IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
PRESENT:
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, CJ
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN
MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR
Civil Appeals No.3264, & 327w of 2020
Against Judgment dated 05.03.2020 passed by the La/tore High
Court, Lahore in Intra Court Appeal No.1.1032 of 2020 and Intra
Court Appeal No. 8516 of 2020.
Dr. Iqrar Ahmad Khan 
Appellant (in both cases)
VERSUS
'S.
Dr. Muhammad Ashraf etc.
Province of Punjab etc.
Respondents (in CA#326-L/20)
Respondents (in CA#327-L/20)
For the Appellant
For the Respondent (s)
Date of Hearing
Mr. Bilal Hassan Minto, ASC
Ch. Akhtar Ali AOR (in cA327..L/Qo)
Mr. Hamid Khan, Sr. ASC assisted by
Hafiz M. Tariq Naseem ASC and
Mr. Muhammad Ahsan Bhoon, ASC.
(No. I in CA 326-L/20 and No. 8 in CA 327-L120)
Mr. Akhter Javed, Addl.AG, Pb.
(No.2, .% 6 and 7 in CA 326-1,120 and No. 1,2,5
and 6 in CA 327-1,/20)
Mr. Muhammad Shahzad Shaukat
ASC along with Mr. Shaiqat Nadeem,
Law Officer
(No.8 in CA 326-1120 and No.7 in CA 32 7-1,/20)
07.12.2020
JUDGMENT
IJAZ UI., AHSAN, J.- Through this single
judgment, we intend to decide Civil Appeals No. 326-L
and 327-L of 2020 as they involve common questions of
law.
2
2.
Through the instant Appeal, the Appellant has
assailed a Judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated
05.03.2020 passed in Intra Court Appeal No. 11032 of 2020
and the Judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated
05.03.2020 passed in Intra Court Appeal No. 8516 of 2020
(hereinafter referred to as the "ICAs"). The ICAs were filed
against a Judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated
04.02.2020 passed in Writ Petition No. 34743 of 2019. The
ICA Bench set aside the judgment passed by a learned Single
Judge dated 04.02.2020 which had declared the appointment
of Dr. Muhammad Ashraf, Respondent No. 1 in CA No. 326-L
of 2020 and Respondent No. 8 in CA No. 327-L of 2020 to the
post of Vice Chancellor of the Respondent-University being
without lawful authority. The learned Division Bench restored
the notification dated 16.04.20 19 issued by the Government
of Punjab appointing Respondent No. 08 as the Vice
Chancellor of the Respondent-University.
3.
The necessary facts giving rise to this Us are that
applications were invited by the Government of Punjab for the
post of Vice Chancellor of the University of Agriculture
Faisalabad (hereinafter referred to as the "Post"), through an
advertisement dated 23.08.20 16 (hereinafter referred to as
the "Advertisement"). The Appellant was the incumbent Vice
Chancellor of the Respondent-University. His term ended in
January 2017. The Appellant applied for the Post of Vice
Chancellor pursuant to the Advertisement and Section 14(8)
of the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act 1973
3
(hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). Section 148 of the Act is
reproduced below for ease of reference as:-
"The incumbent Vice Chancellor shall not be allowed
any extension in his tenure but subject to eligibility he
may again compete for the post of the Vice Chancellor
in accordance with the procedure prescribed by or
under this section."
Until the appointment of a regular Vice
Chancellor, the Appellant was assigned the duties of the
acting Vice Chancellor by the Chancellor i.e. Respondent No.
4 in CA. 326-L of 2020 and Respondent No. 3 in CA. 327-L of
2020 vide notification dated 27.01.2017. The said notification
was challenged by way of Writ Petition No. 54628/2017 and
the Appellant was restrained from acting as the Vice
Chancellor vide order dated 09.08.2017. In order to run the
everyday affairs of the Respondent-University, a Pro-Vice-
Chancellor was appointed as per Section 15-A of the Act. For
almost 2 years, because of pending litigation in the matter of
appointment of the Vice Chancellor, a regular appointment
could not be made. A Search Committee was finally
constituted under Section 14(3) of the Act on 27.03.2018
which recommended three names to the Chancellor for
possible appointment of one as Vice Chancellor in the order of
merit. The Appellant stood at Number 1 on the merit list.
