IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT 
 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ  
 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE TARIQ PARVEZ 
 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE GHULAM RABBANI 
 
Civil Petitions No. 987 to 989 of 2011 
(On appeal from the judgment of High Court of 
Sindh at Karachi dated 31.5.2011 passed in Const. 
P.Nos.D-1391/2004, 
D-1151/2007 
and 
D-494/ 
2008) 
 
All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others 
(in CPs.987, 989/11) 
M/s Pakistan Heralds Publications and others  (in CP 988/11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… 
PETITIONERS 
VERSUS 
 
Federation of Pakistan and others  
 
(in CPs.987, 989/11) 
Chairman Implementation Tribunal etc.  
(in CP. 988/11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
… 
RESPONDENTS 
 
For the petitioners/ 
 
Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Sr. ASC 
Employers:  
 
 
Mr. Afzal Siddiqui, ASC,  
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
Assisted by: 
 
 
 
 
 
M/s Hameed Ahmad,  
Mustafa Aftab Sherpao and  
Bilal Akbar Tarar, Advocates 
 
 
 
 
 
On Court Notice:  
 
Maulvi Anwar-ul-Haq, 
 
 
 
 
 
Attorney General for Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
Assisted by  
 
 
 
 
 
M/s Salman Faisal, 
 
 
 
 
 
Syed Ali Mustafa Gillani and 
 
 
 
 
 
Mrs. Shafaq Mohsin, Advocates 
 
For PFUJ (Dastoor Group): 
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC 
 
For respondent No. 2C(i)  
Mr. Mehr Khan Malik, AOR  
(ii)(iii)& (v) [CP 987/2011] &  
for respondent No. 4  
[CP 989/2011]  
 
For respondent No. 3   
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC 
[CP 987/2011] &  
 
 
Mr. Mehr Khan Malik, AOR assisted by 
For respondent No. 4   
M/s Umar Akram Chaudhry, 
[CP 988/2011] &  
 
 
Smeer Khosa, Malik Ghulam Sabir, 
For respondent No. 6 
 
Yasir Latif Hamdani, Faiz Ghanghro, 
[CP 989/2011] 
 
 
Ms. Aneesa Agha & 
 
 
 
 
 
Ms. Sahr Bandial, Advocates 
For respondent No.3  
 
Mr. Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, ASC 
 
 
[CP 988/2011] 
 
 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
 
For respondent no. 1:   
Nemo [despite service of notice] 
[CP 987/2011]  
CPs 987-989/2011 
2 
For respondent no. 1-3:  
Nemo [despite service of notice] 
[CP 988/2011]  
For respondent no. 1-2:  
Nemo [despite service of notice] 
[CP 989/2011]   
 
Dates of hearing   
: 
20, 21, 28 & 29th September, 2011 
…  
 
J U D G M E N T 
 
 
 
IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ. — The 
petitioners seek leave against two separate judgments of even date, 
(31st May, 2011) passed by a learned Division Bench of the High Court 
of Sindh at Karachi whereby Constitution Petitions No. D-1391/2004, 
D-1151/2007 and D-494/ 2008 filed by them challenging the 
constitutionality of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) 
Act, 1973 [Act No. LVIII of 1973], hereinafter referred to as the 
“NECOSA”, or in the alternative, the constitutionality of the Seventh 
Wage Award dated 25th October, 2001, and the powers of the 
Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, hereinafter 
referred to as the “ITNE” were dismissed with costs throughout.  
2.  
 
Brief facts giving rise to the instant petitions are that on 
8th July, 2000, the Government of Pakistan constituted the Seventh 
Wage Board under the NECOSA for the purpose of fixing the rates of 
wages of the newspaper employees. The Wage Board (hereinafter 
referred to as ‘the Board’), headed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Raja Afrasiab 
Khan, a former  Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan as Chairman 
along with 10 members, five each nominated by the employers and 
the employees pronounced its Award, published by the Government of 
Pakistan vide S.R.O. No.744(I)/2001, dated 25th October, 2001. The 
petitioners, All Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS) and others, felt 
aggrieved by the Award and made a representation to the Government 
of Pakistan through Secretary, Information and Media Development 
CPs 987-989/2011 
3 
and Secretary Labour Manpower and Overseas Pakistanis, but no relief 
having been provided to them, they filed Constitution Petition No. 35 
of 2002 before this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution 
challenging, inter alia, the constitutionality of the NECOSA on the 
ground of being violative of their Fundamental Rights and ultra vires 
the Constitution, as also the Award being void ab initio and of no legal 
effect and consequence. This Court, vide judgment dated 8th April, 
2004 reported as All Pakistan Newspapers Society v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 2004 SC 600), dismissed the petition as not 
maintainable and the petitioners were asked to avail remedy before 
the proper forum, if they so desired.  
3. 
 
