IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, HCJ 
MR. JUSTICE MAZHAR ALAM KHAN MIANKHEL 
MR. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 957 & 958 OF 2014 
(On appeal against judgment dated 19.06.2013 passed 
by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition 
No. 2927/2009) 
 
Secretary Local Government, Election 
Rural Development, KPK etc 
 
 
 
(In both cases) 
 
… Appellants 
 
VERSUS 
 
Muhammad Tariq Khan  
 
 
 
(In CA 957/2014) 
Muhammad Tahir Abbas etc 
 
 
 
(In CA 958/2014) 
 
 
 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellants: 
Barrister Qasim Wadood, Addl. A.G. 
 
(In both cases)  
 
 
 
For the Respondent: 
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC 
 
 
 
 
(In CA 957/2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Syed Iqbal Hussain Shah Gillani, ASC 
 
 
 
 
(For respondent No.1 in CA 958/2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Sabah ud Din Khattak, ASC 
 
 
 
 
(For respondent No. 2 in CA 958/2014) 
 
Date of Hearing: 
 
25.05.2021 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.- Through this consolidated 
judgment, we intend to decide the above-titled civil appeals filed under 
Article 185(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, 
as they have nexus inter-se and a common question of law has been 
raised in these appeals.  
 
2. 
 
The facts of Civil Appeal No. 957/2014 are that the 
respondent was appointed as Assistant Director Civil (BPS-17) in the 
Provincial Urban Development Board on contract basis vide order 
dated 16.02.1995. However, on 30.05.1998 he along with several 
other employees was terminated from service by the department. Being 
aggrieved by his termination, the respondent filed Writ Petition No. 
973/1998 before the Peshawar High Court. Some other employees also 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
2
challenged the said termination before the Peshawar High Court by 
filing other writ petitions. During the proceedings before the High Court 
vide an interim order, the respondent and others were allowed to 
continue in service till the final disposal of the writ petitions. 
Ultimately, vide consolidated judgment dated 30.09.1999, the writ 
petitions filed by the respondent and others were adjudicated and 
decided wherein the department was directed to consider them for 
appointment on available vacancies, while evaluating their case on 
merits upon the basis of ‘last cum first go’. The respondent challenged 
the said order before this Court by filing Civil Petition No. 116-P/2000 
but the same was dismissed as barred by time vide order dated 
13.10.2000. He also filed Civil Review Petition No. 279/2000 before 
this Court, however, it also met the same fate vide order dated 
01.11.2001. Thereafter, the respondent again filed Writ Petition No. 
225/2009 but the same was dismissed as withdrawn on 09.06.2009. 
The respondent filed yet another Writ Petition No. 2927/2009 before 
the Peshawar High Court, which was disposed off with certain 
observations vide order dated 04.02.2010. Being aggrieved by this 
judgment, the Government of KPK challenged it before the High Court 
by filing review petition but the same stood dismissed vide order dated 
15.06.2010. This order in review was challenged before this Court in 
Civil Petition No. 660-P/2010 and this Court vide order dated 
07.11.2012 remanded the matter back to the High Court with certain 
observations to decide Writ Petition No. 2927/2009 afresh. During the 
proceedings before the learned High Court after remand, the impugned 
judgment dated 19.06.2013 has been passed with a direction to the 
appellant department to re-adjust the respondent with all benefits 
accrued to him except the wages of the intervening period. As far as 
facts of Civil Appeal No. 958/2014 are concerned, the respondent No. 
1 Muhammad Tahir Abbas was appointed as Assistant Director Civil 
(BPS-17) in the Provincial Urban Development Board on contract basis 
vide order dated 18.10.1993. However, on 30.05.1998 he along with 
several other employees was terminated from service by the 
department. Being aggrieved by his termination, the respondent filed 
Writ Petition No. 978/1998 before the Peshawar High Court. Some 
other employees also challenged the said termination before the 
Peshawar High Court by filing various writ petitions. However, the 
respondent did not press his petition before the High Court provided he 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
3
was given pay and other allowances upto 31.05.1998 i.e. the expiry of 
the project and the same was disposed of accordingly vide 
consolidated order dated 30.09.1999. So far as the other employees 
are concerned, the learned High Court vide the judgment dated 
30.09.1999 directed the department to consider the aggrieved 
employees for appointment on available vacancies on merit. It appears 
from the record that the respondent did not challenge this order of the 
High Court before this Court and it ultimately attained finality. 
However, the record shows that subsequently, he filed another Writ 
Petition No. 102/2002 against his termination and when he was 
declined the relief sought for from the High Court, he challenged the 
same before this Court by filing Civil Petition No. 1241/2002, which 
was disposed of on 16.03.2005 by observing that the respondent being 
junior most, his service was rightly terminated and he was advised to 
approach the Government for consideration for fresh recruitment being 
a previous employee of the Board. The respondent then approached 
the department but when he saw that nothing favourable to him is 
likely to happen, he filed another Writ Petition No. 322/2009 wherein 
vide order dated 06.10.2011, the department was once again asked 
by the High Court to consider the case of the respondent on 
humanitarian 
grounds 
but 
the 
department 
vide 
order 
dated 
05.01.2012 refused to adjust the petitioner, which led to filing of yet 
another Writ Petition No. 1180/2012, which has been disposed of vide 
impugned order dated 19.06.2013 whereby the appellants are directed 
to adjust the respondent with all consequential benefits except wages. 
Hence, the instant appeals by leave of this Court. 
 
