Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v State of Gujarat and Others
Supreme Court of India

10  May  1988
Criminal Appeal No. 319 of 1988
The Judgment was delivered by : A. P. Sen, J.
1.  This appeal by special leave brought from the judgment and order of the Gujarat High Court dated 21st November, 1987 and the connected petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution are directed against an order passed by the District Magistrate, Panchmahals, Godhra dated 28th May, 1987 for the detention of the appellant under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 of the  Gujarat Prevention ofAnti-Social Activities Act, 1985 on being satisfied that it was necessary to do so, with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.
2.  It is not an undisputed fact that the appellant is engaged as a commission agent or broker in the rather lucrative but illicit business of liquor traffic at Godhra in the State of Gujarat where there is total prohibition by importing different varieties of Indian made foreign liquor in sealed bottles like scotch whisky, beer etc. from wine merchants of Vanswada in the State of Rajasthan. But then by engaging himself in such activities he falls within the description of a 'bootlegger' as defined in s. 2(b) and therefore comes within the ambit of sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act by reason of the legal fiction contained in sub-s. (4) thereof.
3.  Put very briefly, the essential facts are these. On prior information that the appellant was about to import Indian made foreign liquor in bulk in truck bearing registration No. GRY 3832, on the night between 29/30th December, 1986, the Gujarat police put up a road block on the bridge near Machan River where on a sign given it failed to stop. After a long chase, the police jeep was able to intercept the truck at Limdi. Both the driver Ahmed Saiyad Abdul Majid Kalander and cleaner Sadique Ahmed Yusuf Durvesh Shaikh got down and said that the truck was empty. However, on a search it was found to be laden with 77 sealed cases containing 2040 bottles of different brands of scotch whisky, beer etc. and it was evident from the statements of the driver and the cleaner who were arrested, that the appellant was the person who had purchased the liquor from wine merchants of Vanswada. On 4th January, 1987 the statements of the witnesses were recorded. Apparently, the appellant absconded and he could not be traced till 2nd February, 1987 when he was arrested but later released on bail. In the meanwhile, he moved the Sessions Judge, Panchmahals for anticipatory bail on 21st January, 1987 but no orders were passed inasmuch as the police made a statement that there was no proposal at that stage to place him under arrest. The appellant is being prosecuted for various offences under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 as applicable to the State of Gujarat, in Criminal Case No. 154/86. On 28th May, 1987 i.e. after a lapse of five months the District Magistrate, Panchmahals, Godhra passed the order of detention along with the grounds therefore which was served on the appellant on the 30th when he was taken into custody. The immediate and proximate cause for the detention was that on 20/30th December, 1986 he transported in bulk foreign liquor from liquor merchants of Vanswada in the State of Rajasthan intended and meant for delivery to persons indulged in anti-social activities by doing illict business of foreign liquor in the State of Gujarat. Incidentally, the grounds furnish particulars of two other criminal cases, namely,
(i) Criminal Case No. 303/82 on account of recovery of 142 bottles of foreign liquor recovered and seized from his residential house on 21st July, 1982, but the case ended in an acquittal as the prosecution case witnesses turned hostile, and
(ii) Criminal Case No. 150/86 relating to recovery and seizure of 24 bottles of foreign liquor from his house on 30th May, 1986 which case was still pending. It was said that persons like the appellant bringing foreign liquor from other States illegally without a permit on a brokerage and storing the same in their permises are not easily detected and there was no other method of preventing such persons from engaging in such anti-social activities except by detention under s. 3(2) of the Act.
4.  In the writ petition before the High Court the appellant assailed the impugned order of detention mainly on two grounds, namely:
(i) The failure of the detaining authority to record his subjective satisfaction as required under sub-s. (2) of s. 3 that the importation of foreign liquor by the appellant from Vansawada across the border was likely to affect public health of the citizens of Gujarat and therefore it was necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to public order, renders the order of detention bad and invalid.
(ii) There was no sufficient material on record on which such subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority could be reached. Neither of the two contentions prevailed with the High Court and it accordingly declined to interfere.
5.  At the time when the judgment was to be delivered by the High Court, learned counsel appearing for the appellant sought permission to raise an additional point and he was permitted to do so. It was as to whether the detention of the detenu at Sabarmati Central Prison, which was a place other than Godhra where he ordinarily resides, was tantamount to a breach of the mandate of Art. 21 of the Constitution as his detention at a far-off place was not consistent with human dignity and civilized normes of behaviour. The additional point so raised also did not find favour with the High Court. The appeal by special leave is directed against this judgment. Learned counsel for the appellant has however not preferred to rais these questions over again.
6.  In the connected petition under Art. 32 learned counsel for the appellant has, in substance, put forth the following contentions, namely:
(1) There is no explanation forthcoming for the admitted delay of five months in making the impugned order of detention and such inordinate unexplained delay by itself was sufficient to vitiate the order.
(2) The impugned order of detention was bad in law inasmuch as there was non- application of mind on the part of the detaining authority. There was nothing to show that there was awareness of the fact that the appellant had applied for grant of anticipatory bail nor was there anything to show that the detaining authority was satisfied about the compelling necessity to make an order for detention which, it is said, was punitive in character. It is said that there was no occasion to commit the appellant to prison while he was on bail in a criminal case facing charges under the Bombay Prohibition Act, 1949 merely on the suspicion of being a bootlegger.
(3) The impugned order of detention was ultra vires the District Magistrate and void ab initio as it displayed lack of certainty and precision on the part of the detaining authority as to the purpose of detention. There was clubbing of purposes as it mentioned that such detention was necessary
(i) in the interests of the nation with a view to stop the anti-national activities,
(ii) for ensuring of public peace,
(iii) for maintenance of public health, and
(iv) in the interest of the State, all rolled up into one.
(4) There was delay in the disposal of the representation made by the appellant to the State Government which renders his continued detention invalid and constitutionally impermissible. We shall deal with the contentions in seriatim.
7.  Point No. (1): It has always been the view of this Court that detention of individuals without trial for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to the community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The Court has therefore in a series of decisions forged certain procedural safeguards in the case of preventive detention of citizens. When the life and liberty of citizen was involved, it is expected that the Government will ensure that the Constitutional safeguards embodied in Art. 22(5) are strictly observed. When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law of preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order. These procedural safeguards are ingrained in our system of judicial interpretation. The power of preventive detention by the Government under any law for preventive detention is necessarily subject to the limitations enjoined on the exercise of such power by Art. 22(5) as construed by this Court. Thus, this Court in Khudiram Das v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCC 81 1974 Indlaw SC 467 speaking through Bhagwati, J. observed:
"the Constitutional imperatives enacted in this article are two-fold:
(1) the detaining authority must, as soon as may be, that is, as soon as practicable after the detention communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order of detention has been made, and
(2) the detaining authority must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. These are the barest minimum safeguards which must be observed before an executive authority can be permitted to preventively detain a person and thereby drown his right of personal liberty in the name of public good and social security."
8.  As observed by this Court in Narendra Purshotam Umrao v. B.B. Gujral, [1979] 2 SCR 315 1978 Indlaw SC 272 when the liberty of the subject is involved, whether it is under the Preventive Detention Act or the Maintenance of Internal Security Act or the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act or any other law providing for preventive detention.
"...it is the bounden duty of the Court to satisfy itself that all the safeguards provided by the law have been scrupulously observed and that the subject is not deprived of his personal liberty otherwise than in accordance with law."
9.  Nevertheless, the community has a vital interest in the proper enforcement of its laws particularly in an area such as conservation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities in dealing effectively with persons engaged in such smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering or with persons engaged in anti-national activities which threaten the very existence of the unity and integrity of the Union or with persons engaged in anti-social activities seeking to create public disorder in the worsening law and order situation, as unfortunately is the case in some of the States today, by ordering their preventive detention and at the same time, in assuring that the law is not used arbitrarily to suppress the citizen of his right to life and liberty. The Court must therefore be circumspect in striking down the impugned order of detention where it meets with the requirements of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution.
10.  There is an inexorable connection between the obligation on the part of the detaining authority to furnish the 'grounds' and the right given to the detenu to have an 'earliest opportunity' to make the representation. Since preventive detention is a serious inroad on individual liberty and its justification is the prevention of inherent danger of activity prejudicial to the community, the detaining authority must be satisfied as to the sufficiency of the grounds which justify the taking of the drastic measure of preventive detention. The requirements of Art. 22(5) are satisfied once 'basic facts and materials' which weighed with the detaining authority in reaching his subjective satisfaction are communicated to the detenu. The test to be applied in respect of the contents of the grounds for the two purposes are quite different. For the first, the test is whether it is sufficient to satisfy the authority, for the second, the test is whether it is sufficient to enable the detenu to make his representation at the earlier opportunity which must, of course, be a real and effective opportunity. The Court may examine the 'grounds' specified in the order of detention to see whether they are relevant to the circumstances under which preventive detention could be supported e.g. security of India or of a State, conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange and prevention of smuggling activities, maintenance of public order, etc. and set the detenu at liberty if there is no rational connection between the alleged activity of the detenu and the grounds relied upon, say public order.
