Causal Inference - when Conditioning on a Collider is correct I have been reading Judea Pearl's Book of Why and in it, he tackles the famous Monty Hall problem through a causal lens. Although it may still grind away at our initial instincts, hopefully nobody here will disagree that the right answer, when addressing the problem as framed in the game show, would be to switch your choice of door as your chances of success in doing so would be 2/3 vs. 1/3 if you stick with your original choice.

What is throwing me for a loop now, however, is that in the causal world, the general advice is to NOT condition on what are called "colliders", which in this case, would be the "Door Opened". This flies in the face of the causal explanation for the RIGHT answer in this problem:

Once   we
obtain  information  on this     variable,   all     our     probabilities   become  conditional
on  this    information.    But when    we  condition   on  a   collider,   we  create  a   spurious
dependence   between     its     parents.    The     dependence  is  borne   out     in  the
probabilities:   if  you     chose   Door    1,  the     car     location    is  twice   as  likely  to  be
behind  Door     2   as Door     1; if   you     chose  Door     2, the  car    location    is  twice    as
likely  to  be  behind  Door    1.

Meaning, by conditioning on the collider Door Opened (which in this case, happens via an action that occurs in reality, e.g. say during the game show) you create a non-causal dependence (or "flow of information", aligning to his metaphor of opening the pipe when you condition on a collider) between "Your Door" and "Location of Car" which Pearl still labels spurious and yet that is how you obtain the right answer to the problem, again despite the fact that collider-conditioning-induced-bias is what you are taught (in general) to avoid unless other adjustments are made to compensate for when you have no other choice.
How does one reconcile this? Am I missing something? Please do tell. Any insight would be much appreciated.

This is an excellent question giving a really incisive inquiry into causal reasoning in a "simple" problem.  The issue here is that when you are playing the Monty Hall game, you are making a predictive inference only --- you want to use the information you have to predict where the car is placed.  You are not attempting to make a causal inference about the effect of you choosing a door --- i.e., you are not seeking to determine whether or not your choice of a door causes the car to move.
A causal inference in the Monty Hall game would be asking whether or not you choosing a door caused the location of the car to move (e.g., an assistant quickly and quietly drove it to another door based on hearing your choice).  If you want to know this then you would not condition on the collider.  You would compute the probability that the car is behind a particular door, conditional only on you having chosen that door and without Monty opening another door.  Suppose you conclude that this conditional probability is $\tfrac{1}{3}$, which matches the prior probability that the car is behind that door.  Since these probabilities match, you would infer that there is no causal effect --- i.e., your initial choice of a door had no effect on the location of the car.
A predictive inference in the Monty Hall game is the standard question we are asking --- given all the information we have, what is the conditional probability for the position of the car?  Since we are making a predictive inference we condition on all available information including the collider variable, and this leads to the famous solution you have outlined.
As you can see from the above, the Monty Hall problem actually is consistent with the general advice given by Pearl --- when making a causal inference we do not condition on the collider variable.  Another way of looking at this is that if we are making a predictive inference we don't care if a statistical relationship is "spurious" or not (see my related answer on "spurious" correlation).
