Dictatorships are more effective than democracies at mobilizing resources for investment.  Dictatorships are superior to democracies in that they can make decisions and implement policies quicker. They can easily modify institutional and legal frameworks towards development goals, as there is no need for a political consensus behind their actions. This also insulates government from special interests that must be reconciled with in democracies. This allows dictatorships to create a pro-investment legal, economic and institutional framework such as low taxes, exchange rate manipulations and import tariffs, without facing political opposition.  For example, fracking, a technique used to extract hard to obtain gas, has generated widespread opposition in the West, leading to it being banned in France [1] . An autocratic government would find it easier to allow cheap access to this energy, boosting industry, as it could disregard this opposition.  Dictatorships can also control resources to allow for better health and education services, by determining curricula, salaries and supplies. Cuba has one of the best healthcare systems in the world, with more doctors per capita than much of the Western world [2] , and in 2009 Shanghai came first in the PISA test [3] .  [1] Castelvecchi, Davide, ‘France becomes first country to ban extraction of natural gas by fracking’, Scientific American, 30 June 2011,   [2] The Economist, ‘Reshoring manufacturing: Coming Home’, 19 January 2013,   [3] Brouwer, Steve, ‘The Cuban Revolutionary Doctor: The Ultimate Weapon of Solidarity’, Monthly Review, Vol.60 No.8, January 2009,


Dictatorships can prevent social unrest  Dictatorships are better at controlling discipline and order within society. They generally promote a state based on hierarchical values, through strict policies based on security. This allows them to prevent financial losses due to strikes and riots, and reduce crime rates, making the country more stable.  Singapore is a de-facto one party state, in which the ruling People’s Action Party, is accused of stopping the operation of opposition parties. A former Foreign Minister of Singapore has asked “How many Singaporeans really want free speech anyway? They want orderliness, a decent living” [1] . This both makes the country more competitive because there are more productive days and more attractive to invest in as expats will want to live in countries with little crime. Moreover when it comes to attracting immigration for sectors of the economy there is none of the opposition that would occur in democracies.  Autocracy may be the only way to stabilize some countries that have never had a democratic government. It has been suggested by Mancur Olson, a leading economist, that “anarchy not only involves loss of life but also increases the incentives to steal and to defend against theft, and thereby reduces the incentive to produce [2] ”. A dictatorship may be the only way to restore order and create a political framework stable enough for trade and investment.  [1] Huff, W.G. (1994). The economic growth of Singapore: trade and development in twentieth century”. Cambridge; New York; Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. p. 358  [2] Olson, M. (2000). Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships. New York: Basic Books. p. 64


Development is about more than economic growth  Amartya Sen has argued that “the removal of substantial unfreedoms […] is constitutive of development [in so far as give people] the opportunity of exercising their reasoned agency [1] ”. In a broader sense, democracy is necessary for a developed society because a precondition of a developed society is for that society to be able to decide for itself what its objectives are. It is society as a whole that needs to define what it considers to be development. The Myanmar under the junta may have considered its goals to be a strong military showing that Burma was developed. But without the citizenry agreeing this would not make Burma a strong state. Quite the opposite the lack of freedoms would show the country is not actually developed. Development means more than economic growth, it has to include other indicators as in the Human Development Index, but also things that are not even captured by that measurement such as freedom of speech.  Economic growth and GDP are even worse at demonstrating which countries are developed. Development only occurs when the wealth, and the choices it brings, reaches the people which is why Equatorial Guinea is not a developed nation despite its high income. Even in the economic realm therefore it is not just the absolute growth that matters but how it is distributed. Przeworski and Limongi show that from 1951-1990 dictatorships had higher growth rates than democracies (4.42% against 3.95%) yet the growth rate in GDP per capita was higher in democracies (2.46% against 2%). [2]  [1] Sen, A. (1999). Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxfor University Press. p. xii  [2] Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi, 1997a; in M. ANTIĆ: “Democracy versus Dictatorship: The Influence of Political Regime on GDP Per Capita Growth”. EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 55 (9-10) pp. 773-803 (2004)


Democratic rule of law is the best ground for political stability and growth  In order for a society to develop economically, it needs a stable political framework and dictatorships are often less stable. A dictator will have to prioritize the retention of power. As repression is inevitable, a dictator will not necessarily be entirely popular. There will regularly be a doubt about the future and sustainability of a dictatorship. Bearing in mind the messy collapses of some dictatorships, a democracy may be a more stable form of government over the long term [1] .  Only democracies can create a stable legal framework. The rule of law ensures all of society has access to justice and the government acts within the law. Free and fair elections act as a bulwark against social unrest and violence. Economic freedoms and human rights protection also have positive effects on economies. Private property rights, for example, encourage productivity and innovation so that one has control of the fruits of their labour.  It has been argued by Acemolgu and Robinson in their book Why Nations Fail? The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty that inclusive political institutions and pluralistic systems that protect individual rights are necessary preconditions for economic development [2] . If these political institutions exist then the economic institutions necessary for growth will be created, as a result economic growth will be more likely.  [1] See for example the work of Huntington, S, P., (1991), The third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century, University of Oklahoma Press,   [2] Acemolgu, D., and Robinson, J. (2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. London: Profile Books.


Political regime has a limited impact on development  It can be argued that a good economic policy, such as China’s economic policies, have helped development. But a free market policy can be done with any form of government, and cannot be exclusively attached to a dictatorship or a democracy. Any political system can use it. Although it has been noted that South Korea was an autocracy during economic ‘takeoff’ its economy has also grown significantly since democratization with GNI per capita growing from $3,320 in 1987 to $22,670 in 2012. [1]  Another example is that Spanish economic growth in the 1950-2000 period. The 1960s economic miracle in Spain was not necessarily caused by Franco’s regime – he controlled the country in the 1950s, when the country did not have such economic success. In 1959, Franco opened up the Spanish economy internationally, ending the isolationist economic policies established following the Civil War so making the country free market bringing dividends. As a result Spain also grew economically after the collapse of the Franco government, continuing on following on from EU membership.  [1] The World Bank, ‘GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)’, data.worldbank.org,


Democracy acts in the interest of the general population, which is good for development  It can be argued that a good economic policy, such as China’s economic policies, have helped development. But a free market policy can be done with any form of government, and cannot be exclusively attached to a dictatorship or a democracy. Any political system can use it. Although it has been noted that South Korea was an autocracy during economic ‘takeoff’ its economy has also grown significantly since democratization with GNI per capita growing from $3,320 in 1987 to $22,670 in 2012. [1]  Another example is that Spanish economic growth in the 1950-2000 period. The 1960s economic miracle in Spain was not necessarily caused by Franco’s regime – he controlled the country in the 1950s, when the country did not have such economic success. In 1959, Franco opened up the Spanish economy internationally, ending the isolationist economic policies established following the Civil War so making the country free market bringing dividends. As a result Spain also grew economically after the collapse of the Franco government, continuing on following on from EU membership.  [1] The World Bank, ‘GNI per capita, Atlas method (current US$)’, data.worldbank.org,


Failure to withdraw blocks legitimate Palestinian aspirations to statehood.  The Palestinian people since 1967 have demonstrated through resistance to Israeli occupation their desire for an independent state of their own. [1] Throughout the years polls have consistently showed respectable Palestinian majorities in favour of a negotiated two-state settlement, which would offer them an independent state as well as allowing Israel to continue to exist as an independent state alongside the new Palestinian nation. [2] Israel's refusal to withdraw to the 1967 borders means that the majority of Palestinian people are compelled to live under the control of a state they do not wish to be a part of, a violation of their right to self-determination under international law. The 1993 Vienna Declaration, which reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter (and so sets the standard in current international law), unequivocally gives all peoples the right to self-determination: “All people have the right to self-determination. Owing to this right they freely establish their political status and freely provide their economic, social and cultural development...World Conference on Human Rights considers refusal of the right to self-determination as a violation of human rights and emphasizes the necessity of effective realization of this right”. [3] Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said in 2006 that the pre-1967 borders uphold the “legitimate aspiration of the Palestinian people for a secure, united, democratic and economically viable state coexisting peacefully with Israel.” [4] By this measure, the Palestinian majority in the occupied territories have the right to self-determination (by democratic processes), and Israel's suppression of that right through its refusal to withdraw to the 1967 borders should be seen as a human rights violation. Consequently, Israel should withdraw to its 1967 borders in order to end its violation of the rights of the Palestinian people.  [1] BBC News. “Israeli settlements condemned by Western powers”. BBC News. 2 November 2011.   [2] Kennedy, Hugh. “The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In”. Da Capo Press. 2007.  [3] United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. “VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION”. United Nations. 14-25 June 1993.   [4] Agence France-Presse, NDTV. “Brazil recognises Palestinian state on 1967 borders”. NDTV. 5 December 2010.


