IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
  (Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT:  
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE SH. AZMAT SAEED 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE SAJJAD ALI SHAH 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.233/2015, CIVIL MISC. APPEAL NO.175/2017 
IN CONST. PETITION NO.NIL OF 2017, CIVIL MISC. 
APPLICATION NO.1535/2013 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.191-L/2010, 
CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO.1536/2013 IN CIVIL APPEAL 
NO.409/2010, CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO.3470/2013, CIVIL 
REVIEW PETITIONS NO. 81/2013,  86/2013, 87/2013, 206/2011, 
218/2013 IN CIVIL PETITIONS NO.492, 493/2013, 494/2013, 
1485/2011 
AND 
1033/2013, 
CIVIL 
REVIEW 
PETITION 
NO.223/2013 IN CIVIL MISC. APPLICATION NO.3470/2013 IN 
CIVIL 
APPEAL 
NO.409/2010, 
CIVIL 
REVIEW 
PETITION 
NO.38/2014 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO.47/2014, CIVIL PETITIONS 
NO.770/2013, 668/2014 & CIVIL APPEAL NO.476 AND 689/2014, 
204-L/2016 AND CIVIL PETITION NO.2620-L/2016 AND CIVIL 
MISC. APPLICATION NO. 845 OF 2018. 
 
C.A.233/2015: 
Sami Ullah Baloch Vs. Abdul Karim Nousherwani & 
others 
 
 
C. M. Appeal 
No.175/2017 
Chaudhry Atta ur Rehman Vs. Election Commission 
of Pakistan, Islamabad.  
 
 
C.M.A.1535/2013: 
Implementation/Modalities of judgment passed in 
C.A.191-L & 409/2010 regarding submission of 
fake/bogus degrees at the time of Election 
 
 
C.M.A.1536/2013: 
Implementation/Modalities of judgment passed in 
C.A.191-L & 409/2010 regarding submission of 
fake/bogus degrees at the time of Election 
 
 
C.M.A.3470/2013: 
News Clipping Published in Daily Jang dated 
04.06.2013 
 
 
C.R.P.81/2013: 
Moulvi Muhammad Hanif Vs. Election Tribunal 
Balochistan thr. Additional Registrar, Quetta & others 
 
 
C.R.P.86/2013: 
Sardar Fateh Ali Khan Umrani Vs. Returning Officer, 
PB 28 Nasirabad-I, Dera Murad Jamali and others 
 
 
C.R.P.87/2013: 
Sardar Fateh Ali Khan Umrani Vs. Returning Officer, 
PB 29 Nasirabad-I, Dera Murad Jamali and others 
 
 
 
C.R.P.206/2011: 
Senator Mir Muhammad Ali Rind Vs. Obaidullah and 
others 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 2 - 
 
 
C.R.P.218/2013: 
Allah Dino Khan Bhayo Vs. Election Commission of 
Pakistan and others 
 
 
C.R.P.223/2013: 
In Re case of Ms. Samina Khawar Hayat, Ex-MPA 
 
 
C.R.P.38/2014: 
Qaimous Khan v. Dr. Haider Ali Khan & others 
 
 
C.P.770/2013: 
Sardar Fateh Ali Umrani v. Samiullah & others 
 
 
C.P.668/2014: 
Abdul Ghafoor Lehri Vs. Election Commission of 
Pakistan thr. its Secretary & others 
 
 
C.A.476/2014: 
Khan Muhammad Khan Jatoi Vs. Sardar Samiullah 
Khan & other 
 
 
C.A.689/2014: 
Sardar Sami Ullah Khan Vs. Khan Muhammad Khan 
Jatoi 
 
 
C.A.204-L/2016: 
Ch. 
Nazir 
Ahmad 
Jatt 
Vs. 
Chief 
Election 
Commissioner of Pakistan, etc. 
 
 
C.P.2620-L/2016: 
Shamona Badshah Qaisarani Vs. Election Tribunal, 
Multan, etc. 
 
 
C.M.A No.845/2018 Implementation/Modalities of judgment passed in 
C.A.191-L & 409/2010 regarding submission of fake/ 
bogus degrees at the time of Election. 
 
For the petitioner(s)/ 
Applicant(s)/appellant(s): 
Dr. Babar Awan, Sr. ASC 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
Assisted by: 
Mr. Shahid Naseem Gondal, Advocate. 
(In C.A.233/2015) 
 
Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Mehr Khan Malik, AOR 
(In C.R.P.206/2011) 
 
Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Sr. ASC 
(In C.R.P.218/2013) 
 
Mian Muhammad Hanif, ASC 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
(For HEC in C.M.As.1535 & 1536/2013) 
 
Mr. Ahmed Raza, ASC 
(In C.M.A.3470/2013) 
 
Mr. Tariq Mehmood, Sr. ASC 
(In C.R.Ps.81, 86, 87, 233/2013, 38/2014 & 
C.P.770/2013) 
 
Mr. Shehzad Shaukat, ASC 
(In C.P.2620-L/2016) 
 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 3 - 
Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Sr. ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
(In C.P.668/2014) 
 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
(In C.A.476/2014) 
 
Mr. Mehr Tanvir Ahmed Jangla, ASC 
(In C.A.689/2014) 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC 
Mr. Zubair Khalid, ASC 
(In C.A.204-L/2016) 
 
Malik Muhammad Qayyum, Sr. ASC.  
(In C.M.A. No.175 of 2017) 
 
 
For the respondent(s): 
Syed Iftikhar Hussain Gillani, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Mahmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
(Respondent No.1 in C.A.No.233/2015) 
 
Mr. Tariq Aziz, AOR 
Mr. Imran-ul-Haq Khan, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB 
(Respondents 2 & 3 in C.A.No.233/2015) 
 
Mr. Mehr Tanvir Ahmed Jangla, ASC 
(In C.A.476/2014) 
 
Mr. Nazir Ahmed Bhutta, ASC 
(In C.A.204-L/2016) 
 
Mr. Umer Aslam, ASC 
(In C.P.2620-L/2016) 
 
Mr. Sattar Sardar, Election Officer, Rajanpur 
(In C.P.2620-L/2016) 
Syed Haziq Ali Shah, ASC 
(In C.R.P.38/2014) 
 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC.  
Assisted by: 
Mr. M. Asad Lada, Advocate.  
(In CMA No. 4275/2013) 
 
 
Amicus Curiae: 
Mr. Munir A. Malik, Sr. ASC 
Syed Ali Zafar, ASC Assisted by: 
Mr. Zahid Nawaz Cheema, ASC.  
 
 
On Court’s notice: 
Mr. Ashtar Ausaf Ali,  
Attorney General for Pakistan 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 4 - 
Assisted by: 
Barrister Asad Rahim Khan, Advocate  
Mirza Moiz Baig, Associate Lawyer 
 
Mr. Muhammad Waqar Rana,  
Additional Attorney General 
 
Nemo.  
(On behalf of Mian Mohammad Nawaz 
Sharif)  
 
Mrs. Asma Jehangir, Sr. ASC 
Assisted by: 
Ms. Noor Ejaz, Ms. Ayesha Malik,  
Mr. Usama Malik, Mr. Arsalan Khalid, 
Advocates.  
(On behalf of Rai Hassan Nawaz, Ex-MNA) 
 
Mr. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, ASC 
Assisted by Mr. Zulqarnain, Advocate.  
(On behalf of Mr. Jehangir Khan Tareen 
 
Nawabzada Ghazanfar Ali Gull, Ex-MPA  
In-person (CMA No.656/2018) 
 
Mr. Mudassar Khalid Abbasi, ASC.  
(CMA No.767/2018) 
 
Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Sr. ASC  
(CMA No.845/2018) 
 
Mr. Faisal Farid Hussain, ASC  
(in-person) 
 
 
For ECP: 
Mr. M. Arshad, D.G. (Law) 
 
 
Dates of hearing: 
30.01.2018, 31.01.2018; 01.02.2018; 07.02.2018; 
08.02.2018; 12.02.2018 & 14.02.2018. 
 
JUDGMENT: 
 
UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J. – All these connected matters seek 
a common relief, namely, an authoritative pronouncement about the 
effect of provisions of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan (“Constitution”). The crucial question raised is 
whether the incapacity imposed by Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution upon a person interested to contest an election to a seat 
in the National Assembly or Senate (“Parliament”), is of perpetual 
effect if there is a declaration against him by a Court to the effect 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 5 - 
that he lacks sagacity or righteousness or is profligate or is dishonest 
or is not Ameen (untrustworthy). This question is posed because 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution does not stipulate the duration of 
incapacitation of a judgment debtor under a judicial declaration on 
one or more of the aforementioned grounds for contesting an 
election to a seat in Parliament. Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution 
provides as follows: 
 
“62. (1) A person shall not be qualified to be elected or 
chosen as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
unless −  
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) … 
(e)  
(f) he is sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, 
honest and ameen, there being no declaration to the 
contrary by a court of law; and 
(g) …” 
 
 In the absence of a fixed period of incapacity of a candidate for 
election to a seat in Parliament being specified for complying the 
requirements under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, one point of 
view urged before the Court is that such incapacity ought to be 
construed as perpetual. The other point of view canvassed before the 
Court is that the period of disqualification under Article 63 of the 
Constitution for the character flaw of moral turpitude ought to be 
construed along with Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. In this 
regard Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution creates a bar for a period 
of five years for contesting an election after serving no less than a 
two year sentence for conviction for an offence involving moral 
turpitude. The said disability ought to be construed along with 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 6 - 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution to limit the period of incapacity 
imposed by the latter provision to five years as well. 
2. 
 
Article 113 of the Constitution makes the qualifications 
under Article 62 of the Constitution and disqualifications under 
Article 63 of the Constitution applicable to the candidates for 
election to a seat in the Provincial Assemblies. Therefore, the 
Constitution has applied the same criteria of eligibility for election to 
a seat in all Constitutional Legislatures together referred in this 
opinion as ‘Parliament’. Article 113 of the Constitution provides as 
follows: 
“113.  The 
qualifications 
and 
disqualifications 
for 
membership of the National Assembly set out in Articles 
62 and 63 shall also apply for membership of a Provincial 
Assembly as if reference therein to “National Assembly” 
were a reference to “Provincial Assembly”.”  
Submissions by the Counsel: 
3. 
 