11.  In the enforcement of a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 there is apt to be some delay between the prejudicial activity complained of under s. 3(1) of the Act and the making of an order of detention. When a person is detected in the act of smuggling or foreign exchange racketeering, the Directorate of Enforcement has to make a thorough investigation into all the facts with a view to determine the identity of the persons engaged in these operations which have a deleterious effect on the national economy. Quite often these activities are carried on by persons forming a syndicate or having a wide network and therefore this includes recording of statements of persons involved, examination of their books of accounts and other related documents. Effective administration and realisation of the purpose of the Act is often rendered difficult by reason of the clandestine manner in which the persons engaged in such operations carry on their activities and the consequent difficulties in securing sufficient evidence to comply with the rigid standards, insisted upon by the Courts. Sometimes such investigation has to be carried on for months together due to the magnitude of the operations. Apart from taking various other measures i.e. launching of prosecution of the persons involved for contravention of the various provisions of the Acts in question and initiation of the adjudication proceedings, the Directorate has also to consider whether there was necessity in the public interest to direct the detention of such person or persons under s. 3(1) of the Act with a view to preventing them from acting in any manner prejudicial to the conservation and augmentation of foreign exchange or with a view to preventing them from engaging in smuggling of goods etc. The proposal has to be cleared at the highest quarter and is then placed before a Screening Committee. For ought we know, the Screening Committee may meet once or twice a month. If the Screening Committee approves of the proposal, it would place the same before the detaining authority. Being conscious that the requirements of Art. 22(5) would not be satisfied unless the 'basic facts and materials' which weighed with him in reaching his subjective satisfaction, are communicated to the detenu and the likelihood that the Court would examine the grounds specified in the order of detention to see whether they were relevant to the circumstances under which the impugned order was passed, the detaining authority would neces sarily insist upon sufficiency of the grounds which would justify the taking of the drastic measure of preventively detaining the person.
12.  Viewed from this perspective, we wish to emphasise and make it clear for the guidance of the different High Courts that a distinction must be drawn between the delay in making of an order of detention under a law relating to preventive detention like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 and the delay in complying with the procedural safeguards of Art. 22(5) of the Constitution. It has been laid down by this Court in a series of decisions that the rule as to unexplained delay in taking action is not inflexible. Quite obviously, in cases of mere delay in making of an order of detention under a law like the Conservation of Foreign Exchange & Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 enacted for the purpose of dealing effectively with persons engaged in smuggling and foreign exchange racketeering who, owing to their large resources and influence have been posing a serious threat to the economy and thereby to the security of the nation, the Courts should not merely on account of delay in making of an order of detention assume that such delay, if not satisfactorily explained, must necessarily give rise to an inference that there was no sufficient material for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority or that such subjective satisfaction was not genuinely reached. Taking of such a view would not be warrented unless the Court finds that the grounds are 'stale' or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. The decisions to the contrary by the Delhi High Court in Anil Kumar Bhasin v. Union of India & Ors., 1987 Indlaw DEL 10199Crl. W. No. 410/86 dated 2.2.1987, Bhupinder Singh v. Union of India & Ors., [1985] DLT 493, Anwar Esmail Aibani v. Union of India & Ors., Crl. W. No. 375/86 dated 11.12.1986, Surinder pal Singh v. M.L. Wadhawan & Ors., Crl. W. No. 444/86 dated 9.3.1987 and Ramesh Lal v. Delhi Administration, Crl. W. No. 43/84 dated 16.4.1984 and other cases taking the same view do not lay down good law and are accordingly overruled.
13.  In the present case, the direct and proximate cause for the impugned order of detention was the importation in bulk of Indian made foreign liquor by the appellant acting as a broker from across the border on the night between 29/30th December, 1986. The District Magistrate in the counter- affidavit has averred that it was revealed from the statements of the witnesses recorded on 4th January, 1987 that the appellant was the person actually involved. Apprehending his arrest the appellant applied for anticipatory bail on 21st January, 1987. It appears that on the same day the appellant apears to have made a statement that there was no proposal at that stage to arrest the appellant. However, later it was discovered that there was no trace of the appellant. He was arrested on 2nd February, 1987 and on the same day he made a statement admitting these facts. Meanwhile, the proposal to detain the appellant was placed before the District magistrate. It is averred by the District Magistrate that on a careful consideration of the material on record he was satisfied that it was necessary to make an order of detention of the appellant under s. 3(2) of the Act and that accordingly on 28th May, 1987 he passed the order of detention. The appellant was taken into custody on 30th May, 1987. He had forwarded the report to the State Government on the 28th and the Government accorded its approval on the 31st.
14.  Even though there was no explanation for the delay between 2nd February and 28th May, 1987 it could not give rise to a legitimate inference that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the District Magistrate was not genuine or that the grounds were stale or illusory or that there was no rational connection between the grounds and the impugned order of detention. There is a plethora of decisions of this Court as to the effect of unexplained delay in taking action. These are admirably dealt with in Durga Das Basu's Shorter Constitution of India, 8th edn. at p. 154. We will only notice to a few salient decisions. In Olia Mallick v. State of West Bengal, [1974] 1 SCC 594 1974 Indlaw SC 434 it was held that mere delay in making the order was not sufficient to hold that the District Magistrate must not have been satisfied about the necessity of the detention order. Since the activities of the detenu marked him out as a member of a gang indulging systematically in the cutting of aluminium electric wire, the District Magistrate could have been well satisfied, even after the lapse of five months that it was necessary to pass the detention order to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the supply of electricity. In Golam Hussain @ Gama v. The Commissioner of Police, Calcutta & Ors., [1974] 3 SCR 613 1974 Indlaw SC 411, it was held that the credible chain between the grounds of criminal activity alleged by the detaining authority and the purpose of detention, is snapped if there is too long and unexplained an interval between the offending acts and the order of detention. But no 'mechanical test by counting the months of the interval' was sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. The Court has to investigate whether the casual connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. In Odut Ali Miah v. State of West Bengal, [1974] 4 SCC 127 1974 Indlaw SC 491 where the decision of the detaining authority was reached after about five months, Krishna Iyer, J. repelled the contention based on the ground of delay as a mere 'weed of straw' and it was held that the 'time-lag' between the dates of the alleged incidents and the making of the order of detention was not so large that it could be said that no reasonable person could possibly have arrived at the satisfaction which the District Magistrate did on the basis of the alleged incidents. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. In Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, [1964] 3 SCC 14 1984 Indlaw SC 230, one of us, Sen, J. observed:
"On merits the impugned order cannot be said to be vitiated because of some of the grounds of detention being non-existent or irrelevant or too remote in point of time to furnish a rational nexus for the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It is usually from prior events showing tendencies or inclinations of a man that an inference can be drawn whether he is likely, in the future, to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order."
15. See also: Gora v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR 996 1974 Indlaw SC 466; Raj Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar & Ors., [1986] 4 SCC 407 1986 Indlaw SC 512 and Hemlata kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 4 SCC 647 1981 Indlaw SC 322.
16.  Point No. (2): Quite recently, we had occasion to deal with this aspect in Bal Chand Bansal v. Union of India & Ors., JT (1988) 2 SC 65 1988 Indlaw SC 73. In repelling a contention raised on the dictum in Ramesh Yadav v. District Magistrate, Etah, [1985] 4 SCC 232 1985 Indlaw SC 63, one of us (Sharma, J.) drew attention to the observations of Mukharji, J. in Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra, [1986] 4 SCC 378 1986 Indlaw SC 785 that the prejudicial activities of the person detained were 'so interlinked and continuous in character and are of such nature' that they fully justified the detention order. Here the grounds of detention clearly advert to two earlier incidents, one of 21st July, 1982 for which the detenu was being prosecuted in Criminal Case No. 303/82 relating to the recovery and seizure of 142 bottles of foreign liquor from his residential house which ended in an acquittal because the prosecution witnesses turned hostile, and the other of 30th May, 1986 for which Criminal Case No. 150/86 relating to recovery and seizure of 24 bottles of foreign liquor from his house was then still pending, and go on to recite that the launching of the prosecution had no effect inasmuch as he had not stopped his activities and was continuing the importation of foreign liquor from across the border. The earlier two incidents are not really the grounds for detention but they along with the transaction in question of importation of foreign liquor in bulk show that his activities in this transaction afforded sufficient ground for the prognosis that he would indulge in such anti-social activities again, if not detained. The District Magistrate in his counter- affidavit has stated that he was aware of the fact that the detenu had on 21st January, 1987 applied for anticipatory bail but no orders were passed inasmuch as the police made a statement that there was no proposal at that stage to place him under arrest. It however appears that he was arrested on 2nd February, 1987 and on his own made a statement admitting the facts.
