaughts, only to be beaten back each time. Naturally, there were
material and moral causes, aside from the mere valor of the Serbians,
which combined to create this disaster for the Austrian forces, but
enough of the human element enters into the military activities of
these campaigns to make them easily the most picturesque of the early
period of the war.

Before entering into a description of the actual events in 1914, it is
well to consider the forces engaged. From a material point of view the
Serbians entered into these campaigns greatly handicapped. They had
lately been through two wars. In the First Balkan War they had not, it
is true, been severely tested; the weight of the fighting had been borne
by the Bulgarians in Thrace. The real test, and the great losses, came
only with the second war, when the Serbian army threw every fiber of its
strength against the Bulgarians in the Battle of the Bregalnitza, one of
the most stubborn struggles in military history. The result was a
Serbian victory, but it was very far from being a decisive and
conclusive victory. The Bulgarians were forced back some fifteen miles
into their own territory, but had it not been for the intervention of
Rumania there can be no doubt that the Serbs would have entered Sofia.
Here it was that the Serbians lost 7,000 killed and 30,000 wounded of
their best men, as against 5,000 killed and 18,000 wounded in the whole
war with Turkey; a total loss that was bound to be felt a few months
later when the struggle was to be against so powerful an adversary as
Austria-Hungary. The two previous wars had, without exaggeration,
deprived the Serbian fighting forces of one-tenth their number--a tenth
that was of the very best of first-line troops.

[Illustration: Pictorial Map of the Balkans.]

Added to this was another serious handicap, possibly even more serious.
Serbia had, indeed, emerged victorious from the two wars, with a large
stretch of conquered territory at her backdoor. But this acquired
territory, practically all of Macedonia that had not gone to Greece, was
peopled by Serbs. For twenty-five years these Macedonians had been
organized into revolutionary fighting bands, the "Macedonian Committee"
for the liberation of Macedonia and Albania from the Turks, and had
struggled, not only against the Turks, but against foreign armed bands
of propagandists. Some eight years subsequently to the foundation of the
Macedonian Committee of native origin, the Bulgars founded in 1893 their
committee which was called the Macedo-Adrianople Committee. During the
First Balkan War these experienced guerrilla fighters were valuable
allies to the Serbian forces operating against the Turks.

But even before the First Balkan War the Serbians had very distinctly
given the Macedonians to understand that they were to remain Serbian
subjects. This action on their part had had not a little to do with
rousing the Bulgarians to precipitate the Second Balkan War. And when
finally Serbia conquered all this territory, confirmed to her down to
Doiran by the treaty of Bucharest, King Ferdinand of Bulgaria began at
once a fiery anti-Serb propaganda throughout the world, and took
measures through provocatory agents and Bulgar bands crossing from
Bulgaria into Macedonia to create disturbances.

When the Great War broke out in July, 1914, this Bulgarian activity in
Serb Macedonia grew more intense. Thus it was that when the Austrians
attacked the Serbians on their front the Serbians had still to detach
enough of their forces to guard the Serbo-Bulgar border to prevent the
crossing into Serb Macedonia of Bulgar bands. And added to this was the
danger from Bulgaria herself. The Serbians knew that the opportune
moment had only to come and Bulgaria, too, would hurl herself on the
Serbian eastern flank. Thus another large percentage of the Serbian
fighting forces had also to be stationed along the Bulgarian frontier to
guard against possible attack from that quarter.

Offsetting these handicaps, however, and more than equalizing them, was
the moral strength of the Serbian fighting units. They had just emerged
through two victorious wars; they had triumphed so completely that there
was small wonder if the Serbian farmers had come to believe themselves
invincible and their leaders infallible. Practically every man in the
Serbian army was a seasoned veteran; he had had not only his baptism of
fire, but he had been through some of the bloodiest battles of modern
times. He had got over his first fright; he was in that state of mind
where danger and bloodshed no longer inspired either fear or horror. And
even the warlike savage trembles on entering his first battle. Finally,
he was now defending his country, his home, his very fireside and his
family against foreign invasion. And it is generally admitted that a man
fighting in that situation is equal to two invaders, all other things
being equal.

The Serb army opposing the Austrian invasions was composed of ten
divisions of the First Ban and five divisions of the Second Ban. Five of
the divisions of the First Ban and the five of the Second came from the
kingdom as it was prior to the two Balkan wars, but the second five
divisions of the First Ban were new creations recruited from Serb
Macedonia.

The principles on which the organization of the Serbian army was based
were very simple. The former kingdom was divided into five territorial
divisional districts--Nish, Valievo, Belgrade, Kragujevatz, and
Zaitchar. Each of these territorial divisional districts was subdivided
into four regimental recruiting districts, each of which provided one
infantry regiment of four battalions and one depot battalion. The
battalion numbered about a thousand men, so that the war strength of the
divisional infantry amounted to, about 16,000 men. Attached to each
division was a regiment of artillery, consisting of three groups of
three 6-gun batteries; in all, 54 guns. The divisional cavalry, existing
only in war time, consisted of a regiment of four squadrons, from men
and horses previously registered. To each division was also attached its
own technical and administrative units, engineers, and supply column,
and its total strength amounted to 23,000 officers and men of first-line
troops.

In addition to these five divisions of the First Ban, there was also a
regiment of mountain artillery, made up of six batteries, six howitzer
batteries and two battalions of fortress artillery. Then there was a
separate cavalry division composed of two brigades, each of two
regiments. Its war strength was 80 officers and 3,200 men. Attached to
the cavalry division were two horse artillery batteries, of eight guns
each. All told, this first-line army numbered about 200,000, with about
5,200 sabers and 330 guns.

[Illustration: Serbian and Austrian Invasions.]

The Second Ban, or reserve, much inferior in armament to the first line,
brought the strength up to about 280,000 men. But this figure is
probably an underestimate. Volunteers were enrolled in immense numbers.
Some of them were men who had been exempted in the first conscription;
others were Serbs from Austrian territory. The United States sent back
thousands of Austrian and Macedonian Serbs who had emigrated there. It
is probable, therefore, that the total strength of the Serbian forces
shortly after the war broke out was at least 280,000, if not a trifle
more. To this must be added the Montenegrin army which, though operating
in a separate field, contributed its share in driving the Austrians
back; another 40,000 men of first-class fighting ability and experience.

Finally, there was the third reserve, another 50,000 men, but they could
be used for fighting only in the gravest emergency.

The infantry of the First Ban was armed with excellent Mauser rifles,
caliber 7 mm., model 1899. The Second Ban carried a Mauser, the old
single loader, to which a magazine was fitted in the Serbian arsenals;
while the Third Ban had the old single-loader Berdan rifle. The machine
gun carried was the Maxim, of the same caliber as the new Mauser.

In artillery the Serbians were perhaps not so well off. Their cannons
had seen a great deal of service in the Balkan wars, and the larger a
piece of artillery the more limited is the number of rounds it can fire.
It is extremely doubtful that there had been time to replace many of
these worn-out pieces.

The field gun was of French make; it was a 3-inch quick firer with a
maximum range for shrapnel of 6,000 yards, a little over 3-1/2 miles.
The Second Ban was armed with old De Bange guns of 8 cm. caliber. The
heavy guns, which had done much service outside Adrianople, were of
Creuzot make, and included 24 howitzers of 15 cm. and some mortars of 24
cm. As for the aviation wing, there was none.

The Serbian army was under the superior command of the Chief of the
General Staff, Voivode (Field Marshal) Putnik. Unlike his younger
colleagues, his military education was entirely a home product; he had
never studied abroad. His father was one of those Serbs born on Austrian
soil; he had emigrated from Hungary to Serbia in the early forties where
he had followed the vocation of school-teacher. In 1847 the future
general was born. After passing through the elementary schools, young
Putnik entered the military academy at Belgrade. He had already attained
a commission when the war of 1876 with Turkey broke out, through which
he served as a captain of infantry. His next experience was in the
unfortunate war with Bulgaria, in 1885, in which the Serbians were
beaten after a three days' battle. At the outbreak of the war with
Turkey, in 1912, General Putnik was made head of the army and received
the grade of voivode (field marshal), being the first Serbian to enjoy
that distinction. The grade of field marshal was created in the Serbian
army during the First Balkan War.

With him worked Colonel Pavlovitch, the son of a farmer, who had won a
series of scholarships, enabling him to study in Berlin. He had directed
the military operations in the field against Turkey and Bulgaria, and he
was to do the same thing under his old chief against the Austrians.




CHAPTER XLVII

AUSTRIA'S STRENGTH AND STRATEGY


Let us now review the Austrian forces that participated in the invasions
of Serbia. In number they were practically unlimited, at least they far
outnumbered the Serbian forces that met them in the field. Their
armament was of the best and their equipment as complete as boundless
resources could make it. They were, however, partly made up of the
peoples of the Slavic provinces of Austria--Bohemians, Croatians,
Dalmatians, and Bosnians. Naturally there could be but little enthusiasm
in their attacks on their brother Slavs, and while there are many mutual
animosities between these various branches of the Slavic race, such
feelings are, at any rate, secondary to the general dislike of the
"Schwabs," as the German-Austrians are called, and the Magyars. Possibly
this had much to do with the Austrian defeats. The Hungarian, or
Magyar, regiments were probably in the majority. But the Magyars from
the interior of Hungary have no special reason to hate the Serbians,
and, aside from that, they were attacking on foreign soil.

At the head of the Austrian campaigns against Serbia was General
Potiorek, generally described as a textbook strategist. But just how
much his failures were due to his own inefficiency and how much to the
inefficiency of those under him will probably never be determined; he
had in the end to suffer for both.

These were the two great contending forces that were set in motion by
the departure of Baron Giesl, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, from
Belgrade, on July 25, 1914. On the same day the Prince Regent Alexander
signed a decree ordering the general mobilization of the Serbian army.
Three days later, on July 28, 1914, Austria declared war. By that time
Serbia was in the midst of her mobilization.

That the Austrians, who had the advantage of having taken the
initiative, and who had presumably chosen their own time for the opening
of hostilities, did not immediately take full advantage of their
favorable situation has caused much surprise among impartial military
critics. On the same day that they declared war they had the opportunity
to hurl their troops across the Danube and take Belgrade with
practically no opposition. Apparently they were not ready; from that
moment the difficulties that would have attended such a movement
increased hourly.

A force of 20,000 men was raised almost immediately for the defense of
Belgrade. To meet this opposition the Austrians had, on the evening of
the day war was declared, July 18, 1914, only one division concentrated
between Semlin and Pancsova, opposite Belgrade--a force that was hardly
sufficient to take the Serbian capital. Two days later an army corps
would have been needed for the enterprise, for by this time the Serbian
army had begun concentrating considerable numbers within striking
distance of the capital. Thus the first opportunity was lost by the
tardiness of the Austrians to act.

It is presumed that the reader has already studied the description of
this theatre of the war presented elsewhere in this work. Aside from
that, the movements that follow should only be traced with the aid of a
map. Written words are inadequate to give a concrete picture of the
field of operations.

The Austrian General Staff realized the difficulties of crossing the
Danube. Its general plan, probably prepared long before, contemplated a
main attack that should begin from another quarter.

The Austro-Serbian frontier, almost 340 miles in extent, is formed on
the north by the Save as well as by the Danube, and on the east and
southeast by the Drina River. These two smaller streams abound in
convenient fords, especially in summer. To many of these points on the
northeastern frontier Austria had already constructed strategic
railways. Moreover, the Austrian territory throughout this section is so
mountainous and well timbered that large forces of troops could be well
screened from observation, whereas the country opposite Belgrade is flat
and bare.

It was from this direction that the Serbian General Staff expected the
first advance of the enemy. And yet there were dozens of other points
where an attack in force was possible. Each must be covered with a force
at least strong enough to hold the enemy back long enough to enable the
forces stationed at the other points to come up to support. Here was the
great advantage that the Austrians had to begin with; an advantage which
the attacking army always enjoys. The attacking general alone knows
where the first battle shall be fought.

The Serbians, therefore, could not count on meeting the Austrians in
full force before they could enter Serbian territory. They realized that
they must give way at the first contact; that the Austrians would
undoubtedly advance quite some distance within Serbian territory before
enough Serbian forces could be brought up against them to make the
opposition effective.

Realizing this, it was decided to place fairly strong advance guards at
all probable points of invasion with orders to resist as long as
possible; until, in fact, defensive tactics could be adapted to the
situation and the main Serbian army could be brought up to offer battle.

However, two points stood out as the most probable. These were the two
already mentioned; the north, along the line from Obrenovatz to Belgrade
and to Semendria; or, the front Obrenovatz-Ratza-Losnitza-Liubovia. The
first possibility had the advantage to the Austrians of offering the
shortest route to the center of the country--the Morava Valley, their
natural objective. But it also necessitated a difficult crossing of the
Danube, which would have had to be preceded by the building of pontoon
bridges. This would have given the Serbians time to move up their main
forces. The second alternative, an invasion from the east, would have
entailed a longer journey, but the advantage of natural covering and
easy crossing made it a sounder plan.

On July 28, 1914, the Serbians concentrated their forces in anticipation
of either event. The outpost forces were stationed at or near Losnitza,
Shabatz, Obrenovatz, Belgrade, Semendria, Pozarevatz and Gradishte. But
their principal armies were centrally grouped along the line
Palanka-Arangelovatz-Lazarevatz, while weaker, though important,
detachments were stationed in the vicinity of Valievo, a branch railroad
terminus, and Uzitze. This narrowed the field down to such limits that
it was possible to march the troops from point to point, while the few
railway facilities available were utilized for food and ammunition
supplies.




CHAPTER XLVIII

AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES


On the morning of July 29, 1914, the day after war had been declared,
the residents of Belgrade were startled by a deep roar, followed by the
whistling shriek of a huge body, hurtling through the air, and a shell
burst over the battlements of the old Turkish citadel, doing no damage.
Immediately there came another deep shock; the Serbian guns were
responding. Thence on the cannonading along the Danube front continued
for week after week, with only now and then a lull.

The Austrian batteries bombarded not only Belgrade, but Semendria,
Gradishte and a number of other points along the river bank. Next they
were seen building a pontoon bridge out to one of the little islands in
the river, opposite the city and barges were towed alongside the
landings on the opposite shore, presently to be crowded with black
masses of Austrian troops. Naturally, the Serbian gunners made these
objects the targets of their fire. But these were mere bluffs, such
feints as the skilled boxer makes when he wants to get behind the guard
of his opponent. If anything, these demonstrations only served to deepen
the conviction of General Putnik that the real danger was not from this
quarter.

But where was the first great blow to strike? Naturally, not only the
General Staff, but the whole army and population waited in deep anxiety.
This tension lasted over the last days of July, into the first week of
August, 1914.

Then, on August 6, 1914, some Bosnian peasants, Serbs, appeared and
reported that they had seen great bodies of soldiers moving along the
mountain roads toward Syrmia, in northeastern Bosnia. Two days later,
early in the morning, two Austrian aeroplanes whirred over the River
Save and circled over Krupanie, Shabatz and Valievo. The last doubts
were then dispelled; the attack was coming from the east.

And finally, on August 12, 1914, the message flashed over the wires that
the outposts had seen boats in movement, full of soldiers, behind an
island on the Drina, opposite Loznitza. Near that town, and in fact
along the whole lower course of the Drina, the river has frequently
changed its channel, thus cutting out numerous small islands, which
would serve as a screen to the movements of troops contemplating a
crossing. Pontoon bridges could be built on the farther side of almost
any of these islands without being observed from the other shore. This
was exactly what the Austrians were doing.

[Illustration: Serbian Infantrymen on Their Way to the Front.]

Suddenly, on August 12, 1914, there came a burst of rifle fire and the
boom of heavy field guns, and a fleet of barges, under cover of this
fire, emerged from around both ends of one of these islands and made for
the Serbian shore. The two battalions of Third Reserve Serbians,
stationed there as an outpost, trained their old De Bange field guns, of
which they had two batteries, on the oncoming swarms and began firing.
But the Austrian fire became heavier and heavier; a blast of steel
pellets and shells swept through the cornfields and the plum orchards,
tearing through the streets of the village and crumpling up the houses.
The breastworks of the small Serbian detachment were literally the
center of a continuous explosion of shells.

When a full tenth of their number lay dead or disabled, the Serbians
began retiring across the cornfields and up the <DW72>s leading to the
heights behind Losnitza. There, on higher ground, which offered more
effective shelter, they made a determined stand and continued their fire
on the Austrian masses.

Having crossed the river, the Austrians threw up defensive breastworks
and dug elaborate trenches, thus fortifying their crossing. Next they
built a pontoon bridge, and then the main Austrian army poured across; a
whole army corps and two divisions of a second.

Meanwhile, on the same day, August 12, 1914, a similar event was
happening at Shabatz, on the Save, where that river takes a sharp
southward turn and then swings up again before joining the Danube at
Belgrade. Here the country is a level plain, really the southern limit
of the great plain which stretches up to the Danube, past Belgrade and
so into Hungary. Here, too, the Austrians screened themselves behind an
island in the river, then hurled their forces across, driving the feeble
detachment of Third Reserve Serbian troops back across the plain up into
the hills lying to the southeast of Shabatz. Then the advance guard of
the Austrian Fourth Army occupied the town, strongly fortified it and
built a pontoon bridge across the river from their railroad terminus at
Klenak.

Further passages of a similar nature were forced that day, August 12,
1914, at other points by smaller forces; one at Zvornik and another at
Liubovia. In addition the Austrians also threw bridges across the river
at Amajlia and Branjevo. Thus it will be seen that the invasion covered
a front of considerably over a hundred miles and that six strong columns
of the enemy had crossed, all of which naturally converged on Valievo.
For Valievo was the terminus of a small, single track railroad which
joined the main line at Mladenovatz. Thus the Austrians would have a
convenient side door open into the heart of Serbia which was, of course,
their main objective. To this Belgrade was merely incidental. With this
line of transport and communication in Austrian hands, Belgrade would
fall of itself.

From Losnitza, where the main column of Austrians crossed the Drina to
Valievo, runs the River Jadar, along a level valley, which narrows as it
nears Valievo. On the left-hand side of the Jadar Valley rise the
southern <DW72>s of the Tzer Mountains, covered with cornfields, prune
orchards, with here and there a stretch of thick timber. Continuing
southward, slightly to the eastward, up the Jadar Valley another range
rises, slightly smaller than the Tzer Mountains, forming a smaller
valley which branches off eastward. Along this runs the River Leshnitza,
parallel with the Jadar until it makes an independent junction with the
Drina. Still farther up the valley the foothills of the Iverak ridges
are lost in a series of fairly important summits which closely flank the
Jadar River.

To the south of the Jadar River the valley stretches into a rolling
plain, which rises abruptly into the giant Guchevo Mountains. It is this
range, converging with the Tzer and Iverak Mountains toward Valievo, and
forming the plain of the Jadar Valley, which was presently to become the
center of the first great battle between the Serbians and Austrians.

A military movement against Valievo, therefore, demanded complete
possession of these two ridges, which overlooked the line of march. This
the Austrians knew well enough, even before the first of their troops
had crossed the Drina. As is well known, the best maps, not only of
Serbia but of all the Balkan countries, have been made by Austrian
engineers. There was probably not a spur, not a fissure, certainly not a
trail, of these mountains that had not been carefully surveyed and
measured by engineers of the Austrian staff.

The Austrians knew the country they were invading quite as well as did
the native Serbians. All through it may be said that it was not through
want of accurate knowledge that the Austrians finally met disaster.
Rather was it because they misjudged the relative values of their facts.
And one of their first mistakes was in overestimating the effects of the
two Balkan Wars on the efficiency of the Serbian army. First of all, as
was obvious from the leisureliness with which they proceeded to occupy
the two mountain chains in question, that they vastly misjudged the
capacity of the Serbian troops to make rapid movements. Even as the
first shots were being fired across the Drina at Losnitza, the Serbian
forces were on the move, westward. Two army corps were at once rushed
toward the Valley of the Jadar; part of a third was sent to block the
advance of the Austrians from Shabatz. Meanwhile the Austrians took
their time. For two days they busied themselves fortifying the bridge at
Losnitza.




CHAPTER XLIX

THE GREAT BATTLES BEGIN


On August 14, 1914, began the first battle of the Serbian campaign. The
Austrians proceeded to storm the heights from which the small outpost
detachments had all the time been bombarding them with its old-fashioned
guns. The Serbians, though few in number, made a desperate resistance.
It was their business to hold back the enemy as long as possible, even
until the reenforcements should arrive.

Early in the morning of August 14, 1914, the Austrians advanced in a
great mass, then charged up the hillsides toward the Serbian position.
The Serbians waited until they were well up the steep <DW72>s and the
rush of the enemy had subsided to a more toilsome climb. Then they sent
down volley after volley from every available weapon.

The Austrian soldiers, who had until then never experienced anything
more warlike than field maneuvers, lost their nerves; the first line
broke and ran at the first fire. However, that was likely to happen to
any troops under fire for the first time. Down in the plain they formed
again, and again they swept up the <DW72>s. This time they did not turn
at the first volley. On they came, with fixed bayonets. And presently
the first line reached the top of the heights, and the fighting was
hand-to-hand. For a moment the Serbians, overwhelmed by numbers, were on
the point of fleeing. But these same men had been through many a
hand-to-hand encounter with both Turks and Bulgars; that experience
stood them in good stead. And again they swept back the attacking masses
of Austria-Hungary.

By evening, August 14, 1914, the Austrians had not yet taken the
heights. But the Serbians, most of them middle-aged and old men, had
spent their vitality. As the dark night lowered over the scene, they
fell back, until, at Jarebitze, they met the first advance guards of the
oncoming Serbian main army. And here they halted, and the united forces
proceeded to dig a trench on a ten-mile front, extending from north to
south, through the town and clear across the Jadar Valley. Nor did the
Austrians then attempt to follow up this first success. Thus the
Serbians were allowed to intrench themselves unmolested until, next day,
August 15, 1914, they were joined by the balance of their forces.

Now, by studying the map, it will be seen at a glance that it was only
the Tzer Mountains which separated the Austrian column crossing the
Drina at Losnitza and the column which had crossed the Save and had
occupied Shabatz. Should the Austrians from over the Drina get
possession of the Tzer ridges, they would thus effect a junction with
the forces in Shabatz, and so form a line that would cut off a large
portion of northwestern Serbia. Aside from that, they would have a solid
front. But should the Serbians possess themselves of the Tzer ridges
first, then they would have driven a wedge in between their two main
forces. This would make it difficult for either to advance, for then
they would be exposing a flank to the enemy, who would also have a great
advantage in position. Moreover, the Serbians would be in a position to
turn immediately toward either of the Austrians' columns, whichever
might need most attention.

Meanwhile, the Serbian cavalry had made a reconnaissance toward Shabatz.
They immediately sent back reports of overwhelming forces occupying the
town. It was out of the question to make any attack there for the
present.

It was now learned, for the first time, that another of the enemy's
columns had crossed the Drina far down in the south, and was marching on
Krupanie, just below the Guchevo Mountains and on the way to the upper
part of the Jadar Valley. However, as the first report seemed to
indicate that this was only a minor force, a small force of third
reserve men was detached to hold this force back and prevent its
entrance into the main field of operations.

During the day and night of August 15,1914, the two opposing forces were
moving into position for battle: setting the pawns for the game of
strategy that was to be played. The Austrians at Losnitza were advancing
up the mountain <DW72>s and took possession of the Tzer and Iverak
ridges, straddling the Leshnitza Valley.

Up in Shabatz, Austrian troops were pouring across the pontoon bridges.
A flanking column, coming from the Drina, had arrived at Slepehevitch.
Another force was stationed with its left and center on Krupanie, its
right spread out into the mountains north of Liubovia.

On the Serbian side the right wing of the Second Army, screened by the
cavalry division, were preparing to cut off the Austrian forces in the
north from their juncture with those advancing along the Tzer ridges;
the center and left was marching on the enemy on the Iverak ridges, in
conjunction with the right of the Third Army, then north of Jarebitze.
The center of the Third held the positions south of Jarebitze, while its
left, split into small detachments, had been directed to oppose the
invasion toward Krupanie and the advance from Liubovia.

Such were the positions of the various forces as dawn broke brightly on
the morning of August 16, 1914. As the growing light made objects
visible, the extreme right division of the Serbian front, which was
creeping northward to cut off Shabatz, discovered a strong Austrian
column moving along the lower spurs of the Tzer Mountains. Obviously
this body was clearing the ground for a general descent of the forces up
along the ridges; a whole army corps. This movement threatened to become
a serious obstacle to the Serbian plan of separating the Austrians in
Shabatz from those farther south. But the situation was saved by one of
those incidents which sometimes stand out above the savagery of warfare
and give to it a touch of grandeur.

A young artillery officer, Major Djukitch, of the Fourth Artillery
Regiment, asked permission to go out and meet this body of advancing
Austrians with but a single cannon. He would create a diversion which
would give the Serbians time to adapt themselves to the changed
conditions, though the chances were very largely in favor of his losing
his life on this mission. Permission was granted. Calling on volunteers
from his command, he advanced with his single cannon and took up a
position in the path of the approaching enemy. The moment he opened fire
the Austrians, naturally not realizing that only one cannon was opposing
them, and believing that a large Serbian force had surprised them, broke
into a panic. Half an hour after he had opened fire, the Serbian field
commander sent a messenger to Major Djukitch, ordering him to retire. In
reply he sent a message to the commander, describing the confusion he
had created in the Austrian ranks, and instead of retiring, he asked for
reenforcements. The balance of his own battery, a detachment of
infantry, and a cavalry division was sent him. The result was that the
Austrian column was temporarily driven back into the mountains. Hastily
re-forming, the Austrians now massed along a line extending from
Belikamen to Radlovatz, while the Serbians deployed along a front
running from Slatina through Metkovitch to Gusingrob.

At 11 a. m., August 16, 1914, the two opposing forces opened fire in
earnest, up and down the line. All day the cannon roared and the rifles
and machine guns crackled; now and again the Austrians would shoot forth
from their line a sharp infantry attack, but these were repulsed, with
more and more difficulty as the day advanced, for the Serbians were much
inferior in numbers. Toward evening their situation became very
critical. Yet every part of the line held out desperately, knowing that
reenforcements were being hurried forward from the rear as fast as men
could move.

And just before dark, along the roads from the eastward, came the
distant cheers from the advancing columns. An officer dashed up on
horseback shouting encouragement to the battered men in the trenches. A
cheer arose, which rolled up and down the line. Again it rose, then,
even before it had died out, with wild yells the Serbians sprang over
their breastworks and swept madly across the intervening space to the
Austrian lines; smashing through cornfields, over rocks, through the
tall grass of orchards. At their heels followed the reenforcing
soldiers, though they had that day marched nearly sixty miles. Over the
Austrian breastworks they surged, like an angry wave from the sea, their
bayonets gleaming in the sunset glow. It was the kind of fighting they
knew best; the kind that both Serbians and Bulgars know best, the kind
they had practiced most.

Small wonder if the inexperienced peasants from the plains of Hungary,
unused till then to any sight more bloody than a brawl in the village
inn, trembled before this onslaught. Their officers shouted
encouragement and oaths, barely audible above the mad yells of the
Serbians. Nevertheless, they gave way before the gleaming line of
bayonet blades before them. Some few rose to fight, stirred by some
long-submerged instinct generated in the days of Genghis Khan. But the
majority turned and fled, helter-skelter, down the sides of the
mountains toward the valleys, leaving behind guns, ammunition, and
cannon. One regiment, the Hundred and Second, stood its ground and
fought. As a result it was almost completely annihilated. The same fate
befell the Ninety-fourth Regiment. But the majority sought and found
safety in flight. By dark the whole Austrian center was beaten back,
leaving behind great quantities of war material.




CHAPTER L

FIRST VICTORY OF THE SERBIANS


The Serbians had made their first move successfully on that day of
August 16, 1914. More important than this mere preliminary defeat of the
enemy was the fact that the Austrians in Shabatz were now definitely cut
off from any possible juncture with the Austrians in the south. For the
present they were debarred from entering the main field of operations.
This freed the Serbian cavalry for action elsewhere. Meanwhile a portion
of the right wing of the Serbian line was detached to keep the Austrians
inside Shabatz.

Farther to the south the Serbians were not so decidedly successful. The
center of the Serbian Second Army, that directed against the southern
<DW72>s of the Tzer Mountains and the Iverak ridges, had arrived at
Tekerish at midnight.

As dawn broke on August 16, 1914, they perceived a strong Austrian
column descending from above, coming in the same direction.
Unfortunately the Serbians were in the midst of bald, rolling foothills,
while the Austrians were up among the tall timber which clothes the
mountain <DW72>s at this point. The Serbians deployed, extending their
line from Bornololye through Parlok to Lisena, centering their artillery
at Kik. The Austrians made the best of their superior position.

For some hours there was furious firing, then, at about eight o'clock
the Austrian gunners got the range of the Serbian left flank with their
field pieces, which was compelled to fall back. But just then timely
reenforcements arrived from the rear, and the Serbians dug themselves
in. By evening the Serbians had lost over a thousand men, though they
had succeeded in taking 300 prisoners and several machine guns from the
Austrians.

The left wing of the Second Army had, in the meantime, arrived against
Iverak. That this division was able to arrive at such a timely juncture
was due to its having made a forced march of fifty-two miles over the
mountain roads during the previous day. Yet before dawn on the morning
of August 16, 1914, it was ready to continue its march to Poporparlok.
But then came the news that the Austrians had driven back the left wing
of the Third Army from that position and had occupied it.

The situation in which this division found itself was by no means clear.
Nothing had been heard from Shabatz. The division operating along the
Tzer ridges had been badly hammered. The Third Army had lost
Poporparlok. The commander decided to stay where he was and simply hold
the ground against any advance of the enemy from Iverak. This division
was, therefore, intrenched along a line from Begluk to Kik, and a strong
advance was thrown out toward Kugovitchi. During the morning this
advance guard made a strong attack against Kugovitchi, drove the
Austrians out, and established themselves there.

At dawn, August 16, 1914, the left flank of this division, at Begluk,
was shelled by the Austrian artillery, which was followed by infantry
attacks. These were easily repulsed during the day. But then the enemy
was reenforced, and late that night they came on again in great masses.
The Serbians allowed them to almost reach their trenches: then, emptying
the magazines of their rifles at them, they piled themselves over their
breastworks and into them with bayonets and hand bombs. This was too
much for the Austrians; they fled in wild disorder.

Least encouraging was the experience of the Serbian Third Army, which
was defending the territory south of the Iverak Mountains. Here the
Austrians developed a vigorous and persistent offensive, hoping to turn
the Serbian left and thus capture the road to Valievo.

The attack on the positions at Jarebitze commenced at daybreak on August
16, 1914. Here the Serbians held good ground: rocky summits, but so
limited in extent that there was room only for a few companies at a
time. On the other hand the ground before them was broken up into
hollows screened by growing corn. This enabled the Austrians to deploy
their lines beyond the Serbian flanks unseen. They did execute just such
a movement, and attempted to circle around toward the Serbian rear.

At the same time the Serbians here were attacked from in front by
another hostile column which had come from across the plain on the south
side of the Jadar valley, where hollows, sunken roads, and fields of
corn again formed ample screening. However, in spite of all these
movements, the Serbians were able to hold their own. The Austrian
attacks were all beaten back. Their position might have been held
indefinitely, but developments to the south were taking on a threatening
form.

It will be remembered that an Austrian force had been reported
approaching from the south, moving on Krupanie, and that it had seemed
so insignificant that a small detachment of third reserve troops had
been sent to hold it back. But this enemy force now developed into three
mountain brigades.

Reenforcements of infantry and mountain artillery were hurried down to
support the retaining force, but the Austrians were able to force their
way on toward Zavlaka. Seeing Valievo thus threatened, the Serbians
retired from their position at Jarebitze and took up a new position
along a line from Marianovitche to Schumer, thus enabling them to face
both the enemy columns. This retreat was fortunately not interfered with
by the Austrians, though in executing it the Serbian artillery, which
had been in position on the right bank of the Jadar, was obliged to pass
along the Austrian front in single file, in order to gain the main road.

Early the next morning, August 17, 1914, the Serbians were in position
and had extended their line to Soldatovitcha, whence the detachment from
Krupanie had retired. Summing up the day's fighting, and considering it
as a whole, it will be seen that the Austrians had pretty well held
their own, except on their extreme left, where they had failed to get in
touch with their forces in Shabatz.

After the defeat of the Austrians at Belikamen on August 16, 1914, the
cavalry division was reenforced by some infantry and artillery, then
sent on the delicate mission of driving a wedge in between the Austrians
in Shabatz and those along the Drina. Spreading out across the Matchva
plain, its left wing up against the <DW72>s of the Tzer Mountains, and
its right wing within reach of Shabatz, it advanced as far as Dublje in
the north. At the same time it was able to assist the column advancing
along the Tzer ridges by playing its artillery on the Austrian position
in the mountains at Troyan. Throughout all the fighting this cavalry
division rendered notable service by its dismounted action.

On the morning of August 17, 1914, the extreme right of the Serbian
front now turned toward Shabatz. Though only half the number of the
forces they were proceeding to engage, they continued onward. But on
closer approach it became apparent that they could do nothing more than
hold the Austrians inside the town. So well and so thoroughly had the
Austrians fortified themselves that it was hopeless for so small a force
to attempt an attack. Thus this section of the Serbian front settled
down to wait for reenforcements.

The center and left of the Second Army now prepared to advance along the
Tzer and Iverak ridges. The Austrians in this section, who had suffered
so severely the day before at Belikamen, were now concentrated around
Troyan, the most easterly and the second highest peak of the chain.

At dawn on August 17, 1914, the Serbians located the Austrians.
Immediately they began a heavy artillery fire on this position, then
proceeded to infantry attack. Two regiments hurled themselves up the
<DW72>s, and with bayonets and hand bombs drove the Austrians back. After
that no further progress was possible that day, the Serbians having to
wait for their artillery to come up. The Austrians now began intrenching
themselves on the heights of Kosaningrad, the loftiest portion of the
Tzer range.

Along the Iverak ridges the Austrians made a determined advance. The
situation of the Serbian troops in this section, the left wing of the
Second Army, was extremely dangerous, for their left flank was becoming
exposed by the continued retreat of the Third Army. The only hopeful
aspect of their situation was that the Austrians were also having their
left flank exposed by the retreat of the Austrians along the Tzer
ridges. Evidently the opposing forces realized this fact, for they made
a fierce attempt to drive back the Serbians opposing them, so that their
danger from the north might be lessened. Half an hour later they were
severely repulsed. But heavy reenforcements came up to the Austrians
just then, and again they attacked, this time more successfully.

By noon, August 17, 1914, the Austrians had extended their line over to
the Serbian right wing.

Unfortunately, at about that time the Third Army again called for
assistance, and this hard-pressed division was compelled to send it. The
result was that it was compelled to withdraw gradually to the heights of
Kalem. The retirement was executed in good order, and the Austrians
satisfied themselves with occupying Kugovitchi. Intrenching themselves
in their new position, the Serbians awaited further attacks. Only an
ineffectual artillery fire was maintained by the enemy. Meanwhile came
the good news of the success of the Serbians along the Tzer ridges, so
preparations were made for another advance on the following day, August
18, 1914.

As has already been stated, the extreme south wing of the Serbian front,
the Third Army, had retreated the day before so that it could present a
solid front against not only the forces opposing it, but also another
column coming up from the south, whose advance had been inadequately
covered by third reserve men. Here the Austrians attempted to pierce the
Serbian line in the extreme south and come out at Oseshina. But though
vastly outnumbered, the Serbians held their ground stoutly until late
afternoon, when, as already shown, they were compelled to ask the
division operating along Iverak for assistance. When this help came they
were able to resume their defense.

Thus ended the second day of the general battle. On the whole the
Austrians had suffered most, but the general situation was still
somewhat in their favor. The Austrian center, along the Tzer ridges, had
been pushed back. To retrieve this setback the logical course for the
Austrian commander in chief was to curl his wings in around the Serbian
flanks. That he appreciated this necessity was obvious, to judge from
the furious onslaughts against the Serbian Third Army in the extreme
south. But to weaken the Serbian center by these tactics it was also
necessary to free the Austrians in Shabatz, or, at least, it was
necessary that they should assume a strong offensive against the
extreme right of the Serbians, and, if possible, flank them.

But the Serbians anticipated the plans of the Austrians. Additional
reenforcements were sent to the extreme right with orders to spare no
sacrifice that would keep the Austrians inclosed within their
fortifications around Shabatz.

And true enough, next morning, August 18,1914, shortly after the hot
summer sun had risen over the eastern ridges, the Austrians emerged from
Shabatz and attacked the Serbians. The Austrian onslaught was furious,
so furious that, step by step, the Serbians, in spite of their
reenforcements, were driven back. Fortunately toward evening the
Austrian offensive began losing its strength, and that night the
Serbians were able to intrench along a line from Leskovitz to Mihana.

This obliged the cavalry division, which had been cooperating with the
Serbian center and was driving the Austrians toward Leshnitza, to retire
along a line from Metkovitch to Brestovatz. Naturally the advance of the
Austrians from Shabatz was endangering its right flank. Moreover, a
reenforced column of Austrians also appeared before it. But this
opposing force did not press its advance.

Meanwhile, on the same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians were
reenforcing their position on the Tzer ridges. They had also strongly
fortified the height of Rashulatcha, which lay between the heights of
Tzer and Iverak, whence they could direct an artillery fire to either
field of activities.

But the difficulties which the Serbians operating along the Iverak
ridges were meeting also hampered the Serbians who were attempting to
sweep the Austrians back along the Tzer ridges. If they advanced too far
they would expose their flank to the Austrians over on Iverak. As a
general rule, it is always dangerous for any body of troops to advance
any distance beyond the general line of the whole front, and this case
was no exception. However, though delayed, this division did advance.
Oxen were employed in dragging the heavy field pieces along the trails
over the rocky ridges.

With savage yells the Serbian soldiers leaped over the rocks, up the
jagged <DW72>s of Kosaningrad. Again they had fallen back on their
favorite weapons, bayonets and hand bombs. The Austrians put up a stout
resistance, but finally their gray lines broke, then scattered down the
<DW72>s, followed by the pursuing Serbians. Having gained possession of
Kosaningrad Peak, the Serbian commander next turned his attention to
Rashulatcha, which, in conjunction with the Serbians over on Iverak,
could now be raked by a cross artillery fire. He had previously left a
reserve force behind at Troyan. This he now ordered to reenforce his
left, which had been advancing along the southern <DW72>s of the Tzer
range. This force he now directed against the heights, but the movement
was not vigorously followed up.

Over on Iverak the Serbians had succeeded in making some headway.
Forming into two columns, this wing marched out and attacked the
Austrians at Yugovitchi and succeeded in driving them from their
trenches. But immediately the Austrian artillery on Reingrob opened fire
on them, and they were compelled to dig themselves in. And late that
night, August 18,1914, the Austrians delivered a fierce counterattack.
But night fighting is especially a matter of experience, and here the
Serbians with their two Balkan campaigns behind them, proved immensely
superior. They drove the Austrians back with their bayonets.

During that same day, August 18, 1914, the Austrians had renewed their
pressure on the Third Army and the Third Ban men. Soldatovitcha was
their first objective. During the day reenforcements arrived and the
commanding general was able to hold his own, retaking Soldatovitcha
after it had once been lost. Thus ended the day of August 18, 1914, the
third day of the battle.

Early next morning, on August 19, 1914, the Austrians in Shabatz renewed
their efforts to penetrate the Serbian lines to the southward. So
determined was their effort that finally the Serbians in this sector
were driven back over on to the right bank of the River Dobrava. All day
the fighting continued, the Serbians barely holding their position,
strong as it was.

This success of the Austrians hampered the cavalry division, which had
not only to secure its flank, but had also to keep between the Shabatz
Austrians and the Serbians operating on Tzer, whom they might have
attacked from the rear.

Along the Tzer ridges, however, things were going well for the Serbians.
At noon they had taken Rashulatcha, which left the column free to
continue its pursuit of the fleeing Austrians along the ridges. From the
heights above the Serbian guns fired into the retreating Austrians down
along the Leshnitza River, turning the retreat into a mad panic. By
evening the advance guard of this division had arrived at Jadranska
Leshnitza.

In the early morning, August 19,1914, the Serbians over on the Iverak
ridges had attacked in deadly earnest. Naturally the huge success and
rapid advance of the Serbians over on the Tzer ridges were of great
importance to them. Here the Austrians were put to rout too. At 11 a. m.
the Serbians stormed Velika Glava and took it, but here their progress
was checked by a strong artillery fire from the west of Rashulatcha.
Then rifle firing broke out along the whole line from Velika Glava to
Kik. Near Kik the Austrians were massing in strong force, and the Third
Army was reported to be again in danger, this time from a hostile
turning movement. Fortunately general headquarters was able to come to
the rescue with reenforcements. This lessened the danger from Kik.
Whereupon the advance along Iverak was continued. By the middle of the
afternoon, when the Austrians were driven out of Reingrob, the Serbians
controlled the situation. The defeat of the Austrians was complete.

The Third Army was again in trouble during this day, August 19,1914. Its
left flank continued its advance from Soldatovitcha, but the Austrians
attempted to pierce their center. But finally this sorely tried section
of the Serbian front emerged triumphant. Before evening the Austrians
were driven back in scattered disorder, leaving behind them three
hospitals filled with wounded, much material, and 500 prisoners.

Here ended the fourth day of the bloody struggle--August 19, 1914. In
the north around Shabatz the Austrians had made some advance, but all
along the rest of the line they had suffered complete disaster. The two
important mountain ridges, Tzer and Iverak, which dominated the whole
theatre of operations, were definitely in the hands of the Serbians. And
finally, the Third Army had at last broken down the opposition against
it.

Next morning, August 20, 1914, dawned on a situation that was thoroughly
hopeless for the Austrians. Even up around Shabatz, where they had been
successful the day before, the Austrians, realizing that all was lost to
the southward, made only a feeble attack on the Serbians, who were
consequently able to recross the Dobrava River and establish themselves
on the right bank.

The cavalry division, whose left flank was not freed by the clearing of
the Tzer ridges, hurled itself against the Austrians in the plains
before it and threw them into wild disorder. First they shelled them,
then charged. The panic-stricken Magyars fled through the villages,
across the corn fields, through the orchards.

"Where is the Drina? Where is the Drina?" they shouted, whenever they
saw a peasant. A burning, tropical sun sweltered over the plain. Many of
the fleeing soldiers dropped from exhaustion and were afterward taken
prisoners. Others lost themselves in the marshy hollows and only emerged
days later, while still others, wounded, laid down and died where they
fell.

In the Leshnitza similar scenes were taking place. From the ridges above
the Serbian guns roared and poured hurtling steel messages of death down
into the throngs of retreating Austrians. Some few regiments, not so
demoralized as the others, did indeed make several attempts to fight
rear-guard actions, to protect their fleeing comrades, but they again
were overwhelmed by the disorganized masses in the rear pouring over
them.

In the Jadar valley another disorganized mob of Austrians was fleeing
before the Serbians up on the Iverak ridges, who also were pouring a hot
artillery fire into their midst. Presently the Third Army joined in the
mad chase. And now the whole Austrian army was wildly fleeing for the
Drina River.

There remained only one exception during the early part of the day,
August 20, 1914. This was the Austrian forces on Kik, to the northwest
of Zavlaka. The Serbian reenforcements which, it will be remembered, had
originally been directed toward Marianovitche, had been afterward sent
westward, and at dawn on August 20 they approached Kik in two columns.
The left column occupied Osoye without resistance, but in descending
from that position, the Austrian artillery opened fire on it.

An hour later the right column came up and opened an artillery fire, and
under cover of this bombardment a Serbian regiment reached the foot of
the mountain. As was afterward learned, the Austrians at this point had
had their machine guns destroyed by the Serbian artillery fire, and by
this time their own artillery had been sent back, in preparation for the
retreat. Consequently they were only able to receive the Serbian attack
with rifle fire.

At the height of this skirmish the extreme left of the Serbians on
Iverak, which had remained to guard against attack from this quarter,
moved over against the Austrians. The cross-fire was too much for them;
they turned and fled, leaving behind over six hundred dead, the Serbians
in this affair losing only seven killed. Jarebitze was now occupied; the
rest of the Serbians joined in the general pursuit.