Mr. Babar Awan, Sr. ASC appearing  before this Court 
(in Civil Appeal No.233 of 2015) has supported the lifetime bar 
under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution on the eligibility of a 
candidate to contest election to Parliament. He argued that the 
Constitution and the law contemplate permanent and transient 
disqualifications. Thus, Article 62(1)(d), (e), (f) and (g) of the 
Constitution do not fix a time limit for the incapacity of a candidate 
to contest an election. Within this category of provisions Article 
62(1)(f) ibid above requires that a declaration by a Court of law 
indicating delinquent conduct be in existence before incapacity upon 
a candidate for election can be imposed thereunder. The remaining 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 7 - 
three clauses do not provide for any such mechanism. These 
provisions were added to the Constitution pursuant to Islamic 
provisions and whenever attracted to a case they create a perpetual 
bar. He read from the verses of the Holy Qur’an to emphasise the 
meaning of the expression “Ameen” used in Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution. These verses include Surah Nisah verse 58 and Surah 
Aal-e-Imran verse 75. As a threshold for the requirement of honesty, 
he referred to Surah Al- Ma’aidah verse 119; Surah At’ Taubah verse 
119; Surah Al Ahzab verse 23, 24 and 35. He pointed out further that 
the permanent bar created under Articles 62(1)(f) of the Constitution 
was endorsed by Parliament in the Constitution (Eighteenth 
Amendment) Act, 2010 (“18th Constitutional Amendment”). No 
omission is attributable to the Constitution nor reading into a 
provision thereof is permissible under the settled rules of 
Constitutional interpretation. If at all the period of embargo under 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is to be relaxed, then such an 
outcome can follow only from a Constitutional amendment by the 
Parliament.  
4. 
 
Mr. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, learned ASC appearing 
for Jehangir Khan Tareen, Ex-MNA has argued against the 
imposition of a permanent embargo under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution on the eligibility of a candidate for election to 
Parliament. He contended that the absence of a specified term of the 
bar on eligibility in the said constitutional provision made the same 
amenable to interpretation and that a life time bar amounted to an 
excessive restriction on the fundamental right guaranteed under 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 8 - 
Article 
17(2) 
of 
the 
Constitution. 
That 
the 
principle 
of 
proportionality ought to be applied to Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution in the light of the embargo on eligibility for election 
provided in similar provisions. Particular emphasis was placed on 
Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution wherein more serious 
misconduct by a candidate for election who has been convicted and 
sentenced for an offence involving moral turpitude has been 
subjected to an embargo on contesting election to Parliament for a 
fixed term rather than permanently. Moreover, gross acts of 
dishonesty catered by Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance and similar 
acts by Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 
(“ROPA”) provide for an embargo for fixed periods. In these 
circumstances, the lack of specification of the duration of the bar 
created under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution ought not be given 
permanent effect. Under the principle of proportionality the Court 
ought to impose a bar that is commensurate with the wrong 
committed by a candidate for election. In this respect, the Court had 
discretion to fix the term but unfitness to contest for five years 
should be treated as an outer limit. He read from Section 100 of the 
ROPA which creates a disqualification of five years for exceeding 
the limit of election expenses and Section 15 of the NAB Ordinance 
for imposing disqualification for ten years after release from prison 
on conviction for offences of corruption and corrupt practices. On 
the other hand, the inadvertent non-disclosure of certain assets by a 
candidate without any intention to deceive the authorities or the 
public appears to be a trivial misdemeanor in comparison, yet the 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 9 - 
Courts have under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution applied a 
permanent time bar in consequence thereof.  
5. 
 
Ms. Asma Jehangir, Sr. ASC appearing for Rai Hassan 
Nawaz Ex-MNA explained that her client was disqualified under 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution for not declaring his inherited 
property in his statement of assets. This is because the said asset was 
held in the name of a family company. Her client derived no 
advantage from the said non-disclosure but has been subjected to a 
life time bar for misdeclaration and concealment of his assets. She 
argued that Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is vague in its 
language for lacking a specific period of incapacitation of a 
candidate for election and sets an exceptionally high standard of 
human character to be met by him. She also contended that sagacity 
and non-profligacy are subjective terms for which determination or 
quantification can be onerous and irrational. Although the meaning 
and effect of these terms was a matter for Parliament to determine, 
yet the Courts have the authority and power to apply the rule of 
proportionality in order to avoid the harsh consequence of 
permanent incapacitation of a candidate under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution. She submitted that Section 99(1)(f) of the ROPA 
provides the same substantive qualifications as expressed in Article 
62 of the Constitution but these do not create a permanent embargo. 
Consequently, for the lack of the same qualification to contest 
election for the Parliament, there are divergent provisions in the 
statute and in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The Constitutional 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 10 - 
mandate in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution ought to be construed 
and enforced in the light of the aforesaid statutory provisions.  
6. 
 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, Sr. ASC appearing for the 
two disqualified appellants in two Civil Appeals (No.476 of 2014 & 
No.204-L of 2016) respectively, submitted that the commission of the  
wrong, namely, the misdeclaration of assets did not cause an injury 
or loss to any person and ought to be treated lightly on the principle 
of Touba (repentance) and Maghfirat (forgiveness), which are the 
foundations of Islamic law and jurisprudence. He was, however, 
candid to accept that except for submitting their affidavits in Court, 
his clients had not made any expression of remorse, regret or 
repentance before the concerned authorities or the public.               
7.  
 
Learned amicus curiae, Mr. Munir A. Malik, Sr. ASC 
stated that a settled principle of interpretation of the Constitution is 
that it should be read as a whole. The chapter of fundamental rights 
lies at the heart of the Constitution and the right to contest elections 
emanates therefrom. Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution are not 
preceded by a non-obstante clause, therefore, these provisions must 
be read in a manner that advances the fundamental right to contest 
election and not curtail the same. Furthermore, Articles 62 setting 
out qualifications and Article 63 laying down disqualifications for 
election to a seat in Parliament ought to be read together as these 
provisions are complementary to each other. According to the 
textual history of the Constitution, the provisions, inter alia, of 
Article 63(1)(g) and (h) belong to a set of disqualifications that are 
based on past delinquent conduct of a candidate. Prior to the 18th 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 11 - 
Constitutional Amendment, the conviction for such delinquent 
conduct resulted in disqualification without a time limitation, hence 
these were construed as being of permanent effect.  
8. 
 
The 
18th 
Constitutional 
Amendment, 
however, 
introduced a time limit in respect of both these disqualifications. 
Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution is relevant for present purpose. 
After the 18th Constitutional Amendment, it lays down that a person 
who is convicted and sentenced to more than two years 
imprisonment for an offence involving moral turpitude stands 
disqualified to contest and election for a period of five years after the 
date of his release from prison. The 18th Constitutional Amendment 
has similarly made the incapacity cast upon a candidate for election 
under Article 62(1)(f) to be contingent upon an adverse declaration 
by a Court of law being made against the candidate. Learned amicus 
curiae submits that this step dilutes the rigours of the sanction under 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution which otherwise does not fix a 
time limit for the incapacity imposed by it. The learned amicus curiae 
has argued that according to his understanding, every act of 
dishonesty conceivably falls within the ambit of moral turpitude. 
Therefore, dishonesty under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is a 
subset of moral turpitude in Article 63(1)(h) thereof. The imposition 
of a lifetime bar on contesting election to Parliament under Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution would render Article 63(1)(h) thereof 
redundant. Therefore, the two provisions of the Constitution ought 
to be construed to derive substance and meaning from each other. 
Consequently, the period of incapacity under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 12 - 
Constitution ought to be limited to the period of disqualification 
imposed on a candidate for election under Article 63(1)(h) of the 
Constitution.  
9. 
 
Syed Ali Zafar, learned ASC also appearing as amicus 
curiae argued that the present exercise is essentially a journey to 
discover the silence of the Constitution. This is because no time 
limitation has been prescribed for the incapacity imposed on a 
candidate by Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. From the historical 
perspective, the disqualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution is permanent which represents one extreme; on the 
other 
hand, 
the 
other 
extreme 
perspective 
can 
be 
that 
disqualification is for one election term, that is five years. However, 
he advocated a third approach for fixing a time period between 
those two extremes to be determined by the Court as it deems fit. 
The learned amicus curiae stated that in doing so, the Court will be 
adopting the structural methodology of constitutional interpretation. 
He then referred to six modalities of construction of constitutional 
provisions as per Philip Babbitt in his book “Constitutional 
Interpretation” referred to in Al-Jehad Trust  vs.   Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 84). By following the structural modality for 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions in the present case, the 
Court would give due importance to the fundamental right of 
citizens to contest election under Article 17 of the Constitution. 
Moreover, qualifications for and disqualifications to contest election 
for a seat in Parliament under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution 
in essence deal with a common subject and therefore the two 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 13 - 
provisions are complementary to each other and ought to be read 
together. A person who has committed a criminal offence involving 
moral turpitude is permitted to contest election after a lapse of five 
years of his release from prison, therefore, the constitutional 
intention cannot be to inflict a graver punishment of a life time bar 
to contest election upon a person who has committed a dishonest 
act. Finally, he submitted that by omitting to prescribe a period of 
incapacity for lack of qualification of a candidate for election, Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution purposefully left the extent of the 
exclusionary bar to the discretion and judgment of the Court.  
10. 
 
At the end of the proceedings, learned Attorney General 
for Pakistan also assisted the Court with his succinct and candid 
submissions. He submitted that omission by the Constitution to 
provide a time limit for the incapacity imposed under Article 62(1)(f) 
of the Constitution cannot mean that such incapacity is of 
permanent character. Such a result would deprive a person of his 
fundamental 
right 
under 
Article 
17 
of 
the 
Constitution. 
Furthermore, the effect of a judicial declaration under Article 62(1)(f) 
of the Constitution has to be weighed on a case to case basis. A case 
of breach of trust differs from forgery or a misdeclaration of fact 
made under oath. However, he accepted that a judicial declaration 
of a person being dishonest or not ameen under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution does not end with the efflux of time. Finally, he stated 
that it is only for the Legislature to put a time limit on the period of 
incapacity suffered by a candidate under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution in consequence of an adverse judicial declaration. Until 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 14 - 
such time as Parliament intervenes, the incapacity to contest 
elections shall continue under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution for 
so long as an adverse judicial declaration against a candidate is in 
force.  
Analysis:        
11. 
 