17. Thereafter, he seems to have disappeared from Godhra. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that there was lack of awareness on the part of the District Magistrate on 28th May, 1987 in passing the order of detention as he did. There is a mention in the grounds of the two criminal cases pending against the detenu and also a recital of the fact that he was continuing his business surreptitiously and he could not be caught easily and therefore there was compelling necessity to detain him.
18.  Point No. (3): The contention regarding lack of certainty and precision on the part of the detaining authority as to the real purpose of detention and that they were 'all rolled up into one' at first blush appears to be attractive but on deeper reflection seems to be of little or no consequence. The purpose of the detention is with a view to preventing the appellant from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It was not seriously disputed before us that the prejudicial activities carried on by the appellant answer the description of a 'bootlegger' as defined in s. 2(b) and therefore he comes within the purview of sub-s. (1) of s. 3 of the Act, by reason of sub-s. (4) thereof. Sub-s. (4) of s. 3 with the Explanation appended thereto gives an enlarged meaning to the words 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' and reads:
"(4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities, whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order.
Explanation: For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any person referred to in this sub-section directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public of any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health."
19.  The District Magistrate in passing the impugned order has recorded his subjective satisfaction with respect to the appellant that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make an order that he be detained. In the accompanying grounds for detention this is the basis for the formation of his subjective satisfaction. They go on to state that unless the order of detention was made he would not stop his illicit liquor traffic on brokerage and therefore it was necessary to detain him under s. 3(2) of the Act, and recite:
"In order to safeguard the health of the people of Gujarat, for public peace and in the interest of the nation, with a view to stop such anti-national activities ..... for the purpose of public order and public peace and in the interest of the State ....."
20.  In our opinion, these words added by way of superscription were wholly unnecessary. They were set out by the District Magistrate Presumably because of total prohibition in the State. In future, it would be better for the detaining authority acting under ss. 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act, to avoid such unnecessary verbiage which are of little or no consequence and give rise to unnecessary debate at the Bar.
21.  Point No. (4): The contention that there was unexplained delay in disposal of the representation made by the appellant to the State Government appears to be wholly misconceived. Admittedly, the appellant made his representations to the State Government as well as to the Advisory Board on 8th June, 1987. The State Government acted with promptitude and after due consideration rejected the same on 12th June, 1987. There was no delay much less inordinate delay in consideration of the representation.
22.  The result therefore is that the appeal as well as the writ petition fail and are dismissed.
Appeal dismissed


T.A. Abdul Rahman v State Of Kerala And Ors.
Supreme Court of India

23 August 1989
Criminal Appeal No. 3 18 of 1989.
The Judgment was delivered by : S. R. Pandian, J.
1. This appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India is preferred by the appellant, Abdul Rahman questioning the validity and correctness of the order of detention passed by the first Respondent on 7.10.1987, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 3(1)(iii) and 3(1)(iv) of the Conservation of Foreign Ex- change and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (Central Act 52 of 1974) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') whereby detaining the appellant's brother Sri T.A. Sirajudeen @ Siraj (the detenu herein) with a view to pre- venting the detenu from engaging in transporting or conceal- ing or keeping smuggled gold or dealing in smuggled gold otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled gold.
2. Though the impugned order was passed on 7.10.1987, the detenu was arrested on 18.1.1988 and detained in the Central prison, Trivandrum from 19.1.1988 onwards. The detenu was fur- nished with copies of the grounds of detention and other connected material documents on 21.1.1988. The detenu made a representation to the third Respondent praying for revocation of the detention order on 25.1.1988 which was rejected on 11.4.1988. Meanwhile on 11.2.1988 a declaration by the third Respondent under Section 9(1) of the Act was made, whereby the detenu was ordered to be detained for a continued detention for a further period of 6 months over one year. The first Respondent made a reference under section 8 of the Act on 5.5. 1988 to the Advisory Board which has reported that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for the detention of the detenu. The material facts which neces- sitated the passing of the detention order can be briefly stated thus:
3. On 30.11.1986, Superintendent of Central Excise, Manjeri Range and party searched the permanent residence of the detenu in his presence which did not result in the seizure of any contraband goods or the recovery of any incriminating documents. But on questioning by the officer, the detenu confessed that he had buried eleven gold biscuits in the backyard of his house. He dug up the spot and produced the relavent gold biscuits which were kept concealed under the ground. Each of the gold biscuits was found wrapped in black carbon paper bearing foreign markings and weighing 10 tolas each with the purity of 24 carats. The total weight of the eleven gold biscuits was 1282.600 gms., the market value of which as on that date was Rs.3,14,237. The contraband goods were seized under a Mahazar. On 30.11.1986 a statement was recorded from the detenu by the Superintendent of the Central Excise under section 108 of the Customs Act in which the detenu had given a detailed note of his involvement in the smuggling activities. On 9.12.1986 also the Superintendent of Central Excise searched the residence of the detenu in the reasonable belief that there was concealment of more smuggled gold in the said house.
4. During this search, the detenu pointed out to the Superintendent one packet which had been placed in the thatched roofing of his house. The Superintendent took out the packet and it was found containing four gold ingots bearing foreign markings weighing 466.400 gms. with 24 carat purity, all to the value of Rs. 1,14,268. The detaining authority taking into consideration of the seizure effected on two occasions and the statement of the detenu admitting his involvement in the prejudicial activities mentioned in the grounds of detention reached its subjective satisfaction of the necessity of passing the impugned order and passed the same on 7.10.1987. The appellant filed a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the impugned order of detention, but was not successful. Hence this appeal.
5. Of the several grounds urged in the Special Leave Petition, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant stressed only the following two contentions seeking to set aside the order of detention.
(1) As there is no proximity in time to provide a rational nexus between the alleged prejudicial activity, that is the seizure of the gold biscuits on 30.11.1986 and the passing of the impugned order of detention after 11 months i.e. on 7.10.1987 and as there is no reasonable and satisfactory explanation given by the first Respondent for this undue and unreasonable delay, the order is liable to be quashed on the ground that the credible chain between the grounds of the alleged criminal activities and the purpose of detention is snapped. Further the unreasonable and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention on 7.10.87 and the date of arrest of the detenu after a lapse of 3 months on 18.1.1988 throws considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to an inference that there was no real and genuine subjective satisfaction as regards the necessity to detain the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in prejudicial manner.
(2) The representation submitted by the detenu to the third Respondent on 25.1.1988 challenging the impugned order clamped upon him had been disposed of by a delay of 72 days i.e. on 11.4.1988 and this long and avoid- able delay vitiates the order of detention as being violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. We shall now deal with the first contention which is referred underground Nos. II & III of the Grounds in the Special Leave Petition which read thus:
"For that the High Court ought to have seen that the petitioner was detained on the basis of a alleged solitary incident occurred on 30.11.1986 and the detention order was passed after lapse of 11 months, i.e. on 7.10.1987, and the petitioner was arrested and detained on 19.1.1988."
"For that the High Court ought to have seen that there was no proximity between the alleged incident and subsequent detention. The time factor has not been considered by the detaining authority and he has mechanically passed the detention order without paying any attention to the loose grounds and quick sands in the reports of the sponsoring officer."
6. The above two contentions are sought to be answered by the first Respondent in his counter stating that the investigating officer had to question a number of persons and to conduct extensive search of various premises in different places in connection with the information gathered during interrogation and the Superintendent issued summons to the brothers of the detenu, namely, Haneefa and Abdul Rahman for appearance on 10.3.87 and 3.3.87 respectively, but Abdul Rahman was absconding and that on 10.2.87, the statement of C.K. Madhavan referred to in the statement of the detenu was recorded and that on 18.5.1987 show cause notices were issued to persons connected with this case and immediately after completion of the investigation the Customs authorities sponsored the proposal for detention of the detenu by their letter dated 26.8.1987 and that the proposal was screened by the Screening Committee on 11.9.1987 and there- after the detention order was passed on 7.10.1987.
7. Coming to the delay in securing the detenu by arrest the explanation is given as follows:
"The detention order was forwarded to the Malappuram Superintendent of Police for its execution by letter dated 9.10. 1987. The Police executed the order on 18.1. 1988. From the above facts it is clear that there is no delay in passing or executing the order of detention as alleged in the petition for Special Leave to Appeal."
8. There is no denying the fact that the impugned order has been passed after lapse of 11 months from the date of sei- zure of the eleven gold biscuits from the back courtyard of the house of the detenu. As repeatedly pointed out by this court that there is no hard and fast rule that merely be- cause there is a time lag between the offending acts and the date of order of detention, the causal link must be taken to be snapped and the satisfaction reached by the detaining authority should be regarded as unreal, but it all depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case and the nature of the explanation offered by the detaining authority for the delay that had occurred in passing the order.
