Ramjas Foundation And Ors. v U.O.I. And Ors.
Supreme Court of India

13 November 1992
Civil Appeal No. 2213 of 1978
The Judgment was delivered by : N. M. Kasliwal, J.
1.  This appeal by the Ramjas Foundation, a society duly registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1960 and five others who are the Secretary and trustees of the Ramjas Foundation is directed against the order of the Delhi High Court dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the civil Writ Petition No.106 of 1978 in limine.
2.  On November 13, 1959, the Chief Commissioner Delhi issued a Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') Land measuring 34070 acres was notified as land likely to be acquired by the Government at the public expense for a public purpose, namely, the planned development of Delhi. The following land was excluded from the scope of the notification:
(a) Government land and evacues land;
(b) the land already notified, either under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for any Government Scheme;
(c) the land already notified either under Section 4 o. under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, for House Building Cooperative Societies mentioned in annexure-lII;
(d) the land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land attached to religious institutions and Wakf property.
3.  The aforesaid land measuring 34070 acres included land measuring about 872 bighas, 9 biswas situated in Chowkri Mubarikabad and measuring about 730 bighas situated in Chowkri Sadhurakhurd, belonging to the Ramjas Foundation. The present appeal relates to the land situated in Chowkri Sadhurakhurd. The Ramjas Foundation on December 11, 1959 filed objections under Section 5A of the Act for the entire land situated in Mubarikabad as well as Sadhurakhurd. The Lt. Governor of Delhi subsequently issued notifications under Section 6 of the Act on 15.4.1968, 27.4.1968, 15.5.1968, 19.8.1968, 14.1.1969 and 18.1.1969. The Lt. Governor also issued notices under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act on December 27, 1972 for Sadhurakhurd land.
4. As regards the land in Mubarikabad notification under Section 6 of the Act was issued on February 28, 1968. Ramjas Foundation filed a writ petition in may, 1968 in the Delhi High Court challenging the Action of the Government in acquiring their lands situated in Mubarikabad. In the said writ petition Sachar, J. (as he then was) who heard the petition was of the view that the matter ought to be tried in a suit instead of writ proceedings. He, therefore, by his order dated August 10, 1971 permitted the Ramjas Foundation to withdraw the petition with liberty to agitate the matter in a suit and as such the writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn.
5. The Ramjas Foundation then filed a suit in the Delhi High Court on November 8, 1971 for quashing the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act in respect of the land situated in Mubarikabad. The suit was dismissed by Awadh Behari Rohtagi, J. of the Delhi High Court by order dated 21.3.1977 reported in AIR 1977 Delhi 261 1977 Indlaw DEL 66. Learned Counsel for the appellants brought to our notice that Letters Patent Appeal before the Division Bench of the High Court is pending against the aforesaid Judgment of the Learned Single Judge.
6.  So far as the land situated in Sadhurakhurd with which we are concerned in the present appeal a Writ Petition No. 213 of 1973 was filed in the High Court and the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 30th March, 1977. Thereafter another Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 was filed challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4, 6, 9 and 10 of the Act and the same was dismissed by the High Court by the impugned order dated January 31, 1978 in limine as already mentioned above.
7.  We have heard Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Tulsi, Learned Additional Solicitor General on behalf of the respondents. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants had submitted their objections under Section 5A of the Act on 11.12.1959 but the same were rejected without affording any opportunity of personal hearing. It was submitted that it was mandatory on the part of the respondents to have given an opportunity of personal hearing specially when the same was desired and a denial of such opportunity of personal hearing invalidates the notifications issued under Sections 6 and 9 of the Act. Reliance in respect of the above contention is placed on Farid Ahmed Abdul Samad & Anr. v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad & Anr., [19771 1 SCR 71 1976 Indlaw SC 233.
8.  It was also contended on behalf of the appellants that the notification issued under Section 4 of the Act itself excludes the land of wakf property. It has thus been contended that so far as the land in question is concerned the same being also a wakf property as such ought to have been exempted under the notification itself. It was submitted that Ramjas Foundation is an educational charitable society which is running several schools and post graduate college in Delhi and several educational institutions are being run on the alleged acquired land itself. As an alternative argument it was submitted that in case this Hon'ble Court takes the view that wakf property mentioned in the alleged notification does not include the educational and charitable institutions run by Hindus or non-Muslims then such notification is void for violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution.
9.  As regards the objection of the violation of the mandatory provisions of Section 5A of the Act
10. The Additional Solicitor General during the course of the hearing of the matter placed an order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi dated 23.2.1968 which has been taken on record and for the purposes of identification has been marked as Annexure 'X'. A copy of the said Annexure 'X' was also given to the Learned counsel for the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order dated 22.3.1968 clearly shows that the Ramjas Foundation Society was represented through Sh. Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who was given a personal hearing. From a perusal of the aforesaid document Annexure 'X' dated 23.2.1968 it is clear that full opportunity of hearing through counsel was afforded to the Ramjas Foundation. It has been further mentioned in this order that the Ramjas Foundation Society was also allowed to file fresh objections if so desired, but Sh. Ratan Lal Gupta, Learned Advocate for the Petitioner society declined and stated that there was nothing more to add in the previous objection petition. After bringing the said document Annexure 'X' to the notice of the Learned counsel for the appellants, no satisfactory explanation or argument came forward on behalf of the appellants.
11. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect of the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible. lt is well settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections filed under Section 5A of the Act was one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in the Special Leave Petition filed before this Court and ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the Special Leave Petition was filed in 1978 itself.
12.  It may be further noted that a common objection petition under Section 5A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated in Mubarikabad as well as in Sadhurakhurd was filed on 11.12.1959 through Sh. Ratan lal Gupta, Advocate. The said objections were heard in the presence of Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate and disposed of by one common order Annexure 'X' and we cannot believe an ipse dixit explanation made orally during the course of arguments on behalf of the appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal hearing being given to Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate. It is also important to note that no such objection was taken in respect of land in Mubarikabad.
13.  Another ground on which the present appeal has been contested is the ground of delay, laches and acquiescence in filing the writ petition challenging the acquisition proceedings. As already mentioned above a common notification was issued under Section 4 of the Act for an area of 34070 acres of land needed for planned development of Delhi. Between 1959 and 1961, about, six thousand objections were filed under Section 5A of the Act. The objections were overruled. On March 18, 1966, the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was published in respect of a portion of the area. Thereafter, in 1970 notices were issued under Section 9(1) of the Act and some of the persons who had received such notices challenged the validity of acquisition proceedings by filing writ petitions before the High Court of Delhi. The High Court negatived all the contentions raised in those cases and dismissed the writ petitions.
