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International Journal of Game Theory 
January 2007, 35:251 | Cite as

Communication and bargaining in the spatial model



This paper studies collective choice by participants possessing private information in policymaking institutions that involve cheap-talk communication and bargaining. The main result establishes a connection between the extent to which problems of this type posses fully-revealing equilibria that select policies in the full information majority rule core (when it is well-defined) and the extent to which a fictitious sender-receiver game possesses a fully revealing equilibria. This result allows us to extend Banks and Duggan’s (Am polit Sci Rev 94(1) 73–88, 2000) core equivalence results to the case of noisy policymaking environments with private information and communication when some combination of non exclusivity and preference alignment conditions are satisfied.


Private Information Ideal Point Bargaining Game Cheap Talk Collective Choice



© Springer Verlag 2006



Meirowitz, A. Int J Game Theory (2007) 35: 251. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3