Three sets of the newspaper establishments, namely, 
APNS & 14 others (petitioners in CP 987/2011); Pakistan Heralds 
Publications & 7 others (petitioners in CP 988/2011); and APNS & 4 
others (petitioners in CP 989/2011) then filed Constitution Petitions 
No. D-1391/2004, D-1151/2007 and D-834/ 2004 under Article 199 of 
the Constitution before the High Court of Sindh. A learned Division 
Bench of High Court of Sindh, vide two separate judgments of even 
date, i.e., 31st May, 2011 dismissed the said petitions. Aggrieved by 
the aforesaid judgments of the High Court of Sindh, the petitioners 
have filed the instant petitions for leave to appeal under Article 185(3) 
of the Constitution before this Court. As caveat was filed by the 
contesting respondents, therefore, notices were issued to the learned 
Attorney General for Pakistan and official respondents so as to finally 
dispose of the petitions as the matter was lingering on for the last 
about ten years.  
4. 
 
Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Sr. ASC for the petitioners has 
argued that the NECOSA is ultra vires the Constitution and liable to be 
CPs 987-989/2011 
4 
struck down as a void law, inter alia, on the grounds that it has not 
provided even a single right of appeal from any adjudicatory or 
directory orders or actions, interim or final made or issued under it; 
although the decision of the Board is deemed an Award of the Full 
Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission (NIRC), which 
can be questioned in appeal/review/revision before a larger bench of 
the NIRC, yet no appeal is provided against it; Chairman of the Board 
is empowered to hand down edicts and Bills of Attainder, which 
violates not only Article 19 of the Constitution, but also the 
fundamental principles of trichotomy of power, access to justice and 
the independence of the judiciary; the Legislature has completely 
abdicated its powers as it is excessive delegation of powers to the 
Wage Board, without any guidelines, in terms of the judgments of this 
Court. There are various laws already existing on the subject, 
incorporated in the Act of 1973 itself, namely, (i) The Payment of 
Wages Act, 1936 [Section 2(h)]; (ii) The Provident Fund Act, 1928 
[Section 5(v)]; (iv) The Factories Act, 1934 [Section 6]; (v) The 
Industrial & Commercial Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 [Section 
17]; (vi) The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1965 [Section 18]; (vii) 
The Social Security Ordinance, 1965 [Section 19]; (viii) The Cost of 
Living Act, 1973; (ix) The Employees Old Age Benefit Act, 1974; (x) 
The Workers’ Participation & Profit Act; and (xi) the Minimum Wages 
Ordinance, 1969; the Wage Board and the Tribunal, constituted under 
the Act of 1973 are not judicial or quasi-judicial forums/bodies who are 
exercising purely executive and administrative functions in a 
discretionary manner. On merits of the Award, the learned counsel has 
made the following submissions: -  
CPs 987-989/2011 
5 
(1) 
The newspaper owners are ready to implement the Wage 
Board Award and what they had done, it was conditional 
implementation and they are making payments in terms of 
the 6th Award conditional upon the outcome of the pending 
proceedings in the courts of law including the intra-court 
appeals before a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court;  
(2) 
The 6th Award, which came in 1995, had inbuilt provisions 
and a machinery in annual increment of not less than 10% 
per annum and promotion to higher grades. These 
increments have been regularly given and promotions 
have not been withheld, so the workers are presently 
getting more than 300% of their emoluments;  
(3) 
As far as the Seventh Award is concerned, it is to be noted 
that it is not as if they are totally oblivious because both 
owners and working journalists cannot exist without each 
other. 
This 
recognition 
is 
always 
there. 
Ex-gratia 
payments, i.e. payments without commitment, are being 
made, especially under the Seventh Award. However, one 
commitment was made that if and when the Seventh 
Award would be implemented, these payments, which they 
are receiving, would be set-off;  
(4) 
Under the Seventh Award, the newspapers exist in 
categories A and B, i.e., the metropolitan newspapers fall 
in Category A while the regional papers fall in Category B. 
In the first category, there are only three metropolitan 
cities, namely, Karachi, Lahore and Rawalpindi-Islamabad, 
the publication whereof is listed as Grade A. The basic pay 
of an Editor Grade employee of a metropolitan newspaper 
was 
proposed 
at 
Rs.9,400/- 
with a 
maximum 
of 
Rs.13,900/- and now the said employee with perks and 
privileges is getting in lacs;  
(5) 
Nobody has been denied annual increments and now some 
of them are getting more than twice or thrice;  
(6) 
There are about 40,000 declarations of the newspapers at 
the moment floating around Pakistan with an initial list of 
260 who are the members and the membership has gone 
up to 2300 in Pakistan – this process of increment is 
CPs 987-989/2011 
6 
automatic and it is calculated over a period of 16 years 
since 1995 and even if it were to be taken at the rate of 
10% with compound increase over and over, it will not be 
less than 300% to 400% of what they were getting in 
1994, which would be less than 250% of what the Seventh 
Award has given them;   
(7) 
The metropolitan newspapers cannot be judged according 
to the standard of the Jang, the Recorder or the Dawn or 
the Nawa-e-Waqt who are giants in their own rights, 
having their own TV channels;   
(8) 
Many of the journalists have now opted out of being 
newspapers journalists to the electronic media where they 
are getting approximately 2 to 3 times salaries. Voluntarily 
they are coming and entering into agreements. It is a 
universal phenomenon all over the world – people always 
have ingenious minds to find ways how to circumvent the 
things. Access has been evaded, companies have been 
found in camel islands. Now here it is happening including 
in the State organizations is that many of these services, 
which are to be performed by the employees, are being so 
stout. Many of newspapers have handed over entire 
security to many security companies, which PIA and other 
organizations has done in various fields, such as catering, 
etc.. As such, when a big chunk of employees are no 
longer employees of an organization, their responsibilities 
no longer rest upon the organization. They are no longer 
entitled to the benefits of the Wage Board Award. 
Employer’s contract is with an independent body to provide 
those services instead of getting such services directly 
from the employees. Many companies hire the security 
agencies, which have contract with many companies and 
the employees are of security agencies and they are not 
employees of the companies so this is happening all over 
Pakistan. The learned counsel has proposed to his clients 
that they accept in spirit the Seventh Wage Board Award 
vis-à-vis the working journalists. His advice has been well 
received at this moment because it is a body, which has to 
CPs 987-989/2011 
7 
take a decision. And to this extent he is hopeful that they 
will come back with a positive response. According to him, 
millions are not being made anywhere except some 
newspapers, i.e. Jang, Dawn, etc., but for the newspapers 
having three members staff sitting in Mastung, this is 
arbitrary. Today, the editor of Kohistan is sitting with 
aside. Daily news papers; Nasim Hijazi’s newspaper; and 
this gentleman along with another outstanding newspaper 
“Sun” were the first victims of the Wage Board Awards and 
it closed down. The newspaper Muslim of Agha Murtaza 
Poya’s had to shut down; Taamir was shut down after the 
4th Wage Board Award; The Morning News from Karachi, 
with Khawaja Khairuddin as the Editor was shut down 
following the 5th Wage Board Award. There is a statement 
that 190 newspapers have been shut down - what would 
be about their workers/hawkers? The Government is the 
biggest advertiser in the country. Since 2001 when this 
Award came, the Government has not increased the rates 
of advertisement even by 1%.   
 