Israel has no right to the occupied territories.  Because Israel won the land during war, it is considered occupied territory under international law, and it is illegal for Israel to annex it. [1] In July 2004, the International Court of Justice delivered an Advisory Opinion observing that under customary international law as reflected in Article 42 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague IV Convention, territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army, and the occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised. Israel raised a number of exceptions and objections, but the Court found them unpersuasive. The Court ruled that territories had been occupied by the Israeli armed forces in 1967, during the conflict between Israel and Jordan, and that subsequent events in those territories, had done nothing to alter the situation. [2] Even the Israeli Supreme court has ruled that “Judea and Samaria [a.k.a. The West Bank] areas are held by the State of Israel in belligerent occupation.” [3] Therefore, Israel has no better claim to these lands than that it won them in a war, which is an illegitimate claim under international law, and also illegitimate as a thinly-disguised, morally abhorrent “might makes right” argument. The fact that Arab states initiated the 1967 war does not justify Israel responding by annexing Palestinian territory. [4] A just settlement would have been a return to the previous borders in exchange for security guarantees, etc. Instead, Israel unjustly used the opportunity to take land from an innocent people. One bad act does not justify another bad act in return. Moreover, it is notable that the nations which Israel took Gaza and the West Bank from in 1967 (Egypt and Jordan, respectively) were not representative nations of the areas' majority inhabitants, the Palestinian people. [5] It is thus illegitimate for Israel to claim ownership of Palestinian land because it defeated non-Palestinian nations in a war, and Israel should therefore return to its pre-1967 borders, leaving Gaza and the West Bank to the Palestinian people.  [1] BBC News. “Israeli settlements condemned by Western powers”. BBC News. 2 November 2011.   [2] International Court of Justice. “Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory”. International Court of Justice, United Nations Organisation. July 2004.   [3] The Supreme Court of Israel. “Mara'abe vs The Prime Minister of Israel”. The Supreme Court of Israel. June 2005.   [4] BBC News. “1967: Israel launches attack on Egypt”. BBC News On This Day. 5 June 1967.   [5] BBC News. “Israeli settlements condemned by Western powers”. BBC News. 2 November 2011.


Returning to the 1967 borders would bring peace to Israel.  If Israel were to withdraw to its 1967 borders, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) would recognise Israel as legitimate within its remaining territories and end the conflict. In October 2010 Senior Palestine Liberation Organization official Yasser Abed Rabbo said that the Palestinians will be willing to recognize the State of Israel in any way that it desires, if the Americans would only present a map of the future Palestinian state that includes all of the territories captured in 1967, including East Jerusalem. “We want to receive a map of the State of Israel which Israel wants us to accept. If the map will be based on the 1967 borders and will not include our land, our houses and East Jerusalem, we will be willing to recognize Israel according to the formulation of the government within the hour... Any formulation [presented to us] – even asking us to call Israel the 'Chinese State' – we will agree to it, as long as we receive the 1967 borders ” added Rabbo. [1] Even Ismail Haniyeh, leader of the more extreme Hamas organisation, has said Hamas will accept a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders and will offer Israel a “long term truce” if it withdraws accordingly. [2] Significant international support for Israel withdrawing to the 1967 borders also exists, even from states with a history of hostility with Israel such as Iran and Saudi Arabia, who have made such a withdrawal a precondition of peace and recognition talks with Israel. [3] [4] Even then-Israeli Prime Miniser Ehud Olmert acknowledged in 2008 that “almost all” of the territory seized during the Six-Day War in 1967 will have to be given back to the Palestinians return for peace. [5] Therefore Israel should withdraw to its 1967 borders as this would bring peace and security to Israel by ending the conflict with the Palestinians and neighbouring states.  [1] Haaretz. “PLO chief: We will recognize Israel in return for 1967 borders”. Haaretz.com. 13 October 2010.   [2] Amira Hass News Agencies, Haaretz. “willing to accept a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders”. Haaretz.com. 9 November 2008.   [3] Al-Quds. “Ahmadinezhad and the Implications of the Two-State Solution”. Pro-Fatah Palestinian newspaper Al-Quds. 29 April 2009  [4] UPI.com. “Saudi to Israel: Return to 1967 borders”. UPI.com. 5 November 2010.   [5] MacIntyre, Donald. “Israel will have to reinstate pre-1967 border for peace deal, Olmert admits”. The Independent. 30 Septemebr 2008.


Returning to the 1967 borders would make war more likely.  The Foreign Minister of Israel, Avigdor Lieberman, said in 2009: “A return to the pre-1967 lines, with a Palestinian state in Judea and Samaria, would bring the conflict into Israel's borders. Establishing a Palestinian state will not bring an end to the conflict.” [1] This is why the American ambassador to the UN at the time of the 1967 war pointed out that “Israel's prior frontiers had proved to be notably insecure”, and American President Lyndon Johnson, shortly after the war, declared that Israel's return to its former lines would be “not a prescription for peace but for renewed hostilities.” Johnson advocated new 'recognized boundaries' that would provide "security against terror, destruction, and war.” [2] An Israel that withdrew completely to the 1967 borders would offer a very tempting target, since it would be a narrow country with no strategic depth whose main population centres and strategic infrastructure would be within tactical range of forces deployed along the commanding heights of the West Bank. This would hurt Israel's ability to deter future attacks and thus make conflict in the region even more likely. This ability of Israel to deter aggressors is particularly important not only due to the region's history of aggression against Israel, but also due to the unpredictable future events in the highly volatile Middle East. There is no way, for example, to guarantee that Iraq will not evolve into a radical Shi'ite state that is dependent on Iran and hostile to Israel (indeed, King Abdullah of Jordan has warned of a hostile Shi'ite axis that could include Iran, Iraq, and Syria), nor that a Jordan's Palestinian majority might seize power in the state (leaving Israel to defend itself against a Palestinian state that stretches from Iraq to Kalkilya), nor that in the future, militant Islamic elements will not succeed in gaining control of the Egyptian regime. [3]  Given its narrow geographical dimensions, a future attack launched from the pre-1967 borders against Israel's nine-mile-wide waist could easily split the country in two. Especially seeing as Islamic militants throughout the Middle East are unlikely to be reconciled to Israel even by a withdrawal to the 1967 borders, such a withdrawal therefore would actually make peace in the region less likely and encourage war against Israel. [4]  [1] Lazaroff, Tovah. “Lieberman warns against '67 borders”. Jerusalem Post. 27 November 2009.   [2] Levin, Kenneth. “Peace Now: A 30-Year Fraud”. FrontPageMag.com. 5 September 2008.   [3] Amidror, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov. “Israel's Requirement for Defensible Borders”. Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace. 2005.   [4] El-Khodary, Taghreed and Bronner, Ethan. “Hamas Fights Over Gaza’s Islamist Identity”. New York Times. 5 September 2009.


Many Israelis now live in the occupied territories.  Israel has more than just national security at stake in the occupied territory of the West Bank -hundreds of thousands of Israeli citizens now live there, many in areas which are not strategically essential (the areas described above). Between the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights (all outside of Israel's 1967 borders), over 400,000 Israelis live in settlements in the occupied territories. [1] These ever-expanding settlements represent a barrier to Israeli withdrawing to its 1967 borders. In 1993, when Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasser Arafat famously shook hands on the White House lawn, there were only 109,000 Israelis living in settlements across the West Bank (not including Jerusalem). Today there are more than 230 settlements and strategically placed 'outposts' designed to cement a permanent Jewish presence on Palestinian land. [2] Forcibly removing these settlers would be too difficult, could foment a kind of Jewish civil war, and would create a level of resentment among fundamentalist Jews that would likely inflame the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Furthermore it should be remembered that these settlers are Israeli citizens, with families, who moved to these areas because the Israeli government told them it was safe and that they would be allowed to stay, and thus Israel has a moral duty to live up to these promises by not withdrawing. Israel cannot afford this sort of internal turmoil, and should not neglect its duty to protect the rights of these citizens, and so it should not withdraw to its 1967 borders.  [1] Levinson, Chaim. “IDF: More than 300,000 settlers live in West Bank”. Haaretz.com. 27 July 2009.   [2] Tolan, Sandy. “George Mitchell and the end of the two-state solution”. The Christian Science Monitor. 4 February 2009.


Israel has the right to claim minimal territory to ensure security  Israel has been the victim of multiple major illegal wars of aggression on the part of the Arab world, most notably in 1948 and 1967. These wars invalidate any special claim made by Arabs and Palestinians to pre-1967 territory, and justify Israel in keeping as much territory as is necessary to secure itself against these hostile states. Israel could have gone much further and taken more territory than it did in 1967 (as it was easily winning the war), but instead it restricted itself to only taking the territory that was necessary for it to create security buffer. [1] When peace deals have allowed Israel to improve its security through giving up land historically, it has done so, for example when it returned the Sinai peninsula to Egypt in 1982 in exchange for a peace treaty with Egypt, or when Israel returned the small swath of Jordanian territory it held when King Hussain of Jordan wanted to make peace. To date, Israel has withdrawn from approximately 93 percent of the territories it captured. In return for peace with Syria and an end to Palestinian terror, it is prepared to withdraw from most of the remaining 7% in dispute, although not all. Israel remains committed to trading land for peace, and never annexed the West Bank or Gaza Strip because it expected to return part of these territories in negotiations. When the Palestinians finally declared that they would recognize Israel and renounce terrorism, Israel agreed to begin to withdraw. Since 1993, Israel has turned over approximately 80% of the Gaza Strip and more than 40% of the West Bank to the Palestinian Authority. Thus, Israel's objection is not so much against returning any of the land captured in 1967, but against returning absolutely all of it and going back completely to the 1967 borders, as this would mean giving up territories vital for Israel's security. The minimal slivers of territory that Israel it seeks to maintain through a peace settlement (after returning 90% of the pre-1967 territory), is very important to its national security as it offers a buffer against future Arab wars of aggression. This why Ehud Olmert stressed that only most of the occupied territory could be returned. He still argued that some had to be kept for security reasons: “We can never totally return to the indefensible pre-1967 borders, ... We simply cannot afford to make Israel [9 miles] wide again at its center. We can't allow the Palestinians to be a couple [miles] from [Tel Aviv's] Ben Gurion Airport in the age of shoulder-fire missiles with the capacity to shoot down jumbo jets.” [2] Moreover, Israel is in an anomalous situation: It is an embattled democracy that historically has had to defend itself repeatedly against the armies of neighbouring Arab states whose declared goal was nothing less than Israel's eradication. The Israel Defense Forces could not afford to miscalculate. While other nations, like France or Kuwait, have been overrun, occupied, and nonetheless have survived to reconstitute themselves, Israel, in contrast, cannot depend on obtaining a second chance. Miscalculation on its part could have had devastating consequences and, thus, its situation is unique. [3] For this critical purpose of national survival, therefore, the annexed land serves a legally legitimate purpose, especially considering that the Arab wars of aggression were what caused the annexation of the land in the first place. In such circumstances, a nation that won a defensive war has a right to set terms to ensure against future wars of aggression.  [1] Johnson, Paul. “A History of the Jews”. Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 1987.  [2] Thinkexist.com. “Ehud Olmert Quotes”. Thinkexist.com   [3] Amidror, Maj.-Gen. (res.) Yaakov. “Israel's Requirement for Defensible Borders”. Defensible Borders for a Lasting Peace. 2005.