However, the Appellant was not appointed as the Vice
Chancellor by the Chief Minister Punjab for the reason that a
number of audit paras were left unanswered by the Appellant
during his past tenure, and that, the purportedly required
four syndicate meetings in a year were not convened by the
Appellant. An appointment was finally made through
4
Notification dated 16.04.20 19 (hereinafter referred to as
"Impugned Notification") through which Mr. Muhammad
Ashraf, Respondent No. 1 in CA 326-L of 2020 and
Respondent No. 8 in CA 327-L of 2020 was appointed as the
Pro-Vice-Chancellor. The said appointment was challenged
by the Appellant and the same was struck down vide
judgment dated 04.02.2020 of the Single Bench of the High
Court. The Respondents challenged this judgment by way of
the ICAs which were allowed.
4. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court vide
order dated 07.09.2020 in the following terms: -
"Learned Counsel for the Petitioner contends that as
per the Judgment in the ease of A ppointments of
Permanent Vice Chancellor of Punjab Universitu
(Human Rights Case No. 13865-P pf 2018). this Court
has laid down the following law with regard to the
appointment of Vice-Chancellors of the Universities in
Punjab:-
'5. The Search Committee shall complete
their work within a period of three weeks
and submit/ recommend names of three
persons in the order of merit to the
Government which shall proceed to notify
the person of highest merit unless there are
cogent reasons for not appointing him
which shall be duly recorded in writing
and shall bejusticiable.'
Learned Counsel contends that although in the
summary placed before the Chancellor, there were
two objections, one with regards to the existence of
164 unsettled Audit Paras and the other, non-calling
of the required meetings of the Syndicate, these
reasons are not enough for excluding the Petitioner
from being appointed as Vice Chancellor for the
reason that the Search Committee has given highest
marks to the Petitioner and, the Secretary Agriculture,
was familiar with the position of 164 unsettled Audit
Paras and non-calling of required syndicate meetings,
he was a member of the Search Committee, and, he
himself has given highest marks to the Petitioner i.e.
45. Further contends that the Search Committee has
considered all aspects of the matter and thereafter,
placed the same before the Chancellor and that the
reasons put forward in the Summary were also within
the knowledge of the Search Committee and despite
that, it has given the highest marks to the Petitioner.
He contends that the High Court has altogether misled
W
5
itself in noting the Judgment of this Court in the
Human Rights Case (supra) as totally misplaced and
not applicable, is altogether illegal, in that, the said
Judgment has jull application to the case in hand and
in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution was binding
upon the High Court, and the High Court could not
have taken a different view than the one taken by this
Court in the cited case.
2.
The submissions made by the learned Counsel
for the Petitioner require consideration. Leave to
appeal is granted to consider, inter alia, the same. The
Appeal stage paper-books shall be prepared,
expeditiously, but not later than one-month. The
parties are allowed to file additional documents, if
any, and for such, one month is allowed. The appeal
shall be heard within a period of two months.
C.M.As No. 920-L and 2300/2020
3.
The operation of the impugned judgments is
suspended."
5. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submits that
the Impugned Notification was issued in violation of the
directions of this Court in HRC No. 13865-P of 2018 dated
22.04.2018. Further, that, the Appellant was awarded the
highest marks by a duly constituted Search Committee
consisting of individuals and academicians of high repute and
immaculate credentials and integrity. The only reason on the
basis of which the Appellant could be denied appointment
was if cogent reasons were recorded for the same, which
would be open to judicial review. He adds that there were no
objections of any "mismanagement" or "poor financial
controls" that were raised by the Search Committee when the
Appellant was being recommended for appointment to the
post of Vice Chancellor. Further, that the Secretary of
Agriculture was part of the said Search Committee and, he
being the Principal Accounting Officer / Representative of the
Government of Punjab, had also awarded the Appellant the
highest marks in management and financial controls. He
further argued that the audit paras which were made the
basis of rejecting the Appellant's appointment against the
post of Vice Chancellor were not related to the Appellant, and,
the question whether or not these related to the Appellant
reflecting on his management and financial control skills was
never examined by the Chief Minister. He adds that there is a
discrepancy when it comes to the actual number of audit
paras against the Appellant in the records of the Government
because at first, they were said to be 164 in number and
then, they were claimed to be 140. He adds that Section 14 of
the University of Agriculture Faisalabad Act 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as the "1973 Act") has wrongly been interpreted
by the learned Division Bench. He further adds that Sections
24 and 25 of the 1973 Act do not mandatorily require a
specific number of syndicate meetings that are to take place.