5.   
 
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned Sr. ASC stated that 
he is representing Dastoor Group of the PFUJ whereas Ms. Asma 
Jehangir would be representing the Working Group, the other 
component of the PFUJ. He submitted that the decision of the Wage 
Board is akin to arbitration proceedings, which is suggestive of a 
greater cordiality amongst the employers and the employees.  
6.  
 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC, who also argued on behalf 
of Ms. Asma Jehangir, learned counsel for the Working Group of PFUJ 
submitted that the Wage Board Award has wrongly been characterized 
as a judicial verdict rendered by a non-judicial forum. Even, it is not 
akin to arbitration; rather it is in the nature of price fixation of 
different commodities. The former essentially decides an existing 
dispute between two parties whereas no dispute was presented before 
CPs 987-989/2011 
8 
the Board. In the latter case, whenever rates are fixed, it is in the 
nature of rule making, which is always done for the future. Right of 
appeal would come in where any individual right is determined one 
way or the other. Even the function performed by the ITNE is not 
adjudication or determination of the rights and obligations, but it 
simply implements the decision of the Board, not to make any further 
determination. The Tribunal is like the Collector of Customs because 
he simply applies the law. No trial is pending before the Tribunal, nor 
any punishment has ever been awarded by it. There is no cause of 
action and the courts do not entertain challenges where there is no 
cause of action or where there is no live issue. The impugned powers 
of the Tribunal have never been invoked or exercised, therefore, there 
is no occasion to challenge the same. The question is purely academic 
in nature. As to the discrimination argument, it is established law that 
there can be a class. The newspaper industry is clearly distinguishable 
from other industries, e.g. cement, textile, etc. So, in order to regulate 
one, all do not have to be regulated. The Constitution leaves that area 
open to the legislature. This is the only sector referred to as the fourth 
pillar of the State. As to the bias, the Chairman is not a judge, his 
function is essentially information gathering and then laying down the 
rates of wages. Nothing has been brought on the record to show that 
the finding of the Board is perverse except taking advantage of their 
own boycotts. As to the excessive delegation, guidelines are there in 
the statute and it is a ground used most sparingly to strike down a 
legislation. It is not shown with any specific instances from the Award 
that the Chairman has acted in excess of the authority vested in him. 
The ground of occupied field is not available. This happens all the time. 
General civil law is in place, but special laws, such as banking, 
CPs 987-989/2011 
9 
cooperative societies etc., creating special procedures for the 
determination of certain rights are enacted. On the role of the 
Chairman and Members of the Board, the High Court of Sindh in its 
judgments has given finding. The language of the law is clear that the 
divergent parties are represented in equal number and it is the 
Chairman who decides by putting the casting vote.   
7.  
 