Migration is 'developmental'.  Recent reports by the HDR (2009) and WDR (2009) have shown migration is a means of development – free movement has the power to alleviate poverty, enable markets, and connectivity. Taking recent evidence concerning worldwide remittance flows, the developmental nature of free movement is shown.  In 2013, it is estimated, through international migration, $414bn were remitted back to developing countries [1] . Remittance flows into Africa (from within and internationally) accounted for $40bn in 2010, accounting for an increasing percentage of GDP (AfDB, 2013; IFAD, 2013). Northern Africa articulated the largest total of remittances received. Remittances remain beneficial for supporting livelihoods. The influx of remittances to households provides security, an additional income for support, enables household consumption, and investment in alternative assets, such as education and land, of which present crucial benefits in reducing poverty. Although the geography of remittances remains uneven, and currently barriers remain to sending and receiving money, the developmental potential of remittances from African diasporas (both outside and within Africa) is now recognised [2] .  [1] See further readings: World Bank, 2013.  [2] For additional information on the debate of migration, remittances and social development see further readings: De Haas, 2010.


The freedom to move is a human right.  Mobility is a human right - which needs to be enabled across national spaces and Africa. Obstacles need to be removed. Mobility enables access to interconnected rights - such as ensuring women their right to move enables empowerment in the political, social and economic spheres.  Taking the case of migration of young people, the process reflects a right of passage, a means of exploring opportunities and identity.For example the Mourides of Senegal have established a dense network sustaining informal trading across multiple scales based on a foundation of ‘Brotherhood’ youths leaving rural areas become integrated into dynamic social networks and educated within the Mouride culture. As research in Tanzania shows although migration is not a priority for all youths, many identify the opportunity as a time to prove yourself and establish your transition into adulthood. The process empowers human identity and rights.


Free movement will provide benefits for productivity.  A free labour market provides a space for sharing (knowledge, ideas, and socio-cultural traditions), competing, and sustaining efficiency in development. As neoliberal theory advocates a laissez-faire approach is fundamental for growth. A free labour market will enhance economic productivity. Free labour movement enables access to new employment opportunities and markets.  Within the East African Community the Common Market Protocol (CMP) (2010) has removed barriers towards the movement of people, services, capital, and goods. Free regional movement is granted to citizens of any member state in order to aid economic growth. Free movement is providing solutions to regional poverty by expanding the employment opportunities available, enabling faster and efficient movement for labour, and reducing the risk of migration for labour. Similar to initial justifications of Europe’s labour market, a central idea is to promote labour productivity within the region [1] .  [1] Much criticism has been raised with regards to the flexible labour market in Europe - with high unemployment across national member states such as Spain, Ireland, and Greece; the prevalent Euro-crisis, and backlash over social welfare with rising migration. Disparities remain in jobs, growth, and productivity across the EU.


Policies towards a free labour market will create unity.  National borders are a result of Africa’s colonial history. The boundaries constructed do not reflect meaning or unite ethnic groups across the continent. The border between Togo and Ghana alone divides the Dagomba, Akposso, Konkomba and Ewe peoples. [1] Therefore encouraging freedom of movement across Africa will erase a vital component of Africa’s colonial history.  The erasing of boundaries, for labour markets, will have significant impacts for rebuilding a sense of unity, and reducing xenophobic fears, of which have been politically constructed.  A sense of unity will motivate citizens to reduce disparities and inequalities of poverty.  [1] Cogneau, 2012, pp.5-6


Implementing a free labour market will enable effective management of migration.  Even without the implementation of a free labour market, migration will continue informally; therefore policies introducing free movement and providing appropriate travel documents provides a method to manage migration. In the case of Southern Africa, the lack of a regional framework enabling migration is articulated through the informal nature of movement and strategic bilateral ties between nation-states.  Several benefits arise from managing migration. First, speeding up the emigration process will provide health benefits. Evidence shows slow, and inefficient, border controls have led to a rise in HIV/AIDs; as truck drivers wait in delays sex is offered [1] . Second, a free labour market can provide national governments with data and information. The provision of travel documentation provides migrants with an identity, and as movement is monitored, the big picture of migration can be provided. Information, evidence, and data, will enable effective policies to be constructed for places of origin and destination, and to enable trade efficiency. Lastly, today, undocumented migrants are unable to claim their right to health care. In Africa, availability does not equate to accessibility for new migrants. In South Africa, migrants fear deportation and harassment, meaning formal health treatment and advice is not sought (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Therefore documentation and formal approval of movement ensures health is recognised as an equal right.  [1] See further readings: Lucas, 2012.


Urbanisation without industrialisation, the dangerous livelihoods of migrants.  Across Africa a reality of ‘urbanisation without industrialisation’ is found (Potts, 2012). Economic growth, and activity, have not matched the urban phenomena across Sub-Saharan Africa. The sombre picture of urban economics questions - what do new migrants do as opportunities are not found?  More than 50% of Youth in Africa are unemployed or idle. [1] With migrants entering urban environments presented with a lack of safe and secure jobs unhealthy sexual politics are found, and precarious methods are used to make a living. The scarcity of formal jobs, means a majority of migrants are forced to work in informal employment. Informal employment will continue to rise creating its own problems such as being barrier to imposing minimum wages and employment security.  [1] Zuehlke, 2009


Who is left behind?  In promoting a free labour market, we need to ask: who is left behind? To understand the developmental nature of migration investigation is needed into who doesn’t migrate - the non-migrant’s lifestyles raise key concerns.  Data from the EAC indicates the EAC labour market remains popular among over 65's and in favour of men; and further, a majority of employment occurs within agriculture [1] . The labour market remains inadequate in providing jobs for women and youths. Women and youths reflect disproportionate numbers of those forced to adapt, and create, new livelihoods following migration. Further, migrants are returning home, retiring, and therefore with limited effect on productivity.  The impact of migration is distributed unequally. In a previous study by Brown (1983) the detrimental effect of male out-migration from rural areas in Botswana was indicated. Family units were altered, changing to being predominantly female-headed households, the lack of human capital resulted in sustaining the agrarian crisis, and women were forced to cope with the burden of care. Little assurance was found as to whether the men would return, or remit resources.  [1] EAC, 2012.


Migration reasonings and exploitation.  A free labour market perceives migration in a predominantly neoclassical light - people migrate due to pull factors, to balance the imbalance of jobs, people move due to economic laws. However, such a perspective fails to include the complex factors enticing migration and lack of choice in the decision. Promoting a labour market, whereby movement is free and trade enabled, makes it easier to move but does not take into account the fact migration is not only purely economical. By focusing on a free labour market as being economically valuable, we neglect a bigger picture of what the reasons for migration are.  Without effective management a free labour market raises the potential of forced migration and trafficking. Within the COMESA region trafficking has been identified as a growing issue with the 40,000 identified cases in 2012 being the tip of the iceberg (Musinguzi, 2013). A free labour market may mean victims of trafficking will remain undetected. Moving for ‘work’, how can distinctions be made to identify trafficked migrants; and clandestine migration be managed?  A free labour market, across Africa, justifies cheap and flexible labour to build emerging economies - however, remains unjust. Promoting free labour movement needs to be matched with a question on ‘what kind of labour movement’?


States will monitor each other, and an international body could be set up  Once a treaty is set up to limit or eliminate cyber-attacks monitoring is unlikely to be a problem because states will be willing to monitor each other. States in order to defend themselves from cyber-attacks already monitor the cyber-attacks that occur – the United States for example already has several cyber defense forces. [1] If that is not enough then there are numerous private groups that will be monitoring cyber-attacks as most are made against corporate rather than government targets. For example private company Mandiant exposed a unit of the People’s Liberation Army for its cyber-attacks in February 2013. [2] Once a cyber-attack has been traced and evidence gathered if the appropriate domestic authorities won’t deal with the culprit then an independent international institution can decide on the punishment for the government that is not living up to its treaty commitments.  If there is a need for international monitoring rather than simply a dispute settlement mechanism then there are models available through current treaties; a UN organisation similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency or International Criminal Court could be set up that can investigate incidents when asked.  [1] US Department of Defense, ‘The Cyber Domain Security and Operations’   [2] Mandiant, ‘Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units’, mandiant.com, February 2013,


