AgentRegistryCore - Agent Creation DoS
AgentRegistryCore allows anyone to mint an `agentID` for the desired owner address. However, in some cases, it may fall prey to DoS, either deliberately or unintentionally.\\nFor instance, let's assume the Front Running Protection is disabled or the `frontRunningDelay` is 0. It means anyone can directly create an agent without any prior commitment. Thus, anyone can observe pending transactions and try to front run them to mint an `agentID` prior to the victim's restricting it to mint a desired `agentID`.\\nAlso, it may be possible that a malicious actor succeeds in frontrunning a transaction with manipulated data/chainIDs but with the same owner address and `agentID`. There is a good chance that victim still accepts the attacker's transaction as valid, even though its own transaction reverted, due to the fact that the victim is still seeing itself as the owner of that ID.\\nTaking an instance where let's assume the frontrunning protection is enabled. Still, there is a good chance that two users vouch for the same `agentIDs` and commits in the same block, thus getting the same frontrunning delay. Then, it will be a game of luck, whoever creates that agent first will get the ID minted to its address, and the other user's transaction will be reverted wasting the time they have spent on the delay.\\nAs the `agentIDs` can be picked by users, the chances of collisions with an already minted ID will increase over time causing unnecessary reverts for others.\\nAdding to the fact that there is no restriction for owner address, anyone can spam mint any `agentID` to any address for any profitable reason.\\n```\\nfunction createAgent(uint256 agentId, address owner, string calldata metadata, uint256[] calldata chainIds)\\npublic\\n    onlySorted(chainIds)\\n    frontrunProtected(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(agentId, owner, metadata, chainIds)), frontRunningDelay)\\n{\\n    \\_mint(owner, agentId);\\n    \\_beforeAgentUpdate(agentId, metadata, chainIds);\\n    \\_agentUpdate(agentId, metadata, chainIds);\\n    \\_afterAgentUpdate(agentId, metadata, chainIds);\\n}\\n```\\n
Modify function `prepareAgent` to not commit an already registered `agentID`.\\nA better approach could be to allow sequential minting of `agentIDs` using some counters.\\nOnly allow users to mint an `agentID`, either for themselves or for someone they are approved to.
```\\nfunction createAgent(uint256 agentId, address owner, string calldata metadata, uint256[] calldata chainIds)\\npublic\\n    onlySorted(chainIds)\\n    frontrunProtected(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(agentId, owner, metadata, chainIds)), frontRunningDelay)\\n{\\n    \\_mint(owner, agentId);\\n    \\_beforeAgentUpdate(agentId, metadata, chainIds);\\n    \\_agentUpdate(agentId, metadata, chainIds);\\n    \\_afterAgentUpdate(agentId, metadata, chainIds);\\n}\\n```\\n