That night, August 20, 1914, the Austrians swarmed across the Drina,
fleeing for their lives. By the next day the whole river bank was
cleared of them. Serbian soldiers lined the whole length of the frontier
in this section. There remained now only the Austrians in Shabatz to
deal with. The whole Serbian army was now able to concentrate on this
remaining force of the enemy left in Serbian territory.

Early on August 21, 1914, the attack began, and the Austrians here
fought stoutly. Indeed, all that day they held the Serbians off from
behind their intrenchments. On August 22, 1914, the Serbians made a
general assault. Fortunately they found a weakness in the fortifications
on the western side of the town. To create a diversion, the Austrians
delivered a counterattack along the road toward Varna.

By the morning of August 24, 1914, the Serbians had brought up a number
of heavy siege guns. But when the general bombardment had already
commenced, it was found that the Austrians had evacuated the town during
the night, and retreated across the river. And so the first Austrian
invasion of Serbia came to its disastrous end.




PART V--THE AUSTRO-SERBIAN CAMPAIGN




CHAPTER LI

RESULTS OF FIRST BATTLES


Though described as a punitive expedition in the Vienna press, this
campaign cost the Austrians very dear, not only in material and in
lives, but in prestige. Just what the Austrian casualties were cannot be
definitely stated at this time, but at least 6,000 were killed outright
on the field of battle, while at least 35,000 were wounded. And another
4,000 fell into the hands of the Serbians as prisoners. In material the
Serbians report that they captured 46 cannon, 30 machine guns, 140
ammunition wagons, and a great mass of rifles, hospital paraphernalia,
ammunition, stores, and other incidentals.

The Serbian losses were heavy: 3,000 dead and 15,000 wounded. That they
were so much less is not extraordinary, for not only were they on the
defensive, but an army in flight, as were the Austrian, always loses
heavily.

The first onslaught of the Austrians in August, 1914, had been driven
back. A disorganized mob, the soldiers of Franz Josef had fled back
across the Drina and the Save, leaving thousands of dead and prisoners
behind. And for over a week the little Serbian army lay panting.

Military science says that a victory should always be followed up
closely, for a beaten army is almost as helpless as a herd of cattle.
But military science must also take into account the limitations of
human muscles and nerves. The Serbian reserve forces had been moving
back and forth along the fighting front, strengthening a defense here,
supporting an attack there, and some of them had covered from fifty to
sixty miles a day. There were no fresh troops to pursue the Austrians.
The Serbians needed rest. And so the Austro-Hungarian soldiers were
allowed to continue their northward flight unmolested.

Thus for twelve days after the Battle of Shabatz, or from August 23,
1914, there was quiet along the Austrian and Serbian frontier. The
remnants of the Austrians had definitely retired northward. And at about
that time the Russians were driving hard at the Galician front. The
Austrians were being beaten there, too. Altogether the situation looked
extremely serious for Austria at that time. But, finally, encouraged by
the Allies, the Serbian General Staff decided to send an expedition over
into Austrian territory.

Not much over twenty miles north of Shabatz is a range of mountains,
called the Frushkagora. A fairly strong force holding these rocky ridges
would be in a position to prevent the Austrian general from reenforcing
his armies in Bosnia and Herzegovina from the east. It would also afford
a better protection to the northern frontier of Serbia than would a
force of the same size stationed within Serbian territory along the Save
River. The chief thought of the Serbian general was, however, to gain
control of this natural position and hold it while another Serbian force
was invading Bosnia, in conjunction with the Montenegrin troops. What
made this first objective the more tempting was the known fact that
between the frontier and the Frushkagora range the Austrian forces
amounted only to about a dozen regiments.

To the First Army, General Putnik assigned the execution of this
expedition. That was now composed of two divisions, and the cavalry
division, which had rendered such excellent service on the Matchva Plain
during the first invasion. The left wing of this expeditionary force was
to be supported by a division in Matchva, while the "Detachment of
Belgrade" was to operate on the right. A second reserve division was to
hold Obrenovatz.

Another glance at the map will show that, almost halfway between Shabatz
and Belgrade, the Save takes a peculiar little loop into Serbian
territory, forming a narrow strip of Austrian territory projecting into
Serbia. Naturally, this little tongue could be commanded by the Serbian
guns without first crossing the river, since the Austrians could only
operate here by marching down in a narrow column between the two sides
of the loop formed by the river. Such a force, however, could be
immediately flanked by the Serbians from their side of the river. This
peculiar peninsula, known as the Kupinski Kut, was chosen as the point
at which the first crossing should be made.




CHAPTER LII

SERBIAN ATTEMPT TO INVADE AUSTRIAN TERRITORY


It was the night of September 5, 1914. So secretly was this movement
planned and begun that the Serbian field officers did not themselves
know what was to be undertaken when their forces arrived on the banks of
the river at the Kut on the nights of September 5 and 6. The marches
were made at night, to hide the movement as long as possible from the
Austrian aeroplanes, which occasionally whirred their flight over
Serbian territory.

At one o'clock in the morning of September 6, 1914, the first troops of
the invading expedition embarked on the barges lined up along the river
bank. A screening force having been ferried across, to protect the ford
against possible attack, the construction of a pontoon bridge was begun
at Novoselo, while farther up some flour mill floats were utilized for a
second bridge.

It was an ideal place for a crossing. Farther up, at the neck of the
isthmus, was an old river bed, where the Save had once cut a straight
channel. This was now full of stagnant water, while between it and the
ford the ground was covered with thick timber. The stagnant water, while
not very deep, afforded somewhat the same protection that a wire
entanglement would, and the woods served as a screen to the advance
guard of the Serbians stationed there to guard the crossing. Not far
distant, farther up in Austrian territory, was a small town, Obrez.

After the Serbian army had crossed safely, it set to work clearing the
timber away, it being no longer necessary to screen themselves from
view, and a strong line of trenches was thrown across the neck of the
isthmus, thus effectually protecting the ford for retreat, should that
be necessary.

At this moment two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery of
the enemy appeared and attempted to oppose the further advance of the
Serbians, but when the Serbian guns began shelling the forest opposite,
this force fled in the direction of Obrez. Then the left of the Serbian
force worked its way around toward the town itself and, after firing
some dozens of shells, entered it and drove the Austrians still farther
on.

The cavalry division now came up to secure possession of the town. The
two divisions then set to work to intrench themselves. Meanwhile the
Serbian right, advancing toward the northeast, encountered another force
of the enemy, consisting of one regiment and two batteries, and, after a
short skirmish, drove it back and occupied the two villages, Kupinovo
and Progar. Thus the Serbian operations in this section fared well.

But at another point, on the extreme left, at Mitrovitza, they did not
encounter such good fortune. The division operating here was to occupy
and fortify Mitrovitza and with it a bridge, after which it was to
advance and worry the enemy's flank. The actual point chosen for the
construction of the bridge was a customs station at Jasenova Grada,
between Mitrovitza and Jarak.

The column here had arrived at the river bank at midnight of September
5, 1914, and at early dawn had begun building the pontoon bridge.
Meanwhile a steady artillery and rifle fire was kept up, sweeping the
opposite bank, to keep back the enemy. The Serbian commander of this
force had received instructions to the effect that as soon as he had
moved his troops across safely, he was to send two regiments forward:
one to the right, the other to the left, and the whole line was to
advance and cover the territory between Mangjeloskabara and Shashinshi,
the object being to push back any movement of the Austrians from Jarak.

As at Novoselo, an advance guard crossed in barges before the bridge had
been thrown across. Immediately a heavy fire began from the enemy,
hidden in the opposite forest. Many of the Serbians threw themselves
into the river, and either swam or waded the rest of their way across.

Finally three barge loads had effected a crossing. While waiting for the
rest to follow, sixty of the Serbians threw themselves over against the
Austrians and, by their very boldness, drove them out of their trenches
and took twenty prisoners.

Some delay in the building of the bridge followed, but more barge loads
of soldiers were sent across, and the fighting with the Austrians was
pushed vigorously. But meanwhile the enemy was also being reenforced,
more rapidly for not having a river behind him. By evening the Serbians,
who had crossed, found themselves tremendously outnumbered and fighting
on the defensive. At that time, one of the Serbian Regiments, which had
advanced as far as Shashinshi, found itself isolated, with both flanks
exposed.

After two hours of stubborn fighting the regiment managed to draw back
to the river bank, carrying with them a mass of wounded comrades, hoping
there to find the support of the main body of their army. But the
pontoon bridge had not yet been completed. Of the 400 yards across the
river, only twenty remained unbridged. Seeing their advantage, the
pursuing Austrians redoubled their attack furiously. The Serbian
regiment, with half its men down, and only 60 feet of water between
itself and the main corps, turned, with its back to the river, and
fought back with equal fury.

With frantic haste, the Serbian engineers attempted to finish the
building of their bridge, so that the main body of the troops might rush
across and relieve the situation of the regiment defending itself
against overwhelming numbers on the opposite bank. But before this could
be accomplished, the wounded began throwing themselves into the pontoon
nearest their side of the river. The mooring lines parted and the barge
drifted away from the end of the bridge, down the river, loaded with
wounded soldiers. The same happened to the next barge. To add to the
disaster, the barges were old and leaky, and soon one of them filled
with water and began sinking. Presently it sank, throwing the wounded
into the river, where most of them were speedily drowned.

The Serbians on the Austrian shore, now seeing their last hope of
support or escape cut off, continued fighting desperately until all
their ammunition was gone. Then the handful of survivors surrendered. By
this time it was already dark. The only one to escape across the river
was the regimental surgeon who, carrying the regimental flag between his
teeth, swam across the river and reached the main body of his countrymen
safely.

Fortunately, the recklessness which led this attempted crossing to
disaster did not characterize the movements of the main body which had
crossed at Novoselo. The advance continued under carefully thrown out
screens of cavalry, and was kept up until the trenches at the landing
could be abandoned and a wider circle of defensive works could be thrown
up, including within their line the villages already mentioned. Thus the
three Serbian bases were strongly protected by a semicircle of field
works, radiating from Kupinovo. Having secured this position, General
Boyovitch, the Serbian field commander, advanced his cavalry in fanlike
formation to the north and west. One division followed the cavalry on
the right; another took a northeasterly direction.

By the evening of September 7, 1914, the enemy had been driven back to a
line reaching from Detch to Nikintzi. No serious encounters occurred for
some days, the Austrians evidently not desiring to make any serious
opposition until they should have sufficient backing. But on the morning
of September 9, 1914, the Serbian right came in contact with strongly
intrenched Austrians at Detch and Surchin. During the first invasion the
fighting had been under a tropical sun. Now the weather was cooler,
almost cold at nights, which rendered the enthusiasm and the fighting of
the men on both sides correspondingly more spirited. It was, therefore,
with some vim that the Serbians threw themselves into an attack against
Detch. After a determined resistance, the Austrians were forced out.
Next Surchin became the center of battle, but here the Austrians held
out stoutly, driving back the Serbian charges again and again.

All that day of September 9, 1914, the Serbian advance was checked, but
the following morning, being reenforced, they charged into Surchin again
and finally drove the Austrians out at the point of the bayonet. The
Serbians then turned north and captured Dobranovtsi. And at this
junction the Serbians stationed at Belgrade crossed the river there and
advanced on Semlin.

On September 11, 1914, General Boyovitch moved his whole front forward,
with the object of driving all of the enemy westward into the
Frushkagora Mountains and gaining full possession of the plain. This
would have left the two divisions and the cavalry free to advance
against the mountain range itself. Having once gained that stronghold,
the Serbians would then have under their control the whole district of
Syrmia with its friendly population of Serbs.

The Serbians were now extended along a front from Hrtkovtsi to Pazova
Nova while the Austrians were intrenched along a line from Jarak to
Pazova Stara. The following morning the Serbian left occupied Pechintsi
and advanced north to the Romer Canal, where they met a heavy fire and
were compelled to intrench themselves. Farther west, however, the
Serbians rushed the town of Jarak and took it by means of bayonets and
hand bombs.

Such was the situation on September 12, 1914, when a bright, clear
morning had dawned and a cool breeze swept over the plain. Off in the
distance rose the blue ridges of the Frushkagora Mountains, streaked
with the green of vegetation along their lower spurs. With tingling
blood and renewed vitality the Serbians looked forward to the word of
command which should send them onward, driving the Austrians before
them.

But that word of command seemed long delayed. Finally, indeed, it came,
but only to the cavalry. The horsemen were sent ahead, up and down the
line, screening the men in the trenches. And then suddenly came the
word to the men in the trenches.

"March!"

They did fall in and begin to march. But not forward. The heads of the
columns turned toward the rear, back toward Serbia. Presently the whole
Serbian army, just as further victories seemed all but won, was on the
retreat. Behind them they heard the fire of their own cavalry,
protecting their rear. The retreat was orderly and the river was
recrossed without loss or confusion. Even more concerned and
disappointed were the Serb peasants of the villages through which they
passed, for these simple folk had thought the Magyars permanently beaten
and that King Peter's men were now moving onward to take Vienna. They
had, therefore, shown unmeasured enthusiasm and had showered gifts of
chicken, milk, eggs and other rural dainties on their brother Serbs from
Serbia, to the full extent of their slender resources. A few days later
they had to pay dearly for this manifestation of their sympathies. When
again the Magyars came down into their territory they became so
oppressive toward these poor villagers that a Croatian regiment, whose
members were racially akin to the Serbs, broke into open revolt and
attacked the Magyars, the result being a pitched battle in which not
only rifles, but machine guns and cannon were employed. Presently word
was passed back and forth among the rank and file of the Serbian army
explaining the disappointing retreat.

"The Austrians are swarming across the Drina again," their officers
whispered. "There will be plenty of fighting yet, but it will be the
same old battle ground."

Thus ended Serbia's brief invasion of Austrian soil.




CHAPTER LIII

AUSTRIA'S SECOND INVASION


The second Austrian invasion of Serbia began September 7, 1914. Had the
Serbian General Staff known what mighty efforts the Austrians were to
put forth at this second attempt to invade the country, it would never
have undertaken the expedition into Syrmia. After the failure of the
first invasion the Austrian staff placed at General Potiorek's
disposition a force of 300,000 men, with a reserve of another 150,000 to
draw upon, should the necessity become strong enough. Fortunately for
the Serbians the Russian pressure in Galicia became so strong, later on,
that this reserve force was sent through the Carpathians, and when the
critical moment did arrive, General Potiorek was unable to avail himself
of its assistance.

It may be well to know how the Austrian forces were disposed just before
the second invasion. There were five whole army corps; one was stretched
out from Klenak to Bosut; another from Bosut to Bijeljina; another from
Janja to Kosluk and another from Kosluk to Zvornik. Aside from this
force there was part of another corps lined up from Zvornik to Liubovia
and one and a half divisions held the front from Semlin to Weisskirchen.
Four battalions were kept busy by the Montenegrins.

It will be remembered that when the expedition into Syrmia began the
bulk of the Serbian army was sent to the western frontier along the
Drina, to be ready to invade Bosnia when the success of the Syrmia
expedition should be assured. But so well is Bosnia wooded in this
section that the Serbians had not been able to observe the concentration
of troops that was going on before them across the Drina.

Suddenly, on the morning of September 7, 1914, the whole frontier along
the Drina, from Jarak south, became alive with Austrian soldiers. North
of Loznitza the fighting took on a very bloody and deadly character. All
day the battle line swayed back and forth with a succession of attacks
and counterattacks. Several times the Austrians almost broke through,
but in the end their whole line was driven back across the river. In the
Matchva district, however, they succeeded in holding a triangular patch
of swamp land, bounded by Ravjne, Tolich and Jarak. But even here they
were checked along a line from Ravjne to Tolich, where both sides
intrenched and came to a deadlock for the time being. Here the two
opposing lines continued their trench warfare without much spectacular
demonstration, but with a tremendous loss of life to both sides and an
expenditure of ammunition which the Serbians could little afford.

Along the line south of Loznitza the fighting was not so favorable to
the Serbians. The forces stationed here had been weakened in the Syrmia
expedition. And then, too, the country being extremely mountainous, they
had overestimated the strength of their positions.

Here, on the morning of September 8, 1914, the Austrians began a general
advance, beginning at Liubovia. At first they were successfully held
back, but when they came on again with greatly augmented numbers, the
Serbians were finally compelled to retire to a line of hills running
from Guchevo, through Jagodina and Proslop to Rozani, where they
intrenched themselves and prepared to resist any further advance.

The Austrians, however, continued to attack. Around Krupanie below
Loznitza, the Serbians made a stubborn defense and succeeded in holding
the heights of Kostainik. But their southern, or left, wing continued to
be driven back.

By September 11, 1914, the Austrians had advanced as far as a line drawn
from Shanatz to Petska. At this critical moment, however, one of the
divisions of the force that had been recalled from Syrmia arrived and
the combined forces were ordered to advance against the Sokolska
Mountains, whose ridges were occupied by the Austrians.

The Serbians rushed the heights with their customary elan. The Austrians
resisted stubbornly. They, in their turn, had been tasting the first
draughts of victory, and were not so prepared to give in as on previous
occasions. For a long time the fighting was hand to hand. The men even
hurled big rocks at each other, grappled together in each other's arms
and fought with knives and teeth. But finally some of the Austrians
broke and scattered and presently all of them fled. Their trenches and
ground on both sides of them, however, were covered with dead, Serbians
and Austrians promiscuously mingling together.

So complete was the Serbian victory that their troops were now able to
advance and form a new line from Shanatz to Brodjanska Glavitza, with
the cavalry patrolling clear down to the Drina at Liubovia.

Further north, however, the Austrians were still in possession of
Matchko Kamen (Cat Rock). Here the fighting had been most terrific, the
heights having been taken and retaken no less than eight times. This
position dominated all the country around within artillery range. By
taking this strategic point the Serbians would have had complete
possession of a chain of heights which begin with Guchevo on the north,
and would have constituted a natural frontier which could have been held
with a minimum force of troops and expenditure of ammunition. But this
move was not carried out. Both sides were literally tired out. The
Serbians were unable to advance any farther, while the Austrians were
content with not being driven back any farther. They were, also, no
doubt worried by the fact that down in the southern section the Serbians
had succeeded in not only driving the Austrians across the river, but
had even advanced some distance into the Bosnian hills.




CHAPTER LIV

END OF SECOND INVASION--BEGINNING OF THIRD


Thus the second Austrian invasion was checked. The strategy was,
perhaps, not so spectacular as in the first invasion, but the losses to
both sides had been much heavier. In killed, wounded and prisoners the
Austrians lost fully 30,000 of their men. There now followed a
situation somewhat similar to that up in northern France; both sides
were deeply intrenched and in some parts faced each other over only a
few yards of neutral ground. Again and again the Austrians delivered
attacks, attempting to break through the Serbian positions. All the arts
of trench warfare were employed by the Austrians to overcome the Serbian
resistance, but the Serbian engineers showed themselves at least their
equals in such maneuvers. At one time they successfully mined over a
hundred yards of Austrian trenches and blew 250 of its defenders into
the air.

As for the Serbians, their attempts to break through the Austrian
positions were fatally hampered by a shortage of ammunition. At one
point they did, in fact, succeed in breaking through and then suddenly
the ammunition supply came to an end and the Serbians had to retire
again, leaving the Austrians to return to the trenches from which they
had just been ejected.

Up in the northwest the Austrians also held a narrow strip of Serbian
territory, along the Drina from Kuriachista up, but with this small
exception they were confined to their side of the river until the
triangular tract in the northeast of the Matchva Plain was reached,
previously mentioned.

Along the Save from Parashnitza to Shabatz they had also attempted a
southward movement, where they were supported by five river monitors.
During the period of comparatively little activity which now followed
the Serbians were much worried by these monitors, which patrolled up and
down the river at night, throwing their searchlights on and exposing the
Serbian trenches. Then, too, they could hurl bombs into the Serbian
positions with almost absolute impunity, for whenever the Serbian shells
struck the heavy armor of these river fortresses they rolled off
harmlessly.

On the night of October 22, 1914, the Serbians sent some mines floating
down the river, one of which struck a monitor and sank it in deep water.

For nearly six weeks through November, 1914, this deadlock continued.
But during all this time, the Austrian General Staff was quietly
preparing for another grand drive through Serbia. It was then that the
150,000 reserve, previously mentioned, was assigned to General
Potiorek's disposal, while his first line was also materially
strengthened.

Nor did the third invasion begin with any dramatic effort. The pressure
was applied gradually, little by little, until the Serbs were finally
face to face with the necessity of shortening their lines, if they were
not to be broken through. Other causes besides the increasing pressure
from the Austrians contributed to the general causes.

Winter was coming on in earnest now. The low bottom lands in the Matchva
Plain were becoming waterlogged; it was impossible to keep the trenches
from filling. The Serbians had, in the first place, made a mistake in
attempting to hold these Matchva levels. On such battle grounds, the
Magyars, from their own level plains, were too nearly their equals. On
level ground, too, the defenders have less the advantage, unless they
are in equal number, and the Serbians were everywhere in smaller number.
This inferiority, too, made it less possible for the Serbian soldiers to
obtain periods of rest away from the constant vigilance necessary in the
first line trenches. The result was that they were under a more severe
strain. They were subjected to all the drawbacks of trench warfare at
its worst, without the respite that is usually accorded to men under
these conditions on other fronts. The nerve-racking strain thus imposed
became finally more than ordinary human beings could endure. Small
wonder that the correspondents with the Serbian army reported many cases
of insanity among the men in the trenches.

Finally the order came to withdraw from the Matchva Plain, to the
foothills of the Tzer Mountains and the heights along the right bank of
the Dobrava River. This retreat, made in the face of no specially strong
attack, did not a little to depress the Serbian rank and file. It was
beginning to feel that its strength was sapping away.

It was soon obvious that a more general retirement would now become
necessary. Complete command of the Tzer Mountains could not be attained
without the expenditure of more energy and ammunition than the Serbians
could afford at this time. So a general withdrawal was ordered, along
the whole line. The Austrians, many of them fresh troops, unused to
defeat, followed up in the footsteps of the retreating Serbians with
enthusiastic vigor, from Shabatz to Liubovia. And presently Valievo, the
railroad terminus and the first objective of the Austrians, became
untenable.

On November 11, 1914, the Serbians were compelled to evacuate this city.
Its capture was the first step in the progress of the Austrians toward
Kragujevatz, Nish and a junction with the Turks near Constantinople.
Still, as later events will show, the Serbians were by no means the
beaten rabble described by the Vienna press. The score or more of cannon
which the Serbians were compelled to abandon on account of the bad
condition of the mountain roads were hailed as evidence of a hardly won
campaign, and the stragglers captured were accepted as signs of a
demoralization which had as yet not set in.

On the other hand, whether this first success was real or not, it did
serve to inspire the Austrian troops with an enthusiasm which they had
hitherto not possessed.

The Serbians had not yet been driven back on the line along which they
had originally intended to make their first stand against the invaders.
During the period between the first mobilization and the beginning of
the first invasion on August 12, 1914, what are referred to as the
Kolubara and Lyg positions had been strongly intrenched. But it had not
proven necessary to fall back on these positions; the Austrians had been
driven back at once. But now, after the fall of Valievo, the Serbians
decided to make no further resistance to the Austrian advance until this
line was reached.

The Kolubara River itself is not of sufficient width to hold back an
advancing army long, but in places its banks rise so high and steep that
it serves very much the same purpose as a moat before a castle. In such
places comparatively few men could hold back a large number of the
enemy. A little south of Lazarevatz the line of intrenchments left the
Kolubara and followed the Lyg River, where the country was even more
rugged. From the source of the Lyg the Serbians had fortified the Jeljak
and Maljen ridges, which control practically all the roads leading to
Kragujevatz and, proceeding in a southwesterly direction, they threw up
earthworks on the Bukovi, Varda, Jelova, Bukovic, Miloshevatz and Leska
Gora ranges, which defended an advance toward the Western Morava Valley.




CHAPTER LV

PRELIMINARY AUSTRIAN SUCCESSES


It was along this line that in November, 1914, the Serbians determined
the decisive battle of the campaign should be fought. At Obrenovatz was
stationed a strong brigade, known as the "Detachment of Obrenovatz."
Further south, at Konatiche, on the Kolubara River, the cavalry division
cooperated with the Second Army, which held the line from Volujak to
Cooka and the ridges farther to the left. The Third Army occupied the
right bank of the Lyg River from Barzilovitza to Ivanovchi. The First
Army stretched itself out from Gukoshi to Ruda and along the Jeljak
ridges to Maljen. And finally the "Army of Uzitsha," which had fought so
brilliantly before in the southern section and penetrated into Bosnia,
was assigned the protection of the base at Uzitsha and the Western
Morava; it intrenched itself from a point southwest of Yasenovatz,
through Prishedo, along the Jelova crests, after which it crossed over
to the heights of the Leska Gora to Shanatz.

This new line, much shorter than that previously held, enabled the
Serbians to contract. Moreover, all the country was favorable to
defense. Nowhere was it so screened that an approaching enemy could
surprise them. Here, certainly, one defender was equal to two invaders.

Apparently the Austrian commanders realized that they had genuine
obstacles to overcome, for they did not proceed with any impetuous
haste. It was six weeks before they had advanced so far as to come into
real contact with the new Serbian line. During that interval they had
been preparing for this kind of mountain warfare, by bringing up special
mountain artillery and men who had had experience in just such a country
on the Italian front.

It was mid-November, 1914, before the Austrians were ready to deliver
their first assaults. Almost every garrison in the town of Bosnia had
been drawn on to swell their numbers and the troops brought up from the
Italian front amounted to a whole army corps. All in all, there were
about 250 battalions of infantry, in addition to cavalry, artillery and
engineer corps.

One feature of this third invasion, which had not attended the first and
second, was the vast number of refugees who now came fleeing through the
Serbian lines. Their ox carts and their flocks blocked the roads, old
men and women and children thronged the trails in their mad haste to get
away from the advancing Austrians. Their reports of the vast numbers of
the enemy that they had seen may not have helped to encourage the
Serbian soldiers, but, on the other hand, they gave reports, somewhat
exaggerated, perhaps, of such hideous atrocities committed by the
Magyars that henceforth the Serbians were to fight with an added
bitterness and hatred.

Allowing for a certain amount of exaggeration, there still seems to be
solid foundation for the reports of atrocities committed by the
Austrians in Serbia. But this seems to be a circumstance inseparable
from any war. And, naturally, the invaders are necessarily always the
guilty ones. The Serbians did not commit atrocities for the very simple
reason that they never had the opportunity to come in among the enemy's
villages. Had they invaded the Hungarian plains there would undoubtedly
have been atrocities committed on both sides. An army like the Austrian,
composed of so many different nationalities and races, would naturally
be more susceptible to such excesses.

Whatever their reasons for waiting so long before their next general
attack, the Austrians had, at any rate, played into the hands of their
enemy to the extent that they had allowed him to accumulate a plentiful
supply of ammunition. Moreover, more was coming, sent by the Allies and
this had a cheering effect on the men.

On the morning of November 15, 1914, the Austrians began their first
attack. It developed principally against the Second Army, south of
Lazarevatz, and against the Uzitsha detachment in the direction of
Kosjerichi. For five days the Austrians sent successive waves dashing
against the Serbian walls, but each was repelled, hurled back, with
comparatively little effort. How determined the Austrians were may be
judged from the fact that the Serbians now took more prisoners than they
had during all the previous operations.

Meanwhile the Austrians were also making a determined effort to take
Belgrade; an effort, as will be described later, which was also to have
an initial success. But, considering the unfamiliarity of even the best
informed with the Serbian country, it will, perhaps, be wiser to take
each theatre by itself. The operations before Belgrade, anyhow, were not
closely connected with those in the interior of the country.

It seemed as though during those first five days of fighting the
Austrians were merely testing the relative strength of the various
sections of the Serbian line. On November 20, 1914, a powerful force of
Austrians advanced and took possession of Milovatz, in close contact
with the right flank of the First Army. Another column drove at its
center at Ruda and successfully stormed the heights of Strazhara. The
next day these movements developed into a mighty assault on the Serbian
positions in this section. All day the Serbians held their ground, but
toward evening the center weakened, then caved in, collapsed. The result
was that the whole First Army was beaten back with heavy loss, until it
was finally able to make another stand along the line from Babina Glava
to Rajac.

The fire of the renewed attack flared up and down the front. The Third
Army of the Serbians succeeded in holding its ground. Between the
Uzitsha detachment and the Austrians the fighting was especially bloody,
but neither side gained any distinct advantage.

But the retirement of the First Army from its strong position from Ruda
to Gukoshi was disastrous, not only from a purely military aspect, but
also in that it sent a wave of depression up and down the whole line of
Serbians. This loss might be retrieved by an effective artillery
support, but again the Serbians were feeling a shortage of ammunition.
Armed Bulgarian bands entering Serbia from Bulgaria had finally
succeeded in interrupting railroad traffic, and the supply of ammunition
had been abruptly broken off.

Fortunately for the Serbians, the Austrians showed their usual
disinclination of following up their success immediately. Their center
rested while their mountain brigades delivered a rather feeble attack on
the Serbian extreme left, on the line from Varda to Gruda.

It was November 24, 1914, before the Austrians came on in force again.
This time the Second Serbian Army was forced back; to a line running
from Galvitza to Smyrdlykovatz and the heights of Cooka were taken. The
Uzitsha army was also forced to retire, on to the Goinjagora Mountains,
at the head of the Western Morava Valley. The Austrians now also
attempted to outflank the extreme left of the Serbian line. With this
object in view they shot their mountain brigades down along their right,
until the threatened Serbian flank was compelled to swing back to
protect itself from an enveloping movement.

Finally, on November 28, 1914, the Uzitsha Army was able to make a
determined stand along the heights from Kita to Markovitza.

In the south the Serbians had suffered a serious setback. Counterattacks
were of little avail. How desperately the Serbians resisted may be
judged from the fact during one of their counterattacks, made at
Salinatz, they took prisoner seven officers and 1,580 men. In general,
however, they were forced back, step by step. One by one, each
succeeding ridge fell into the hands of the invaders. And finally the
dominating ridges of the Suvobor Mountains were in complete possession
of the Austrians.

In the north the Serbians had made a better showing. Along the Kolubara
River the fighting had been especially heavy. One Austrian division had
even succeeded in penetrating as far as Progon, on November 24, 1914,
but it was finally driven back by the cavalry division with heavy loss.

The result of this stage of the fighting was that the Serbians had again
been compelled to lengthen their lines; their front now extended from
Tchatchak to Belgrade, almost seventy miles.




CHAPTER LVI

CRISIS OF THE CAMPAIGN--AUSTRIAN DEFEAT


We have now arrived at the critical point, not only of the third
Austrian invasion, but of all the military operations in the Serbian
theatre. If the Austrians should now again be driven back, it would be
practically impossible for them to make another invasion unaided, at
least so long as they were engaged with Russia. And, on the other hand,
if the Serbians lost now, the whole country was lost. The climax was at
hand. For this reason it may be well to define again the position and
the strength of the two opposing lines.

On November 28, 1914, the Serbian units were disposed as follows: The
Second Army, from Vechani to Vagan; the Third Army, from Kalanjevchi to
Kelja; the First Army, from Silopaj to Galich; the Uzitsha Army, from
Kita to Markovitza.

The Austrians had four mountain brigades in the direction of the Western
Morava Valley; about one and a half army corps on the road along Valievo
to Milanovatz; an entire corps against Lazarevatz and two corps moving
eastward against the Serbian line from Belgrade to Mladenovatz.

On the night of November 29, 1914, to shorten this long line the
Serbians decided to withdraw from Belgrade. A redistribution of the
Serbian forces was then made as follows: the troops from the Kolubara
retired to the heights about Sibnitza and the Belgrade detachment was
thrown astride the Belgrade-Nish Railroad along the summits of
Varoonitza in the east and Kosmai in the west. Elsewhere the positions
remained practically the same as before. Apparently General Putnik felt
that the retreat of the First Army, which had caused the general
retirement of the Serbian front, had not been absolutely necessary, for
the commander of that force was now relieved and in his place was
appointed General Mishitch, a member of the General Staff. How wise this
change was may be judged from the later behavior of the First Army,
which was destined yet to retrieve itself.

To the trained military observer, the strategic plan of the Austrians
would by this time have become apparent. With the Suvobor Mountains as a
central pivot, they had strengthened their wings and attempted to swing
around in the north by Mladenovatz and south down the Western Morava
Valley. Had this movement been safely accomplished the mass of the
Serbian army, together with their arsenal at Kragujevatz, would have
been rounded up, after which the new Serbian capital, Nish, would have
followed easily and Serbia would have been completely in Austrian hands.

On December 2, 1914, this was the plan which the Austrians were putting
into execution, in rather a leisurely way, when the Serbians, having
drawn in their breath for a final effort, began their great
counterattack. Nor can there be any doubt that the Austrians were
completely surprised by this sudden renewal of the Serbian strength. It
is only necessary to read the press dispatches from Vienna, issued
during the few days previous, to be convinced that General Potiorek had
reported the Serbians as completely defeated. Not only the Austrians,
but the whole world was surprised by the startling change that now took
place in the Serbian theatre.

Under the command of General Mishitch, the First Army hurled itself
against Suvobor and, after a bloody three days' struggle, took the
heights and pushed in the Austrian center, driving its forces in this
section in a disorganized flight toward Valievo. The days that ended the
first invasion were renewed. Nor was this flight a mere sudden panic; it
had, in fact, risen in a crescendo, from a small beginning, until it
developed into a veritable debacle.

At first the Austrians had attempted an orderly withdrawal, as testified
by their effort to take with them all their heavy artillery. The scene
that occurred near Gorni Toplitza will serve to illustrate the whole
retreat. Here, where the road winds around a commanding bluff, which
overlooks a valley, the Austrians had planted a battery of field guns,
right on the edge of the cliff. In the road leading up to this height
were placed a score of ammunition wagons from which little two-wheeled
carts were employed to carry the ammunition up to the guns. Deployed on
the flank of this position, the Serbian gunners had suddenly covered it
with a terrible enfilading fire and men, horses, carts, and wagons lay
in a mangled heap. There were dead horses in the shafts of the carts,
whose bridles were still clutched by the hands of dead men. Some few had
tried to escape the avalanche of flying steel and as they ran they
hurled from them caps, ammunition, haversacks and rifles only to be
raked down before they could reach the shelter of a neighboring ravine.
And this was merely one little corner of the general scene. All along
the road to Valievo the ground was strewn with material, even to the
rations of the soldiers, jolted out of the knapsacks as they were cast
down by their fleeing owners.

During that first day of fighting the First Army captured twelve
officers, 1,500 men, five mountain howitzers and four machine guns, then
advanced, until by nightfall it was able to take up a position along a
line from Kostuniche to Vranovicha. During this time the Uzitsha Army
was fiercely attacked in its position on both sides of the Western
Morava Valley, but it succeeded in driving back the assaults. The Third
Army had also advanced slowly toward Lipet, taking over 500 prisoners
and two machine guns. The Second Army met desperate opposition, but
finally began surging ahead and soon sent in its share of captured war
material and prisoners.

In the north an important force of the Austrians was making toward
Belgrade, to lead a triumphal entry. Reconnoitering parties, sent out
from the flank of this body, were seen in the direction of Slatina and
Popovitch.

The decided successes of this first day's fighting acted as a powerful
stimulant on the previously depressed Serbian rank and file, though they
still realized that there was many a hard fought attack to be driven
into the vitals of the ponderous body of the enemy before he could be
finally hurled back across the frontier. The Austrians still remained in
possession of mountain positions of great natural strength, which could
only be taken at the point of the bayonet. But the Serbians had
recovered their _morale_; again they were fighting with that energy and
vigor which had characterized their assaults during the first and second
invasions. And they were amply rewarded.

By December 5, 1914, the First Army had retaken the dominating heights
of the Suvobor Mountains and the summit of Rajatz. The Third Army, after
buckling back a stubborn resistance, advanced as far as Vrlaja during
the day. During that same night the Austrians were driven from Lipet,
leaving 2,000 of their own number behind as prisoners. The Second Army,
on its part, had pushed steadily on and by night it reached Kremenitza
and Barosnevatz. The Uzitsha Army, opposed by greater numbers, was
unable to participate in the general forward movement, but, on the other
hand, it held its own during the day's fighting. During that night it
hurled itself at the enemy, and by morning he was retreating toward
Zelenibreg.

There was now no longer any doubt that the chances of success for this
third invasion of Serbia were beginning to assume very slender
proportions. The three army corps in the Austrian center and right had
been completely broken and were now retreating in mad, disorganized
flight toward Valievo and Rogatitza. Even should the Serbians fail to
follow up this section of the enemy's forces with full vigor; even
should it have a few days for re-forming, the loss of so much war
material made such a possibility very difficult. There would hardly be
time, under any circumstance, to draw fresh supplies from over the
frontier before the Serbians could come up with them.

On December 7, 1914, the Uzitsha Army reached Pozega. The First Army,
after storming and taking the heights of Maljen, advanced and formed a
line between Maljen and Toplitza. The Third Army made a strong push
forward and reached the line from Milovatz to Dubovitza, making a great
haul of guns and prisoners. Only the Second Army failed to make any
headway. Obviously, the Austrian field commander realized that the
situation in the center was lost; this would account for his attempted
diversion in the north. Here two Austrian corps held their ground
successfully and they not only were able to check the advance of the
Second Army, but they advanced to an attack against the detachment of
Belgrade at Kosmai and Varoonitza.

On the whole, however, the fortunes of war had, during that day, rested
decidedly with the Serbians. They had captured 29 officers, 6,472 men,
27 field guns, 1 mountain gun, 15 gun carriages, 56 wagons loaded with
artillery ammunition and between 500 and 600 ordinary transport wagons.
Above all, the situation in the south, where it had at first seemed most
hopeless, was now retrieved beyond question and the Austrians in that
section were fleeing helter-skelter before a lively Serbian advance, led
by the Serbian Generals Yourishich and Mishitch.

The next day, December 8, 1914, began with hard fighting around Uzitsha,
but the division here (the Uzitsha detachment), was not to be pressed
back on its very own home soil; the Austrian lines wavered, broke, then
scattered, the soldiers fleeing for the frontier. The First Army
continued triumphantly, as it had done the day before, advancing and
sweeping all in its way before it. It ended the day by storming and
entering Valievo.

The Austrians holding Valievo had carefully prepared for its defense,
for this town they were reluctant to give up. The approach by the main
road had been heavily intrenched and the guns were in position. But the
main force of the Serbians circled around in the hills and flanked the
position of the Austrians, taking them completely by surprise. They
broke and ran, and while the fugitives hurried off toward Loznitza and
Shabatz, a rear guard of Hungarians on the hills to the northwest put up
a rather indifferent fight before they, too, fled in mad disorder. The
last of them were caught by the Serbian artillery and, while running
over a stretch of rising ground, over a hundred were shot to pieces by
shrapnel. When the Serbians arrived the ground was literally covered
with mangled forms; here and there sat a few wounded.

The Third Army likewise shared in the general triumph. It reached the
Kolubara, at its junction with the Lyg. Throwing out one of its
divisions eastward, it threatened the right flank of the enemy on Cooka,
then permitted the Second Army to carry that position. By this movement
the Serbians succeeded in driving in a wedge and completely cut off the
three beaten and fleeing corps in the south from the two in the north,
which were still showing some disposition to hold their ground.

The operations in the west and northwest now resolved themselves into a
wild, scrambling foot race for the frontier. The worst of the fighting
was now over; indeed, the Austrians now fought only when cornered. Most
of them were by this time unarmed, thinking of nothing but how to reach
the frontier before the first of the pursuing Serbians.

Only a powerful literary pen could paint such a picture as was now
spread over the land of Serbia. Wounded warriors, now resolving
themselves into helpless, suffering farmers, simple tillers of the soil,
save for the tatters of their blue and gray uniforms which alone
indicated what they had been, lay by the roadsides and along mountain
trails, abandoned by their comrades. Others lay mangled, their forms
beaten out of all recognition. Scattered over all, wherever road or
trail passed, lay guns and cartridges, sometimes in heaps, where they
had been dumped out of the fleeing wagons. And further on lay the wagons
themselves, some thrown over on their sides, where the drivers had cut
the traces and continued their flight on the backs of their horses.

Later in the day, December 8, 1914, the scenes along the highways took
on a different character. The main columns of the pursuing Serbians had
passed on, but straggling files of those too tired or too weak to be in
the fore of the chase still continued onward. More slowly followed a
steady stream of returning refugees, their oxen, in various stages of
life and death, yoked up to every conceivable manner of springless
vehicle, piled high with odds and ends of furniture and bedding which
had been snatched up in the mad hurry of flight. On top of the bundles
lay sick and starving children, wan with want and exposure. Beside the
wagon walked weary women or old men, urging their animals on with weird
cries and curses, returning to the devastated remains of what had once
been their homes.

Later still, from opposite directions, came processions of Austrian
prisoners, sometimes thousands of them, guarded by a handful of Third
Ban Serbian soldiers, still wearing their peasant costumes. Among the
prisoners were smooth-faced youths and old men, some in the uniforms of
soldiers, or of Landwehr, or Landsturm. All types of that hodge-podge of
nationalities and races which the flag of Austria-Hungary represents
were there; Germans, Magyars, Croats, Czechs, Moravians, Slovaks,
Rumanians, Lithuanians, and Bosnian Musselmans.

In between the convoys straggled men of the Serbian army who had fallen
out of the chase by the way, most of them Third Ban men, too advanced in
years to keep up the pace set by the younger men. Nowhere moved anything
but suffering, bleeding humanity.

On this scene the sun, a glowing disc of copper, finally set, and the
struggling figures merged into the deepening dusk, and presently only
black, halting shadows were creeping along the dark trails and roads.




CHAPTER LVII

THE FATE OF BELGRADE


During all this time a separate drama was being enacted in and around
Belgrade, the Serbian capital. Unfortified and not especially adapted
for defense, except for the breadth of the Danube flowing along its low
front, it was the cause of a general, world-wide wonder that it should
not have fallen almost immediately into Austrian hands. Quite aside from
military values, the capture of an enemy's capital always makes a
strong, moral impression, on both sides.

Beginning with the early morning of July 29, 1914, when a detachment of
Serbian irregulars beat off a river steamer and two troop laden barges
which were attempting to approach the shore just below Belgrade, there
followed a period during which the citizens of the city had their full
share in experiencing the horrors of warfare. The booming of heavy siege
artillery and the screaming of shells at first startled them, then
became so commonplace as barely to attract their attention. The attacks
and counterattacks on mid-river islands became incidents of daily
occurrence. Ruined buildings, wrecked houses and dead bodies in the
streets became an unmarked portion of their everyday life.

For the greater part of this period Austrian cannon, planted across the
river, poured shell, shrapnel, and incendiary bombs into the city, with
intent to batter down its modern buildings and to terrorize the
inhabitants. Over 700 buildings were struck by bombs, shells, or
shrapnel, and of these sixty were the property of the state, including
the university, the museum, foreign legations, hospitals, and factories.
The foundries, bakeries and all the factories along the Serbian shore of
the river were razed to the ground. Austrian howitzer shells dropped
through the roof of the king's palace and wrecked all of the gorgeous
interior. The university was riddled until the building, with its
classrooms, laboratories, library, and workshops, was entirely
demolished. Even the cellars were destroyed by great shells, which broke
down the walls, pierced their way into the very bowels of the earth and
there exploded. As the result of a steady fire to destroy the state
bank, one street, running up from the water's edge, was ripped up from
curb to curb. Missiles pierced the wood paving and its concrete
foundations by small holes, passed along underground for some distance,
then exploded, throwing particles of the roadway to all sides.

Many of these shells were fired from the Austrian batteries stationed
over near Semlin, but presently there also appeared a fleet of river
monitors, so heavily armored that no Serbian shell could pierce their
sides. These would parade up and down the river channel with impunity,
adding their share to the general destruction.

Finally, in the beginning of November, 1914, there arrived in Belgrade
two big 14-centimeter cannon, sent by the French Government by way of
the Adriatic, together with French gunners and 20,000 rounds of
ammunition. These were put into position above the city and on November
8, 1914, the French gunners sent their first message over into Hungary.
The damage inflicted so impressed the monitors that they did not again
venture into range. Moreover, spies, of whom there were probably a
number in Belgrade, had doubtless notified the Austrians that measures,
were now being taken to mine the river effectively. In fact, many
measures for a more effective offensive were being undertaken when the
trend of operations in the interior forced the Serbian General Staff to
order the evacuation of the capital.