14. Thereafter appeals by grant of special leave against the judgment of the Delhi High Court as well as writ petitions filed directly under Art. 32 of the Constitution were heard and disposed of by this Court by a common Judgment reported in Aflatoon & Ors. v. Lt. Governor Delhi & Ors., [1975] 1 SCR 802 1974 Indlaw SC 256. In the aforesaid case a Constitution Bench of this Court held that in the case of an acquisition of a large area of land comprising several plots belonging to different persons, the specification of the purpose can only be with regard to the acquisition of the whole area. Unlike in the case of an acquisition of a small area, it might be practically difficult to specify the particular purpose for which each and every item of land comprised in the area is needed.
15.  It was further held in the above case that about six thousand objections were filed under Section 5A by persons interested in the property. Several writ petitions were also filed in 1966 and 1967 challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The Government had necessarily to wait for the disposal of the objections and petitions before proceeding further in the matter. The High Court was of the view that there was no inordinate delay on the part of the Government in completing the acquisition proceedings. The conclusion of the High Court was held to be correct.
16. It was also held in the above case that the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners. In the above case this Court had found that the appellants of that case had not moved in the matter even after the declaration under Section 6 was published in 1966. They approached the High Court with their writ petitions only in 1970 when the notices under Section 9 were issued to them. This Court then observed as under:
"There was apparently no reason why the writ petitions should have waited till 1972 to come to this Court for challenging the validity of the notification issued in 1959 on the ground that the particulars of the public purpose were not specified. A valid notification under Section 4 is sine qua non for initiation of proceedings for acquisition of property. To have sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete the acquisition proceedings on the basis that the notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on grounds which were available to them at the time when tile notification was published would be putting a premium on dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioners".
17.  The delay and laches in the case before us are even worse than those in the above cited Aflatoon's case 1974 Indlaw SC 256. The appellants had initially filed a writ petition No. 213/73 challenging the notification dated 13.11.1959 under Section 4 of the Act and notification dated 27.4.1968 under Section 6 of the Act with respect to 245 bighas and 1 biswas of land situated in the revenue estate of Sadhurakhurd and the notices dated 27.12.1972 under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act issued by the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi with respect to Khasra No. 1040/353 (12 bighas and 8 biswas). On 30.3.1977 Shri M.C. Gupta, Learned counsel for the Ramjas Foundation stated that he had instructions from his clients to state that they did not want to press the petition and wish to withdraw it. The statement of Sh. Gupta had been separately recorded. The Court, in these circumstances permitted to withdraw the petition and dismissed the same as withdrawn. lt is important to note that in the statement Sh. M.C.Gupta, Learned counsel for the petitioners stated as under:
"I may be permitted to withdraw this petition in view of the Judgment delivered by Hon. Mr. Justice Awadh Behari in Suit 451 of 1971 decided on 21st March, 1977, between the parties, wherein the contentions urged were precisely the same as urged in this petition, my clients reserved the opportunity to file a fresh suit if so necessitated by the circumstances in future."
18.  It may be noted that the reference with regard to suit No. 451 of 1971 decided on 21st March, 1977 is in respect of the land of petitioners situated in Mubarikabad. It is surprising that though the opportunity was sought for filing a fresh suit, the appellants again filed a writ petition No. 106 of 1978 in the High Court on 7.1.1978 which was ultimately dismissed by the High Court in limine on 31st January, 1978 by a Division Bench comprising of T.P.S. Chawla and Awadh Behari, JJ. In this writ petition No. 106 of 1978 the appellants conveniently omitted to mention that the permission to withdraw the petition No. 213 of 1973 was granted on the statement of Sh. M.C. Gupta that his clients reserved the liberty to file a fresh suit and not writ. Thus no liberty was sought or given for filing a fresh writ petition. In any case there were no fresh ground or circumstances available to the appellants to file a fresh writ petition No. 106 of 1978 on 7.1.1978 on identical grounds when the earlier writ petition No. 213 of 1973 had been dismissed as withdrawn on 30.3.1977. Nothing had happened between 30.3.1977 and 7.1.1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to the appellants to file the writ petition No. 106 of 1978. Awadh Behari, J. had dismissed the suit No. 451 of 1971 by order dated 21.3.1977 in regard to the lands in Mubarikabad and he was also one of the Judges of the Division Bench who passed the impugned order dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ petition in limine as he was fully aware of the entire background of this litigation.
19. The appellants are themselves responsible for creating confusion in initiating separate proceedings at different period of time in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to the acquisition proceedings was on common grounds. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of such conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In case, as sought to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, the appellants were depending on the result of the civil suit filed in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the writ petition No. 213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed on 21.3.1977. We find no justification for filing the writ petition in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on 30th March, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on 7.1.1978 instead of suit.
20.  Independently, of all the circumstances mentioned above, we shall now consider the question of delay and laches in filing the writ petition No. 106 of 1978 and the earlier writ petition No. 213 of 1973 relating to lands in Sadhurakhurd. Mr. Tarkunde, Learned Senior Counsel vehemently contended that there is no limitation prescribed for filing the writ petition and the question of delay and laches has to be examined independently in the facts and circumstances of each case.
21. He has argued that the appellants are continuing in possession uptil date and though challenge has been made to the validity of notifications issued under Section 4 in 1959, Section 6 in 1968 and 1969 and Section 9 and 10 in 19722, there is no delay, since no award has been passed so far and no loss has occasioned to the respondents due to lapse of time. It has been submitted that there was no change of circumstances during the intervening period and the delay had been fully explained on the aforesaid grounds. It has also been argued that notifications under Sections 9 and 10 were issued in 1972 and soon there after the appellants came forward with a writ petition No. 213 of 1973 challenging the notifications issued under Sections 4, 6, 9 and 10 of the Act. We find no force at all in the above contentions.
22.  It is an admitted fact that notification under Section 4 of the Act was issued as early as 1959 and all the notifications under Section 6 of the Act in relation to the land of the appellants in Sadhurakhurd were issued in 1968 and 1969. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings was mainly based on the ground that in the notification dated 13.11.1959 issued under Section 4 of the Act the lands of wakf property were excluded and the lands of the appellants being also used for educational and charitable purposes the same were also liable to be excluded.
23. At a later stage a ground was also taken that if wakf property in the aforesaid notification under Section 4 of the Act meant only wakf properties of the Mohammedans, then such notification was discriminatory and violative under Art. 14 of the (Constitution as there was no reasonable ground to discriminate such properties of Hindus or non-Muslims also meant for charitable purposes. So far as the notifications under Section 6 of the Act are concerned the same were attacked on the ground that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to hear the objections filed under Section 5A of the Act. Thus it is abundantly clear that the challenge was in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act alone and though in the prayer clause relief had been sought to quash the notification under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act also which were issued in 1972 but no ground whatsoever has been pleaded in the writ petition nor raised before us as to how the notifications under Sections 9 and 10 had any concern for explaining the delay in respect of the challenge to notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.
