tbtc - provideFundingECDSAFraudProof attempts to burn non-existent funds
The funding flow was recently changed from requiring the funder to provide a bond that stays in the Deposit contract to forwarding the funds to the keep, paying for the keep setup.\\nSo at a high level, the funding bond was designed to ensure that funders had some minimum skin in the game, so that DoSing signers/the system was expensive. The upside was that we could refund it in happy paths. Now that we've realized that opening the keep itself will cost enough to prevent DoS, the concept of refunding goes away entirely. We definitely missed cleaning up the funder handling in provideFundingECDSAFraudProof though.\\n```\\n// If the funding timeout has elapsed, punish the funder too!\\nif (block.timestamp > \\_d.fundingProofTimerStart + TBTCConstants.getFundingTimeout()) {\\n    address(0).transfer(address(this).balance);  // Burn it all down (fire emoji)\\n    \\_d.setFailedSetup();\\n```\\n
Remove the line that attempts to punish the funder by burning the Deposit contract balance which is zero due to recent changes in how the payment provided with createNewDepositis handled.
```\\n// If the funding timeout has elapsed, punish the funder too!\\nif (block.timestamp > \\_d.fundingProofTimerStart + TBTCConstants.getFundingTimeout()) {\\n    address(0).transfer(address(this).balance);  // Burn it all down (fire emoji)\\n    \\_d.setFailedSetup();\\n```\\n