`SwellLib.BOT` can subtly rug-pull withdrawals by setting `_processedRate = 0` when calling `swEXIT::processWithdrawals`
When users create a withdrawal request, their `swETH` is burned then the current exchange rate `rateWhenCreated` is fetched from swETH::swETHToETHRate:\\n```\\nuint256 rateWhenCreated = AccessControlManager.swETH().swETHToETHRate();\\n```\\n\\nHowever `SwellLib.BOT` can pass an arbitrary value for `_processedRate` when calling swEXIT::processWithdrawals:\\n```\\nfunction processWithdrawals(\\n  uint256 _lastTokenIdToProcess,\\n  uint256 _processedRate\\n) external override checkRole(SwellLib.BOT) {\\n```\\n\\nThe final rate used is the lesser of `rateWhenCreated` and _processedRate:\\n```\\nuint256 finalRate = _processedRate > rateWhenCreated\\n  ? rateWhenCreated\\n  : _processedRate;\\n```\\n\\nThis final rate is multiplied by the requested withdrawal amount to determine the actual amount sent to the user requesting a withdrawal:\\n```\\nuint256 requestExitedETH = wrap(amount).mul(wrap(finalRate)).unwrap();\\n```\\n\\nHence `SwellLib.BOT` can subtly rug-pull all withdrawals by setting `_processedRate = 0` when calling `swEXIT::processWithdrawals`.
Two possible mitigations:\\nChange `swEXIT::processWithdrawals` to always fetch the current rate from `swETH::swETHToETHRate`\\nOnly allow `swEXIT::processWithdrawals` to be called by the `RepricingOracle` contract which calls it correctly.
```\\nuint256 rateWhenCreated = AccessControlManager.swETH().swETHToETHRate();\\n```\\n