3. 
 
Learned Additional Advocate General, KPK, while opening 
address inter alia contended that the respondents were project 
employees; that it is clearly mentioned in their appointment letters that 
appointment is contractual/temporary in nature and would be liable to 
be terminated subject to one month’s notice; that the project was never 
regularized or taken on the budget and the same was completed; that 
the matter of termination of the respondents had already been decided 
by this Court in the earlier round of litigation and the same has 
attained finality; that the respondents cannot be given any leverage on 
the basis of earlier order of this Court dated 13.10.2000 passed in 
Civil Petition Nos. 1752/1999 etc because only those persons who 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
4
were party to that order were appointed by the department; that the 
Project Management Unit as also Provincial Urban Development Board, 
NWFP, do not exist being dissolved and instead new development 
companies like Mardan Development Authority and Peshawar 
Development Authority etc have been created; that the learned High 
Court has 
wrongly interpreted 
and applied 
the principle of 
discrimination in the impugned judgments; that the respondents could 
not be adjusted against the posts of Assistant Directors as no post is 
available in the department; that the impugned judgment suffers from 
legal and factual infirmities and requires interference by this Court.  
 
4. 
 
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent in 
Civil Appeal No. 957/2014, inter alia, contended that if one category of 
the employees is given relief, the other category falling under the same 
parameter cannot be denied the relief; that the respondent was never 
non-suited by this Court and his rights are in continuity; that keeping 
in view the performance of the respondent, he was subsequently 
promoted to BS-18, which shows that he is a competent employee; that 
after the afore-referred judgment of this Court dated 13.10.2000, the 
terminated Assistant Directors including the respondent were included 
in the seniority list of Assistant Directors and the name of the 
respondent was placed at serial number 92, which impliedly means 
that the department had recognized all the Assistant Directors to be 
regular employees of Provincial Urban Development Board; that if the 
similarly placed employees have been re-appointed by the department, 
the respondent also deserves the same treatment to be meted out and 
this fact has already been mentioned in paragraph 6 of the impugned 
judgment; that the respondent was appointed as BS-18 officer in the 
Municipal Services Delivery Program but after the impugned judgment, 
resignation was taken from him and he was reinstated as Assistant 
Director in BPS-17.  
 
5. 
 
Learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 in Civil Appeal 
No. 958/2014 while adopting the arguments of learned counsel for the 
respondent in the connected Civil Appeal No. 957/2014, inter alia, 
contended that pursuant to judgment of this Court dated 16.03.2005 
passed in Civil Petition No. 1241/2002, the respondent was 
considered to be employee of the Board and not a project employee, 
therefore, the order of the termination had no force.  
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
5
 
6. 
 
We have heard learned counsel for the parties and have 
perused the available record.  
 
7. 
 