Even otherwise, Rule 3 of the University of Agriculture
Faisalabad Conduct Of Business Rules 1976 uses the word
'ordinarily' which means that the said provision is
discretionary in nature and not mandatory. He adds that
there is no conflict in the case of Professor Dr. Razia
Sultana and others v. Professor Dr. Ghazala Yasmeen
Nizam and others (2016 SCMR 992) with the HRC Order of
this Court. He concludes by submitting that the failure to
appoint the Appellant as Vice Chancellor for the reasons
provided by the Chief Minister is a mala fide act because
many other appointments have been made involving
individuals who had many more outstanding audit pans and
7
the said reason has never before been found used to refuse
appointment. He has cited specific instances in this regard.
6.
The learned counsel for Respondent No. 1 in CA
326-L of 2020 and Respondent No. 8 in CA 327-L of 2020
submits that the Chief Minister has exercised his discretion
correctly and the reasons recorded by him in the exercise of
his discretion are sound and cogent which are not open to
interference. He states that the Impugned Notification was
issued after a transparent process of selection and the
exercise of discretion in the manner complained of does not
amount to any illegality. He adds that a writ of quo warranto
and mandamus is generally not maintainable in matters of
appointment and that, the same falls squarely within the
domain of policy which cannot be interfered with by courts
unless it can be shown that non-interference may lead to
grave injustice. He further submits that a presumption of
validity is attached to executive actions and the same ought
to be attached to the actions of the Chief Minister.
7.
Learned Assistant Advocate General has mainly
relied upon the arguments advanced by the counsel for
Respondent No. 1 I Respondent No. 8. The only additional
argument advanced by the Learned AAG is that the HRC
Order of this Court does not apply to the present controversy.
8.
Before we examine the case at hand, we consider
it appropriate to list the issues before us for determination.
These in our opinion are as follows:-
8
i. Whether the HRC Order of this Court is applicable to
this case; and
ii. Whether the reasons provided by the Chief Minister
were valid.
iii. Could the recommendation provided by the Search
Committee in order of merit be overridden without
assigning valid and cogent reasons which would
withstand judicial scrutiny?
WHETHER THE HRC ORDER OF THIS COURT IS
APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE?
9.
Appointments to the post of Vice Chancellor are
made according to the 1973 Act. Section 14(3) of the said Act
is relevant for this controversy which is reproduced below for
ease of convenience:-
"3. The Government shall constitute, for a term of two
years, a Search Committee consisting of not less than
three and not more than five members for making
recommendations for appointment of the Vice
Chancellor."
Further, Section 14(5) of the 1973 Act provides
that the Search Committee shall recommend the names of
three persons, who are in its opinion suitable for appointment
to the post of Vice Chancellor, to the Government.
10.