9. There is a catena of decisions on this point, but we feel that it is not necessary to recapitulate all those decisions except a salient few. This court in Golam Hussain alias Garna v. Commnr. of Police of Calcutta & Ors., [1974] 4 SCC 530 1974 Indlaw SC 411 wherein there was a time lag of 6 months between the incident and the date of order of detention while answering a similar contention, laid down the ratio of proximity as follows:
"No authority, acting rationally, can be satisfied, subjectively or otherwise, of future mischief merely because long ago the detenu had done something evil. To rule other- wise is to sanction a simulacrum of a statutory requirement. But no mechanical test by counting the months of the interval is sound. It all depends on the nature of the acts relied on, grave and determined or less serious and corrigible, on the length of the gap, short or long, on the reason for the delay in taking preventive action, like information of participation being available only in the course of an investigation. We have to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. Gora v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCR 996 1974 Indlaw SC 466 has held thus:
There is, therefore, no hard and fast rule that merely because there is a time lag of about six months between the 'offending acts' and the date of the order of detention, the causal link must be taken to be broken and the satisfaction claimed to have been arrived at by the District Magistrate must be regarded as sham or unreal. Whether the acts of the detenu forming the basis for arriving at a subjective satisfaction are too remote in point of time to induce any reasonable person to reach such subjective satisfaction must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test to be blindly applied by merely counting the number of months between the 'offending acts' and the order of deten- tion. It is a subsidiary test evolved by the court for the purpose of determining the main question whether the past activities of the detenu is such that from it a reasonable prognosis can be made as to the future conduct of the detenu and its utility, therefore, lies only in so far as it subserves that purpose and it cannot be allowed to dominate or drawn it. The prejudicial act of the detenu may in a given case be of such a character as to sug- gest that it is a part of an organised opera- tion of a complex of agencies collaborating to clandestinely and secretly carry on such activities and in such a case the detaining authority may reasonably feel satisfied that the prejudicial act of the detenu which has come to light cannot be a solitary or isolated act, but must be part of a course of conduct of such or similar activities clandestinely or secretly carried on by the detenu and it is, therefore, necessary to detain him with a view to preventing him from indulging in such activities in the future."
10. In Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra 1981 4 SCC 647 1981 Indlaw SC 322, this Court held:
"Delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention is not fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactori- ly examined by the detaining authority."
See also SK Serajul v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCC 78 1974 Indlaw SC 475; Rekhaben Virendra Karadia v. State of Gujarat & Ors., [1979] 2 SCR 257 1978 Indlaw SC 71; Harnek Singh v. State of Punjab, [1982] 1 SCC 116 1981 Indlaw SC 601: Shiv Ratan Makin v. Union of India and Others, [1986] 1 SCC 40l 1985 Indlaw SC 301; Smt. K. Aruna Kumari v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors., [1988] 1 SCC 296 1987 Indlaw SC 28061 and Rajendra Kumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others, [1988] 3 SCC 153 1988 Indlaw SC 71.
11. In a recent decision in Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P. and Others 1988 (4) SCC 559 1988 Indlaw SC 802, this Court has reiterated the earlier view consistently taken by this Court observing:
"......... it is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay ............ It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not."
12. The conspectus of the above decisions can be summarized thus:
The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case.
13. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner.
14. In the light of the above proposition of law, we shall now examine the first contention which has been raised for the first time before this Court. From the reading of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the first Respondent, it is seen that the detaining authority has attempted to explain the laxity that has occasioned in passing the im- pugned order, but miserably failed in explaining the delay of three months in securing the arrest of the detenu from the date of the passing of the order, and keeps stunned silence on that score. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent when queried by this Court whether he could give any reason for this undue delay in arresting the detenu on 18.1.1988 in pursuance of the impugned order of detention made on 7.10.1987, he has frankly admitted that he could not do so--rightly so in our view--in the absence of any expla- nation in the counter affidavit.
15. The Superintendent of Police, Malapurram to whom the detention order was forwarded for execution has not filed any supporting affidavit explaining the delay in securing the arrest of the detenu. Under these circumstances, we hold that leaving apart the question of delay in passing the order of detention from the date of the seizure of the gold, the fact remains that the detaining authority has failed to explain the long delay in securing the arrest of the detenu after three months from the date of the passing of the detention order and this non-explanation in our view throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority vitiating the validity of the order of detention.
16. The next contention stressed by the learned counsel for the appellant is with regard to the delay of 72 days in the disposal of the representation made by the appellant to the third respondent on 25.1. 1988. This contention is raised in ground Nos. VIII and IX of the Grounds in the Special Leave Petition. This is resisted by the third respondent in para- graph 8 of his counter stating that a representation dated 2.2.1988 was received in the COFEPOSA Section of Ministry of Finance on 16.2.1988 with a letter dated 5.2.1988 from the Government of Kerala; that as certain information was not available with the Central Government, the Collector of Customs, was asked to get a copy of the representation from the State Government and to send his comments; that Collector of Customs, informed the Central Government by a telex message dated 1.3.1988 which was received in the COFEPOSA Section on 8.3.1988 informing that the representation was not available with the Home Department; that thereafter a copy of the representation was forwarded to the Collector of Customs by post on 8.3.1988; that the comments of the Col- lector were received back on 28.3.1988; that then the representation along with the comments were placed before the Joint Secretary, COFEPOSA Section on 30.3.88, who forwarded the same to the Minister of State for Revenue on the same day and on 4.4.88 the Minister of State forwarded his comments to the Finance Minister who considered and rejected the representation on 8.4.88. According to the third Respondent, the representation was considered expeditiously and as such there is no violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
17. The learned counsel for the appellant has explained that the representation was submitted originally on 25.1.1988, but was got back and resubmitted on 2.2.1988. According to him, it is surprising that the said representation was received by the third respondent only on 16.2.1988 after a considerable delay of two weeks and thenceforth there was a considerable delay from 16.2.88 to 28.3.88 in receiving the comments of the Collector of Customs, and again there was a delay of 7 days in forwarding the representation to the Minister of State for Revenue with the comments of the Joint Secretary, COFEPOSA Section. The long interval in receipt of the representation and the comments of the Collector of Customs, Cochin indicate the casual and indifferent attitude displayed by the authorities concerned dealing with the representation.
18. In our opinion, the manner in which the representation has been dealt with reveals a sorry state of affair in the matter of consideration of the representation made by the detenu. Further we fail to understand why such a long delay from 16.2.88 to 28.3.88 had occasioned in getting the comments from the Collector of Customs. The only futile explanation now offered by the third respondent is that this delay had occasioned because the Collector of Customs was not able to get a copy of the representation from the Home Department, Kerala and thereafter the Collector got a copy of the representation on being forwarded by the third respondent on 8.3. 1988. Even then there is a delay of 20 days in getting the comments of the Collector and that delay is not at all explained.
19. This Court in Rama Dhondu Borade v. Shri V.K. Saraf Commissioner of Police & Ors., [1989] I Scale Vol. 4 22 1989 Indlaw SC 618 after referring to various decisions, has observed thus:
"The detenu has an independent constitutional right to make his representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. Correspondingly, there is a constitutional mandate commanding the concerned authority to whom the detenu forwards his representation questioning the correctness of the detention order clamped upon him and requesting for his release, to consider the said representation with reasonable dispatch and to dispose the same as expeditiously as possible. This constitutional requirement must be satisfied with respect but if this constitutional imperative is observed in breach, it would amount to negation of the Constitutional obligation rendering the continued detention constitutionally impermissible and illegal, since such a breach would defeat the very concept of liberty-the highly cherished right-which is enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution."
" ....... What is reasonable dispatch de- pends on the facts and circumstances of each case and no hard and fast rule can be laid down in that regard. However, in case the gap between the receipt of the representation and its consideration by the authority is so unreasonably long and the explanation offered by the authority is so unsatisfactory, such delay could vitiate the order of detention."
20. Bearing in mind the above principle when we approach the facts of the present case, we are of the firm view that the representation of the detenu has not been given prompt and expeditious consid- eration, and was allowed to lie without being properly attended to. The explanation now offered by the third re- spondent that the delay has occurred in seeking the comments of the Collector of Customs etc. is not a convincing and acceptable explanation. In our view the delay in 72 days in the absence of satisfactory explanation is too long a period for ignoring the indolence on the part of the concerned authority. Hence we hold that the unexplained delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu is violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India, rendering the order of detention invalid.
21. For all the above mentioned reasons, we allow this criminal appeal by setting aside the judgment of the High Court, quash the impugned order of detention and direct the detenu to set at liberty forthwith.
Appeal allowed


Abdu Salam @ Thiyyan S/O Thiyyan Mohammad,Detenu No. 962, Ge v Union Of India And Others
Supreme Court of India

17 April 1990
Criminal Appeal No. 271 of 1990.
