Pending CRV rewards are not accounted for and can cause unfair liquidations
pendingRewards are factored into the health of a position so that the position collateral is fairly assessed. However WCurveGauge#pendingRewards doesn't return the proper reward tokens/amounts meaning that positions aren't valued correctly and users can be unfairly liquidated.\\nBlueBerryBank.sol#L408-L413\\n```\\n        (address[] memory tokens, uint256[] memory rewards) = IERC20Wrapper(\\n            pos.collToken\\n        ).pendingRewards(pos.collId, pos.collateralSize);\\n        for (uint256 i; i < tokens.length; i++) {\\n            rewardsValue += oracle.getTokenValue(tokens[i], rewards[i]);\\n        }\\n```\\n\\nWhen BlueBerryBank is valuing a position it also values the pending rewards since they also have value.\\nWCurveGauge.sol#L106-L114\\n```\\nfunction pendingRewards(\\n    uint256 tokenId,\\n    uint256 amount\\n)\\n    public\\n    view\\n    override\\n    returns (address[] memory tokens, uint256[] memory rewards)\\n{}\\n```\\n\\nAbove we see that WCurveGauge#pendingRewards returns empty arrays when called. This means that pending rewards are not factored in correctly and users can be liquidated when even when they should be safe.
Change WCurveGauge#pendingRewards to correctly return the pending rewards
User is liquidated when they shouldn't be
```\\n        (address[] memory tokens, uint256[] memory rewards) = IERC20Wrapper(\\n            pos.collToken\\n        ).pendingRewards(pos.collId, pos.collateralSize);\\n        for (uint256 i; i < tokens.length; i++) {\\n            rewardsValue += oracle.getTokenValue(tokens[i], rewards[i]);\\n        }\\n```\\n