Mr. Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, learned ASC supported the 
arguments advanced by Mr. Salman Akram Raja and added that the 
representatives of the newspaper establishments, after joining in the 
consultative process before the pronouncement of the Award, cannot 
insist upon providing a right of appeal to them.  
8.  
 
The learned Attorney General for Pakistan supported the 
constitutionality of the NECOSA and the Wage Award.  
9.  
 
Keeping in view of the importance of the constitutional 
issues raised in these petitions, challenging the vires of NECOSA, it is 
considered appropriate to look into the history of the laws on the 
subject for the purpose of better understanding of such issues. 
Initially, the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 
1960 (hereinafter referred to as “the Ordinance, 1960”) was 
promulgated to regulate certain conditions of service of working 
journalists and other persons and to provide for constitution of a Wage 
Board. Section 8 of the Ordinance, 1960 provided that it was within 
the jurisdiction of the Provincial Government to constitute a Wage 
Board. The scope of the Wage Board was confined to the fixation of 
wages of working journalists as defined under section 2(f) of the 
Ordinance. On 30th May, 1960, the First Wage Board was constituted 
headed by late Mr. Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan, the then Judge of the 
High Court, as the Chairman of the Board. The Wage Board gave its 
CPs 987-989/2011 
10 
decision on 31st December, 1960. The decision of the Wage Board was 
subject to review and revision after five years from the date of its 
enforcement by an authority that might be set up by the Federal 
Government. However, instead of five years, the Second Wage Board 
was constituted on 25th April, 1969. The Board announced its decision 
on 8th June, 1974, fixing new pay scales of the newspaper employees 
while maintaining the categorization of the newspapers, periodicals 
and the news agencies as was already done in the First Wage Board 
Award.  
10.   
It seems that despite pronouncement of two Wage Boards 
Awards, it failed to achieve the object as no effective/independent 
forum was provided for the redressal of the grievances of non-
journalist newspaper employees, as a result whereof the newspaper 
employees had been observing strikes, etc. Thus, after the integration 
of the Provinces of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, the Provinces 
were authorized to constitute Wage Boards for fixing wages of the 
newspaper working in the respective Provinces. All the Provinces 
agreed on the constitution of one Wage Board. The journalists started 
demanding that the constitution of the Wage Board should be brought 
under the control of the Federal Government (reference may be made 
to the Parliamentary Debates). As such, under the circumstances, 
keeping in view the difficulties highlighted hereinbefore as well as to 
avoid uncertainty and to provide smooth and peaceful atmosphere, the 
NECOSA was enacted on 11th August, 1973. The difference in both the 
enactments is apparent from their titles. Former i.e. the Ordinance 
was only to regulate the service conditions of working journalists, 
whereas, the NECOSA was meant for the working journalists as well as 
other persons employed in the newspaper establishments. It would not 
CPs 987-989/2011 
11 
be out of context to mention here that the latter enactment, in fact, 
was in continuation of the Ordinance, 1960 as the former was repealed 
by it with certain amendments, re-enacting sections 2(c), (d) and (e) 
and section 9, 10, 11, 12, 12A, 13 and 13A. 
11.   
The Third Wage Board, constituted on 24th January, 1979, 
headed by Mr. Justice (R) Mohammad Munir Faruquee as its Chairman, 
initially provided interim relief on 5th August, 1979 and then 
announced final decision on 25th May, 1980, following the existing 
scheme of categorization of establishments and the gradation of the 
employees. The Fourth Wage Board, constituted on 4th October 1984 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Mian Fazle Mahmood, Judge of 
the Lahore High Court, initially provided interim relief on 10th January, 
1985 and then announced the final decision on 28th September, 1985, 
following the existing scheme of categorization of establishments and 
the gradation of the employees. The Fifth Wage Board constituted on 
20th July, 1989 under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice Agha Ali Haider, 
Judge of the High Court of Sindh gave its decision on 18th December, 
1990. The Sixth Wage Board, headed by Mr. Justice Zia Mahmood 
Mirza, a former Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan was 
constituted on 23rd October, 1994, granted interim relief on 1st 
December, 1994 and thereafter announced the final decision on 13th 
March, 1996.  
12.   
It is informed that the Sixth Wage Board was challenged 
before the Lahore High Court by filing Writ Petition No. 8926 of 1996, 
which was dismissed vide judgment dated 12th September, 1997 
reported in Pakistan Herald Publications (Private) Ltd. v. Federation of 
Pakistan (1998 CLC 65). Against the said judgment, ICA No. 859 of 
1997 was instituted in the Lahore High Court, which remained pending 
CPs 987-989/2011 
12 
from 1997 until 16th June, 2010 when it was consigned to record, in 
terms of the order of the said date, with the observation that “we, 
therefore, consign this appeal to record. If and when the appellants 
make arrangements for appropriate representation before this court, 
they may make any application for re-fixation/revival of this case.” Mr. 
Afzal Siddiqui, learned ASC stated that so far no application has been 
filed for re-fixation or the revival of the ICA. It would also not be out of 
context to note that in absence of stay order, reportedly the Sixth 
Wage Board Award has been implemented.  
13.   
One of the questions agitated by Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, 
Sr. ASC is in respect of violation of Article 25 of the Constitution qua 
classification between the working journalists and non-working 
journalists given in section 2(d) of the NECOSA. According to him, the 
definition of newspaper employees is unjustified and unreasonable as 
two distinct classes of persons, i.e., working and non-working 
journalists have been combined through it, which does not stand the 
test of reasonable classification, thus, the NECOSA has been rendered 
as a bad law and unconstitutional and the same is liable to be struck 
down on this ground. In this context his arguments are twofold:-   
(i) 
There is no reasonable classification under section 
2(e) of the NECOSA between working and non-
working journalists.  
(ii) 
Except newspaper establishments no other industry 
has been subjected to any special law for fixing 
wages of the employees working therein and 
newspaper industry has been picked up with an 
object not recognized under the law. 
 