The issues involved in these appeals are three fold: (i) 
whether the project/temporary employees have the right to be retained 
in service after expiry of the project; (ii) whether on the matter of re-
appointment, the respondents have been discriminated against; and 
(iii) whether the subsequent writ petitions filed by the respondents 
were maintainable and not contrary to the principle of res judicata?   
 
8. 
 
Admittedly, the respondents were contract employees and 
were hired by the Project Management Unit for the project of slum 
upgrading, site and service etc, which subsequently came to an end 
and the respondents were terminated from service. This Court in a 
number of cases has held that contract/project employees have no 
vested right to claim regularization. The direction for regularization, 
absorption or permanent continuance cannot be issued unless the 
employee claiming regularization had been appointed in pursuance of 
a regular recruitment in accordance with relevant rules and against the 
sanctioned vacant posts, which admittedly is not the case here. 
Respondents were appointed on temporary basis pursuant to the 
Provincial Urban Development Board Service Rules, 1988. There was 
no provision in the said Rules for absorption of a project employee. The 
said Provincial Urban Development Board was dissolved and probably 
a new department City Development and Municipal Development was 
created, which has its own different Rules. The respondents have no 
vested right to claim regularization against regular posts, being 
contractual employees of the project, the tenure of which has already 
been expired, thus they being project employees and hired for the said 
project period are not entitled to be regularized. When the project is 
completed and closed, the employees have to go along with its closure. 
Temporary/project employees, who are appointed specifically till the 
completion of a certain project cannot be regularized as they have 
neither any vested right to hold such post beyond prescribed period nor 
the Government owes any obligation to maintain continuity in their 
service for an unlimited period. We have perused the appointment 
orders of the respondents and found that regularization / re-
adjustment was not part of terms and conditions of their service. In 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
6
paragraph No. 4 of the appointment letter of respondent Muhammad 
Tariq Khan dated 16.02.1995, it has been specifically mentioned that 
his employment was purely temporary and could be terminated at one 
month’s notice. Similarly, the appointment letter of respondent 
Muhammad Tahir Abbas dated 18.10.1995 clearly stipulates that his 
services were on contract basis and would be liable to termination at 
any time without any notice. Both the respondents had accepted the 
contingent terms of service and cannot blow hot and cold in the same 
breath to claim regularization subsequently.  
 
9. 
 
