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May 2017, Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 21–56 | Cite as

Theorizing command-and-commodify regulation: the case of species conservation banking in the United States



State-directed but market-oriented forms of regulation, especially environmental examples like cap-and-trade and ecological offsetting, have proliferated in the past two decades, but sociologists have been slow to theorize these broad institutional shifts. This article offers a framework for explaining these processes of regulatory marketization. First, I argue that institutions of this sort are examples of what I call command-and-commodify regulation, a mode of regulation that distinctively hybridizes economic and authoritative dimensions of power. Second, I explain how and why one example of command-and-commodify regulation, species conservation banking, emerged and remained concentrated in California, but did not so easily develop in other American states. Finally, abstracting from the case, I argue that the concept of market reconstruction is useful for developing a more general theory of the ways that social conflicts and mobilization reconfigure regulatory power and thus give rise to new modes of regulation. Together, a theory of command-and-commodify regulation and market reconstruction may be useful for explaining the development of a wide variety of environmentally focused and other regulatory institutions.


Commodification Endangered species Environment Institutional emergence Markets Regulation



Special thanks to Thomas Angeletti, Tim Bartley, Jens Beckert, Fred Block, Winston Chou, Guus Dix, Rebecca Emigh, Jenny Goldstein, Neil Gong, Hannah Landecker, Ching Kwan Lee, Yewon Lee, Michael Mann, Bill Roy, Ksenia Varlyguina, Ed Walker, the Theory and Society Editors and reviewers, and the participants of the UCLA Comparative Social Analysis seminar for many helpful comments and ideas that contributed to this article. Anonymous reviewers in a previous review process were also very helpful. The research presented in this article was developed in part under GRO Fellowship Assistance Agreement no. F13A10071 awarded by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). It has not been formally reviewed by EPA. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.



Informant counts by organizational affiliation and geography

Totals do not sum to N = 50 because informants often had experience and expertise in multiple categories (e.g. worked in California and then nationally or first as a regulator then as a banker, etc.)


Fixed effects linear panel regression testing association with gross state product per capita in the construction industry, 1990-2012

For 2005 real dollars. The construction industry includes public civil en-gingering projects as well as private development. For a complete list of included economic activity and explanation, see http://www.census.govicgibinissiorlinaics/naiosatiachart.code=23/cseareh=2012%2ONAICS%20Search

N = 1127 with 49 groups (Alaska and the District of Columbia excluded)

***p < .001

aDummy variable to account for shift from the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to the The North American Industry Classification System (NAILS) in 1997


Mean state-year species listing expected values (SLEVs), 1990–2012

aSLEV values in Hawaii and Massachusetts are skewed by these states having few counties (14 in MA, 5 in HI) some of which have moderate (MA) to high (HI) species listings, but also very small areas. This yields a very high number of species listings per unit area, and a higher SLEV







Rea, C.M. Theor Soc (2017) 46: 21. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9283-5



