RocketDepositPool - Potential gasDoS in assignDeposits  Acknowledged
`assignDeposits` seems to be a gas heavy function, with many external calls in general, and few of them are inside the for loop itself. By default, `rocketDAOProtocolSettingsDeposit.getMaximumDepositAssignments()` returns `2`, which is not a security concern. Through a DAO vote, the settings key `deposit.assign.maximum` can be set to a value that exhausts the block gas limit and effectively deactivates the deposit assignment process.\\n```\\nfor (uint256 i = 0; i < rocketDAOProtocolSettingsDeposit.getMaximumDepositAssignments(); ++i) {\\n    // Get & check next available minipool capacity\\n```\\n
The `rocketDAOProtocolSettingsDeposit.getMaximumDepositAssignments()` return value could be cached outside the loop. Additionally, a check should be added that prevents unreasonably high values.
```\\nfor (uint256 i = 0; i < rocketDAOProtocolSettingsDeposit.getMaximumDepositAssignments(); ++i) {\\n    // Get & check next available minipool capacity\\n```\\n