Now the question which remains to be looked at is 
whether the respondents have been discriminated against or not. In 
the earlier round of litigation, after the consolidated judgment of the 
Peshawar High Court dated 13.09.1999 whereby the department was 
directed to consider the terminated Assistant Directors for appointment 
on available vacancies on merit and on the basis of ‘last cum first go’, 
the respondent Muhammad Tariq Khan had approached this Court by 
filing Civil Petition No. 116-P/2000, which was dismissed solely on the 
ground of being barred by time vide order dated 13.10.2000. He had 
also filed Civil Review Petition No. 279/2000 but the same was also 
dismissed vide order dated 01.11.2001. So far as the respondent 
Muhammad Tahir Abbas is concerned, he had not pressed his writ 
petition bearing No. 978/1998 before the High Court provided he was 
given pay and other allowances upto 31.05.1998. This prayer was 
accepted by the learned High Court and the writ petition was disposed 
of as not pressed. The order of the learned High Court dated 
30.09.1999 specifically finds mention of this fact. It appears from the 
record that the respondent Muhammad Tahir Abbas did not challenge 
this order before this Court and subsequently filed another writ petition 
against his termination order and when he did not get any relief from 
the High Court, he challenged the said order before this Court by filing 
Civil Petition No. 1241/2002, which was disposed of on 16.03.2005 by 
observing that the respondent being junior most, his service was 
rightly terminated. He was advised to approach the Government for 
consideration of fresh recruitment being a previous employee of the 
Board. The respondent then approached the department but when he 
could not get any relief, he filed yet another Writ Petition No. 
322/2009. When the petition of respondent Muhammad Tariq Khan 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
7
was dismissed as being barred by time before this Court vide order 
dated 13.10.2000 and respondent Muhammad Tahir Abbas had not 
pressed his writ petition before the High Court, the matter had attained 
finality. Knocking the doors of High Court and this Court again and 
again amounts to mockery of law. The other employees, who had also 
filed writ petitions and whose writ petitions were decided on 
13.09.1999 vide consolidated judgment by the Peshawar High Court 
had filed Civil Petition Nos. 1752, 1753/1999 etc before this Court, 
which were disposed of vide order dated 13.10.2000 and the 
department was directed to reconsider the facts of the cases of the 
petitioners therein in juxtaposition with the cases of 29 other Assistant 
Directors, who were retained in service although they were junior to 
them. It appears from the record that pursuant to this judgment of this 
Court, a seniority list of 93 Assistant Directors was prepared and some 
of them were adjusted. Learned counsel for the respondents put much 
stress on the point that pursuant to the judgment of this Court dated 
13.10.2000 passed in Civil Petition Nos. 1752, 1753/1999, the 
respondents ought to have been adjusted but they were discriminated 
against. However, we do not tend to agree with learned counsel for the 
respondents because the afore-referred judgment of this Court was 
restricted only to the Assistant Directors, who were party/petitioners in 
the said case. This Court in the judgment dated 27.08.2012 passed in 
Civil Petition No. 346-P/2003 while dealing with the cases of similarly 
placed Assistant Directors has specifically taken note of this fact and 
has held that “this Court (vide order dated 13.10.2000) had not 
ordered the re-instatement of the petitioners before it but directed that 
their cases be considered viz-a-viz some other Assistant Directors. The 
relief granted by the Supreme Court was restricted to the petitioners 
before it.” So far as certain appointments/regularization of Assistant 
Directors, which have been mentioned by the learned High Court in the 
impugned judgments are concerned, neither their letters of termination 
nor appointment letters are available on record so that we could know 
as to what were their terms and conditions of service. Even otherwise, 
the learned High Court itself has mentioned that not all terminated 
Assistant Directors have been re-appointed/adjusted/regularized. 
Although some of them have been adjusted but still there are persons, 
who have not been adjusted again, therefore, the question of 
discrimination does not arise. So far as the argument of learned 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
8
counsel for the respondent Muhammad Tariq Khan that he was 
appointed as BS-18 officer in the Municipal Services Delivery Program 
but after the impugned judgment, resignation was taken from him and 
he was reinstated as Assistant Director in BPS-17 is concerned, 
despite our asking, learned counsel could not place on record any 
document to support his argument, therefore, we are unable to 
consider the same.  
 
10. 
 
Now we come to the third question i.e. whether the writ 
petitions filed by the respondents in the instant round of litigation are 
hit by the principle of res judicata? There is an old latin maxim ‘res 
judicata pro veritate accipitur’. According to this maxim, a suit/dispute 
in which the matter directly or substantially in the issue has been 
directly/substantially in issue in a former suit/proceeding between the 
same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them 
claim has been decided by a competent court shall not be tried again in 
the same matter in any other courts. In simple words, a decision once 
rendered by a competent court on a matter in issue between the parties 
after a full inquiry should not be permitted to be agitated again by the 
same court or some other court between the same parties in the same 
matter. The rule of estoppel by res judicata is a rule of evidence, which 
prevents any party to a suit/proceeding which has been adjudicated 
upon by the competent court from disputing or questioning the decision 
on merit in subsequent litigation. It is based on the concept of public 
policy and private justice which apply to all the judicial proceedings. 
According to this, public policy involves that the general interest of the 
litigation must come to an end or that the litigation must have its 
finality. Similarly, private justice requires that an individual should be 
protected from vexatious multiplication of suits and prosecutions at the 
instance of an opponent whose superior power and resources may 
enable him to abuse the process of court. A decision by a competent 
court, which is final, should be binding and the same questions are 
sought to be controverted in the subsequent litigation for which this 
maxim applies. The only point in issue on which the respondents filed 
the subsequent writ petitions was their termination from service. As 
discussed in the preceding paragraph, the issue was already put to 
rest and once it attained finality, the second/continued litigation by 
filing number of writ petitions was not warranted under the law. It 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
9
would be of considerable advantage to refer to a judgment of this Court 
reported as Khurshid Soap and Chemical Industries (Pvt) Ltd Vs. 
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2020 SC 641) wherein it was held as 
under:- 
 