14.   
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, learned ASC submitted that the 
Ordinance of 1960 was promulgated wherein in terms of section 8(1), 
the Wage Board was empowered to fix rates of wages of the working 
CPs 987-989/2011 
13 
journalists only, therefore, on promulgation of the NECOSA the Board 
was empowered to fix wages of the newspaper employees, which 
includes a whole-time journalist and a whole-time non-journalist to 
ensure smooth working of the newspaper industry.  
15.   
Learned counsel in the same breath has made a statement 
that the owners of the newspapers (petitioners) are likely to accept in 
spirit the Seventh Wage Award vis-à-vis the working journalists. It 
may be noted that somehow identical statement was also made by him 
while appearing in the case of All Pakistan Newspapers Society (PLD 
2004 SC 600). When we drew his attention towards the said 
statement, he did not deny the same, but stated that it was a 
conditional statement and to elaborate his plea in respect of the same 
stand, he had gone to the extent of stating that advice so given by him 
would be considered in a meeting by the newspaper establishments. 
The representative of the respondents vehemently opposed the 
statement and stated that the Court may decide the case on merits 
instead of leaving it to the newspaper establishments. However, from 
his above stance, prima facie, it is established that the petitioners are 
ready to accept the Seventh Wage Award as far as the working 
journalists as defined in section 2(d)(i) ibid. Be that as it may, to deal 
with this argument, we have to refresh our memory with the 
background/history/circumstances, which persuaded the legislature to 
make amendments in the Ordinance of 1960 and without any fear of 
contradiction that all the Awards given by the Wage Board for both the 
categories of newspaper employees, i.e., working journalists and non-
working journalists in terms of section 2(d) of the NECOSA have been 
implemented. Learned counsel without supporting his arguments on 
the basis of material stated that some of the allied services, e.g., 
CPs 987-989/2011 
14 
printing and publication, security services, catering, etc., have been 
outsourced, therefore, the persons engaged in those areas could not 
be treated as the employees of newspaper establishments. As such, 
the definition of newspaper employee based on irrational classification 
being violative of Article 25 of the Constitution is not acceptable. There 
is no cavil with the proposition that all citizens are equal before the law 
and are entitled to equal protection of law. But, we fail to understand 
as to how this point is available to the newspaper establishments 
because they have to plead discrimination under Article 25 of the 
Constitution if for the sake of argument, they have not been treated 
equally under the definition of newspaper employees given in section 
2(d) of the NECOSA. Apparently, under this provision of the law, 
categories of working journalists and non-working journalists have 
been created for argument’s sake, newspaper employees could plead 
discrimination or irrational classification against themselves. However, 
the petitioners/newspaper establishments legitimately can agitate 
against the rate of wages fixed by the Wage Board for both the 
categories of the newspaper employees.   
16.   
In the case of Pakistan Herald Publications (supra) on 
behalf of a group of owners of newspapers, contention was raised that 
though there may be some justification for treating the working 
journalists as a separate class and fix their wages considering the 
nature of their duties, but there was no occasion for giving similar 
treatment to other employees of the newspaper establishments who 
are non-working journalists. This contention on their behalf was 
repelled as under: -   
“38.  I am unable to agree with the learned counsel. The 
Act on.-the face of it provides for fixation of wages of all 
newspaper employees, both journalist and non-journalists. 
CPs 987-989/2011 
15 
The law was framed to ensure payment of wages and 
salaries of the persons engaged in the newspaper industry 
as a whole in recognition of the position that dissemination 
of news is vital to public interest. It was, therefore, 
necessary to ensure that all those persons who are 
engaged in bringing out newspapers should be free from 
shackle of economic misery and the resultant sense of 
despondency. The nature of duties being performed by the 
journalists may be unique and of more importance but it is 
equally clear that without the participation of other 
non-journalists employees it is not possible to bring out a 
newspaper. The legislature, being alive to this position, has 
chosen to frame the law for the newspaper industry as a 
whole which by itself is a separate class. This classification 
cannot be said to be arbitrary or irrational and the 
question of violation of Article 25 of the Constitution which 
does not prohibit reasonable classification, does not arise. 
It may be noticed that the earlier law namely the Working 
Journalists 
(Conditions 
of 
Service) 
Ordinance, 
1960 
provides for fixation of wages of the working journalists 
only 
which 
was 
found 
to 
be 
unsatisfactory. 
The 
Newspapers Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 
which 
repealed 
the 
aforesaid 
Ordinance, 
therefore, 
provides for fixation of wages of both whole time 
journalists and whole time non-journalists and defined in 
sub-clause (i) and sub-clause (ii) of clau3e (8) of section 2 
of the Newspaper Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 
1973. 
39.  There is also merit in the contention of Mr. Minto 
that the grant of better conditions of service only to the 
journalists as compared to other persons engaged in 
bringing out of the newspapers tended to create friction 
among the two sets of employees and was not congenial to 
the better relations inter se. It may also be mentioned 
here that relevant law in India namely The Working 
Journalists (Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act, 1955 was originally applicable only to 
CPs 987-989/2011 
16 
working journalists but by subsequent amendment, 
provision has been made for fixing wages of the non 
journalists also. In Independent Newspapers Corporation 
(Pvt.) 
Ltd. 
v. 
Chairman 
Fourth 
Wage 
Board 
and 
Implementation 
Tribunal 
for 
Newspaper 
Employees, 
Government of Pakistan, Islamabad (1993 SCMR 1533), it 
was observed that the purpose of Newspaper Employees 
(Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 is the betterment of 
financial condition of persons employed in the newspaper 
establishments 
and 
it 
should 
receive 
beneficial 
construction.” 
 
