probability that the players will exchange their initially drawn number Consider the following two-player game. The players simultaneously draw one sample
each from a continuous random variable X, which follows $Uniform\ [0, 100]$. After observing the value of her own sample, which is private information (that is, opponent
does not observe it), players simultaneously and independently choose one of the following: $SWAP$, $RETAIN$. If both the players choose $SWAP$ then they exchange their initially drawn numbers. Otherwise, if at least one person chooses $RETAIN$, both of
them retain their numbers. A player earns as many Rupees as the number she is holding
at the end of the game.
what is the probability that the players will exchange their initially drawn numbers?
My approach
this is a question from one of master's entrance exams, now i think that the question is incomplete because given the information in the question if the it is up to player to draw any number from the given interval of $ [0,100]$, why would any player choose any number less than $100$. all the players will choose to maximize their payoff and hence they must draw $100$. and hence the required probability should be equal to 0
But if there is a missing point from the question, for instance the players might draw from 101 balls numbered 0 to 100 in that case the question seems like Monty Hall Problem.
If i am wrong then can anyone please help me with this question?

+1 to Walid for noting an error in an earlier version of this answer.
How about defining some cutoff value $q_1$ below which player 1 will decide to swap and a cut-off value $q_2$ below which player 2 will decide to swap. Then compute the win probability as a function of $q_1$ and $q_2$ and see whether there is a Nash equilibrium.

For a given strategy, $q_1$, of player 1, the player 2, can reduce their $q_2$ level which reduces the area of the 'both players 50% chance' and it increases the 'player 1 wins' and 'player 2 wins area'.
Depending on the levels of $q_1$ and $q_2$ the relative increase in those two areas differs.

*

*When $q_2 > 0.5 q_1$ then the reduction of $q_2$ leads to more improvement for player 2 than for player 1.


*When $q_2 < 0.5 q_1$ then the reduction of $q_2$ leads to less improvement for player 2 than for player 1.
So the best strategy for player 2, as function of the strategy of player 1, is to choose $q_2 = 0.5 q_1$.
Due to the symmetry of the problem an equilibrium must be when the optimal strategy for both players is equal: $q_2 = q_1$. This happens only when the values are zero, since for any non-zero value $q_1$ the player 2 optimal strategy is at a different value $q_2 = 0.5 q_1$.

why would any player choose any number less than 100

Say a player has the number 99 then of course the player would still prefer a larger number but the probability that the swapped number is an improvement is very low.