The matter of appointments of Vice Chancellor
came up before this Court in Human Rights Case No. 13865-
P of 2018 (hereinafter referred to as "HRC Case"). Objections
were raised in the HRC Case against the appointments which
were being made on recommendations of the Search
Committee. It was pointed out that discretion was being
exercised arbitrarily, in an unstructured, unregulated and
biased manner and the principle of merit was not being
followed. In this background, vide order dated 22.04.2018
9
(hereinafter referred to as "NRC Order"), the following order
was passed:-
a4. We are mindful of the fact that public sector Universities
cannot be left to operate without the appointment of a
permanent Vice Chancellor. Therefore as an interim
measure till such time that the permanent Vice Chancellors
are appointed pursuant to recommendations submitted by
the authorized Search Committees, acting Vice Chancellors
will be appointed in the following manner-
i)
For King Edward Medical University as well as
Nishtar Medical University, the existing Pro-Vice
Chancellors will hold the posts of acting Vice
Chancellors for running day to day affairs of the
Universities till the appointment of permanent
Vice Chancellors. This is in line with the
respective statutes governing the two Medical
Universities.
ii)
As far as the University of Health Sciences,
Rawalpindi Medical University and Faisalabad
Medical University are concerned, their acting
Vice Chancellors shall be appointed as follows:-
a. The names often senior most Professors
according to the seniority list
maintained by the Department shall be
placed before the Search Committees
which shall nominate/ recommend one
person to be notified as the acting Vice
Chancellor. On receipt of such
recommendations, the Government of
Punjab shall notify the said person as
the Acting Vice Chancellor immediately.
5. The Search Committees shall complete their work within
a period of three weeks and submit/ recommend names of
three persons in order of merit to the Government which
s/wit proceed to notifz4, the person of highest merit unless
there are cogent reasons for not appointing him which
shall be dultj recorded in writing and shall be justiciable.
6. The learned Advocate General, Punjab, shall submit a
comprehensive report regarding the appointment of acting
Vice Chancellors within one week and shall submit
periodical reports regarding the progress being made
towards the appointment of permanent Vice Chancellors.
Let the matter be relisted for hearing after two weeks."
11. A bare perusal of the aforenoted order reveals that
guidance was provided by this Court and the method of
appointments to the posts of Vice Chancellors were
structured to preclude the arbitrary and capricious exercise of
discretion at the cost of appointments on merit. It was held by
this Court that the appointments have to be made on the
principle of merit unless cogent reasons for not appointing
the person who is highest in merit are given, which would be
0
10
subject to judicial review. The said HRC Order was a speaking
order giving clear instructions to the Government. We are
unable to agree with the learned Division Bench insofar as it
has held that the HRC Order was only applicable to
universities that were before this Court in the HRC Case in
question. The order passed by this Court laid down a rule of
universal application which was meant to prevent the
unstructured, arbitrary, biased and unregulated exercise of
discretion solely dependent upon the sweet will of the Chief
Minister, with the object of safeguarding and upholding the
principle of merit. As such, being a pronouncement of this
Court, it is binding on all executive and judicial functionaries.
The record reveals that many subsequent appointments were
made by the Chief Minister and the Government of Punjab
while following and adhering to the rule settled by this Court
in its order dated 22.04.2018. As a matter of fact, the
recommendations of the Search Committee in this very case
also followed the directions issued through the HRC Order
and gave its recommendations in the order of merit. It shows
that it was clearly understood by the Government of Punjab
that the criteria given in the HRC Order was applicable to all
future appointments made through the mode of Search
Committees. Therefore, we find no valid basis, lawful reason
or reasonable justification for the view taken by the learned
ICA bench of the High Court that such Order was only
applicable in the HRC Case.
-
11
12.
It may be noted that directions were issued by this
Court that Vice Chancellors be appointed expeditiously. The
matter of such appointments got prolonged due to another
Writ Petition No. 12857 of 2019 filed in the High Court titled
Prof Dr. I/czz Ahmad etc. v. Province of Pun jab etc. This
Petition was, however, dismissed vide order dated 13.03.2019
while observing that the post of Vice Chancellor of the
University of Agriculture had been lying vacant since
23.01.2017 and the same ought to be filled without delay. It
was further directed that according to the HRC Order, the
person highest in merit shall be notified unless there were
cogent reasons for not appointing him which shall be
recorded in writing, within a period of fifteen days from the
date of the order of the learned High Court.
13.
