_calculateMaxBorrowCollateral calculates repay incorrectly and can lead to set token liquidation
When calculating the amount to repay, `_calculateMaxBorrowCollateral` incorrectly applies `unutilizedLeveragePercentage` when calculating `netRepayLimit`. The result is that if the `borrowValue` ever exceeds `liquidationThreshold * (1 - unutilizedLeveragPercentage)` then all attempts to repay will revert.\\nAaveLeverageStrategyExtension.sol#L1110-L1118\\n```\\n    } else {\\n        uint256 netRepayLimit = _actionInfo.collateralValue\\n            .preciseMul(liquidationThresholdRaw.mul(10 ** 14))\\n            .preciseMul(PreciseUnitMath.preciseUnit().sub(execution.unutilizedLeveragePercentage));\\n\\n        return _actionInfo.collateralBalance\\n            .preciseMul(netRepayLimit.sub(_actionInfo.borrowValue))\\n            .preciseDiv(netRepayLimit);\\n    }\\n```\\n\\nWhen calculating `netRepayLimit`, `_calculateMaxBorrowCollateral` uses the `liquidationThreshold` adjusted by `unutilizedLeveragePercentage`. It then subtracts the borrow value from this limit. This is problematic because if the current `borrowValue` of the set token exceeds `liquidationThreshold` * (1 - unutilizedLeveragPercentage) then this line will revert making it impossible to make any kind of repayment. Once no repayment is possible the set token can't rebalance and will be liquidated.
Don't adjust the max value by `unutilizedLeveragPercentage`
Once the leverage exceeds a certain point the set token can no longer rebalance
```\\n    } else {\\n        uint256 netRepayLimit = _actionInfo.collateralValue\\n            .preciseMul(liquidationThresholdRaw.mul(10 ** 14))\\n            .preciseMul(PreciseUnitMath.preciseUnit().sub(execution.unutilizedLeveragePercentage));\\n\\n        return _actionInfo.collateralBalance\\n            .preciseMul(netRepayLimit.sub(_actionInfo.borrowValue))\\n            .preciseDiv(netRepayLimit);\\n    }\\n```\\n