24. It is worthwhile to note that according to the appellants own showing the notices under Sections 9 and 10 issued to the appellants in 1972 were in respect of the land being Khasra No. 1040/353 which related to 12 bighas and 8 biswas only. The challenge on the other hand in the writ petition is in respect of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 covering the entire land measuring about 730 bighas situate in village Sadhurakhurd. We find no justification at all in explaining the delay on the ground that no award has been passed nor the appellants have been dispossessed so far.
25. This cannot be an explanation for not challenging the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the 9Act and in the present case the appellants had themselves sought stay from this Court as early as 15.11.1978 for not making and declaring the award and not to dispossess the appellants. Thus we find no justification at all for the delay in not challenging the notification issued under Section 4 on 13.11.1959 till 1973. Even notifications under Section 6 of the Act were issued in 1968 and 1969 but not challenged till 1973. As already mentioned above in Aflatoon's case 1974 Indlaw SC 256 (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that even after the declaration under Section 6 of the Act published in 1966, the appellants had approached with their writ petitions in 1970 when the notices under Section 9 were issued to them the writ petitions were liable to be dismissed on the grounds of laches and delay. Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior counsel made strenuous effort to distinguish the aforesaid case on the ground that in the aforesaid case the Court was influenced with the fact that the petitioners had sat on the fence and allowed the Government to complete (emphasis added) the acquisition proceedings.
26. Much emphasis has been laid on the word 'to complete' the acquisition proceedings. We find no force in this submission as the facts narrated in the above case clearly shows that the petitioners in those cases had filed writ petitions in the High Court in 1970 and in the Supreme Court in 1972 after the issuance of notices under Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Act. The use of the word complete' was not of much significance and the main reasoning of the case was that grounds to attack the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act were available at the time of publication of such notifications. In the facts and circumstances of the case before us the appellants were also sitting on the fence and did not take any steps of challenging the notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act till 1973 though the grounds now sought to be urged were available to the appellants as soon as such notifications were issued.
27. Thus viewing the matter from any angle we are clearly of the view that the writ petition was also liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the appellants apart from other grounds already dealt by us. In the face of the aforesaid view taken by us, it is not necessary at all to go on other questions raised in the case. We decline to express any opinion on any questions of law raised in the appeal.
28.  In the result we dismiss this appeal with costs. In view of the dismissal of the appeal itself all interim orders stand vacated automatically.
Appeal dismissed


State of Bihar and Another v Ranchi Zila Samta Party and Anr
Supreme Court of India

19 March 1996
Civil Appeal No. 5177 of 1996 [Arising out-SLP [C] 5841-44 and 5845-46 of 1996]
The Order of the Court was as follows :
1.  Leave granted.
2.  Heard learned counsel on both sides.
3.  These appeals by special leave arise from the Judgment dated March 11, 1996 of the Division Bench of the Patna High Court in CWJC No.459 of 1996 and batch. It is not necessary to narrate all the facts stated in the impugned judgment of the High Court. Suffice it to state that a large-scale defalcation of public funds, fraudulent transactions and falsification of accounts, to the tune of around Rs. 500 crores, came to light in the Animal Husbandry Department of the State of Bihar. This had taken place during the years 1977-78 to 1995-96. A similar situation prevailed in the Education, Cooperation and Fisheries Departments. It is agreed by all the counsel that an in-depth investigation is required to be made. The only controversy between counsel on either side is whether the High Court, in exercise of its power under Article 226, could take the investigation away from the State police and entrust lt to the Central Bureau of Investigation [CBI].
4.  Shri F.S. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing for the State, contended that, by reason of Entry 80 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution and Section 6 of the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946 [Act 26 of 1946], without the consent of the appropriate State Government no investigating agency other than the State police could investigate an offence committed in the State. The High Court, while exercising power under Article 22, should have kept in mind this limitation. The limitation did not apply to this Court exercising power under Article 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice. The High Court therefore, was not correct in law in directing the CBI to investigate the allegations of defalcation of public funds, large-scale misappropriation, fabrication and destruction of the record etc. Shri P P. Rao, learned senior counsel, contended that the State Government had not delayed in instituting the investigation. As soon as the matter was brought to the knowledge of the Chief Minister, he took prompt action, suspended the erring officers and constituted an Enquiry to submit periodical reports. The state, Mr. Rao submitted, would not attempt to shield any corrupt officer from being prosecuted or proceeded with departmentally. The prompt action taken established the sincerity of the State Government to see that proper investigation was carried out.
5. There was no allegation against the State police. The High Court could have preserved control and supervised the investigation by the State police. Instead, it divested the State police of its statutory power and entrusted the case to the CBI, which upset the distribution of powers under the Constitution. Shri Soli J. Sorabjee, learned senior counsel, supporting all the contention, submitted that the power was traceable to Entry 39 of the Government of India Act, 1935. the State police could not be divested of the power. The investigation by the Central agency could not have been ordered by the High Court without the consent of the State Government.
6.  On the other hand, Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel leading for the respondents, contended that the power of the High Court was unlimited There were selfimposed limitations on the exercise or that power. in view of the enormity fraudulent transactions that had taken placed within the administration of the State, they needed to be investigated and the erring officers brought to book by an independent agency. The people's confidence would be best assured if the investigation was conducted by an independent agency.There was no reason for the CBI to either falsely implicate any innocent person or shield any real culprit. Therefore, in a democratic set up when a cloud was cast on the administration it would be appropriate for an independent agency to conduct the investigation. The High Court, therefore, in exercise of its discretionary power under Article 226 had rightly directed the CBI to investigate these fraudulent transactions involving more than Rs.500 crores an estimate given by the State itself. Shri Arun jaitley, learned senior counsel, criticized the inaction on the part of the State police in investigation and laying charge-sheets against erring officers on the basis of the evidence on record despite the Income-tax Department's information in this behalf through the State's vigilance Commission. Shri Rajeev Dhavan learned senior counsel, supported the judgment on the argument of public confidence and Shri O.P. Sharma learned senior counsel, echoed it.
7.  In view of the contentions, the question that arises for consideration is whether this Court would be justified in interfering with the order passed by the High Court. The parameters of the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to direct an investigation by the CBI, though without the consent of the concerned State, is the subject matter of a reference pending consideration of a Constitution Bench of five Judges of this Court. [This is in w.p.Nos.531-36 of 1985 by order dated March 10, 1989.] Therefore, the frontiers of the power of the High Court under Article 226 to give directions to the CBI to investigate into offences without the State's consent, are already before this Court and shall be gone into. All arguments addressed by learned counsel on either side would be considered and dealt with by the Constitution Bench.
8.  The only question then is whether this is a fit case for our interference under Article 136 of the Constitution? The exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution in a public interest litigation was not to give any advantage to a political party or group of people, as apprehended by counsel for the appellants. It was also not to cast a slur on the State police. It was done to investigate corruption in public administration, misconduct by the bureaucracy, fabrication of official records, and misappropriation of public funds by an independent agency that would command public confidence. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the direction given by the High Court appears to be just and proper and calls for no real interference.
