The attacker can use larger dust when opening a position to perform griefing attacks
When opening a position, unused assets are sent to dustVault as dust, but since these dust are not subtracted from inputAmt, they are included in the calculation of positionOpenUSDValueE36, resulting in a small netPnLE36, which can be used by an attacker to perform a griefing attack.\\n```\\n            uint inputTotalUSDValueE36;\\n                for (uint i; i < openTokenInfos.length; ) {\\n                 inputTotalUSDValueE36 += openTokenInfos[i].inputAmt * tokenPriceE36s[i];\\n                      borrowTotalUSDValueE36 += openTokenInfos[i].borrowAmt * tokenPriceE36s[i];\\n                 unchecked {\\n            ++i;\\n                }\\n            }\\n                // 1.3 calculate net pnl (including strategy users & borrow profit)\\n            positionOpenUSDValueE36 = inputTotalUSDValueE36 + borrowTotalUSDValueE36;\\n            netPnLE36 = positionCurUSDValueE36.toInt256() - positionOpenUSDValueE36.toInt256();\\n```\\n
Consider subtracting dust from inputAmt when opening a position.
```\\n            uint inputTotalUSDValueE36;\\n                for (uint i; i < openTokenInfos.length; ) {\\n                 inputTotalUSDValueE36 += openTokenInfos[i].inputAmt * tokenPriceE36s[i];\\n                      borrowTotalUSDValueE36 += openTokenInfos[i].borrowAmt * tokenPriceE36s[i];\\n                 unchecked {\\n            ++i;\\n                }\\n            }\\n                // 1.3 calculate net pnl (including strategy users & borrow profit)\\n            positionOpenUSDValueE36 = inputTotalUSDValueE36 + borrowTotalUSDValueE36;\\n            netPnLE36 = positionCurUSDValueE36.toInt256() - positionOpenUSDValueE36.toInt256();\\n```\\n