Arenas of potential conflict must be regulated  Conflict needs to be regulated, and something that can start conflicts even more so. Warfare and conflict is currently regulated by the Geneva Conventions that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict and regulate the conduct of the involved actors. [1] Just as importantly there are rules on what weapons can be used through various treaties that ban weapons such as the Land Mine Ban, [2] and on when a state can legally initiate conflict through the UN Charter.  In just the same way when a new area of potential conflict arises that too must be regulated by treaty. The internet and the threat of cyber-conflict is that new area at the moment. While cyber warfare is not currently a large scale threat it is still a form of conflict that could escalate just like any other - the Pentagon has explicitly stated it could respond militarily to a cyber-attack. [3] As a result it is most sensible to draw up the rules and regulations early, to ensure everyone knows the consequences and prevent damage by making sure that states agree not to engage in offence cyber-attacks against each other.  [1] ‘The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols’, ICRC, 29 October 2010,   [2] ‘Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and on their destruction’, un.org, 18 September 1997,   [3] Brookes, Adam, ‘US Pentagon to treat cyber-attacks as ‘acts of war’’, BBC News, 1 June 2011,


The use of the internet undermines the state by demonopolizing the use of force  Ever since the state rose to ascendancy over powerful internal actors, such as the nobility in a feudal system, the state has had a monopoly on the use of force. The state quickly became the only institution with the resources to maintain military forces and has become the only legitimate wielder of force. The internet however changes this. Cyber-attacks are often by individuals or groups who can carry out a cross border attack without the aid of their home country.  In 2011 CIA director Leon Panetta told Congress “when it comes to national security, I think this represents the battleground for the future. I've often said that I think the potential for the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber-attack.” [1] If cyber-attacks are so important it stands to reason that the groups who are able to engage in such activities should be as limited as possible. While it is not always possible states try to make sure that the weapons of war for the most part remain in the hands of responsible actors. This should apply as much in cyberspace as elsewhere. While terrorist groups do exist – and are occasionally armed by states – for the most part they are seen by every government as being illegitimate.  [1] Serrano, Richard A., ‘U.S. intelligence officials concerned about cyber attack’, Los Angeles Times, 11 February 2011,


A cyber treaty benefits everyone  A treaty that bans, or sharply curtails cyber-attacks would benefit every state. Even those who may currently benefit from cyber espionage would be better off signing up to the treaty.  First most cyber-attacks are not carried out by the state even in countries like China where the state is using the internet as an offensive tool. In its annual report to congress the Department of Defence stated some cyber-attacks “appear to be attributable directly to the Chinese government and military” but this does not sound like a majority. [1]  Secondly no state wants a risk of conflict as a result of an unregulated new field of potential conflict. Or even to risk relations with other nations; cyber-attacks in large part go on because they are cost free.  And finally all nations are the victims of cyber-attacks. The United States has repeatedly condemned cyber-attacks against it but China also claims that it is the victim of cyber-attacks. China’s Minister of National Defense General Chang Wanquan says “China is one of the primary victims of hacker attacks in the world.” [2] Having a treaty against cyber attacks would not only make business easier for all countries but it would build up trust between nations where it is currently being eroded.  [1] Office of the Secretary of Defense, ‘Annual; Report to Congress Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013’, Department of Defense,  p.36  [2] Brook, Tom Vanden, ‘Cyber attack? What cyber attack?’, USA Today, 19 August 2013,


A treaty would benefit larger powers over the small  Any treaty that seeks to ban cyber-attacks would simply be an attempt to cement the position of the most powerful countries at the expense of weaker ones. This is because cyber-attacks are, like terrorism, weapons that can be used by anyone to attack a much bigger target. To launch a cyber-attack there is little need for training, only a small amount of comparatively cheap equipment (to military hardware at any rate), and an internet connection. [1] And it is difficult to defend against. This makes it ideal for poor nations to maintain cyber warfare as a credible threat to their bigger neighbours while their neighbours threaten them conventionally with their bigger militaries. We have seen before arms treaties that are fundamentally biased in favour of a small group of powerful states. Most notable is the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty where there are five recognised nuclear weapons states who are allowed the horrific weapons and everyone else is banned from having them. This discrimination was accepted as a result of the agreement that the nuclear weapons states would eventually disarm. It has not happened so leaving a troubled treaty system that appears to be regularly flouted. [2]  [1] Phillips, Andrew T., ‘Now Hear This – The Asymmetric Nature of Cyber Warfare’, U.S. Naval Institute, Vol.138/10/1316, October 2012,   [2] Miller, Steven E., ‘Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime’, American Academy of Arts & Sciences, 2012,


Unlike warfare cyber-attacks don’t kill so they don’t need to be restricted in the same way  Warfare needs to be closely regulated because of the numbers of people who can be killed and the devastation that can result. This is not something that is a concern with cyber-attacks. So far cyber-attacks have not been very effective. ‘Stuxnet’ was a computer worm targeted an important control system in the Iranian nuclear program sabotaging gas centrifuges by making them run out of control. It was created by US and Israeli intelligence yet was not particularly effective, and certainly did not kill anyone. [1] Other major attacks have infected a large number of machines, such as ‘Shamoon’ that attacked the Saudi state oil company ARAMCO which affected 30,000 computers, but again this is simply destruction of property. [2] No matter how indiscriminate cyber-attacks may be that they don’t cause large numbers of deaths means there is little need to ban such attacks – it simply does not matter if attackers don’t follow a set of conventions like the Geneva conventions.  [1] Barzashka, Ivanka, ‘Are Cyber-Weapons Effective? Assessing Stuxnet’s Impact on the Iranian Enrichment Programme’, RUSI Journal, Vol.158, Issue 2, 28 April 2013,   [2] Garamone, Jim, ‘Panetta Spells out DOD Roles in Cyberdefense’, American Forces Press Service, 11 October 2012,


It would never work  There are immense challenges to making a treaty seeking to prevent or curtail cyber-attacks work. Even on issues where there are clear security concerns it is unusual for the involved nations to be willing to get along and cooperate. This has proven to be the same with regards to the internet governance with Russia and China wanting greater state control while the US and Western Europe is opposed. [1] Even on issues where lives are being lost there is often no global agreement as can be seen by the deadlock in the UN security council over what to do about the civil war in Syria. [2]  Additionally there is the problem that working out who engaged in a cyber-attack is difficult. Such attacks are often routed through proxy computers to launch their attacks. If attacking a difficult target that may seek to strike back the attack will be through numerous proxies which will be in numerous countries to make tracking back difficult. [3] This means there can be misattribution of attacks creating confusion about which state needs to act domestically to prevent the cyber-attacks – or in the worst case resulting in a response aimed at the wrong country. For example South Korea has blamed its Northern neighbour for an attack on the website of the South Korean Presidency but the hacking is more likely to have been the work of someone in South Korea itself as a South Korean detailed his plans on Twitter before the attack. [4] If it is difficult to attribute who launched the attack then it would clearly be easy to get around any ban.  [1] Nebehay, Stephanie, ‘China, Russia seek greater control of Internet’, Reuters, 7 March 2013,   [2] Black, Ian, ‘UN may struggle to respond to reports of Syrian chemical attacks’, The Guardian, 21 August 2013,   [3] Greenemeier, Larry, ‘Seeking Address: Why Cyber Attacks Are So Difficult to Trace back to Hackers’, Scientific American, 11 June 2011,   [4] Koo, Soo-Kyung, ‘Cyber Security in South Korea: The Threat Within’, The Diplomat, 19 August 2013,


It is in the national interest for democracies to support those seeking to oust dictators  Democracies should support moderate groups seeking to oust dictators because the result will hopefully be a moderate, democratic state. This would then be a reliable partner for the future that would be more willing to help engage and resolve the region's problems. But this is not all about being high minded and wanting to promote democracy in the Middle East, arms need to be provided in order to ensure future influence in Syria. We already know that there are jihadis operating in Syria so it is plain that this is a conflict that will eventually have wider implications for the west. If we want to have influence in Syria after Assad is overthrown then we need to begin helping opposition groups. It is in our interest to build up the moderate groups so as to deny support to the extremists; once this is over we would be in a much better position if we have grateful friends on the ground rather than groups who are resentful that we provided fine words but no real help. We don't want to find ourselves having to root out terrorists from the air using UAVs. [1]  [1] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


Diplomacy is not going anywhere  The best solution would be a ceasefire between the two sides in the Syrian civil war and a negotiated settlement, but it is clear we are long past the point where this approach stood a chance of success. The United Nations peace effort under Kofi Annan failed in the middle of last year [1] and there has been no progress since. Similarly all attempts to bring pressure to bear throughout the security council have failed as a result of Russia supporting Assad's regime. This leaves the unilateral initiatives to help the rebels. No state wants full intervention as France did in Mali [2] so the only alternative is simply to help the Free Syrian Army. To do so means providing what they need to win the conflict; primarily arms that can defeat the Syrian army. This need not be considered to be exclusive with diplomacy; the intervening state should continue to try to find a diplomatic solution just as before the Dayton accords NATO helped the Croats militarily while at the same time looking to diplomacy to provide an overall solution to the conflict. [3]  [1] Plett, Barbara, ‘Syria crisis: Kofi Annan quits as UN-Arab League envoy’, BBC News, 2 August 2012  [2] See the debatabase debate ‘ This House believes France is right to intervene in Mali ’.  [3] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


Syria clearly meets the standards for intervention  The Assad regime has clearly lost its legitimacy and has precipitated a humanitarian crisis in Syria. The February estimate of 70000 killed [1] is up from an estimate of 60000 only a month before, [2] so clearly the violence is escalating. The conflict is also affecting neighbours; refugees have flooded into Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey, and Israel is already believed to have attacked a convoy or research facility involved in chemical and biological weapons development. [3] Clearly the presence of these weapons show how much worse the situation could get if Assad is not overthrown. Not intervening risks the whole region being slowly destabilised and drawn in to the conflict. [4]  [1] Nichols, Michelle, ‘Syria death toll likely near 70,000, says U.N. rights chief’, Reuters, 12 Feb 2012  [2] ‘Data suggests Syria death toll could be more than 60,000, says UN human rights office’, UN News Centre, 2 January 2013  [3] ‘Q&A: Israeli ‘strike’ on Syria’, BBC News, 3 February 2013  [4] Byman, Daniel, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