Resultantly, the Search Committee constituted by
the Government of Punjab for the selection of the Vice
Chancellor, University of Agriculture, Faisalabad, made
recommendations to the Chief Minister of Punjab who then
advised the Governor / Chancellor of the University of
Agriculture to appoint Respondent No. 8 / Respondent No. 1
as the Vice Chancellor for a period of four years in terms of
Section 14(6) read with Section 11(8) of the 1973 Act. This
appointment was made in place of the Appellant who was
placed highest in merit, on the ground that certain unsettled
audit paras had remained unaddressed during the
Appellants' tenure as Vice Chancellor and that four syndicate
meetings that were required to be called in a year were not
CIVIL APPEALS V0.326-1, AND 327-i 0F2020 
12
convened, which constituted sufficient reason to deny
appointment to the Appellant even though he was on top of
the merit list having scored the highest marks.
14.
The learned Division Bench has relied upon the
case of Professor Dr. Razia Sultana and others a
Professor Dr. Ghazala Yasmeen Nizam and others (2016
SCMR 992) to support its conclusions. The cited case on its
facts is distinguishable for the reason that in the first place
the Higher Education Department, KP, prepared the merit list
of shortlisted candidates, who were interviewed by the Search
Committee. The Search Committee interviewed the shortlisted
candidates and finally, three candidates were recommended
by it. The Search Committee did not allocate any merit to the
three candidates and its recommendation was not based on
any preference. Whereas, in the present case, there was no
involvement of the Higher Education Department in making
of the merit list and, the Search Committee had in the instant
case prepared a merit list and such list was based upon order
of merit with the candidate scoring in aggregate the highest
marks on top of the list. The name of the Appellant was
admittedly placed on top of the list.
15.
It may be noted that the order in the HRC was
passed subsequent to the case of Dr. Razia Sultana (ibid)
and in essence, while recognizing the discretionary powers of
the appointing authority as recognized in the said case, by
way of the HRC Order went one step further to structure the
same in a manner that the discretion was not exercised in an
C 
13
unbridled, unstructured, biased or arbitrary manner to
ensure the same was not abused or misused. The question
decided in Dr. Ra.zia Sultana's case and the order in the HRC
dealt with two totally different issues namely, discretionary
powers of the appointing authority (as recognized in Dr. Razia
Sultana's case) and the structured exercise of such discretion
by the appointing authority in order to prevent abuse of
discretion (through the HRC Order). Moreover, it was after the
case of Dr. Ra.zia Sultana (supra) that the unbridled
discretion to appoint anyone of the choosing of the appointing
authority was structured by the Order of this Court in order
to safeguard against abuse of discretion at cost of merit.
Further, there existed no concept of preparing a list in the
order of merit by assigning marks at the time when the
judgment of Dr. Razia Sultana (ibid) was rendered. It was
only after this Court passed the HRC Order that the
Universities were directed to proceed with appointments of
Vice Chancellors on merit as determined by a Search
Committee. The HRC Order represents further development of
the jurisprudence on the question of appointments on the
recommendations of Search Committees. In Professor Dr.
Razia Sultana the issue of discretionary powers of the Chief
Minister and the mode and manner of exercise of the same
was neither the issue nor was it examined or ruled upon by
this Court.
16. 
The relevant paragraph of the judgment of
Professor Dr. Razia Sultana is reproduced below:-
I
14
"10. In the instant matter, absolute power of
appointment was not given to authorities i.e. the
Chancellor/ Governor to appoint any person of their
choice but the Search Committee consisting of eminent
professionals was constituted who after detailed
scrutiny of the credentials and length interview of each
candidate, recommended three names which, as per
para wise comments, was not on the basis of any
preference and the Chancellor/ Governor, on the advice
of the Chief Minister, appointed one candidate out of the
three candidates in exercise of his powers, as
mentioned above. Section 12(1) of the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa Universities Act, 2012 gives discretion to
the Chancellor/ Governor to appoint anyone out of the
candidates recommended by the Search Committee on
the advice of C.M. The only allegation against the
appellant (Dr. Razia Sultana) is that she belongs to the
constituency of the Chief Minister but without any
supporting material, this cannot be termed as an act of
mala Jide."