9.  The question then is whether the direction given by the High Court needs any modification. It is pointed out by Shri Nariman that the State police have already instituted 40 First Information Reports against different persons, arrested 44 offenders and attached the properties of 239 perhaps. There is no gainsaying that all persons involved in these offences need tc be identified. Not only all the aforementioned persons but also all other persons involved need to be dealt with according to law. This modification shall be made.
10.  We are also of the opinion that, to alleviate the apprehensions of the State about the control of the investigation by the CBI, it should be under the overall control and supervision of the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court. The CBI officers entrusted with the investigation shall, apart from the concerned criminal court, inform the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court from time to time of the progress made in the investigation and may, if they need any directions in the matter of conductions the investigation, obtain them from him. The learned Chief Justice may either post the matter for directions before a Bench presided over by him or constitute any other appropriate Bench. After the investigation is over and reports are finalized, as indicated by the Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned judgment, expeditious follow-up action shall be taken. The High Court and the State Government shall co-operate in assigning adequate number of special Judges to deal with the cases expeditiously so that no evidence may be lost.
11.  The order of the Division Bench of the high Court in paragraph 54, to the effect that investigation by the State police in cases already instituted shall remain suspended, is modified. The entire investigation now stands entrusted to the CBI as aforesaid. The CBI is directed to take over the investigation already made by the State police, inclusive Of the FIRs, arrests and attachments aforementioned, and deal appropriately therewith.
12.  The appeals are disposed of accordingly. No costs.
Appeal disposed of


Kazilhendup Dorji v Central Bureau Of Investigation
Supreme Court of India

29 March 1994
W.P. (Civil) NO. 313 of 1993
The Judgment was delivered by : S. C. Agrawal, J.
1. This writ petition filed u/art. 32 of the Constitution raises the question whether it is permissible to withdraw the consent given by the State Government u/s. 6 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') whereby a member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment (DSPE) was enabled to exercise powers and jurisdiction for the investigation of the specified offences in any area in the State and, if so, what is the effect of such withdrawal of consent on matters pending investigation on the basis of such consent on the date of withdrawal.
2. The Act was enacted to make provision for the Constitution of a special police force in Delhi for the investigation of certain offences in the Union Territories, for the superintendence and administration of the said force and for the extension to other areas of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the said force in regard to the investigation of the said offences. DSPE constituted under the said Act is now known as the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act read as under:
"5. (1) The Central Government may by order extend to any area (including Railway areas) in a State, not being a Union Territory the powers and jurisdiction of members of the Delhi Special Police Establishment for the investigation of any offences or classes of offences specified in a notification u/s. 3.
(2)When by an order under sub-s. (1) the powers and jurisdiction of members of the said police establishment are extended to any such area, a member thereof may, subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, discharge the functions of a police officer in that area and shall, while so discharging such functions, be deemed to be a member of the police force of that area and be vested with the powers, functions and privileges and be subject to the liabilities of a police officer belonging to that police force.
(3)Where any such order under sub-s. (1) is made in relation to any area, then, without prejudice to the provisions of sub- section (2), any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment of or above the rank of Sub-Inspector may, subject to any orders which the Central Government may make in this behalf, exercise the powers of the officer-in- charge of a police station in that area and when so exercising such powers, shall be deemed to be an officer-in-charge of a police station discharging the functions of such an officer within the limits of his station.
Nothing contained in S. 5 shall be deemed to enable any member of the Delhi Special Police Establishment to exercise powers and jurisdiction in any area in a State, not being a Union Territory or railway area, without the consent of the Government of that State."
3. By his letter dated 20-10-1976, addressed to the Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Sikkim conveyed the consent of the Government of Sikkim u/s. 6 of the Act to the members of the DSPE in exercising powers and jurisdiction on the whole of the State of Sikkim for the investigation of the offences punishable under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code specified therein as well as offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Similar consent in respect of offences under other enactments was conveyed by letter of the Chief Secretary, Government of Sikkim, dated 10-7-1979 and the orders of the Government of Sikkim dated 24-12-1983, 28-6-1984 and 10-12-1984.
4. Respondent 4 was the Chief Minister of Sikkim during the period 1979 to 1984. He ceased to be the Chief Minister on 11-5-1984. On 26-5-1984, a case [RC.5/84-CIU(A)] was registered by the CBI for offences punishable u/s. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The allegations, in brief, were that Respondent 4, while Acting as the Chief Minister of the State of Sikkim and thus being a public servant, had acquired assets disproportionate to his known sources of income. On 7-8-1984, another case [RC.8/84-CIU(A)] was registered by CBI for offences punishable under Section 120- B IPC and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, against Respondent 4 and others. The allegations, in brief, were that Respondent 4 and Shri P.K. Pradhan, the then Secretary Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing their position as public servants in conspiracy with other persons caused pecuniary advantage to the private parties and the corresponding loss to the Government of Sikkim and further that these persons entered into a criminal conspiracy with other private persons and awarded contracts to the tune of Rs 1,62,31,630 to the private parties for implementing Rural Water Supply Scheme under the Minimum Needs Programme during 1983-84 on higher rates and had ignored the recommendations of the concerned Rural Development Department officials on this point. After registering these two cases CBI started investigation and while the matters were under investigation Respondent 4 again became the Chief Minister of Sikkim in March 1985. By notification dated 7-1-1987, when Respondent 4 was the Chief Minister of Sikkim, it was notified that all consents of or on behalf of the State Government under letters dated 20-10-1976 and 10-7-1979 and orders dated 24-12-1983, 28-6-1984 and 10-12- 1984 for investigation of offences by CBI u/s. 6 of the Act, are withdrawn and stand cancelled with immediate effect. In spite of requests made by officials of the Government of India in their letters dated 17-10-1988, 12-12-1988 and 10-2-1989 and the Ministers of State in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions in letters dated 9-3-1989 and 16-9-1992, the Government of Sikkim did not agree to permit investigation by CBI in respect of cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act and declined to give consent for such investigation. As a consequence of the notification dated 7-1-1987, CBI suspended further action in the aforementioned two cases registered against Respondent 4. The petitioner, who happens to be a former Chief Minister of Sikkim, has filed this writ petition, by way of public interest litigation, wherein he has sought various reliefs including the quashing of the notification dated 7-1-1987. The petitioner has submitted that there is no provision under the Act which empowers the State Government to withdraw the consent which has been accorded and that impugned notification dated 7-1-1987, withdrawing the consent is in violation of the provisions of the Act.