Before 
we 
proceed 
to 
examine 
the 
respective 
contentions of the learned counsel appearing before us, it would be 
useful to reproduce the provisions of Articles 62 and 63 of the 
Constitution as originally framed in the year 1973 (“1973 
Constitution”), followed by their version after amendments 
expanding the list of qualifications and disqualifications laid down 
therein for becoming or remaining a Member of Parliament: 
 
 
1973 Constitution: 
“62. A person shall not be qualified to be elected or chosen 
as a member of Parliament unless—  
(a) he is a citizen of Pakistan;  
 
(b) he is, in the case of the National Assembly, not 
less than twenty- five years of age and is enrolled 
as a voter in any electoral roll for election to that 
Assembly;  
 
(c) he is, in the case of the Senate, not less than 
thirty years of age and is enrolled as a voter in any 
area in a Province or, as the case may be, the 
Federal Capital or the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, from where he seeks membership; 
and 
 
(d) he possesses such other qualifications as may be 
prescribed by Act of Parliament.” 
 
“63.(1) A person shall be disqualified from being elected or 
chosen as, and from being, a member of Parliament, if—  
(a) he is of unsound mind and has been so declared 
by a competent court; or  
 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 15 - 
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent; or  
 
(c) he ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan, or acquires 
the citizenship of a foreign State; or  
 
(d) he holds any office of profit in the service of 
Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to 
disqualify its holder; or  
(e) he is so disqualified by Act of Parliament.  
 
(2) 
If any question arises whether a member of 
Parliament has become disqualified from being a member, 
the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Chairman shall 
refer the question to the Chief Election Commissioner and, 
if the Chief Election Commissioner is of the opinion that 
the member has become disqualified, he shall cease to be a 
member and his seat shall become vacant.” 
 
12. 
 
During the Martial Law regime of General Zia-ul-Haq, 
amendments were made in 1973 Constitution including some that 
were meant to supplement the Islamic content of the Constitution. In 
the present context, the President’s Order No.14 of 1985 introduced, 
inter alia, new qualifications and disqualifications for membership to 
Parliament. These are reproduced below: 
 
 
1985 Amendment: 
“62. A person shall not be qualified to be elected or chosen 
as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) unless—  
(a) he is a citizen of Pakistan;  
(b) he is, in the case of National Assembly, not less 
than twenty- five years of age and is enrolled as a 
voter in any electoral roll for election to a Muslim 
seat or a non-Muslim seat as the case may be in that 
Assembly;  
(c) he is, in the case of Senate, not less than thirty 
years of age and is enrolled as a voter in any area in 
a Province or, as the case may be, the Federal 
Capital or the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
from where he seeks membership;  
(d) he is of good character and is not commonly 
known as one who violates Islamic Injunctions;  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 16 - 
(e) he has adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings 
and practices obligatory duties prescribed by Islam 
as well as well abstains from major sins;  
(f) he is sagacious, righteous and non-profligate 
and honest and ameen;  
(g) he has not been convicted for a crime involving 
moral turpitude or for giving false evidence;  
(h) he has not, after the establishment of Pakistan, 
worked against the integrity of the country or 
opposed the ideology of Pakistan:  
Provided that the disqualifications specified in 
paragraphs (d) and (e) shall not apply to a person 
who is a non-Muslim, but such a person shall have 
good moral reputation; and  
 
(i) he possesses such other qualifications as may be 
prescribed by Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament).” 
 
The new disqualifications for election incorporated by the 
President’s Order No.14 of 1985 in Article 63 of the Constitution 
recapitulated the prescriptions made in certain existing statutes but 
without emphasizing the Islamic law: 
“63.(1) A person shall be disqualified from being elected or 
chosen as, and from being, a member of the Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament), if—  
(a) he is of unsound mind and has been so declared 
by a competent court; or  
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent; or  
(c) he ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan, or acquires 
the citizenship of a foreign State; or  
(d) he holds an office of profit in the service of 
Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to 
disqualify its holder; or  
(e) he is in the service of any statutory body or any 
body which is owned or controlled by the 
Government or in which the Government has a 
controlling share or interest; or  
(f) being a citizen of Pakistan by virtue of section 
14B of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 (II of 
1951), he is for the time being disqualified under 
any law in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir from 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 17 - 
being elected as a member of the Legislative 
Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; or  
(g) he is propagating any opinion, or acting in any 
manner, prejudicial to the Ideology of Pakistan, or 
the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or 
morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the 
integrity or independence of the judiciary of 
Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule 
the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan; or  
(h) he has been, on conviction for any offence 
which in the opinion of the Chief Election 
Commissioner involves moral turpitude, sentenced 
to imprisonment for a term of not less than two 
years, unless a period of five years has elapsed 
since his release; or  
(i) he has been dismissed from the service of 
Pakistan on the ground of misconduct, unless a 
period of five years has elapsed since his dismissal; 
or  
(j) he has been removed or compulsorily retired 
from the service of Pakistan on the ground of 
misconduct unless a period of three years has 
elapsed 
since 
his 
removal 
or 
compulsory 
retirement; or  
(k) he has been in the service of Pakistan or of any 
statutory body or any body which is owned or 
controlled by the Government or in which the 
Government has a controlling share or interest, 
unless a period of two years has elapsed since he 
ceased to be in such service; or  
(l) he is found guilty of a corrupt or illegal practice 
under any law for the time being in force, unless a 
period of five years has elapsed from the date on 
which that order takes effect; or  
(m) he has been convicted under section 7 of the 
Political Parties Act, 1962 (III of 1962), unless a 
period of five years has elapsed from the date of 
such conviction; or  
(n) he, whether by himself or by any person or 
body of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or 
on his account or as a member of a Hindu 
undivided family, has any share or interest in a 
contract, 
not 
being 
a 
contract 
between 
a 
cooperative society and Government, for the 
supply of goods to, or for the execution of any 
contract or for the performance of any service 
undertaken by, Government:  
Provided that the disqualification under this 
paragraph shall not apply to a person—  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 18 - 
(i) where the share or interest in the contract 
devolves 
on 
him 
by 
inheritance 
or 
succession or as a legatee, executor or 
administrator, until the expiration of six 
months after it has so devolved on him;  
(ii) where the contract has been entered into 
by or on behalf of a public company as 
defined in the Companies Ordinance, 1984 
(XLVII of 1984), of which he is a 
shareholder but is not a director holding an 
office of profit under the company; or 
(iii) where he is a member of a Hindu 
undivided family and the contract has been 
entered into by any other member of that 
family in the course of carrying on a 
separate business in which he has no share 
or interest; or  
Explanation.— In this Article “goods” does 
not 
include 
agricultural 
produce 
or 
commodity grown or produced by him or 
such goods as he is, under any directive of 
Government or any law for the time being 
in force, under a duty or obligation to 
supply. 
(o) he holds any office of profit in the service of 
Pakistan other than the following offices, namely:- 
(i) an office which is not whole time office 
remunerated either by salary or by fee;  
(ii) the office of Lumbardar, whether called 
by this or any other title;  
(iii) the Qaumi Razakars;  
(iv) any office the holder whereof, by virtue 
of such office, is liable to be called up for 
military training or military service under 
any law providing for the constitution or 
raising of a Force; or  
(p) he is for the time being disqualified from being 
elected or chosen as a member of the Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament) or of a Provincial Assembly 
under any law for the time being in force.  
 
(2) If any question arises whether a member of the Majlis-
e-Shoora (Parliament) has become disqualified from being 
a member, the Speaker or, as the case may be, the 
Chairman shall refer the question to the Chief Election 
Commissioner and, if the Chief Election Commissioner is 
of the opinion that the member has become disqualified, 
he shall cease to be a member and his seat shall become 
vacant.” 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 19 - 
 
13. 
 
The above amendments made by the President’s Order 
No.14 of 1985 were affirmed by the elected Parliament vide 8th 
Constitutional Amendment in the year 1985. Constitutional 
amendments were also made in the year 2002 by the Legal 
Framework Order, 2002 during the Martial Law regime of General 
Pervez Musharraf. However, these amendments are not significant 
for our present discussion regarding eligibility to contest an election 
for a seat in Parliament. This is because in the year 2010, Parliament 
discarded these changes through the 18th Constitution Amendment 
Act, 2010 and substantially reformed the constitutional scheme 
regarding candidature for election to the Parliament. Therefore, it is 
the post 18th Amendment version of Articles 62 and 63 of the 
Constitution that is relevant to the present controversy and may 
now be examined in order to comprehend the improvement made in 
the clarity and enforceability of the said provisions: 
Post 18th Amendment: 
“Qualifications for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament). – 
62. (1) A person shall not be qualified to be elected or 
chosen as a member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
unless−  
(a) he is a citizen of Pakistan;  
(b) he is, in the case of the National Assembly, not 
less than twenty-five years of age and is enrolled as 
a voter in any electoral roll in −  
(i) any part of Pakistan, for election to a 
general seat or a seat reserved for non-
Muslims; and  
(ii) any area in a Province from which she 
seeks membership for election to a seat 
reserved for women.  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 20 - 
(c) he is, in the case of the Senate, not less than 
thirty years of age and is enrolled as a voter in any 
area in a Province or, as the case may be, the 
Federal Capital or the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas, from where he seeks membership;  
(d) he is of good character and is not commonly 
known as one who violates Islamic Injunctions;  
(e) he has adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings 
and practices obligatory duties prescribed by Islam 
as well as abstains from major sins;  
(f) he is sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest 
and ameen, there being no declaration to the 
contrary by a court of law; and  
(g) he has not, after the establishment of Pakistan, 
worked against the integrity of the country or 
opposed the ideology of Pakistan.  
(2) The disqualifications specified in paragraphs (d) and (e) 
shall not apply to a person who is a non-Muslim, but such 
a person shall have good moral reputation.” 
“Disqualifications for membership of Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament).  
63.(1) A person shall be disqualified from being elected or 
chosen as, and from being, a member of the Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament), if −  
(a) he is of unsound mind and has been so declared 
by a competent court; or  
(b) he is an undischarged insolvent; or  
(c) he ceases to be a citizen of Pakistan, or acquires 
the citizenship of a foreign State; or  
(d) he holds an office of profit in the service of 
Pakistan other than an office declared by law not to 
disqualify its holder; or  
(e) he is in the service of any statutory body or any 
body which is owned or controlled by the 
Government or in which the Government has a 
controlling share or interest; or  
(f) being a citizen of Pakistan by virtue of section 
14B of the Pakistan Citizenship Act, 1951 (II of 
1951), he is for the time being disqualified under 
any law in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir from 
being elected as a member of the Legislative 
Assembly of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; or  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 21 - 
(g) he has been convicted by a court of competent 
jurisdiction for propagating any opinion, or acting 
in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology of 
Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of 
Pakistan, or the integrity or independence of the 
judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings 
into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of 
Pakistan, unless a period of five years has elapsed 
since his release; or  
(h) he has been, on conviction for any offence 
involving 
moral 
turpitude, 
sentenced 
to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, 
unless a period of five years has elapsed since his 
release; or  
(i) he has been dismissed from the service of 
Pakistan or service of a corporation or office set up 
or 
controlled 
by 
the 
Federal 
Government, 
Provincial Government or a Local Government on 
the ground of misconduct, unless a period of five 
years has elapsed since his dismissal; or 
 