A bare perusal of the aforenoted paragraph
provides that, the names provided to the Search Committee
were not in order of preference, but, were at random. In
essence, what this means is that no list was prepared in the
order of merit. Comparing the said case to the present
controversy, it becomes apparent that after the HRC Order
the names were required to be shortlisted by the Search
Committee in order of merit, with the person highest on merit
having a legitimate expectancy of being appointed unless the
Chief Minister recorded valid reasons for not appointing him,
and such reasons were open to judicial scrutiny and review.
Consequently, the underlying principle and ratio of both
orders of this Court were totally different and there is no
conflict between the two.
17. Even otherwise, appointments to various other
Universities such as the Fatima Jinnah Medical University,
were made according to the HRC Order of this Court. Vice
C
15
Chancellors have been appointed in various universities
across the province, following the principle laid down in our
order dated 22.04.20 18 which has, for all intents and
purposes, been implemented by the provincial governments in
respect of all appointments made on the basis of
recommendations of the search committees. Therefore, the
finding of the learned Division Bench that the order dated
22.04.2018 was applicable only to universities before this
Court in the said matter is obviously erroneous, contrary to
facts, ignores the ground realities and clearly represents a
myopic approach. It may be noted that in the HRC order of
this Court, a rule of general application relating to the
appointment of Vice Chancellors in public sector universities
on the basis of recommendations of search committees has
been laid down. The applicability of the rule is not limited
only to the universities before this Court but to all
universities in the public sector under the control or authority
of the government which was fully represented before this
Court when the said order was passed. Further, the said
order was not only implemented with reference to the
institutions before us but to all other public sector
universities for all intents and purposes. The order has also
attained finality and continues to hold the field.
WHETHER THE REASONS FURNISHED BY THE CHIEF
MINISTER WERE VALID?
18. From the very outset, it has been admitted that
the reasons provided by the Chief Minister are justiciable and
I
16
courts can examine them on the touchstone of validity,
fairness and compliance with the law, rules and departmental
practice. Further, it has been admitted that the discretion of
the Chief Minister is not unfettered, unbridled and
unregulated. The counsel for the Respondent admits that the
reasons cannot be capricious, rnala fide or arbitrary but
states that the reasons provided by the Chief Minister were
adequate and sufficient. We have therefore examined the
reasons furnished by the Chief Minister for not appointing the
Appellant who had been placed highest on the merit list and
instead, deciding to appoint the Respondent who was
admittedly unanimously placed lower in the order of merit by
the Search Committee which consisted of eminent citizens,
respected representatives from academia, experts and high
ranking government officials. The two reasons assigned by the
Chief Minister in the Summary dated 13.04.2019 for not
appointing the person placed highest in the order of merit
were as follows:-
"a) Dr. Iqrar Ahmad who has obtained the highest
marks has previously served as Vice Chancellor of the
University of Agriculture. His period of appointment as
Vice Chancellor was marked by poor financial controls
and management as evidenced by 164 unsettled
audit paras.
b) Dr. Iqrar Ahmad was also unable to hold the
required number of meetings of the Syndicate."
19. We note that the counsel for the Appellant has
placed before us several similar cases of appointment of Vice
Chancellors of other universities. In the said cases, the
appointees had pending audit paras and despite that, they
were appointed to the post of Vice Chancellor. This fact has
17
not been controverted by the learned counsel for the
Respondents. We further note that the Chief Minister has
made no effort to examine the said audit paras to ascertain
whether they were actually related to the financial control and
management of the Appellant. The record reflects that he
recorded a general finding without ascertaining the facts with
any degree of accuracy or due application of mind. Nothing
has been shown to us that may connect the outstanding
audit paras with poor financial controls of the Appellant. It is
also important to note that, this too has not been contested
by the learned counsel for the Respondents. The only
document examining the audit paras is a letter dated
01.03.2019 and the said letter does not examine the details of
the pending audit paras or the question whether they related
to the mismanagement or lack of financial or administrative
control during the Appellant's tenure as the Vice Chancellor
of the Respondent-University. All other letters issued in the
matter appear to have been prepared after the Impugned
Notification was issued.