5. In the counter-affidavit of Shri Parag Prakash, Deputy Secretary to Government of India, Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions, filed on behalf of Respondent 2, Union of India, it has been stated that after due investigation in case No. RC.5/84-CIU(A) the CBI had come to the conclusion that Respondent 4 had acquired assets worth Rs 16,49,434 which were disproportionate to his known sources of income and that a prima facie case for offences punishable u/ss. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was made out against him and that similarly after investigation of case No. RC.8/84- CIU(A) the CBI had come to the conclusion that a prima facie case for the offences punishable under Section 120-B IPC and S. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act was made out against Respondent 4 and Shri P.K. Pradhan, the then Secretary Rural Development Department, Government of Sikkim, and fifteen others for having caused pecuniary advantage to the private parties to the tune of Rs 3,07,230. It has been further stated in the said affidavit that before the CBI could file charge-sheet as provided u/s. 173 CrPC in either of the aforesaid two cases in the court of law, the State of Sikkim, by its notification dated 7-1-1987, withdrew the consent earlier accorded by it to the members of the Special Police Establishment for investigation of offences in the State of Sikkim as provided u/s. 6 of the Act and that in spite of various communications sent by Government of India to the Government of Sikkim requesting for restoration of the consent u/s. 6 of the Act, the State Government had declined to give consent as requested. It has been further stated in the said affidavit that the withdrawal of the consent by the State Government through notification dated 7-1-1987, has caused grave injustice to the investigation of the aforesaid two cases registered by CBI because for want of said consent the reports u/s. 173 CrPC could not be filed in the court of law. It has also been stated that the law, once set in motion by registering criminal cases, ought not be permitted to be stalled and the case must be allowed to reach its logical conclusion and that criminal justice requires that the investigating agency should be allowed to bring the result of investigation to the court of law by filing reports u/s. 173 CrPC as required under law, notwithstanding the withdrawal of consent during pendency of investigation. It is also stated in the said affidavit that notification dated 7-1-1987, through which the consent was withdrawn, is prejudicial to the fair and free investigation by CBI and thus illegal and not tenable under the law and further that there is no provision in law for withdrawal of consent once accorded and that, in any case, in respect of cases already taken up for investigation or trial on the basis of a valid consent legally accorded by the State Government, there is no scope of withdrawing it in between and that notification dated 7-1-1987, deserves to be quashed in totality and certainly in respect of the cases already taken taken up for investigation by CBI.
6. A counter-affidavit has been filed by Shri K.A. Varadan, Chief Secretary, State of Sikkim, on behalf of Respondent 3, the State of Sikkim, but the said affidavit is confined to the question whether a meeting of the Cabinet was held on 19-5-1984 wherein, as asserted in the writ petition by the petitioner, it was decided that since Respondent 4 had acquired assets by illegal means the Central Government be requested to require CBI to institute complaints/file case against Respondent 4. In the said affidavit no reference has been made to the order dated 7-1-1987, whereby the consent granted u/s. 6 of the Act was withdrawn as well as the legality of the said action.
7. Respondent 4 has also filed a counter-affidavit wherein he has alleged that the writ petition was politically motivated and further that the registration of cases by CBI against him was vitiated by mala fides and is part of a campaign of character assassination against him. In his counter-affidavit Respondent 4 has disputed that a meeting of the Cabinet was held on 19-5-1984, or a decision was taken empowering CBI to investigate the allegations of corruption against Respondent 4 and that the sanction to investigate offences by CBI u/s. 6 of the Act was illegally granted which had been properly withdrawn. Along with the said counter-affidavit Respondent 4 has placed on record (as Annexure VI) the notings in the file containing the opinions of the then Advocate General as well as the Chairman of the State Law Commission expressing the view that the consent given u/s. 6 could be rescinded u/s. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.
8. S. 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 is in following terms:
"21. Power to issue, to include power to add to, amend, vary or rescind, notifications, orders, rules or bye-laws.- Where, by any Central Act or Regulation, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions if any to add to, amend, vary or rescind any notifications, orders, rule or bye-laws so issued."
9. Shri Ram Jethmalani, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, has urged that S. 21 of the General Clauses Act has no application to a consent given u/s. 6 of the Act inasmuch as S. 21 of the General Clauses Act postulates conferment of the power to issue notifications, orders, rules, or bye-laws by any Central Act or Regulation and that S. 6 of the Act does not confer a power to issue a notification or order and that the consent given u/s. 6 cannot be regarded as a notification or order. In this context, Shri Jethmalani has contrasted the provisions of S. 6 with S. 3 of the Act which prescribes that the "the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify the offences or classes of offences which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment". Shri Jethmalani has pointed out that the original consent dated 20-10-1976, was contained in the letter of the Chief Secretary and was not in the form of a notification and so also was the consent contained in the letter dated 10-7-1979. Shri Jethmalani has also contended that even if S. 21 of the General Clauses Act is held to be applicable so as to permit withdrawal of consent given under Section 6, such withdrawal of consent cannot be related to an investigation which has started on the basis of consent granted earlier and that once the investigation has started Chapter XII of CrPC comes into play and the statutory powers vested in the CBI under the provisions of the Code have to be exercised and the exercise of said powers is not affected by a subsequent withdrawal of the consent. Shri Jethmalani has further contended that since the impugned notification for withdrawal of the consent was one in which Respondent 4 had a vital interest, the decision for such withdrawal should have been taken by the Governor in exercise of his personal discretion and not on the advice of the Council of Ministers and that in the present case the impugned notification was issued on the basis of advice of the Council of Ministers headed by Respondent 4, who was the Chief Minister at that time.
10. The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for Respondents I and 2, has also assailed the validity of the impugned notification and has urged that no action of any authority can be permitted to impede the course of criminal justice and that but for the impugned notification withdrawing the consent the CBI would have discharged its statutory obligations in the matter of investigation and prosecution of the accused persons.
11. Shri Hegde, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the State of Sikkim,has assailed the validity of S. 6 of the Act on the ground that DSPE isa police force of the Union Territory and Parliament does not have the legislative competence to make a law providing for extension of powers and jurisdiction of members of a police force belonging to a Union Territory to any area outside the Union Territory.
12. Shri Parasaran, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Respondent 4, has submitted that the writ petition is an abuse of the process of the court inasmuch as it is politically motivated and, in this context, he has invited our attention to the order passed by this Court on 5-5-1993, wherein it has been stated:
" Shri Jain strongly urged that the petitioner who was instrumental in the admission of Sikkim as a State in the Indian Union, is greatly exercised and troubled over the inaction of the CBI in investigating into certain charges against Respondent 4. It would appear that in 1987 there was a purported revocation of the sanction. If the revocation is valid, we are afraid, re-agitation of the matter at this distance of time by the petitioner would not be proper and would earn the criticism of amounting to an abuse of the process. But, Shri Jain would say that there is no power of revocation and the CBI must proceed on the assumption that none exists."
13. Shri Parasaran has also urged that there is inordinate delay in filing of the writ petition inasmuch as the FIR was registered as far back as in 1984 and the notification withdrawing the consent was issued in 1987 but the writ petition was filed in 1993, nearly six years after the passing of the impugned notification.