It will be remembered that the Serbians had been beaten back from their
main line of defense and that a rearrangement of the Serbian forces had
thereby become necessary, in order that the line might be shortened.

This included the abandonment of Belgrade on November 29, 1914. The
order was carried out during the night. But before retiring, the French
gunners, who saw that they were going to lose their two big guns,
determined to bid the enemy across the river a hearty good-by. In the
early morning they fired off their stock of 240 rounds of ammunition and
in a little more than half an hour deposited some twelve tons of
melinite on the enemy's forts at Bezania, with such terrifying effect
that the garrison abandoned it. Thus it came to pass that the two
strongholds, having snarled and barked at each other across the dividing
waters for nearly five months, were both evacuated at the same time.

As will be remembered, the right wing of the Serbian lines, now joined
by the garrison of Belgrade, swung back and stretched across the
Belgrade-Nish railroad, along the ridges of Varoonitza in the east and
Kosmai in the west. The Austrian left, composed of two army corps,
immediately covered the ceded territory and, of course, entered
Belgrade. Then followed the strong Serbian counterattack against the
Austrian center along the Suvobor ridges and the complete demoralization
of the Austrian forces from the center south.

The northern wing of the Austrians, however, which held the country
around Belgrade succeeded in holding its own, though it was presently
cut off from the rest of the Austrian forces. But this was all according
to the plans of General Putnik. Being much outnumbered he could not
spare the forces necessary to rout the enemy's strong northern force.
Having broken the center of Potiorek's front, the Serbian commander gave
his chief attention to capturing the Austrian southern wing, operating
in the Western Morava Valley.

On December 8 and 9, 1914, the Serbian right wing had been hard pressed
along the line from Kosmai to Varoonitza, but the completeness of the
Austrian defeat in the other theatres enabled General Putnik to
rearrange his troops. He therefore dispatched the left wing of the Third
Army against Obrenovatz, attached the rest of the Third Army and the
cavalry division to the Second Army and placed this new combination of
forces, together with the garrison of Belgrade, under the command of
Voivode Stepanovitch, he who had made so brilliant a record at the first
battle on the Tzer ridges.




CHAPTER LVIII

ATTEMPTS TO RETAKE BELGRADE


On December 10, 1914, General Stepanovitch immediately began a movement
against Belgrade which had now been in the hands of the Austrians since
the first of the month. At this time the Third Army was pressing on
toward Obrenovatz, the cavalry division held the left bank of the
Beljanitza River, the Second Army was holding a line from Volujak to
Neminikuchir, the Belgrade detachment still maintained the ridges along
Kosmai and Varoonitza and a detachment, which had come up from
Semendria, occupied Pudarchi. The troops thus formed a crescent, with
one horn touching the Save and the other the Danube, Belgrade being the
star in the middle.

The Austrian main positions stretched from Obrenovatz up the right bank
of the Kolubara to Konatitche and then across to Grooka through Boran,
Vlashko and Krajkova Bara.

There now followed what was probably the most stubborn fighting of the
third invasion: either the Austrian soldiers composing this northern
army were better material, or the Austrian commanders were especially
animated with the necessity of holding Belgrade.

On the morning of December 11, 1914, the Serbian advance began. As
possession of the railroad was of first importance, the center pushed
rapidly ahead until it reached Vlashko heights. Again and again the
Serbians charged up the <DW72>s of this eminence, only to be beaten back.
But finally, toward evening, the Austrians fell back and the summit was
taken, thereby giving the Serbians control of the railroad at Ralia; the
terminus of the line, in fact, for a tunnel several miles farther north
had been blown up by the Serbians on the day they had evacuated
Belgrade.

Early the next day, December 12, 1914, the advance was continued and the
left wing of the Third Army reached Obrenovatz and its right occupied a
line from Konatitche to Boshdarevatz. The Second Army occupied the
summits designated as Hills 418 and 287 and the Belgrade detachment
advanced to a front from Koviona to Krajkova Bara.

Thus, with astonishing swiftness, and in spite of the stubborn
resistance, the crescent was contracting and the Austrians were being
squeezed back into Belgrade. But they continued their desperate
resistance, fighting over every foot of ground before surrendering it.
By December 13, 1914, the enemy had been routed from all the territory
lying between the Save and the Drina, but with such desperation did the
Austrians cling to Belgrade that they delivered repeated counterattacks
upon the Serbian positions at Koviona and Krajkovo Bara before they
finally retired north.

The triumphant Serbians, though they had suffered severely, followed up
the retreat vigorously, pressing along the banks of the Topchiderska
River on the left and up the main road on the right. The left wing had
advanced up the Kolubara River toward its junction with the Save, which
was eight miles behind the Austrian front. The enemy had to draw back
for fear of being suddenly taken in the rear. Two monitors were sent up
the river to check the Serbian cavalry division, which was trying to
work its way around the marshes and thus cut off the Austrian force
entirely. But this movement of the left wing was merely a feint; it was
intended simply to make the Austrian line waver. While the Austrians
were maneuvering in answer to this feint, the Serbian center was pushing
its advance.

The Austrians had attempted to check the Serbian advance by intrenching
heavy rear-guard forces in several strong positions, the nature of the
country being especially suited to such tactics. The hills along the
road north of Ralia are, indeed, strategic points of immense military
value. But the Serbians, their capital now almost in view, pressed on
with frantic vigor.

The Austrians fought manfully, giving them one of the best fights they
had yet been through. Instead of merely clinging to their hill
intrenchments, they made fierce and determined efforts to pierce the
Serbian line. It was in one of these counterattacks, near the central
height, where the railroad entered a tunnel, that the resistance of the
Austrians was broken. After the Serbian riflemen, with their machine
guns, had thrown back the enemy, the Serbian artillery caught the
retiring masses of blue and gray clad soldiers of the Dual Empire.

This produced a panic in the densely packed retreating column, whereupon
the Serbian infantrymen leaped out of their trenches and dashed forward
in pursuit, forming two pursuing columns, one on either flank of the
fleeing Austrians, like wolves worrying a wounded buffalo. And as these
streams of Serbians ran uphill more rapidly than the blue-gray flood
moved, the Austrian rear guards, composed of heavy forces, turned to
check the pursuit.

On the morning of December 14, 1914, the Serbians approached the
southern defenses of Belgrade, where the Austrians must make their last
stand; along a line from Ekmekluk to Banovobrodo. Here General Potiorek
had constructed a system of earthworks, consisting of deep trenches with
shrapnel cover and well-concealed gun positions, with numerous heavy
howitzers and fieldpieces. Evidently he hoped to withstand an indefinite
siege on this fragment of Serbian territory, holding Belgrade as a
bridgehead for another advance toward the main Morava Valley, when the
next effort to invade Serbia should be made. He would, at the same time,
preserve at least a semblance of his prestige from all the calamities
that had befallen his armies, enabling him to represent the campaign as
a reconnaissance in force, similar to Hindenburg's first advance against
Warsaw.

But his troops had been so terribly punished that they could not
garrison the siege defenses. The Serbians, now drunk with their many
victories, and absolutely reckless of death, as they drove on toward
their capital, with their old king, grandson of Black George, moving
through their foremost ranks, charged up into the ring of hills.

The last fight, on December 14, 1914, which definitely broke the back of
the last effort of the Austrians to maintain a footing on Serbian soil,
took place on the central height, Torlak. Two battalions of Magyars were
defending this point. And just as the sun was setting over in the
Matchva swamps in a glow of fiery clouds, the foremost Serbians leaped
up to the attack.

Long before the fight was over darkness set in. The Serbians, driven
back again and again, came back like bounding rubber balls. Finally they
gained the trenches, and one general, horrible melee of struggling,
shouting, furious combatants set in. The shooting had died down; they
were fighting with bayonets and knives now. Finally the tumult died
down. But nearly every Austrian on that height died. Few escaped and not
very many were taken prisoners. Then, under cover of the night, the
Serbians spread over the other heights and captured the whole line of
defense works.

No Serbian slept that night. They tugged and dragged at their heavy guns
through all the dark hours, up toward the city, and placed them on
heights commanding the pontoon bridges that had been thrown over the
Save from Semlin.

When dawn broke on December 15, 1914, a heavy mist hung over the river,
but the Serbians knew with accuracy the location of the pontoon bridge.
All during the previous day and during the night the retreating
Austrians had been crowding over this bridge to escape into Austrian
territory. At first the retirement had been orderly, but later in the
day, as the news from the front became more serious, as the low, distant
roar of rifle and machine gun rolled nearer, the movement increased in
intensity, and, during the night, developed into a hurried scamper.
Cannon were unlimbered and thrown into the river, and troops fought
among themselves over the right of way along the narrow plank walk. In
the midst of this confusion, while yet thousands of the invaders were
still on the Serbian side of the river, just as dawn was breaking, there
came a deep report, the hissing of a flying steel missile, and a shell
dropped in the middle of one of the pontoon supports, hurling timber and
human beings up into the air. The confusion now became a wild panic.
Some tried to return to the Serbian shore, others fought on. Dozens of
the struggling figures rolled over the side of the bridge into the
eddying currents of the waters.

Again came the dull, heavy report, then another and another, followed by
the screeching overhead. Shells dropped into the water on all sides. And
then another bomb burst on the pontoon where the first shell had landed.

Even the roar of the shouting soldiers could not be heard above the
crashing of timbers, the snapping of mooring chains. The bridge swayed,
then caved in, where the pontoon had been struck and was sinking.
Between the two broken-off ends, still crowded with struggling humanity,
rushed the turbid current of the river. The last road to safety had been
cut.

Presently the fog lifted and revealed a long line of retreating
Austrians, reaching down the road toward Obrenovatz, still heading
desperately for the bridge, as unconscious of its destruction as a line
of ants whose hill has been trampled in by a cow's hoof. But they were
not long to remain unconscious of the fact that they were now prisoners
of war.




CHAPTER LIX

SERBIANS RETAKE THE CITY--END OF THIRD INVASION


As the sun rose on December 15, 1914, the Serbian cavalry, accompanied
by King Peter, swept down from the heights of Torlak and entered the
streets of the capital. A volley from the remnant of a Hungarian
regiment met them. The cavalrymen dismounted and began driving the
Magyars down the streets, from one square to another. And while this
fight, an armed riot rather than a military action, was going on,
finally to end in the practical slaughter of all the Hungarians who
would not surrender, the king entered the cathedral of his capital to
celebrate a Mass of thanksgiving for the deliverance of his kingdom from
the hands of the enemy. And even as the Mass ended, stray shots echoed
through the streets of the city still.

Two hours later the Crown Prince Alexander, accompanied by his brother,
Prince George, a strong cavalry escort, and the British military
attache, approached Belgrade. They were met on the outskirts by a crowd
of women and children who, with a few exceptions, were all of the
inhabitants that remained, the Austrians having carried the others off
with them the day before. They had collected masses of flowers, and with
these they bombarded and decorated the incoming soldiers. The girls
brought the embroidered scarfs and sashes, which they had worked in
preparation for marriage, and these they hung about the cavalrymen's
necks until they looked as though they were celebrating at a village
wedding. Huge tricolor streamers now hung from the houses and buildings,
while bits of dirty bunting fluttered from the cottages.

In the streets of Belgrade the Austrians left 5 cannon, 8 ammunition
wagons, 440 transport wagons, and 1,000 horses. Some 150 junior officers
and 10,000 men also found their retreat suddenly cut off; among them
were few officers of high rank. In one of the officers' headquarters the
evening meal was still spread on the table, the soup half consumed, the
wine half drunk.

So ended the third Austrian invasion of Serbia. Of the army of 300,000
men who had crossed the Drina and Save rivers, not over 200,000
returned. During the last thirteen days of the operations the Serbians
had captured 41,538 prisoners, including 323 officers, and enormous
quantities of war material; 133 cannon, 71 machine guns, 29 gun
carriages, 386 ammunition wagons, 45 portable ovens, 3,350 transport
wagons, 2,243 horses, and 1,078 oxen. The Austrian killed and wounded
numbered not far from 60,000.

The Austrian occupation of Belgrade had lasted just fourteen days. The
invaders had evidently not counted on the disaster that was so soon to
come to them. Under the guidance of their late military attache in
Serbia they had established themselves in the best available buildings,
began to repair the streets, which they themselves had ripped open by
shell fire, and set up the semblance of a city administration. But it
was still evident that no central authority from above had as yet been
able to assert itself. The personality of each commander, was
represented by the marks left behind in his district. The buildings
occupied by one military authority remained cleanly and intact, even the
king's photograph being left undamaged. In others, furniture was
destroyed and the royal image shot and slashed to pieces. Entire
sections of the town escaped pillage. Other quarters were plundered from
end to end. While the cathedral and other churches were not seriously
damaged, the General Post Office was completely wrecked. The furniture
in the Sobranje, the house of the national assembly, was destroyed and
broken, and the Royal Palace was stripped from floor to ceiling, the
contents being carted off to Hungary in furniture vans, brought
especially from Semlin for that purpose.

With the army of occupation came 800 wounded soldiers from the other
theatres of operations. Most of them were immediately turned over to the
American Red Cross unit established in Belgrade, already caring for
1,200 wounded Serbians. As the fighting continued in the interior these
numbers were constantly augmented, until the American hospital
sheltered nearly 3,000 wounded men.

When the evacuation began the Austrians left their own wounded, but took
with them the Serbian patients, to swell the number of their prisoners
of war. Several hundred of the non-combatant citizens were also taken
into captivity.

In the importance of its influence on the war as a whole, the
achievement of the Serbians in repelling the three Austrian invasions
will probably be found, when the later history of the war is finally
written, to take very high rank. For had Serbia fallen, the Teutonic
Empires would have been united with little delay to their Turkish
allies. Austria might then have been able to hold off the Russians by
herself, while the Germans would thereby have been so much stronger for
pressing their campaigns in Belgium and East Prussia; with what results
can only be guessed. The Austrians themselves were astounded by the
extraordinary power of little Serbia. Their last disaster, indeed, so
roused their anger that they began preparing again for another attempt
to conquer this stubborn little nation.

Calling the Germans to their aid, they began in January, 1915, to
collect a new army, 400,000 strong, which was ranged along the Serbian
frontier. But the pressure from the Russians on the Carpathian front
presently became so heavy that this body of troops was needed there, and
so Serbia was left in peace for the time being.

Thenceforward only insignificant fighting took place between the
belligerents on each side of the river, such fighting being mostly in
the nature of artillery actions. Belgrade was not again, during that
period at least, subjected to bombardment. An arrangement was made
between the Serbian and Austrian commanders whereby the Serbians
refrained from firing on Semlin, and the Austrians spared Belgrade.

There was, however, some activity on the river itself. Belgrade was now
garrisoned by a mixed force of Serbians, British, and French, the
British being mostly gunners, who had been detached, together with some
big naval guns, from the British navy. For some time before they arrived
the Austrian monitors and picket boats had again been patrolling the
Danube and annoying the Serbians, but the Belgrade garrison put an end
to the activities of these vessels with their big guns. The British
sailors especially rendered good service by means of a small picket boat
commanded by Lieutenant Commander Kerr. Though armed with only a single
machine gun, this small boat was so persistently troublesome to the
enemy that it earned for itself the name "Terror of the Danube." Of dark
nights it would poke its way into creeks and passages, alarming the
Austrians constantly and causing them no little loss. Once it even
succeeded in persuading one of the monitors to pursue it into a
carefully prepared mine field, over against the Serbian shore, with the
result that the monitor was permanently put out of action. But these
operations were of minor importance just then. For now Serbia was called
on to face a new enemy, in some of its aspects much more terrible than
the Austrians, for it demanded a sort of fighting in which the Serbians
were not so well trained. The Austrians had, indeed, left behind them an
ally that was to accomplish as much mischief almost as they themselves
had caused the Serbians.

Not long after the final defeat of the third invasion an epidemic of
typhus appeared among the Serbian soldiers. Run down physically, as they
must have been, their vitality sapped by the hardships of the campaigns
they had just passed through, they fell victims to this scourge by the
thousands. Not knowing how to attack or to defend itself against such an
enemy, the little kingdom sent forth a cry for help, which was heard and
responded to by the United States, Great Britain, France, and even
Russia. Organizations were formed with the purpose of assisting Serbia
in this extremity, and private persons also came forward with offers of
money and service. The Red Cross also did what it could under the
emergency, but its resources were already being taxed to their full
extent by demands in all the battle fields of Europe. Sir Thomas Lipton
sailed his yacht, the _Erin_, to Saloniki, loaded with supplies of
medical stores, and carrying a full passenger list of doctors and
nurses. Lady Paget, Lady Wimborne, and other women of rank in Great
Britain also devoted their whole energies to the cause. A society of
women physicians, an offspring of the Scottish Federation of the
National Union of Women's Suffrage Societies, did noble work in Serbia.
After sending two hospital units to France, this women's organization
dispatched a third to the Balkans, where it was received with the
deepest gratitude, Serbia agreeing with enthusiasm to pay the salaries
of its members and the cost of its maintenance. It was stationed at
Kragujevatz, where it was given a hospital of 250 beds.

But meanwhile the epidemic had spread over the country. There were
thousands of serious cases; men, women, and children were dying
everywhere, unattended and under the most distressing circumstances.
Hardly had the first of the foreign aid arrived when the immensity of
the task required was recognized, and telegrams and cables were sent all
over the world calling for further assistance. To this second appeal no
country responded more nobly than the United States.

Owing to the virulent character of the disease that raged in every
district the mortality was frightful. In many localities the death rate
was over 50 per cent. All during the spring and summer of 1915 the need
of Serbia was extreme. In July there were in the country 420 British
doctors alone, aside from the French, Russian and American medical men,
all working at the highest pressure and doing with very little sleep,
yet unable to cover the ground. Many were the stricken patients who must
be satisfied with floors instead of beds; many more who could not even
be admitted into the hospitals. Nor were the Serbians the only
sufferers; from among the foreigners who had so nobly come to help the
Serbians in their distress there were not a few who succumbed to the
fatal disease.




CHAPTER LX

MONTENEGRO IN THE WAR


The military operations on the Montenegrin front should really be
considered as a part, though a detached part, of the Serbian campaigns.
Up to the first Balkan War Serbia and Montenegro, or Tzernagora, as it
is called by its own people, were separated by the sanjak of Novibazar,
a territory which Turkey was allowed to retain after the Treaty of
Berlin at the instigation of Austria, so that the two countries should
have no opportunity to unite. By blood the two peoples are closely akin,
though the isolation of the Montenegrins has been the cause of their not
adopting so many of the outward tokens of civilization as the Serbians.

Already on July 25, 1913, before Austria had officially declared war
against Serbia, the Montenegrin Government, at the capital, Cettinje,
announced that it would support Serbia should there be an outbreak of
hostilities with their common hereditary enemy, Austria. Montenegro had,
indeed, even more reason than Serbia for hating the great empire to the
northward, for its territory stretched down the coast from Dalmatia, and
literally fenced her in from the Adriatic, whose blue waters are visible
from the Montenegrin towns and villages perched up on the mountains
above the shore. In the Balkan war the army of Montenegro had captured,
at a terrible sacrifice of blood, the town of Scutari from the Turks,
which dominates the only fertile section among the crags of the little
mountain kingdom. It was Austria, at the London Conference, who had
forced her to relinquish this dearly paid for prize, though so
reluctantly was it given up that the Powers were on the point of
intervening.

The value of the Montenegrin army in such a great war as was now begun
was slight, however, for in numbers it did not amount even to a full
army corps. Nor would it be very efficient outside of its own territory,
for the Montenegrins, whose manner of life is quite as primitive as that
of the Albanians, are essentially guerrilla fighters, who cannot well
adapt themselves to army discipline.

On a war footing the army is composed of four divisions, the first three
of three brigades each, while one is composed only of two brigades.
Altogether there are fifty-five battalions, or about 40,000 men. Each
brigade also includes one detachment of mounted scouts, one mountain
battery, one group of rapid-fire guns, one section of telegraphists and
one section of engineers. Each division has, in addition, attached to it
a detachment of mounted scouts, a section of engineers, a field battery
and a heavy battery. Then there is a reserve of eleven battalions,
usually assigned to garrison or guard duty. Altogether the total
armament amounts to 40,000 rifles, 104 guns and forty-four
mitrailleuses.

Of the actual operations along the Montenegrin front not so much
detailed information is available as there is of the other sections of
the theatre of war. War correspondents were not allowed to accompany
either army in this field and the only reports so far given out,
covering this period, are from the few official bulletins issued by the
two respective governments and from other more indirect sources.

On August 3, when the Austrians had already begun bombarding Belgrade,
King Nicholas signed an order for the mobilization of his forces, and
four days later, on August 7, he declared war against Austria. But
already the Austrians had detached an army corps under General Ermoly to
prevent any possible juncture between the Serbian and Montenegrin
forces. For the time being, therefore, until the Serbians had driven
back the first Austrian invasion, the Montenegrins facing this division
of the Austrian army acted on the defensive.

This, however, with the advantageous nature of the country, did not
require the full strength of the Montenegrin army; part of it,
therefore, was employed in an attack on the Austrian towns situated on
the narrow strip of Austrian territory running along the sea coast. The
chief of these, Cattaro, was subjected to a hot bombardment from the
heavy guns on Mt. Lovcen, commanding that section of the coast. A few
days later, on August 10, the Montenegrin infantry descended from the
surrounding heights and delivered a strong assault on Spizza and Budua.
The activity of Austrian warships, which bombarded Antivari, where
Montenegro touched the coast, made it impossible for the Montenegrins to
hold what they had taken. Another force, however, turned toward Scutari
and occupied that town. Mt. Lovcen continued, not only then, but at
intervals for the next year, to pour a heavy artillery fire on Cattaro,
and its environs.

In Bosnia, over toward the Serbian operations, fighting had already
begun and continued until the Serbians drove the main Austrian army
back. On August 20, just as the Serbians were delivering their last
attack on Shabatz and the Austrians were stampeding across the Drina,
the Montenegrins delivered a heavy attack along their whole front,
causing the Austrians to retire in that section as well. The following
day the Austrians, in trying to recover their lost ground, brought up
more mountain artillery, then advanced their infantry up against the
Montenegrin entrenchments. Here occurred the first hand-to-hand
fighting, the Austrians charging with their bayonets again and again,
but they were finally repulsed again with heavy loss.

From now on the Montenegrins, under the command of General Vukotitch,
who had so distinguished himself in the Balkan War, gradually assumed an
offensive and advanced into Bosnia. On September 2 he again encountered
the Austrians at Bilek, and succeeded in defeating them after a heavy
fight, in which a comparatively large number of prisoners were taken.

The Montenegrins, comprising practically all of their army, continued
advancing in three columns. On September 9 there was another hot fight
at Foca, south of Sarajevo.

At this juncture the Serbians sent a column into Bosnia, from Visegrad,
whose purpose was to effect a connection with General Vukotitch, that
the two combined forces might advance on and take Sarajevo, a movement
which was to be carried on simultaneously with the Serbian advance into
Austrian territory from the Save.

But, although the two allied armies almost reached the vicinity of the
Bosnian capital, the Austrians were now, toward the latter part of
September, returning to this region in great force, to begin the second
invasion of Serbia. The Montenegrin army was, in consequence, obliged to
retire before vastly superior forces and, during the rest of the year,
as did the Serbians, the Montenegrins were satisfied merely with keeping
the enemy out of their home territory. What fighting occurred after that
moment was of more or less a desultory nature and entirely defensive.




PART VI--AUSTRO-RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN




CHAPTER LXI

STRENGTH AND EQUIPMENT OF THE ANTAGONISTS


The first campaign between the Austrian army and the Russian legions
began on August 6, 1914, when Austria declared war on Russia. We have
witnessed in the preceding chapters the German invasion of Belgium and
France, and the Austrian invasion of Serbia; we will now view the
fighting of the Russians and the Austrians on to the frontier, as it
progressed simultaneously with the Russian and German campaigns to be
described in subsequent chapters.

For some days before war was declared, as noted in Volume I of this
work, Austria-Hungary and Russia understood each other thoroughly.
Russia was satisfied that Austria intended to force war on Serbia, and
Russia was pledged to protect and uphold the little nation, which was
really her ward and over which she had announced a protectorate.

A review of the situation at this time shows that while mobilization was
being hastened, Russia had joined the Slav kingdom in asking for a delay
on the ultimatum that Serbia had received from Austria on July 24, 1914.
On July 27 Russia notified Austria that she could not permit Serbia to
be invaded. On July 29 an imperial ukase issued by the czar called all
reservists to the colors.

On July 31, 1914, M. Goremykin, President of the Council of the Russian
Empire, issued a manifesto which read: "Russia is determined not to
allow Serbia to be crushed, and will fulfill its duty in regard to that
small kingdom, which has already suffered so much at Austria's hands."

Germany on July 30, 1914, had asked Russia to stop its mobilization, and
had demanded a reply within twenty-four hours. Russia had ignored the
ultimatum, and on August 1 the German Ambassador had handed a
declaration of war to the Russian Foreign Minister. On August 6, 1914,
Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia, and the Austrian Ambassador left
St. Petersburg. In such wise was the eastern arena cleared for action.

Before describing in detail the Austro-Russian campaign, it is necessary
to bear in mind the conditions in the opposing armies. The strength of
the Austrian army is discussed in the chapter on the Austro-Serbian
campaigns, while the fighting forces of Russia are discussed in the
chapter on the Russian and German campaigns.

Much has been said, and justly, in criticism of Russia's army at the
outbreak of the war and afterward, but there is no disputing the fact
that it had been improved wonderfully as the direct result of the war
with Japan. In the strenuous years that followed that war, with
revolution an ever-present menace, the establishment of a constitutional
monarchy, and the granting of religious toleration to the many creeds
and sects which helped to make up the population, awakened its diverse
people to a new unity, inspired the people with hopefulness and
activity, and the _morale_ of the Russian army improved accordingly.

The army, at the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, on a peace basis
included about 50,000 officers and more than 1,200,000 men, which
included about 1,000,000 actual combatants. In recent years preceding,
the annual contingent had been about 430,000. At the end of July, 1914,
the ukase, which proclaimed a general mobilization, summoned to the
colors five classes, or about two million men. The total number was
increased by other reservists and volunteers to 4,100,000.

[Illustration: Pictorial Map of Russia.]

There had been a wave of reform in every branch of the military service.
The men who were conscripted to form the main strength of the army were
young and possessed more initiative than had the recruits of years
before. Every effort was made to encourage this initiative under the new
field service regulations.

In creating a new army with real fighting spirit, cohesion, and ability,
Grand Duke Nicholas, who was made Generalissimo, was conspicuous. Each
year the progress made under his direction has been displayed at the
autumn maneuvers. Another member of the imperial family, Grand Duke
Sergius, was largely responsible for the excellent showing made by the
Russian guns and gunners after war began.

For purposes of administration all of European Russia was divided into
eight military districts--the Caucasus, Kazan, Kiev, Moscow, Odessa,
Petrograd, Warsaw, and Vilna. There were also four Siberian districts,
making twelve in all. To each district were assigned two or more army
corps. In war, these were grouped in varying numbers from three to five
to constitute an army or army group.

The equipment of the Russian infantry soldier comprised at the outbreak
of the Great War a rifle, a 299-mm. weapon with a quadrangular
bayonet--which also was carried by noncommissioned officers--a waistbelt
supporting a pouch for thirty rounds on each side of the clasp, an
intrenching tool, a bandolier holding another thirty rounds carried over
the left shoulder under the rolled greatcoat, and a reserve pouch also
holding thirty rounds, which completed the full load of 120 rounds for
each man, suspended by a strap over the right shoulder.

As the Russian soldiers moved to the Austrian frontier, there was slung
over the right shoulder kits containing food and clothing and cooking
utensils, and over the left shoulder one-sixth part of a shelter tent.
The total weight borne by the regular Russian infantryman was nearly
58-1/4 pounds.

When the war started, the Russian army, in its invasion of Austria, had
its full complement of officers, and because of the great capacity of
its military schools, it was as well able as other nations engaged to
make up for losses in battle. One sweeping and beneficial change that
had been made was that promotion no longer went by seniority but
entirely by merit: the higher the position the more rigid the tests.
Incidentally, it was Russia's good fortune that the war came at a time
when the noncommissioned ranks were full and it was possible to promote
many of these men to fill vacancies in the commissioned service.

The use of Russian infantry on the battle fields, as we shall soon see,
differed in no essential way from that common to other nations of
Europe. An advance under fire was almost identical with that of other
nations. A single company in attack would dispatch two platoons as a
firing line, retaining two in reserve, each of the platoons in front
providing its own protection for skirmishing, according to the nature of
the ground.

If the cover was adequate, a few rifles were enough to locate the enemy,
and either they could be reenforced or the front could be extended. If
the ground were quite open, the two leading platoons were extended at
once, so as to oppose the enemy with an equal extent of fire, and then
advanced by rushes, each section covering the rush of the other by
alternate firing. The two reserve platoons could be used either to
outflank the enemy, if the nature of the ground permitted, or for direct
reenforcement in any formation required.

As has been said, all the nations engaged in the great conflict pursued
similar tactics in this respect, and the only advantage possessed by
Russia in their use was that both her infantry and artillery possessed a
much larger number of officers, who had been trained to understand how,
against a powerful opponent, to carry out efficiently in practice and in
times of great stress the theory which all nations held in common.

The observer of the battles in the Russo-Austrian campaigns will see
that the Russian cavalry was inadequate, because its horses were too
small, of inferior strain, and lacking the stamina needed in modern
warfare. They were valuable, however, because of their large numbers,
and the fact that during the winter months, being acclimated and to the
country born, they were able to pick up a living in the snow when other
horses would starve.

As regards field batteries, near the western Russian frontier and in
Asia, nearly all of them had, when war was declared, eight guns. In most
of the batteries in Asia the number of men maintained in peace was the
same as in war.

[Illustration: Russian Invasion of Galicia.]

The Russian army moved forward with adequate aerial corps. The keenest
interest in military aviation had been taken in Russia during two years
before the war. Grand Duke Alexander was one of the founders of the
aviation school at Sebastopol, where two-thirds of the Russian aviation
officers obtained their training. In the spring of 1914 the air fleet
consisted of 16 dirigibles and 360 aeroplanes, while orders for 1,000
aircraft of different descriptions had been placed with various firms in
Russia.

The army of Austria-Hungary which faced the Russians was composed of men
from a country where universal military service prevailed. In theory
only the physically unfit were exempt from service, and the liability
extended from the beginning of the nineteenth year to the close of the
forty-second. Actual service in the ranks and with the reserve was
twelve years. After the men had served ten years with the army and in
its reserve they were included in the Landwehr for another two years. It
is likely that Austria had at the outbreak of war from 1,200,000 to
1,300,000 men at her disposal. During the three years preceding she had
greatly strengthened her equipment.

The infantry of the joint Austrian army, which had to fight the
campaigns against the Russians on the east, and against the Serbians on
the south, comprised 102 regiments of infantry, 27 battalions of
Jaegers, 4 regiments of Tyrolese Jaegers, and 4 regiments of
Bosnia-Herzegovina infantry. Every infantry regiment had four field
battalions and a depot battalion. The duty of the latter was to fill up
the ranks of the others. Each infantry regiment had at least two
machine-gun detachments of two guns each, and in many there were two
guns per battalion. In Bosnia and Herzegovina every battalion had four,
and this also was true of every Jaeger battalion.

The Austrian infantrymen, as they met their Russian antagonists, carried
a small-bore magazine rifle, in use in the army since 1895, and known
after its inventor as the Maennlicher. It had a caliber of .315 inch and
fired a pointed bullet. It was loaded by means of a charger which
contained five cartridges, and it was equipped with a bayonet. The
cavalry carbine was shorter but took the same bullet. One hundred and
twenty rounds were carried by the infantry soldier, and there were
forty rounds in the company ammunition wagon, and 160 in the infantry
ammunition columns, in addition. The machine gun in use was of the same
caliber and took the same ammunition as the infantry rifle. It was
composed of few parts, and was a simple and highly effective instrument.

On these first days of August, 1914, the cavalry of Austria--the
hussars, uhlans, and dragoons, but really all of one type--light
cavalry--was equipped uniformly with saber and carbine. The
noncommissioned officers and others who did not carry a carbine rode
forth equipped with an automatic pistol. There were forty-two cavalry
regiments in the entire Austrian army, consisting of six squadrons, each
of which had a fighting strength of 150 sabers, not counting the pioneer
troops. Every cavalry regiment had four machine guns with 40,000 rounds
of ammunition. The pioneer troops of the cavalry, which first were
introduced in Austria, were composed of an officer and twenty-five men,
equipped with tools and explosives needed by an advance force to clear
obstacles, destroy railways, etc. Besides the pioneer troops, eight men
in each squadron were equipped with similar tools. The telegraph
section, consisting of eight men, carried about seven miles of light
wire.

The artillery of Austria-Hungary had been greatly modified in recent
years. The gun used for horse and field batteries was known as M5--that
is, the pattern of 1905. It was of 3-inch caliber, a quick firer,
throwing a shrapnel shell which weighed 14.7 pounds. High-explosive
shells also were carried in the proportion of two to five of shrapnel.
The gun had a long recoil on its carriage, which absorbed the shock and
the gun returned to its place. This made rapid fire possible.

Like the other powers, Austria-Hungary had adopted a howitzer for its
heavy batteries. It fired a shell of 38.132 pounds. There was also a
heavy gun in use, a 10.5 centimeter, corresponding to a 4.1-inch gun.
The ammunition was like that of a howitzer--a shell weighing 38.132
pounds, which contained a high-explosive bursting charge and shrapnel
with 700 bullets, fifty to the pound. On the march the carriage was
separated from the gun, and each was drawn by six horses.

The mountain regions on all the frontiers of the Dual Monarchy resounded
on these August days of 1914 with the mountain artillery. The
10.5-centimeter guns and 4.1-inch howitzer quick firers threw a shell of
thirty-two pounds. This howitzer had a range of more than 6,000 yards,
and was a powerful weapon. The 30.5-centimeter mortars fired a shell of
858 pounds with a bursting charge of 56 pounds of ecrasite. The extreme
range of this mortar was about six miles. Ten rounds could be fired each
hour. Two guns and their ammunition lorries were drawn by three large
tractors. An hour was required to get one of these guns ready for
action.

Let us enter the headquarters of the Austrian army at the beginning of
the Russian campaign. There we meet the engineer staff, which built and
besieged fortresses, and a military works department, which built and
maintained buildings that were not immediately connected with
fortifications. Austria-Hungary had only a few fortresses of modern
construction. The intrenched camps in Galicia, Cracow, and Przemysl were
soon to be besieged, and between them was a fortress known as Jaroslav,
of insignificant value, like that of Huy between Liege and Namur in
Belgium.

The Austrian army had not made as much progress in aeronautics as those
of other nations. There was a depot for dirigibles at Fischamend, about
eleven miles southeast of Vienna, but only a few dirigibles were ready
for service. These were of the Parsefal type. There were a number of
captive balloons. The number of aeroplanes available was very small. A
school for teaching aviation had been established at Vienna-Neustadt.

The faces of the soldiers of the Austria-Hungarian army on the Russian
frontier denoted many races, but it possessed considerable solidarity.
Officers and soldiers recognized alike that they were all under a single
head--the emperor. The officers were drawn from all classes of society,
and this was also a unifying influence. They were on more intimate
relations with their men than the Prussian leaders, and "led" instead
of "drove" them. Commands for the whole army were given in German, but
otherwise the language varied according to the composition of the
various regiments as regarded races. The use of the German language for
commands undoubtedly aided in unifying the army.




CHAPTER LXII

GENERAL STRATEGY OF THE CAMPAIGN


The Austrian army faced the Russians on August 11, 1914, with a
well-organized strategical plan. Austria, realizing the importance of
unity, cohesion, and harmony in her own forces, proposed at the outset
of the war to dissipate the strength of her enemy, Russia, by causing an
uprising in Poland. The vanguard of Austria's advance along the Vistula
consisted of the Galician army corps, made up of Polish soldiers. Along
the border, arms and ammunition had been collected for the anticipated
insurrection. A proclamation was sent by the Polish associations of
Galicia and Posen to their "brethren of Russian Poland." In this, the
Poles of Russia were urged to prepare for a rising, but not to attempt
it until the Austrian vanguard had arrived and won a first battle. Then
arms would be provided for them.

Russian strategy checkmated this plan. The czar issued a proclamation
promising home rule to Poland as soon as Germany and Austria had been
repulsed. With this home rule he also offered self-government and
freedom of law and religion, and the reconstitution of the old Polish
territory by means of the annexation of Posen and Galicia. This move
divided the Polish leaders and stifled the incipient revolution.

The spy system won and lost the first strategical battles before a shot
was fired. There is no doubt that the Austrians before the war knew
almost as much about Russia's preparations as did the Russians
themselves. The Austrian system of espionage was elaborate and accurate,
and the Austrians profited by that of Germany also. Nevertheless,
Russia surprised her foes and allies alike by the rapidity with which
she got her troops into action on the offensive once war was on.

The Russian army was handicapped by lack of railroad facilities, but she
made the most of them. Her total mileage was about 25,000, her system
being inferior to that of Germany or Austria. Germany's was by far the
best of the three. Many of the Russian roads had but one line of track,
their construction was inferior, stations were farther apart, and the
speed of trains was comparatively slow. They could not carry as much
traffic as those of either of her two adversaries. The gauge of the
Russian roads was 5 feet, so that the rolling stock could not be used on
German and Austrian roads, which had a uniform gauge of 4 feet 8-1/2
inches. The management of Russian railroads was too complicated for army
purposes. But Sukhomlinoff simplified it and instituted schools in which
army officers were instructed in putting soldiers on cars rapidly and
routing trains to the best possible advantage. This and other activities
of Sukhomlinoff, along the line of reform and improvement, were in no
small measure responsible for the rapidity with which Galicia was
invaded.

Austria's military problem was a difficult one from the start. Her ally,
Germany, could not extend much military assistance until a decisive blow
had been struck in the western theatre of war, but Austria, having a
million men in readiness and being strong in artillery, was expected to
assume the offensive from the start and attack the imperfectly mobilized
Russian forces in western Poland. An immediate offensive was required,
because she must hold Galicia at all cost.

There were three places where Russia might cross the frontier of
Galicia--west of the point where the waters of the San empty into the
Vistula, between the Upper Bug and the San, or along the line of the
River Sereth on the east. There was great danger in a combined movement
by Russia against the first and third sections of the frontier which
would cut off and surround the forces of Austria which were based on
Przemysl and Lemberg. In order to avoid this peril, apparently the
safest as well as boldest plan was to proceed northward against the
fortresses of Warsaw. Such an advance would in all probability prevent
the armies of Russia from crossing the Vistula and postpone any attack
against the Sereth from the east.

Austria was staking the success of such tactics on the incompleteness of
mobilization by the Russians, and therein she proved to be in error.
Indeed, the quickness of Russia's military movements amazed the entire
world, with the exception of her Generalissimo, Grand Duke Nicholas, and
his aides and advisors.

At the outbreak of the Great War, Nicholas was in command of the St.
Petersburg military district. Under him was a Corps of Guards, and the
First and Eighteenth Army Corps from 120,000 to 150,000 men. He was a
soldier of the first rank and an able strategist. He had familiarized
himself with the armies of other European nations. He long had planned
for the emergency that now confronted him.

In the rapid movement of the Russian forces, he was aided chiefly by
General Vladimir Sukhomlinoff. The latter saw that one of the chief
defects in the Russian army, as disclosed by the Japanese War, was the
slowness of her railroad operations, and some time before war was
declared he had set himself to improving conditions. He established a
school of railroading for officers where the rapid loading of troops on
cars and the general speeding up of transportation were studied
scientifically. The good results of such work were apparent at the very
outset of hostilities.

As we have seen, France was saved in the first campaign in the west by
the sturdy resistance of little Belgium to the advance of the Germans
through her territory, so Russia now helped to save France a second time
by the rapidity of her campaign. While German troops still were
investing Liege in Belgium, the Russian troops were registering their
first triumph at Eydtkuhnen, and upon the very day that Ghent fell into
the hands of the Germans, Russia began her strong offensive in East
Prussia. By such means were a large part of the German forces, intent on
taking Paris, diverted from attack on the western war arena to protect
the eastern frontier from Russian menace. The relief which Russia thus
gave her Allies was invaluable. The battle of Mons was over in Belgium
and the retreat to the Marne in France had begun, and the Germans were
almost in sight of the French capital, when, save for Russia's timely
blow on the Polish frontier, the Germans, many war critics believe,
would have reached Paris.

When the Germans in the west were striving toward Calais on the English
Channel as their goal, it was the Russian offensive in Galicia that
forced Germany to transfer more army corps to the eastern front in order
to stop the tide that threatened to overflow Austria. Thus the French
and British were able to stop the advance that threatened to engulf them
on the western front and given time to organize themselves for a
strenuous contest.

The strategic problem which confronted Russia was much more complicated
than that which had to be solved either by Germany or Austria. It was
quite evident to her General Staff that at least during the first few
months of hostilities Germany would devote her whole time and attention
to attack in the western arena, the French being at the time her most
dangerous enemy. Except for a small part of the Austrian forces left to
oppose the Serbians and Montenegrins, the whole army of Austria was
depended upon to oppose the Russian advance.

The important strategic condition that confronted Russia was this: Her
most dangerous enemy was Germany, but in order to attack Germany it was
necessary that Austria's army should first be destroyed.

The eastern theatre of the war has been described in a preceding chapter
and it will be recalled that for about two hundred miles from east to
west Russian Poland is inclosed on the north by East Prussia and on the
south by Austria. Moreover, the Sudetic Mountains on the Austrian
frontier and the huge forests of Poland protect the position of German
Silesia southeast of Breslau. Passing through it are the chief lines of
railway connecting eastern and western Europe, including the routes
between Poland, Galicia, Moravia, and Bohemia. At varying distances from
her Russian frontier Austria has a line of mountains of great defensive
strength. This is the Carpathian, which, extending inside the
Austrian-Russian border line, is joined by the Transylvanian Alps and
continues to form the south frontier of Austria.

It would not be possible for the Russian invaders to menace Austria
seriously until these mountains had been crossed. Russia, however, was
menaced by the configuration of the German-Austrian frontier, with
Poland open to invasion from three sides. Also, Austria and Germany had
many strongly intrenched positions at strategical points covering all
the chief lines of approach on their frontiers where the latter faced
Russian territory. Besides being defended by artificial works, the
frontier had natural defenses, such as lakes, swamps, and forests. All
along the Russian-Austrian frontier, in fact, there exist such natural
defenses against invasion. On the southern boundary of Poland the
Russian army was held off by great bogs which cover from east to west a
distance of about 250 miles. The only crossing was a single line of
railroad, the one extending from Kiev to Brest-Litovsk. From a military
viewpoint, these marshes divided the line in two parts, imperiling the
situation of any fighting in front of them in case of defeat. They would
offer no kind of sustenance to troops driven within them.

Russia was not prepared to put into the field an army large enough to
hold the entire line from the Baltic to the Rumanian frontier,
approximately 1,000 miles, and there was no time, if part of the German
forces were to be diverted from the western front, to raise such forces
and equip them.

At the beginning of hostilities on August 11, 1914, the chief offensive
against Russia was intrusted to the First Austrian Army under General
Dankl. This was composed of about seven army corps, having various
additional units, or amounting in all to about 350,000 men. This army
had its base on Przemysl and Jaroslav, and the work which had been
assigned to it was to advance upward between the Vistula on the left
side and the Bug on the right, on to Lublin and Kholm. There it was to
sever and hold the Warsaw-Kiev railroad so the line would be exposed in
the direction of Brest-Litovsk and the chief communications in the rear
of Warsaw. The First Austrian Army, while it advanced to this position,
would have as protection from attack on its right and rear from the
east and south the Second Army under General von Auffenberg. This army,
advancing northeast from Lemberg, would control eastern Galicia from the
Bug to the Sereth and the Dniester.

The numerical strength of Von Auffenberg's army at the start probably
was about 300,000, and consisted of five army corps with five divisions
of cavalry. This, however, was only its initial strength. As hostilities
developed Von Auffenberg added to his strength until he is reported to
have had no less than six corps and additional cavalry. At first this
increase came from the Third or Reserve Army, over which Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand had command. While General Dankl was advancing toward Lublin
on August 28, 1914, being protected on his right flank by Von
Auffenberg, the army of the Archduke appears to have been pushed out in
a similar manner on the left.