20. The record further reveals that the Secretary,
Agriculture Department, Government of Punjab, was part of
the Search Committee. The said Secretary is the Principal
Accounting Officer of the Government of Punjab. He was a
member of the Search Committee that placed the Appellant at
Serial No. 1 of the merit list. It is worth mentioning that the
same Secretary has given the Appellant 10 out of 10 marks in
the category of "Administrative and Financial Management".
Further, the Appellant was given 45 marks in the Interview.
As against this, the Respondent was given only 31 marks in
the Interview. The same Secretary was part of the interview as
well. Therefore, when the representative of the Government
who had first-hand knowledge of all material and relevant
facts also gave highest marks to the Appellant and low marks
to the Respondent, we do not see why the Appellant was not
appointed and that too without cogent and convincing
reasons.
21. Keeping in view the fact that other persons have
been appointed as Vice Chancellors, and while considering
their appointments, the pendency of audit paras has not been
considered as a material and determining factor reflecting on
their administrative ability or financial controls, we do not see
why the same standard was not applied in the case of the
Appellant and that too without due application of mind and
examination of the documents or material attributable to
alleged lax financial controls of the Appellant. Further, he was
never confronted with the same and was virtually condemned
unheard and behind his back. The reasons provided by the
Chief Minster show an exercise of pick and choose with a pre-
determined mind and a conscious and deliberate effort
appears to have been made to contrive reasons to appoint a
person lower on merit and deprive a person better qualified,
higher on merit and obviously more suitable for the post in
question. This act of the Chief Minister amounts to an illegal,
arbitrary, capricious and unbridled exercise of discretion by
19
the Chief Minister and cannot be countenanced especially so
when the Search Committee, comprising of credible
academicians, independent members and representatives of
the Government itself with impeccable credentials, placed the
Appellant on top of the merit list. Not only was he at No.1 of
the merit list in the written exam, but, he was also given the
highest marks in the interview. The same interview in which
the Respondent did not perform as well.
22. From the facts and circumstances discernable
from the record, it is evident that the Appellant was denied an
appointment unlawfully and arbitrarily and, reasons were
contrived to furnish a basis for a predetermined decision
which fail to stand the test for judicial scrutiny. It was
precisely for this reason that in our order dated 28.04.2018,
while retaining the discretion of the government to appoint a
person lower on merit we had circumscribed and structured
the exercise of discretion by making it obligatory on the
authority to record cogent reasons with a rider that such
reasons will be justiciable. As discussed in the preceding
paragraphs, the impugned order not only lacks bonafide and
transparency but also assign reasons which are neither
cogent nor show any consistency in executive decision
making.
23. 
The second reason provided by the Chief Minister
is that the Appellant was unable to hold the required number
of syndicate meetings. The stance of the Appellant is that
there is no requirement in the Act to hold a certain number of
r 
--
20
meetings of the syndicate. Statutes of other Universities
expressly and specifically provide for the same in their law.
The said requirement stems from an amendment made by the
syndicate on 28.06.2014 to Rule 3 of the University of
Agriculture Faisalabad Conduct of Business Rules of the
Syndicate, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the "Rules") which
reads as follows:-
"Meetings. 3. (1) Ordinarihi, the Syndicate will meet
at the University Campus and Faisalabad at least
four times in a Calendar year"
24. It is evident from a perusal of the said provision in
its true perspective that it is discretionary and not mandatory
in nature as no consequence is provided in the law or the
rules for failure to comply with the same. Even otherwise,
despite our query, the learned ASC for the Respondent has
been unable to show any prejudice having been caused to
anybody on account of the alleged failure to call the requisite
minimum number of syndicate meetings in a year. Further,
where the relevant law requires a specific number of
meetings, it provides for the same in the Act for example
Section 22 of the Act which requires the "Senate" to hold two
meetings in a year. The word used in the provision relating to
syndicate meetings is "ordinarily" which is indeed
discretionary as opposed to Section 22(3) which uses the
word "shall" which in the facts and circumstances of the case
points towards a mandatory command. The said Section is
reproduced as:-
"(3) The Senate shall meet at least twice in every year
on dates to be fixed by the Vice Chancellor with the
consent of the Chancellor"
CIVIL APPEALS N0.326-LAND 327-1, OF 2020 
21
25.