14. The contention urged by Shri Hegde about the legislative competence of Parliament to enact Ss. 5 and 6 of the Act stands concluded by the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Advance Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Gurudasmal (1970) 1 SCC 633 : (1970) 3 SCR 881 1970 Indlaw SC 91 wherein the expression "State" in Entry 80 of List 1 in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution has been construed to include "Union Territory" in view of the definition of "State" contained in S. 3(58) of the General Clauses Act and it has been held that members of police force belonging to the Union Territory can have their powers and jurisdiction extended to another State provided the Government of that State consents.
15. The submission of Shri Parasaran that the filing of the writ petition amounts to abuse of the process of court also does not merit acceptance. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of Respondent 2, Union of India, shows that after due investigation of both the cases it has been found that prima facie case for offences u/s. 5(2) read with S. 5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and offences under Section 120-B read with S. 5(2) and S. 5(1)(d) is made out and that if the impugned notification had not been issued the charge-sheet u/s. 173 CrPC would have been filed by CBI. In these circumstances, merely because the petitioner happens to be a political rival of Respondent 4 it cannot be said that filing of this writ petition amounts to abuse of process of the court. The order of this Court dated 5-5-1993, only means that if the revocation is found to be valid re- agitation of the matter at this distance of time by the petitioner would not be proper and would earn the criticism of amounting to an abuse of the process. By the same order the Court after noticing the contention of Shri R.K. Jain that there was no power of revocation and that CBI must proceed on the assumption that none exists, decided to issue notice to CBI in the first instance and on 1-10-1993, after examining the affidavit filed by Shri Ram Deo Pandey, Superintendent of Police, CBI, directed that notice be issued to other respondents. The order of this Court dated 5-5-1993, therefore, does not lend support to the contention that the filing of the writ petition amounts to abuse of the process.
16. As regards delay in filing of writ petition we find that after the issuance of the impugned notification in 1987, efforts were made by the Central Government during the period from 1988 to 1992 to persuade the Government of Sikkim to accord the necessary consent and when the said attempts failed, the petitioner moved this Court in 1993. Having regard to the seriousness of the allegations of corruption that have been made against a person holding the high public office of Chief Minister in the State which have cast a cloud on his integrity, it is of utmost importance that the truth of these allegations is judicially determined. Such a course would subserve public interest and public morality because the Chief Minister of a State should not function under a 1 cloud. It would also be in the interest of Respondent 4 to have his honour vindicated by establishing that the allegations are not true. The cause of justice would, therefore, be better served by permitting the petitioner to agitate the issues raised by him in the writ petition than by non-suiting him on the ground of laches.
17. Coming to the contention urged by Shri Jethmalani on merits it may be mentioned that S. 21 of the General Clauses Act does not confer a power to issue an order having retrospective operation. [See Strawboard Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Gutta Mill Workers' Union 1952 Indlaw SC 80 .] Therefore, even if we proceed on the basis that S. 21 of the General Clauses Act is applicable to an order passed u/s. 6 of the Act, an order revoking an order giving consent u/s. 6 of the Act can have only prospective operation and would not affect matters in which Action has been initiated prior to the issuance of the order of revocation. The impugned notification dated 7-1-1987, has to be construed in this light. If thus construed it would mean that investigation which was commenced by CBI prior to withdrawal of consent under the impugned notification dated 7-1-1987, had to be completed and it was not affected by the said withdrawal of consent. In other words, the CBI was competent to complete the investigation in the cases registered by it against Respondent 4 and other persons and submit the report u/s. 173 CrPC in the competent court. On that view of the matter, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of S. 21 of the General Clauses Act can be invoked in relation to consent given u/s. 6 of the Act.
18. The writ petition is, therefore, allowed and it is declared that the notification dated 7-1-1987, withdrawing the consent given by the Government of Sikkim under letters dated October 20, 1976, and 10-7-1979 and orders dated 24-12-1983, 28-6-1984, and 10-12-1984, u/s. 6 of the Act, operates only prospectively and the said withdrawal would not apply to cases which were pending investigation on the date of issuance of the said notification. The notification dated 7-1-1987, does not preclude the CBI from submitting the report in the competent court u/s. 173 CrPC on the basis of the investigation conducted by it in RC.5/84-CIU(A) and RC.8/84-CIU(A).
No order as to costs.


Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v State of Maharashtra and others
Supreme Court of India

14 December 2004
S.L.P. (C) No. 26269 of 2004
The Judgment was delivered by : Hon'ble Justice Arijit Pasayat
1. This case is a sad reflection on members of the legal profession and is almost a black spot on the noble profession. The petitioner who belongs to this profession filed a petition styled as "Public Interest Litigation" before the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court. By the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed it holding that there was no public interest involved and in fact the petitioner had resorted to black mailing respondent nos. 6 and 7 and was caught red handed accepting "black mailing" money. The High Court also noticed that the allegations of unauthorized constructions made in the petition were also not true.
2. Cost of Rs.25,000/- (Rupees twenty five thousand only) which was levied, was directed to be paid to the affected respondent nos. 6 and 7 before the High Court.
3. It is in fact, a black day for the black robed professionals, if the allegation, as found by the High Court to be true and which presently appear to be the subject matter of further proceedings in a criminal case, are true. This will leave the members of the legal profession black faced for the black deed of the petitioner who may be as the High Court found a black sheep in the profession. Though the petition filed by the petitioner carried the attractive brand name of "Public Interest Litigation", the least that can be said is that it smacks of every thing what the Public Interest Litigation should not be.
4. When there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, said petition is to be thrown out. Before we grapple with the issue involved in the present case, we feel it necessary to consider the issue regarding public interest aspect. Public Interest Litigation which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be "publicity interest litigation" or "private interest litigation" or "politics interest litigation" or the latest trend "paise income litigation". The High Court has found that the case at hand belongs to the last category. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it becomes also a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreck vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot also be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. Courts of justice should not be allowed to be polluted by unscrupulous litigants by resorting to the extraordinary jurisdiction. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. These aspects were highlighted by this Court in The Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary (1992 (4) SCC 305 1992 Indlaw SC 1257) and Kazi Lhendup Dorji vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, (1994 Supp (2) SCC 116 1994 Indlaw SC 422). A writ petitioner who comes to the Court for relief in public interest must come not only with clean hands like any other writ petitioner but also with a clean heart, clean mind and clean objective. (See Ramjas Foundation vs. Union of India, (AIR 1993 SC 852 1992 Indlaw SC 1037) and K.R. Srinivas v. R.M. Premchand, (1994 (6) SCC 620 1994 Indlaw SC 1765).
5. It is necessary to take note of the meaning of expression 'public interest litigation'. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, Volume 4 (IV Edition), 'Public Interest' is defined thus:
"Public Interest (1) a matter of public or general interest does not mean that which is interesting as gratifying curiosity or a love of information or amusement but that in which a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
6. In Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), "public interest" is defined as follows:
"Public Interest something in which the public, or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. It does not mean anything the particular localities, which may be affected by the matters in question. Interest shared by national government...."
