Full inventory asset purchases can be DOS'd via frontrunning
Users who attempt to swap the entire component value can be frontrun with a very small bid making their transaction revert\\nAuctionRebalanceModuleV1.sol#L795-L796\\n```\\n    // Ensure that the component quantity in the bid does not exceed the available auction quantity.\\n    require(_componentQuantity <= bidInfo.auctionQuantity, "Bid size exceeds auction quantity");\\n```\\n\\nWhen creating a bid, it enforces the above requirement. This prevents users from buying more than they should but it is also a source of an easy DOS attack. Assume a user is trying to buy the entire balance of a component, a malicious user can frontrun them buying only a tiny amount. Since they requested the entire balance, the call with fail. This is a useful technique if an attacker wants to DOS other buyers to pass the time and get a better price from the dutch auction.
Allow users to specify type(uint256.max) to swap the entire available balance
Malicious user can DOS legitimate users attempting to purchase the entire amount of component
```\\n    // Ensure that the component quantity in the bid does not exceed the available auction quantity.\\n    require(_componentQuantity <= bidInfo.auctionQuantity, "Bid size exceeds auction quantity");\\n```\\n