The Free Syrian Army is outgunned  The Syrian army is one of the biggest armies in the world; it is nothing like the poorly equipped Libyan army that was beaten by western backed rebels in 2011. The government has aircraft, and helicopters that are used to bomb the rebels, and heavy Russian built tanks that are impervious to most of the small arms the free Syrian army has. Providing arms would quickly even the odds; light anti-tank weapons would be effective against Syrian armoured vehicles repeating the success with which Hezbollah employed them when they knocked out sixty Israeli armoured vehicles in 2006, [1] while man portable air defence systems would quickly make the skies too dangerous for the Syrian airforce so protecting free Syrian controlled areas from the threat of attack from the air. [2]  [1] Cordesman, Anthony H., ‘Preliminary “Lessons” of the Israeli-Hezbollah War’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 17 August 2006, P.18  [2] Doran, Michael, and Shaikh, Salman, ‘Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now’. Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013


Would balance the support for Syrian government  Syria's government has been receiving outside support from a variety of sources; Russia and Iran being the most prominent. Iran has been training the Jaysh al- Shabi, a Syrian government-controlled force modelled on Iran's Basij militia. Far from just providing weapons, both Iran and Hezbollah from Lebanon have been sending fighters to support the Syrian government. [1] The rebels have received some support for Qatar and Saudi Arabia but not to the extent the Syrian government has. Anyone with an interest in the free Syrian cause should realise that they cannot do so simply by sitting on their hands expecting a victory when those doing the fighting are only provided diplomatic support.  [1] Doran, Michael, and Shaikh, Salman, ‘Arm the Syrian Rebels. Now’. Foreign Policy, 8 February 2013


Arming the rebels would be unpopular  Ten years after the Iraq war interventions in the Middle East are no more popular than they were back in 2003. Getting involved in Syria would not be popular no matter how small the commitment. In the United States voters oppose the idea of supplying arms to Syrian rebels by 45% against to only 16% in favour, in the United Kingdom opinion is even more opposed; while there are still 16% in favour there are 57% opposed. [1] Clearly arming the rebels would not be popular with voters - there can therefore be no domestic reason for this policy.  [1] Clark, Tom, ‘US and UK public reject stronger military support for Syrian rebels’, guardian.co.uk, 22 March 2013


Would it work?  The most fundamental question for any policy is whether it would actually work if implemented? In this case it seems to be doubtful that in practice arming the rebels would be enough to allow them to prevail. It will simply be helping to even the odds; providing enough arms to prevail over a fully equipped army that is supplied by Iran and Russia would require a truly colossal effort. No one is seriously going to consider providing M1 Abrams tanks to overcome Syrian armour when there are even concerns about providing anti-aircraft missiles. Even supporters of arming the rebels such as Senator John McCain say "this alone will not be decisive". All arming the rebels does then is make the government appear to be doing something (in a bad way since it is an unpopular policy), and stick a toe in the water (also bad as that may lead to escalating commitments), and another decision point six months down the line. [1]  [1] Lynch, Marc, ‘Shopping Option C for Syria’, Foreign Policy, 14 February 2013


Possibility of being drawn into a long drawn out conflict  Even just providing the rebels with arms risks drawing the powers that supply those arms into the conflict. [1] This is because it gives the intervening power a stake in the conflict. Once weapons have been supplied allowing the Syrian government to reassert control would be a large foreign policy reversal and would damage relations with the Syrian government for years to come.  We need only look at the Vietnam conflict to know that what starts out as a very small commitment can rapidly escalate when the government decides it cannot afford to back down. What starts as just arming the rebels could quickly lead to troops on the ground. Indeed it might require men on the ground right from the start as if we were to be providing heavy weapons the rebels would need training in how to use those weapons if they are to seriously be considered an equaliser.  [1] Byman, Daniel, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


Unforeseeable consequences  We do not know where arming the rebels will lead. The most obvious parallel has to be Afghanistan in the 1980s where the United States armed the mujahideen and succeeded in their objective of damaging the USSR through a war of attrition much as the US had suffered in Vietnam. Afghanistan became an albatross around the Soviet Union’s neck. [1] But the US did not win the peace, Afghanistan descended into civil conflict which had a Taliban victory that sheltered Osama bin Laden; US arms in Afghanistan unintentionally lead more than a decade later to September 11. In this case we would be arming a movement that has many jihadi elements that could end up with the weaponry. Other countries such as Turkey are also worried about where powerful weapons such as anti aircraft missiles could end up if provided to the rebels. They fear they could easily find their way across the border to militant Kurds. [2] Other paths that this could lead to are just as bad; for example helping the Libyan rebels lead to the conflict in Mali. [3] In this case the short term consequences could be just as bad. Arming the Sunnis could provoke retaliation from either Iran or Hezbollah who could feel undermined by the move, in the worst case scenario they could even attack western assets in the area. [4]  [1] Hoffman, David E., The Dead Hand: Reagan, Gorbachev and the Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race, Icon Books Ltd, 2011, p.211  [2] Hokayem, Emile, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013  [3] Jones, Owen, ‘The war in Libya was seen as a success, now here we are engaging with the blowback in Mali’, The Independent, 13 January 2013  [4] Yacoubian, Mona, in ‘Roundtable: arming the Syrian rebels’, Foreign Policy, 21 February 2013


Sovereignty and non intervention in internal affairs  It is a clear international rule that nations are sovereign and other states are simply not allowed to be making interventions into another country’s domestic affairs. The UN Charter emphasises “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”. [1] Within a state only the government is legitimate as the supreme authority within its territory. [2] This is to prevent the bigger and richer powers from doing exactly this sort of thing to obtain the result they want inside another country. This is why Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov stated "International law does not permit the supply of arms to non-governmental actors and our point of view is that it is a violation of international law," in response to suggestions that the UK would arm the Syrian rebels. [3]  [1] UN General Assembly, Article 2, Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945  [2] Philpott, Dan, "Sovereignty", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)  [3] Abbas, Mohammed, ‘Russia says arming Syrian opposition would be illegal’, Reuters, 13 March 2013


Reparations would be a step towards closing colonial scars.  It is difficult for former colonies to feel as if they can move on and develop a wholly independent identity when their ties to the past, and to their former colonisers, have not been definitively ended. For example, while it is important to remember those who suffered under slavery, the overwhelming memory of it [1] overpowers the history of those countries and innately links them back to former colonial powers. Furthermore, many of the problems now faced by former colonies can be traced back to the actions of colonial-era masters, for example the birth of ethnic tensions between minorities in Rwanda [2] and Burundi [3] . In order to move on from that damaging legacy, and to conclusively prove that such prejudices are always wrong, it is necessary for former colonial powers to show a tangible move towards closing that colonial chapter of their history. In this way they can begin to move towards a fresh, equal and co-operative relationship with the developing countries which were their former colonies, without the background of history which currently warps such relationships. Italy’s payment of reparations to Libya [4] allowed Libya to ‘mend fences with the West’ [5] and to improve international relationships. This is a step to recognise developing countries as a nation, rather than an economic opportunity. In this way, reparations would be an effective way of demonstrating a global community and spirit.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11.  [4] Time. ‘Italy Pays Reparations to Libya’. Published 02/09/2008. Accessed from  on 12/09/11.  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations demonstrate a true concern for the developing world.  Even alongside the colonial justifications for providing reparations, there are also many other strong reasons why former colonial powers should grant reparations. Former colonial powers tend to be economically developed, like America, Britain and France. The developed world should recognise the dire poverty and social challenges fed by the developing world today. Giving aid as an act of charity can sometimes be seen as derogatory [1] , and is even rejected by the potential recipients [2] [3] [4] . However, reparations allows a transfer of wealth between these countries in a way which is sensitive to the history between them, and which also demonstrates a desire to improve their relationship. It allows aid to be given to the developing world in a means which is dignified but not spurious.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


What happened during the colonial era was morally wrong.  The entire basis for colonisation was predicated on an innate ‘understanding’ and judgment of one superior culture and race [1] . This ethnocentric approach idolised western traditions while simultaneously undermining the traditions of the countries which were colonised. For example, during the colonisation of America, colonists imposed a Westernised school system on Native American children. This denied their right to wear traditional clothing [2] or to speak their native language [3] , and the children were often subject to physical and sexual abuse and forced labour [4] . The cause of this was simply ignorance of culture differences on behalf of the colonists, which was idyllically labelled and disguised as ‘The White Man’s Burden’ [5] . Colonial powers undermined the social and property rights [6] of the colonies, using military force to rule if civilians should rebel against colonisation in countries such as India [7] . After Indian fighters rebelled against British colonial force in the Indian Mutiny of 1857-58 [8] , the British struck back with terrible force, and forced the rebels to ‘lick up part of the blood’ from the floors of the houses [9] . The actions which occurred during colonisation are considered completely inappropriate and undesirable behaviour in a modern world, and in terms of indigenous rights to culture and to property, as well as human rights more generally. Reparations would be a meaningful act of apology for the wrongs which were committed during the past.  [1] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [6] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [7] Accessed from  on 11/09/11.  [8] Accessed from  on 11/09/11  [9] Accessed from  on 11/09/11


