`getPositionRisk()` will return a wrong value of risk
In order to interact with SPELL the users need to `lend()` some collateral which is known as Isolated Collateral and the SoftVault will deposit them into Compound protocol to generate some lending interest (to earn passive yield)\\nto liquidate a position this function `isLiquidatable()` should return `true`\\n```\\n    function isLiquidatable(uint256 positionId) public view returns (bool) {\\n        return\\n            getPositionRisk(positionId) >=\\n            banks[positions[positionId].underlyingToken].liqThreshold;\\n    }\\n```\\n\\nand it is subcall to `getPositionRisk()`\\n```\\n    function getPositionRisk(\\n        uint256 positionId\\n    ) public view returns (uint256 risk) {\\n        uint256 pv = getPositionValue(positionId);          \\n        uint256 ov = getDebtValue(positionId);             \\n        uint256 cv = getIsolatedCollateralValue(positionId);\\n\\n        if (\\n            (cv == 0 && pv == 0 && ov == 0) || pv >= ov // Closed position or Overcollateralized position\\n        ) {\\n            risk = 0;\\n        } else if (cv == 0) {\\n            // Sth bad happened to isolated underlying token\\n            risk = Constants.DENOMINATOR;\\n        } else {\\n            risk = ((ov - pv) * Constants.DENOMINATOR) / cv;\\n        }\\n    }\\n```\\n\\nas we can see the `cv` is a critical value in terms of the calculation of `risk` the `cv` is returned by `getIsolatedCollateralValue()`\\n```\\n    function getIsolatedCollateralValue(\\n        uint256 positionId\\n    ) public view override returns (uint256 icollValue) {\\n        Position memory pos = positions[positionId];\\n        // NOTE: exchangeRateStored has 18 decimals.\\n        uint256 underlyingAmount;\\n        if (_isSoftVault(pos.underlyingToken)) {\\n            underlyingAmount =                                              \\n                (ICErc20(banks[pos.debtToken].bToken).exchangeRateStored() * \\n                    pos.underlyingVaultShare) /\\n                Constants.PRICE_PRECISION; \\n        } else {\\n            underlyingAmount = pos.underlyingVaultShare;\\n        }\\n        icollValue = oracle.getTokenValue(\\n            pos.underlyingToken,\\n            underlyingAmount\\n        );\\n    }\\n```\\n\\nand it uses `exchangeRateStored()` to ask Compound (CToken.sol) for the exchange rate from `CToken` contract\\n```\\nThis function does not accrue interest before calculating the exchange rate\\n```\\n\\nso the `getPositionRisk()` will return a wrong value of risk because the interest does not accrue for this position
You shoud use `exchangeRateCurrent()` to Accrue interest first.
the user (position) could get liquidated even if his position is still healthy
```\\n    function isLiquidatable(uint256 positionId) public view returns (bool) {\\n        return\\n            getPositionRisk(positionId) >=\\n            banks[positions[positionId].underlyingToken].liqThreshold;\\n    }\\n```\\n