(j) he has been removed or compulsorily retired 
from the service of Pakistan or service of a 
corporation or office set up or controlled by the 
Federal Government, Provincial Government or a 
Local Government on the ground of misconduct, 
unless a period of three years has elapsed since his 
removal or compulsory retirement; or  
(k) he has been in the service of Pakistan or of any 
statutory body or any body which is owned or 
controlled by the Government or in which the 
Government has a controlling share or interest, 
unless a period of two years has elapsed since he 
ceased to be in such service; or  
(l) he, whether by himself or by any person or body 
of persons in trust for him or for his benefit or on 
his account or as a member of a Hindu undivided 
family, has any share or interest in a contract, not 
being a contract between a cooperative society and 
Government, for the supply of goods to, or for the 
execution of any contract or for the performance of 
any service undertaken by, Government:  
Provided that the disqualification under this 
paragraph shall not apply to a person −  
(i) where the share or interest in the contract 
devolves 
on 
him 
by 
inheritance 
or 
succession or as a legatee, executor or 
administrator, until the expiration of six 
months after it has so devolved on him;  
(ii) where the contract has been entered into 
by or on behalf of a public company as 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 22 - 
defined in the Companies Ordinance, 1984 
(XLVII of 1984), of which he is a 
shareholder but is not a director holding an 
office of profit under the company; or 
(iii) where he is a member of a Hindu 
undivided family and the contract has been 
entered into by any other member of that 
family in the course of carrying on a 
separate business in which he has no share 
or interest;  
Explanation.− In this Article “goods” does not 
include agricultural produce or commodity grown 
or produced by him or such goods as he is, under 
any directive of Government or any law for the 
time being in force, under a duty or obligation to 
supply; 
or (m) he holds any office of profit in the service of 
Pakistan other than the following offices, namely:−  
(i) an office which is not whole time office 
remunerated either by salary or by fee;  
(ii) the office of Lumbardar, whether called 
by this or any other title;  
(iii) the Qaumi Razakars;  
(iv) any office the holder whereof, by virtue 
of such office, is liable to be called up for 
military training or military service under 
any law providing for the constitution or 
raising of a Force; or  
(n) he has obtained a loan for an amount of two 
million rupees or more, from any bank, financial 
institution, cooperative society or cooperative body 
in his own name or in the name of his spouse or 
any of his dependents, which remains unpaid for 
more than one year from the due date, or has got 
such loan written off; or  
(o) he or his spouse or any of his dependents has 
defaulted in payment of government dues and 
utility expenses, including telephone, electricity, 
gas and water charges in excess of ten thousand 
rupees, for over six months, at the time of filing his 
nomination papers; or  
(p) he is for the time being disqualified from being 
elected or chosen as a member of the Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament) or of a Provincial Assembly 
under any law for the time being in force.  
Explanation.− For the purposes of this paragraph 
“law” shall not include an Ordinance promulgated 
under Article 89 or Article 128.  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 23 - 
(2) If any question arises whether a member of the Majlis-
e-Shoora (Parliament) has become disqualified from being 
a member, the Speaker or, as the case may be, the 
Chairman shall, unless he decides that no such question 
has arisen, refer the question to the Election Commission 
within thirty days and if he fails to do so within the 
aforesaid period it shall be deemed to have been referred 
to the Election Commission.  
(3) The Election Commission shall decide the question 
within ninety days from its receipt or deemed to have been 
received and if it is of the opinion that the member has 
become disqualified, he shall cease to be a member and his 
seat shall become vacant.” 
 
14. 
 
It will be seen that the introduction in 1985 of Islamic 
provisions in Article 62 of the Constitution were retained by the 18th 
Constitutional Amendment. However, certain overlap in the subject 
matter of the provisions of clauses (g) and (h) of Article 62(1) and 
Article 63 of the Constitution was removed by deleting repetitive 
text in Article 62(1) of the Constitution. The salient Islamic 
provisions of Article 62, retained by the 18th Constitutional 
Amendment are contained in its clauses (d), (e) and (f) of Article 62 
of the Constitution. These carry Quranic qualifications under Islamic 
law for establishing eligibility to hold public office of trust or 
authority. Although introduced in the year 1985, these clauses 
continue to remain part of the Constitution. Clauses (d) and (e) of 
Article 62 lay down the following conditions of eligibility for 
election to Parliament, namely, good character, observance of 
Islamic injunctions, knowledge of Islamic teachings and abstention 
from major sins. These conditions are subjective and under Article 
62(2) obligate only the Muslim candidates for election to Parliament. It 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 24 - 
may also be noted that these provisions do not prescribe objective 
standards of conduct. Therefore, only cases of blatant deviation from 
commonly recognized and accepted standards of Islamic norms can 
form the subject matter of such restraints.  
15. 
 
On the other hand, Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution 
also imposes  Islamic ethical conditions for eligibility of a candidate 
for election to Parliament but these are made applicable to both 
Muslim as well as non-Muslim candidates for Parliamentary 
membership. One reason that the conditions of Article 62(1)(f) are 
made a criterion of eligibility of all candidates for election is the 
universality of their ethical prescription. Their content constitutes a 
basic norm in all progressive democratic societies that are governed 
by the rule of law. It is a matter of fact that in Pakistan the members 
of Parliament occupy leadership roles for the people of Pakistan and 
constitute the political and ruling elite in society. According to the 
Preamble of the Constitution, these persons are representatives of 
the people of Pakistan to whom the former are ultimately 
responsible as fiduciaries. It was held by this Court in Muhammad 
Yasin  vs. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2012 SC 132 at p.164) that: 
“56. 
… holders of public office are first and foremost 
fiduciaries and trustees for the people of Pakistan …. and 
when performing the functions of their Office, they can 
have no interest other than the interests of the honourable 
People of Pakistan.” 
An instructive observation in this behalf was also made in 
Habibullah Energy Limited  vs.  WAPDA (PLD 2014 SC 47 at p.69) 
in the following terms: 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 25 - 
“6. 
… A breach of the duty of loyalty, such as in the 
case of a self-dealing transaction or one involving conflict 
of interest, will trigger heightened scrutiny by the court. 
Further, if public officials fail to exercise the duty of care 
that is expected of a prudent manager, the court will assess 
the underlying action or transaction to ascertain whether 
the state functionaries have breached their fiduciary 
obligations to the people of Pakistan.” 
 
16. 
 
The Holy Qur’an narrates the accounts of different 
exalted personalities having leadership roles. Amongst these, the 
Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is regarded as the finest example 
for emulation by mankind; not only for his exceptional spiritual 
qualities as a Messenger of Almighty Allah Subanahu Wa Ta’ala 
(“SWT”) but also his remarkable capabilities of humanity and 
leadership that distinguished him as the best role model. With such 
qualities the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) escaped persecution 
in his own land of Mecca to establish without any coercion a just and 
egalitarian society in the distant land of Madina. This city state was 
governed by the laws laid down in the Holy Qur’an and exemplified 
in the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Likewise, 
for his conquest of Mecca without the use of any force. A prominent 
American author, Michael H. Hart explains in his book titled “The 
100, a Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History”; 
Citadel, 1992 that: 
“My choice of Muhammad [PBUH] to lead the list of the 
world’s most influential persons may surprise some 
readers and may be questioned by others, but he was the 
only man in history who was supremely successful on 
both the religious and secular levels. … Muhammad 
[PBUH] was a secular as well as a religious leader. In fact, 
as the driving force behind the Arab conquests, he may 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 26 - 
well rank as the most influential political leader of all time. 
… We see then, that the Arab conquests of the seventh 
century have continued to play an important role in 
human history, down to the present day. It is this 
unparalleled 
combination 
of 
secular 
and 
religious 
influence which I feel entitles Muhammad [PBUH] to be 
considered the most influential single figure in human 
history.” 
 
 
 
 
 
[emphasis provided] 
 
For his extraordinary character qualities and impeccable ethical 
values the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) is described in Surah 
Al-Ahzab Ayat 21 (33:21) in the Holy Qur’an as follows:    
 
 
“Indeed in the Messenger of Allah (Muhammad SAW) you have a 
good example to follow for him who hopes in (the Meeting with) 
Allah and the Last Day and remembers Allah much.”   
The qualities of sagacity, righteousness, honesty and trustworthiness 
laid down in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution as qualifications for 
membership to the elected Houses are actually derived from the 
Sunnah of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Such strengths 
can never be equaled by ordinary mortals for whom these are goals 
to strive for and more importantly not to consciously violate. 
17. 
 
The Holy Qur’an recognizes the temporal significance 
of the character qualities specified in Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution. These qualities are since acknowledged in political 
thought as attributes of a public leader. One account of some 
qualities is are narrated by the Holy Qur’an in the story of Hazrat 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 27 - 
Yusuf (AS) in Surah Yusuf, Ayat No.54-55 (12:54-55) with a clear 
message: 
“And the king said, "Bring him to me; I will appoint him 
exclusively for myself." And when he spoke to him, he said, 
"Indeed, you are today established [in position] and trusted. 
[Joseph] said, “Appoint me over the storehouses of the land. 
Indeed, I will be a knowing guardian.” 
[emphasis supplied] 
 
These verses are often quoted to demonstrate Allah (SWT)’s 
guidance 
that 
the 
qualities 
of 
honesty, 
trustworthiness, 
guardianship, knowledge and skill are necessary attributes of 
persons holding public office involving trust and responsibility. 
These requirements are echoed in the conditions of sagacity, honesty 
and Ameen (trustworthiness) specified as qualifications in Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution for membership to Parliament. As 
observed above, the laws of mature secular democracies emphasise 
the importance of the above-noted qualities to dignify persons 
holding parliamentary office. These standards are generally lodged 
in laws, enforced, inter alia, through a code of conduct for 
lawmakers; or as regulations that provide amongst others, for a duty 
to act honestly solely in public interest, avoidance of conflict of 
interest and setting out the terms and extent of disclosure of their 
pecuniary and other interests. The priority of the duties owed by 
Parliamentarians and of accountability for their actions that are 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 28 - 
established in the current Code of Conduct for Members of 
Parliament (United Kingdom) are such that deserve review: 
“The Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament 
Prepared pursuant to the Resolution of the House of 19 July 1995 
I. Purpose of the Code  
1. The purpose of this Code of Conduct is to assist all 
Members in the discharge of their obligations to the 
House, their constituents and the public at large by: 
(a) establishing the standards and principles of 
conduct expected of all Members in undertaking 
their duties;  
(b) setting the rules of conduct which underpin 
these standards and principles and to which all 
Members must adhere; and in so doing  
(c) ensuring public confidence in the standards 
expected of all Members and in the commitment of 
the House to upholding these rules.  
 