There is already a precedent for paying reparations to such states.  In the past, dominating global powers have paid reparations and compensation for historical wrongs. For example, Germany pays an annual amount of money to Israel to recognise wrongs committed against Jews during the Holocaust, and to recognise the theft of Jewish property at this time [1] . These reparations have helped Israeli infrastructure enormously, providing ‘railways and telephones, dock installations and irrigation plants, whole areas of industry and agriculture’ [2] and contributing to Israeli economic security. Japan also paid reparations to Korea after World War II as the Koreans were ‘deprived of their nation and their identity’ [4] . Britain has paid compensation to the New Zealand Maoris for the damage done during colonial times and the seizure of their land [5] , and Iraq pays compensation to Kuwait for damage done during the invasion and occupation of 1990-91 [6] . There is little reason why other nations should not be paid for the grievances caused to them by domination countries. There is support for the notion that colonial powers should pay for free universal education in Africa [7] ; this would be an entirely appropriate and desirable measure.  [1] 'Holocaust Restitution: German Reparations', Jewish Virtual Library, accessed 16/1/2014,   [2] 'Holocaust Restitution: German Reparations', Jewish Virtual Library, accessed 16/1/2014,   [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [6] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [7] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations would effectively right the economic imbalance caused by colonialism.  Given that much of the motive for colonisation was economic, many former colonies have suffered damage to their natural resources [1] or human resources, [2] which has left them less able to sustain a healthy economy. Colonists targeted countries with rich natural resources and little ability to defend themselves from invasion and manipulation. By this method, they could supply their own markets with the natural resources which they had already exploited at home [3] , and find cheap (or free) human labour for their markets [4] . Given that powerful countries such as Britain [5] and France [6] gained their own economic prosperity through the exploitation of the economic potential of the colonies, it is entirely appropriate and logical that they should pay reparations as compensation. In this way, the economic disparity between former colonies and colonists would be equalised.  [1] Accessed from  on12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [6] ‘The Haitian Revolution and its Effects’. Patrick E. Bryan. Accessed from  on 12/09/11.


Such reparations would do little to actually improve the developing countries.  Reparations are an incredibly short-term economic measure. To have any substantial impact, long-term systems would need to be put in place to truly benefit such countries, and it would be far better to encourage sustainable growth [1] than a one-off bumper payment. Developed countries should look towards improving their long-term relationship with former colonies and establishing measures such as fairer trade rules or debt relief as an efficient measure. This would allow the aid to be focused in the places where these countries need it most.  The symbolism of reparations is also potentially dangerous. Firstly, paying reparations may bring the belief that former colonial powers have ‘paid their debt’ and no longer have to seek to improve their own conduct of foreign policy. Secondly, this measure would allow dictators such as Robert Mugabe to feel justified in their declarations that colonial powers are independently responsible for all the problems affecting their countries [2] [3] [4] . In this way, Mugabe tries to hide his own shortcomings and place blame entirely on the West, which has negative impacts on the potential for international relations. In the case of Italy’s reparations to Libya, this could be seen as strengthening the Gaddafi dictatorship at the expense of the Libyan people and the West, particularly as Gaddafi is prone to blaming the West [5] or indeed anybody else he can [6] .  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [3] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [4] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [5] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [6] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


The very payment of reparations exerts a neo-colonial power over former colonies.  The recognition that many former colonies are in desperate economic need only adds to the sense that former colonial powers desire to hold sway over them. Giving reparations induces dependency and can weaken the appearance of government in the former colonies, and may allow the donor government to exert influence over policy areas within the recipient country [1] . Far from giving the recipient country the means to develop itself as an independent nation, this motion simply recalls the old power structure which existed during colonisation.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Reparations unfairly target the taxpayers of former colonial powers who had nothing to do with the deeds committed under colonisation.  It is unclear who exactly is being punished under this mechanism. Ordering reparations rather than, for example, a public apology from a monarch or government, only serves to harm tax-paying citizens whose money would be used to pay such reparations. There is a huge disconnection between the people who actually committed wrongs and the people who are now forced to literally pay for them. This is likely to lead to an increase in hostility from the taxpayers who do not understand why they are being punished, towards the people of former colonies. It is no longer a case where reparations could ever be paid from the direct profits of exploitation as any profit from that must have been spent long ago. It is wrong to impose undue guilt and obligation of payment on to people who are entirely disconnected from that history.


Time has removed the opportunity to truly make reparations to those who may have deserved it.  Reparations are used to make ‘amends for wrong or injury done’ [1] ; it is impossible to truly achieve this when the victims of wrongdoing are long since dead. Moreover, reparations which may have been made immediately after colonisation could have had a specific purpose – for example, to rebuild property which was destroyed, or to restore items which were wrongfully taken. However, the development of both countries has led to a very different state of affairs in both, and there may no longer be an obvious end for the money from reparations. There is also no precedent for giving reparations to countries after so long a period of time. For example, Germany began paying reparations to Israel in 1952 [2] , only 7 years after World War II ended in 1945. Time also makes it very difficult to judge who the ‘victims’ are now. The descendants of original victims may well be independently wealthy now – would it be right to financially cripple of Western country and their people, already suffering from economic depression, to pay people who may not need it now? In any case, it would take a very long to even work out how we could pay reparations, let alone whether we should.  [1] Accessed from  on 12/09/11  [2] Accessed from  on 12/09/11


Georgian rule in South Ossetia is historically illegitimate and oppressive  Modern Georgia never really controlled S. Ossetia. South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia shortly after Georgia gained independence from the disintegrating USSR in 1991. South Ossetia has maintained de facto independence ever since. [1] Georgia, therefore, cannot really claim to have had sustained, legitimate sovereign control over South Ossetia in modern times. Even the USSR recognised S. Ossetia as distinct from Georgia, with the Kremlin stating in 1920 that “we consider that Ossetia should have the power it prefers. Georgian intrusion into affairs of Ossetia would be an unjustified intervention into foreign internal affairs”. [2] S. Ossetia was an autonomous region within the USSR. It was not considered part of the same region that is now Georgia, and thus during its years under the USSR, S. Ossetia built up a significant degree of autonomy and independence in its internal functioning. Therefore, Georgia's only real claim to South Ossetia must extend back nearly a century, before the time of the Soviet Union.  This significantly weakens Georgia's claim over South Ossetia, but moreover Georgia's historical claim on South Ossetia is quite weak even in isolation. This is because S. Ossetia has its own distinct language and history to that of Georgia. Ossetian or Ossetic is a member of the Northeastern Iranian branch of Indo-European languages. About 500,000 people speak Ossetian in Ossetia. [3] , [4] That Ossetia has this distinct language is an important fact in favour of its status as a nation-state and in favor of its independence. Georgia, however, has been accused of committing genocide against the South Ossetians in 1920, 1993, and 2008, with tens of thousands of S. Ossetians dying over the course of these conflicts. [5] The Georgian government has also attempted to suppress S. Ossetian culture and identity, for example banning the use of the Ossetian language in official documents and abolishing S. Ossetian autonomy within Georgia. [6] Georgian rule in S. Ossetia is therefore both ahistorical, due to S. Ossetia's long and recognised history of independence and cultural and linguistic distinctness, and illegitimate, as the Georgian government has waged war upon the very lives and identity of the S. Ossetian people.  [1] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.   [2] Bzarov, Ruslan. “Independence of the Republic of South Ossetia – a guarantee of safety and reliable future of the Ossetian people”. Speech of Doctor of historical sciences, Professor Ruslan Bzarov at the VI congress of the Ossetian people. September 2007.   [3] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.   [4] Omniglot. “Ossetian”. Omniglot.   [5] Portyakova, Natalya and Sysoyev, Gennady. “Measuring South Ossetia by Kosovo”. Kommersant. 15 November 2006.   [6] Makarkin, Alexei. “How is South Ossetia different from Kosovo?”. RIA Novosti. 9 March 2006.


South Ossetia has a right to self-determination  The 1993 Vienna Declaration, which reaffirmed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter (and so sets the standard in current international law), unequivocally gives all peoples the right to self-determination: "All people have the right to self-determination. Owing to this right they freely establish their political status and freely provide their economic, social and cultural development...World Conference on Human Rights considers refusal of the right to self-determination as a violation of human rights and emphasizes the necessity of effective realization of this right". [1]  By this measure, South Ossetia has the right to self-determination (by democratic processes), and any suppression of that right should be seen as a human rights violation. In 2006, South Ossetia held a referendum that found over 99% of its population of over 100,000 desire independence from Georgia. 95% of the population turned out to vote. The referendum was monitored by a team of 34 international observers. [2] These facts are the core of the case for South Ossetian independence. It demonstrates that South Ossetians are entirely unified and enthusiastic in their desire for independence. The strength and unity of these calls for independence are almost unprecedented and cannot be ignored by the international community. And, certainly, the percentage of a population that desires independence is of relevance to assessing the legitimacy of the call and a country's right to self-determination. By this standard, South Ossetia's right to self-determination is highly legitimate.  [1] United Nations World Conference on Human Rights. “VIENNA DECLARATION AND PROGRAMME OF ACTION”. United Nations. 14-25 June 1993.   [2] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.


South Ossetian independence will help prevent future conflict  The status quo in the region is one of militarized clashes and tensions. It is important to recognize that South Ossetia has been de facto independent for some time. If it does not achieve independence, the proposed alternative is that it re-integrate into Georgia. Yet, of South Ossetians have made it clear that they will not accept this. The only possible course of action, therefore, would be to force over 100,000 South Ossetians to live under the tyranny of the majority of the Georgian state. This would not only be a clear violation of self-determination and basic democratic principles, but it would also risk a protracted war or insurgency in S. Ossetia against any re-assertion of Georgian authority. S. Ossetia and Georgia have been battling each other for over a century. Georgia has been accused of ethnic cleansing there, and of launching a 'war of aggression' which killed a large number of S. Ossetian civilians in 2008. [1] This war, as the culmination of Georgian aggression against S. Osstia, has made finally made any sort of reconciliation between the two impossible, and hardened S. Ossetian desires for independence. Keeping S. Ossetia within Georgia will simply prolong this ethic struggle, which has demonstrated itself to be irreconcilable in the foreseeable future. This conflict could easily draw in other powers (such as Russia) and cause a wider war once again. Granting S. Ossetian independence, therefore, would help avoid future conflicts and their awful humanitarian consequences.  [1] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.