The Judgment was delivered by : K. Jayachandra Reddy, J.
Leave granted.
1.  This is an appeal seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The appellant who has been detained under Section 3(1)(i) and 3(1)(iii) of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, has challenged the detention order. The appellant is a native of Panakkad, Malapuram District in Kerala and had been to Jeddah after his Haj pilgrimage and from Jeddah he landed in Bombay on 15.9.87. Then he started by a bus to go to his native place. On 17.9.87 the Customs Officials intercepted the bus near Thiruvannoor and in the presence of panch witnesses, a search was conducted on the person of the appellant and the chappals worn by him were inspected and on their being opened up about 13 gold ingots with foreign marking were found and they were duly recovered. Further some incriminating documents were also recovered. The gold was valued at Rs.4,64,951 and it was found to be smuggled gold. The appellant was interrogated by the Superintendent of Customs and a statement of the appellant was recorded. He confessed that he was introduced to a person who promised to give him remuneration provided he carries the gold to India and appellant agreed and carried these gold biscuits. Criminal proceedings were initiated.
2. However, the detaining authority, the Home Secretary to Government of Kerala being satisfied passed the detention order dated 21.9.88 against the appellant with a view to preventing him from smuggling activities. The grounds also were served within time and in the grounds all the above mentioned details are mentioned. In the grounds the appellant also is informed that if he desires to make a representation to the Advisory Board, he may address it to the Chairman, Advisory Board and that he can also make a representation to the detaining authority or the Central Government. Questioning the same the present appeal is filed.
3.  It is submitted that the representation was made on 27.9.88 to the Central Government and it was disposed of on 2.11.88. Therefore there was enormous delay by the Central Government in rejecting the representation and the delay amounts to violation of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The next submission is that though the alleged smug- gling of gold is said to have been taken place on 17.9.87, the detention order was passed on 21.5.88 i.e. after a lapse of eight months and that too it was a solitary instance and because of the delay, the same has become stale and there is no other material to establish any nexus or live connection between the alleged date of smuggling and the date of detention. The next submission is that there was delay in the execution of the detention order which was executed only on 6.8.88 though passed on 21.5.88 and that there is no allegation that the appellant was absconding. It is also submitted that the appellant was not given an effective opportunity to represent his case before the Advisory Board inasmuch as the appellant was not permitted to be represented by an advocate or by his next friend.
4.  In the counter-affidavit it is stated that the Collector of Customs furnished proposals for the detention of the appellant on 24.3.1988 and the detention order was passed on 21.5.1988 and the appellant was detained on 6.8.1988. The appellant made a representation to the detaining authority on 27.9.1988 and it was rejected by the State Government on 1.10.1988 and the Central Government rejected the same on 2.11.1988. Therefore in the counter-affidavit it is admitted that there is a delay of one month and five days in considering and rejecting the representation by the Central Government.
5.  It can be seen that so far as the State Government namely the detaining authority is concerned, there is no delay but the submission is that the delay in disposing of the representation by the Central Government also is fatal. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India lays down that when any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
6.  It is well-settled that this Clause confers a valuable fight upon the detenu to make a representation and also mandates that the detaining authority should dispose of the same without delay. Therefore the right under this Clause is two-fold, namely that the authority making the order must communicate to the detenu the grounds on which the order has been made, as soon as the order is made and secondly that the detenu must also be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
7.  Article 22(5) itself does not say to whom the representation is made or who will consider the representation. By virtue of provisions of the statute under which he has been detained, the appropriate Government is legally obliged to comply with these requirements. It is obligatory on the appropriate Government to consider the detenu's representa- tion separate from the consideration of the detenu's case by the Advisory Board. But what the learned counsel submits is that the Central Government which has the power to revoke the detention order passed by the State authority, is also under legal obligation to dispose of the representation without delay. Learned counsel relied on some of the decisions of this Court. In Khudiram Das v. The State of West Bengal and Others, [1975] 2 SCC 81 1974 Indlaw SC 467 this Court held that one of the basic requirement of clause (5) of Article 22 is that the authority making the order must afford the detenu the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order and this requirement will be ineffective unless there is a corresponding obligation to consider the representation of the detenu as early as possible. It may not be necessary for us to refer to all those decisions which deal with the delay caused by the appropriate Government in considering the representation inasmuch as in the instant case there is no delay in considering the representation by the State Government which is the detaining authority.
8.  Section 11 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 deals with the revocation of detention orders and under Section 11(b) the Central Government may, at any time, revoke or modify an order made by the State Government. Though strictly speaking the Central Government is not the detaining authority within the meaning of Article 22(5) yet they are under legal obligation to dispose of the representation as early as possible but the question is whether such delay by the Central Government also should be subjected to such a rigorous scrutiny as is done in the case of a delay caused by the appropriate Government. namely the detaining authority.
9.  In Tara Chand v. The State of Rajasthan, [1980] 2 SCC 321 1980 Indlaw SC 247, this Court held that:
"Once a representation is made to the Central Government, it is duty bound to consider the same in order to exercise its discretion either in rejecting or accepting it.if there is inordinate delay in considering the representation that would clearly amount to violation of Article 22(5) so as to render the detention unconstitutional and void."
10.  In Shyam Ambalal Siroya v. Union of India and Ors., [1980] 2 SCR 1078 1980 Indlaw SC 248 it is held that:
"The power of the Central Government to revoke the order of detention implies that the detenu can make a representation for exercise of that power. Any petition for revocation of an order of detention should be dealt with reasonable expedition ..... It may be permissible for the Central Government to take reasonable time for disposing any revocation petition. But it would not be justified in ignoring the representation for revocation of the detention as a statutory duty is cast upon the Central Government. It is necessary that the Government should apply its mind and either revoke the order of detention or dismiss the petition, declining to order for revocation."
11.  In Sabir Ahmed v. Union of India and Ors., [1980] 3 SCR 738 1980 Indlaw SC 313 dealing with the power of the revocation of the Central Government it is observed that such power is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government and that the Central Government should consider the same with reasonable expedition and that what is reasonable expedition depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. No hard and fast rule as to the measure of reasonable time can be laid down. It is also observed that it certainly does not cover the delay due to negligence, callous inaction, avoidable red tapism and unduly protracted procrastination.
12.  In Sabir Ahmed's case as well as in Shyam Ambalal Si- roya's case the representation made by the detenu to the Central Government has been ignored and left unattended for a period of about four months and under those circumstances it was held that there was violation of Article 22(5).
13.  In Rama Dhondu Borade v.V.K. Saraf, Commissioner of Police and Others, [1989] 3 SCC 173 1989 Indlaw SC 618 the detenu made a representation to the Central Government on 26.9.1988 and the decision of the Central Government rejecting the representation was communicated to the appellant on 31.10.1988. The explanation submitted by the Central Government was not accepted on the ground that it is not satisfactory. In T.A. Abdul Rahman v. State of Kerala and Others, [1989] 4 SCC 741 1989 Indlaw SC 205 there was a delay of 72 days and it was observed that the representation of the detenu has not been given prompt and expeditious consideration and was allowed to lie without being properly attended to.
14.  Bearing these principles in mind we shall examine whether the Central Government has expeditiously considered the representation or not. We have already noted that the representation was made on 27.9.88 and disposed of by the Central Government on 2.11.88, i.e. within a month and five days. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Central Government it is stated that the representation dated 27.9.88 was received in the COFEPOSA Section of the Ministry of Finance on 10.10.88 and the representation was in Malayalam. It is also stated that there were some allegations regarding the non- placement of certain documents and non-supply of certain, documents to him. Therefore a copy of the representation was sent to the sponsoring authority i.e. Collector of Customs, Cochin on that very day and the comments from the Collector of Customs, Cochin dated 25.10.88 were received in the COFEPOSA Section on 27.10.88 and that the Additional Secretary examined them and with his comments, they were forwarded to the Minister of State for Revenue on 31.10.88, since 29th and 30th October, 1988 were holidays. The Minister of State for Revenue with this comments forwarded the representation on the same day i.e. 31.10.88 to the Finance Minis- ter. The Finance Minister considered and rejected the representation on 1.11.88 and the file was received in the Office on 2.11.88 and on the same day, a memorandum rejecting the representation was sent to the detenu. From the explanation it can be seen that the representation was considered most expeditiously and there is no "negligence or callous inaction or avoidable redtapism". For these reasons we are unable to accept this contention of the learned counsel.