7. In Janata Dal case 1992 Indlaw SC 1257 (supra) this Court considered the scope of public interest litigation. In para 54 of the said judgment, after considering what is public interest, has laid down as follows :
"The expression 'litigation' means a legal action including all proceedings therein initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of right or seeking a remedy. Therefore, lexically the expression "PIL" means the legal action initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected."
8. In para 62 of the said judgment, it was pointed out as follows:
"Be that as it may, it is needless to emphasis that the requirement of locus standi of a party to a litigation is mandatory, because the legal capacity of the party to any litigation whether in private or public action in relation to any specific remedy sought for has to be primarily ascertained at the threshold."
9. In para 98 of the said judgment, it has further been pointed out as follows:
"While this Court has laid down a chain of notable decisions with all emphasis at their command about the importance and significance of this newly developed doctrine of PIL, it has also hastened to sound a red alert and a note of severe warning that Courts should not allow its process to be abused by a mere busy body or a meddlesome interloper or wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or concern except for personal gain or private profit or other oblique consideration."
10. In subsequent paras of the said judgment, it was observed as follows:
"It is thus clear that only a person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will alone have as locus standi and can approach the Court to wipe out the tears of the poor and needy, suffering from violation of their fundamental rights, but not a person for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. Similarly a vexatious petition under the colour of PIL, brought before the Court for vindicating any personal grievance, deserves rejection at the threshold".
11. It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievances go unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the do others of the Courts never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants and resultantly they loose faith in the administration of our judicial system.
12. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be used for suspicious products of mischief. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique considerations. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives, and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
13. The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows :
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests. Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."
14. The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the information being not vague and indefinite. The information should show gravity and seriousness involved. Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests; (i) nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
15. Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994 (2) SCC 481 1993 Indlaw SC 461), and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation vs. M/s GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr., (AIR 1994 SC 2151 1994 Indlaw SC 1633). No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (See Dr. B.K. Subbarao vs. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996 (7) JT 265 1996 Indlaw SC 977). Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public.
16. As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Others. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Others. (AIR 1999 SC 114 1998 Indlaw SC 235), this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so-called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Apart from the sinister manner, if any, of getting such copies, the real brain or force behind such cases would get exposed to find out the truth and motive behind the petition. Whenever such frivolous pleas, as noted, are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
17. In S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981 Supp. SCC 87 1981 Indlaw SC 599)it was emphatically pointed out that the relaxation of the rule of locus standi in the field of PIL does not give any right to a busybody or meddlesome interloper to approach the Court under the guise of a public interest litigant. He has also left the following note of caution:
"But we must be careful to see that the member of the public, who approaches the court in cases of this kind, is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective."
18. In State of H.P. vs. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, Simla and Others. (1985 (3) SCC 169 1985 Indlaw SC 286), it has been said that public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection.
19. These aspects have been highlighted in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal (2004 (3) SCC 349 2003 Indlaw SC 1010) and Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Others. (2004 (3) SCC 363 2004 Indlaw SC 196).
20. It is disturbing feature which needs immediate remedial measure by the Bar Councils and the Bar Association to see that the process of law is not abused and polluted by its member. It is high time that the Bar Councils and the Bar Associations ensure that no member of the Bar becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and/or abetting files frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name of "Public Interest Litigation". That will be keeping in line with the high traditions of the Bar. No one should be permitted to bring disgrace to the noble profession. We would have imposed exemplary cost in this regard but taking note of the fact that the High Court had already imposed costs of Rs.25,000/-, we do not propose to impose any further cost.
21. Let copy of this judgment be sent to Bar Council of India and the Supreme Court Bar Association by the Registry for necessary action.
The petition deserves to be dismissed, which we direct.


Gurpal Singh v State of Punjab and Others
Supreme Court of India

10  May  2005
Civil Appeal No. 2802-2803 of 2002
The Judgment was delivered by : Arijit Pasayat, J.
1.  By the impugned judgment a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the appointment of the appellant as Auction Recorder of the Market Committee, Patran was invalid and illegal. The said order came to be passed on the basis of a Writ Petition filed by respondent No. 4. It is to be noted that the said petition was styled as a Public Interest Litigation (in short 'PIL').
A brief reference to the factual aspect would be necessary.
2.  Appellant was appointed as Auction Recorder on 19.11.1986. Appointment of the appellant was challenged by one Ashok Kumar, clerk of the Market Committee by filing a complaint before the competent authority alleging that the appellant having been convicted under Section 61(1)(a) of Punjab Excise Act in 1974 for alleged commission of offence on 21.5.1973 and was therefore ineligible for being considered for appointment.
3. The complaint was looked into by the Market Committee and by order dated 22nd May, 1989 it was held that the appointment was not contrary to law. The Standing Counsel of the Committee categorically opined that since no moral turpitude of any kind was involved, there was no ineligibility attached to the appellant and his appointment was in accordance with law.
4. For the aforesaid purpose reliance was placed on a decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Narain Singh v. N.S. Chima (1997 SLWR 448). On 5.9.1989 appellant's services were regularized under the Punjab Market Committees (Class III) Rules, 1989 which came to be operative after appellant was appointed. Prior to that no specific Rules were there.
5. A Civil Writ Petition No. 3451 of 1989 was filed by one Chandra Bhan before Punjab and Haryana High Court challenging the direct appointment of the appellant. During pendency of the said Writ Petition Sukhjinder Singh filed a complaint before the Administrator, Market Committee questioning appellant's appointment.
6. Notice was issued by the Administrator to the appellant, who filed his reply. A revision in terms of Section 42 of the Punjab and Haryana Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (in short the 'Markets Act') was filed before the Special Secretary to the Government of Punjab, Department of Agriculture who passed orders to the effect that Administrator should look into the matter and take a decision as to whether action against the appellant was called for. While Writ Petition No. 3451 of 1989 was pending, Civil Writ Petition No. 6180 of 2000 was filed by the respondent No. 4 challenging appointment of the appellant and as noted above the petition was stated to be one in public interest.
7. Counter Affidavit was filed by the Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee taking the stand that since conviction of the appellant did not involve any moral turpitude the appointment was in accordance with law. Appellant also filed counter affidavit before the Market Committee questioning locus standi of the Writ Petitioner to challenge his appointment.
8. It was pointed out that no public interest involved and because of political and personal rivalry the petition had been filed. The High Court by the impugned order held that since the appellant had been convicted by a Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 61 of the Punjab Excise Act, his appointment was not according to rules. Therefore his appointment was set aside and the Punjab Mandi Board and the Market Committee were directed to start fresh process of selection for filling up of the post.
9.  In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Writ Petition filed by the writ petitioner (respondent No. 4) was nothing but a sheer abuse of process of court. It was by no stretch of imagination Public Interest Litigation and it was filed because of personal and political rivalry and ought to have been dismissed by the High Court.