CHAPTER LXIII

AUSTRIA TAKES THE OFFENSIVE


The Austrians crossed the Polish border on August 29, 1914, and moved on
as far as Kielce and toward Radom without encountering serious
opposition. That may have been as far as it was intended to proceed. In
all three of the armies of Austria there were about 1,000,000 men, and
against these forces were arrayed three Russian armies--a small force on
the Bug, which may be called the First Russian Army; a Second Russian
Army under General Russky, which was moving on Sokal from the Lutsk and
Dubno fortresses; and a Third Army under General Brussilov, which was
proceeding against the Sereth. There were about 300,000 men in each of
the two latter armies.

Now the Russian strategy on September 1, 1914, was this: It was intended
that their First Army should retire before Dankl, the Second Army to
menace Lemberg from the northeast and put its right wing between Dankl
and Von Auffenberg, and the Third Army to advance from the Sereth to
the town of Halicz on the Dniester, and so finish the investment of
Lemberg on the south and east.

It may have been, though this is not certain, that the General Staff of
the Austrians did not see the close connection between the movements of
Russky and Brussilov. It may be that they believed they had only
Brussilov to face at Lemberg, since Russky would be obliged to proceed
to the aid of the First Russian Army on the Bug.

Russky was famed as a highly scientific soldier, being a professor in
the Russian War Academy. In the war with Japan, he had been chief of
staff to General Kaulbars, the commander of the Second Manchurian Army.
Afterward, he had been closely associated with General Sukhomlinoff in
the reorganization of the Russian forces. Brussilov, whose army
consisted of men of southern Russia, was a cavalry general and had seen
service under Skobelev in the Turkish War of 1877. General Ewarts, in
charge of the Third Army, the smallest of the three, whose duty was to
fight a holding battle, was a corps commander.

No serious resistance was made by the Russians against the main Austrian
advance under General Dankl, and it proceeded almost to Lublin. At one
time it was within eleven miles of that place.

On August 10, 1914, the Austrians who had crossed the frontier had a
front of about eleven miles wide to the west of Tarnogrod. The Russian
frontier posts had a brush with the advance cavalry of the Austrians and
then fell back. There was a second skirmish at Goraj and a more serious
meeting at Krasnik, and the Russians still retreated. The Austrians were
jubilant over their victory at Krasnik and at the few delays they
encountered at the hands of the enemy. The Russians in their retreat
proceeded toward the fortified position of Zamosc or toward Lublin and
Kholm.

In the meantime Russia had been gathering an army on the line from
Lublin to Kholm. There the Russians had the railroad behind them, in one
direction to Warsaw, and in the other to Kiev and Odessa. Each day as
the Austrians advanced the strength of the Russian army was improving.
In the early days of September, 1914, it probably amounted to 400,000
men.

When the Austrians were within fifteen miles of Lublin they first
encountered heavy resistance. They were checked and then delayed, but
the Russians were not ready to do more than hold their antagonists. They
were waiting for developments farther to the southeast.

On August 17,1914, the Russian offensive had its definite start. General
Dankl was finding himself with the First Austrian Army; when he stopped
in his advance toward Lublin, General Russky began a powerful attack
against Von Auffenberg. Cooperating with Russky, as we have noted, and
on his left was Brussilov, the total forces of these two commanders
being at first double those with which Von Auffenberg was equipped to
oppose them. As soon, however, as Von Auffenberg became aware of the
numerical superiority of his opponents, he drew for reenforcements on
the Third, or Reserve Army, which had advanced into Poland as far as
Kielce.

The latter troops hurried to join Von Auffenberg, crossing the Vistula
by means of bridge boats at Josefow. When the issue really was joined,
the troops of the Third Austrian Army, under the Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, were ready to act in close cooperation with those of Von
Auffenberg. Thus, in the armies on both sides there were, in all, about
1,200,000 men, with the advantage in favor of the Russians. Having this
superiority in numbers, Russky felt that he was safe in attempting to
envelop the Austrian forces on both flanks. With the larger army--the
Second--he hurled his troops at the Austrian left and center, advancing
along the railway.

On August 22, 1914, the Russians crossed the frontier and on the
following day, Russky occupied Brody, with small opposition. On the same
day, Brussilov, on his left, also crossed the frontier at Woloczysk,
which is the frontier station on the Lemberg-Odessa railway. At this
point the rolling stock used by the Russians on their own railway in
their advance was no longer available, as the gauge of the Russian and
Austrian lines differs. The Austrians had retired with their own rolling
stock in the direction of Lemberg, destroying what they did not take
away, and so the Russian advance from that point was continued wholly,
perforce, on foot. There was a good wagon road which ran parallel to the
railroad toward Lemberg, and along this Brussilov's cavalry hurried.




CHAPTER LXIV

CAUTIOUS RUSSIAN ADVANCE--RUSSIAN SUCCESSES--CAPTURE OF LEMBERG


On August 23, 1914, the Russians were almost on the heels of the
retreating Austrians. After three hours' fighting, they drove them out
of Tarnopol. Thereupon they retreated along the line of the Zlota Lipa,
which is an affluent of the Dniester and runs almost directly southward.

On August 25 and 26, 1914, there was some heavy fighting along this
river, especially at Brzezany. Heretofore, the army under Brussilov had
not met with any important resistance, having encountered chiefly
frontier posts, skirmishers, and small detachments of Austrians. It
seems that no great body of Austrians had penetrated much beyond the
Zlota Lipa. On the eastern side of this river was a line of low hills,
offering a fine defensive position; the Austrians hastily began to make
use of them. They were still constructing trenches when the Cossack
cavalry appeared, driving the skirmishers of the Austrians before them.

A fight began on August 24, 1914, which lasted ten days. The Russian
cavalry was not strong enough to attempt to take the Austrians'
intrenched position, and therefore waited for the main body of the
Russian forces to come up. The fight extended over twenty miles of
front, stubbornly contested by the Austrians. Finally, by direct
assault, the Russians took the position and the Austrians fell back, in
good order, toward Halicz, where the Gnita Lipa joins the Dniester.

In the meantime, while Russky was thus pounding at Von Auffenberg's
right, Brussilov was attacking his right and center. Having crossed the
frontier between Brody and Sokal, Russky extended his forces on a wide
front. While the center advanced straight for Busk and Krasne in a
direct line toward Lemberg, the right, proceeding almost due west, was
attempting to penetrate between the army of Von Auffenberg and that of
Dankl on the north, and was pushing powerfully on Von Auffenberg's left.
Gallantly resisting, the Austrians were forced back in all directions,
slowly but firmly. The fighting on Russky's right and center was
especially fierce and severe and resulted in great losses on both sides.

By the time Brussilov had taken the position on the Zlota Lipa, his
right was in touch with Russky's left, and the first stage of the
campaign was over. That Russia had been able to proceed so far with her
plans would seem to indicate that the Austrians had underestimated the
rapidity with which she could complete her preparations. It was the fall
of Tarnopol that made possible a junction of the Russian armies and
enabled them to advance in a united line upon Lemberg.

General Brussilov had to move to the attack without attracting
attention. This was accomplished by both Russky and himself throwing out
a screen of Cossacks all along the frontier of Eastern Galicia. For an
extent of one hundred and fifty miles, the Cossacks skirmished at every
border road or bridge between the Bug and the Dniester rivers. They
started this immediately after war was declared and soon, so
inconsequential did such activity appear, that the Austrians, it seems,
came to regard it as lacking any real purpose. After the third week in
August, however, the commander at Lemberg sent a force of 2,000 men to
make a reconnaissance in Podolia.

These troops arrived at Gorodok, a small town across the border. Their
presence there was most inconvenient for the Russians, for General
Brussilov was at that time advancing with a big army through Gorodok on
toward Galicia. It was imperative that the Austrian reconnoitering
troops should be stopped and the only force available for this purpose
was nine hundred Cossacks stationed at Gorodok to screen the main army.
It was necessary for these Cossacks to repulse the Austrian
reconnoitering force, without calling for large reenforcements. If the
latter were done, it would excite the suspicions of fugitives from the
fight.

Therefore, the Cossacks lined out in the woods far beyond the village
and then thirty of them went forward from cover to cover until they came
upon the Austrians. Simulating surprise, they fled in apparent panic.
The Austrians entered upon a swift pursuit and were led into ambush.
Thousands of them were cut down by a cross-fire of rifles and machine
guns. The rest were pursued by Cossacks over the border and the invasion
of Galicia was begun by the Russian main force.

Then began the perilous part of the enterprise. The army of Russky was
advancing on Lemberg from the north and the army of Brussilov was
converging on the Galician capital from the east. After they had been
united, they would assuredly outnumber the Austrian force which was
guarding Lemberg, but in the meantime either Russky or Brussilov was too
weak to escape defeat. Each might be met singly and overwhelmed. The
skill with which their combined operations were carried out was such,
however, that General Brussilov was able to steal into Galicia and
occupy a large part of the country before battle actually was joined.

The secrecy with which his great movement was executed was
extraordinary. It was executed in daylight, covering a period of
thirteen days, from August 19 to August 31, 1915. It was performed in
spite of the fact that the Austrians had many spies, a large force of
trained cavalry, and scouts in aeroplanes darting over the frontier. Yet
not until it was too late did the Austrians discover the real nature of
the Russian turning movement in Eastern Galicia.

In part, this was attributable to the fact that the territory in which
Brussilov was operating was an ancient Russian duchy which had been
wrested from the ancestors of the czar. Eastern Galicia might be
compared to Alsace-Lorraine, which had been torn from France. Peopled by
a Slav race, Eastern Galicia had the same language, religion, and
customs as the soldiers in Brussilov's army.

When at the beginning of operations, Russia first assumed a general
offensive on August 17, the Grand Duke Nicholas issued the following
proclamation addressed to Russian inhabitants of Galicia:

"Brothers--A judgment of God is being wrought. With Christian patience
and self-annihilation, the Russian people of Galicia languished for
centuries under a foreign yoke, but neither flattery nor persecution
could break in it the hope of liberty. As the tempestuous torrent breaks
the rocks to join the sea, so there exists no force which can arrest the
Russian people in its onrush toward unification.

"Let there no longer be a subjugated Russia. Let the country which forms
the heritage of Saint Vladimir throw off the foreign yoke and raise the
banner of united Russia, an indivisible land. May the providence of God,
who has blessed the work of the great uniters of the Russian lands, be
made manifest. May God aid his anointed, the Emperor Nicholas of All the
Russians, to complete the work begun by the Grand Duke Ivan Kalita.

"Rise, fraternal Galician Russia, who have suffered so much, to meet the
Russian army for you and your brethren, who will be delivered. Room will
be found for you in the bosom of our mother Russia without offending
peaceable people of whatever nationality. Raise your sword against the
enemy and your hearts toward God with a prayer for Russia and the
Russian Czar!"

This proclamation was received in Galicia with acclaim. When the Russian
soldiers came, priests and people came out from the villages with
flowers and banners to meet their "little brothers." Flowers were thrown
on their heads from the upper balconies of houses, as they marched
through the streets. Whatever could be done by pretended ignorance or
silence to mislead the Austrians regarding the Russian advance was done
by peasants.

Meanwhile, General Brussilov was making the most of his opportunities.
He passed over the tributaries of the Dniester and without revealing his
strength pushed back the Austrian cavalry screen. For this work he used
large bodies of Cossacks, with all necessary infantry and artillery
support.

[Illustration: Field Marshal von Hindenburg]

While appearing to be merely a border raider, the Cossack had to veil
his main army and clear its path through bridgeheads, forts, and
blockhouses, and he was well suited to this kind of work. Moving at the
rate of eight miles a day in advance of the infantry and the big guns,
he maintained a continual skirmish with cavalry scouts, infantrymen, and
gunners in places that had been fortified, and even armored trains.

In all, the Cossack in the Galician campaign, proved himself not only a
most efficient soldier but well behaved. Previously, his reputation had
been an evil one. Naturally, there were reports of brutality and
savagery, but none were proved. In fact, neither on the part of the
Russians nor the Austrians was there manifest any of the "frightfulness"
attributed, rightly or wrongly, to combatants in the western theatre of
war.

It was, of course, not to the interest of the Russians to mistreat the
people of Galicia. They came, in their own estimation at least, as
deliverers, not as despoilers. As for the Austrians, they were in their
own country when in Galicia. When they penetrated north into Russia, it
appears that they did little wanton damage. On their return, it is true,
they laid waste a large part of the province of Volhynia, burning
villages and farmsteads as they proceeded. But this was dictated by
military exigencies, in order to delay and inconvenience their pursuers.

There was an occasion when it might have been supposed there would have
been excesses. This was when after an Austrian defeat, the Russian van,
composed of three divisions of Cossack cavalry, pushed through Halicz in
pursuit of the enemy. The victorious troops swept through a country,
full of Jews, and utterly undefended. It was a garden of plenty, a rich
and fertile country. Instead of presenting a picture of desolation and
ruin after the Russian army had passed, its cattle still grazed in the
fields, the fields were full of shocks of grain, and chickens, ducks,
and swine wandered about the streets of the town.

There was not a single wrecked house in the town itself, only a few
buildings, such as warehouses near the railway station, having been
demolished by the Russians in order to hasten the departure of the
enemy.

There was another significant incident at the neighboring town of
Botszonce. Here the retiring Austrians attempted to make a stand, but
were shelled out by the Russians with their heavy guns. There were only
three buildings in the city which were not reduced to ruins. These were
two churches and the Town Hall, which, having a church-like spire, the
Russians evidently took for a church of worship, also. In this
connection, we may quote here a second proclamation which the Grand Duke
Nicholas, as Commander in Chief of the Russian forces, distributed in
the districts of Austria captured by the Russians. It was designed to
prevent ill feeling between the people and the invaders. It was dated
September 17, and read:

"To the inhabitants of Austria-Hungary:

"The Government of Austria declared war against Russia because the great
empire, ever faithful to its historical traditions, could not forsake
inoffensive Serbia, nor acknowledge its enslavement.

"On entering the Austro-Hungarian territory, I declare to you in the
name of the great Emperor, that Russia, which has spent its blood many
times for the emancipation of nations from the yoke of foreigners, only
seeks the rehabilitation of right and justice.

"Russia also brings liberty and the realization of your national views.
For many centuries the Austro-Hungarian Government planted among you
discord and enmity, for it knew that as a result of this strife its
dominion over you would continue.

"On the contrary, my sole aim is that each and every one of you may grow
and prosper and keep at the same time the precious inheritance of
language and faith of your fathers.

"Let every one of you, united to his brothers, live in peace and harmony
with his neighbors, respecting their national rights. Being convinced
that you will cooperate with all your strength to realize this, I call
upon you to welcome the Russian troops as faithful friends who are
fighting for the realization of your greatest ambitions."

Now, to return to the campaign which had been waged by Von Auffenberg:

While he may be said to have lost this preliminary campaign, his army
was unbeaten. Immediately it fell back into the powerful and carefully
built line of defenses in front of Lemberg, extending over a front of
seventy or eighty miles, from the vicinity of Busk on the north to
Halicz on the Dniester, on the south. An irregular extent of volcanic
hills, some containing extinct craters, extended along the greater part
of its length, and ended on the south in a ridge parallel to the Gnita
Lipa as far as the Dniester. The northern end of this territory was
skirted by the railway running due east of Lemberg. The Austrian left
rested north of the railroad on the River Bug and the lake district
around Krasne. Artificial fortifications improved these natural
defenses. There were many miles of trenches with barbed-wire
entanglements, and at different points massive fortifications of
concrete and steel. The position was difficult to take at any point.

On August 26 and 27, 1914, after the forces of Russky and Brussilov had
been joined, the Russians immediately began their attack along the
entire front. The days that followed were replete with furious charges.
Positions were taken only to be surrendered. Bayonet fighting figured
largely in the clashes. After two days, though the Austrian lines were
still intact, the Russians claimed a victory. Events came about in this
way: After he had forced the crossing of the Zlota Lipa on August 26,
and his right wing had connected with Russky on the north, Brussilov had
extended his left, by forced march through a country almost devoid of
roads, as far to the south as the valley of the Dniester. On August 31,
1914, the main body of this flanking body arrived in front of Halicz. On
the day following, September 1, 1914, a furious attack began. More guns
were brought up and a fierce attack was concentrated near the little
village of Botszonce, where the enemy had taken a position. Afterward,
the condition of the field, which had been literally plowed up with
shell fire and strewn with the debris of cannonading and accouterments,
showed how terrific the conflict had been. The final assault was made by
the Russian Ninth and Fifty-ninth Infantry under cover of a heavy shell
fire. Enormous losses were sustained, but the Russians were enabled to
make a breach some kilometers wide in the Austrian line.

Then the entire Austrian line began to give way. A desperate stand was
made as a last resort in the village of Botszonce itself, but this was
turned into a useless sacrifice when the Russians, pushing forward heavy
guns, unlimbered them on the same hills where the Austrians had fought
so determinedly and quickly reduced the town to ruins.

On September 3, 1914, the Austrian retreat began in earnest. Where the
fighting had been hottest around Botszonce and Halicz, the Russians
claim they buried 4,800 Austrian dead and captured thirty-two guns, some
of which had been mounted by the Austrians but taken before they could
be brought into use. The Austrian reports deny such figures, while
claiming heavy losses by the Russians.

There was a fine steel bridge across the river Dniester at Halicz, and
the extreme right of the retiring Austrian army crossed this, with, the
Russian cavalry pursuing. The bridge was destroyed and also the only
other bridge in that region of the Dniester at Chodorow. In such wise
was the pursuit southward delayed until pontoons could be thrown across
the stream by Russian engineers.

This was done on the following day, whereupon Cossack cavalry to the
strength, it was reported, of three divisions, crossed the river and
came up with the retiring enemy. Behind the cavalry at a short distance
came several divisions of Brussilov's infantry, which rapidly pushed
across the south of Lemberg toward Stryj.

After the extreme right of the Austrian line had been shattered and
Russky had been victorious in his attack on the other extreme, the whole
line fell apart quickly and while the entire front was exposed to
attack, the Austrian left was being enveloped from the direction of
Kamionka by a flanking movement. One end of the Austrian line was being
broken and the other bent back. The Russians increased the fury of their
attack and it was not long before the entire Austrian army was in
retreat.

On September 2, 1914, Lemberg was in the hands of the Russians. This
city, otherwise known as Lwow or Loewenberg, was first known as Leopolis,
being founded in 1259 by the Ruthenian Prince Daniel for his son Leo.
His history had been a checkered and stormy one. In 1340 it had been
captured by Casimir the Great; it had been besieged by the Cossacks in
1648 and 1655, and by the Turks in 1672; it had been captured by Charles
XII of Sweden in 1704, and bombarded in 1848. As capital of the
crownland of Galicia, it had come to be a handsome city, of many parks,
wide boulevards, three cathedrals, many churches, and a great number of
important public monuments. It was the seat of a university which
contained a highly valuable library of books and manuscripts and a great
many treasures of historic and antiquarian interest. Its population was
about 200,000.

The Austrians declared that Lemberg had been evacuated in order to save
all these treasures from destruction. It is certain that the civil
population of the town was strongly opposed to its being defended. It
was cosmopolitan and contained elements, doubtless in the minority, who
sympathized with Russia and who welcomed the Russian troops with great
enthusiasm. Whatever other reasons may be given for its abandonment,
however, the fact remains that any attempt to hold it would have been
futile.

After the Russians had taken possession of Lemberg, tranquillity again
prevailed. Although it was crowded for a considerable time thereafter
with Russian soldiery, there was no violence, disorder, or confusion. On
every hand were seen Russian soldiers of all branches of the service
fraternizing with the people of the place. If a soldier even jostled a
civilian accidentally he saluted and apologized. No drunkenness was
permitted. A considerable number of Austrian policemen continued to
patrol the streets, with a Russian badge on their arms, however.

Austrian surgeons and nurses, left in the town when the Austrian troops
retreated, continued to help care for Austrian wounded, also left there,
and received the same pay for their services as their Russian associates
of the same rank. Austrian Red Cross attendants were allowed to walk
about the streets at will, unmolested.

After its occupation by the Russians, Lemberg at once became a huge
hospital base. For the care of wounded that daily came in from the
front, there were forty-two immense institutions.

The inhabitants of Lemberg welcomed the Russians as deliverers. A
deputation came to General Russky and requested him to make known to the
czar the readiness of the whole Slav population of the city to be loyal
"sons of Russia." In surrendering the government to Count Bobrinsky,
whom the czar appointed Governor General of Galicia, M. Rutovsky, Mayor
of Lemberg, said:

"Not without our cooperation have the Austro-Hungarian troops left
Lemberg, without firing a shot. There was no struggle here, thanks to
our efforts. We believe your excellency has been informed that your
troops found here cooperation and a cordial reception.

"In proffering the government of this capital, allow me to express my
gratitude to the former military governor, who lessened our hardships."

In his reply, Bobrinsky outlined the principles of his policy:

"I consider Lemberg and East Galicia the real origin of Great Russia,"
he said, "since the original population was Russian. The reorganization
will be based on Russian ideals. We will immediately introduce the
Russian language and Russian customs. These steps will be taken with the
necessary care.

"We shall at first limit this to the appointment of Russian governors
and other officials. Many of the present officials will not be replaced.
We shall forbid the convocation of your Legislature during the war. All
social and political organizations must be discontinued, and may resume
their activities only by permission. These precepts obtain only in East
Galicia; West Galicia will be treated differently."

The Russians considered Lemberg to be of great strategical importance.
Railroad lines radiated from it in all directions giving its captors
direct communication with Kiev and Odessa, with their fortified
positions at Dubno and Rovno and thence to Petrograd, with
Brest-Litovsk and Warsaw--save only for the inconvenience of changing
the gauge at the frontier. Soon after crossing the frontier, the
Russians had changed the gauge of many of their engines and cars to fit
the Austrian gauge. They found at Lemberg thirty locomotives and a large
number of railway cars left there by the Austrians.

When on September 3, 1914, the Russians entered Lemberg, the official
Russian announcement of its taking was as follows:

"Seven days of the most stubborn fighting in Eastern Galicia have
resulted in a complete victory for the Russians. Five Austrian Corps
were completely routed, and in retreating in disorder westward,
abandoned their arms and baggage.

"Besides an enormous number of killed, the Austrians lost not less than
40,000 prisoners, including many generals. The roads of retreat of the
Austrians are so encumbered with carts, guns, and impedimenta that the
pursuing troops are unable to use the roads. Panic is spreading among
the Austrian troops. During the seven days the Russians have taken over
200 guns, several colors, and about 70,000 prisoners. Lwow (Lemberg) is
in our hands."

Russia received this report with great joy. The news of the occupation
of the town was conveyed by Grand Duke Nicholas to the czar. The Fourth
Class of the Order of St. George was bestowed on General Russky for "his
services in the preceding battles." The Third Class was given him for
the capture of Lemberg. The Fourth Class of the same Order was bestowed
on General Brussilov. Throughout the empire, Thanksgiving Services were
held to celebrate "the reunion with Galicia." General Count Bobrinsky
was appointed Governor General of the province.




CHAPTER LXV

DANKL'S OFFENSIVE AND RETREAT


Let us now turn our attention to the scene of operations further north.
There, it will be recalled, was taking place the principal Austrian
offensive by the First Army commanded by General Dankl. In the middle of
August, he was being held up by the armies of Generals Ewerts and
Plehve, who barred his way toward Lublin and Kholm. A strong offensive
was not attempted then by the Russians against him, as they were
gathering strength and waiting until Dankl's army should be cut off from
reenforcements. It was desired that their advance take place at the same
time as the completion of the advance on Lemberg of Russky and
Brussilov. Finally, on September 4, 1914, the brief official
announcement was made by Russia:

"Our armies on September 4 assumed the offensive along a front between
the Vistula and the Bug."

Coming as it did, when the Russian people were rejoicing over the taking
of Lemberg, this news was greeted with great enthusiasm.

It will be recalled that when Russky's army advanced, a portion of the
Austrian Reserve Army, commanded by Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, was
hurriedly withdrawn from the position it held in Poland on the left of
the Vistula, across the rear of Dankl's army, to assist General von
Auffenberg.

This was referred to as an "advance," in a "communique" published by the
Austrian General Staff on September 3, 1914. It is probable that at that
very early date some German troops also were being brought up for the
same purpose. Some of the Austrian reenforcements had been joined with
Von Auffenberg's army and had shared in its reverses. Some had remained
to screen Dankl on the right.

After Von Auffenberg's army began to encounter difficulties and its
progress was stopped, the gap between its left and Dankl's right and
rear grew too large for safety, so that there was a hurrying of forces
from the left bank of the Vistula to fill the gap. Later, as the Russian
strength grew, an entirely new Austrian army was assembled, consisting,
it seems, of portions of the Third or Reserve Army under Archduke Joseph
Ferdinand, which was augmented by two corps withdrawn from the Serbian
frontier, and also some German troops.

The "Fourth" Army, under the command of the Archduke, was referred to
thereafter in official announcements by Russia as the "Tomaszow Army."
To strengthen Dankl's left, which lay upon the Vistula at Opolie, German
troops from Breslau also were brought up.

In the last part of August and the first part of September, 1914, there
was considerable confused fighting between detached forces on both sides
in the frontier country between Zamosc and Sokal. Both sides claimed
successes. The Russians claimed that their wedge was driven through
successfully to Tomaszow and that there a severe defeat was administered
to the Austrians.

From there the latter retired to the swampy land about Bilgoraj and upon
Tarnograd. The tactics of the Russians had put a last barrier between
the two principal sections of the Austrians. Interest thereafter
centered in Dankl's First Army.

Fighting on the Lublin-Kholm front, having been purely defensive on the
part of the Russians, at first, had grown fiercer as days passed, until
there was continuous battle along the entire line. When Von Auffenberg
had been defeated and his right and rear threatened, the condition of
the northern army seemed so critical that General Dankl decided to force
the issue. He might fall back or break through the Russian defense. He
decided to attempt to pierce the line between Lublin and Kholm. On
September 2, 1914, the Tenth Austrian Army Corps led the assault against
the weaker part of the Russian line and reached within eleven miles of
Lublin. There it was halted, and so the Austrian offensive seems to have
spent itself.

As we have seen, the Russian offensive began definitely on September 4,
1914. According to the Russian official announcement, two days later,
"the enemy's center, lying in the region West of Krasnostaw (this being
almost due north of Zamosc, about halfway to the center of a line drawn
from Lublin to Kholm) was particularly disorganized. The Forty-fifth
Austrian Regiment including the colonel, forty-four officers, and 1,600
men were surrounded, and surrendered." The same announcement stated that
"a German division, coming to the aid of the Austrians, was attacked on
the left bank of the Vistula." Presumably, the Russian troops there had
come from Ivangorod.

After the Austrian First Army began to retire, it was followed by the
Russian forces along its line. And this line, at first, was
approximately eighty miles. As it retired, the left wing being hemmed in
by the River Vistula, and the right feeling steady pressure from Russian
forces on the right, where direct retreat was prevented by the swampy
nature of the country, the front was contracted until it was less than
forty miles.

This had been accomplished by the time the army reached the San, where
it was necessary to effect a crossing by four or five bridges at
different points. Dankl was highly praised for the manner in which he
handled his army during this retreat, and saved it from destruction. In
Russia, it had been assumed that the retreat would degenerate into a
panic and the fate of the First Army was regarded there as practically
sealed. Russian strategists themselves speak in high terms of the way
Dankl handled his army in this crisis.

The Austrian advance on this front had its high mark on a line drawn
from Opolie on the Vistula, through Krasnostaw to Grabiowiec, whence the
line curved southward toward Tyszowce. And it was in the region of the
latter place that the Austrians claimed a big success, though this was
denied by Petrograd.

After the Russian advance on this front from Lublin and Kholm, as we
have seen, had begun with the "disorganization" of the Austrian center
at Krasnostaw, the next attempt was to strike at the Austrian left,
starting at Opolie and developing thence along the entire line as far as
Turobin.

It was on this wing of the Russian army that the chief strength had been
assembled, the other parts of the line being left comparatively weak.
Reasoning that even if the Austrians were able to break through the
front, where it was weaker, it would only make more certain their being
surrounded finally, all new troops that arrived were shifted over to the
right wing.

On September 5 and 6, 1914, the Russians attacked the Austrian army at
Tomaszow, situated northeast of Krubessiow and southeast of Rawa-Russka.
The Austrian army retired.

Near Frempol, the Russian cavalry rushed big convoys of the enemy in the
direction of Lublin. Troops and convoys which were moving in the
direction of the road leading from Josefow to Annopol were dispersed by
Russian artillery on the left bank of the Vistula.

Detachments of the Fourteenth Austrian Army Corps attempted an attack
near Rawa-Russka, during the night of September 7, but were repulsed.
Near Tomaszow the Russians took an enemy aeroplane.

Aerial battles were not infrequent. Captain Nesteroff, one of the most
daring of Russian aviators, sacrificed his life in a successful attempt
to destroy an Austrian aeroplane. He was returning from the front after
an aerial reconnaissance when he saw an Austrian aeroplane hovering over
the Russian forces with the intention of dropping bombs.

The Russian aviator immediately headed straight for the Austrian machine
at full speed and dashed into it. The force of the impact caused the
collapse of both machines, which plunged to earth, both aviators meeting
instant death.

The fortress of Nikolaieff, twenty miles south of Lemberg, was taken by
the Russians after severe fighting. The fortress was one of the most
modern military strongholds in Austria, being supplied with all the
newest forms of defense and offensive weapons. It had steel cupolas,
masked ranges of earthworks, and guns of modern type and heavy caliber.

The Nikolaieff fortress commanded the passage of the River Dniester. At
the fortress forty guns of the heaviest type and stores of all kinds
were captured. Like Lemberg, the fortresses had been well stocked with
provisions, which fell into the Russians' hands.

After occupying Nikolaieff the Russians undertook, after allowing their
soldiers only two hours of rest, a night march for the purpose of
attacking new positions occupied by the enemy. A Russian battery, placed
on the Vistula River, engaged with success an Austrian steamboat armed
with rapid-fire guns.

About the same time troops were sent by train from the east of Lemberg
to near Chelm, and put in action against Austrian infantry intrenched on
a long line, which included the village of Michailowka. The Russians
entered the village the same night, the Austrians having fallen back to
a half circle of small, steep hills which overlooked the town. Some
houses had been set afire, but the flames had been extinguished by the
villagers themselves.

At three o'clock the following morning the attack on the hills began.
The Austrians occupying them numbered 15,000, of which a large number
were in a deeply wooded gorge. The Russian artillery swept the crest of
the hill and shelled the gorge with shrapnel. The Austrians replied
strongly.

At noon the position was stormed. The Russians, at the word of command,
rose with cheers and rushed the hill. Austrian guns to the left cut them
down badly. Later, after a desperate, brave fight, the position was
taken. The gorge was full of dead men lying in heaps. Officers said they
had never seen so many dead lying in a single place. The troops gave the
place the name of "The Valley of Death."

It was reported that the Austrian general commanding the defense watched
some of his men being disarmed after the battle. Presently the Austrian
standards were brought up from the gorge. At this sight, it was said,
the Austrian general drew his revolver and shot himself dead.

On September 5, 1914, Austrian troops which had been stationed behind
the Grodek Lake district passed the railway lines of Rawa-Russka and
Horynier, and on the next day advanced to Kurniki. On the following day
a heavy battle began between these forces and a strong Russian force
advancing northward. Two days later the Austrians opened their offensive
on a forty-mile front, having the better of the conflict until September
11, especially on the southern wing near Lemberg.

The Austrians then retired because of the necessity which had arisen for
a new grouping of their forces, the north wing of their army near
Rawa-Russka being threatened by superior Russian forces near Krasnik and
between Krasnik and the battle fields of Lemberg.

The attack by the Russians on the Opolie-Turobin section of the line
seems to have been a powerful one and the Austrians retired southward,
paralleling the course of the Vistula. For nineteen miles the Russian
cavalry was engaged with the rear guard of the retreating forces. There
was particularly fierce fighting at Suchodola and also at Krasnik. At
Frampol, there was a strong Russian cavalry charge. From this point, the
Austrians were forced back on the left into the morasses about Bilgoraj
and the right and the center were crowded together as they drew near the
San. By that time, Russia claimed to have sent 10,000 prisoners back to
Lublin. These movements were all the first days of September, 1914.




CHAPTER LXVI

BATTLE OF RAWA-RUSSKA


During the time that Auffenberg's army had been retaining the position
before Lemberg, a new line of defense had been instituted in his rear.
This line ran from Grodek to Rawa-Russka, and thence along the railroad
line toward Narol. As the Russian forces between the armies at Tomaszow
had not as yet gotten as far as Tarnograd, the far left of Von
Auffenberg's troops, or those of the Archduke, which were a continuation
of Von Auffenberg's army at this point, were for a brief time almost in
touch with the fringe of Dankl's army on its way to the San. But there
was no combined and determined stand at any time. The entire army fell
back, set upon getting across the river.

It is probable that on the line from Grodek to Rawa-Russka there were
more than 1,250,000 men in the armies on both sides. The line was more
than sixty miles long, but the struggle was concentrated on certain
points and fighting elsewhere was not important. The most critical
points were at Grodek on the far south, where a position of considerable
strength was occupied by the Austrians, and at Rawa-Russka.

One advantage which accrued to the Austrians was that they occupied
positions which had been well fortified before the battle of Lemberg,
probably in anticipation of a retreat. Nature, itself, protected their
right at Grodek against a turning movement. They had excellent railway
facilities in their rear. The advantages possessed by the Russians were
those of numbers and the fact that they were encouraged by victory.

The battle had its beginning about September 8, 1914, round the position
at Grodek, where the Austrians had retreated after the capture of
Lemberg. It was on the extreme north of the line, however, that they
first began to give ground. There they were not able to make any
extended stand because the enemy, besides attacking them fiercely from
in front, began to envelop their left.

The fighting went on over a large extent of ground. At several places
large numbers of Austrian prisoners were taken. The upper part of the
Austrian line was forced steadily back, not without desperate fighting,
and finally the entire line became doubled back on itself at a sharp
angle from Rawa-Russka. Here the fighting was terrific.

Rawa-Russka was a small Galician city, inhabited chiefly by Jews. The
greater part of the town was old, but there was a modern settlement near
the railway station, the town being one of the chief railway centers in
that part of Galicia. There, two lines cross, one a branch of the main
line to Cracow, from a point near Jaroslav to the frontier at Sokal, and
the other extending northwesterly from Lemberg to the Polish frontier at
Narol. There were at Rawa-Russka large railroad works, roundhouses,
sidings, and storage yards.

As the big battle began to develop on September 8, 1914, it was seen
that Rawa-Russka was the place where it probably would be decided and
the best efforts of both sides were exerted there. The defenses on the
point of the angle of the Austrian line, just behind which was the
town, were in extent no longer than six, or at most eight, miles.
Nevertheless, during eight days, there were as many as 250,000 or
300,000 men engaged here in night and day fighting.

After the first two days, the Russians concentrated their attack on the
very apex of the Austrian angle, atop the bluffs at the edge of the
ten-acre battle field. During eight days, the Russians stormed this
point repeatedly. In a single mile the Austrians made no less than eight
distinct stands.

Some points before being evacuated were taken and surrendered several
times, and then retreat was only for a short distance, followed by just
as determined resistance. The courage and determination of both armies
was equally admirable.

One position held by Austrians for hours was in a stubble field. It was
necessary to hold this point while a better position was being dug a few
hundred yards behind in a slight dip in the ground. The rain of shrapnel
was so heavy about this place that later it was not possible to pick up
a handful of dirt from it without finding therein pieces of lead. For a
mile across the field where the Austrians had lain, bloody bandages and
pieces of equipment were strewn thickly.

Behind this line, two or three hundred yards, was another line just
beyond a small ground swell, where the Austrians placed themselves in
fairly deep trenches. The Russians took this trench, but being unable to
advance farther, dug themselves in on their side. The next day they were
driven out by the Austrians. Afterward the trench presented the strange
appearance of a ridge of earth with a trench on each side--with Austrian
relics on one side and Russian relics on the other.

Day by day the Russians drove the Austrians back farther, until at last,
the Austrians were holding a deep trench on the <DW72> of the crest of
the last ridge of hills defending the town itself. Immediately over the
ridge the Austrian batteries were concentrated. The last trench was not
more than four hundred yards in front of the Russian guns.

Nevertheless, the Russians were unable to make any advance against this
position until they brought up and put into position a considerable
number of heavy howitzers. Then slowly they began to crumble the
Austrian defenses. Notwithstanding this bombardment, the Austrians held
on for more than a day. Then the Russians stormed the entire top of the
hill and seized the few guns which they had not already put out of
commission. The hill was taken at the point of the bayonet. This was the
decisive moment in the whole conflict.

From the center of the field where this action was taking place the
Russian wedge extended to the north and south. The Austrian center was
broken when night fell and the Russians were dropping shells into the
outskirts of Rawa-Russka. Attacks by the Russians followed, making it
impossible for the Austrians to hold the town and it was abandoned by
the Austrian forces. In any event it soon would have been enveloped in
the rear, considering the way events were shaping themselves on the
southerly end of the line, and the defense would have been costly.




CHAPTER LXVII

RUSSIAN VICTORIES--BATTLES OF THE SAN


Early in September, 1914, the Russians attacked strongly fortified
positions at Grodek. This was during the time when the Russian northern
army was busy driving back the enemy from Frampol to Biloraj. The
defenses of Grodek, which included the position at Sadowa-Wisznia, were
protected by a chain of six lakes and considerable ground cut up by
dikes.

The Russians were commanded by General Brussilov, who duplicated here
the tactics of continuous and heavy attack with which he had overcome
the resistance of the Austrians at Halicz.

The Austrians had taken stand on a group of heavily wooded hills. In
order to reach this, the Russians were obliged to cross a plain about
three miles wide, in a series of parallels, while subjected to fire from
machine guns and rifles.

It was not until three days later that they were able to gain a position
where their guns could reach effectively the trenches of the Russians.
When the assault was made with bayonets, the trenches were found heaped
with bodies. According to the Russians, the prisoners they took said
they had been without regular food for many days and had subsisted on
raw potatoes and wild pears. Continually harassed by the Russians, they
had not time to bury their dead and so the living had fought on while
the remains of their fallen comrades decayed beside them.

A brief account of the affair from the Russian viewpoint is contained in
the announcement from the Russian Headquarters Staff, made September 14,
1914:

"The army of General Brussilov, against whom the Austrians made their
last desperate onslaught has, on taking the offensive, captured many
guns, prisoners, and artillery parks, the numbers of which are now being
reckoned. General Brussilov testifies that his troops displayed the
highest energy, stanchness, and gallantry. The corps commanders calmly
and resolutely directed their troops and frequently wrested the victory
at critical moments. General Brussilov specially mentions the
distinguished services of General Radko Dmitrieff."

There is no doubt that the engagement here referred to was one of the
most bitterly and desperately contested of the war. But the conflict on
many fields was being conducted on a scale so huge that it loses much of
its importance in a general survey. On the day following the
announcement just quoted, the Grand Duke Nicholas briefly announced that
"the Russians, after occupying Grodek, reached Mocziska, and are now
within one day's march of Przemysl."

While Brussilov's center was moving on to Mocziska, which is about forty
miles west of Lemberg, his left was advancing southwesterly along the
railroad line to Sambor, and on to Chyrow. The latter place, however,
was not taken until September 24, 1914. The fortress of Przemysl was
thus cut off from the south.

When Grodek fell, Brussilov's soldiers had been marching and fighting
without pause for longer than three weeks. The feats of endurance they
had performed were extraordinary but without delay they pursued the
Austrians from Grodek with the same alertness that they had shown in
following them from Halicz.

In the meantime, as we have noted, Rawa-Russka had been taken. Like
Brussilov, Russky was not inclined to give an enemy he had bested any
chance to recuperate, and while Brussilov was pursuing the Austrian
right from Grodek to Chyrow on the south of Przemysl, Russky was
following up his success with equal vigor, driving toward Sieniawa the
shattered forces which had opposed him.

Sieniawa was occupied on September 18, 1914, the same day that Brussilov
took Sambor. Jaroslav was captured by assault on September 21. There was
hard fighting on the way there, around Javorow, fifteen miles east of
Przemysl, where the Russians claimed to have taken 5,000 prisoners and
thirty guns. In such wise was Przemysl cut off on the north, east, and
south. Behind its defenses, what was left of Von Auffenberg's army took
refuge.

The Austrians also had met with reverses where Dankl's army had been
falling back before the troops of Generals Ewarts and Plehve. It has
been shown that the continuity of the Austrian defenses had not been
effective in the region northwest of Rawa-Russka, though it extended
beyond the frontier between Tomaszow and Tarnograd. After the conflict
at Tomaszow, the line of the Archduke Joseph Ferdinand above Rawa-Russka
to that place had been bent back on the Rawa-Russka-Jaroslav railroad,
while the main body of Dankl's troops fell back on the line of the San.

Never was the Russian pressure on its rear relaxed. The pressure was
especially strong from the Russian right which had fought the battle of
Krasnik, after clearing the Opolie-Truobin district. The larger portion
of the Austrian troops crossed the San near its junction with the
Vistula. Probably they hoped that while they might place themselves, on
the other side, in touch with the Austrian railroads, the river would be
a barrier behind them against the Russians.

It appears that General Dankl, anticipating the necessity of falling
back across the San, had been sending his transports back in advance of
his retreat, almost from the time the retreat began. In fact, some of
the transport trains had been sighted and subjected to shell fire as
early as September 9, 1914, from the left bank of the Vistula. Not until
September 12 did the army itself reach the banks of the San.

Two heavy rear guards, to north and east, were left to hold back the
oncoming Russians, while the main body and the baggage were crossing the
river on September 12. The Vistula protected the left of one of these
rear guards, the San protected the right of the other. Thus the two
formed an arch between the two streams.

Marshy ground made difficult the attack on their front, but,
nevertheless, they seem to have been unable to prevent the Russians from
piercing the screen before the crossing of the river had been completed.
There was great slaughter. The Russians claimed that they took 30,000
prisoners. The artillery of the Russians was highly effective in
shelling the bridges while the Austrians were passing over them in solid
masses. Beside the large number of those killed by shell fire many were
reported to have been forced into the water and to have drowned.

Neither was there respite for the Austrians on the other side of the
river, although, in theory, the forcing of the passage of the San by an
invading army was considered an impossible task. Enormous sums had been
spent by the Austrians in an attempt to make it impregnable.

Along the upper or southern part of its extent it was protected by the
powerful position of Przemysl and by Jaroslav. From there a light
railroad, which had been built solely for strategic purposes, ran
parallel and close to its left bank almost to the point where it joined
with the Vistula.

As they retired, the Austrians destroyed bridges behind them. But they
were not able to destroy all, otherwise a few days' rest might have been
vouchsafed the First Army. By quick work the Russians seized and
maintained a hold on the bridge at Kreszov, on the frontier a few miles
west of Tarnograd. As an official communique from Petrograd put it:
"The Russians leaped across the river on the very shoulders of the
retreating enemy."

The victory on the San, September 12-19, 1914, may well be considered
one of the most important of the campaign. There is no way of estimating
the Austrian losses, over and above the 30,000 prisoners the Russians
say they took, but they probably were heavy. Still more important was
the fact that the Russians had broken down the barrier which the
Austrians had sought to put between themselves and the invaders. Save
for the fact that the Austrians were now in touch with their railroads,
and for the moment within reach of security, being under the shelter of
Cracow, their position within the triangle formed by the Vistula was no
more safe than it had been when they were above it.

The Russians reported that within that triangle they seized an enormous
amount of supplies of every kind. Moreover, with the advance on
Krzeszov, the last of the invading Austrians had been forced from
Russian soil. No longer was an enemy left in the provinces of Podolia or
Volhynia.

It must be recalled also that Russian troops which were based on
Ivangorod also had intercepted German reenforcements on the left of the
Vistula as they hastened across Poland to the aid of Austria. The guns
of the Russians also had shelled the transports of the Austrians as they
retired along the right bank. The Russian right, pressed on the retiring
Austrians, had been able to spare a large number of troops, and these it
had thrown across the Vistula at Josefow. These, acting as
reenforcements of the Russian troops already on that side of the river,
had hurried southward, paralleling the advance of the main army on the
right bank and brushing aside whatever forces of the enemy they met.