II. Scope of the Code  
2. The Code applies to Members in all aspects of their 
public life. It does not seek to regulate what Members do 
in their purely private and personal lives.  
3. The obligations set out in this Code are complementary 
to those which apply to all Members by virtue of the 
procedural and other rules of the House and the rulings of 
the Chair, and to those which apply to Members falling 
within the scope of the Ministerial Code.  
III. Duties of Members  
4. By virtue of the oath, or affirmation, of allegiance taken 
by all Members when they are elected to the House, 
Members have a duty to be faithful and bear true 
allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, her heirs and 
successors, according to law.  
5. Members have a duty to uphold the law, including the 
general law against discrimination.  
6. Members have a general duty to act in the interests of 
the nation as a whole; and a special duty to their 
constituents.  
7. Members should act on all occasions in accordance with 
the public trust placed in them. They should always 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 29 - 
behave with probity and integrity, including in their use of 
public resources.  
 
IV. General Principles of Conduct  
8. In carrying out their parliamentary and public duties, 
Members will be expected to observe the following general 
principles of conduct identified by the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life in its First Report as applying to 
holders of public office. These principles will be taken into 
account 
when 
considering 
the 
investigation 
and 
determination of any allegations of breaches of the rules of 
conduct in Part V of the Code.  
Selflessness  
Holders of public office should take decisions solely in 
terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order 
to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, 
their family, or their friends.  
 
Integrity  
Holders of public office should not place themselves under 
any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or 
organisations 
that 
might 
influence 
them 
in 
the 
performance of their official duties.  
 
Objectivity  
In carrying out public business, including making public 
appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending 
individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public 
office should make choices on merit.  
 
Accountability  
Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions 
and actions to the public and must submit themselves to 
whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.  
 
Openness  
Holders of public office should be as open as possible 
about all the decisions and actions that they take. They 
should give reasons for their decisions and restrict 
information only when the wider public interest clearly 
demands.  
 
Honesty  
Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private 
interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to 
resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the 
public interest.  
 
Leadership  
Holders of public office should promote and support these 
principles by leadership and example.”  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 30 - 
 
V. Rules of Conduct  
9. Members are expected to observe the following rules 
and associated Resolutions of the House.  
10. Members shall base their conduct on a consideration of 
the public interest, avoid conflict between personal interest 
and the public interest and resolve any conflict between 
the two, at once, and in favour of the public interest.  
11. No Member shall act as a paid advocate in any 
proceeding of the House.  
12. The acceptance by a Member of a bribe to influence his 
or her conduct as a Member, including any fee, 
compensation or reward in connection with the promotion 
of, or opposition to, any Bill, Motion, or other matter 
submitted, or intended to be submitted to the House, or to 
any Committee of the House, is contrary to the law of 
Parliament.  
13. Members shall fulfill conscientiously the requirements 
of the House in respect of the registration of interests in the 
Register of Members’ Financial Interests. They shall always 
be open and frank in drawing attention to any relevant 
interest in any proceeding of the House or its Committees, 
and in any communications with Ministers, Members, 
public officials or public office holders.  
14. Information which Members receive in confidence in 
the course of their parliamentary duties should be used 
only in connection with those duties. Such information 
must never be used for the purpose of financial gain.  
15. Members are personally responsible and accountable 
for ensuring that their use of any expenses, allowances, 
facilities and services provided from the public purse is in 
accordance with the rules laid down on these matters. 
Members shall ensure that their use of public resources is 
always in support of their parliamentary duties. It should 
not confer any undue personal or financial benefit on 
themselves or anyone else, or confer undue advantage on a 
political organisation.  
16. Members shall never undertake any action which 
would cause significant damage to the reputation and 
integrity of the House of Commons as a whole, or of its 
Members generally.  …” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[emphasis supplied] 
 
The substantive content of the Code of Conduct is derived from 
centuries of parliamentary experience in the United Kingdom. 
However, these principles mirror and build upon the basic values 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 31 - 
and standards of public conduct that were espoused by the Holy 
Qur’an and the Holy Prophet (PBUH) fourteen centuries ago. Be that 
as it may, the universality of standards of honourable conduct in 
public life in the contemporary democratic world, irrespective of 
faith or culture, makes it plausible that firstly, the conditions of 
eligibility for election under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution  are 
made applicable to all candidates for the Parliament including non-
Muslim candidates; and secondly, that these conditions have been 
retained by the elected Parliament in the 18th Constitutional 
Amendment.  
18. 
 
The foregoing view is further reinforced by the 
Constitutional duty of honesty, devotion of best ability in decisions, 
faithfulness and fidelity to the Constitution and the law that are 
sworn by every member of Parliament in his Oath made in 
pursuance of Article 65 of the Constitution read with its Third 
Schedule and by every member of the Provincial Assemblies sworn 
under Articles 65 and 127 read with the Third Schedule to the 
Constitution. Such a firm and robust commitment enjoined by the 
Constitution upon members of the elected Legislatures conforms the 
Constitutional architecture envisaged in its Preamble providing for 
the exercise of authority over the people of Pakistan, within the 
limits prescribed by Almighty Allah (SWT), as a sacred trust. For the 
State is to be run through the chosen “representatives of the people” 
observing principles of democracy, freedom, tolerance and social 
justice as envisaged by Islam, enabling Muslims to order their lives 
individually and collectively in accordance with the teachings and 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 32 - 
requirements of Islam, as set out in the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah of 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). [emphasis supplied]. 
19. 
 
With the foregoing structure of normative values 
enshrined in and reiterated by our Constitution, there can be no 
doubt that the qualifications in Article 62(1)(f) occupy a crucial place 
in the exercise of political rights conferred by the Constitution. These 
political rights are guaranteed by Article 17 of the Constitution, 
which is reproduced herein below: 
“Freedom of Association: 
17.(1) Every citizen shall have the right to form 
associations 
or 
unions, 
subject 
to 
any 
reasonable 
restrictions imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty 
or integrity or Pakistan, public order or morality.  
(2) Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall 
have the right to form or be a member of a political party, 
subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in 
the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and 
such law shall provide that where the Federal Government 
declares that any political party has been formed or is 
operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or 
integrity of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall, within 
fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the 
Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be 
final.  
(3) Every political party shall account for the source of its 
funds in accordance with law.” 
 
In the case of Muhammad Nawaz Sharif  vs.  Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 1993 SC 473 at p.559), the right to contest an election 
and to form government has been held to emanate from the right 
conferred by Article 17(2) of the Constitution, that guarantees the 
freedom to form and to be a member of a political party. The 
fundamental right under Article 17(2) of the Constitution has been a 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 33 - 
subject of repeated scrutiny by this Court as and when actual or 
perceived threats to the democratic dispensation were challenged 
before the Courts. A celebrated judgment in this behalf was 
delivered in the case of Miss Benazir Bhutto   vs.  Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 416). It laid down a threshold for ensuring 
the lawful exercise of the fundamental right of political association 
and action. The precedent hold that the exercise of political rights 
and action is not absolute in character and is subject to any 
reasonable restriction imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty 
or integrity of Pakistan. These observations made in the said 
judgment (at page 570 of the law report) are presently relevant and are 
reproduced below: 
“The right to form associations or unions or political 
parties, like all other Fundamental Rights, is not absolute. 
Article 17 explicitly authorises the State to impose 
reasonable restrictions on the exercise and enjoyment of 
this right. The restrictions which the State is empowered to 
impose on the right to form or be a member of a political 
party will have to satisfy criteria embodied in Article 17(2), 
firstly that these restrictions should have a statutory 
sanction which means that the executive cannot, without 
the backing of law, impose any restriction on the exercise 
and enjoyment of the right. Second, the restrictions 
imposed should pass the test of reasonableness before they 
can validly restrict the exercise of the right. Third, these 
restrictions in order to be constitutional will have to have a 
clear nexus with one of the grounds i.e. sovereignty or 
integrity of Pakistan. These requirements are implicit in 
the expression “in the interest of” the sovereignty or 
integrity of Pakistan.” 
 
The expression “integrity of Pakistan” used in Article 17(2) of the 
Constitution has been construed in the said judgment to include 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 34 - 
“morality” as one of its features. This is because the word “integrity” 
means moral soundness, morality and sound moral principles. 
These ought to be read as forming part of the expression “integrity 
of Pakistan.” After quoting the Holy Qur’an, it is observed (at page 
526 of the law report) that: 
“… [N]ot only individually but also collectively Muslims 
have to live within an exclusively moral framework as 
enjoined by the Holy Quran and the Sunnah. No civilised 
society can deny this standard of morality. The concept of 
democracy in our Constitution should, therefore, be 
regarded to be imbued with individual and collective 
morality as according to Islam (Holy Quran and Sunnah). 
It goes without saying that morality provides the basis for 
the society’s spiritual values and in terms of democracy--
freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice. Collectively 
the political parties are now expected to protect public 
morals in the same way as other legal institutions protect 
public truthfulness and public symbols of authority. To 
leave the political parties entirely free to do as they please 
is to suggest that morality does not matter. A situation like 
this might prove ultimately subversive to the fabric of the 
State in the maintenance of the law and order. Therefore, 
political parties should conform to stringent obligations of 
high ethical standard.” 
 
20. 
 
Pursuant to the said criteria the political rights of action 
under Article 17(2) of the Constitution are subject to reasonable 
restrictions that may be imposed by statutory law. These would 
include conditions imposed upon a candidate to contest election. 
The stature of the qualifying limitations under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution occupy an insular and superior pedigree than statutory 
limitations. This is because the test under Article 17(2) of the 
Constitution applies to statutory but not to constitutional 
restrictions. The latter enjoy an autonomy that is discussed below.  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 35 - 
21. 
 
