document: Incentivizing high-quality user-generated content We model the economics of incentivizing high-quality user generated content ( UGC ) , motivated by settings such as online review forums , question-answer sites , and comments on news articles and blogs . We provide a game-theoretic model within which to study the problem of incentivizing high quality UGC , in which contributors are strategic and motivated by exposure . Our model has the feature that both the quality of contributions as well as the extent of participation is determined endogenously in a free-entry Nash equilibrium . The model predicts , as observed in practice , that if exposure is independent of quality , there will be a flood of low quality contributions in equilibrium . An ideal mechanism in this context would elicit both high quality and high participation in equilibrium , with near-optimal quality as the available attention diverges , and should be easily implementable in practice . We consider a very simple elimination mechanism , which subjects each contribution to rating by some number A of viewers , and eliminates any contributions that are not uniformly rated positively . We construct and analyze free-entry Nash equilibria for this mechanism , and show that A can be chosen to achieve quality that tends to optimal , along with diverging participation , as the number of viewers diverges .
doc_bio_tags: O O O O O O O O O O O B I I O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O