15.  The next submission of the learned counsel is that the date of search was 17.9.87 and the detention order was passed on 21.5.88 after a long time and therefore there is no nexus between the alleged incident and the detention order and therefore there is no genuine satisfaction on the part of the detaining authority. The learned counsel submits that there was no live existing connection between the incident and the detention. In Lakshman Khatik v. The State of West Bengal, [1974] 4 SCC 1 1974 Indlaw SC 487 it is observed that mere delay in passing a detention order is not conclusive but the type of grounds given have to be seen and then consider whether such grounds could really weigh with an officer after such delay in coming to the conclusion that it was necessary to detain the detenu. In Rajendrakumar Natvarlal Shah v. State of Gujarat and Others, [1988] 3 SCC 153 1988 Indlaw SC 71. it is held that the mere delay in passing the detention order is not fatal unless the court finds that the grounds are stale or illusory or that there is no real nexus between the grounds and the detention. In Abdul Rahman's case seizure of the gold biscuits was on 30.11.86 and the detention order was passed 11 months thereafter. On the ground that there was no satisfactory explanation for this undue, unreasonable and unexplained delay, it was held that the delay throws a considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
16.  In the counter-affidavit, in the instant case, filed on behalf of the detaining authority it is stated that the case records relating to the petitioner were received at the office of the sponsoring authority on 1.2.88 and they were processed in the Office and the show-cause notice under the Customs Act was issued on 9.2.88 and the proposals were sent for COFEPOSA action on 24.3.88 and they were received by the State Government on 2.4.88. The matter was considered by the Screening Committee which met on 28.4.88 and thereafter submitted the proposals to the detaining authority. On 2.5.88 the detaining authority ordered to ascertain the reasons for the delay in sponsoring the case and accordingly the sponsoring authority at Cochin was addressed on 2.5.88. He was reminded on 7.5.88 and 12.5.88. His reply was received on 16.5.88 and thereafter the order was passed on 21.5.88. In our view, the delay has been reasonably explained. The courts have not laid down that on mere such delay the detention has to be struck down. In Yogendra Murari v. State of U.P., [1988] 4 SCC 558 1988 Indlaw SC 802, it is held that:
"It is not right to assume that an order of detention has to be mechanically struck down if passed after some delay ..... It is necessary to consider the circumstances in each individual case to find out whether the delay has been satisfactorily explained or not."
17.  That apart, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that because of this delay the necessary nexus got severed and that the grounds have become stale and illusory. In appreciating such a contention. the Court also has to bear in mind the nature of the prejudicial activities indulged by the detenu and the likelihood of his repeating the same. It is this potentiality in him that has to be taken into consideration and if the detaining authority is satisfied on the available material then on mere delay as long as it is not highly unreasonable and undue the Court should not normally strike down the detention on that ground. In Hemlata Kantilal Shah v. State of Maharashtra, [1981] 4 SCC 647 1981 Indlaw SC 322 it is held that delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person. For these reasons we are of the view that in this case the delay by itself does not invalidate the detention but even otherwise it has been reasonably explained.
18.  Yet another ground urged by the learned counsel is that there was delay in arresting the detenu after the detention order was passed and therefore there is no genuineness in the detention order. In the counter-affidavit it is stated that after the detention order was passed, it was sent to the Superintendent of Police, Malappuram on 23.5.88 for immediate execution and they were passed on to Circle Inspector, Malappuram. On 29.6.88, it was reported that the Circle Inspector had made due enquiries but the detenu could not be apprehended. Thereupon a special squad was deputed as per-the directions of the Superintendent of Police and thereafter he was detained on 6.8.88. It is further submit- ted in the counter-affidavit that the delay in execution of the order is caused due to detenu's deliberate attempt to make himself scarce. That apart there is no decision where a court has gone to the extent of holding that a mere delay in arresting the accused renders the detention invalid. In the instant case, the delay, if at all, is only about 2/1/2 months and the explanation offered for the delay is reasonable. The learned counsel, however, relied on Abdul Rahman's case. In that case the detention order was passed on 7.10.87 and the detenu was arrested on 18.1.88. The court found that there was no reasonable explanation for the delay in the counter affidavit at all. This ground was taken into consideration alongwith the other important grounds in quashing the detention. In SK. Serajul v. State of West Bengal, [1975] 2 SCC 78 1974 Indlaw SC 475 it is observed that:
"There was delay, both at the stage of passing the order of detention and in arresting him, and this delay, unless satisfactorily explained, would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction...
But this must not be misunderstood to mean that whenever there is delay in making an order of detention or in arresting the detenu pursuant to the order of detention, the sub-. jective satisfaction of the detaining authority must be held to be not genuine or colourable. Each case must depend on its own peculiar facts and circumstances. The detaining authority may have a reasonable explanation for the and that might be sufficient to dispel the inference that its satisfaction was not genuine."
19.  It can therefore be seen that on the mere delay in arresting me detenu; pursuant to the order of detention the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be held to be not genuine. Each case. depends on its own facts and circumstances. The Court has to see whether the delay is explained reasonably. As mentioned above, in the instant case, we are satisfied with the explanation for the delay in arresting the detenu. Therefore this contention is also liable to be rejected. For all the above-mentioned reasons, the appeal is dismissed.
Appeal Dismissed


Ashok Kumar v State of Punjab
Supreme Court of India

21 September 1976
Cr.A. No. 306 of 1971 [Arising as an appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order Dt. 26 May 1971 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Cr.A. 871 of 1970].
The Judgment was delivered by: BHAGWATI, J.
1.  The appellant and his two brothers Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal were charged before the Sessions Judge, Amritsar for the offence of intentionally causing the death of one Dharam Pal (hereinafter referred to as the deceased). Briefly the prosecution case was, the here we are cutting out the background and the frills of the incident, that on October 20, 1969 at about 1.15 p.m. the deceased and his brother Sain Das were proceeding towards Gali Jatan Chowk when appellant, Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal came from the direction of their house, each armed with a knife. Dharam Pal raised a lalkara that the deceased should not be allowed to escape and opened the attack by giving a knife blow on the head of the deceased. Kewal Krishan then inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased and the appellant plunged his knife in the left flank of the deceased.
On receipt of these injuries the deceased fell down and Dharam Pal gave another knife blow on the chest of the deceased after he had fallen down. This incident was seen by Sain Das who was accompanying the deceased and two other persons, namely, Satpal and Manohar Lal also witnessed the incident. These three persons raised an alarm on which the appellant, Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal ran away with their knives. The deceased died within a few minutes thereafter. A first information report in regard to the offence was lodged by Sain Das at the police station. The police investigated the offence and ultimately chargesheeted the appellant, Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal for various offences arising out of the incident.
2.  There were three eyewitnesses to the incident, namely, Sain Das, Satpal and Manohar Lal, but out of them only two were examined by the prosecution, namely, Sain Das and Satpal and Manohar Lal was given up as he was won over by the other side. Sain Das Satpal deposed to the incident as narrated above and the learned Sessions Judge, accepting their evidence in its entirety, held that the prosecution case was sufficiently established against the appellant, Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal and convicted the appellant u/s. 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and sentenced him to life imprisonment and so far as Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal were concerned, he convicted u/s. 323 read with S. 34 and sentenced each of them to suffer 10 years' rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000. Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal were also convicted u/s. 324 and sentenced to two years' rigorous imprisonment and the appellant was convicted u/s. 324 read with S. 34 and sentenced to one year's rigorous imprisonment. The sentences of imprisonment were directed to run concurrently.
3.  The appellant, Kewal Krishan and Dharam Pal preferred an appeal to the High Court against the conviction and sentence recorded against them. The High Court felt that there was inconsistency between the medical evidence in regard to the injuries caused to the deceased and the oral evidence in regard to the role played by Dharam Pal in inflicting the injuries and taking the view that there was scope for reasonable doubt, the High Court gave the benefit of doubt to Dharam Pal and acquitted him.
However, so far as the appellant and Kewal Krishan were concerned, the High Court confirmed their convictions and since the conviction of the appellant was under Section 302, the High Court maintained the sentence of life imprisonment, but in regard to Kewal Krishan, the High Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment from ten years to two years' rigorous imprisonment. The appellant and Kewal Krishan both preferred a petition for special leave to this Court. The appellant succeeded in obtaining special leave, but the petition of Kewal Krishan was rejected. The present appeal is in the circumstances directly only against the order of conviction and sentence passed against the appellant.
4.  This being an appeal by special leave, it would not be right for this Court to embark on a reappreciation of the evidence and to interfere with the concurrent view taken in regard to the evidence by the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court. We must proceed on the basis that the appellant, Kewal Krishan and one other person whose identity with Dharam Pal could not be said to be established, attacked the deceased and the unidentified assailant gave a knife blow on the head of the deceased, Kewal Krishan then inflicted a knife blow on the chest of the deceased and following upon this, the appellant gave a knife blow in the left flank of the deceased and lastly, after the deceased had fallen down, the unidentified assailant gave a knife blow on the chest of the deceased. The only knife blow attributed to the appellant was a knife blow on the left flank of the deceased. Now, if we turn to the evidence given by Dr. Narender Mohan (PW 3), who performed the post-mortem examination on the dead body of the deceased, we find that six injuries were received by the deceased. Injuries 5 and 6 were merely abrasions and we need not consider them, because they could have been caused by falling on the ground. Injury 1 was an incised wound on the right side of the head above the right ear and this was obviously an injury caused by knife blow given by the assailant who was wrongly identified as Dharam Pal. Injury 2 was an incised wound in the epigastric region on the left side just away from the middle.