The matter of curtailment of the fundamental right of 
freedom of expression of parliamentarians under Article 19 of the 
Constitution came up for scrutiny by this Court in the case of 
Wukala Mahaz Barai Tahafaz Dastoor   vs.  Federation of Pakistan 
(PLD 1998 SC 1263). The issue was whether safeguards against 
defection by parliamentarians incorporated by Article 63A in the 
Constitution amounted to a violation of the parliamentarians’ 
political right of freedom of expression guaranteed under Articles 19 
and 66 of the Constitution. It was held that Article 8 of the 
Constitution giving overriding effect to Fundamental Rights over 
conflicting statutes did not, however, operate to judge or invalidate 
other provisions of the Constitution (at p.1313 of the law report). As a 
result Article 63A of the Constitution was held to be valid law 
although it made parliamentarians liable to dismissal by their 
parliamentary party leader:  for breach of party discipline expressed 
through the party’s constitution, code of conduct and declared 
policies or for voting contrary to the directions issued by the 
parliamentary party to which they belong or for abstention from 
voting in the House contrary to the party’s policies against any bill. 
It was held that forfeiture of parliamentary membership as a 
consequence of the breach of party discipline by a parliamentarian 
nevertheless did not wrest his  freedom of speech and expression 
under Article 19 of the Constitution.  
22. 
 
Just as the validity of a Constitutional provision cannot 
be tested at the touchstone of Article 8 and fundamental rights 
thereof [Ref: Mahmood Khan Achakzai   vs.  Federation of Pakistan 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 36 - 
(PLD 1997 SC 426)], it is also an established rule that Article 2A of 
the Constitution cannot be made a benchmark to test the validity of 
another Constitutional provision [Ref: Hakim Khan vs. Government 
of Pakistan (PLD 1992 SC 595 at pp.630 & 634)]. In the above 
scenario, the overriding principle of Constitutional interpretation is 
that every word, clause and Article of the Constitution must be 
given effect and the attribution of redundancy to any part of the 
Constitution be avoided. [Ref: Reference by the President (PLD 1957 
SC 219 at p.235). As such, the Constitution must be interpreted as a 
whole because it is an organic document that is meant to apply to 
the changing circumstances of time and space. Consequently, each 
provision of the Constitution or part thereof has a purpose, meaning 
and integral place that must be understood, acknowledged and 
applied harmoniously. It is only when a conflict between two 
provisions of the Constitution is irreconcilable and one of such 
provisions was inserted when the Constitution was held in 
abeyance, then the provision which was made part of the 
Constitution during the period of its abeyance would yield, 
provided that the other provision conflicting therewith was enforced 
by parliamentary will and is closer to the provisions of the Preamble 
of the Constitution. Reference is made to District Bar Association, 
Rawalpindi   vs.  Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2015 SC 401). 
23. 
 
In 
the 
background 
of 
aforesaid 
principles 
of 
interpretation of the Constitutional provisions and the equal 
standing of both Article 17(2) and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, 
the task of harmoniously interpreting the fundamental right under 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 37 - 
Article 17(2) of the Constitution and the pre-conditions for reposing 
responsibility and authority upon persons vying for parliamentary 
office under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution may now be 
undertaken. The substantive content of Article 62(1)(f) finds support 
from the Preamble of the Constitution emphasising Islamic values in 
Society and from the Oath of parliamentary office which enjoins 
honesty, faithfulness to public interest and the law. Endorsement of 
such conditions is also given by the 18th Constitutional Amendment 
passed by an assertive Parliament in the year 2010. Several 
important adjustments were made by this Amendment in the 
contours of the Constitution. Most notably, these include the 
distribution of State functions and authority between the Federation 
and the Provinces; and also a new mechanism for appointment of 
superior Court Judges. In the present context, the conditions and 
qualifications in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution were retained in 
toto; and made objectively and transparently enforceable by the 
prescription of a judicial declaration for precipitating the loss of the 
electoral qualification specified in the said clause. Where a 
declaration made by a Court of law against a candidate for election 
warrants a conclusion of his misrepresentation, dishonesty, breach 
of trust, fraud, cheating, lack of fiduciary duty, conflict of interest, 
deception, dishonest misappropriation, etc. to be derived from such 
a verdict, then it stands to reason that the consequential incapacity 
imposed upon the candidate for election should last for as long as 
the declaration is in force. This result follows as a rational 
consequence of the judicial declaration and from the lack of any time 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 38 - 
period of incapacity of the candidate being laid down in Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution. In other words, if the declaration by the 
Court has attained finality, the embargo under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution acquires permanent effect.  
24. 
 
The foregoing aspects of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution do not encumber but regulate the fundamental right of 
political association and action under Article 17(2) of the 
Constitution. The incorporation of the requirement of declaration by 
a Court (in terms of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution) necessarily 
involves delinquent conduct by a candidate for election that is in 
violation of the law. A Court of law does not issue a declaration that 
offends mere sentiments or sensibilities. Consequently, a valid 
declaration by the Court would involve the breach of a legal duty or 
obligation owed by the candidate for election to another person or 
the violation of the latter’s legal right or privilege.  
25. 
 
In our legal system the rights and duties of parties in a 
legal correlation are broadly speaking of two kinds. One species 
concerns the breach of rights or duties involving the commission of 
criminal offences. The convictions after trial for such offences carry 
punishments 
including 
the 
capital 
penalty, 
imprisonment, 
proprietary forfeitures and pecuniary fines. The other kind of legal 
correlation involves the breach of rights and duties that carry civil 
liability. A decree by a Court of civil jurisdiction can grant pecuniary 
or specific relief, including, a declaration with respect to a legal 
right, status or legal character. Such a decree that is based on 
admissions or evidence and sustained by reasons attains finality 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 39 - 
after remedies before the higher fora are exhausted. A final decree 
has binding effect and is commonly described as a past and closed 
transaction having permanent effect. Therefore, the consequence of 
permanent nature i.e. incapacity, following a final and binding 
decree of Court of civil jurisdiction, is the ordinary and lawful 
outcome of civil litigation.   
26. 
 
To advance the plea against permanent ineligibility 
under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution reference has been made to 
the constitutional disqualification to contest an election to a seat in 
Parliament on account of a conviction and sentence for commission 
of any offence involving moral turpitude. The provisions of Article 
63(1)(h) of the Constitution lay down this disqualification in the 
following terms: 
“63. (1) A person shall be disqualified from being elected 
or chosen as, and from being, a member of the Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament), if −  
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) … 
(e) … 
(f) … 
(g) … 
(h) he has been, on conviction for any offence 
involving 
moral 
turpitude, 
sentenced 
to 
imprisonment for a term of not less than two years, 
unless a period of five years has elapsed since his 
release; or  
…” 
 
 
 
[emphasis supplied] 
 
We have already observed that a conclusion about a judgment 
debtor having character failings specified in Article 62(1)(f) of the 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 40 - 
Constitution, that emanate or can be derived from a final judicial 
declaration, would cause the permanent incapacity of a candidate 
for elected office. It has been argued before us that the character 
flaws covered by Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution falls within the 
ambit of wrongs that involve moral turpitude under Article 63(1)(h) 
of the Constitution. A conviction and sentence by a Court of law for 
offences involving moral turpitude is subjected to a disability to 
contest an election to Parliament for a period of five years following 
release of the convict from prison. The expression “moral turpitude” 
is not a defined expression in our codified law; however, it has been 
examined in authoritative legal commentaries and precedents. 
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition 27-A, assigns the following 
meaning to the said expression: 
“Moral turpitude” is a vague term, and its meaning 
depends to some extent on the state of public morals; it is 
anything that is done contrary to justice, honesty, 
principle, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness, or 
depravity in the private and social duties which a man 
owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to 
the accepted and customary rule of right and duty 
between man and man; it implies something immoral in 
itself, regardless of fact whether it is punishable by law.”  
 
 
 
 
 
[emphasis supplied] 
 
The foregoing definition was considered by this Court in Ghulam 
Hussain    vs.   Chairman, POF Board (2002 SCMR 1691) and it was 
held that: 
“7. 
Perusal of the meaning of above expression clearly 
indicates that anything which is done contrary to the good 
principles of morality is within the circuit of above 
expression. In fact, any act which runs contrary to justice, 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 41 - 
honesty, good moral values, established judicial norms of a 
society, falls within the scope of above expression. …” 
 
According to the said definition, it is clear that offences of moral 
turpitude would include delinquent conduct involving, inter alia, 
misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust or fiduciary duty, 
dishonesty, misappropriation, forgery, cheating, conflict of interest,  
etc.  
27. 
 
It is apparent straightaway that the offences of moral 
turpitude should cover certain errant conduct that falls within the 
terms of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. Consequently, 
delinquent conduct under Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution would 
to such extent eclipse the criteria of qualifications set out in Article 
62(1)(f) thereof. However, both these provisions of the Constitution 
are distinct and separate which possess their respectively different 
place, meaning and effect under the Constitution. Article 63(1)(h) of 
the Constitution deals with the consequences of criminal liability of 
a delinquent action. Such action may also fall within the ambit of 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. However, the distinct place, 
purpose and meaning of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution becomes 
obvious from the civil consequences of its provisions as opposed to 
Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution which deals with the cognizance 
of the same action by a criminal court followed by criminal 
punishment. The two provisions of the Constitution, namely, Article 
62(1)(f) and Article 63(1)(h) deal with different laws, remedies, fora, 
and relief although the underlying subject matter of the legal action 
is the same. It is settled law that the outcome of criminal 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 42 - 
proceedings for a particular misconduct cannot foreclose the 
outcome of civil proceedings in relation to the same act. If the 
exclusivity of jurisdiction and proceedings in a Court and their 
outcome, that is civil or criminal respectively, is disregarded as is 
urged before us, redundancy would attach to the provisions of 
either Article 62(1)(f) or Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution, as the 
case may be. This is impermissible; the result of a judicial 
declaration envisaged in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution cannot 
be overshadowed by the outcome of a criminal proceeding for the 
same conduct.  
28. 
 