A South Ossetian state is unviable  There are many factors that make South Ossetia unviable as a state. South Ossetia is very small with a very small population. It is also a landlocked state and very poor. These facts make it unlikely that South Ossetia could act effectively as an independent state. The result is that it would become dependent on other states. [1] This can already be seen from the fact that S. Ossetia has only been able to secure its current de facto independence with substantial military and foreign aid from Russia. [2] S. Ossetia is economically unviable as an independent state. It is landlocked and only has meaningful road access to the sea through Georgia. S. Ossetian GDP was estimated at US$ 15 million (US$ 250 per capita) in a work published in 2002. S. Ossetia is arguably lacking in the basic economic necessities for autonomy. Indeed, a $15 million GDP would make South Ossetia one of the poorest nations in the world. Particularly following a war with Georgia in the 1990s, South Ossetia has struggled economically. Employment and supplies are scarce. The majority of the population survives on subsistence farming. Virtually the only significant economic asset that South Ossetia possesses is control of the Roki Tunnel that links Russia and Georgia, from which the South Ossetian government reportedly obtains as much as a third of its budget by levying customs duties on freight traffic. The separatist officials admitted that Tskhinvali received more than 60 percent of its 2006 budget revenue directly from the Russian government. [3] [4] Finally, S. Ossetia has a population of roughly 70,000. [5] This would make it one of the smallest states in the world. This fact, combined with its high level of poverty, makes it a poor candidate for independence, and shows that its “independence” would compel it to become even more dependent on Russia, or else risk disintegrating as an unviable state.  [1] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.   [2] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006.   [3] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.   [4] Vaisman, Daria. “No recognition for breakaway South Ossetia's vote”. The Christian Science Monitor. 10 November 2006.   [5] BBC News. “S Ossetia votes for independence”. BBC News. 13 November 2006.


Georgia has a right to territorial integrity  Georgia has a legitimate sovereign right to maintain its territorial integrity as well as the social contract accompanying it. Georgia has the right to take action to secure the integrity of these things, unless blocked by a higher international authority. Internationally, S. Ossetia's independence is recognised by only five nations (including Russia), demonstrating that the international community is not convinced that S. Ossetia's claim to self-determination trumps Georgia's claim to territorial integrity. [1] In order to obtain independence, it is important that a country be recognized diplomatically by a significant number of the members of the United Nations. This is important in large part because it ensures that a state will have viable diplomatic relations internationally if it becomes independent. It also demonstrates that the international system supports a certain action being taken internationally. Thus Georgia's claim should continue to stand until the international community changes its mind, and at the moment the international community has legitimate concerns regarding the regional instability and conflict that an independent S. Ossetia might foster. Moreover, as shown above the S. Ossetian state is entirely dependent on Russian support, and so it can be accurately stated that the issue of S. Ossetian independence, and its threat to Georgian territorial integrity, has arisen only because of Russian interference within Georgia. Even those who argue that any region has the right to self-determination would probably reject the idea that nations have the right to foster and encourage parts of other nations to secede from their current state and join another. The S. Ossetian independence movement can thus be correctly seen simply as Russian aggression against Georgia for its own advantage, not an issue of self-determination.  [1] RIA Novosti. “Nicaragua recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia”. RIA Novosti. 4 September 2008.


Illegitimacy of the 2006 referendum  South Ossetia was wrong to hold elections under conflict conditions. In 2006, South Ossetia can be said to have been in 8 conflicts with Georgia when it held its 2006 referendum on independence. Holding referendums under such conflict conditions is generally illegitimate because the results of the elections are skewed by the conflict, threats, and the various risks for the voters involved. This caused David Bakradze, the chairman of a Georgian parliamentary European Integration Committee, to comment, “Under conflict conditions, you cannot speak about legitimate elections.” [1] This mirrors European human rights watchdog, the Council of Europe’s, denunciation of the referendum as "unnecessary, unhelpful and unfair". [2] Furthermore Russia's involvement in the 2006 referendum arguably corrupted its validity, as many of the authorities in S. Ossetia were installed there by the Russian government. [3]  [1] Radio Free Europe. “Overwhelming Support For South Ossetia Independence”. Radio Free Europe. The Journal of the Turkish Weekly. 13 November 2006.   [2] Walker, Shaun. “South Ossetia: Russian, Georgian...independent?”. Open Democracy. 15 November 2006.   [3] Socor, Vladimir. “MOSCOW’S FINGERPRINTS ALL OVER SOUTH OSSETIA’S REFERENDUM”. Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 3 Issue: 212. The Jamestown Foundation. 15 November 2006.


Progress in ending conflict in Africa  Conflict in Africa is slowly being ended. In 1992 there were 18 conflicts in Africa; by 2009 this had been halved to 9. [1] But a decline in the number of conflicts is not the only positive trend in African conflicts: there has also been a decline in the size of wars. They have changed from wars between two organised armies to being small scale insurgencies. In 1984 the conflicts were on average causing more than 20,000 battle deaths per year, but by 2008 only around 1,000. Even the number of incidents of genocide and mass killing has been going down from 9 in the 1980s to five in the 2000s. [2] Ending war might therefore be considered to be ambitious but it is not against the trend and not inconceivable.  [1] Straus, 2012, pp.183-184  [2] Straus, 2012, pp.189-191


The Solemn Declaration  The Solemn Declaration did not just highlight the goal but also that it would be achieved through three techniques: by 1, addressing the causes of conflicts – economic and social disparities, strengthening judicial systems to ensure accountability, and reaffirming collective responsibility, 2, preventing emerging sources of conflict such as piracy getting a foothold, and 3, engaging in conflict prevention. [1]  Africa has been building the African Peace and Security Architecture to address these causes of conflict. It has created the Peace and Security Council that facilitates the AU’s response to crises; it can engage in actions from humanitarian assistance to military intervention if there are particularly grave circumstances such as genocide. [2] When it does authorise action, this action is coordinated by the AU commission. When it comes to peaceful resolution of conflict, the AU has a ‘Panel of the Wise’ made up of former presidents and others with lots of influence and moral authority who use preventative diplomacy to try to resolve conflicts. [3]  [1] African Union, 2013, p.5  [2] Williams, Paul D., ‘The African Union’s Conflict Management Capabilities’, Council on Foreign Relations, October 2011,  , p.7  [3] Ibid, p.12


The increasing effectiveness of the African Union  The African Union has been taking a much more active stance in preventing and resolving conflict. Since 2003 responsibility for peace in Africa has been with the Peace and Security Council. This body has authorised AU interventions in Somalia, Sudan, Burundi, and the Central African Republic. [1] The African Union is not the only organisation engaged in peacekeeping; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has also been actively engaged in peacekeeping, having been deployed in numerous conflicts since the 1990s, most recently in Mali where they took part alongside French forces in defeating an Islamist insurgency. [2]  The AU is also boosting its collective capacity to respond to crises creating the African Standby Force made up of five regional brigades of 4000 soldiers. This force, when complete, will enable rapid deployment anywhere in Africa so helping to prevent crises becoming full scale wars. [3]  [1] ‘Peace and Security Council’, peaceau.org, 23 July 2013,   [2] News24, ‘Ecowas urges members to send troops to Mail’, 23 October 2013,   [3] Cilliers, Jakkie, ‘The African Standby Force An update on progress’, Institute of Strategic Studies, March 2008,


Not all conflict is war  What is War? The AU’s declaration does not define it. Ending all conflict is ambitious, ending only inter state war in Africa on the other hand is not. The vast majority of conflicts in Africa have been internal. The only true inter state conflicts have been the wars between Israel and Egypt, the Eritrean-Ethiopian war, the Uganda-Tunisia war, and the Second Congo War. [1] None of these are ongoing. The only conflicts that might count as inter-state that might be considered ongoing are the situation in Western Sahara and border clashes between the Sudans. Western Sahara might be considered to be frozen with very few deaths as a result of it and the Sudan conflict is in large part a result of the border being new.  [1] Wikipedia, ‘List of conflicts in Africa’, accessed 10 January 2014,


Africa is the most warlike continent  In 2012 Africa had the most distinct conflicts of any region with 13 ongoing conflicts. [1] While Africa and Asia have throughout most of the last fifty years had roughly similar numbers of conflicts – approximately 10 per year [2] - Africa has had many more non state conflicts and the number has not declined since 2004 when there were 20 non-state conflicts; in 2011 there were 22. [3] All in all there is little hope of managing to end all these conflicts by 2020.  [1] ‘Armed Conflicts 2012’, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2013,   [2] ‘Armed Conflict by Region’, UCDP, 2013,   [3] ‘Non-state Conflicts by Region, 1989-2011’, UCDP, 2012,


No mechanism to prevent crises and war exists  Within countries it is the state that ensures that conflict does not occur: the state has a monopoly on the use of force so ensures law and order. There is no such hierarchy between states. African nations, as with most other states in the world, believe in the sovereign right of states to manage their own affairs. In the same document as there is a pledge to end war “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each of its [AU’s] Member States” is reaffirmed. [1] While states are considered sovereign there is no possible way to create a mechanism to ensure that conflicts do not happen. The AU cannot dictate to its members to ensure they avoid internal conflicts even if the AU knows a conflict is coming as those members are the stakeholders. [2] All that the AU can do is react to ongoing conflicts when it is already spilling out of control and encourage good practice.  [1] African Union, 2013, p.1  [2] Williams, 2011, p.9


