LenderCommitmentForwarder#updateCommitment can be front-run by malicious borrower to cause lender to over-commit funds
This is the same idea as approve vs increaseAlllowance. updateCommitment is a bit worse though because there are more reason why a user may wish to update their commitment (expiration, collateral ratio, interest rate, etc).\\nLenderCommitmentForwarder.sol#L212-L222\\n```\\n    require(\\n        _commitment.principalTokenAddress ==\\n            commitments[_commitmentId].principalTokenAddress,\\n        "Principal token address cannot be updated."\\n    );\\n    require(\\n        _commitment.marketId == commitments[_commitmentId].marketId,\\n        "Market Id cannot be updated."\\n    );\\n\\n    commitments[_commitmentId] = _commitment;\\n```\\n\\nLenderCommitmentForwarder#updateCommitment overwrites ALL of the commitment data. This means that even if a user is calling it to update even one value the maxPrincipal will reset, opening up the following attack vector:\\nUser A creates a commitment for 100e6 USDC lending against ETH\\nUser A's commitment is close to expiry so they call to update their commitment with a new expiration\\nUser B sees this update and front-runs it with a loan against the commitment for 100e6 USDC\\nUser A's commitment is updated and the amount is set back to 100e6 USDC\\nUser B takes out another loan for 100e6 USDC\\nUser A has now loaned out 200e6 USDC when they only meant to loan 100e6 USDC
Create a function that allows users to extend expiry while keeping amount unchanged. Additionally create a function similar to increaseApproval which increase amount instead of overwriting amount.
Commitment is abused to over-commit lender
```\\n    require(\\n        _commitment.principalTokenAddress ==\\n            commitments[_commitmentId].principalTokenAddress,\\n        "Principal token address cannot be updated."\\n    );\\n    require(\\n        _commitment.marketId == commitments[_commitmentId].marketId,\\n        "Market Id cannot be updated."\\n    );\\n\\n    commitments[_commitmentId] = _commitment;\\n```\\n