Article 62 of the Constitution provides the qualifications 
that must necessarily be possessed by a candidate for contesting 
election to Parliament. These qualifications are enumerated in 
Article 62(1)(a) to (g) of the Constitution. On the other hand, Article 
63(1) of the Constitution enumerates the disqualifications for the 
membership to the Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. These 
disqualifications are enumerated in clause (a) to clause (p) of Article 
63 of the Constitution. Although the ultimate result of a candidate 
for election lacking a qualification under Article 62 of the 
Constitution or for incurring disqualification under Article 63 of the 
Constitution is the same, namely, his ouster from the election 
contest, yet the object, meaning and effect of the two provisions is 
very different. The view that qualifications and disqualifications are 
interchangeable and therefore, the consequences of incurring either, 
namely, period of ouster from the election contest should be similar 
because the same misconduct can form the subject matter of both 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 43 - 
provisions, is flawed. In the case of Govt. of Pakistan  vs.  Akhlaque 
Hussain (PLD 1965 SC 527 at p.579), the two facets of ineligibility for 
vying a professional office were analysed in the following terms: 
“While sometimes qualification and disqualification may 
present two aspects of the same matter the two concepts 
are obviously distinct and it is not possible to contend that 
there can be no classification into qualification and 
disqualification of the attributes of a person in relation to a 
profession, etc. Reference may in this connection be made 
to Article 103 of this very Constitution which in two 
separate paragraphs provides for qualifications and 
disqualifications 
for 
membership 
of 
an 
Assembly. 
“Qualification” as will appear from Aiyar’s Law Lexicon 
means “that which makes person fit to do an act.” The 
Lexicon goes on to state: “qualification relates to the fitness 
or capacity of the party for a particular pursuit or a 
profession”. Webstor defines qualifications to mean “any 
natural endowment or acquirement which fits a person for 
a place, office or employment, or enables him to sustain 
any character with success”. It should be quite appropriate 
to refer by qualifications to the competence or the positive 
qualities needed for carrying on a profession and to regard 
the obstacles in the carrying on of a profession as 
disqualifications. Every profession requires for the efficient 
performance of the duties involved in it (1)knowledge, 
(2)skill and (3)a moral standard. In short whatever goes to 
his competence or makes a person fit to discharge the 
duties involved in his profession is a qualification. On the 
other hand, if a person is debarred from entering a 
profession though he is admittedly quite competent to 
discharge his duties for some reason not connected with 
his competence that is a disqualification. A person may be 
disqualified because he has served under a foreign 
Government or because he belongs to a particular tribe or 
his father was a rebel or because he has already sufficient 
income from lands or he is a shareholder of a company 
and so on. He may be the most competent person for 
carrying on a profession yet he may be debarred because 
of some other attributes which he possesses. That will be a 
disqualification.” 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 44 - 
 
Another pronouncement on the same point but on different facts 
was made in the case of Hamid Sarfaraz  vs.  Federation of Pakistan 
(PLD 1979 SC 991) wherein the issue addressed was that when 
Article 207 of the Constitution required a person appointed as 
Attorney General to possess the qualifications for appointment as 
Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, then would such person be 
deemed to be under the same ‘disability’ that was placed by the 
Constitution on a Judge of the Supreme Court in the matter of 
accepting another assignment carrying the right to remuneration. It 
was held that: 
“… The argument is clearly misconceived, as merely 
prescribing a certain qualification for appointment as 
Attorney-General for Pakistan does not mean that he 
would be governed by the same disability as applies to a 
Judge of the Supreme Court.” 
Subsequently, the same view has been followed in a reasoned 
judgment given by the learned High Court in Muhammad Shahbaz 
Sharif   vs.   Muhammad Altaf Hussain (PLD 1995 Lahore 541). On 
the other hand, the two aspects of eligibility, namely, qualifications 
and disqualifications to hold office, were held to be interchangeable 
by a learned Single Judge of the High Court in Muhammad Yousaf  
vs.  Irshad Sipra (1988 CLC 2475). This view has subsequently been 
shared by individual members of this Court but never as an opinion 
of a majority and without considering the afore-noted two 
judgments of this Court. One of the basic rules of construction of a 
Constitutional instrument is that effect should be given to every part 
and every word of a Constitution. Therefore, the Court must lean in 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 45 - 
favour of a construction which gives effect to every word without 
rendering it idle or nugatory. Reliance is placed upon the judgments 
in Reference by the President (PLD 1957 SC 219) and Mr. Fazlul 
Quader Chawdhry   vs.  Mr. Mohd. Abdul Haque (PLD 1963 SC 
486). Both on the said principle of Constitutional interpretation as 
well as the distinct nature and purpose of qualifications vis-a-vis 
disqualifications, 
the 
provisions 
of 
Article 
62(1)(f) 
of 
the 
Constitution 
containing 
qualifications 
cannot 
be 
used 
interchangeably with the disqualification under Article 63(1)(h) of 
the Constitution. The two provisions have their separate spheres of 
operation. Although the ultimate result of the enforcement of each 
provision is the exclusion of a candidate from an election contest on 
account of his delinquent conduct, yet each provision is worded 
differently and must be interpreted and construed in accordance 
with its terms. It goes without saying that since the two provisions 
pertain to the same subject matter, therefore, they ought to be 
construed harmoniously. However, in the discussion that follows, it 
is concluded that the two provisions address significantly different 
situations which ought to, in the proper scheme of things, be 
interpreted differently.     
29. 
 
Under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, the judicial 
declaration by a Court of civil jurisdiction against a candidate for 
election to Parliament would adjudicate misconduct of the candidate 
that has not resulted in his criminal conviction and sentence for 
more than two years by the competent Court. Accordingly, we now 
consider the argument that a civil law declaration involving 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 46 - 
personal flaws mentioned in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution 
should not carry ineligibility for contesting election that is longer in 
duration to the disability provided in Article 63(1)(h) of the 
Constitution for the same misconduct. 
30. 
 
At this juncture, two important considerations must be 
kept in mind; firstly, according to Article 63(1)(h) of the 
Constitution, the torment of a minimum of two years imprisonment 
upon conviction of an offence involving moral turpitude is 
necessary. This is of some importance. The reason for such an 
approach may be noticed in the view expressed by this Court on the 
concept of punishment awarded to an accused in a criminal case. In 
Dadullah  vs.  State (2015 SCMR 856 at p.862) it is held that: 
“9. 
Conceptually punishment to an accused is awarded 
on the concept of retribution, deterrence or reformation. 
The purpose behind infliction of sentence is two fold. 
Firstly, it would create such atmosphere, which could 
become a deterrence for the people who have inclination 
towards crime and; secondly to work as a medium in 
reforming the offence. Deterrent punishment is not only to 
maintain balance with gravity of wrong done by a person 
but also to make an example for others as a preventive 
measure for reformation of the society. …” 
 
31. 
 
Retributive justice entails several serious consequences 
apart from deprivation of personal liberty of the convict. Such a 
convict in fact suffers a loss of life by being immobilized, endures 
loss of his livelihood, watches disruption and hurt to his family and 
lives with the lasting stigma of conviction on his reputation. It is, 
therefore, said that a convict, who has undergone a sentence of 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 47 - 
corporal punishment has “paid his dues to society.” Even after his 
release from jail, the convict faces many daunting challenges for 
rehabilitating himself in society as a responsible, productive and 
acceptable member thereof. It is in this context that one should look 
at the disqualification under Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution for a 
limited period of five years imposed upon a convict after his release 
from jail. Even so, with the limited period of his disqualification as 
an ex-convict for offences involving moral turpitude, he still carries 
the odium of his past conviction before the voters in his 
constituency, whose hearts and minds he has yet to win. An ex-
convict suffers huge handicaps to find dignity and acceptance for 
himself in society. The notable effort by the Constitution to allow 
him an opportunity to reform himself and to strive for such a 
position in society cannot be deprecated for providing him relief 
rather than longer disenfranchisement.   
32. 
 
Secondly, on the other hand, a candidate for election 
who has committed misconduct falling within the terms of Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution, in particular, misrepresentation, 
dishonesty, breach of trust, fraud, cheating, lack of fiduciary duty, 
conflict of interest, deception, dishonest misappropriation, etc. as 
declared by a Court of civil jurisdiction has on the Islamic and also 
universal criteria of honesty, integrity and probity, rendered himself 
unfit to hold public office. He cannot be compared to the case of an 
ex-convict under Article 63(1)(h) of the Constitution because he has 
not paid a personal price for his delinquent act. It is in such 
circumstances that a person declared to be dishonest or in breach of 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 48 - 
his trust or fiduciary duty or being non-righteous or profligate must 
suffer the burden of that finding of incapacity for as long as the 
Court decree remains in force. Considering that the Constitution 
does not fix the period of incapacitation of such a judgment debtor 
shows a clear intention that the lack of qualification under Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution should extend so long as the declaration 
of law envisaged in Article 62(1)(f) remains in the field. If such 
declaration is final and binding, then the incapacity to contest 
elections to any of the Legislatures provided by the Constitution 
becomes permanent. There is no reason for applying the rule of 
proportionality to the incapacity of a candidate for election 
following a final decree against him in term of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution. Indeed the Court has no jurisdiction whatsoever to 
read into the Constitution nor any grounds for treating civil and 
criminal 
proceedings 
alike 
in 
relation 
to 
their 
respective 
consequences.  
33. 
 
In order to complete the picture it will be helpful to 
record the past view taken by this Court on the question presently in 
issue. There are several reported cases of this Court adjudicating 
deficiency in qualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution  
of a candidate but some that deal with the duration of his ouster 
from election. The first among these is reported as Imtiaz Ahmed 
Lali  vs. Ghulam Muhammad Lali (PLD 2007 SC 369). For the 
General Elections held in the year 2002, Chief Executive’s Order 
No.7 of 2002 enacted that if the candidate had been dismissed from 
service of Pakistan or a Province on the ground of misconduct 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 49 - 
involving moral turpitude, he shall be disqualified for contesting an 
election to Parliament. The relevant provision did not impose any 
time limitation. Consequently, the appellant who had been 
dismissed for misconduct from police service on 28.10.1990 was 
denied eligibility to contest election. It was held that the appellant 
suffered a life time embargo on his eligibility for election because his 
dismissal from service for misconduct barred him permanently from 
future employment as that would be prejudicial to the good order 
and discipline of the police force.  
34. 
 