We are therefore of the view that, the Appellant
was not "required" to hold a certain number of syndicate
meetings and the Appellant could not have been denied
appointment for his failure to do what he was not required by
law to do.
26.
The learned Division Bench has erroneously and
for reasons best known to it held that the Court cannot
adjudicate upon the reasons given by the Chief Minister. This
finding in our humble view constitutes abdication of
jurisdiction and power of judicial review of administrative
actions by the High Court which is the foundation and
hallmark of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
199 of the Constitution. Further, we had clearly and
categorically held in our order dated 22.04.20 18 that the
reasons recorded by the appointing authority will be
justiciable. In the presence of such clear and categorical
findings recorded by this Court, we are unable to comprehend
how a finding of this nature could be recorded by the learned
High Court. We have been unable to find the basis, logic,
reason or rationale behind the view taken by the learned
Division Bench that the reasons recorded by the appointing
authority do not have to undergo judicial scrutiny. The order
of this Court was clearly on a question of law, enunciated a
principle of law and was binding on the learned Division
Bench in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution. This fact
has unfortunately escaped the notice of the learned Division
Bench of the High Court. Further, it is settled law that, even
I
22
the obiter dicta of this Court is binding on the High Court.
Reliance in this regard is placed on Justice Khurshid Anwar
Bhinder v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 Supreme
Court 48$i the relevant part of which is reproduced as
under-.-
"Even obiter dictam of the Supreme Court, due to the
high place which the Court holds in the hierarchy-of
courts in the countru, enjotj a highly respected position
as if it contains a definite expression of the Courts
view on a legal principle, or the meanin g of a law. (M.
Ismail & Sons v. Trans-Oceanic Steamship Co., Ltd
PLD 1966 Dacca 296, Nagappa is. Ramchandra AIR
1946 Bombay 365, K. C. Venkata Chalamayya v.
Mad. State AIR 1958 Andh-Par. 173, K.P. Doctor v.
State of Bombay AIR 1955 Born. 220, Bimla Devi is.
Chaturvedi AIR 1953 All. 613)." (Emphasis supplied)
 
27. 
The aforenoted principle of law was further
highlighted in the case of Muhammad All Abbasi and 2
others v. Pakistan Bar Council (PLD 2009 Karachi 392)
the relevant paragraph of which is reproduces as under:-
"Indeed, it is too well-settled of a principle of law,
requiring no reconsideration1 that even obiter dictpf
the Supreme Court are bindin g on the High Courts,
irrespective of the latter's strength (see M. Ismail and
Sons v. Trans-Oceanic Steamship Co. Ltd. PLD 1966.
Dacca 296, Ghaus Muhammad is. The State PLD 1978
La/i, 1235, Afaquz Zubair V. Muhammad Idrees PLD
1978 Kar. 984, Faiz Bakhsh v. Muhammad Munir
1986 CLC 507, Ghulam Mustafa Mughal is. Azad
Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir 1992
MLD 2083, Abdul Razzak is. The Collector of Customs
1995 CLC 1453, Mian Manzoor Ahmed Wattoo is. The
State 2002 Y LR 3433, Hafeez-ud-Din is. Badar-ud-Din
PLD 2003 Kar. 444, Azad J & K Government v. C/i.
Muhammad Saeed, Stenographer 2003 PLC (CS) SC
(AJ&K) 789 and Watan Party is. FOP 2005 Y LR 388L
(Emphasis supplied)
28. For reasons recorded above we find that the
impugned judgment of the learned Division Bench of the
Lahore High Court dated 05.03.2020 is unsustainable and
liable to be set-aside.
05.03.2020.
23
29. 
Accordingly, we allow these appeals and set aside
the impugned judgment of the Lahore High Court dated
ANNOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON t6.1 .2-1AT ISLAMABAD.