In this way they were able to prevent any help from that quarter coming
to the Austrians. Also, when their comrades were delivering a final blow
to the Austrians at the crossing of the San, they were busy on the
opposite side of the Vistula driving back a large Austrian force and
occupying the important place of Sandomierz. They encountered and
overcame near Sandomierz the Second German Landwehr Corps under General
Woyrsch. In the neighborhood of and at the town they reported that they
had taken 3,000 prisoners and 10 guns.




CHAPTER LXVIII

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER, 1914


Let us now briefly summarize the Russian strategy during this month of
portentous development, September, 1914, which concluded with the
advance down the left bank of the Vistula and the occupation of
Sandomierz.

It will be recalled that, being more or less prepared, Russia had found
herself invaded by armies operating in three different directions over
an extended front. These armies contained in all about a million men.
The weakness of this advance, the Russians saw, consisted in this: that
the farther two armies of invaders, advancing in divergent lines,
proceed, the farther they become separated. Thus it is more difficult
for them to act in harmony or for either to protect the flanks of the
other.

For this reason the Russians were satisfied to allow the First or
northern Army of the Austrians to advance almost without resistance
until it came within artillery range of its first main objective--that
is Lublin and the railway line to Ivangorod and Warsaw.

Then the Russians delivered a blow with force at the weak Point between
the two invading armies in the vicinity of Tomaszow. The Austrians, to
meet this attack, were obliged to withdraw their reserve forces from the
far left across the rear of the First Army. When these forces proved
inadequate, the organization of a new army began, and this was thrown
into the gap.

If it had been advanced immediately and simultaneously with the other
two armies, the new army might have served its purpose, but the
campaign, it seems, was already too far advanced. The strength of the
Russians had been augmented, and after they had driven the wedge in at
Tomaszow they retained it in place, and were able to widen the break by
means of the operations which followed in the vicinity of Bilgoraj, and
by driving back the Austrian forces above Rawa-Russka. In this way the
First Austrian Army was left dangling at the extreme of its advance.

In the meantime Brussilov had made his well-planned turning movement
along the Dniester on the far south, and had delivered his blow on
Halicz. Russky at the same time was hammering at the Austrian front and
left, penning in Von Auffenberg's army on an ever-contracting front, and
throwing it back on its successive lines of defense on the Zlota Lipa
before Lemberg, and from Grodek to Rawa-Russka.

The Austrians, pushed back from each of these, and with Cossack cavalry
on their right, ranging over a considerable extent in southern Galicia,
were forced to fall back, guarding as best they might their rear,
westward toward Cracow.

When Von Auffenberg's army had been put in a tight place, busy taking
care of its own safety, the Russians were able to devote their attention
to the army Dankl had in the north. There was no chance of aid reaching
it now, and it was weakened from efforts to force the barriers that had
been put across its path.

The chief strength of the Russians was massed against the left of this
army, for if that wing was broken the entire army would find itself
hemmed in and must retreat in order to avoid being surrounded. And so,
forced from Opolie along the Vistula, attacked constantly on its entire
front and right flank from Tomaszow and Tarnograd, Dankl's army was
forced down to and across the San and beyond it.

The movements of the Russians had been executed with great harmony. By
September 23, 1914, Dankl's army had been driven by Ewarts and Plehve to
the line of the Wisloka. Jaroslav was taken by Russky on September 21.
Chyrow was possessed by Brussilov on September 24. Brussilov had entered
Galicia at Woloczysk on the same day--August 22--that Russky had crossed
the frontier and occupied Brody.

The Austrian losses, since the taking of Lemberg, according to an
official statement made by the Russians on September 17, 1914, were
250,000 killed and wounded, and 100,000 prisoners with 400 guns, many
colors, and a vast quantity of stores. We are not obliged to accept
these figures. They are given here for what significance and merit they
may have, but as coming from Russia. It was also reported by Russia that
the rifles taken numbered almost half a million. The enemy's total
losses were put by Russia at from 35 to 50 per cent. Even the small
estimate is said by Austria to be an exaggeration.

The Russians now held all eastern Galicia, and were masters of Lemberg,
Jaroslav, Brody, Busk, Tarnopol, Grodek, Brzezany, Sambor, and other
towns of no little importance, and also of the railroads between these
towns. They also were in control of the oil fields of Galicia, of
considerable importance to them at this time, and of the valuable
agricultural resources of Galicia, or of such part of it as they
occupied. Przemysl alone held out. Russian cavalry was already trying
the approach to the Carpathians from the Dukla Pass to the Bukowina.




CHAPTER LXIX

INVESTITURE OF PRZEMYSL


Many fortresses lost a reputation of long standing for strength during
the Austro-Russian campaign. Grodek and Rawa-Russka, with fine natural
defenses and excellent works, were carried by assault after gallant
resistance. Lemberg's defenses were reputed to be powerful, but no
attempt was made to utilize them. The fall of Jaroslav has never been
explained. It was considered generally to be stronger than Namur or
Liege, and a prolonged resistance was anticipated there. It withstood
attack for only two days. When heavy guns were brought to bear on it by
the Russians the garrison withdrew. Przemysl seems, alone of all the
Austrian defenses, to have justified its reputation.

Przemysl was not only a strongly fortified place but a beautiful city as
well, surrounded with flower gardens and orchards. Its history, like
that of Lemberg, had been a stormy one. Its population in 1914,
including residents of its suburbs, was about 50,000, principally Poles
and Ruthenes, who lived together in amity and great religious
toleration. In September of that year, when the Russians made their
whirlwind advance, there was, according to official reports from Vienna,
an army of 80,000 based on the city, under the leadership of General
Boroyevich.

With a large part of this army, Boroyevich was reported to have moved to
the line of the Wisloka to give aid to Dankl's hard-pushed troops as
they made their stand on that river. It was understood that many of Von
Auffenberg's soldiers, as they fell back, were employed as a garrison
for the fortress. At the time of its investment it was said to contain
about 100,000 men, with its defense in charge of General Kusmanek.
Afterward the strength of the garrison was increased.

It has been indicated previously how the railway communications had been
broken on the east and south by the advance of the Russians after the
fall of Grodek and the taking of Mocsiska. The isolation of the fortress
of Przemysl was completed by the fall of Jaroslav and the occupation of
Radymno, a town on the main Cracow railway on the left bank of the San,
about eight miles east of Jaroslav and fifteen miles north of the
fortress. And so it remained isolated, save for a short period when the
tide of invasion was driven back. During this time it was again in
communication with Cracow.

The Russians took it as a matter of course that the fortress would soon
fall to them. Its fate was predicted in the newspapers of the Allies;
but, in preparation for defense, stores of all kinds had been hurried
into it, and plans had been laid for stout resistance. It had a
determined commander in General Kusmanek.

The first shots were fired on September 18, 1914. The city was
surrounded on September 20, and an unbroken bombardment with many
desperate sorties ensued until October 2, when the Russians sent out a
white flag to the city and demanded its surrender. General Kusmanek's
reply was that he would not discuss surrender until he had exhausted all
powers of resistance. The attack reached its height on October 5, 1914.
The Russians stormed again and again, hills of corpses outside the works
testifying to furious attacks they made. They succeeded in carrying
temporarily one of the outer works, eleven battalions having succeeded
in approaching these defenses undetected, because of damage to an
Austrian searchlight.

Suddenly they stormed the walls. The garrison retreated to the
casemates, from which they defended themselves with rifles and machine
guns. The Russians forced their way to the casements and a hand-to-hand
struggle with bayonets, gun butts, and hand grenades followed. When
Austrian reenforcements, hastily telephoned for, arrived, the attacking
party was already retiring, leaving their dead and wounded in the
casemates and on the wall. Rockets and light shells illuminated their
retreat. There was desultory fighting during several days thereafter,
and then the Russian army settled down to a routine investment, biding
the time when their heavy siege guns could be brought up and the way
made ready for an effective assault. On October 18, 1914, there was a
battle to the east of Chyrow and Przemysl, which was successful for the
Austrians. The fighting near Mizynico was especially severe. The Magiera
Heights, which had been in the possession of the Russians, were occupied
by the Austrians after a formidable bombardment by their artillery. At
the same time Russian attacks on the east of Przemysl to Medyka Heights,
on the southern wing of the battle field, which were especially directed
against the heights to the southeast of Stryj and Sambor, were repulsed.
A fresh attack of the Russians on the east bank of the river near
Jaroslav also was repulsed.

The addition of reserves and the opportunity to reorganize their army,
gave new fighting force to the Austrians about this time. Wherever the
Russians retired they followed them closely and by reconnaissances were
able to develop weak points in the Russian positions. On October 20,
1914, the Austrians had gained ground in several spots in a heavy,
stubborn attack on the fortified positions of the Russians from Plotzyn
to the highroad east of Medyka, while a Russian counterattack was
unable to make headway.

On the heights north of Nizankowice, Austrian troops scored another
victory and took also the villages situated against the heights. In the
southern wing the battle was carried on mainly by artillery. The modern
field fortification system being liberally used by the Austrians, the
battles had largely the nature of fortress warfare. On the same day the
Austrians captured in the Carpathians the last point, Jablonki Pass,
held by the Russians.

Thus we now see the Austrian army, which had been described as routed
and destroyed in battles in Galicia, seemingly taking on a new lease of
life, although appearing to have found an impenetrable barrier at the
River San north of Jaroslav. On October 22, 1914, the Austrians retook
Czernowitz, capital of the crownland of Bukowina, which had been in the
possession of the Russians since early in the war. They also captured
two field fortifications, situated one behind the other, to the
southeast of Sambor.

For eight days a terrific fight was waged between the Russians and the
Austrians on the line from Sambor, along the River San to Przemysl and
Jaroslav, and then to the southward. The battle extended over a front of
about sixty-five miles. The cannonading was uninterrupted. The Austrians
had started the attack at Sambor, but were thrown back by vigorous
Russian counterattacks. A concentration of Austrian corps then attempted
an advance against Lemberg, with the intention of bisecting the Russian
line. This attack was defeated with losses.

On October 31, 1914, the Austrians defeated a mixed Russian column near
the Galician-Bukowinian frontier, north of Kuty. In middle Galicia by
that date they had occupied Russian positions northeast of Turka, near
Stryj, Sambor, east of Przemysl, and on the lower San. Several Russian
attacks around Lisko were repulsed. At Lisko, Stryj, Sambor, and other
points the Austrians took many prisoners. Near Stryj and Sambor the
Austrians blew up a Russian ammunition depot.

On November 1, 1914, the Austrians claimed that they then had interned
in Austria-Hungary, 649 Russian officers and 73,179 Russian soldiers,
not including the prisoners they had taken in the fighting in the
district northeast of Turka and south of the Stryj-Sambor line. The
fighting in this locality was renewed with greater intensity by both
sides early in the month, fortune favoring first one and then the other.
On November 2, 1914, two infantry divisions and a rifle brigade of
Russians were dislodged from a strongly intrenched position.

About this time the czar's forces began concentrating their main attack
northeast of Kielce in an effort to repeat the tactics by which they won
important victories over the Austrians in the first days of the war. It
was their plan, provided they were able to break through at this point,
to turn southward against the rear of the Austrian army in Galicia, just
as they did two months before, after the battle of Rawa-Russka.

The line of battle in the southeast now became more definitely outlined,
extending from Turka through Nadworna and Kolomea to the Russian border
just east of Czernowitz in Bukowina. The renewal of Russian attacks
followed the bringing up of a new levy of reserves.

The Russians now advanced with fair success along the whole Vistula
front. They secured Piotrkow and other places in such positions as to
suggest that the Austrians were running the risk of being cut off from
Cracow, their ultimate goal of retreat. A rear-guard defense was
attempted by the Austrians at Opatow but without success, and the
Russians took several hundred prisoners and six Maxims with a supply
train.

On the San River, where the fighting had been severe for a fortnight,
the Russians adopted the method of deliberately sapping their opponents'
trenches, precisely as a besieging force saps its way toward a fortress.
This proved a success. When the Russian sap burst in the trenches the
Austrians retreated, and the Russians, taking advantage of the
confusion, stormed the fortifications in the neighborhood and took them,
capturing 5 officers, 500 men, and all the Maxims.

An Austrian column which had descended the north <DW72> of the
Carpathians in the direction of Narvoda, where it had intrenched itself,
was attacked and driven back. This operation, being removed by more
than one hundred miles from the nearest point to the great struggle,
indicated that the Austrians, confident of victory, sent forces across
the Carpathians to catch the Russians in the rear when the proper moment
came.

This moment, it seems, failed to arrive, and the Russians, having the
support of the native inhabitants, had little difficulty in dealing
successfully with successive isolated attempts of the considerable
Hungarian reserve bodies sent across the Carpathians at various points.

There was some activity about this time before Przemysl, which several
times had been reported, incorrectly, as having been taken by the
Russians. An attempt was made by the garrison at a sortie. The Russians
allowed it to proceed until they could cut in behind, when the force was
surrounded. When it found it was impossible to cut a way through either
forward or backward, it surrendered. The Russians took about 2,000
prisoners.

On the Austrian retiring line from Kielce to Sandomierz the Russians
succeeded on November 5, 1914, in breaking down the defenses of the
enemy, and in stimulating a more or less orderly retreat into a hasty
flight. Sandomierz, itself, an exceedingly important strategic point,
which had played a vital part since the early days of the war, fell into
the hands of the Russians. In fighting with the Austrian rear guard
southward of Kielce the Russians took within a week 200 officers and
15,000 men prisoners, with scores of guns and Maxims.




CHAPTER LXX

AUSTRIAN RETREAT BEGINS


At this time the Russians were strongly established on the six-mile
front of the left bank of the San River, between Nizko and Rudnik. The
Austrian opposition there had been long and determined, but was finally
broken early in November, 1914. The Austrians began a retreat along this
front.

This retreat was such as to indicate less a general defeat than a
general obedience to orders to withdraw. It is true that the Russians
had been pressing with great energy upon the upper Vistula and San
fronts, especially since the settlement of the main fight farther north
against the Germans and mixed forces, but the Austrians were in
possession of strong fortified positions which still were giving trouble
to the Russians, in spite of their constantly increasing numbers.

It was now plain that the Russians had left the Galician front until the
Vistula front had been cleared, when a proportion of the troops released
there could proceed to add to the fighting force in Galicia, thereby
causing the retreat of the Austrians along the whole front.

On November 5, 1914, the Russians achieved what the General Staff
characterized as "the greatest victory since the beginning of the war."
This was the recapture of Jaroslav. It was announced to the Allies by
Grand Duke Nicholas in a formal message, which also stated:

"Following our successes upon the Vistula, a complete victory has just
been gained by our troops along the whole of the front in Galicia. Our
strategical maneuver has thus been crowned by what is incontestably the
greatest success gained on our side since the beginning of the war. I am
most confident of the speedy and entire accomplishment of our common
task, persuaded as I am that decisive success will be gained by the
allied armies." In the capture of Jaroslav the Russians took 5,000
Austrian prisoners.

During several days before the general Austrian retreat along the
Vistula front began, they were engaged in furious attack, their
artillery fire being especially severe. It was evidently a supreme
effort. The last engagement was over an extended front, enormous forces
striving to prevent the Russians crossing the San at a point near
Monastryzek. It was reported that reenforcements pushing over the
Carpathians in an attempt to aid them were delayed in the snow-filled
mountain passes.

We will have a better understanding of Russian tactics as worked out in
the activities just referred to, if we consider here an official
statement issued by the General Staff about this time concerning them.
It read:

"Fierce combats on the River San and south of Przemysl, which have been
going on for more than three weeks, resulted on September 5 in the
general retreat of the Austrians.

"On the preceding night the Austrians made a last effort to repulse our
troops who were crossing the San. Until a late hour the enemy attacked
on an extended front, taking the offensive in dense, successive lines,
but everywhere they suffered enormous losses and were repulsed.

"On November 5,1914, the enemy's columns commenced to move from the San
in the direction of Dukla Pass across the Carpathians and south of
Przemysl, seeking everywhere to leave the battle front. We pursued them
energetically all along the line.

"The abandonment by the main Austrian forces of the line of the San is
the result of the victorious battle fought at the end of September, the
original purpose of which was to block the offensive of the
Austro-German armies against Warsaw and Ivangorod.

"At the beginning of October our troops were engaged along a front
extending for 330 miles and passing through Warsaw, Kozienica, Przemysl,
and Czernowitz. Toward October 20 we succeeded in gaining a decisive
victory on the left bank of the Vistula in the region of Warsaw.

"Following up our successes during the last eighteen days, on a front of
380 miles, we broke the resistance of the enemy who is now in full
retreat. This victory enables our troops to proceed to a realization of
further tasks to inaugurate a new period of the war."

This announcement is embodied here, not only for such information as it
contains which coincide with established facts, but that the Russian
viewpoint toward such events and the purpose behind Russian activities
may be manifest.

To the south of Przemysl on November 7, 1914, the Russians, having
increased their activities in the region considerably, took 1,000
prisoners. Warfare about the fortress now seemed to be entering a new
phase, which the Russians initiated with great artillery activity and
an advance against Medyka. The Austrians responded with a closer
concentration, with the fortress as their center. After the first attack
on Przemysl, all damage to the fortress had been repaired and the outer
forts strengthened by field fortifications, of a very strong character,
and covered by battery positions.

A new railroad bridge was built at Nizankowice and communications with
Chyrow, about twenty-five miles to the south, restored. Numerous trains
had been used to transport wounded soldiers and useless Przemysl
civilians southward and to bring back flour, Zwieback, and other
supplies to the fortress. The arrival of many carloads of beer caused
particular rejoicing.

On November 11, 1914, the Russians, advancing on Cracow from the
direction of Jaroslav, occupied Miechow and Dynow. The forces operating
farther south seized Lisko. It now seemed to the Russians that the enemy
would not be able to make an effective stand east of Tarnow and the
Dunajec River and so the Russians would find themselves once more on the
lines they had been forced to abandon hastily six weeks previously, when
the Germans first made their rapid advance to the Vistula. It was as a
result of this campaign and the course of the Russians in conceding
smaller successes in order to concentrate their forces at the most
important point that the Austrians found themselves driven back now at
every point, while the Russians advanced for the possession of the
western part of Galicia. It was the hope of the Russians that their
advance in Galicia would soon set free their Cossack divisions for a new
invasion of Hungary.

On November 12, 1914, the Russians sustained a defeat near Czernowitz,
capital of the Austrian province of Bukowina. The Austrians made an
unexpected movement, crossing the Pruth, a few kilometers north of
Czernowitz and suddenly attacking the Russian right wing. The Russians
were completely surprised and after a short resistance decided to fall
back upon their base, which seemed free. However, they were then taken
under fire by Austrian artillery, which caused great losses among the
Russian detachments. The battle field was strewn with corpses. Russian
forces in the Stryj valley also were forced to retire with heavy losses
by a surprise attack from an Austrian armored train and Austrian
cavalry.

The Russian offensive in Galicia toward Dounaietz nowhere encountered
resistance. The Russians occupied Krosno and inflicted heavy losses on
the Austrian rear guard.

It should be noted that during the middle of November, 1914, the
campaign on which the Russians were concentrating their attention was
against the Austrians. The Russian campaigns had consistently adhered to
the principle that in military operations important results are obtained
by bringing every force to bear upon a single point until the desired
end is accomplished. The Russians still followed this policy.

The operations in East Prussia and in western Poland were for the time
being made secondary while all energy was devoted to pushing forward the
campaign against Cracow. When they were now within fifteen miles of it,
an appeal was sent by the city to the Germans for reenforcements. The
civilians of the place removed themselves from the fortified area and
the inhabitants generally fled the locality. The German colony left for
Berlin and Bavaria.

Cracow was surrounded by a triple line of fortifications of which the
outer line contained fifteen forts, eleven on the north, and four on the
south bank of the Vistula. The defenses on the north were much stronger
than those on the East, where the San River and the fortresses of
Jaroslav and Przemysl were once regarded as a secure barrier against
Russian advance. The Russians already had broken down that barrier and
only two small streams lay between their eastern army and the last
stronghold of Galicia.

On November 15, 1914, the Austrians defending Przemysl again attempted a
sortie, this time with greater success than before. It forced back the
Russians on the north side of the fortress to the heights of Rokietnica,
with small Austrian losses. A second sortie was repulsed by Russian
artillery and cavalry and heavy losses inflicted on the Austrians.

In Galicia we now find the Austrians west of the Donajec River, along
the front from Tarnow to the Vistula. The Austrian line then followed
the Biala River for a few miles until it cut across to take advantage of
the Wisloka, north and south of Jaslo. From there east the Austrians
were retreating into the passes of the Carpathians.

These latter troops were relatively small bodies, whose main object was
to prevent the Russian cavalry from making raids into Hungary. Opposite
Tarnow the Austrians were prepared to put up a most stubborn resistance,
for they regarded the holding of this part of their line as essential.
Unless they could hold back the Russians there, they reasoned, the
latter would have a chance to break through and cut off the Austrian
army that was retreating from Sanok and Jaslo. A Russian advance north
of Cracow, they figured, would tend to cut off the entire Austrian army
from its German ally. This was an object for which the Russians were
striving.

Abandonment by the Austrians of Central Galicia and the gathering of
their armies toward Cracow soon began to show results in the stiffening
of their resistance to Russian advance. As the Austrians retreated
westward their front decreased in length with consequent strengthening
of their line. It was their desire that this strengthening should enable
them to extend northward along the Warthe River, thus freeing some of
the German troops for service in the army that was advancing from Thorn.

By the Russians a German advance in considerable force along the narrow
battle front on the west bank of the river Vistula was regarded as a
feint at the city of Warsaw, the intention of which was to draw Russian
troops from their advance upon Cracow and distract attention from
efforts to establish a strongly fortified defensive line from Kalisz to
Cracow.




CHAPTER LXXI

FIGHTING AT CRACOW


On November 20, 1914, the Russians were before the outer line of
defenses of Cracow, with strong opposition to their further advancement.
Meanwhile they were pushing forward minor columns of Cossacks into the
passes of the Carpathian Mountains, intending that these should emerge,
if possible, upon the Hungarian plains in raids similar to those which
were made in the first Russian advance in September.

During the next few days following November 20, 1914, there was constant
and hard fighting in the vicinity of Cracow, the Austrians reporting
that they had taken three battalions of Russians prisoners. All reports
showed a stiffening of the Austrian line, while the energy of Russian
attacks was reduced by the diversion of troops to stem the Austrian
invasion by way of the Vistula.

The Austrians were obliged, however, a few days later, to evacuate Neu
Sandec, fifty miles southeast of Cracow, and an important railroad
junction of the River Dunajec and the main line to Cracow. The Russians
reported they took 3,000 prisoners and some machine guns. The capture of
Neu Sandec revealed a new Russian advance, threatening the right flank
of the Austrian army along the Carpathian Mountains. By this capture the
Austrians were deprived of an important railway into Hungary. In order
to stop this turning move it was necessary for them to weaken their
campaign north of Cracow.

In the Cracow region the Austrians advanced on the north to Pilica,
Wolbrom, and Miechow, about twenty miles from the Galician border. To
the east the Russians advanced to within twelve miles of the fortress.
In the fighting at Pilica and Wolbrom the Austrians claimed the capture
of 29,000 Russians.

In the latter part of November, 1914, the Russians were successful in
attack in Galicia along a line from thirty to sixty miles southeast of
Cracow, taking more than 7,000 prisoners, thirty cannon, and twenty
machine guns in one engagement. On November 29, 1914, the Austrians also
scored a victory on the front extending from Proszowicz to Onszreniawa,
fourteen miles northeast of Cracow, southward through Brzesko on the
Vistula to Bochnia and Adsniez.

General Radko Dmitrieff's cavalry kept in close touch with the
retreating Austrians, who were attempting to shake off contact with, the
Russians and gain time to re-form their ranks back of Cracow. Part of
the Austrian troops defeated on the San had retired beyond the
Carpathians to recuperate while the Russians attacked the Austrian force
southeast of Cracow.

At this stage of hostilities, the Russians estimated that the
Austro-Hungarian casualties had amounted to 19,000 officers and 900,000
men. At the same time, it was estimated by the Austrians that the total
Russian losses had been 760,000 in dead, wounded, deserters, and
prisoners. Of these, 420,000 were attributed to the various battles
against the Austro-Hungarian forces, and 340,000 to battles against the
Germans.

The losses of the Russians in the campaigns against Austria-Hungary, as
estimated for the various engagements, were as follows: Early raids,
skirmishes, and frontier fighting, 15,000; Krasnik, Niedzfica Duza,
Lublin, 45,000; Zamosz, Komarow, Tyszowce, 40,000; first battle of
Lemberg, 45,000; second battle of Lemberg, 30,000; Rawa-Russka,
Magierow, 30,000; offensive against middle Galicia, 15,000; offensive
around Przemysl, 40,000; raising siege of Przemysl, 15,000; Carpathian
invasions, 30,000; battles on the San beyond Przemysl, to date, 25,000;
Medyka-Stari, Sambor, 40,000; outposts in the Carpathians, 15,000; last
battles of the Vistula from Sandomierz to Ivangorod, 35,000.

On December 1, 1914, the Austrians had been driven from all their
positions over a front about thirty-three miles long, which defended the
Carpathian passes from Konecha Village, twelve miles north of Bartfield
eastward--that is, on all roads leading through the Dukla Pass over the
Carpathians. This was the lowest pass anywhere available across the
mountain range and being also the widest, is in all respects best
suited for military purposes. All armies that previously had invaded the
present area of Hungary from time immemorial, via the Carpathian
Mountains, had used the Dukla Pass.

A number of points along the line mentioned, where the Austrians had
established defensive positions, were taken by the Russians, the most
easterly being south of Mezolaborez. All were taken by assault. Many
guns, Maxims, and prisoners were captured. An energetic Russian advance
continued to push the Austrians back toward Cracow. The Austrians
evacuated one position after another with large losses.

The Russian advance toward Bartfeld and Hammona, on the south <DW72> of
the Carpathians in Hungary, indicated an attempt to push forward a
turning force around the south flank of the Austrian position, as it
stood at that time. The damage caused by this raiding expedition was
calculated to force the Austrians to meet it and so divert them from the
main fighting line at Cracow. Evidence of this shift was shown in a
reverse which the Austrians administered to the Russians at Hammona.

Early in December, 1914, Russia replied to reports that she was
suffering from a shortage of recruits by declaring she could put two
corps against every one that Germany brought into Poland and still have
enough to carry on the campaign against Cracow as originally planned.
Her two armies operating against that important objective point had
linked flanks. Investment of the city was daily feared.

The southern army, which moved directly west on the Tarnow-Cracow line,
had fought its way over every inch of the ground, making a record of
forty-five battles in forty-five days. At least, according to old
measures, these fights would be classed as battles. Under the stupendous
conditions which surrounded this modern cataclysm, they probably range
as little more than reconnaissances in force.

Back to the banks of the River Raba, the advancing Russians pushed the
Austrian foe. Here in a position of considerable defensive value, the
enemy made a determined resistance. But the Russians swept on. The
Austrians made a stand soon afterward, outside the protecting radius of
the fortress guns, in the angle made by the Raba and Schreniawa.

Przemysl about this time was reported to be in dire straits. Monsignor
Joseph Sebastian Felczar, Archbishop of Przemysl, said, December 3,
1914, after he had left the city for the Vatican:

"Would to God my cathedral city might be spared the horrors of invasion
but I feel I can hope no longer. Our garrison has resisted with stubborn
heroism but the Russians outnumber them two to one. I got away only
after long hours of wearisome wanderings across the Russian lines; the
Muscovites had then already captured several of the outer ring of forts,
besides other important vantage ground, and had hemmed round the whole
fortress in a circle of steel.

"When I left Przemysl, indescribable desolation reigned there. The
houses, palaces, and public buildings were reduced to dust heaps.
Despite severe measures taken by the authorities brigand bands prowled
among the ruins and pillaged such of the civil population as still
remained. A never-ending procession of caravans traversed the streets,
which were chock full of wounded and dying. The hospitals were
overcrowded and the injured laid out in rows in the churches."

On December 4, 1914, the Russians, by the capture of Wieliczka, gained
another step in their campaign for the possession of the broad passes to
the south and west of Cracow. Wieliczka is a small town, about nine
miles southwest of Cracow and three miles from the line of forts. It is
built over salt mines, a short railway bearing the product thereof to
the larger city.

On the northwestern side, the Russians were only a few miles from the
city. It was only the Austro-German army, sitting in trenches and making
occasional attacks on the Czenstochowa-Oilusz-Cracow line that prevented
the complete encirclement of the place. The contest between these forces
was mostly a slow artillery duel from day to day.

It was now the turn of the Germans to relieve the Austrians, if they
could, from a critical position. For months before, the Austrians had
been sacrificed in the interest of the German plan of winning a
crushing victory in France, and during the retreat from Warsaw it was
the Austrians who bore the brunt of the fighting as a rear guard. Again,
when the Germans found themselves hard pressed between the Warthe and
the Vistula, they flung the Austrian reenforcements to fresh defeat at
Wienun.

It was the contention of Austrian military writer that in order to
maintain an effective resistance to the Russians at this time and
afterward, the Germans should continue to withdraw troops from the
western front.

The Russians seemed to feel secure at this time in holding back the
German forces in Poland and so were passing forward their campaign in
Galicia, in an effort to interpose a wedge between the forces of the
opposing nations.

Russia also had a special motive for exerting every effort to inflict
some signal disaster upon the Austrians. It was only by such means that
she could relieve the pressure on Serbia and thus save the smaller Slav
state from being overrun by the victorious Austrians.

The Russian campaign against Cracow had been little effected by the
fighting going on at Lodz. The Russian forces in the region of Cracow
had a clear line of retreat, if retreat should be necessary, and were
not needed for strengthening the resistance being made by the Russians
at Warsaw, as troops from Central Russia could be moved to that
threatened district by the available railroads, much more rapidly than
armies could be sent overland from Cracow. The Russian forces in the
vicinity of Cracow could best help in the defense of Warsaw, the Russian
General Staff believed, by pressing their attack energetically and so
keeping busy in that field a large force of Austrians and Germans.

On December 6, 1914, the defense of Cracow was stiffened by the arrival
of a large body of German troops. All the magnificent trees which
surrounded the place were cut down to afford space for the artillery and
various new lines of fortifications and barbed-wire entanglements were
constructed.

The Russians perceived a turning movement on the part of the enemy,
south of Cracow, directed against the Russian left wing. Russian
reenforcements which arrived found that the bridge over the Dunajec,
near Kourove, had been destroyed, and that the heights on the left bank
of the river were occupied by the enemy. Under a sustained fire by
Germans, one of the Russian regiments crossed the Dunajec at a ford.
They made their way through ice water up to their necks, and coming out
on the other side, captured the heights by a vigorous assault. This
assured and made safe the passage of the river by the other Russian
troops.

On the following day, December 7, 1914, the Austro-Germans made an
effort to counteract the advance of the Russians to Wieliczka, southeast
of Cracow. By a dash toward Neu Sandek, on the headwaters of the Dunajec
River, the Austrians attempted to outflank the Russians and thus force
them to retreat from their advance position.

The Austro-German forces occupied the valley of the stream Lososzyna,
and the fighting front extended from near Wieliczka southeastward to the
Dunajec, about fifty miles in length. The Russian attack was successful,
the losses inflicted upon the enemy, especially the German Twenty-fourth
Corps, being very heavy. Several German heavy guns were knocked out,
five field batteries were reduced to silence, guns and prisoners taken,
and the Russians continued their attack.

In the next few days in December, 1914, events favored the Austrians. In
West Galicia the south wing of the Russian army was defeated at Limanovo
and compelled to retreat. The Austrians engaged in hot pursuit and took
many prisoners. Austrian forces took Neu Sandec and again entered
Grybow, Gorlice, and Zmigrod. The Austrians reported that the Russians
had completely evacuated the Zemplin country.

A third incursion of Germans into Galicia was arrested by Russians on
the very border of the province. Some maneuvering on the part of General
Dmitrieff's corps sufficed to check the invading columns, although they
crossed the Carpathians on a wide front extending between Wieliczka and
the headwaters of the San River.

During the same week, the garrison of Przemysl made a series of
attempts at sorties, but each time were driven back with heavy loss. The
Russians captured several hundred prisoners and ten Maxims. It was
learned later that increasing scarcity of provisions complicated by
sickness was responsible for these tentative efforts to lift the siege.
An unsuccessful attempt also was made by a force from the garrison to
open the railway in the direction of Biercza, on the southwest.

It was asserted at Austrian headquarters that the total number of
Russians captured by the Austro-Hungarians in Galicia within three days
in the middle of December, 1914, was 33,000. After a battle at Limanowa,
it was said, 26,000 were captured. The number of Russians killed was
very large, according to report, 1,200 dead being found at Limanowa
alone.

The problem of caring for prisoners had by this time become acute both
for Austria and for Russia. According to the Russian Department of the
Interior, which had charge of the maintenance of prisoners, there were
then in Russia, exclusive of the Germans reported captured in operations
under way in North Poland, 350,000 Austrian and German prisoners of war.
Of this number only 100,000 were Germans, the rest being Austrians
captured during the campaign in Galicia.

At Semipalatinek, on the Irtish River, near the borders of Western
Mongolia, one small escort of Russian soldiers was serving as guard for
100,000 Austrian and German prisoners, whose prison walls consisted of
four thousand miles of frozen steppes, separating them from the borders
of their own countries.

The prisoners were brought by rail to Omsk, where they were embarked on
steamboats for the thousand mile trip down the Irtish River to
Semipalatinek. Here quarters were found for them in the big barracks
erected for the mobilization of the Russian army and unoccupied since
its departure for the front.

Every morning at eight o'clock the prisoners were released from the
barracks and permitted to wander about at will. When they departed in
the morning, they were told that unless they reported at the barracks by
nightfall they would be locked out. At that time of the year, in such a
bleak country, this would mean death, as there was practically no place
where they could obtain shelter. The freedom of the prisoners during
the day was absolute, even to the extent of accepting employment from
local mining companies.

In the thick of its fighting in Galicia, Russia had another problem to
deal with, which was the Russianization of the country. In the middle of
December, 1914, arrangements were made under the auspices of a member of
the Duma charged with national education in Galicia, for a large number
of elementary school teachers in the native schools of Galicia, to
attend at certain centers a series of lectures on Russian language and
literature. Lember, Sambor, Tarnopol, Stanislavoff, and Chernovtsi were
the first towns chosen for the opening of these courses. Besides this
measure, Russia, in the following month, opened ten model elementary
schools where all teaching was given in the Russian language. These were
in small towns and villages.




CHAPTER LXXII

AUSTRIANS AGAIN ASSUME THE OFFENSIVE


On December 14, 1914, the Russian General Staff announced that it had
"discovered the enemy trying again to assume the offensive in Galicia."
Two days later, Austro-German columns were pouring over the Dukla. It
was understood that three new German army corps had been sent to the
eastern front, making nine new corps since the beginning of hostilities,
and that three Austrian corps were withdrawn from Serbia. The number of
troops entering Galicia through the mountain passes was estimated at
175,000 men.

This movement compelled the Russians to withdraw the raiding parties
which had invaded Hungary. It is unlikely, however, that Russia had
planned to invade Hungary in force, so long as Przemysl and Cracow stood
firm. As the situation then was, it would have been a perilous feat to
send an army any distance across the mountains. Before such an invasion
could be attempted, it was first necessary that the positions of the
Russians in western Galicia and Poland should be greatly strengthened.

When the new Austro-German reenforcements arrived in Galicia over the
Dukla, the extreme southern end of the Russian line below Cracow was
pushed back from advanced positions west of the Raba to and over the
Dunajec. But the Russians did not regard the menace from this quarter as
a grave one. Announcement was made by General Sukhomlinoff, the Russian
Minister of War, on December 23,1914, that it had been stopped
"absolutely." We have said before that it was at the Austrians, rather
than the Germans, that the Russians wished at this time to strike a
telling blow.

On December 28, 1914, General Dankl's army sought to help the main
German forces by passing over the Nida near its junction with the upper
Vistula above Tarnow. The Russians suddenly were reenforced at this
point by troops who swam the ice-filled stream, attacked the Austrians
on their flank, drove them back, and took 10,000 prisoners.

It was about this time, when Radko Dmitrieff was operating so
successfully in the neighborhood of Tarnow, that General Brussilov
resumed the offensive in Galicia. He was able to feed and munition his
army from Kiev. Practically all the railroad system of Galicia could be
utilized by him for maneuvering troops and distributing supplies. His
troops numbered only about 250,000, but their strength was increased by
railway facilities. General Brussilov could afford to send a large force
under General Selivanoff to help invest Przemysl.

To the Russians, however, Przemysl was not of immediate importance. The
fortress commanded the railroad leading past Tarnow to Cracow, and would
have been badly needed, it is true, if the army of Dmitrieff at Tarnow
had been attacking Cracow. But the army of General Ivanoff had been
forced by this time to retire about fifty miles north of Cracow.
Therefore, the smaller force commanded by Dmitrieff was unable to do
anything against Cracow from the east; and so it withdrew from the upper
course of the Dunajec River and became intrenched along the more
westerly tributary of the Dunajec, the Biala.

The Russian line extended from the Biala to the Dukla Pass in the
Carpathians. Still farther eastward, all along the lower valleys of the
Carpathians, the army of General Brussilov was holding out against a
large Austro-Hungarian force. This was under the command of General
Ermolli.

The chief offensive movement of Ermolli in December, 1914, was directed
toward the relief of Przemysl. As has been indicated, his lines ran
through Grybov, Krosno, Sanok, and Lisko, thereby putting a wedge
between the army of Brussilov and that of Dmitrieff. He attacked
Dmitrieff from the east along the line of the Biala and the Dunajec. In
Christmas week Dmitrieff administered a heavy defeat to him, and took
nearly thirty thousand prisoners and many guns. In this way he helped
prepare for new plans which Grand Duke Nicholas and his staff had
prepared for the Russian army in Galicia for the new year.

Cracow had successfully resisted assault, and seemed likely to hold out
against the best efforts of the Russians. The gateway to Silesia had
been closed. Hindenburg had achieved one of his chief objects in forcing
the central Russian forces back. He had paid a huge price in men in
order to establish a deadlock of warfare in trenches, about midway in
the big bend of the Vistula. Nevertheless, from the German viewpoint,
the result achieved was worth it.

If the battle for Silesia had been won in November, 1914, by General
Russky and General Ivanoff on the field in front of Cracow, Italy and
Rumania might have been brought into the fight by their continued
advancing movement. Austria and Hungary thus might have been attacked
and overcome by huge forces from three sides. If Austria-Hungary fell,
the overthrow of Germany might have been threatened. Hindenburg's
strategy had put this out of the range of possibility.

It was such developments as have been mentioned that caused the Russian
commander in chief to decide on Hungary as the next object of attack. He
planned to bring direct pressure upon Vienna and Budapest and so force
first the Hungarians and then the Austrians to ask for terms of peace.
If they did not, he counted on Italy and Rumania entering the war and
assuring victory for the Allies.

On Christmas Day, 1914, under such conditions, began the great battles
of the Carpathians, which continued for many months to be a crisis of
the war. The Russians were outnumbered, but their position was
favorable. On December 25 they advanced on the Dukla Pass. Meanwhile
fierce fighting continued at various points in Galicia. In the
neighborhood of Tuchow, south of Tarnow, the Russians, on observing the
advance of the Twenty-sixth Austrian Brigade, slipped past on parallel
roads and surprised the Austrian rear. The Russians opened fire with
machine guns and virtually annihilated the whole brigade. In two days'
fighting in southern Galicia, near the Carpathians, the Russians
captured more than 4,000 prisoners, including a major of the General
Staff and five other officers, besides three heavy guns and two machine
guns. In this region the Russians were moving small detachments through
the mountain passes.

Many spectacular engagements took place during the development of the
Russian offensive among the mountain spurs of the Carpathians. On
Christmas Day, 1914, two Russian infantry regiments, under a murderous
fire and wading waist deep in the icy water of the River Jasiolka,
dislodged by bayonet charges the Austrians from their line and took as
prisoners four officers and 150 men. On the same day an inferior force
of Austrians surprised a Russian detachment and took 4,000 prisoners.

In another engagement south of the Vistula, in the region of Tarnow, the
Russians drove back the Austrians from the Tuchnow-Olpiny line. The
enemy abandoned ten rapid firers and the Russians took prisoner 43
officers and more than 2,500 men. The next day, December 2, 1914,
continuing the pursuit of the Austrians, the Russians captured 8 machine
guns and about 1,000 prisoners. The Russians occupied the heights near
Siedfizka, on the left bank of the Biala River. This gave them
possession of a twenty-mile strip of territory separating the two
Austrian forces.

Late in December, 1914, all attacks by the Austrians in the territory
between the Pilica and the upper reaches of the Vistula ceased and the
Russians assumed the active offensive in this region. They cleared the
left or easterly bank of the Nida River by the capture of an obstinately
defended Austrian position which was taken by storm.

South of the Vistula, or astride it on the front from Opatow across the
Biala River to Biecz, the Russians took prisoners 200 officers and
15,000 men in their sweeping process. A retreat of Austrians in Galicia
along the Lisko-Sanok-Dulka-Zmigrod front was precipitate, the nature of
the country favoring them, the corridor-like valleys and passes
preventing the Russians from pursuing them over parallel roads or
harassing their flanks. Only six roads cross the Carpathians, two of
which are little more than mountain trails. Owing to the unbroken
character of this region, the Russian cavalry was able to do little
scouting, while the extreme cold interfered with the work of aeroplanes.

In western Galicia the Russians made progress in spite of the almost
impassable condition of the country due to mud, driving the enemy from
the front of Stromnik-Gorlice-Jasliska, taking guns and a large number
of machine guns.

The year of 1914 closed with the Russian troops advancing in western
Galicia, having stormed several fortified works of the enemy, east of
Zakliczyn, making prisoners of 44 officers and 1,500 soldiers, and
capturing 8 machine guns.

Southwest of Dukla Pass the Russians had dislodged the Austrians from
positions they had strongly fortified. They had also realized an
important success south of Lisko and had repulsed counterattacks by the
enemy in the Carpathians at Uzsok Pass and renewed sorties by the
garrison at Przemysl.

Early in January, 1915, the Russians developed great activity in
Bukowina and the Carpathians, without making much impression on Austrian
positions which they attacked on the Sucwaza River, in the Upper
Csermosz territory, and also further west, on the ridges of the
Carpathians. In the district of Gorlice and to the northwest of
Zakliczyn determined Russian attacks were repulsed. During the fighting
at Gorlice the Austrians stormed and captured a height south of there.

During the second week in January, 1915, heavy rains put a stop
temporarily to the Russian offensive southward in the direction of Neu
Sandek, and at the same time to the Austrian offensive in Russian
Poland. A thaw following rain converted the whole country into a vast
morass. It was physically impossible for the Austrians to bring up heavy
artillery, without which the Russian position along the Nida River could
not be forced.

The Russian lines on the east bank of the Nida followed the heights,
which were admirably suited for intrenchments and well covered with
positions for the Russian artillery fire. There was little firing,
however, except an occasional artillery duel when the fog permitted and
sporadic local infantry firing. Conditions were similar east of Cracow,
the adversaries being well intrenched on opposite sides of the Dunajec
River.

During this time another determined sortie was made by the garrison at
Przemysl, preceded by extensive cavalry reconnaissance. The Austrian
infantry then advanced in force in the direction of a wood near the
city. The Russians opened fire, but the Austrians rushed forward and
gained the cover of the woods. They continued to push forward and the
Russians permitted them to advance close to their position before making
a serious attempt to halt them.

With the fighting thus at close range, the Russians opened a terrific
fire from rifles and machine guns. The battle raged for several hours,
with heavy losses on both sides. The Austrians then retired to the
fortress.

From the middle to the end of January, 1915, fierce snowstorms and
bitter cold interfered with the activity of both Russians and Austrians.
There were few engagements. Toward the end of the month, concentration
of Austrian troops in Bukowina became stronger. On January 21, 1914, an
Austrian force, including an infantry division with artillery, attacked
the Russian front in the region of Kirlibaba, but was repulsed.