In the post-18th Constitutional Amendment scenario, an 
adverse declaration by a Court of law against a candidate is 
necessary to oust him from an election. It was held in Abdul 
Ghafoor Lehri   vs. Returning Officer, PB-29 (2013 SCMR 1271) that 
a false declaration made in the nomination papers by a candidate 
about his academic qualification led to a permanent embargo on the 
candidature for election. This is because Article 62 of the 
Constitution did not provide any period for which a person would 
stand debarred from contesting elections and, therefore, the 
appellant before the Court could not become qualified merely by 
efflux of time. To the same effect is the judgment in Muhammad 
Khan Junejo   vs.  Federation of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1328 at 
p.1336) wherein a deficiency in qualification under Article 62(1)(f) of 
the Constitution led to a permanent disqualification. This outcome 
was followed in Allah Dino Khan Bhayo   vs.   Election 
Commission of Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1655), in which the following 
observations were made with respect to the duration of embargo 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 50 - 
imposed by a deficiency in qualification under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution: 
“11. 
… The provisions of the said Articles when 
examined in the light of the judgment of this Court 
referred to and reproduced herein above reveal that 
certain disqualifications are removed by the afflux of time 
e.g. disqualification on account of conviction or removal 
from service. Similarly, the qualifications can be acquired 
by some future act of the candidate e.g. by acquiring 
exclusive citizenship so as to become qualified in terms of 
Article 62(1)(a) of the Constitution. However, with regards 
to a qualification in terms of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution, the framers of the Constitution have chosen 
not to prescribe any period of time through the flux 
whereof or any act or omission through which such 
qualification can be acquired if a candidate or a member 
has been held not to possess the same. Consequently, if a 
person, is held not to be qualified in terms of Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution such absence of qualification in 
law will haunt him forever.” 
35. 
 
It is clear from the findings recorded in the afore-noted 
four judgments by this Court that the absence of a time limit for the 
ineligibility of a candidate for election in Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution is the basis for holding his incapacity to be incurable by 
efflux of time. The reasons recorded in our judgment reinforce that 
conclusion. It may also be noted that the Constitution envisages 
other situations in which a permanent bar to the eligibility of a 
candidate for election is enforced so long as the judgment that 
records or justifies the disability of the candidate remains in 
existence and occupies the field. This view is supported by Articles 
63 
(1)(a) 
and 
63(1)(b) 
of 
the 
Constitution 
that 
provide 
disqualifications on account of judicial declaration regarding the 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 51 - 
mental unfitness or the undischarged insolvency of a candidate for 
election. These disabilities also continue so long as the adverse 
judgment is in the field. Finally, it may be noted that the prescription 
by the 18th Constitutional Amendment of an adverse judicial 
declaration to precipitate the ineligibility of a candidate for election 
has provided a lawful, transparent and fair mechanism to a 
candidate under challenge both for contesting and for avoiding the 
onset of an embargo on his eligibility to contest elections. The 
restriction imposed by Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution for the 
eligibility of a candidate for election to Parliament serves the public 
need and public interest for honest, upright, truthful, trustworthy 
and prudent elected representatives. The judicial mechanism in 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution grants a fair opportunity and 
adequate remedy for relief to a candidate under challenge to 
vindicate himself. Therefore, the permanent incapacity of a 
candidate for election under Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is not 
an arbitrary, excessive or unreasonable curtailment of his 
fundamental right under Article 17(2) of the Constitution.  
36. 
 
In the result, we are inclined to hold that the incapacity 
created for failing to meet the qualifications under Article 62(1)(f) of 
the Constitution imposes a permanent bar which remains in effect so 
long as the declaratory judgment supporting the conclusion of one 
of the delinquent kinds of conduct under Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution remains in effect.  
37. 
 
In view of the above, all these cases are directed to be 
fixed before appropriate Benches for decision in accordance with the 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 52 - 
law laid down in this judgment, keeping in view the respective facts 
and circumstances of each case.  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
Islamabad, 
Announced in Court 
on  13th day of April, 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CJ. 
 
 
 
 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING. 
Irshad Hussain /* 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 53 - 
 
Sh. Azmat Saeed, J.- I have had the 
privilege to go through the judgment of my learned 
brother Umer Ata Bandial, J., though I concur with 
the conclusions drawn in the said judgment but I do 
not 
find 
myself 
in 
agreement 
with 
reasoning 
employed in its entirety. 
2. 
 
The adjudication of the lis at hand requires 
the 
interpretation 
of 
Article 
62(1)(f) 
of 
the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
1973 so as to determine the period of time to which 
the lack of qualification in terms thereof shall extend. 
The aforesaid provision is reproduced herein below 
for ease of reference:- 
“62. (1) A person shall not be qualified to 
be elected or chosen as a Member of 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) unless:- 
……………………………………………. 
  ……………………………………………. 
(f) 
he 
is 
sagacious, 
righteous, 
non-   
profligate, honest, and ameen, there 
being no declaration to the contrary 
by a court of law; and 
………………………………………………. 
……………………………………………....  
 
 
The 
words 
and 
expressions 
denoting 
the 
attributes for being qualified to be a Member of 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), as spelt forth in the 
aforesaid provision, leaves no manner of doubt that 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 54 - 
the same i.e. Article 62(1)(f)  of the Constitution is 
rooted in and inspired by our Islamic values. It is not 
necessary to dwell further on this aspect of the 
matter in the instant proceedings. However, the said 
provision must be interpreted with great care, 
caution and respect. 
3. 
 
The historical background and various 
amendments, 
which 
have 
been 
periodically 
introduced into Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution 
have been very ably dealt with by my learned brother 
in his judgment and need not to be repeated. 
However, Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is 
required to be interpreted as it stands today. A plain 
reading of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution reveals 
that in order to be a Member of Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament), 
the 
person 
must 
be, 
inter 
alia, 
sagacious, righteous, non-profligate, honest, and 
ameen. 
However, if there is a declaration by a 
Court of Law to the contrary i.e. he is not sagacious 
or righteous or non-profligate, honest, and ameen 
then such person shall not be qualified to be a 
Member 
of 
Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament). 
A 
declaration by the Court of Law would mean a 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 55 - 
conclusive finding. Obviously, such finding would be 
with regard to a lis before the Court, arising out of 
the violation of a law or non-fulfillment of a legal 
obligation. It is clear and obvious that lack of 
qualifications in terms of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution is the effect of a declaration by a Court 
of Law to the contrary, which is the cause. The 
obvious, legal and logical conclusion would be as 
long as the cause i.e. the declaration of a Court of 
Law holds the field its effect i.e. the lack of 
qualification shall also prevail. This appears to be the 
only possible interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution. 
4. 
 
The expression “declared by a Court” has 
also been used in Article 63(1)(a) of the Constitution, 
which is reproduced hereunder: 
 
“63(1)(a) 
he is of unsound mind and 
has been so declared by a competent 
court; or” 
 
 
(underlining is for emphasis) 
 
5. 
 
Obviously, in the aforesaid circumstances, 
the disqualification would continue as long as the 
declaration regarding the mental incapacity subsists. 
No sane person could seriously urge to the contrary.  
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 56 - 
6. 
 
During the course of hearing of the instant 
proceedings, a large number of counsels addressed at 
the bar, both on behalf of various parties and as 
amicus curie. Each and every counsel was confronted 
with the above mentioned obvious interpretation of 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution that the lack of 
qualification was the effect of the declaration by a 
Court of Law, which was the cause and the duration 
of such effect would be the duration of the cause i.e. 
declaration. The response on behalf of the learned 
counsels by and large  that  upon an accumulative 
reading of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution 
pertaining to the qualifications and disqualifications 
of a Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) would 
reveal that disqualifications resulting from acts and 
omissions of much greater gravity the period of 
disqualification is limited, hence that lack of 
qualification in terms of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution cannot be  perpetual. It was also 
contended that  lack of  qualifications in terms of 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution also falls squarely 
within the disqualification as is set forth in Article 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 57 - 
63(1)(h) of the Constitution and the negative impact 
thereof is for a limited period of time. 
7. 
 
Adverting first to Article 63(1)(h) of the 
Constitution, 
the 
reasons 
for 
disqualifications 
provided therein do not appear to be congruent with 
the lack of qualifications as set forth in Article 62(1(f) 
of the Constitution. More importantly, if such an 
interpretation is accepted, it would make Article 
62(1)(f) 
of 
the 
Constitution 
superfluous 
and 
redundant. It is an elemental principle of the 
interpretation of the Constitution that surplusage 
cannot be attributed to any provision of the 
Constitution, hence, it is legally impossible to accept 
this contention.  
8. 
 
No doubt the period of disqualification in 
certain sub-Articles of Article 63 of the Constitution 
has been provided but such a sunset clause is not 
found in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. The 
framers of the Constitution chose not to do so. This 
Court is empowered to interpret the Constitution  but 
not to amend it. It is an equally elemental principle of 
interpretation of the Constitution that  nothing can 
be added thereto, therefore, we cannot read into 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 58 - 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution, a period of such 
lack of qualification, which is not mentioned therein.  
9. 
 
Some of the learned counsels also voiced 
that perhaps the effect of Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution  qua the period of lack of qualification 
may be disproportionate and a little harsh. Such 
arguments are perhaps more suitable to the floor of 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) than at the bar before 
this Court. We, as stated above, can only interpret 
the Constitution not amend or change it. This aspect 
of the matter is rather ironic as several  persons 
before us were or had been the Members of Majlis-e-
Shoora (Parliament) at some point of time and may 
have passed the amendments, which now stand in 
their way.  
10.  
None 
of 
the 
learned 
counsels, 
who 
appeared before us confronted the elephant in the 
room i.e. the obvious interpretation of Article 62(1)(f) 
of the Constitution is that lack of the qualification to 
a Member is the effect of declaration by a Court of 
Law, which is the cause and period of lack of 
qualification would be co-extensive with the period to 
the cause i.e. declaration. None of the learned 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 59 - 
counsels refuted the aforesaid obvious interpretation 
but only sidestepped the issue.  
11.  
However, at the very end, the learned 
Attorney General for Pakistan addressed the Court 
and in no uncertain terms stated that once 
declaration has been made by a Court of Law that a 
person is not sagacious or righteous or non-profligate 
or honest and ameen, such a person is not qualified 
to be a Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). This 
lack of qualification is the effect of the aforesaid 
declaration, which is the cause and as long as the 
declaration by the Court holds the field, the person in 
respect of whom such declaration has been made will 
continue to be deprived of the qualifications to be a 
Member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament).  
12.  
The stand taken by the learned Attorney 
General for Pakistan is not only fair but is also in 
accordance with the obvious and self-evident intent 
of Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution. Incidentally, 
this Court on more than one occasions has already 
held that lack of qualification suffered under Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution is in perpetuity. Reference, 
in this behalf, may be made to the judgments of this 
C.A.No.233 of 2015, etc. 
- 60 - 
Court reported as Mian Najeeb-ud-Din Owasi and 
another v. Amir Yar Waran and others (PLD 2013 SC 
482), Muhammad Nasir Mahmood and another v. 
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of 
Law, Justice and Human Rights Division, Islamabad 
(PLD 2009 SC 107) and Allah Dino Khan Bhayo v. 
Election Commission of Pakistan, Islamabad and 
others (2013 SCMR 1655), and no reason has been 
advanced to persuade me to take a different view.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
 