At this juncture, it is to be observed that as far as the working 
journalists or non-working journalists are concerned, they have no 
reservations against each other although according to the Wage Board 
Award, the wages of both types of newspaper employees are not at 
par as is evident from the contents of the Award. The argument so 
raised by the learned counsel has not impressed us, as it has already 
been observed hereinabove that the grievance of the petitioners at the 
best could be that the wages of the newspaper employees of both 
categories i.e., working journalists and non-working journalists, fixed 
by the Board are irrational.  
17.   
There has been a protracted litigation in the instant case. 
Earlier, a petition under Article 184(3) of the Constitution was filed 
before this Court, which was decided in the case of All Pakistan 
Newspapers Society (supra). Then petitions under Article 199 were 
filed before the High Court of Sindh, which remained pending for a 
considerable period of time, and prior to instant legal proceedings, the 
question being raised, has been decided by the Lahore High Court in 
1998 in Herald Publications’ case. But despite it, no material has been 
brought on record to substantiate the plea of discrimination to the 
CPs 987-989/2011 
17 
petitioners by defining “newspaper employees” under section 2(d) of 
NECOSA has caused to them and how wages fixed by the Board were 
irrational. Article 25 of the Constitution confers a right upon the 
citizens that they should be treated equally and whosoever challenges 
any provision of the law, it becomes his responsibility to prove the 
same and in absence thereof it is held that section 2(d) of the NECOSA 
is not violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.   
18.   
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, while laying down foundation of 
his case, has drawn our attention towards the case of All Pakistan 
Newspapers Society v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2004 SC 600) and 
submitted that the NECOSA is a beneficial legislation, which is aimed 
at the betterment of the newspaper employees, therefore, it should 
receive beneficial construction. It is well-settled that there is a 
presumption 
in 
favour 
of 
the 
constitutionality 
of 
legislative 
enactments, the Courts must lean in favour of upholding the 
constitutionality of a legislation and that the law should be saved 
rather than destroying it. Reference in this behalf may be made to the 
cases of Abdul Aziz v. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1958 SC 499), 
Province of East Pakistan v. Siraj-ul-Haq Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 854), 
Inam-ur-Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 563), Sabir 
Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PLD 1995 SC 66), Multiline Associates 
v. Ardeshir Cowasjee (PLD 1995 SC 423), Elahi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. 
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1997 SC 582) Tariq Nawaz v. Government 
of Pakistan (2000 SCMR 1956), Asif Islam v. Muhammad Asif (PLD 
2001 SC 499) and Federation of Pakistan v. Muhammad Sadiq (PLD 
2007 SC 133). He further contended that as far as the Parliament is 
concerned, it is competent to legislate a law making rational 
classification amongst different persons similarly placed in view of the 
CPs 987-989/2011 
18 
judgments pronounced by this Court from time to time, including the 
case of I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 1041) 
wherein the principles governing reasonable classification were 
highlighted. In I.A. Sharwani’s case (supra), this Court had highlighted 
that reasonable classification should be based on–  
(a) 
intelligible differentia, which distinguishes persons 
or things that each group together from those who 
have been left out. 
(b) 
That differentia must have nexus to the appeal cited 
achieve by such classification.  
 