Gains may be reversed; events can’t be foreseen  Africa still has many fragile states. The Institute of Strategic Studies Africa identified 26 ‘fragile’ states (meaning they have weak governance, conflict and violence, inequality and poverty) including DR Congo and Ethiopia and forecasts that there will still be 11 fragile states by 2050. [1] This rather implies that war will not be ended by 2050, let alone 2020.  Even in countries that are considered stable events can quickly spiral into conflict. Mali was considered to be democratic and reasonably stable before a coup in 2012: there were multiparty elections in 1992, it held regular elections that passed international inspections, its first president Konaré willingly stood down, there was comparatively good freedom of speech and media. [2] Yet after a coup in 2012 it went downhill to the point of requiring intervention by French troops in early 2013.  [1] Cilliers, Jakkie, and Sick, Timothy D., ‘Prospects for Africa’s 26 fragile countries’, ISS Africa, p.7,   [2] Whitehouse, Bruce, ‘What went wrong in Mali?’, London Review of Books, Vol.34, No.16, 20 August 2012,  , p.17


War is in human nature  War and conflict between groups is in human nature. As Hobbes famously wrote “the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short… Nature should thus dissociate and render men apt to invade and destroy one another”. [1] Although the motives have changed, conflict has been a constant throughout human history. The first militaries were created around 2700 BC but conflict between societies almost certainly occurred before this. [2] Pledging to end all war is high minded, but it is unlikely to actually succeed in overturning human nature.  [1] Hobbes, Thomas, ‘Chapter XIII of the Natural Condition of Mankind as concerning their felicity and misery’, Leviathan,   [2] Gabriel, Richard A., and Metz, Karen S., A Short History of War, 1992,


Only an international treaty can create penalties for non-compliance  A non-binding agreement will not have any penalties for any countries that do not comply with it, this sets the agreement up for failure. Without a binding agreement a government will find it difficult to bind its successors who may back track in the decades that follow. Some states are backtracking even before the agreement is finalised; the UK has been abandoning its green policies – cutting subsidies for renewables, cancelling carbon capture and storage, reducing funding for domestic energy efficiency, and selling the green investment bank. [1] If governments will take such measures before the agreement is even finished then what hope does it have in the future if there is nothing to persuade sovereign governments to comply with their pledges?  [1] Monbiot, George, ‘On climate change this government is indifferent to life, in love with death’, The Guardian, 2 December 2015,


The hard part is the cutting of emissions  The problem with a non-binding agreement, even one where the targets have been submitted by the governments themselves is exactly that it is non-binding. If governments are not bound to cut emissions then there is a good chance that many of them wont. [1] The British government, which has binding targets, has been on course to miss its 2025 targets with reductions of only 23% against targets of 31% due to a decision to reduce subsidies for housing insulation. [2] If countries which have set targets for themselves in the past are missing them what hope do we have for these voluntary targets?  [1] Taylor, Lenore, ‘Paris climate talks: the real test is whether countries will keep their word’, The Guardian, 30 November 2015,   [2] Harvey, Fiona, ‘UK on track to miss carbon targets, climate change advisers warn’, The Guardian, 15 July 2014,


It is too late for half measures  Two degrees Celsius has generally been regarded as that safe level which agreements should be aiming for. This agreement does not go so far with it expected to keep the temperature increase to around 2.7 degrees if everyone sticks to their commitments and makes deeper ones after 2030. [1] Unfortunately however the world will still most likely be heading towards a 3.5 degrees rise if no further cuts are made later. [2] Now is the time to be much more ambitious and part of that means binding cuts to prevent backsliding or those agreeing carrying on as usual.  [1] Nuttall, Nick, ‘Global Response to Climate Change Keeps Door Open to 2 Degree C Temperature Limit’, UNFCCC Press Office, 30 October 2015,   [2] Romm, Joe, ‘Misleading U.N. Report Confuses Media on Paris Climate Talks’, thinkprogress.org, 3 November 2015,


Only a non-binding agreement would get the targets necessary  Fully binding treaties with mechanisms for compliance are the gold standard for agreements between nations. But because they are onerous they are the most difficult kind of treaties to get agreed to start with. If the aim were such an agreement it would unfortunately never happen. This has been demonstrated by the years of successive failures in crafting climate agreements. COP 15 is the most notable; expectations were immensely high for a binding international treaty but there was a failure to deliver, largely because governments did not want a binding international solution which is what was being negotiated at Copenhagen. [1]  [1] BBC News, ‘Why did Copenhagen fail to deliver a climate deal?’, 22 December 2009,


A more informal agreement avoids the US congress  The United States Congress is a potential hurdle for any climate agreement. While President Barack Obama is keen to make tackling climate change a legacy of his Presidency the Republican dominated Congress is both likely to try to block the President for that very reason and is sceptical of climate change. It is therefore a major benefit to have an agreement that will not need to be submitted to Congress for approval as any treaty needs to be confirmed by the Senate.  The Secretary of State Kerry argues that it is “definitely not going to be a treaty,” and “not going to be legally binding reduction targets like Kyoto”. It won’t need to be passed to the Senate because the President already has the power to implement the agreement through existing law. [1]  [1] Mufson, Steven, and Demirjian, Karoun, ‘Trick or treaty? The legal question hanging over the Paris climate change conference’, Washington Post, 30 November 2015,


Sovereign states should be allowed to set their own targets and be trusted to meet them  States are sovereign entities meaning that only they have power within their borders and climate change should not be a cause for groups of countries meddling in the business of others. Each state making its own commitment and then doing its own monitoring and enforcement is the right way to go about preventing climate change. By doing it this way no countries will feel unduly burdened or persecuted.


On issues such as gay marriage, human rights activists have taken the line that the right to marry is nobody else’s business. That principle of privacy should work both ways.  Many have argued that issues relating to homosexual relations are, fundamentally, a matter of privacy. That we should respect the rights of individuals to live their lives as they see fit without having the views, actions and opinions imposed upon them. [1] It’s a reasonable position but must surely relate to viewers and readers as much as it does to the subjects of news stories.  If gay men and women have the right to live their lives free from the intervention of other traditions and beliefs then so do those communities – religious and otherwise – that find some of their demands offensive or objectionable.  If the rights to privacy and self-determination are supported by those who support gay rights, then it would be inconsistent to suggest that this does not generate a right to avoid offence on behalf of those receiving news.  [1] Human rights campaign, ‘Should gay marriage be legal?’, procon.org, updated 10th August 2012,


Broadcasters almost never show scenes of torture or torment because they know this will cause offence, the same principle should apply here.  Journalists and editors use their judgement all the time on what is acceptable to print or broadcast. Expletives [1] or graphic images of violence or sex are routinely prevented because they would cause offence, giving personal details might cause distress and are omitted as a courtesy, and the identities of minors are protected as a point of law in most jurisdictions. It is simply untrue to suggest that journalists report the ‘unvarnished truth’ with no regard to its ramifications. Where a particular fact or image is likely to cause offence or distress, it is routine to exercise self-censorship – it’s called discretion and professional judgement [2] . Indeed, the news outlets that fail to do so are the ones most frequently and vociferously denounced by the high-minded intelligentsia who so frequently argue that broadcasting issues such as this constitutes free speech.  It is palpably and demonstrably true that news outlets seek to avoid offending their market; so liberal newspapers avoid exposés of bad behaviour by blacks or homosexuals otherwise they wouldn’t have a readership. [3] Most journalists try to minimise the harm caused by their reporting as shown by a study interviewing journalists on their ethics but how they define this harm and what they think will cause offence differs. [4] Western journalists may find it awkward that many in the Arab world find the issue of homosexuality unpleasant or offensive but many of the same journalists would be aghast if they were asked to report activities that ran counter to their cultural sensibilities simply as fact.  [1] Trask, Larry, ‘The Other Marks on Your Keyboard’, University of Sussex, 1997,   [2] For example see the BBC guide to editorial policy.  [3] Posner, Richard, A., ‘Bad News’, The New York Times, 31 July 2005,   [4] Deppa, Joan A, & Plaisance, Patrick Lee, 2009 ‘Perceptions and Manifestations of Autonomy, Transparency and Harm Among U.S. Newspaper Journalists’, Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, pp.328-386, p.358,


Where there is a clear objection to discussing a certain subject, insisting on doing so is not news, it’s propaganda.  Ultimately all news outlets report that which is of interest to their viewers. Where there is no interest or, more frequently, an active lack of interest, news outlet do not - and should not – impose a particular set of judgements or interests on their customers. Doing so would arguably be patronizing and certainly be financial suicide [1] .  As a result they report what is both interesting and acceptable to those who consume the news and, for the vast majority of news outlets, the companies that advertise on the station, website or in the paper. Expecting news outlets to ignore those simple realities is asking them to self-destruct by ignoring their market. It is a clear example of sacrificing the good in the name of the best – in the example given, the writer mentions that Al Jazeera covers stories relating to gay rights but does so on its English language channels. [2] This exactly shows the market in action; Al Jazeera English broadcasts mostly to a European audience who are not offended by reports on gay rights whereas “Al Jazeera Arabic is geared towards a Middle Eastern audience and does not challenge cultural values or orthodox religion”. [3]  [1] For example the actions of advertisers and readers killed the News of the World.  [2] Pellot, Brian, 2012, ‘(Not) reporting homosexuality in the Middle East’, Free Speech Debate,   [3] Krajnc, Anita, ‘Al Jazeera Arabic ignores gay news’, Toronto Media Co-op, 2 August 2010,