document: Choice from a three-element set : some lessons of the 2000 presidential campaign in the United States We consider the behavior of four choice rules - plurality voting , approval voting , Borda count , and self-consistent choice - when applied to choose the best option from a three-element set . It is assumed that the two main options are preferred by a large majority of the voters , while the third option gets a very small number of votes and influences the election outcome only when the two main options receive a close number of votes . When used to rate the main options , Borda count and self-consistent choice contain terms that allow both for the `` strength of preferences '' of the voters and the rating of the main candidates by voters who vote for the third option . In this way , it becomes possible to determine more reliably the winner when plurality voting or approval voting produce close results
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