This was an injury on the left side could well be the injury inflicted by the appellant. If this was the injury caused by the appellant, it would obviously be impossible to convict him of the offence under Section 302, since according to the medical evidence, it was a simple injury and not responsible for the death of the deceased. But the State contended that it was not injury 2 which was inflicted by the appellant but it was injury 3. Injury 3 was an incised stab wound on the outer side of the left side of the chest 6
"below the axilla and it was admittedly the fatal injury which caused the death of the deceased. Dr. Narender Mohan deposed that injury 3 was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death and it was this injury which was responsible for the death of the deceased. There is, however, nothing to show that it was the appellant who inflicted injury 3. Both injuries 2 and 3 are on the left side, one in the epigastric region and the other 6"
below the axilla and it is not possible to say which of these two injuries was caused by the appellant. The only evidence given by the eyewitnesses was that the appellant gave a knife blow on the left flank of the deceased and this evidence would be compatible with either of the two injuries 2 and 3. Moreover, it appears from the dimensions of injuries 3 and 4 - both are 1/3"x 1/4"- that these two injuries must have been caused by the same weapon and the same person must be the author of both these injuries. Now the only assailant, who, according to the prosecution evidence, inflicted two injuries was the unidentified assailant and hence injury 3 would more properly be attributable to him and not to the appellant. It is, therefore, not possible to say that the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that injury 3 which was the fatal injury, was caused by the appellant. The possibility cannot be ruled out that it was injury 2 which was caused by him and hence the conviction of the appellant for the offence u/s. 302 cannot be sustained and for the individual injury caused by him, he can be convicted only u/s. 324.
5.  The appellant would also be constructively guilty for the other injuries caused to the deceased, since it is apparent from the prosecution evidence that the appellant, Kewal Krishan and the unidentified assailant attacked the deceased in pursuance of a common intention shared by all of them. The common intention, according to the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court, was to cause grievous hurt to the deceased and it was on this footing that the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court convicted Kewal Krishan of the offence u/s. 326 read with S. 34. We very much doubt whether the learned Sessions Judge and the High Court were right in taking the view that the common intention of the three assailants was merely to cause grievous hurt to the deceased.
6. As many as four injuries were inflicted on the deceased by knives and out of them, one was on the head and three were on the chest. Having regard to the weapons used by the three assailants, the number of injuries caused by them and the vital parts of the body on which the injuries were inflicted, it does appear that the common intention of the assailants was to cause the death of the deceased and Kewal Krishan could, therefore, have been convicted u/s. 302 read with S. 34.
But unfortunately the State has not been vigilant in enforcement of the criminal law and regrettably it has not preferred an appeal against the acquittal of Kewal Krishan u/s. 302 read with Section 34, with the result that his conviction u/s. 326 read with S. 34 must stand. And if that be so, consistency compels us to reach the conclusion that the appellant also must, on the same basis, be convicted u/s. 326 read with S. 34 instead of S. 302 read with S. 34.
7.  We accordingly allow the appeal and convert the conviction of the appellant from one u/s. 302 to that u/s. 326 read with S. 34. Kewal Krishan was also conviction u/s. 326 read with Section 34, but surprisingly enough the High Court let him off with a ridiculously light sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment. It is difficult to understand how the High Court could take such an absurdly lenient view in the case of Kewal Krishan when the assault in which Kewal Krishan participated resulted in the death of the deceased. But the case of Kewal Krishan not being before us, we cannot do anything about it. We can only try to ensure that a proper sentence is imposed on the appellant. We are told that the appellant has already been in jail for a period of about 6 years and ten months. That, in our opinion, would be sufficient punishment to him and we accordingly sentence him to imprisonment for the period already undergone by him. The appellant is on bail since the last month or so and he need not surrender to his bail. The bail bonds will stand cancelled.
Appeal allowed.


Chinta Pulla Reddy and Others v State of Andhra Pradesh
Supreme Court of India

30 March 1993
Cr.A. No. 817 of 1985, (From the Judgment and Order Dt. 15 November 1984 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Cr. A. No. 100 of 1983)
The Judgment was delivered by: ANAND, J.
1.  For an occurrence which took place on the night intervening May 31 and June 1, 1982, at about 1.00 a. m., in which one Iragana Gurava Reddy was murdered, six persons, namely, Dagumati Venkata Subba Reddy (A-1); Chinta Pulla Reddy (A-2); Balamreddi Pulla Reddy (A-3); Gaddam Pulla Reddy (A-4); Gaddam Panchala Reddy (A-5) and Bade Rami Reddi (A-6) were challaned and ultimately sent up for trial before the Additional Sessions Judge, Nellore. The first charge against the accused was under Section 148 IPC. They were all convicted of the said charge and each of the each of the accused was sentenced to two years, R. I. The second charge against A-1 was for an offence under Section 302 IPC. He was convicted for the said offence and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life. The third charge was for an offence under Sections 302/149 IPC against remaining accused persons. The conviction was recorded for the offence under Sections 302/149 IPC against A-2 to A-6 and each one of them was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life.
2.   Against their conviction and sentence all the accused-convicts appealed to the High Court. The High Court acquitted A-3 and A-6, but maintained the conviction and sentence of A-1 for the offence under Section 302 IPC and altering the conviction of A-2, A-4 and A-5 from the one under Sections 302/149 IPC to the one under Section 302/34 IPC maintained the sentence of life imprisonment. Conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 148 IPC was, however, set aside. After the judgment of the High Court was delivered, it appears that A-1 died. A-2, A-4 and A-5 have filed this appeal, on special leave being granted.
3.  Though generally speaking this Court does not reappreciate the evidence in an appeal, on special leave being granted, under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, 1950 where two courts have appreciated the evidence and recorded concurrent findings, but since the High Court acquitted A-3 and A-6, we have, with the assistance of learned counsel for the parties, ourselves appreciated the material evidence in the case, with a view to determine whether the conviction and sentence recorded against the three appellants is justified or not.
4.  The first information report in this case, Ex. P-1, was lodged at 7.30 a. m. by PW 1, son of the deceased. It was scribed by LW-9, who however was not examined at the trial. In the first information report, besides A-1 to A-6, thirty other persons A-7 to A-36, with their parentage, were also named as accused persons. During the investigation, however, PW 1 in his statement recorded under Section 161 CrPC by the investigating officer, categorically asserted that he had not told the scribe that 30 persons A-7 to A-36, apart from A-1 to A-6 had also come armed to the house of the deceased at the time of occurrence. Even at the trial, PW 1 mentioned that apart from A-1 to A-6, no other person was mentioned as an accused by him to the police. The statements of other witnesses recorded under Section 161 CrPC also implicated only A-1 to A-6 in the crime. The investigating officer, therefore, had challaned only A-1 to A-6 and sent them for trial.
5.  It is the prosecution case, that earlier in the evening of May 31, 1982, Seshamma, PW 8 was assaulted by some persons, belonging to the party of A-1 in front of the house of A-1 and on learning about the assault, the deceased along with his wife PW 4, went to the house of A-1 where A-2 was also present to reprimand them for assaulting a lady. A-1 and A-2 took objection to the reprimand and threatened the deceased and PW 4 that they would seen "the end of the deceased". The deceased and his wife were told to leave and they went back to their house. Regarding the incident relating to the assault on PW 8, a complaint was lodged with the Police and a constable PW 9 was deputed to go to the village to see that no further occurrence takes place in view of two factions in the village.
6.  On the night of May 31, 1982, the wife of the deceased, PW 4, went to the house of her son, PW 1 and told him as to what had happened in the evening and the threat which had been administered to them by A-1 and A-2. She asked PW 1 to go to the house of his brother PW 2 and sleep there along with PW 2 as the deceased was staying with PW 2 at that time. PW 1 obeyed the command of his mother and went to the house of PW 2 and slept there leaving his mother PW 4 to stay in his house. Both PW 1 and PW 2 slept for the night near the cot of their father. A hurricane lantern was burning and both PWs 1 and 2 also had torchlights with them when they went to bed.
7.   On hearing the cry of their father, at about 1.00 a. m., PW 1 and PW 2 as also PW 3, wife of PW 2 and the daughter-in-law of the deceased who was sleeping inside the house woke up and saw six accused present there. They found A-1 and A-2 standing near the cot towards the head of the deceased, while A-3 to A-6 were standing on the southern side of that cot. All the accused were allegedly armed. After saying as to what they were waiting for, A-1 is alleged to have stabbed the deceased, with a knife which he was carrying, twice near his chest. None of the other accused, however, caused any injury to the deceased. The witnesses, PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 saw and identified the accused in the light of the hurricane lantern and by flashing torchlights. After threatening the prosecution witnesses, all the accused left the place and went away. PW 1 sent information to his mother about the injuries caused to the deceased and himself went to the house of Sudhakara Rao, LW-9 and asked him to scribe the report, Ex P-1 which he presented to the investigating officer, PW 13 at about 7.30 a. m.