On the night of January 27, 1914, the Russians were driven back in the
Upper Ung Valley from their positions on both sides of Uzsok Pass. This
was one of the most important of the Carpathian passes, for the
possession of which many important engagements had been fought since
the beginning of the war. It was strongly intrenched and stubbornly
defended in several good positions, one behind the other. It fell into
the hands of the Austrians after three days of hard fighting. West of
the Uzsok Pass, Russian attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. Near
Vezeralles and Volovco battles ended with the Russians being driven from
the heights of the pass. The Austrians took 400 prisoners.

During the latter part of January, 1915, there were no developments of
importance in Galicia.




PART VII--RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN




CHAPTER LXXIII

FIRST CLASH ON PRUSSIAN FRONTIER


The first clash of arms between the Russian and German armies occurred
on August 6, 1914, near Soldau, East Prussia. In this chapter we will
follow the events which were taking place on this frontier,
simultaneously with the movements of the German invasions of Belgium and
France, the Austro-Serbian campaigns, the Russian invasion of Austria,
and the campaigns in the other parts of the world. The general causes
preceding the outbreak of the war have been fully narrated in Volume I,
while the theatre of the following campaign is clearly described in the
chapter on that subject. It is necessary at this time, however, to
review the fighting lines before we bring the mighty German army and the
Russian hosts into combat on their first battle ground.

We have seen that for many years previous to the outbreak of the great
European War all the countries involved had been forced by political,
economic, and social conditions to work, each country in its own way,
toward the same main object--military preparedness. Many factors, of
course, determined not only the means for achieving this result, but
also the degree to which it was finally accomplished. At this time we
are interested only in the results so far as they affected Russia and
Germany at the beginning of the war.

When the armies gathered on the Russo-German frontier, both of these
countries had reached a high degree of military efficiency. Germany,
which for decades had been the acknowledged leader among the great
powers as far as army development was concerned, had practically
concluded the increases and improvements for the accomplishment of which
its people had only recently submitted to a special scheme of very
extensive taxation, the "Wehrbeitrag." By the results of this move, we
find that the western defenses against France and indirectly against
England profited much more than those in the east against Russia.

Russia, as its army stood ready to strike its first blow at Germany, had
drawn to the fullest extent the obvious conclusions impressed upon it by
its defeat in the Russo-Japanese War. Graft, which had played such great
havoc during its last war, had been stamped out. The artillery equipment
had been brought up to date and the troops in charge of it had increased
vastly their skill in its use. Everywhere formations had been
rearranged, increased and improved, and this rearrangement had affected
especially the distribution of the empire's forces. Never before in its
history had Russia concentrated so many troops in its eastern and
central provinces.

In setting its armies into action, Germany faced by far the easier
problem. Its territory was much more compact, its means of communication
were vastly greater and superior, and racial differences between its
various parts were practically nonexistent. With a total area of 208,825
square miles, the German Empire possessed 39,532 miles of railroad,
whereas the Russian Empire in Europe, with 2,100,000 square miles had
only 35,447 miles of railroad. The Germans had the further advantage of
having brought all their means of transportation to the very acme of
perfection, while the Russians were lacking in equipment as well as in
organization.

The remarkable quickness and effectiveness with which the Russian army
operated at the moment of war indicates not only an unexpectedly high
state of preparedness, but also a remarkably high degree of leadership
on the part of its generals.

The general staffs of both Russia and Germany were as well prepared to
meet on the battle ground as far as it had been within human power and
foresight. Each side had collected all available information concerning
the other. The German genius for organization had proved itself
especially valuable and fertile in this direction. On the basis of this
knowledge, well-defined plans of campaign had been worked out, and the
leaders of both sides had many opportunities to exercise their strategic
abilities, not only by solving problems created by these plans
theoretically across the tables in their respective war colleges, but
also practically during the annual periods of maneuvers.

As the armies faced each other in the first week of August, 1914, the
strategy of both sides was determined chiefly by three factors: (1) by
the obstacles and defenses which nature itself had placed in the
localities in which the fighting was likely to take place; (2) by the
means of defense and offense which were available; (3) by political
conditions.

At the beginning of the war all but the last were absolutely known
quantities, and as far as Russia and Germany were concerned this last
factor could be figured out comparatively easily. For it was clear that
if Germany would become involved in a war with Russia, Austria would be
found fighting by its ally's side and _vice versa_. It was also fairly
reasonable to assume, and had immediately become a fact, that under such
conditions Germany would find itself involved with France too, which
would mean that Germany's available fighting strength would have to be
divided into two parts at least. It was, of course, a matter of fairly
common knowledge that Germany's concentration was much more powerful on
its western border than on its eastern, so that Russia could count with
reasonable certainty on a comparative weak, even if well organized,
resistance on the part of Germany at the beginning of war.

Germany's strategy in the east was influenced chiefly by its plan for
the western campaign, which we have already considered in the preceding
chapters. The fight against France seemed to be of greater importance
and urgency to Germany than that against Russia. Why German strategy
reached this conclusion does not concern us here. In passing, however,
it may be well to remember that the German provinces adjoining France
directly, or indirectly behind Belgium and Luxemburg, were of much
greater importance and value to the Germans than their provinces
adjoining Russia, and that even the temporary loss of these would
probably have spelled disaster to Germany. Then, too, it was on the
western side that England's influence was being felt; and, furthermore,
the French army, though much less numerous than the Russian, was a more
formidable adversary on account of its greater effectiveness, as well as
of the certainty of its much quicker movements.

Russia had a preponderantly large advantage in numbers over Germany. The
result of this fact, from a strategic point of view, was that Russia
could dare much more than her adversaries. She could strike stronger,
quicker, and with greater frequency in more directions, and could risk
to extend her operations much farther. The fact that means of
transportation, as has been pointed out, were much better developed in
the German frontier provinces than in those of Russia, was a
disadvantage only as long as Russia fought on its own territory, though
even then, necessarily, the invading enemy would be hampered at least
equally by the lack of transportation facilities.

Russia's natural advantage of greater numbers pointed clearly to an
immediate offensive which would bring with it the promise of more
advantages, while both German and Austrian conditions indicated with
equal clearness as the safest and sanest strategy a policy of "watchful
waiting," at least until such time when large enough forces could be
spared from the western front or concentrated from available reserve
sources to promise to a more aggressive policy a fair chance of success.

Thus Russia decided to strike immediately against Germany as well as
against Austria. With the latter campaign we are not concerned here. How
she devoted herself to this twofold task with all the power and means at
her command we shall see in the following narrative.

The hosts of Russia were standing on the German frontier. In the four
provinces adjoining Austria-Hungary a total of sixteen army corps, or
one-half of all the Russian army in European Russia, were available. By
July 31, 1914, the czar had ordered the general mobilization of army and
navy. The German Ambassador in Petrograd was instructed to notify the
Russian Government that unless this order was countermanded within
twelve hours, Germany would immediately respond by mobilization of her
army and navy. As the Russian mobilization had continued, Germany
officially took the same step in the late afternoon of August 1, 1914,
after a state of war had already been proclaimed for the entire empire
on July 31, 1914.

The fighting forces on the German side at the beginning of the war on or
near the east front included the First Army Corps at Koenigsberg, the
Twentieth at Allenstein, the Seventeenth at Danzig, the Fifth at Posen,
and the Sixth at Breslau. These mustered a total of forty-four infantry,
twenty-one cavalry, and twenty-five artillery regiments, augmented by
four battalions of rifles (Jaeger), and twelve formations of technical
troops. The entire peace effectiveness of these formations was about
150,000 men, which at full war strength undoubtedly meant at least not
less than 500,000 men, of whom about one-half were of the first line,
the balance being made up of reserves and Landwehr troops.

The Russians drew up, in the face of the Germans, two armies: the Army
of Poland and the Army of the Niemen. The latter in peace time centered
in Vilna and consisted of five army corps; the former used Warsaw as its
base and consisted of at least as many army corps. It now held a wide
front from the Narev in the north to the valley of the Bug River. These
two armies together had an effectiveness of almost twice as many men as
the German forces, supported as they were by a series of well-garrisoned
fortresses: Grodno, Osowiec, and Bialistock in the north; Lomza, Novo
Georgievsk, and Warsaw in the center; and Ivangorod and Brest-Litovsk in
the south. In its entirety the mobilization of these forces was
completed about the third week of August, 1914, but by the end of the
first week the Army of the Niemen had completed its mobilization, and it
was from there that the first blow was struck.

This army was commanded by General Rennenkampf, one of the few Russian
generals who had succeeded in coming through the Russo-Japanese War, not
only with an untarnished, but even with an enhanced reputation. Its task
was to invade the northern part of East Prussia, striking directly at
Koenigsberg.

Small engagements, of course, took place all along the Russo-German
border between the advance guards of the two armies from the day war had
been declared.

On August 6, 1914, a Russian cavalry division crossed over into the
enemy's country south of Eydtkuhnen. The next ten days saw many isolated
advances of this nature, all of them initiated by the Russians, and most
of them accomplishing their respective objects. One small force ventured
as far north as the immediate proximity of Tilsit of Napoleonic memory.




CHAPTER LXXIV

ADVANCE OF RUSSIANS AGAINST THE GERMANS


On August 16, 1914, within seventeen days after the official beginning
of the Russian mobilization, everything was in readiness for the general
advance. The next day immediately developed the first strong German
resistance. At Stallupoehnen the German First Corps from Koenigsberg,
under General von Francois, supported by two reserve corps, attempted to
stem the Russian flood. Though they succeeded in taking 3,000 prisoners
and some machine guns, they had to fall back upon Gumbinnen. The
pressure of the superior Russian numbers--four active and two reserve
corps--proved too strong. The battle front now was about thirty-five
miles long, extending from Pillkallen on the north to Goldap on the
south, with Gumbinnen in the center.

On August 20, 1914, the first real battle on the eastern front was
fought before this pretty country town, which was founded in the
beginning of the eighteenth century, and had gradually acquired about
15,000 people. General Rennenkampf used his numerical superiority for a
powerful onslaught against the enemy's center. Fourteen hours of the
most stubborn fighting--beginning at dawn and ending only with the
coming of night--resulted in the final withdrawal of the German center.
Though artillery did some preparatory work, it was the slashing thrust
of glittering bayonets in massed formations and the tearing devastation
of hand grenades that carried the day. The German wings kept up their
resistance for the next day, but finally joined the main army which had
withdrawn through Gumbinnen to Insterburg. The losses on both sides
probably were about even, amounting to at least 5,000.

The certainty of the Russian numerical superiority undoubtedly was
responsible for Von Francois's continuation of his retreat to his main
base, Koenigsberg. The Russians lost no time in following and reached
Insterburg on August 23, 1914. Practically without further opposition
all of northern East Prussia as far as the river Memel was in General
Rennenkampf's hands, Tilsit, Labiau, Tapiau, Gerdauen, Korschen,
Rastenburg, Angerburg, and Goldap indicate the limits of his conquest.
With it went four of the six railroads centering in Koenigsberg, leaving
open only the two lines running to Allenstein and Danzig, which, of
course, meant serious danger to this important German fortress.

The Russian Army of the Narew had, in the meantime, pushed its advance
with equal rapidity and success from the south. Its commander, General
Samsonoff, had won laurels in Manchuria, and had acquired considerable
military reputation as a commander in Turkestan and as a member of the
general staff. He had approximately as many men at his disposal as his
colleague--about 250,000. His task, however, was more difficult. For his
entire front would face, almost immediately after crossing the border,
the treacherous lake district in the south of East Prussia. For his
advance he used the two railroads from Warsaw into East Prussia, on the
west through Mlawa and Soldau, and on the east through Osowiec and Lyck.
From the latter town he pushed his right wing forward in a northwesterly
direction, and sent his center toward the southwest to Johannisburg.

On August 23 and 24, 1914, to meet this advance, the Germans had
available only one active army corps, centered in Allenstein, the
Twentieth. Local Landwehr formations found the task of delaying the
Russians far beyond their power. In quick succession Samsonoff took
Soldau, Neidenburg, Ortelsburg, and finally Allenstein. At Frankenau,
just west of the Mazurian Lakes, his right wing connected with the
Twentieth German Corps, which, supported by strongly prepared
intrenchments, managed to hold up the Russian advance, but finally had
to give way and fall back on Allenstein and Osterode. This gave to the
Russians command of one more railroad to Koenigsberg, that from
Allenstein. Though the two Russian armies had not yet formed a solid
connection, they were in touch with each other through their cavalry,
and the Russian front was in the form of a doubly broken line running
from Friedland through Gerdauen to Angerburg (Niemen Army) and from
there through Frankenau and Allenstein to Soldau (Narew Army). The
former, facing southwest, in connection with the latter, now threatened
not only Koenigsberg, but the defensive line of the Vistula from Thorn to
Danzig. The greater part of East Prussia seemed securely in the
possession of more than 500,000 Russian soldiers, chiefly of the first
line, and under apparently very able leadership.

The occupied territory suffered severely. Bombardment and fire had laid
waste, at least partially, some of the towns and a great many of the
villages. Requisitions for the support of the invading army necessarily
brought great hardships and losses to the unfortunate inhabitants. The
avalanche-like success of the Russian arms, the clearly displayed
weakness of German numbers and the rapid retreat of their forces
naturally added to the terror of the peasants who make up the largest
part of East Prussia's population. By thousands they fled from their
villages and hamlets, carrying on their slow oxcarts or on their
shoulders whatever they had gathered as their most precious possessions
in their first hours of fear and terror. To them the word "Cossack"
still called up pictures of the wild hordes that had overrun their
country during the Seven Years' War, and later again in the Napoleonic
wars. The large, strongly fortified cities of Koenigsberg and Danzig
seemed to hold out the only hope for life and security, and toward these
they flocked in ever-increasing masses. Even Berlin itself had brought
home to it some of the more refined cruelties of war by the arrival of
East Prussian refugees.

We have already seen that at the outbreak of the war only five active
German corps were left on the eastern front. Two, the First and the
Twentieth, had, so far, had to bear the brunt of the Russian advance;
one other, the Sixth, had been sent from Breslau to detract, as much as
possible, the Russian onslaught against the Austrian forces in Galicia;
and the other two, the Fifth and Seventeenth, stationed in Danzig and
Posen, were too far back to be immediately available.




CHAPTER LXXV

BATTLE OF TANNENBERG AND RUSSIAN RETREAT


When on August 22, 1914, the full strength of the Russian attack became
evident, the German General Staff decided on heroic measures. An
immediate increase of the German forces to the point where they would
match the Russian seemed out of the question, and the solution of the
problem, therefore, clearly lay in the ability of the general staff to
find a general who could, with the forces on hand, meet the requirements
of the situation--free East Prussia of the invader.

Fortunately for Germany, its hour of need on the eastern front brought
forth this man. There had been living for a number of years in the west
German city of Hanover a general who had been retired in 1911 as
commander of an army corps. His name was Paul von Hindenburg. He was at
that time in his sixty-seventh year, but having been an army officer
since his youth, he was "hard as nails," and from a military point of
view still in the prime of his years as a leader.

It was well known in military circles that Von Hindenburg had acquired
the most thorough knowledge of the difficult lake district south of
Koenigsberg. He had devoted his time and energies for years to a most
exhaustive study and investigation of the Mazurian lakes and swamps.
Again and again he had tramped through them on foot, picked his way
along their treacherous paths on horseback, and finally put their few
roads to the supreme test of the motor car. He knew their every
shortcoming and advantage. His topographical information included
fording places for men and guns, and quicksands.

Much of this knowledge he passed on to younger officers to whom he
lectured at the General Staff College in Berlin, and when, only some
years ago, practically all arrangements had been concluded by powerful
financial interests to drain and cultivate his beloved lakes and swamps
for agricultural purposes, he succeeded in overthrowing these plans at
the last moment. It is said that so powerful were these interests that
Von Hindenburg succeeded only by going, at last, to the emperor himself,
and convincing him that the natural defensive possibilities outweighed
in value any amount of increased acreage of reclaimed land.

We have already shown the problem which faced Von Hindenburg. To drive
the Russians out of East Prussia he had to defeat two armies composed of
at least 500,000 men, whose offensive momentum had been raised to a very
high power by a highly successful advance of more than a week's
duration. He, himself, could count only on far inferior numbers, not
more than the equivalent of four army corps. These he had to assemble
without loss of time and with as much artillery equipment as could be
spared from all directions. From Koenigsberg came the biggest part of the
beaten First Corps and its reserves. What was left of the Twentieth
Corps, of course, was right on the ground. Undoubtedly the fortresses of
Danzig, Graudenz, Thorn, and Posen had to yield parts of their
garrisons. However, most of these were troops of the second line.

On August 23, 1914, Von Hindenburg arrived at Marienburg, about seventy
miles southwest from Koenigsberg and almost as far to the northwest from
Allenstein, and assumed command of the East Prussian forces. Only three
days later, on August 26, 1914, he was ready to put in execution the
plans on which he had worked for almost a lifetime.

[Illustration: Battle of Tannenberg.]

Hindenburg's general strategical plan was as simple as the carrying out
of it, considering the means at his command was difficult. Facing him
were two armies still out of contact with each other, or at least only
very loosely connected. Each alone outnumbered him at least by 50,000;
combined they were more than three times as powerful as all his forces.
His only hope, therefore, was in attacking them separately. Thus he
chose to strike first at Samsonoff's army which was much farther spread
out than Rennenkampf's, and would find it much more difficult than the
latter to keep open its main line of retreat and supply. Its left rested
on Soldau, its right on Frankenau, while its center had been pushed
forward to Allenstein through Soldau, and southeast from it ran the only
direct railroad to his Polish base by way of Mlawa. Three other lines
centered there, one in the west from Thorn, one in the northwest from
Eylau (connecting with Danzig and Koenigsberg), and one in the east from
Neidenburg, which from there run north to Allenstein and northeast to
Johannisburg and Lyck. Apparently centering his efforts on pushing his
advance, Samsonoff had neglected to secure the former two roads.

On August 26, 1914, Von Hindenburg occupied both and took Soldau
Junction. The shortest line of retreat had now been cut off to the
Russians, whose forces were scattered over a considerable territory, and
on account of lack of railroads could not be concentrated quickly or
efficiently at any one point. Though a determined effort was made on
August 27, 1914, to retake Soldau, it was foredoomed to failure.
Samsonoff's left was thrown back on Neidenburg, making his front even
more unwieldly than before.

At this time the German front was very short, its left being at
Hohenstein, about halfway between Soldau and Allenstein and slightly
northeast of Tannenberg. But it made up in activity what it lacked in
length. In vain the Russians tried to break the German ranks and open up
a road to the northwest. Much blood was spilled on both, sides during
three days' fighting, but the German line held. In the meantime the
Russians had evacuated Allenstein, feeling the imperative need of
shortening their front. This gave Von Hindenburg the railroad that ran
almost parallel to the Russian front as well as the splendid main road
that runs alongside of it. Commandeering every available motor vehicle
from the entire surrounding countryside, he immediately extended his
line and swung around the Russian right as previously he had swung
around their left. Almost every road, rail or otherwise, that was of any
importance was now in the hands of the Germans and along them could be
sent men and guns with overwhelming rapidity. With relentless energy Von
Hindenburg now used his intimate knowledge of the territory in which he
was fighting. Wherever he knew the most hopeless territory to be, there
he drove the Russians. Mazurian swamps and lakes did all that he had
ever claimed they would do and more. They swallowed up his enemy by the
thousand, they engulfed his guns and sucked in his horses.

Within a week after Von Hindenburg had reached East Prussia the problem
of the Narew Army had changed from how to extend its advance most
quickly to how to escape from this bottomless pit along the few
inadequate lines of escape that were left. The morale of this Russian
army was broken. For even the most stolid Russian peasant soldier, whom
neither the roar of guns nor the flash of bayonets could move, quaked at
seeing whole companies and batteries disappear, in less time that it
takes to tell about it, in the morasses of a country without firm roads
and a minimum of solid ground.

On the last day of August, 1914, thousands of Russians had laid down
their arms and were sent back into central Germany. Of Russian armies of
more than a quarter of a million nearly a hundred thousand fell into
German hands. Almost half as many more were killed or wounded. The
Russian commander in chief was killed on August 31, 1914. Only one corps
escaped by way of Ortelsburg and Johannisburg, while scattered fragments
of varying size fought their way out, some into north Poland and some
into the protecting arms of the Niemen Army. Most of the guns of
Samsonoff's army were either captured by the Germans or lost in the
swamps. This one week's battle among the Mazurian lakes is known now as
the Battle of Tannenberg, so named after a small town west of and
halfway between Soldau and Allenstein.

Without giving his troops any rest Von Hindenburg now turned against
Rennenkampf's forces. But, in spite of the rapidity of movement, the
German commander could not accomplish all that he had set out to do.
Apparently his plan was now to strike north past Angerburg and Goldap to
Gumbinnen, or possibly even to Eydtkuhnen in order to cut off the
retreat of the army of the Niemen and drive them in a southerly
direction to their destruction in the Mazurian lakes, just as he had
done in his easterly drive against the Narew Army. But Rennenkampf was
too quick. He recognized the danger that threatened him through the
defeat of Samsonoff's forces and he began his retreat as soon as it
became evident that the other army's cause was lost. He was in a much
more advantageous position than his colleague had been. For not only did
the territory through which he had to fall back offer no particular
difficulties when once he had escaped Hindenburg's attempt to push him
up against the Mazurian lakes, but he had also a fairly efficient
network of railroads at his command centering in Insterburg.

Long before he evacuated this city on September 11, 1914, he had drawn
in most of his outlying formations in the north and west and had sent
them back safely across the border and behind the protection of the
Niemen and its shield of fortresses--Kovno, Olita, and Grodno. In this
he was also materially assisted by the stubborn resistance which Von
Hindenburg encountered at Lyck at the hands of a small army that had
been sent out from Grodno to aid him, and the nucleus of which consisted
of an entirely new Finnish, and an equally complete, Siberian Corps. In
spite of this, however, the pressure of the victorious Germans was
strong and rapid enough to force him to a generally hurried retreat. The
losses in killed and wounded were comparatively small, for almost all
the fighting was rear-guard action. But the Germans succeeded in
gathering in about 30,000 more prisoners, chiefly detachments that had
been unsuccessful in connecting in time with the main army. Much more
serious was the loss of some 150 guns and vast quantities of war
material for the removal of which both time and means had been lacking.

On September 15, 1914, Von Hindenberg could announce that the last of
the invaders had either been captured or driven back and that not an
acre of German soil was in the possession of the Russian forces. On that
date, moreover, he had already advanced far enough into Russian
territory to occupy the seat of government of the Russian province of
Suwalki, almost 150 miles in direct line east of Tannenberg, though less
than 20 from the German border. From that point on he intrusted the
further conduct of these operations to Lieutenant General von Morgen,
who had been one of his division commanders at Tannenberg.

By September 23, 1914, Rennenkampf had completed his retreat behind the
Niemen. The fighting which took place during the ensuing week is
commonly designated as the "Battle of Augustovo," though it covered a
much larger area. Augustovo itself is a small town about ten miles from
the German frontier, about twenty miles south of Suwalki, and forty
miles northwest from Grodno.

The German advance clearly suggested an attempt on their part to force a
crossing of the Niemen. This in itself was a very difficult undertaking.
The river is more than 600 feet wide, too deep to ford, and naturally
none of the few bridges over it were available for the Germans.
Furthermore its right bank, which was held by the Russians, is very
high, commanding absolutely and practically everywhere the low left bank
which in many places is almost as swampy as the worst parts of the
Mazurian lakes. West of the Niemen and between it and the frontier the
country is full of lakes, much as in the Mazurian region. The Germans,
of course, were under the same disadvantages there as the Russians had
suffered from in East Prussia. Of railroads there were none except one,
running in the shape of a semicircle from Grodno through Augustovo and
Suwalki to Olita.

On September 25, 1914, in spite of these conditions and disregarding the
weakened state of their forces, the Germans attempted to cross the
Niemen simultaneously at two places. About thirty miles north of Grodno
they had constructed a pontoon bridge and began to send across their
infantry. It was only then that the Russians opened up their murderous
fire from well-protected positions. Against it the Germans were
practically helpless. In spite of large numbers of guns that they
brought up, and in spite of repeated efforts of crossing in massed
formations, the result was the same: immense losses on the part of the
Germans and comparatively slight ones on the part of the Russians.
Indeed, the last attempt was not only frustrated, but the Russians even
forced back the Germans some miles.

Somewhat farther south the other attempt met with a similar fate. There
not only had the Russians posted their heavy guns on the right bank, but
infantry had been strongly intrenched on the left. Their combined
opposition forced back the Germans under heavy losses after they had
fought all day and all night. During the last week of September, 1914,
the Germans were gradually forced back along their entire front. Much of
the fighting was done in the dense forests east of Augustovo and was
hand-to-hand fighting. In the afternoon of October 1, 1914, the Russians
recaptured Augustovo after the Germans had made a determined stand,
yielding only when heavy guns bombarded their positions from the west
and northwest. On the next day the Germans had to retreat from Suwalki
and withdraw the lines that they had extended northward, and fall back
behind their frontier. This meant the end of the German attempt to cross
the Niemen and the beginning of the second invasion of East Prussia.




CHAPTER LXXVI

SECOND RUSSIAN INVASION OF EAST PRUSSIA


Wonderful as had been Von Hindenburg's accomplishment in defeating the
Russians and practically destroying one of their first-line armies, the
latter's recuperative power was almost as surprising. Deprived of the
prize of three weeks' fighting, defeated, and driven by the enemy on
their entire front for a depth of fifty miles into their own country,
they were nevertheless ready in a few days for a new offensive.
Undoubtedly this was partly due to the talent of their new commander,
General Russky, who had been sent up from Galicia, where he had gathered
experience as well as honors. But more so was it due to the protecting
defenses of the Niemen and the opportunities they offered for
reorganization, rest, and the collection of new forces.

The situation which was faced on the first week of October, 1914, was
perilous to all the armies engaged. Russia's fortresses on its eastern
front were concerned for a twofold purpose. In the first place, they
were to lend increased power of resistance to whatever means of defense
nature had provided, and this function, of course, determined their
location. Wherever rivers or other natural obstacles would offer
themselves to an invading enemy, there Russia had added especially
strong artificial defenses.

Any army invading Russia from East Prussia in a southerly direction
would have to cross the Narew River and its principal tributary on the
right, the Bober. These two run, roughly speaking, parallel to the
Russo-German border at a distance of about thirty to thirty-five miles,
and no army attempting an invasion east of the Vistula and south of the
Niemen could advance farther than this short distance without first
crossing the Narew and Bober.

The group of fortresses along this natural line of defense begins
opposite the southwestern corner of East Prussia with Osowiec, situated
on the railroad that runs from Lyck Bialistock. Thence it stretches in a
southwesterly direction through Lomsha, Ostrolenka, Rozan, Pultusk to
Novo Georgievsk, which latter is the most important of these, commanding
as it does the conflux of the Narew, Wkra, and Vistula rivers.

This series of fortified places forms the center of the system of
fortifications against Germany. In a southeasterly direction from it the
Vistula offers another strong natural line of defense strengthened still
more by the two big fortresses of Warsaw and Ivangorod, behind which, on
a bend of the Bug River and almost equally distant from both,
Brest-Litovsk, at the very western end of the vast Pripet swamps,
defends the entrance to central Russia, to Smolensk and Moscow.

Adjoining Osowiec on the north and making even more formidable and
naturally very strong defensive line of the River Niemen are Grodno,
Olita, and Kovno.

The second purpose of all these fortified places is to protect the rear
of an offensive army advancing toward Germany and to offer a haven of
refuge if it should become necessary for such an army to fall back. At
the same time they serve as powerful bases and screens behind which an
army of defense could quickly be changed into one of offense. Not only
had they served well this last purpose at the time of mobilization, but
again and again later on weakened Russian armies succeeded in retreating
behind these protecting shields, from which they emerged again a little
later, bent on new attacks, after they had been strengthened by
reenforcements from Russia's inexhaustible resources of men.

It was thus that the Russian armies saved themselves after Von
Hindenburg's smashing victory at Tannenburg. Out of about 650,000 men,
forming the Army of the Narew, and the Vilna Army, more than 300,000 had
succeeded in reaching the shelter of their fortresses.

At that time the German forces, sadly in need of rest, were much too
small and too weak to attempt an energetic general attack against either
the Niemen or the Narew-Bug lines of defenses. However, in order to
prevent another invasion of East Prussia something had to be done. They
therefore advanced a goodly distance into the province of Suwalki,
occupying even the seat of its government, a town of the same name.
Farther south Osowiec represented a continuous danger to East Prussia,
being very close to the border and on the direct railroad to Lyck.
Though the Germans were in no condition to undertake a siege, they
determined to attempt at least to close the crossing of the Bober at
this most advantageous point.

September 18, 1914, saw the beginning of this movement and ten days
later heavy artillery in limited force was thundering against the gates
of the small but strong fortress.

The suffering on both sides during this period was very great. Keeping
continuously moving, fighting day and night under conditions the natural
difficulties of which had been increased still more by unending
rainstorms, resulting in long delays for food and other supplies,
Russians as well as Germans displayed wonderful energy and perseverance.
And in spite of these difficulties, in spite of roads ankle deep in mud,
the Germans advanced and the Russians re-formed their forces.

On October 2, 1914, the Russian advance started from Grodno as a base.
The Third Siberian and parts of the Twenty-second Finnish Army Corps,
forming the left wing, met the enemy at Augustovo. For two days the
battle lasted, and though it involved only comparatively small numbers
it was one of the most sanguinary engagements of this period. Both sides
lost thousands of men and large quantities of war equipment. The Germans
having received reenforcements, attempted a flanking movement against
the right wing, undoubtedly with the intention of attacking the Russians
from the rear. They succeeded in getting a small force around the
Russian right, which, however, had to be withdrawn very soon. For the
balance of October the fighting raged along the entire front from the
Niemen in the north to Lomsha in the south, a distance of about 150
miles. Neither side was able to gain any decisive advantage, for both
the offensive and the defensive was fought with equal stubbornness. One
day fortune would smile on Russia's masses, only to turn its back
against them during the next twenty-four hours. The lack of success of
the German flanking movement around the Russian right brought to the
latter greater freedom of movement. It advanced toward Wirballen with
the object of gaining the road to Eydtkuhnen and Stallupoehnen, which
would enable them to strike once more for the important junction at
Insterburg. This attempt resulted in another minor but very sanguinary
engagement north of Vysztyt Lake. Again no decision had been reached,
though the Russians were getting closer and closer to East Prussia. A
Russian attempt to outflank the German left at Schirwindt, a few miles
north of Eydtkuhnen and right across the line in East Prussia, was not
any more successful than the previous German attempt, and weakened the
Russian right, just as a similar failure on the other side had weakened
the German left. Again honors, hardships, and losses were fairly even.

In the center the Russian advance covered an extensive plain, known as
the Romintener Heide. There, too, continuous fighting, a great deal of
which was carried on at night, involved usually only comparatively small
formations and the result was equally indecisive.

The Russian left wing had been more successful. It had fought its way
across the border and taken Wargrabova. The Germans, however, succeeded
in retaking this place as early as October 9, 1914, pursuing the
Russians and finally stormed their strong intrenchments a week later.
The country here is slightly elevated and the Russians had dug
themselves in rather elaborately. Manyfold rows of trenches, in some
places six and eight deep, had been thrown up around the small village
of Vielitzken which suffered severely during the German onrush.

In the meantime another attempt to take Lyck had succeeded. The direct
road through Osowiec was not available on account of the German force
located there. So the Russians sent a division forward from Lomsha
which, taking Bialla, reached Lyck on October 8, 1914. The Germans,
lacking sufficient forces for a successful defense, withdrew not only
from Lyck, but also from before Osowiec.

But by October 13,1914, the Niemen Army's advance into East Prussia had
been either forced back or delayed to such an extent that this
comparatively weak Russian advance in the extreme south was out of touch
with the main forces of the Niemen Army, and therefore in turn was
withdrawn.

This practically finished the second Russian invasion of East Prussia.
The German forces gradually cleared all of their country of the enemy
and followed him even into his own territory. But although continuous
fighting went on during the last week of October, again chiefly around
Augustovo and Bakalartshev, the Russians for the time being contented
themselves with a defensive policy, just as the Germans were satisfied
with their success in preventing the Russian advance without going over
to a clean offensive.




CHAPTER LXXVII

FIRST GERMAN DRIVE AGAINST WARSAW


We have already spoken of the strategic position of Russian Poland, of
its vulnerability, exposed as it is to attack from the Central Powers on
three sides, and finally what Russia had done to strengthen Poland's
natural line of defense, the Vistula River, by building fortresses on
its most important points. It may be well to recall here that the lower
part of this river flows through West Prussia, from Thorn to the Gulf of
Danzig. For almost a hundred miles, from Thorn to Novo Georgievsk, it
cannot actually be considered of defensive value to Russia; flowing
slightly northwest from the latter fortress to the border it is open to
German use on either side. But at that point, about twenty miles
northwest of Warsaw, any army coming along its valley would have to take
first this important fortress before it could continue farther into
central Poland. Should it fail in this it would have to withdraw its
forces from the right bank and then force a crossing at some point
between Novo Georgievsk and the point where the Vistula enters Russian
Poland from Austrian Poland, a few miles east of Cracow. It is at this
point also that the Vistula is swelled by its most important
contributary, the Bug River, which, roughly speaking, flows parallel to
the Vistula at a distance of about seventy miles from the Galician
border to a point on the Vilna-Warsaw railroad, about fifty miles east
of Warsaw, where it bends toward the west to join the Vistula. The Bug
River thus forms a strong secondary natural line of defense. In the
north the Narew--a tributary of the Bug--forms an equally strong barrier
against an army advancing from East Prussia.

There cannot be much doubt that the plan of the Central Powers
originally was to take Poland without having to overcome these very
formidable obstacles. If Von Hindenburg had succeeded after the battle
of Tannenberg in crossing the Niemen, and if, at about the same time the
Austro-Hungarians had also succeeded in defeating their Russian
adversaries in Galicia, described in another chapter, this object could
have been accomplished very easily by a concerted advance of both along
the east bank of the Bug, with Brest-Litovsk as the most likely point of
junction. The result would have been twofold: in the first place all of
Poland would have been in the hands of the Central Powers; for Russia
either would have had to withdraw its forces from there before their
three main lines of retreat--the railroads from Warsaw to Petrograd,
Moscow, Kiev--had been cut by the invaders, or else the latter would
have been in a position to destroy them leisurely, having surrounded
them completely. In the second place it would have meant the shortening
of the eastern front by hundreds of miles, making it practically a
straight line from the Baltic Sea to some point on the Russo-Galician
frontier.

In the preceding chapters, however, we have seen that up to the
beginning of October, 1914, neither the Germans nor the Austrians had
accomplished this object. The former had to satisfy themselves with
having cleared their own soil in East Prussia of the Russian invaders
and with keeping it free from further invasions, while the latter were
being pressed harder and harder every day and had to figure with a
possible invasion of Hungary. It was then that the Central Powers
decided to invade Poland from the west, and thus gradually drove out the
Russians. Why they persisted in their efforts to gain possession of
Russian Poland is clear enough. For in addition to the above-mentioned
advantage of shortening and straightening their front, they would also
deprive Russia of one of its most important and populous centers of
industry, in which the czar's domain was not overrich, and it would
remove forever this dangerous indentation in the back of the German
Empire.

Before we consider in detail the first German drive for Warsaw, it is
also necessary to consider briefly political conditions in Russian
Poland.

Ever since the partition of the old Kingdom of Poland among Germany,
Austria, and Russia, the Polish provinces created thereby for these
three empires had been a continuous source of trouble and worry to each.
The Poles are well known for their intense patriotism, which perhaps is
only a particular manifestation of one of their general racial
characteristics--temperament. At any rate the true Pole has never
forgotten the splendid past of his race, nor has he ever given up hope
for a reestablishment of its unity and independence. It is a rather
difficult question to answer whether Russia, Germany, or Austria have
sinned most against their Polish subjects. The fact remains, however,
that all three most ruthlessly suppressed all Polish attempts to realize
their national ideals. It is equally true that Russia went further along
that line than either Germany or Austria, and on the other hand did less
for its Polish subjects than the other two countries. Both in Germany
and Austria there existed therefore a more or less well-defined idea
that the Russian Poles would welcome German and Austrian troops with
open arms as their saviors from the Russian yoke. In Russia a certain
amount of anxiety existed about what the Poles would do. The latter, in
a way, at the beginning of the war found themselves facing a most
difficult alternative. That their country would at some time or other
become a battling ground of the contending armies was quite evident.
Whether Russia or the Central Powers would emerge as the final victor
was at least open to dispute. Whatever side the Poles chose, might be
the wrong side and bring to them the most horrible consequences. It was
undoubtedly with this danger in view that the "Gazeta Warzawska" printed
on August 15, 1914, an editorial which in part read as follows:

     "Remain passive, watchful, insensible to temptation.

     "During the coming struggle the Kingdom of Poland will be the
     marching ground of various armies; we shall see temporary victors
     assuming lordship for a while; but change of authority will
     follow, and inevitable retaliation; this several times, perhaps,
     in the course of the campaign. Therefore every improvident step
     will meet with terrible revenge. By holding firm through the
     present conflict you best can serve the Polish cause. In the name
     of the love you bear your country, of your solicitude for the
     nation's future, we entreat you, fellow countrymen, to remain
     deaf to evil inspirations, unshakable in your determination not
     to expose our land to yet greater calamities, and Poland's whole
     future to incalculable perils."

This, of course, was far from being a rousing appeal to support Russia's
cause, but it was even further from being a suggestion to support that
of the Central Powers and revolt against Russia. Polish newspapers of
the next day printed a proclamation signed by the Commander in Chief
Grand Duke Nicholas prophesying the fulfillment of the Polish dream of
unity, at least, even if under the Russian scepter, and promising a
rebirth of Poland "free in faith, in language, in self-government."

On August 17, 1914, four of the Polish political parties published a
manifesto in which they welcomed this proclamation and expressed their
belief in the ultimate fulfillment of the promises made. The net result
of the sudden three-cornered bid for Polish friendship and support,
then, seems to have been that the leaders of Polish nationalism had
decided to abstain from embarrassing Russia, even though their
resistance against Germany and Austria with both of which other Poles
were fighting was not always very deep-seated.

During the first month of the war practically nothing of importance
happened in the Polish territory. German detachments occupied some of
the towns right across the border, in many instances for a short time
only. Mlawa, Kalish, and Czestochowa were the most important places
involved.

On August 31, 1914, however, the occupation of Radom, about 130 miles
from the German frontier, was reported, and a few days later that of
Lodz, next to Warsaw the biggest city of Russian Poland and an important
manufacturing center. At about the same time all of the places along two
of the railroads running from Germany to Warsaw, Thorn to Warsaw, and
Kalish to Warsaw, as far as Lowitz, where they meet, were occupied. In
this territory the Germans immediately proceeded to repair the railroad
bridges destroyed by the retreating Russians, who, apparently, had
decided to fall back to their defenses on the Vistula. The Germans must
have felt themselves fairly secure in their possession of this
territory, for on September 15, 1914, Count Meerveldt, then governor of
the Prussian Province of Muenster, was appointed its civil governor. A
day later the commanding general (Von Morgen) published a proclamation,
addressed to the inhabitants of the two provinces of Lomza and Warsaw.
In it he announced the defeat of the Russian Narew Army and
Rennenkampf's retreat and stated that larger forces were following his
own army corps, which latter considered them as its friends and had been
ordered to treat them accordingly. He called upon them to rise against
their Russian oppressors and to assist him in driving them out of
beautiful Poland which afterward was to receive at the hands of the
German Emperor political and religious liberty.

About ten days later the "additional stronger forces," which General
von Morgen had prophesied, put in an appearance. They consisted of
four separate armies, one advancing along the Thorn-Warsaw railroad,
another along the Kalish-Warsaw line, a third along the
Breslau-Czestochowa-Kielce-Radom-Ivangorod railroad, and the fourth
from Cracow in the same direction. Just how large these four armies
were is not absolutely known. Estimates range all the way from 500,000
to 1,500,000 which makes it most likely that the real strength was
about 1,000,000. Of these all but the Fourth Army were made up of
German soldiers, whereas the Cracow Army consisted of Austrians,
forming the left wing of their main forces which about that time had
been rearranged in western Galicia.

By the time all of these armies were ready to advance, the victor of
Tannenberg, Von Hindenburg--who meanwhile had been raised to the rank of
field marshal--had been put in supreme command of the combined German
and Austro-Hungarian armies in Poland. Though he was fighting now on
territory concerning which he had at least no superior knowledge than
his adversaries, his energy made itself felt immediately. He pushed the
advance of his four armies at an overpowering rate of speed and forced
the Russians, who apparently were not any too sure, either about the
strength of the opposing forces or their ultimate plans, to fall back
everywhere. By October 5 the Russians, attempting to make a desperate
stand near Radom, had been forced back almost as far as Ivangorod, and
within the week following the Austro-German army, still further south,
had reached the Vistula between the Galician border and Ivangorod. The
advance of the Germans as well as the retreat of the Russians took place
under terrific difficulties, caused by torrential rains which poured
down incessantly. Some interesting details may be learned from a letter
written about that time by a German officer in charge of a heavy
munition train: "From Czestochowa we advanced in forced marches. During
the first two days roads were passable, but after that they became
terrible, as it rained every day. In some places there were no roads
left, nothing but mud and swamps. Once it took us a full hour to move
one wagon, loaded with munitions and drawn by fifteen horses, a distance
of only fifteen yards.... Horses sank into the mud up to their bodies
and wagons up to their axles.... One night we reached a spot which was
absolutely impassable. The only way to get around it was through a dense
forest, but before we could get through there it was necessary to cut an
opening through the trees. For the next few hours we felled trees for a
distance of over five hundred yards.... For the past eight days we have
been on the go almost every night, and once I stayed in my saddle for
thirty consecutive hours. During all that time we had no real rest.
Either we did not reach our quarters until early in the morning or late
at night. What a bed feels like we've forgotten long ago. We consider
ourselves lucky if we have one room and straw on the floor for the seven
of us. For ten days I have not been out of my clothes. And when we do
get a little sleep it is almost invariably necessary to start off again
at once.... Even our food supplies have become more scarce day by day.
Long ago we saw the last of butter, sausage, or similar delicacies. We
are glad if we have bread and some lard. Only once in a great while are
we fortunate enough to buy some cattle. But then a great feast is
prepared.... Tea is practically all that we have to drink.... The
hardships, as you can see, are somewhat plentiful; but in spite of this
fact I am in tiptop condition and feeling wonderfully well. Sometimes I
am astonished myself what one can stand."

Early in October, 1914, the Germans came closer and closer to Warsaw. At
the end of it they were in the south, within twenty miles of the old
Polish capital--at Grojec. At that time only a comparatively small
force, not more than three army corps, was available, under General
Scheidemann's command, for its defense. These, however--all of them made
up of tried Siberian troops--fought heroically for forty-four hours,
especially around the strongly fortified little town of Blonie, about
ten miles west of Warsaw. The commander in chief of all the Russian
armies, Grand Duke Nicholas, had retired with his staff to Grodno, and
Warsaw expected as confidently a German occupation as the Germans
themselves. But suddenly the Russians, who up to that time seem to have
underestimated the strength of the Germans, awoke to the desperate needs
of the situation. By a supreme effort they contrived to concentrate vast
reenforcements to the east of Warsaw within a few days and to change the
proportion of numbers before Warsaw from five to three in favor of the
Germans to about three to one in their own favor.

On October 10, 1914, panic reigned supreme in Warsaw. Although the
Government tried to dispel the fears of the populace by encouraging
proclamations, the thunder of the cannons, which could be heard
incessantly, and the very evident lack of strong Russian forces, spoke
more loudly. Whoever could afford to flee and was fortunate enough to
get official sanction to leave, did so. The panic was still more
intensified when German aeroplanes and dirigibles began to appear in the
sky. For fully ten days the fighting lasted around the immediate
neighborhood of the city. Day and night, bombs thrown by the German air
fleet exploded in all parts of the city, doing great damage to property
and killing and wounding hundreds of innocent noncombatants. Day and
night could be heard the roar of the artillery fire, and nightfall
brought the additional terror of the fiery reflection from bursting
shrapnel. The peasants from the villages to the west and south streamed
into the city in vast numbers. Thousands of wounded coming from all
directions added still more to the horror and excitement.