19.   
Although we have held hereinabove that the plea of 
unjustified or unreasonable classification in terms of Article 25 of the 
Constitution of creating two categories of employees, working 
journalists and non-working journalists would only be available to the 
newspaper employees who have been placed in one compartment, 
although the nature of their job, for the sake of argument, is different 
from each other, i.e., a whole time journalist: an editor, a leader 
writer, news editor, feature writer, reporter, correspondent, copy 
tester, cartoonist, news photographer, calligraphist, writer, news 
editor, feature writer, reporter correspondent, copy tester, cartoonist 
news photographer, calligraphist and proof reader, and a whole time 
non-journalist: 
manager, 
clerk, 
stenotypist, 
printing 
engineer, 
linotype, operator, composer, type-seller, photo studio attendant, 
printing worker, accountant and office peon, who are performing 
distinct and different functions. However, without prejudice to the 
discussion made hereinabove, looking from this angle as well and 
presuming that the petitioners have grievance that a reasonable 
classification has not been made amongst the working journalists and 
non-working journalists. We have to apply the test noted hereinabove 
CPs 987-989/2011 
19 
from the case of I.A. Sharwani (supra) on the definition of the 
newspaper employees. In this context, it may be noted with reference 
to the object and text as a whole of the NECOSA is to be made to 
ascertain that it is not a journalist or any other individual alone who 
can successfully provide support to the newspaper industry for printing 
and publication of the newspapers containing public news or 
comments, etc. Argument of Mr. Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, learned 
counsel for the respondents at this stage seems to be very relevant as 
according to him without causing prejudice to the case of any of the 
categories of the newspaper employees, whenever a news is 
generated or broken, it would be of no use without the help of the 
supporting staff who fall within the category of a whole time non-
journalist specified in section 2(d)(ii) of the NECOSA to publish and 
print it because the object and purpose is to print, publish and 
circulate the newspapers, therefore, there is a nexus in the 
performance of the duties by the different categories of both types of 
persons with cooperation and collaboration with each others. Thus, on 
the basis of intelligible differentia the categories of the newspapers 
employees are different and distinct from other persons who are 
engaged in some other industries, but their object and purpose is not 
common as is shown that object and purpose of both the categories is 
common and to achieve the same there was a necessity of 
classification.  
20.   
Thus, such classification calls for equal protection of law to 
the working journalists and non-working journalists because they are 
equally placed, as such deserves to be treated alike both in privileges 
and liabilities. As far as promulgation of the NECOSA is concerned, it is 
the domain and prerogative of the legislature, which has wisdom to 
CPs 987-989/2011 
20 
promulgate a law to achieve a particular object and purpose 
presumably promulgating such laws legally, validly and constitutionally 
on the basis of its competence. In the instant case, the competence of 
the legislature has not been questioned except, inter alia putting 
forward the arguments noted hereinabove.  
21.   
Learned counsel also contended that the employees of the 
electronic media, i.e., radio and television are not covered by the 
NECOSA, therefore, applying phenomena of pick and choose, prejudice 
has been caused to the petitioners. Suffice to observe that in view of 
the above discussion, the newspaper industry is distinct and different 
from all other industries referred to hereinabove by the learned 
counsel and at the same time for such reason alone the NECOSA 
cannot be declared ultra vires the Constitution.  
22.   
It may be noted that as far as Article 19 of the Constitution 
is concerned, it deals with freedom of speech, etc. Thus, argument 
raised by the learned counsel that by phenomena of pick and choose, 
discrimination has been caused to the petitioners has no substance. 
23. 
 
