document: Protecting browser state from web privacy attacks Through a variety of means , including a range of browser cache methods and inspecting the color of a visited hyperlink , client-side browser state can be exploited to track users against their wishes . This tracking is possible because persistent , client-side browser state is not properly partitioned on per-site basis in current browsers . We address this problem by refining the general notion of a `` same-origin '' policy and implementing two browser extensions that enforce this policy on the browser cache and visited links . We also analyze various degrees of cooperation between sites to track users , and show that even if long-term browser state is properly partitioned , it is still possible for sites to use modern web features to bounce users between sites and invisibly engage in cross-domain tracking of their visitors . Cooperative privacy attacks are an unavoidable consequence of all persistent browser state that affects the behavior of the browser , and disabling or frequently expiring this state is the only way to achieve true privacy against colluding parties .
doc_bio_tags: O O O O O B O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O B O O O O