The hardest fighting around Blonie occurred from October 13 to 17, 1914.
On the 13th the Germans were forced to evacuate Blonie, and on October
14 Pruszkow, a little farther south and still nearer to Warsaw. On
October 15 the Russians made a wonderful and successful bayonet attack
on another near-by village, Nadarzyn. The next day, the 16th, saw almost
all of this territory again in the hands of the Germans, and on the 17th
they succeeded even in crossing the Vistula over a pontoon bridge
slightly south of Warsaw. However, even then the arrival of Russian
reenforcements made itself felt, for after a short stay on the right
bank of the Vistula the Germans were thrown back by superior Russian
forces. All that day the fighting went on most furiously and lasted deep
into the night. The next day at last the Russian armies had all been
assembled.




CHAPTER LXXVIII

GERMAN RETREAT FROM RUSSIAN POLAND


On October 19, 1914, the Germans, who apparently had accurate
information concerning the immense numbers which they now faced, gave up
the attack and began their retreat. The retreat was carried out with as
much speed and success as the advance. By October 20 the Germans had
gone back so far that the Russian advance formations could not keep up
with them and lost track of them. Without losing a gun, the First German
Army managed to escape the pursuing Russians as well as to evade two
attempts--one from the south and one from the north--to outflank them
and cut off their retreat.

During the fighting before Warsaw the total front on which the Russian
armies were battling against the German and Austrian invaders of Poland
was about 160 miles long, stretching from Novo Georgievsk in the north,
along the Vistula, through Warsaw and Ivangorod to Sandomir at the
Galician border in the south. All along this line continuous fighting
went on, and the heaviest of it, besides that directly before Warsaw,
took place around the fortress of Ivangorod. Two attempts of the
Russians to get back to the left side of the Vistula on October 12 and
14, 1914, were frustrated under heavy losses on both sides. A German
soldier states in a letter written home during the actual fighting
before Ivangorod that at the end of one day, out of his company of 250,
only 85 were left--the other 66 per cent having been killed or wounded.

Just as the Russians had succeeded in assembling sufficient
reenforcements at Warsaw, to make it inevitable for the German forces to
retreat, they had brought equally large numbers to the rescue of
Ivangorod. However, these did not make themselves really felt there
until October 27, 1914. Previous to that date the Germans and Austrians
captured over 50,000 Russians and thirty-five guns. When, on October 23
and 24, 1904, aeroplane scouts discovered the approaching vast
reenforcements, and similar reports were received from the First Army
fighting around Warsaw, the German and Austrian forces were all
withdrawn. The retreat of these groups of armies was accomplished much
in the same way as of that in the north, except that it began later and
brought with it more frequent and more desperate rear-guard actions. The
Russians, who were trying desperately to inflict as much damage as
possible to the retreating enemy, showed wonderful courage and heroic
disregard of death. In some places, however, the Germans had prepared
strong, even if temporary, intrenchments, sometimes three or more lines
deep, and the storming of these cost their opponents dearly.

By October 24, 1914, the invaders had been forced back in the south as
far as Radom and in the north to Skierniewice; by October 28 Radom as
well as Lodz had been evacuated and were again in Russian hands. The
lines of retreat were the same as those of advance had been, namely, the
railroads from Warsaw to Thorn, Kalish, and Cracow. Much damage was done
to these roads by the Germans in order to delay as much as possible the
pursuit of the Russians. Considerable fighting occurred, however,
whenever one of the rivers along the line of retreat was reached; so
along the Pilitza, the Rawka, the Bzura, and finally the Warta. By the
end of the first week of November the German-Austrian armies had been
thrown back across their frontiers, and all of Russian Poland was once
more in the undisputed possession of Russia.

In a measure Von Hindenburg followed the example of his Russian
adversaries when he withdrew his forces from Poland into Upper Silesia
in November, 1914, after the unsuccessful first drive against Warsaw, of
which we have just read the details. His reasons for taking this step
were evident enough. When it had been established definitely that the
reenforcements which Russia had been able to gather made futile any
further hope of taking Warsaw with the forces at his command, only two
possibilities remained to the German general: To make a stand to the
west of the Vistula until reenforcements could be brought up, or to fall
back to his bases and there concentrate enough additional forces to
make a new drive for Poland. He chose the latter, undoubtedly because it
was the safer and less costly in lives.

How quickly the German retreat was accomplished we have already seen. In
spite of their rapidity, however, the Germans found time to hold up the
Russians, not only by severe rear-guard actions, but also by destroying
in the most thorough manner the few railroad lines that led out of
Poland. In this connection they proved themselves to be as much past
masters in the art of disorganization as they had hitherto shown
themselves to be capable of the highest forms of organization.

About November 10, 1914, Von Hindenburg had completed his regrouping.
The line along which the Russians were massed against him stretched
from the point where the Niemen enters East Prussia, slightly east of
Tilsit, along the eastern and southern border of East Prussia to the
Vistula at Wloclawek, from there to the Warta at Kola, where it turns
to the west, along and slightly to the east of this river through
Uniejow-Zdouska-Wola to Novo Radowsk. From there it passed to the
north of Cracow in a curve toward Galicia, where strong Russian armies
were forcing back the Austrians on and beyond the Carpathians. Along
this vast front--considerably over 500 miles long--the Russians had
drawn up forces which must have amounted very nearly to forty-five
army corps, or over 2,000,000 men. These were distributed as follows:
The Tenth Army faced the eastern border of East Prussia west of the
Niemen; the First Army the southern border of this province, north of
the Narew and both north and south of the Vistula; the Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Ninth Armies, forming the main forces of the Russians,
fronted along the Warta against lower Posen and Upper Silesia, while
the balance of the Russian armies had been thrown against the
Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia.

Against these Von Hindenburg had three distinct armies which were
available for offensive purposes. The central army under General von
Mackensen was concentrated between Thorn and the Warta River; a southern
army had been formed north of Cracow and along the Upper Silesian
border, and was made up chiefly of Austro-Hungarian forces with a
comparatively slight mingling of German troops. North of the Vistula,
between Thorn and Soldau, a third and weaker army had been collected for
the protection of West Prussia. In Galicia, of course, stood the main
body of the Austro-Hungarian forces, and in East Prussia defenses had
been prepared which made it possible to leave there weaker formations
for defensive purposes only.

The Germans fully appreciated the danger of the Russian numerical
superiority. If these mighty forces were once allowed to get fully under
way and develop a general offensive along the entire front, the German
cause would be as good as lost. The main object of Von Hindenburg,
therefore, was to break this vast offensive power, and he decided to do
so by an offensive of his own which, if possible, was to set in ahead of
that of the Russians. Though the latter most likely had at least
one-third more men at their disposal than he, he had one advantage over
them, a wonderfully developed network of railroads, running practically
parallel to this entire line. The Russians, on the other hand, had
nothing but roads running from east to west or from north to south,
which could be used as feeders only from a central point to a number of
points along their semicircular line. Troops having once been
concentrated could be thrown to another point if it was at any distance
at all only by sending them back to the central point and then sending
them out again on another feeder, or else by long and difficult marches
which practically almost took too much time to be of any value. Von
Hindenburg could, if need be, concentrate any number of his forces at a
given point, deliver there an attack in force and then concentrate again
at another point for a similar purpose, almost before his adversary
could suspect his purpose. His plan was to attack with his strongest
forces under Von Mackensen the weakest point of the Russian line between
the Vistula and the Warta, beat them there and then march from the north
against the right wing of the main forces of the Russians, which latter
was to be kept from advancing too far by the mixed Austrian and German
army. On his two outmost flanks, in East Prussia and East Galicia,
nothing but defensive actions were contemplated.

The Russian plan was somewhat similar, except that their main attack
apparently was to be directed in the south against Cracow, and from
there against the immensely important industrial center of Silesia. At
the same time, they intended to press as hard as possible their attacks
in East Prussia and Galicia in order to force a weakening of the German
center.




CHAPTER LXXIX

WINTER BATTLES OF THE POLISH CAMPAIGN


During November and December, 1914, and January, 1915, much of the
fighting which took place on this immense front consisted of engagements
between comparatively small formations, and is very difficult to follow
in detail. For convenience we shall consider first the fighting in
Poland, and then separately that in East Prussia, although, of course,
they were carried on concurrently.

On November 10, 1914, the Germans had reached Komn on the Warta, where
it met a small Russian force, of which it captured 500 men and machine
guns. Two days later, November 12, the Russians crossed the Warta, and
their advance troops, chiefly cavalry, had almost reached Kalish on the
East Prussian border. On that day, however, they were forced back again
a short distance. Similar engagements took place at various points along
the entire line, chiefly for the purpose of testing their respective
strength.

November 14, 1914, however, saw the first more extensive fighting. Von
Mackensen's group had reached by that time Wloclawek on the western bank
of the Vistula and slightly east of the Thorn-Lowitz railroad, about
thirty miles from Thorn. One of the Russian army corps of General
Russky's group made a determined stand. However, it was forced to fall
back and lost 1,500 prisoners and some ten machine guns. The Germans
followed up this gain by pressing with all their power against the
right wing of the Russian center army. For two or three days the battle
raged along a front running from Wloclawek south to Kutno, a distance of
about thirty miles. Both of these country towns are situated on the
strategically very important railroad from Thorn to Warsaw by way of
Lowitz. The Russians had two or three army corps in this sector,
including the one that had been forced back from Wloclawek. The Germans
undoubtedly were in superior force at this particular point, and were
therefore able to press their attack to great advantage. The final
result was a falling back of the entire Russian right to the Bzura River
after both sides had lost thousands in killed and wounded, and the
Russians were obliged to leave over 20,000 men, 70 machine guns, and
some larger guns in the hands of the Germans. Von Mackensen was rewarded
for this victory by being raised to the rank of "general oberst," which
in the German army is only one remove from field marshal.

In a measure separate battles in this Polish campaign sink, at this
time, into insignificance. For the total number of men involved, the
extent of the battle ground, the frequency of engagements which under
any other circumstances would, without any doubt, have been considered
battles of the first magnitude, stamped them at this time as "minor
actions." The fighting, however, was as furious as at any time, the
hardships as severe as anywhere, and the valor on both sides as great as
ever. Again the wonderful mobility of the German army organization was
one of the strongest features. A French critic says of the fighting in
Poland at this time that "it was the most stirring since Napoleonic
times. It forced generals to make movements and to change and improvise
plans to an extent which war history never before had registered." Dr.
Boehm, the war correspondent of the "Berliner Tageblatt," says that the
advance was so fast that the infantry frequently had no time to lay down
before firing, but had to do so standing or kneeling. Artillery most of
the time moved on to a new position after having fired only a few shots.
He also mentions the many cadavers of horses that could be seen
everywhere. Some of these, of course, were the victims of rifle or gun
fire. But more had a small round hole in their forehead where the shot
of mercy out of their own master's revolver had put them out of their
misery. For the condition of the roads was such that, chiefly on account
of the rapidity of the advance, large numbers of horses would fall down,
weakened and often with broken legs.

Among one of the minor results of the battle of Kutno, necessitating the
hurried withdrawal of the Russians, was the capture of the governor of
Warsaw, General von Korff. He was surprised in his automobile by a troop
of German cavalry toward which he was driving apparently in the belief
that they were Russians.

During this period the Russians made an attack against the Germans
between Soldau and Thorn. The left wing of this group was advancing
along the right bank of the Vistula against Thorn, but was successfully
stopped by the Germans at Lipno and thrown back in the direction of
Plock. By November 16, 1914, the Russians had lost in that sector a
total of about 5,000 prisoners with a proportionate number of machine
guns. In general throughout the entire fighting in this territory the
Russian losses by capture were astonishingly high. Of course, the
Germans, too, lost men in this manner; but being in the offensive they
suffered less, while the Russians, continually forced to fall back,
often found it impossible to withdraw advanced formations in time.
Further to the north the Russians had reached the border along the
Warsaw-Danzig railroad. An attempt to cross and take Soldau, however,
miscarried, and on November 18 they fell back for the time being on
Mlawa.

By this time the Russian defense had stiffened. Von Mackensen was now
well fifty miles within Russian territory. But for the next few weeks
the Bzura was used with great success as a natural line of defense by
the Russians.

From the 18th to the 30th of November, 1914, the fighting continued
without pause along the entire line. In the north of the central group
it centered around Plock, in the center of the same group around the
important railroad junction Lowitz, and in the south once more around
Lodz. One day would bring some advantages to the Russians, the next day
to the Germans. Much of this fighting assumed the character of trench
warfare, though, naturally, not to the extent that this had taken place
on the western front. By December 1, 1914, the troops under Von
Mackensen fighting around Lodz and Lowitz claimed to have captured a
total of 80,000 men, 70 guns, 160 munition wagons, and 150 machine guns.
Still further down south the Austro-German group had much the same kind
of work to do. The fighting there centered first around Czestechowa, and
later around Novo Radowsk.

About the end of November, 1914, it looked for a time as if the Russians
were gaining the upper hand. After they had fallen back to the Bzura,
Von Hindenburg directed, with part of his left wing, an attack against
Lodz from the north. Success of this move would mean grave danger to the
entire central group of the Russians, the Warta Army. It threatened not
only its right wing, but would also bring German forces in the back of
its center and cut off its retreat to Warsaw. The Russian commander
recognized the danger, and immediately began to throw strong
reenforcements toward Lodz from Warsaw. To meet these Von Hindenburg
formed a line from Lowitz through Strykow to Brzeziny. A Russian success
would mean immediate withdrawal of these forces from their attack
against Lodz, and possibly have even more important results. At the last
moment the Russians brought up reenforcements from the south, and with
them almost surrounded one of the German army corps which had advanced
about ten miles to the southeast of Brzeziny to Karpin. For three days
it looked as if this corps would either be annihilated or captured, but
at last it succeeded in breaking through by way of Galkow to Brzeziny
not only with comparatively small losses of its own, but with a few
thousand of captured Russians.

For eighteen days the fighting lasted before Lodz. The Russians resisted
this time most stubbornly. They had thrown up strong fortifications
around the entire town, which they used as a base for continuous
counterattacks.

As late as December 5, 1914, fighting was still going on, but finally
that night the Russians made good their withdrawal, and on the 6th the
Germans were once more in Lodz. This was partly the result of an
unsuccessful attempt on the part of the Russians to relieve Lodz from
the south. Between the battle ground around Lodz and that on which the
most southern Austro-German group under the Austrian General,
Boehm-Ermolli, was fighting there was a slight gap. Through this--just
west of Piotrkow--an attack could be made against the right wing of Von
Mackensen's army. To meet this stroke a small separate army was formed
under the command of the Austrian cavalry general, Von Tersztyansky,
consisting of one German brigade, one Austro-Hungarian brigade, and a
cavalry division. This shows the close cooperation which existed at that
time between the forces of the Central Powers. This new army group took
in the first days of December 19, 1914, some of the smaller places west
and south of Piotrkow.

From then on until December 15, 1914, fighting went on day and night.
One small village--Augustijnow--changed hands three times within one
day--December 8, 1914--remaining finally in the possession of the
Austro-Germans. In the evening of the 15th Piotrkow was finally taken by
storm. This not only prevented any further attack against Von
Mackensen's right, but also gave the Austro-Germans possession of the
railroad from Cracow to Warsaw as far as Piotrkow, and secured to them
the most important crossings over the Pilitza.

This long-continued fighting, lasting almost the entire twenty-four
hours of every day and being accompanied by very severe artillery duels,
spelled ruin to very many of the towns and villages involved; especially
a large number of the latter in the immediate vicinity of Lodz suffered
terribly. In many of them not a single house or hut was left standing,
and thousands of Polish peasants, who even at the best had no
superfluity of riches, were deprived of everything they possessed. Fire
added to the terror; for most of the houses were covered with straw, and
the destruction of one was usually quickly followed by the burning of
all others within reach.

The losses of the Russians were not only very heavy in prisoners, but
also in wounded and killed, although in the latter respect the invading
armies suffered almost as severely. Generals Scheidemann and Welitschko,
both corps commanders, lost their lives, while it was reported that
General Rennenkampf, who failed to come to the rescue of Lodz in time,
was placed before a court-martial.

After Lodz had been occupied on December 6, 1914, Von Mackensen's army
followed the retreating Russians. The latter offered the most stubborn
resistance and a great deal of very close fighting took place. In many
instances the Russian rear guard dug itself in wherever the ground
offered possibilities to do so quickly and then frequently protected its
positions with barbed wire. The storming of these of course caused the
Germans heavy losses and delayed them sufficiently to allow the Russians
to withdraw in good order.

For the possession of Lowitz, one of the most important railroad
junctions west of Warsaw, the battle raged more than two weeks. It began
as early as November 25, 1914, but it was not until about December 15,
1914, that the Russians gave up this point. They had thrown up very
strong fortifications on all sides of the town and the Germans under
General von Morgen had to bring up a strong force of artillery before
they could reduce the place. The result was that this little town which
had been in the thick of the fighting so many times was finally almost
entirely destroyed and the outlying countryside became a scene of the
most complete and terrible devastation.

Some of the most violent fighting before Warsaw occurred at this time
along the upper Bzura and its southern tributary, the Rawka. The Russian
line ran now almost straight from the influx of the Bzura into the
Vistula, along the east bank of the former through Sochaczev, then along
the east bank of Rawka through Skierniewice and Rawa, from there along
some hills to the river Pilitza, crossing it at Inovolodz, through
Opoczno and along the River Nida to the Vistula and beyond it through
Tarnow into Galicia. In spite of their strong intrenchments and their
heroic fighting the Russians were gradually, though very slowly, forced
back. A great deal of this fighting was trench warfare of the most
stubborn type. This necessarily meant that for weeks the line wavered.
One day the Germans would force a passage across one, or perhaps all, of
the rivers at one or more points, only to be thrown back the next day
and to have the Russians follow their example with an offensive
excursion on the west bank. These continually changing "victories" and
"defeats" make it next to impossible to follow in full all the
developments along this line. By December 25, 1914, the Germans held
Skierniewice; by December 27, 1914, Inovolodz; by January 3, 1915, Rawa;
by January 5, 1915, Bolimow.

Throughout the entire month of January, 1915, the most ferocious
fighting continued around all these places, and many of them changed
hands two or three times. Both sides very freely used the protecting
darkness of night to make attacks, and this naturally added a great deal
to the hardships which the troops had to suffer. It must also not be
forgotten that by this time winter had set in in earnest. Snow covered
the ground and a very low temperature called for the most heroic
endurance on the part of everybody.

One of the American war correspondents, who at this time was with the
Russian forces before Warsaw, gives a very vivid description of a night
cannonade in the neighborhood of Blouie: "The fire of the German cannons
is unbearable. Night grows darker and darker. Everywhere, in a great
circle, the country is lighted up by camp fires which send their flames
toward heaven in a cloud of smoke. These little red spots throw
everywhere a fiery glow over the snow, and down upon this wonderful
color symphony the moon pours its weak, ghostlike light through a
curtain of clouds so that people seem to float away as in a dream. In
the foggy twilight three battalions march to the front.... The noise of
the gunfire penetrates to us in separate, spasmodic outbreaks. Flashes
of fire flare up on the horizon.... Gradually we come closer and closer
to the firing line. Now we are only two or three miles away from the
firing batteries. We turn toward the west and there a magnificent battle
panorama lies before our eyes. The moon sheds just enough light through
the clouds to make it possible to recognize the shadows on the snow. The
flat, white field is lined with a seam of black trees. Behind these thin
woods stand the cannons. They stretch out in a long line, as far as the
eye reaches, and their irregular positions are shown by the red tongues
of fire which flare up again and again. The noise of the battle, which
had sounded all around us, has now swollen into the roaring thunder of
cannons. At a short distance, where the sky seems to touch the field,
other flashes flare up, these are the German cannons. Sometimes as many
as four of these flashes break forth at one time and tear the dull
twilight with their glaring brightness. For a moment all the surrounding
country with its phantastic shadows and its darting lights is submerged
in blinding brilliancy; then another glittering light captures the eye.
It is a bursting rocket which breaks up into thousands of little stars
and illuminates the vast field of snow everywhere so that it glitters
and glares.

"But again another light appears in the dusky sky. A spray of gold! That
is an exploding shrapnel, and almost at the same point three more of
these missiles burst into their reddish golden glow. Then the giant arm
of a searchlight is thrust out into the midst of the foggy, swelling
atmosphere and shows houses, fences and paths with an unsparing
clearness. Irresolutely the mighty finger of light wanders across the
plain as if it were searching for something and could not find it. At
last it throws its coldling, shining ray on a defile and rests there.
And suddenly out of the darkness there flares up a multitude of little
flashes which look from the distance as if innumerable matches were
struck and gave off sparks. The sparks run in a straight line, and these
bounding lights show the position of the trenches. Another line of
sparks puts in appearance, seemingly only a short distance away. That is
formed by the battalions of the advancing, attacking enemy. Then
suddenly a ribbon of flame cuts through the shadows, and the sharp echo
of machine guns bites into the night air. But so immensely far spreads
the battle panorama that the eye is able to fix only small sections at a
time...."

Among the many small villages and towns in this small sector between
Warsaw and Lowitz, Bolimow saw the most furious fighting. Almost step by
step the Russians fought here the German advance, and when finally they
gave way for a mile or less after days and nights of grueling fighting,
they did so only to throw up immediately new defenses and force the
invaders to repeat their onslaught again and again. At any other time of
the year this part of the country would have yielded little ground for
fighting; for it is covered extensively with swamps. But now the bitter
cold of midwinter had covered these with ice solid enough to bear men
and even guns. On January 28, 1915, the Germans at last threw the
Russians out of their strong intrenchments at Bolimow. But others had
already been prepared a short distance to the east, at a small village,
Humin.

The attack on this particular position began in the morning of the last
day of January, 1915. For three days the battle raged until, late in the
afternoon of February 2, 1915, the Germans took Humin by storm. At times
it is difficult to decide whether battles involving vast fronts and
equally vast numbers, or those fought in a small space and by
comparatively small numbers are the more heroic and ferocious. In the
latter case, of course, individual valor becomes not only much more
noticeable, but also much more important and details that are swallowed
up by the great objects for which great battles are usually fought stand
out much more clearly. It will, therefore, be interesting to hear from
an eyewitness, the war correspondent of one of the greatest German
dailies, the "Koelnische Zeitung," what happened during the three days'
battle of Humin:

"It was seven o'clock in the morning of January 31, 1915. Punctually, in
accordance the orders given out the previous evening, the first shot
rang out into the snowy air of the gray morning at this hour from a
battery drawn up some distance back. Like a call of awakening it roared
along, and fifteen minutes later when it had called everyone to the
guns--exactly to the minute the time decided on by general orders--the
battle day of January 31, 1915, began with a monstrous tumult. With
truly a hellish din the concert of battle started. A huge number of
batteries had been drawn up and sent their iron "blessing" into the
ranks of the Russians. Field batteries, 15-centimeter howitzers,
10-centimeter guns, 21-centimeter mortars, and, to complete the wealth
of variety, 30-centimeter mortars of the allied Austrians joyfully
shouted the morning song of artillery. A dull noise roared around
Bolimow, for in back of the town, before it, to the right and to the
left, stood the various guns in groups of batteries, and through the air
passed a shrill whistle. But it was not only their hellish din which
made one tremble and start up, but even more so the dismal, powerfully
exciting howl of the gigantic missile of the great mortars, chasing up
and 'way into the air almost perpendicular. It sounded each time as if a
giant risen from out of the very bowels of the earth sent up great sobs.
Like a wild chase of unbridled, unchained elements the powerful missile
shot up high from the gun barrel.

"A shriek of the most horrible kind, a trembling and shaking started in
the wildly torn air, a continual pounding, hissing whirlwind shot up
like a hurricane, lasted for seconds and disappeared in the distance
like some monstrous mystery. Surrounded by a glare of fire, encircled by
blinding light, licked by sheaves of flames, the short barrel of the
mortar drew back at the moment of firing. Clouds of dust rose; they
mixed gray with brown, with the smoke of gunpowder which hid from sight
for a few moments the entire gun, and then it rained down from the air,
for whole minutes, the tiny pieces into which the cover of the charge
had been torn. After every shot of the big mortars, the heavy howitzers
and the 21-centimeter mortars--which usually are the loud talkers in an
artillery battle--could hardly make themselves heard. An entire battery
of them could not drown the noise of _one_ shot from an Austrian mortar.
It sounded like a hoarse but weak bark as compared with this gigantic
instrument of death and destruction.

"During the morning the sky cleared; this enabled the observers to sight
more accurately. Orders were sent over the telephone; the telescope
controlled the effect of the gunfire, and one could see plainly how, in
a distance of a few miles, the hail of shot descended on the enemy's
trenches. 'Way up towered the geysers of earth when the shot struck
home. Above the Russian trenches lay a long white cloud of powder
forming a great wall of waves. The dull thunder of the guns was
tremendous. It whistled and howled, it cried and moaned, it roared like
the surf of the ocean, like the terrifying growl of a thunderstorm, and
then it threw back a hundredfold clear echo. In between came the dull
crack of the Russian shrapnel. They broke in the broad, swampy lowlands
of the Rawka; they pierced the cover of ice which broke with a
tremendous noise while dark fountains of bog water gushed up from the
ground. In front and in back of the German batteries one could see the
craters made by the Russian hits; they were dark holes where the hard
frozen ground had been broken up into thick, slaglike pieces weighing
tons and all over the white cover of snow had been strewn, dark brown
and as fine as dust, the torn-up soil.

"Then the storm of the trenches set in. At a given hour the roar of the
guns stopped suddenly. A few minutes later the masses of infantry, held
in readiness, arose. They came up from their trenches, climbed over
their walls, sought cover wherever it could be found, and were promptly
received by rifle and machine-gun fire from the Russians. That, however,
lasted only a moment; then they advanced in a jump; the attacking line
thinned out, stretched itself out and, continually seeking cover, tried
to advance. A few minutes only and the first Russian trench line was
reached. In storm, with bayonet and rifle butt, they came on and broke
into the trenches. They were fighting now man for man. Then the
artillery fire set in again. Again in the afternoon the infantry
advanced in storm formation against the head of the village and the
trenches flanking it. From them roared rifle and machine-gun fire
against the storming lines. Nothing could avail against these
intrenchments. Again artillery was called upon to support the attack.

"It was now five o'clock in the afternoon on January 31, 1915, and the
artillery fire still roared over the white plain. Here and there were a
few scattered farms, deeply snowed in. In the distance stood forests,
darkly silhouetted against the sky, covered with heavy, low-hanging snow
clouds. In between were yawning depths, and farther up other curtains of
clouds glowing in the full purple light of the setting sun. A wonderful
majesty lay on the heavens at that hour. But down on the earth, across
the white plain, the fighting German troops still crowded against the
enemy. Again infantry fire started and became the livelier the nearer
twilight approached and the deeper evening shadows prepared the coming
night.

"The 1st of February, 1915, the second day of battle, broke damp and
cloudy. Once more artillery fire set in. Later in the morning, just as
on the first day, the infantry again attacked. While the roar of the
battle went on, some of the men prepared the last resting place for
their comrades who had fallen on the previous day. Silently this work
was done. Here there were single graves, and then again places where
larger numbers were to be put to rest together. One such grave was dug
close to the wall of the cemetery and in it were bedded the dead heroes
so that their closed eyes were turned westward--toward home. A chaplain
found wonderful words at the open grave, blessing the rest of those who
had fallen on the field of honor and speaking to their comrades of the
joys of battle and of its sorrows while they said farewell to the dead
with bared heads.

"The guns still roared; then they were silent and then roared on again.
A remarkable tension was in the air. In a discord of feelings the day
drew to its end, and after that the third day of battle, the 2d of
February, dawned with renewed fighting. It was noon. We were sitting at
division headquarters, lunching, when the telephone rang loudly. With a
jump a staff officer was before it. 'General, the Russian lines are
giving way.' Quickly the general issued his orders. Once more the
fighting set in with all the available strength and vigor. The thunder
of the guns was renewed, and so the third day of battle ended with the
storming of the strong Russian positions in Humin and with the
occupation of the entire village by the German troops."

After the storming of Humin the Germans took the heights near Borzimow,
which commanded the road Bolimow-Warsaw. Here, too, the fighting was
very hard. South of Humin, near Wola-Szydlowieca, the Russian lines
again were broken on February 3, 1915, after a combined artillery and
infantry attack, which began early on February 2, 1915, and lasted for
more than twenty-four hours. The next ten days brought continuous
fighting at many points, some of it almost as ferocious as that of which
we have just spoken, but none of it yielding any important results to
either side. With the middle of February a lull set in in this sector of
the front. Of course the fighting did not stop entirely. But the Germans
did not advance farther, and the Russians were unable to break their
lines or to force them back anywhere to any appreciable extent.

Of course all this fighting took place near enough to Warsaw to be heard
there and to fill its inhabitants with terror and fear of a possible
siege or attack on the city proper. Although a great many people had
fled to the interior, thousands of others had flocked to the city,
especially from those outlying districts that had been overrun by the
invaders. Most of these were practically destitute and without means or
opportunity to earn any money. The Russian Government did its best to
help them, and provided nineteen asylums and thirteen people's kitchens
which, it is reported, distributed each day 40,000 portions. Wood, coal,
and oil gradually became more and more scarce and advanced to very high
prices, causing a great deal of suffering, especially among the poorer
classes.

Again reports of various neutral war correspondents, located at that
time in Warsaw, are of great interest. Says one: "The thunder of the
cannons has started up once more. Only the forts of the belt line of
fortresses are still silent. The railroad to Wilanow has been closed. No
one is allowed to go beyond Mokotow. In front of the two railroad
stations silent crowds of people are standing, their features showing
their terror. They stand there like they would at a fire to which the
firemen are rushing with their engines and ladders. One's feet are like
lumps of ice, one's head feels foolish and empty. Doors and windows in
the big new houses in Marshalkowska Street have been boarded up in
expectation of the rifle fire. It reminds one of a boat when, before the
breaking of the storm, hatches are closed up and sails are trimmed.
Omnibuses come in loaded with wounded, likewise butcher wagons with
similar loads. Many of the lighter wounded soldiers limp on foot. With
nightfall the entire city falls into darkness--strange, ghostlike.
People creep along the walls with bowed heads. The silence of the night
only intensifies the roar of the untiring guns, and they seem then to
come closer."

During all this time the German dirigibles and aeroplanes were very
active, too, throwing bombs. Granville Fortescue pictures the terror
spread by them most realistically. "Warsaw's inhabitants know now well
the meaning of an aeroplane, and whenever they see one approach they run
in wild terror into their houses and cellars. Before every open door
pushing, shouting crowds mass themselves, and serious panics are caused
when the sharp crack of the exploding bomb shakes and rattles all the
windows. As soon as the danger is passed the curious collect, first with
hesitation, then bolder and bolder, around the spot where the bomb fell
and gape with terror at the powerful results produced by the explosion.
Here a stretch of the railroad has been destroyed; the walls of the
near-by houses are covered with innumerable holes looking like smallpox
scars; others, of the splinters from the bomb, have dug themselves deep
into the ground and not a single window in the vicinity is unbroken."

A winter of the most bitter misery has closed in on the unfortunate
city; miserable-looking shapes by the thousands, without home or food,
crowd the narrow, crooked streets. As sand flows through an hourglass,
so regiment after regiment, from every part of the vast empire of the
czar, streams through the streets which now are black with people. From
far-distant Siberia and from the borderlands of Turkestan these
gray-clad soldiers pour through Warsaw to the plains of Poland. In their
dull features no trace can be discovered of what they feel or think. One
can study the faces of these Tartars, Mongols, and Caucasians as much as
one pleases, there remains always the same mystery. Tramp, tramp,
tramp--they march from the Kalish station along the railroad until they
disappear together with the horizon in a single gray mass--who knows
whither, who knows whence? It is at such times that one realizes the
magnitude of Russia if one considers that many of them have traveled
all the way from the Ural Mountains.

Quietness and gloominess now reign in Warsaw's hospitals, in which
formerly there was so much life and activity. The patients have been
sent, as far as their condition permitted, into central Russia to
recuperate, and at this time only slightly wounded men are brought in.
This is a bad sign, for the doctors figure correctly that it indicates
that those seriously wounded are left on the battle fields and perish
there. The hotels, on the other hand, are full of life. There officers
have settled down; every rank and every branch of the service is
represented here, from the grizzly general down to the beardless
lieutenant; every province of the immense empire seems to have sent a
representative. You may see there the most fantastic figures: Caucasian
colonels with enormous caps, huge mustaches, and black boots, figures
which look still exactly like the Muscovian warriors from the days of
Napoleon. It strikes one as very strange to hear so many German names
borne by these Russian officers. And while the poor inhabitants of
Warsaw await their fate with fear and trembling, the officers are the
only ones full of joy, for war is their element and a promising
opportunity for thousands of enticing possibilities which peace never
brought them.

During November and December, 1914, both in north and south Poland,
continuous fighting went on along the lines. In south Poland the field
of action was at first north of Cracow, between the Rivers Warta and
Pilitza, and later between the latter and the River Nida. But although
the result of this fighting--which mainly was in favor of the
German-Austrian forces--to a certain extent influenced the result in the
central sector to the west of Warsaw, the details of it do not properly
call for consideration at this time and place. For it was directed much
more by the Austrian General Staff than by that of the German armies,
the forces involved were preponderantly Austro-Hungarian, and it was
more closely connected with the Russian attack on Galicia and the
Carpathians than with Von Hindenburg's attack on the Russian center. It
will find its proper consideration in another place in connection with
the Galician campaign. Suffice it to say here that the Austro-Hungarian
forces under Boehm-Ermolli, supported by the German division under
General van Woyrsch, carried successfully that part of Von Hindenburg's
general plan which had been assigned to it--the protection of the right
wing of his central group of troops and the shielding of Cracow from a
direct Russian attack.

To the north of the central group--north of the Vistula and between it
and the Narew--the Germans had assembled, as we have already stated,
another group which had as its bases Soldau and Thorn. Their chief task
was to protect the German provinces of West and East Prussia from a
Russian attack from Novo Georgievsk and Warsaw.

During November, 1914, these forces restricted themselves entirely to
defensive fighting along the border. With the beginning of December,
however, when the Russians had temporarily weakened their forces
fighting north of the Vistula in order to send additional support to the
defenders of Warsaw, the Germans attempted an advance which for a short
time was successful.

On December 10, 1914, Przasnysz, about twenty-five miles southeast of
Mlawa, was stormed after the latter place had been occupied some time
before. By December 15, 1914, however, the Russians had again stronger
forces at their command for this part of the front, and with them they
not only threw the Germans again out of Przasnysz, but forced them to
evacuate Mlawa and retire behind their border. A week later, about
December 22, 1914, the Germans again advanced from Soldau and
Neidenburg, and by December 24, 1914, Mlawa once more was in their
hands. Although the fighting in this sector practically went on without
intermission from the beginning of November, 1914, to the end of
February, 1915, comparatively small forces were involved on both sides.
This, of course, excluded any possibility of a decisive result on either
side, and we can therefore dismiss this end of the campaign with the
statement that, although the Germans north of the Vistula were more
successful in keeping the Russians off German soil than the Russians
were in keeping the Germans out of Poland, the latter did not make here
any appreciable headway in the direction of Warsaw, and accomplished no
more than to keep a goodly number of Russian regiments tied up in the
protection of Novo Georgievsk and the northern approach to Warsaw
instead of permitting them to participate in the repulse of the main
attack against the Polish capital, where they would have been very
useful indeed.




CHAPTER LXXX

WINTER BATTLES IN EAST PRUSSIA


The most northern part of the eastern front is now the only one left for
our consideration. We have already learned that when the German General
Staff planned its second drive against Warsaw, it had been decided to
restrict the German forces collected in East Prussia south of the Niemen
and east and south of the Mazurian Lakes to defensive measures. At that
time--the beginning of November, 1914--and until about the beginning of
February, 1915, they consisted of two army corps under the command of
General von Buelow, who at the outbreak of the war and for a few years
previous to it had been in command of a division with headquarters at
Insterburg, and who was therefore well qualified for his task through
his intimate knowledge of the territory. About 50 per cent of his forces
belonged to the Landwehr, about 25 per cent to the Landsturm and only
about 25 per cent were of the first line. These faced a numerically very
superior force variously estimated at five to seven army corps. The
Germans therefore found it necessary to equalize this overpowering
difference by withdrawing behind a strong natural line of defense. This
they found once more behind the greater Mazurian Lakes to the south and
behind the River Angerapp which flows out of the lakes at Angerburg to
the north until it joins the river Pissa slightly to the east of
Insterburg.

[Illustration: The town of Gerdauen, East Prussia was burned during the
Russian invasion, when for a time East Prussia suffered like Belgium and
Poland.]

These positions apparently were prepared during the early part of
November, 1914. For as late as November 15, 1914, fighting took place
at Stallupoehnen on the Kovno-Koenigsberg railroad and some ten miles
east of the Angerapp. A few days earlier, on November 9, 1914, a Russian
attack, still farther east, north of the Wysztiter Lake, had resulted in
considerable losses to the Russians. North of the Pissa River the
Germans managed to stick closer to their border, along which there flows
a small tributary of the Niemen offering natural protection.
Considerable fighting took place in this territory around the town of
Pillkallen, but the German line held.

On November 30, 1914, the Russians had again occupied that part of East
Prussia located between the border and the Mazurian Lake-Angerapp line.
On that day the first of a long series of attacks against this very
strong line was made east of Darkehmen, but was as unsuccessful as all
its successors. The German Emperor saw some of this fighting during a
short visit to the East Prussian defenders. All through December, 1914,
the Russians made repeated attacks against the German lines, always
without accomplishing their object of breaking through it and advancing
again against Koenigsberg. Of course, they inflicted severe losses on
their adversaries, though their own, both in disabled and captured, were
much more severe, due to the disadvantages which the difficult territory
heaped upon the attacking side. By the beginning of January winter had
set in in full earnest and the weather became so severe that no fighting
of any importance took place throughout the entire month. The only
exceptions were Russian attacks about January 15, 1915, against Loetzen,
the German fortress on the eastern shore of the northernmost group of
the lakes, which, however, brought no results. At the same time
Gumbinnen was once more the center of considerable fighting.

Later in the month, January 26, 28, and 29, 1915, this town again and
again had to pay dearly in additional destruction of what little of it
that was still left of its former prosperity for the advantage of being
located on the Koenigsberg road. On January 30, 1915, the Russians
attempted to break through a little further south at Darkehmen--but
still the German lines held.

In the meanwhile new troops had been prepared and collected and were
being rushed to that part of the east front for the purpose of clearing
all of East Prussia of its invaders. These reenforcements were sent to
the right and left wings of the Mazurian Lakes-Angerapp line, and the
former began its attack in February. A few days before an exceptionally
heavy snowfall, accompanied by very high winds and very low
temperatures, had set in. This not only added to the hardships of the
troops, but increased immensely the difficulties with which the leaders
on both sides had to contend. On account of the weather the roads became
impassable for motor cars and the railroads were hardly in better
condition. At no time could a general count with any amount of certainty
on the prompt execution of movements. Trains were delayed for hours and
regiments appeared in their allotted positions hours late.

The right wing of the German front was sent around the southern end of
the lake chain by way of Johannisburg. There the Russians had thrown up
very strong fortifications in connection with the dense forests
surrounding this town. To the southeast the river Pisseck forms the
outlet for one of the lakes and flows toward the Narew. This line, too,
was held by the Russians, who had considerable forces, both in
Johannisburg and to the east in Bialla. In the late afternoon and during
the night of February 8, 1915 a crossing over the Pisseck was forced and
Johannisburg was stormed. Russian reenforcements from the
south--Kolno--arrived too late and were thrown back with considerable
losses in men and guns. In spite of the bitter cold the Germans pressed
on immediately. They took Bialla on February 9, 1915, and then
immediately pushed on to Lyck with part of their forces. This town, like
so many other East Prussian towns, had suffered cruelly, having been in
the thick of the fighting almost from the beginning of the war. Now the
Russians again made a most determined stand in its vicinity, induced, no
doubt, chiefly by the defensive advantages which the territory offered
here. To the west of Lyck, beyond the Lyck Lake, they had built up very
strong intrenchments which resisted all German attacks for days, and it
was not until the middle of February, 1915, that they gave up these
positions. But even then they continued to hold Lyck itself, and it was
not taken until after the middle of the month. The other part of the
right wing in the meantime had forced the Russians out of the southeast
corner of East Prussia and was advancing against Grajeko and Augustovo.

In the north the German left wing had pushed its advance
simultaneously, starting from around Tilsit and the Niemen line. The
Russians fell back on strongly prepared intrenchments along the line
Pillkallen-Stallupoehnen, but by February 10, 1915, they had to give
up this line and withdraw still farther south and east toward
Eydtkuhnen, Kibarty, and Wirballen, all places of which we heard
considerable during the previous battling in East Prussia. It was
snowing furiously and the Russians apparently counted with too much
certainty on this as a means of keeping the Germans from following
closely. They procured quarters in these three towns and were going to
enjoy a much needed rest for one night. But during that night the
Germans, overcoming all difficulties of snowdrifts and impassible
roads, attacked and stormed Eydtkuhnen as well as Wirballen and
killed, wounded, or made prisoners almost all the Russian forces
located there, amounting to about 10,000 men with considerable
artillery and even greater quantities of supplies. Gumbinnen also was
retaken by the Germans and by February 12, 1915, they were on Russian
territory and advancing once more against Suwalki.

By the middle of February the last Russian had been driven out of
Germany. This series of battles, known commonly as the "Winter Battle of
the Mazurian Lakes" not only freed East Prussia, but yielded
comparatively large results in the numbers of prisoners taken. In nine
days' fighting about 50,000 men, 40 guns, and 60 machine guns were
captured. Both sides, of course, suffered also heavy losses in killed
and wounded. These great battles here briefly summarized to round out
the account of the operations of the first six months are described in
greater detail in Volume III.




CHAPTER LXXXI

RESULTS OF FIRST SIX MONTHS OF RUSSO-GERMAN CAMPAIGN


This brings us approximately to the end of the first six months'
fighting at the eastern front. It will be well now to pause for a short
space of time and to sum up the results of the tremendous conflict which
has been narrated. However, before we consider these results from a
military point of view and strike the balance of successes achieved and
failures suffered, let us see how they affected those who were the
actors in this terrible tragedy of mankind--the men who fought these
battles and their leaders, and the poor, unfortunate men, women, and
children whose habitations had been thrown by an unkind fate into the
path of this vortex of death and destruction.

In determining the total losses which the Russian and German forces
suffered during the first six months of the war, it is next to
impossible to arrive at this time at absolutely correct figures. This is
especially true in regard to the German troops. In a way this sounds
strange, for the German war organization made itself felt in this
respect, just as much as along other lines, and in none of the countries
involved were the official lists of losses published as rapidly,
frequently, and accurately as in Germany, especially in the early stages
of the conflict. However, these lists included the German losses on all
fronts as well as on the seas, and therefore are available for our
purposes only as a basis for a computation of average losses. But by
taking these totals and comparing them with other figures from various
sources--newspapers, official Russian reports, English and French
computations (non-official), statistics of the International Red Cross,
etc.--it is possible to determine a total per month of German losses of
all kinds--killed, wounded, missing, and captured--for all fronts on
which German forces were fighting during the first six and a half months
of the war. This total is 145,000 men per month. Assuming that all in
all the losses were about evenly divided on the western and eastern
fronts, and disregarding the comparatively small losses of the navy, we
get a monthly average of German losses at the eastern front of 72,500
men, or a total for the entire period of 471,250 men. This does not
include those wounded who after a varying period of time were again able
to return to the fighting, and whose number of course was very large,
but represents the number of those whose services had been lost to the
German forces for all time.