“9.    The principle of res judicata is a principle of peace. Once 
a controversy with regard to a right in property or a right to 
office is adjudicated upon and attains finality through a 
judicial pronouncement of a competent Court of law, it no more 
remains open to challenge in any subsequent judicial 
proceedings between the same parties on the same subject 
matter. This principle is intended not to afford a litigant more 
than one opportunity for resolution of a judicial dispute and 
thus eliminates the chances of repetitious and successive 
litigation against a party on the same issue. The maxim that 
there should be an end to litigation is germane to such matters. 
10.  Any relief which a litigant seeks in a judicial proceeding 
with regard to any power or a right or an obligation connected 
with some property or an office which power or right or 
obligation is not dependent upon the legitimacy of a legislative 
enactment and stands or falls on its own strength then in such 
cases when the decision rendered by a court of competent 
jurisdiction attains finality, there is no difficulty in applying the 
principle of res judicata to such a decision. However, it would 
be difficult to apply such a principle in matters where a power 
or a right or an obligation solely depend upon the very 
legitimacy of the enactment that has come under challenge in a 
Court of law on the touchstone of the Constitution. In such a 
situation the existence of such power or right or obligation 
would solely depend on the final adjudication as to the legal 
validity of the enactment itself. This could be understood from 
a situation where a controversy as regards constitutional 
validity of an enactment has come under challenge before two 
High Courts, one declaring the enactment ultra vires the 
Constitution and the other intra vires. If the principle of res 
judicata is applied to the decision of the High Court that 
declared the law ultra vires as the same was not challenged 
any 
further 
by 
the 
Government 
then 
two 
conflicting 
declarations would stand side by side on the legitimacy of a 
legislative enactment, one party treating the law valid and the 
other invalid. This would lead to treating an Act of the 
parliament valid for some and invalid for others though both 
the set of persons are similarly placed. If the decision rendered 
by the High Court that declared the law intra vires the 
Constitution is only challenged before the Supreme Court and 
after examining the merits of the case the enactment is 
declared by this Court to be intra vires the Constitution, then in 
such peculiar situation when this Court finally validates the 
legislative enactment then the same has to be applied 
uniformly to every person falling within its ambit. Such final 
judicial determination on the legitimacy of a legislative 
enactment has to be treated as a judgment in rem regardless of 
the fact that the judgment of the High Court that invalidated 
the very same enactment was not challenged before this Court. 
Such a situation warrants departure from the doctrine of res 
judicata. Omission of a public functionary to file appeal cannot 
put fetters on the universal application of a legislative 
enactment declared by this Court to be constitutionally valid as 
it would amount to repealing the statute for some and treating 
Civil Appeal Nos. 957 & 958/2014 
10
it valid for others. Hence conflicting decisions on the vires of a 
legislative enactment of two High Courts, decision of one 
remains unchallenged in the hierarchy as no appeal was 
preferred and the other is challenged before this Court, then 
the verdict of the High Court that went unchallenged, which is 
in conflict with the final decision of this Court has to be treated 
as outmoded and no longer executable. The Supreme Court of 
the United States of America took note of a similar situation in 
the case of United States v. Stone and Downer Co. [274 U.S. 
225 (1927)] and held that if some of the persons are released 
from the application of a provision of legislative enactment on 
the principle of res judicata, it will lead to inequalities and 
discrimination causing injustice and confusion. It was held that 
in such a situation the plea of res judicata cannot be 
sustained.” 
 
(Underlined to lay emphasis) 
 
11. 
 
In view of the above said discussion on various aspects of 
the case and the law laid down by this Court, we are of the considered 
view that the relief sought by the respondents does not commensurate 
or is covered by any legal premises / provision of law on the subject 
and the same is claimed on its own strength without any backing of 
law. We are, therefore, constrained to hold that the Constitutional 
Petitions filed by the respondents before the Peshawar High Court, 
which have been decided through the impugned judgments, were 
primarily not maintainable being hit by the principle of res judicata.  
 
12. 
 
For what has been discussed above, these appeals are 
allowed and the impugned judgments are set aside.  
   
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Islamabad  
Announced on 01.07.2021 
Approved For Reporting 
Khurram 
