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Mathematical Models and Computer Simulations 
July 2016, Volume 8, Issue 4, pp 401–408 | Cite as

Modeling position selection by individuals during information warfare in society



In this paper, a mathematical model is developed for information warfare in society whereby an individual chooses between two suggested viewpoints. The model is based on the traditional Rashevsky framework of imitative behavior. A primary analysis of the model is conducted. The model has the form of a nonlinear integro-differential equation in which the unknown function is under the sign of the derivative and within the integration limit and acts as an argument of an exogenously given function.


mathematical modeling information warfare imitative behavior incentives for behavior of individuals

Original Russian Text © A.P. Petrov, A.I. Maslov, N.A. Tsaplin, 2015, published in Matematicheskoe Modelirovanie, 2015, Vol. 27, No. 12, pp. 137–148.





© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2016




Petrov, A.P., Maslov, A.I. & Tsaplin, N.A. Math Models Comput Simul (2016) 8: 401. https://doi.org/10.1134/S2070048216040141