In the case of the Russian losses it is somewhat easier to arrive at
fairly accurate figures, at least as far as their losses through capture
are concerned. For the official German figures in this respect go into
great detail and undoubtedly may be accepted as generally correct.
During the early part of the war when the Russians were fighting along
the border and on East Prussian territory they lost 15,000 officers and
men by capture, at Tannenberg 90,000, and immediately afterward in the
Lake district 30,000 more. In October, 1914, fighting in the province of
Suwalki, during Hindenburg's advance to the Niemen and his retreat, he
captured 10,000, and by November 1, 1914, there were according to the
official German count 3,121 officers and 186,797 men in German prison
camps. By January 1, 1915, this number had increased to 3,575 and
306,294 respectively, and by the middle of February the total in round
numbers must have been at least 400,000. That this is approximately
correct is proven by the statement of the Geneva Red Cross published in
the "Journal de Geneve," which gives the total of Russian prisoners in
the hands of the Central Powers by the end of February as 769,500.
According to the same source the Russians had lost by that time in
killed 743,000 and in totally disabled 421,500, while their slightly
wounded--those who finally returned again to the active forces--reached
the huge total of 1,490,000. These figures again are for the entire
Russian forces, those fighting against German as well as
Austro-Hungarian forces. Just what proportion should be assigned to the
Russian forces fighting against the Germans is rather problematical. For
while these were fighting on a much larger front than those who had been
thrown against Galicia and the Bukowina, the latter were comparatively
much more numerous and, therefore, probably suffered proportionately
larger losses. Some of the losses also occurred in the fighting against
Turkey. However, we will be fairly safe--most likely shooting below
rather than above the mark--in estimating one-half of all these losses
as having been incurred on the Russo-German front. This, then, would
give us for the period of August 1, 1914, to February 15, 1915, the
following total Russian losses in their fighting against the German
forces: Killed, 371,500; totally disabled, 210,750; captured, 384,750, a
grand total of 967,000, or about twice as much as the German losses.

Even these figures, without any further comment, are sufficient to
indicate the terrible carnage and suffering that was inflicted on the
manhood of the countries involved. But if we consider that every man
killed, wounded or captured, after all, was only a small part of a very
large circle made up of his family--in most cases dependent on him for
support--and of his friends, even the most vivid imagination fails to
give proper expression in words of the sum total of unfathomable misery,
broken hearts, spoiled lives, and destroyed hopes that are represented
in these cold figures.

At various points in this history we have had occasion to speak of the
various generals, both Russian and German, who were directing these vast
armies, the greatest numerically and the most advanced technically which
mankind has ever seen assembled in its entire history. To go into
details concerning the hundreds of military geniuses which found
occasion to display the fruits of their training and talent would be
impossible. But on each side there was among all these leaders one
supreme leader on whose ability and decision depended not only the
results of certain battles, but the lives of their millions of
soldiers--yes, even the fate of millions upon millions of men, women and
children. The Russians had intrusted their destiny to a member of their
reigning family, an uncle of the czar, Grand Duke Nicholas, while the
Germans had found their savior in the person of a retired general,
practically unknown previous to the outbreak of the war, Paul von
Hindenburg. Each had been put in supreme command, although the former's
burden was even greater than that of the latter, including not only the
Russian forces fighting against the Germans, but also those fighting
against the Austro-Hungarians. On both, however, depended so much that
it will be well worth while to devote a short space of time to gain a
more intimate knowledge of their appearance, character and surroundings.
We will spend, therefore, a day each at the headquarters of these two
men by following the observations which some well-known war
correspondents made during their visits at these places.

The war correspondent of the London "Times" had occasion during his
travels with the Russian armies to make the following observations:
"Modern war has lost all romance. The picturesque sights, formerly so
dear to the heart of the journalist, have disappeared. War now has
become an immense business enterprise, and the guiding genius is not to
be found on the firing line, any more than the president of a great
railroad would put on overalls and take his place in an engine cab. Here
in Russia the greatest army which ever met on a battle field has been
assembled under the command of one individual, and the entire
complicated mechanism of this huge organization has its center in a
hidden spot on the plains of West Russia. It is a lovely region which
shows few signs of war. In a small forest of poplars and pines a number
of tracks has been laid which connect with the main line, and here live
quietly and peacefully some hundreds of men who form the Russian General
Staff. A few throbbing autos rushing hither and thither and a troop of
about 100 Cossacks are apparently the only features which do not belong
to the everyday life of the small village which is the nearest regular
railroad station. Many hundreds of miles away from this picture of
tranquillity is stretched out the tremendous chain of the Russian front,
each point of which is connected with this string of railroad cars by
telegraph. Here, separated from the chaos of battle, uninfluenced by the
confusion of armed masses, the brain of the army is able to gain a clear
and free view of the entire theatre of war which would only be obscured
by closer proximity."

Another, a French correspondent, says: "Whatever happens anywhere, from
the Baltic Sea to the Carpathian Mountains, is known immediately in the
big blue railroad cars whose walls are covered with maps. Telegraph and
telephone report the most minute occurrence. Should the commander in
chief desire to inspect a position or to consult personally with one of
the commanding generals there is always an engine ready with steam up.
Headquarters suddenly rolls off; and, after two or three days, it
returns noiselessly, with its archives, its general staff, its
restaurant, and its electric plant. The Grand Duke rules with an iron
fist. Champagne and liquor is taboo throughout the war zone, and even
the officers of the general staff get nothing except a little red wine.
Woe to anyone who sins against this order, here or anywhere else at the
front. The iron fist of the Grand Duke hits, if necessary, even the
greatest, the most famous. At a near-by table I recognize an officer in
plain khaki, Grand Duke Cyril. The proud face and the powerful figure of
the commander in chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, is sometimes to be seen in
this severe room. Shyly one approaches the chief commander upon whose
shoulders rests all the responsibility; and the attitude of the man who
has been chosen to lead the Russian armies to victory does not encourage
familiarity. Next to him I notice Janushkewitch, the Chief of the Great
General Staff, with the gentle, almost youthful face of a thinker. But
everything is ruled by the personality of the Grand Duke, which, with
its mixture of will power and of gracious majesty, is most captivating."

Let us now rush across space and follow still another war correspondent,
this time a representative of the German press, to the headquarters of
the German armies: "Field Marshal von Hindenburg has an impressive
appearance. With his erect, truly military carriage he makes a picture
of strength and health. With him appears a very young-looking general
who cannot be older than fifty years. A high forehead, clear blue eyes,
a powerful aquiline nose, an energetic mouth, a face--in one word--which
would be striking even if the man, to whom it belongs, would not be
wearing a general's uniform and the insignia of the order 'Pour le
merite'--one knows that one is face to face with the chief of the
General Staff, Ludendorff. The Field Marshal greets his guest with
charming friendliness, leads the way to the table and offers him the
seat to his right. During the simple evening meal he rises and offers
the toast: 'The German Fatherland!' Around the table are about ten
officers, among them Captain Fleischmann von Theissruck of the Austrian
army, who represents the Austrian General Staff. The Field Marshal
mentions a letter which he received from some one entirely unknown to
him in which the writer reproaches him most severely because some
Cossacks had entered some small town on the border. 'That will happen
again and again,' he says, 'and cannot be avoided. I cannot draw up my
troops along the entire border, man by man, like a quarantine guard. To
gather forces quickly again and again and to beat the Russians again and
again, that is the best way to make them disgusted with their stay at
the German border.' Then he relates some details about the battle of
Tannenberg. He does not tire of entertaining his guest with interesting
details about the fighting. He mentions the vast number of presents
which have been sent to him by his numerous admirers. 'It is touching
how good people are to me. A great many of their gifts are very
welcome--but what shall I do with framed pictures while I am in the
field? What shall I do after the war is over? Nothing. I'll go back to
Hanover. There are lots of younger men [pointing to Ludendorff and the
others] who want their chance, too. With my years, there is nothing more
beautiful than to retire after one's work has been done and to make room
for the younger generation.'"

Apparently the men at the "helm of the ship" lead a life of comparative
ease and security. But if we consider the fearful responsibilities that
they have to carry and the tremendous mental strain under which they are
continuously, we can readily see that their lot is not to be envied. Of
course, their rewards are equally great if they are successful. But what
if they fail? At any rate they, as well as the troops who fight under
them, have the glamour of fighting, the promise of glory, the sense of
duty well done, to sustain them. But what of those others, equally or
even more numerous, on whose fields and forests, in whose streets and
market places, around whose houses and churches the battles rage and the
guns roar? What of the women and children, the sick and the old, whose
fathers, husbands and sons are doing the fighting or, perhaps, have
already laid down their lives upon the altar of patriotism? What is
there left for them to do when they see their houses go up in flames,
their few belongings reduced to ashes, their crops destroyed and even
their very lives threatened with death and sometimes--worse yet--with
dishonor?

All this and more, millions upon millions of Russians and Germans, rich
and poor alike, had to suffer most cruelly. And on the eastern front
this suffering in a way, perhaps, was even more severe than in the west.
For there the actual fighting, while extending over an equally long
front, was much more concentrated, and after the first few months did
not move forward and backward; and existence, except in the immediate
vicinity of the firing line, was at least possible, even if dangerous
and precarious. But in the east thousands upon thousands of square miles
in East Prussia, in West Russia, and especially in Poland, the fighting
passed in ever advancing and retreating waves as the surf rolls along
the beach, and soon gunfire and marching millions of armed men had
leveled the country almost as smoothly as the waves of the ocean grind
the sand.

In East Prussia the devastation wrought by the Russians, some through
wanton lust for destruction and in unreasoning hate for the enemy, but
mostly through the pressure of military necessity, was terrible,
especially east of the Mazurian Lakes and south of the Niemen. But
there, at least, the poor inhabitants had the consolation of being able
to return to their destroyed homes after the Russians had been finally
driven out and to begin to build up again what war had destroyed, and in
this they had the help and support of their highly organized government
and their more fortunate compatriots from the interior.

In Poland, however, especially in the rural districts, even that
consolation was lacking. For after German and Russian armies alike had
passed over the country again and again, not only destroying values that
it had taken centuries to build up, but on account of the huge masses
concerned frequently denuding the entire countryside of absolutely every
means of sustenance, the final result was occupation by the enemy. And
even if that enemy, true to his inherent love of order and to his talent
for organization, immediately proceeded to establish a well-regulated
temporary government, at the best his efforts would have to be
restricted; for he had not much to spare, neither in men to do the work
needed, nor in means to finance it, nor even in food to give sustenance
to those who had lost everything.

And the worst of it was that for years previous to the outbreak of the
war the two principal races inhabiting Poland--the Poles and the
Jews--had been fighting each other, with the Russian sympathies strongly
on the side of the Poles. Now when war overtook this unfortunate
country, both the Poles and the Russians threw themselves like hungry
wolves upon the unfortunate Jews. They were driven out from their
villages, often the entire population irrespective of age, sex, or
condition. They were made to wander from one place to another, like so
many herds of cattle, except that no herd of cattle had ever been
treated as cruelly as these poor helpless droves of women, children, and
old and sick people whose men folk were fighting for their country while
this very country did its best to kill their families. This is not the
place or time to go into this horrible catastrophe, beyond stating this
fact: In July, 1914, Poland had been inhabited by millions of
hard-toiling people who, though neither overly blessed with wealth or
opportunities, nor enjoying conditions of life that were particularly
conducive to happiness, were at least able to found and raise families
and to sustain an existence which was bearable chiefly because of the
hope for something better to come. Six months later--January,
1915--these millions had stopped toil, for their fields were devastated,
their cattle had been killed or driven away, their houses had been
burned down. Hundreds of thousands of them had been forced to flee to
the interior, other hundreds of thousands had died, some through want
and illness, some during the fighting around their homes, some through
murder and worse. Families had been broken up and others wiped out
entirely, and thousands of mothers had been separated from their
children, perhaps never to see them again. Even if, in isolated cases,
destruction, and even death, was merited or made inevitably necessary,
in the greatest number of cases the suffering was as undeserved as it
was severe.

From a military point of view the net result of the fighting during the
first six months of the war most decidedly was in favor of the Germans.
February, 1915, found them conquerors along the entire extent of the
Russo-German front, and the Russians those who had been conquered. In
spite of the successful campaigns which German arms had won, however,
they had fallen far short of what they had apparently set out to do, and
in that wider sense their successes came dangerously near to being
failures. But even at that they were still ahead of their adversaries;
for though they had not gained the two objects for which they had
striven most furiously--the possession of Warsaw and the final
destruction of the offensive power of the Russian armies--they held
large and important sections of the Russian Empire, they had driven the
Russians completely out of Germany and forced them to do their further
fighting on their own ground, and they had reduced the effectiveness of
their armies by vast numbers, killing, disabling, or capturing, at a
most conservative estimate, at least twice as many men as they
themselves had lost.

During the first three weeks of August, 1914, the Russian armies had
invaded East Prussia and laid waste a large section of it. Then came the
debacle at Tannenberg, and by the middle of September, Germany was freed
of the invader, who had lost tens of thousands in his attempt to force
his way into the heart of the German Empire. Not satisfied with these
results, the Germans on their part now attempted an invasion of large
sections of West Russia, pursuing their defeated foes until they reached
the Niemen and its chain of fortresses which they found insurmountable
obstacles. It was once more the turn of the Russians, who now not only
drove back the invading Germans to the border, but who by the beginning
of October, 1914, faced again an invasion of their East Prussian
province. However, less than two weeks sufficed this time to clear
German soil once more, and by October 15, 1914, the Russians had again
been forced back across the border. By this time the German Commander in
Chief, Von Hindenburg, had learned the lesson of the Niemen. Instead of
battering in vain against this iron line of natural defenses, he threw
the majority of his forces against Poland, and especially against its
choicest prize--historic Warsaw. October 11, 1914, may be considered the
approximate beginning of the first drive against the Polish capital.
During about two weeks of fighting the German armies advanced to the
very gates of Warsaw, which then seemed to be theirs for the mere
taking. But suddenly the Russian bear recovered his self-control, and
with renewed vigor and replenished strength he turned once again against
the threatening foe. By October 28, 1914, the Germans in North and
Central Poland and the Austro-Hungarians in South Poland had to retreat.

November 7, 1914, became the starting date for the third Russian
invasion of East Prussia. The Germans now changed their tactics. Instead
of meeting the enemy's challenge and attempting to repeat their previous
performances of throwing him back and then invading his territory, they
restricted themselves, for the time being, to defensive measures in East
Prussia, and launched a powerful drive of their own against Russian
territory. For the second time Warsaw was made their goal. By this time,
to a certain extent at least, the offensive momentum of both sides had
been reduced in speed. Where it had taken days in the earlier campaigns
to accomplish a given object, it now took weeks. Of course the rigors of
the eastern winter which had set in by then played an important part in
this slowing-up process, which, however, affected the speed only of the
armies, but not the furor of their battling. December 6, 1914, brought
the possession of Lodz to the Germans, and on the next day the Russians
were taught the same lesson before the Mazurian Lakes that they had
taught to the Germans a few months before when they faced the Niemen.
East Prussia up to the Lakes was in the hands of Russia, but beyond that
impregnable line of lakes and swamps and rivers they could not go.

In the meanwhile the drive against Warsaw was making small progress in
spite of the most furious onslaughts. There, too, a series of rivers and
swamps--less formidable, it is true, than in East Prussia, but hardly
less effective--stemmed the tide of the invaders. For more than two
weeks, beginning about December 20 and lasting well into January, the
Russians made a most stubborn stand along the Bzura and Rawka line, and
successfully, though with terrible losses, kept the Germans from taking
Warsaw. However, in order to accomplish this they had to weaken their
line at other points and thus bring about the collapse of their drive
against Cracow, by means of which they expected to gain from the south
the road into Germany which had been denied to them again and again in
the north.

The end of January, 1915, found the Germans practically as far in Poland
as the beginning of the month. It is true that they had made little
progress in four weeks, but it is also true that they had given up none
of the ground they had gained. And with the coming of February, 1915,
they reduced their offensive activities at that part of the front and
turned their attention once more to East Prussia. The second week of
February, 1915, brought to the Russians their second great defeat on the
shores of the Mazurian Lakes. By February 15 East Prussia again had been
cleared of the enemy, and parts of the Russian provinces between the
border and the Niemen were in the hands of the Germans who apparently
had made up their minds that they were not going to permit any further
Russian invasions of East Prussia if they could help it. They now held a
quarter of Poland and a small part of West Russia, while the Russians
held nothing except a long battle front, stretching almost from the
Baltic to the Carpathian Mountains and threatened everywhere by an enemy
who daily seemed to grow stronger rather than weaker.




PART VIII--TURKEY AND THE DARDANELLES




CHAPTER LXXXII

FIRST MOVES OF TURKEY


The entrance of Turkey, the seat of the ancient Ottoman Empire, into the
Great War in 1914, with its vast dominions in Europe, Asia, and Africa,
created a situation which it was appalling to contemplate. The flames of
world war were now creeping not only into the Holy Land, the birthplace
of Christian civilization, but to the very gates of Mecca, the "holiest
city of Islam." Would the terrible economic struggle in Europe, the war
for world trade, now develop into a holy war that would bring the
religious faiths of the earth on to a great decisive battle ground?

The seething flames of economic supremacy that were consuming Europe had
threatened from the beginning of the war to creep into the Occident, as
we shall see in the chapter on "Japan and the Far East." Moreover, as
described in "Naval Operations," it was in the waters of the Near East
that the first big incident of the war on the sea took place.

Despite the fact that the public had been looking forward to an
immediate clash of the dreadnought squadrons of the two countries
somewhere between the east coast of Scotland and the Dutch shore,
nothing of the kind happened. Instead, both grand fleets ran to safety
in the landlocked harbors of their respective countries.

In was to the Mediterranean in the first week of August, 1914, that the
attention of the world was first drawn by events. Two German warships,
the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, were off the coast of Algeria. The first
was one of the finest ships of the German navy, a superdreadnought
battleship cruiser of 23,000 tons, capable of making more than 28 knots
an hour. Her main battery consisted of ten 11-inch guns, and in addition
she mounted twelve 5.9-inch guns and twelve 21 pounders. She was capable
therefore of meeting on equal terms any enemy vessel in the
Mediterranean, and more than capable of outrunning any of the heavier
vessels of the French or British navy stationed in those waters. The
_Breslau_ was capable of a similar speed, but was a much weaker vessel,
being a light cruiser of only 4,478 tons. Both of these vessels had
enormous coal capacities, the _Breslau_, in particular, being able to
travel more than 6,000 miles without refilling her bunkers.

The speed and the coal capacity of these vessels were to prove of vital
importance in the events of the next few days. For their role was to be
one of flight, not to battle. England alone and, in an overwhelming
degree, England and France combined hopelessly outnumbered and outgunned
the two German warships in the Mediterranean. Realizing this, the German
commander, after firing a few shots into the Algerian coast towns of
Bone and Philippville, steamed northwest with the intention either of
outwitting the English and French squadron commanders, or of running
through Gibraltar and so on to the broad Atlantic to wage war upon the
British mercantile marine. The British, however, were alive to this
danger and headed off the two German warships. Whereupon they turned
northeast.

Early on the morning of Wednesday, August 5, 1914, these ships were
discovered steaming into the harbor of Messina, Italy. The English and
French fleets, close upon the heels of the enemy, immediately took up
positions at either end of the Straits of Messina, confident that they
had successfully bottled up the Germans.

Then quickly there developed one of the most dramatic incidents in the
history of naval warfare. It is described in this chapter as well as in
the narrative on "Naval Operations" because of its direct bearing on
Turkish politics and policies. The captain and officers of the _Goeben_
and the _Breslau_ went ashore at Messina, made their wills and deposited
their valuables with the German consul. The decks of the apparently
doomed vessels were cleared for action, flags run up to the resounding
cheers of the sailors and with the brass bands of the boats playing
"Heil dir im Siegerkranz" they steamed swiftly out of Messina harbor to
what seemed like certain destruction.

A blood-red sun was quickly setting in the perfect Italian sky. The
bands were hushed aboard the German warships, every light was dimmed,
and the sailors were ordered to their posts. In tense whispers they
discussed the coming fight. The ships were already at top speed plowing
through the waters of the Mediterranean as fast as the throbbing engines
could urge them. A sharp lookout was kept for the enemy, but as one
hour, two hours, three hours passed and none was seen it became apparent
that for the time at least they had evaded detection. Rounding the
southern coast of Italy, they turned due east and the course laid for
Constantinople.

Morning came and still, at 28 knots an hour, the German warships were
speeding toward the Turkish capital--and safety. To the rear, too far to
reveal their funnels, the pursuing French and English squadron followed,
thin lazy strips of smoke attested their presence to the men aboard the
_Breslau_ and the _Goeben_.

Suddenly far to the southeast the masts of a single vessel were seen on
the horizon. Then the smokestacks of the British light cruiser
_Gloucester_ poked their tops above the skyline and daringly she opened
fire on the mighty _Goeben_. Tempting, however, as the opportunity was
for the German commander with an overwhelming force at his heels he
dared waste no time nor run the risk of a chance shot disabling his
vessel. He sheered off sharply to the northeast and in a few hours lost
the plucky _Gloucester_ to view.

At the end of this week in August the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, their
engines hot from constant steaming at forced speed, but with flags
flying and bands playing, steamed through the narrow channel of the
Dardanelles, through the sea of Marmora, and cast anchor off the
gloriously beautiful city of Constantinople. As quickly as the
formalities would permit the two German warships were transferred to
Turkish sovereignty, and to all intents and purposes, as future events
proved, the Ottoman Empire entered the war as an ally of Germany and
Austria.

Turkey's attitude in these early days of the crisis of August, 1914, was
conditioned by several major causes easily discernible. For almost a
generation, Germany has been sedulously cultivating Turkish friendship.
With that single-minded purposefulness so conspicuous in her diplomacy,
Germany found it easy, especially under the regime of the former Sultan
Abdul Hamid II to outmaneuver the easy-going diplomacy of France,
Russia, and England. Indeed, she found a real rival only in England,
who, starting with the initial advantage of long political friendship
with the Turkish people and the good will that grew out of the Crimean
War, successfully opposed many of the chess moves of her German rival.

However, with the coming to Constantinople as German Ambassador of the
late Marshal von Bieberstein, German prestige became supreme. Easily the
best German diplomatist of the present generation, Von Bieberstein
dominated the diplomatic corps at Constantinople and practically
dictated the foreign policy of Turkey. Through him, the Deutsche Bank
secured the great Bagdad railway concession and completed the commercial
subjugation of the country by Berlin.

These disquieting developments had been watched with anxiety in London.
But it was not until Von Bieberstein sprang the Bagdad railway surprise
that England fully awoke to the situation. Then she stepped in and
prevented any extension of the line to the Persian Gulf, an area which
British political and commercial circles regarded as peculiarly their
own.

At the same time an effort was made to reclaim the position Great
Britain had lost in Turkey. With the fall of Abdul Hamid and the coming
of the Young Turks there seemed a chance to do this, especially as
Germany was looked upon by the members of the Committee of Union and
Progress as the chief support of the deposed sultan. Kaiser William,
however, played his cards with consummate skill. The German policy was
quickly adapted to the new situation. Von Bieberstein was eventually
shifted to London and the leaders of the Young Turks, such as the
youthful and popular Enver Bey, were invited to Berlin to come under
the influence of the German army chiefs. The British Government, then in
the midst of negotiations with Russia and unwilling or unable to enter
into any outside arrangement that seemed to oppose the satisfaction of
the Russian dream of Constantinople refused to accept the Young Turks'
invitation to guarantee the integrity of the Turkish Empire for a
limited period in return for commercial and political concessions. On
the other hand, Emperor William reaffirmed to the new sultan his
guardianship of Islam and his interest in the welfare of the Mohammedans
wherever found.

But perhaps the deciding factor in the inclination of the Turks toward
Germany and her ally was to be found in the situation of the Mohammedan
world. Turkey had never reconciled herself to the English control of
Egypt and India and saw in the present war a possibility such as had
never occurred before and possibly would never occur again of wresting
from the British the far-flung lands peopled by the followers of
Mohammed. With powerful allies, and on more even terms than they had
ever dreamed of, they could now do battle with the enemy that held their
race in subjugation and with Russia, whose avowed object through
generations had been the capture of Constantinople, the possession and
perhaps desecration of the holy places of their religion and the
dismembering of the last self-governing state of Mohammedanism.

These, then, were the major considerations that weighed with the Turkish
people, no less than with the Turkish Government, in coming to a
decision. So tremendous were the stakes at issue, so widespread, almost
world-wide, were the interests involved, that Turkey, situated as it was
guarding practically the sole gateway leading from Europe to Russia,
could not hope to remain neutral. For better or for worse a decision
between the two warring factions must be made.

England, France, and Russia protested vigorously against the action of
the Turkish Government in taking over the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_.
Turkey replied by drawing attention to an incident that had seriously
inflamed public opinion in the Ottoman Empire. When the war started two
first-class battleships, the _Sultan Osman_ and the _Reshadie_, were
nearing completion for Turkey in English yards. Without any diplomatic
preliminaries the British admiralty confiscated the two ships on the
grounds of naval necessity. Whatever may have been the English motive,
the Turkish people regarded this as an attempt on the part of England to
weaken the Ottoman Empire and to make it impossible for it to safeguard
its national interests in the troublesome days that were surely to come
to neutrals as well as to belligerents.

But the Entente Powers hesitated to force a break on the _Goeben_ and
_Breslau_ question and the diplomatic correspondence of the period shows
that they had strong hope, not only at that moment, but up to the moment
of the final severance of relations of keeping the Turkish nation in a
state of neutrality at least. Signs were multiplying, however, that such
was not the intention of those in control at Constantinople.

In August and September, 1914, great activity prevailed throughout the
country. Arms and ammunition, especially heavy artillery in which the
Turkish army was notoriously weak, constantly arrived from Germany and
Austria. Every train from the central countries brought German army
officers and a sprinkling of German noncommissioned officers with which
to stiffen the Ottoman troops. The army was mobilized and General Liman
von Sanders, a distinguished German officer, was appointed inspector
general of the Turkish army. Immense stores of food and munitions were
concentrated at Damascus, Constantinople, Bagdad, and on the
Trans-Caucasus frontier, while a holy war against the infidel was openly
preached.

German vessels lying off Constantinople seem to have been given more or
less of a free hand and frequently searched Russian and British vessels
for contraband. The Turkish authorities appear to have gone as far as
they dared in preventing Russian supplies getting through to the Black
Sea. Russia protested and at times, along the shores of the Black Sea,
used methods closely bordering upon open warfare. Both sides, however,
seemed reluctant to take definite steps toward an open break.

In so far as Turkey was concerned this was probably due to a
disagreement among the members of the Government and others of powerful
influence outside official life. It was said that the sultan, the grand
vizier, and Djavid Bey, Minister of Finance, as well as a majority of
the cabinet, were opposed to war. However that may be, the issue was
soon decided by a small but immensely powerful clique headed by Enver
Bey and Talaat Bey, two of the more prominent and forceful of the Young
Turk leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress.

Of all the figures in Turkish life during the first months of the Great
War, the most picturesque and probably the most influential in the
events that led up to the outbreak of hostilities in Turkey was that of
the youthful Enver Pasha. He was one of the heroes of the remarkable
rebellion that resulted in the downfall of Abdul Hamid, and since then
he had ever played a leading part in the constantly shifting drama in
Constantinople. Dapper, alert intelligent, and approachable, modest
almost to the point of shyness, Enver was almost a venerated figure
among the Turkish people. As he passed on horseback, his slim figure
erect and stiff in its military pose, he attracted more attention and
interest than did the sultan himself.

He formed the chief and perhaps the strongest link between
Constantinople and Berlin. Honored in an unprecedented manner by the
sultan, Enver's influence in Constantinople was almost supreme. It is
through him that the various negotiations with Berlin were conducted.
Soon after the triumph of the Young Turk movement Enver went to Berlin
as military attache to the Turkish Embassy, and thoroughly imbibed the
Prussian military spirit. He returned to the Turkish capital an
enthusiastic admirer of the German army system and became a willing ally
of General Liman von Sanders in the latter's attempt to repair the
weaknesses of the Turkish army revealed by the Balkan War.

Second only to Enver Pasha in those critical days was Talaat Bey, an old
and more experienced member of the inner council of the Committee of
Union and Progress and also a prominent figure in the revolution against
Abdul Hamid. He was described by Sir Louis Mallet, British Ambassador to
Constantinople, as the most powerful civilian in the cabinet and also
as the most conspicuous of the leaders of the Committee of Union and
Progress. He was troubled by no such personal modesty and shyness as was
Enver. He was, however, a much harder man to judge. Enver was openly
pro-German in the weeks that preceded the actual break with the Entente
Powers, but for a long time the real intentions of Talaat Bey were in
doubt--at least they were to the British, French, and Russian
Ambassadors.

Djemel Pasha, Minister of Marine, while pro-German in his sentiments, is
believed to have hesitated in advising an open break, largely because of
the condition of the Turkish navy and the state of Turkish finance. The
arrival of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_, the importation of hundreds
of German sailors to stiffen the Turkish marine, and, during October,
the receipt of about $20,000,000 in gold from Berlin, won him over. In
the end Djemel Pasha stood with Enver and Talaat.

Other members of the Turkish Cabinet made a demonstration of attempting
to hold their country to an uneasy neutrality. Whether their efforts
were sincere or designed to prevent an open rupture until the
psychological moment had arrived it is impossible to say. Sir Louis
Mallet, in his private dispatches to his Government, expresses his firm
conviction that the sultan, the heir apparent, the grand vizier, Prince
Said Halim, Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance and a clear majority of
the cabinet were determined not to allow Turkey to be drawn into the
war. Up to the very last minute the British Ambassador did not despair
of the success of this peace party. Events were too strong for these
advocates of neutrality--events and the control of the all-important
army and navy by Enver and his associates. By the sword the Ottoman
Empire was reared and by the sword it has been ruled ever since.

During the months of September, 1914, and October, 1914, there were many
plain signs that Enver Pasha and Talaat Bey were heading straight for a
break. On September 9, 1914, the Porte gave notice of the proposed
abolition of the capitulations by which the various powers enjoyed
extraterritorial rights. At the same time what amounted to a final
demand was made upon the British Government to return the two Turkish
battleships seized at the outbreak of the war.

Extraordinary efforts were made by all the Entente Powers to keep Turkey
neutral. They proposed to agree to the abolition of the capitulations as
soon as a modern judicial system could be set up in Turkey; they agreed
to guarantee the independence and integrity of the country for a limited
but extended term of years; they declared that Turkey would not suffer
by any changes of national frontiers growing out of the war; and England
even promised to return the two superdreadnoughts upon the conclusion of
the war, claiming that their retention meanwhile was absolutely
necessary for her protection.

The main stipulations made by the Entente Powers in return for these
concessions were that the German crews of the _Goeben_ and the _Breslau_
be sent out of Turkey and that General Liman von Sanders and the other
members of the German military mission be dismissed. With these demands
Turkey refused to comply, after hesitating over the first. Indeed, the
strength of the German stiffening in Turkey was constantly becoming
greater: by the middle of September there were no less than 4,000 German
officers and noncommissioned officers in Constantinople alone and every
train from the north brought others. This situation of tension between
Turkey and the Entente Powers continued all through September and
October. The outside world momentarily expected an open rupture.




CHAPTER LXXXIII

THE FIRST BLOW AGAINST THE ALLIES


On October 29, 1914, came news of a Bedouin invasion of the Sinai
peninsula and an occupation of the important Wells of Magdala on the
road to the Suez Canal. England became alarmed, and her composure was
not restored by the news that came a few hours later. Claiming that
Russia had taken aggressive action in the Black Sea, three Turkish
torpedo boats sailed into Odessa Harbor, shelled the town, sank a
Russian guardship, and did other considerable damage.

On the following day, October 30, 1914, the Russian Ambassador at
Constantinople asked for his passports and the British and French
representatives with evident reluctance soon followed suit. On November
1 Turkey was definitely and irretrievably at war with the Entente Powers
and an ally of Germany and Austria.

The war from the point of view of the Turkish people was a matter of
four frontiers. There was the Dardanelles to guard; there was Egypt and
the Suez Canal to be threatened and perhaps captured; there was the
Caucasus, where across towering mountains and deep gorges the Ottoman
faced the Russian, his hereditary and most feared enemy; and finally
there was Mesopotamia. All of these theatres of possible warfare
presented military problems, and one of them naval problems among the
most intricate and interesting of those facing the nations involved in
this unprecedented war. In the Caucasus the mountains and the scarcity
of broad passes and good roads, the almost entire lack of railway
facilities and the whole nature of the country rendered offensive
operations as difficult as on the northeast frontier of Italy or in the
Carpathians. In Syria and on the road to the Suez Canal, the waterless
desert, the entire absence of railways, the paucity and inadequacy of
roads and the nature of the obstacles to be crossed before an invasion
of Egypt was possible made the task one of terrible difficulty. In the
Dardanelles the peninsula of Gallipoli, strong as it was in natural
advantages, was open to naval attack from two and perhaps three sides
and its defense must prove not only a costly affair but one the issue of
which must be constantly open to doubt. Lastly in Mesopotamia the task
for the Turks was a comparatively easy one, for an invading army must
meet with constant difficulties through lack of water, excessive heat,
absence of roads and railways and distance from real base of supplies.

At the time of Turkey's entry into the war, military opinion all over
the world was divided on the question of the relative efficiency of her
army. All agreed, however, that as an individual fighting animal the
Turk had few if any equals. Centuries of warfare had established his
reputation, and the wonderful defense of Plevna had set the seal upon
it. On the defensive, it was believed by many, he was unbeatable,
conditions of supply and equipment being equal.

The Balkan War, however, had been a severe blow to his prestige. It was
widely felt that his defeat by the Bulgars, the Serbians, and the Greeks
had revealed serious, even vital, weaknesses in the Ottoman army.
Consequently the test of Turkey in the Great War was anxiously awaited
by both allies and foes. Tremendous issues were at stake, and the
failure or success of the soldiers of the Crescent in standing before
the troops of Russia, France, and Great Britain was bound to have an
important, perhaps decisive, influence on the outcome of the struggle as
a whole.

It is doubtful if the general staff of any of the warring countries had
any accurate or dependable figures of the Turkish army. Especially was
this so of the army on a war footing. At one time only Mohammedans were
permitted to serve with the colors, the citizens of other religious
beliefs being called upon to pay a yearly tax in lieu of service. Of
recent years, however, that law was altered, and in the Balkan War
Mohammedan and Christian served side by side and fought with equal ardor
for their country. Just how large a proportion of the Christian
population had been incorporated into the army at the time of the
outbreak of hostilities few experts were in any position to estimate.

Germany, because of her painstaking investigations in Turkey as well as
in every other country, probably was in possession of more accurate data
than any other nation, not even excepting the Turks themselves. The best
neutral authorities speak of 1,125,000 as the total war-time strength of
the Ottoman forces, but that estimate was made prior to the war and
before the world had learned that nations under modern conditions are
able to place a much larger proportion of their available manhood in the
field than was ever thought possible. Probably the Turkish war strength
was underestimated. The chief difficulty was not in finding the men,
but in providing quickly equipment, and at the outset that was evidently
a very real obstacle in Turkey.

The Turkish army was essentially a German creation, and largely the
personal accomplishment of that very able military organizer and student
of war, Field Marshal von der Goltz. Von der Goltz spent a decade with
the Turkish army, and returned to Germany only to reorganize the eastern
defenses of his country in preparation for the Great War. When Turkey
entered the struggle he returned to Constantinople at Enver Bey's
personal request.

The Turk does not become subject to military duty until he reaches the
age of twenty. Then, however, for the next two decades he belongs to the
army, either actually or potentially. The first nine years are spent in
the Nizam or first line, first with the colors and then in immediate
reserve. Then come nine years in the Redif or Landwehr, and, finally,
two years in the Mustaph'-phiz or Landsturm.

All branches of the Turkish army were not equally good. Cavalry and
infantry were probably the equal of corresponding troops in the armies
of any other country, but the inefficiency of the artillery was blamed
for the debacle of the Balkan War. Many of the thousands of German
troops poured into Turkey before and after she entered the war were
trained gunners sent with the object of stiffening the weakest arm of
the Turkish army.

The Turkish army has always suffered, as have the armies of many other
countries, from a shortage of properly trained officers. Since the
advent of the Young Turks, and especially since Enver Pasha, with his
German training, succeeded to the position of Minister of War and
Commander in Chief, the personnel of the officers' corps has been vastly
improved. But it takes years--yes, generations--to create an adequate
supply of officers and noncommissioned officers for an army of the
proportions of Turkey's, and the assistance of the German stiffening
must have been of inestimable advantage to the Ottoman command.

At the outbreak of the war the Turkish army was disposed in four
regional groups. The number of men actually with the colors, according
to the best estimates, was 500,000, with another 250,000 trained men in
immediate reserve awaiting equipment. In or near Constantinople were
about 200,000 troops, including the First, Third, and Fifth Corps, a
part of the Sixth, and four cavalry brigades. In Thrace, watching the
uncertain Bulgars and Greeks, were the Second and most of the Sixth
Corps with cavalry regiments and frontier guards. In Palestine, menacing
the Suez Canal, were the 40,000 troops of the Eighth Corps, besides
unnumbered irregular Arab forces, who could not, however, be depended
upon. In the Caucasus the Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Corps and three
brigades of cavalry were facing the Russian forces across the winding
frontier. At Bagdad the Thirteenth Corps, and at Mosul the Twelfth,
stood guard over Mesopotamia.

For centuries England had had a very genuine and active interest in the
Persian Gulf, recognizing its strategic and potential commercial
importance with that foresight which has distinguished her statesmen and
traders for generations. Russia had been regarded as the most likely
nation to contest England's predominance in that quarter of the world,
and her every move was watched and checkmated in Downing Street.

At the outbreak of the war, however, and for a decade before, Germany
had given many signs that she had to be reckoned with in any
arrangements in the waters washing the shores of Mesopotamia. And it
soon became apparent that the domination of that part of Turkey was to
be one of the chief spoils of victory. Much has been written about
Germany's territorial ambitions. Much of it is based upon pure
speculation, but publicists in Germany make no disguise of the
Fatherland's desire to win and make a political and economic unit of the
countries now embraced in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Servia, perhaps
Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey in Europe and Asia. One has but to take up
the map and outline this aggregation of states and turn to a table of
statistics to realize the enormous advantages and powers of such a unit.
Politically and economically, it would dominate Europe as has no other
power for many generations. Economically and financially, it would be
absolutely independent of the rest of the world, but even if it were
not, no nation or combination of nations could afford to attempt to
isolate it.




CHAPTER LXXXIV

BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN MESOPOTAMIA


It was some such considerations as these working in the minds of the
members of the British Government that impelled them to undertake an
offensive in Mesopotamia almost immediately after the break of relations
with Turkey. But in addition there were two other reasons. Russia feared
a Turkish attack in force in the Caucasus and called to England and
France for a diversion. The Mesopotamia campaign working on the right
flank of the Turkish forces, as a whole, was an ideal operation intended
to draw troops from the Russian frontier. Secondly, the moral effect of
any considerable British success in Mesopotamia, and especially the
capture of Bagdad, was bound to be very great. Bulgaria, Greece, and
Rumania were believed to be waiting for a cue to enter the struggle, and
perhaps turn the scales in the Balkans, while the attitude of the
Mohammedans in the French and British possessions was largely dependent
upon the prestige of those two countries.

Finally, in considering the relative importance of particular campaigns,
observers are likely to lose sight of the tremendous importance of
possession. In law possession is said to constitute nine points. In
warfare, and in diplomacy, which must eventually follow, possession is
even more important. When the plenipotentiaries of the warring nations
gather around the peace table to arrive at a basis of settlement and the
cards are laid on the table, that nation in possession of disputed
territory, whatever may be her military and financial condition, is in a
position to largely influence the terms. Only by the concession of
equivalent advantages or considerations will it be possible to oust her.

How widely this is recognized will be evidenced by the scramble that is
made by each of the warring nations to secure possession of the land
regarded as its particular sphere of influence. This is true of
Mesopotamia, as of many other parts of Europe, Asia, and Africa.

It is evident that the Turkish military authorities were taken somewhat
by surprise by the rapidity with which the British Government in India
perfected their arrangements for an attack upon Mesopotamia. Knowing
that the total British army was extremely limited, it was thought that
France, and possibly Egypt, would absorb British military activity for
some months to come. There was every reason, however, why the British
should not delay the attack upon the shores of Mesopotamia washed by the
Persian Gulf. Running down to the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab to a
point (Abadam) almost directly opposite the Turkish village of Sanijeh
was the enormously important pipe line of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
Now this pipe line was one of the main supplies of the British navy
which, with the launching of the newer superdreadnoughts, was becoming
increasingly dependent upon oil instead of coal. So much was this so
that the British admiralty some time before the war bought a controlling
interest in this same Anglo-Persian Oil Company. It was, then, primarily
to protect this fuel supply from a Turkish raid that an early descent
upon the Mesopotamian coast was planned.

On November 7, 1914, the Poona Brigade, composed of white and Indian
troops, under command of Brigadier General W. S. Delamain, appeared off
the Turkish village of Fao, where an antiquated Turkish fort lies amid a
grove of palm trees. Against Persian Gulf pirates it could have put up a
valiant fight, but it was a poor match for the guns of the British
gunboat _Odin_. The defenders fled and the British force sailed up the
Shat-el-Arab. At Sanijeh they effected a landing, intrenched, and
awaited the coming of two additional brigades.

It soon became apparent that the Turks, either because they were not
prepared or because they preferred to make their real stand nearer their
base of supplies, did not intend to offer any serious opposition to the
British advance. They adopted tactics designed to harass and delay the
invaders, however, and on the 11th of November a small force moved out
of Basra and engaged the Indian troops attached to General Delamain's
command. After a sharp action the Turks retired. No further opportunity
was given them to attack in small force, for two days later Lieutenant
General Sir Arthur Barrett arrived at Sanijeh with the Armednagar and
the Belgaum Brigades, both made up of Indian troops with a stiffening of
British regiments.

By November 16, 1914, the whole of the British forces were ashore, and
on the following day at daybreak General Barrett ordered an advance. The
main Turkish forces were located at Sahil, about halfway between Sanijeh
and Basra. The battle was opened by an artillery duel. The British had a
great advantage in the possession of gunboats, upon which had been
mounted guns of considerable caliber. The Turks had selected their
positions with great skill and knowledge, and despite the heavy
artillery preparation, the British troops, when they did advance, were
badly punished. Recent rains had made the ground heavy, almost marshy,
and the entire absence of vegetation gave the Turkish riflemen and
machine-gun crews an excellent chance to work. Slowly the Turks were
forced out of their advance positions, but just as the invaders were
about to take advantage of the retreat of the enemy a curious phenomenon
occurred. Between the advancing British and the retiring Turks a mirage
interposed and effectually screened the movements of the latter. Because
of this and the heavy ground no pursuit was possible.

This action, resulting in the loss of 353 of the British force and an
even larger number of the Turkish troops (estimated by the British at
1,500, but which is almost certainly an exaggeration), decided the fate
of Basra. Some opposition was made to the passage of the British river
expedition, and at one point an unsuccessful attempt was made to block
the passage of the Shat-el-Arab by the sinking of three steamers.

About ten o'clock in the morning of November 22, 1914, the British river
force, after silencing a battery that had been hurriedly erected by the
Turks just below the town, reached Basra, and General Barrett hoisted
the British flag on the German Consulate, the customhouse having been
fired by the retreating Turks. Some time was spent by the invaders at
Basra in preparing a base.

It was not until December 3, 1914, that Lieutenant Colonel Frazer of
General Barrett's force with Indian troops and some of the Second
Norfolks advanced on Kurna, fifty miles above Basra, at a point where
the Tigris empties into the old channel of the Euphrates. Lieutenant
Colonel Frazer's force was accompanied by three gunboats, an armed
yacht, and a couple of armed launches. The troops landed four miles
below the town and intrenched, while the river force moved up and
shelled Kurna. When the troops advanced, it immediately became apparent
that the strength of the Turks had been underestimated and that
Lieutenant Colonel Frazer's force was much too small to dislodge them.
After losing heavily, Frazer ordered a retreat to the intrenchments four
miles down the river, and sent word to Basra for reenforcements.

On December 6, 1914, General Fry appeared with additional troops, and
plans were laid for attacking Kurna on the flank. Just as the scheme was
nearing completion, however, Turkish officers appeared at the English
camp and asked for terms. Conditions were refused, and finally the Turks
laid down their arms.

With the capture of Kurna the British secured control of the delta of
the Euphrates, made impossible any raid upon the Persian Gulf and its
oil supply except in great force, and laid the foundations of an
ambitious campaign against the strategic points of the whole of
Mesopotamia. Elaborate intrenched camps were built at Kurna, and near-by
at Mezera, to await the coming of larger forces and supplies.





End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Story of the Great War, Volume II
(of VIII), by Various

*** 