8.  The Inspector of Police, PW 14 after receipt of the FIR along with PW 13 and some constables proceeded to the spot and conducted the investigation. Various articles were taken into possession from the place of occurrence, including the blood-stained clothes of the deceased and blood-stained earth. The deceased had in the meanwhile succumbed to the injuries. PW 4 and others had also arrived and were present at that place. Inquest proceedings were conducted and PWs 1 to 4 were examined by the investigating officer. The dead body of the deceased was then sent for post-mortem examination. PW 5 conducted the post-mortem examination. He found two stab injuries besides three other injuries on the dead body of the deceased. Both, injuries 1 and 2, which were found to be the stab wounds in the chest had caused damage to the vital organs of the deceased.
9.  Accordingly to the opinion of the doctor PW 5, the deceased died as a result of shock and hemorrhage on account of the injuries to the lung, liver and heart, which were referable to injuries 1 and 2 allegedly caused by the two stab wounds inflicted by A-1. The investigating officer during the investigation examined some other witnesses including PWs 6, 7 and 9 and ultimately made efforts to arrest the accused persons. They were, however, found absconding. The challan was filed without any delay and at the trial, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses to connect the accused A-1 to A-6 with the crime. All the accused in their statement under Section 313 CrPC denied the occurrence and pleaded false implication due to fictional rivalry in the village. A-1 and A-2 pleaded alibi and in support of the plea of alibi examined DW-2, DW-3, DW-4 and DW-5.
10.  The High Court after consideration of the evidence on the record, as already noticed, convicted A-2, A-4 and A-5 and acquitted A-3 and A-6. The High Court disbelieved the defence witnesses and rejected the plea of alibi set up by A-1 and A-2. For acquitting A-3 and A-6, the High Court found that since on PW 2's own showing he had told the police that he had not mentioned the names of A-4 to A-6 to his mother as the assailants of his father and PW 9, constable Nasthanaiah, had deposed that PW 2 had informed him "that A-1, A-2 and four others stabbed his father and went away", it would not be safe to convict A-3 and A-6 and giving them benefit of doubt acquitted them.
11.  Mr.  Lalit, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants has submitted that the grounds on which benefit of doubt was given to A-3 and A-6 were also available insofar as A-4 and A-5 are concerned and the High Court has not given any distinguishing feature insofar as they are concerned and, therefore, their conviction cannot be sustained and they also deserve to be acquitted like A-3 and A-6. A careful examination of the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 9 would go to show that they specifically implicated only A-1 and A-2 as the persons present together near the cot.
According to PW 2:
"I told the police that I told my mother and my brother Iragana Ramanareddy and others that A-1 to A-3 were the assailants of my father".
Accordingly to PW 9:
"the constable who was present in the village. At about 1.00 a. m. (in the night), we heard cries from the western direction. We went to the house of PW 2 and found the deceased lying dead with bleeding injuries on a cot. PW 2 informed us, that A-1, A-2 and four others stabbed his father and went away. When we asked PW 2 to give a report, he stated that his brother PW 1 left for Atmakur in order to give a report. Thereafter, we went to the house of A-1 and A-2, but they were not in their houses."PW 1 in his statement categorically stated that" I did not tell the scribe of Ex. P-1 that A-2, A-3, A-4, A-5, A-6 stabbed indiscriminately my father with the knives in their hands"
12.  Referring to the earlier incident of the evening, when his father and mother had gone to the house of A-1, PW 1 stated that A-1 and A-2 on being reprimanded had threatened my father with dire consequences. PW 4 the widow of the deceased who had accompanied her husband to the house of A-1 in the evening deposed:
"I and my husband went to the house of A-1 and questioned A-1 and A-2 who was also present there as to why Seshamma was beaten by their party people. Thereupon, A-1 and A-2 took objection for questioning them and stated that they would see to his deceased fate."
13.   Thus it was, according to the prosecution case, A-1 and A-2 who alone had administered the threat and who had taken strong exception to the reprimand by the deceased. A-4 and A-5 did not figure in the earlier episode, which provided the immediate motive, for the commission of the crime.
14.  The evidence led by the prosecution about the actual assault during the night on the deceased also specifically implicated A-1 and A-2 only.
Accordingly to PW 1:
"I saw only A-1 stabbing my father. I did not see any other accused stab my father. A-1 stabbed my father on the right chest near the nipple and below the nipple."
15.   After stating that all the six accused had come armed, the witness admitted in the cross-examination that 'I and my brother did not address A-1 and A-2 why they had come to commit that heinous crime." This part of his testimony is also supported by PW 2.
16.  Accordingly to PW 3, the wife of PW 2, she had seen A-1 and A-2 standing together near the head of the cot. As already noticed, the first version given by PW 2 to the constable PW 9 who reached the houses of PW 2 on hearing the cries, PW 2 had informed him that "A-1 and A-2 and four others" had stabbed his father. After the occurrence, after PW 1 had left the house for lodging the report, the villagers along with PW 9 also only went to the houses of A-1 and A-2 to search for them and they did not go in search for A-4 and A-5.
17.  According to the medical evidence, only two stab injuries were found on the deceased and according to the eyewitnesses both the injuries had been caused by A-1. Keeping in view the evidence relating to the threat administered in the evening and the statement which PW 2, the son of the deceased made to PW 9 immediately after the occurrence, it appears to us that the prosecution has not been able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt the participation of A-4 and A-5 in the crime. In our opinion, the case against A-4 and A-5 has not been established beyond a reasonable doubt and they are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt.
18.  Coming now to the case of A-2. We are unable to agree with Mr. Lalit that his participation in the crime has not been established. It is the consistent case of the prosecution that both A-2 and A-1 had administered the threat in the evening to the deceased and his wife when they had gone to reprimand A-1 for the assault on PW 8. They, therefore, had the immediate cause and provocation for the assault on the deceased in furtherance of the threat administered by them earlier.
19.   The testimony of PW 1, PW 2 and PW 3 who are the natural witnesses and are the eyewitnesses is consistent insofar as the presence of A-1 and A-2 at the time of occurrence is concerned. They have clearly deposed about the manner in which A-1 and A-2 were standing towards the head of the cot armed with knives as also how A-1 stabbed the deceased twice on his chest. The witnesses knew both A-1 and A-2 and had identified them clearly. Their testimony leaves no manner of doubt to hold that A-2 along with A-1 had come armed with knives to the house of the deceased and both were present at the middle of the night near the head of the cot on which the deceased was lying when A-1 stabbed him twice in the chest and thereafter left together. Both A-1 and A-2 had thus, shared the common intention of causing the death of the deceased, as according to the medical evidence, the two stab injuries inflicted on the deceased on his chest were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature of cause death.
20.  The plea of alibi put up by A-1 and A-2 need a notice only to be rejected. The testimony of the defence witnesses DW 2 to DW 5 does not inspire any confidence. In the cross-examination, the story given out by them has been successfully shattered. We are in agreement with High Court that the plea of alibi is false and we are of the view that the same was rightly rejected by the courts below. Both A-1 and A-2 were named as the assailants at the earliest point of time by PW 2 to constable PW 9. Since, A-1 and A-2 had been named as the assailants by the eyewitnesses, constable PW 9 and others had rushed to the house of A-1 and A-2 but they had absconded.
21.   A careful analysis and appraisal of the evidence on the record shows that A-2 was present on the night of the occurrence with a knife along with A-1, who was also armed with a knife, and had shared the common intention with A-1 of causing bodily injuries to the deceased which were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death of the deceased. Section 34 IPC is, therefore, clearly attracted to the case of A-2, even though he did not by himself cause any specific injury to the deceased. The High Court had rightly convicted both A-1 (since dead) and A-2 for the offence of murder of the deceased. The conviction of A-2 for an offence under Section 302/34 IPC is, therefore, well merited and the sentence of imprisonment for life imposed upon him is justified.
22.  As a result of the above discussion, we give benefit of doubt to the two appellants, Gaddam Pulla Reddy (A-4) and Gaddam Panchala Reddy (A-5) and setting aside their conviction acquit them of the charges against them. We, however, uphold and maintain the conviction of A-2, Chinta Pulla Reddy, for the offence under Sections 302/34 IPC and also the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him by the High Court.
23.  As a result, while the appeal of A-4 and A-5 succeeds and is allowed, the appeal of A-2 fails and is dismissed. A-2 is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled and he is directed to be taken into custody to suffer the remaining period of his sentence.
Appeals disposed of.