10. The assertion that appellant and respondent No.4 were pitted against each other in several elections has not been denied. Even the Punjab Government has as back as on 22.6.1981 issued a Circular that only records of conviction for preceding five years were to be taken note of.
11.  Learned counsel appearing for the Market Committee supported the stand of the appellant and submitted that there was nothing irregular in the appointment of the appellant and the same was in terms of the rules of appointment. Learned counsel for the respondent No. 4, writ petitioner however, submitted that merely because the writ petition was filed after fourteen years and because there was some personal differences that cannot dilute the public interest element involved in the writ petition.
12. It was further submitted that notwithstanding the clear direction of the High Court to start the process of selection afresh within four months, nothing has been done and this amounts to contempt of Court.
13.  The scope of entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation, locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters involving service of an employee has been examined by this court in various cases.
The Court has to be satisfied about
(a)The credentials of the applicant;
(b)The prima facie correctness or nature of information given by him;
(c) The information being not vague and indefinite.
The information should show gravity and seriousness involved.
Court has to strike balance between two conflicting interests;
(i) Nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and reckless allegations besmirching the character of others; and
(ii) Avoidance of public mischief and to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable executive actions.
14. In such case, however, the Court cannot afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely careful to see that under the guise of redressing a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.
15. The Court has to act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and busy bodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating as public spirited holy men. They masquerade as crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of the public or even of their own to protect.
16.  Courts must do justice by promotion of good faith, and prevent law from crafty invasions. Courts must maintain the social balance by interfering where necessary for the sake of justice and refuse to interfere where it is against the social interest and public good. (See State of Maharashtra vs. Prabhu, (1994 (2) SCC 481), 1993 Indlaw SC 461 and Andhra Pradesh State Financial Corporation vs. M/s GAR Re-Rolling Mills and Anr., (AIR 1994 SC 2151). 1994 Indlaw SC 1633 No litigant has a right to unlimited draught on the Court time and public money in order to get his affairs settled in the manner as he wishes.
17. Easy access to justice should not be misused as a licence to file misconceived and frivolous petitions. (See Dr. B.K. Subbarao vs. Mr. K. Parasaran, (1996 (7) JT 265). 1996 Indlaw SC 977 Today people rush to Courts to file cases in profusion under this attractive name of public interest. They must inspire confidence in Courts and among the public.
18.  As noted supra, a time has come to weed out the petitions, which though titled as public interest litigations are in essence something else. It is shocking to note that Courts are flooded with large number of so called public interest litigations where even a minuscule percentage can legitimately be called as public interest litigations. Though the parameters of public interest litigation have been indicated by this Court in large number of cases, yet unmindful of the real intentions and objectives, High Courts are entertaining such petitions and wasting valuable judicial time which, as noted above, could be otherwise utilized for disposal of genuine cases.
19. Though in Dr. Duryodhan Sahu and Ors. v. Jitendra Kumar Mishra and Ors. (AIR 1999 SC 114), 1998 Indlaw SC 235 this Court held that in service matters PILs should not be entertained, the inflow of so called PILs involving service matters continues unabated in the Courts and strangely are entertained. The least the High Courts could do is to throw them out on the basis of the said decision.
20. The other interesting aspect is that in the PILs, official documents are being annexed without even indicating as to how the petitioner came to possess them. In one case, it was noticed that an interesting answer was given as to its possession. It was stated that a packet was lying on the road and when out of curiosity the petitioner opened it, he found copies of the official documents. Whenever such frivolous pleas are taken to explain possession, the Court should do well not only to dismiss the petitions but also to impose exemplary costs.
21. It would be desirable for the Courts to filter out the frivolous petitions and dismiss them with costs as afore-stated so that the message goes in the right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do not have the approval of the Courts.
22.  The aforesaid position was highlighted in Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B. (2004 (3) SCC 349). 2003 Indlaw SC 1010 It is depressing to note that on account of such trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts, innumerable days are wasted, which time otherwise could have been spent for the disposal of cases of the genuine litigants.
23. Though we spare no efforts in fostering and developing the laudable concept of PIL and extending our long arm of sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed and the needy whose fundamental rights are infringed and violated and whose grievance go unnoticed, un- represented and unheard; yet we cannot avoid but express our opinion that while genuine litigants with legitimate grievances relating to civil matters involving properties worth hundreds of millions of rupees and substantial rights and criminal cases in which persons sentenced to death facing gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for long years, persons suffering from undue delay in service matters government or private, persons awaiting the disposal of tax cases wherein huge amounts of public revenue or unauthorized collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu expecting their release from the detention orders etc. etc.
24. Are all standing in a long serpentine queue for years with the fond hope of getting into the Courts and having their grievances redressed, the busy bodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers or officious interveners having absolutely no real public interest except for personal gain or private profit either of themselves or as a proxy of others or for any other extraneous motivation or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing their faces by wearing the mask of public interest litigation and get into the Courts by filing vexatious and frivolous petitions of luxury litigants who have nothing to loose but trying to gain for nothing and thus criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts and as a result of which the queue standing outside the doors of the court never moves, which piquant situation creates frustration in the minds of the genuine litigants.
25.  Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used as an effective weapon in the armory of law for delivering social justice to the citizens. The attractive brand name of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used for suspicious products of mischief.
26. It should be aimed at redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury and not publicity oriented or founded on personal vendetta.
27. As indicated above, Court must be careful to see that a body of persons or member of public, who approaches the court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or private motive or political motivation or other oblique consideration. The Court must not allow its process to be abused for oblique considerations by masked phantoms who monitor at times from behind. Some persons with vested interest indulge in the pastime of meddling with judicial process either by force of habit or from improper motives and try to bargain for a good deal as well to enrich themselves. Often they are actuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity. The petitions of such busy bodies deserve to be thrown out by rejection at the threshold, and in appropriate cases with exemplary costs.
28.  The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford Foundation in USA defined the "public interest litigation" in its report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:
"Public Interest Law is the name that has recently been given to efforts provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such efforts have been undertaken in the recognition that ordinary market place for legal services fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant interests.
Such groups and interests include the proper environmentalists, consumers, racial and ethnic minorities and others."
(See : Dr. B. Singh v. Union of India and Others (2004(3) SCC 363) 2004 Indlaw SC 196
29. When a particular person is the object and target of a petition styled as PIL, the court has to be careful to see whether the attack in the guise of public interest is really intended to unleash a private vendetta, personal grouse or some other mala fide object.
30. Since in service matters public interest litigation cannot be filed there is no scope for taking action for contempt, particularly, when the petition is itself not maintainable. In any event, by order dated 15.4.2002 this Court had stayed operation of the High Court's order.
31.  Judged in the above said background the High Court was not justified in entertaining the Writ Petition. The judgment of the High Court is indefensible and is therefore set aside.
The appeals are allowed with no orders as to costs.
Appeal allowed