Mr. Abdul Hafeez Prizada, Sr. ASC, learned counsel for the 
petitioners vehemently contended that the provisions of the NECOSA 
are violative of the Fundamental Rights enshrined in Articles, 4, 10A, 
18, 19, 24 and 25 as well as Article 2-A of the Constitution, therefore, 
the same deserve to be declared as void. The learned counsel 
vehemently contended that it is, in particular, violative of the due 
process of law clause as recently introduced into the Constitution by 
means of Article 10A inserted by the 18th Amendment as in section 9 
of the NECOSA, no right of appeal was provided against the Wage 
Award. In support of his argument, he relied upon the judgment in the 
case of In re: Islamization of Laws (PLD 1986 FSC 29) wherein on the 
CPs 987-989/2011 
21 
recommendations of the Federal Shariat Court, right of appeal was 
ordered to be provided to the convicts of the Field Court Martial. He 
also submitted that it is violative of the judicial system as it negates 
the rights of access to justice in terms of Sharaf Faridi Case (PLD 1994 
SC 105).  
24.   
On the other hand, Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, learned 
counsel for the respondents contended that the Legislature, keeping in 
view the history of the service conditions of the working journalists 
and newspaper employees, validly promulgated the NECOSA in 
accordance with the constitutional provisions, which, in no way, 
violated the Fundamental Rights of the petitioners. According to him, 
the NECOSA has survived since 1973 during course whereof five 
awards have been pronounced, which have been implemented and in 
no manner it has been found violative of the due process of law. He 
submitted that non-availability of any right of appeal could not be a 
ground to strike down any legislative instrument on the pretext of 
violation of due process of law. Further, the NECOSA is not a 
discriminatory, unjustified or an unreasonable law, as the definition of 
newspaper employees has not created a separate class between 
working and non-working journalists and other persons working in the 
newspaper industry on account of nature of their duties, rather it 
creates a nexus with the object of the legislation, viz., to regulate the 
conditions of service of the newspaper employees. The legislation in 
question, in order to ensure smooth functioning of the newspaper 
industry and to establish nexus between newspaper establishments 
and newspaper employees brought about amendments in the Working 
Journalists (Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1960 as a result whereof 
the NECOSA was promulgated and on account of the mechanism 
CPs 987-989/2011 
22 
provided for fixation of the wages, all the previous Awards under the 
NECOSA, except the Seventh Award, have been implemented and the 
newspaper industry is functioning smoothly and satisfactorily. The 
learned counsel were of the opinion that the nature of function 
entrusted to the Wage Board of determining future wages of the 
newspaper employees under the NECOSA was a legislative act, against 
which non-providing of right of appeal would not be tantamount to 
denial of the due process of law.  
25.   
Mr. Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, learned ASC fully supported the 
arguments advanced by Mr. Salman Akram Raja and added that the 
vires of the NECOSA for ascertaining whether it is inconsistent with 
any of the Fundamental Rights as per Article 8 of the Constitution, the 
petitioners who represent certain newspaper establishments, not more 
than 80 newspapers in number, are not holding brief on behalf of the 
whole lot of newspaper establishments, whereas rest of them have not 
challenged the vires of the NECOSA, therefore, from this angle alone, 
the bona fides of the petitioners can be judged. He submitted that the 
learned counsel for the petitioners has failed to point out any violation 
of the Fundamental Rights, except claiming a right of appeal against 
the Award. According to him, equal numbers of representatives of the 
newspaper establishments (petitioners) and of the newspaper 
employees (respondents) are nominated to advise the Chairman of the 
Wage Board, therefore, after joining in the consultative process before 
the pronouncement of the Award, they cannot insist for providing a 
right of appeal to them. The non-working journalists are the backbone 
of the newspaper industry and in absence of the services, which are 
provided by them for the smooth running of the newspaper industry, 
the State cannot enforce Article 19 of the Constitution.  
CPs 987-989/2011 
23 
26.   
The learned Attorney General for Pakistan submitted that 
the NECOSA as well as the Seventh Award dated 25th October, 2001 
are not violative of any of the Fundamental Rights of the petitioners or 
the due process of law as envisaged by the Constitution. Therefore, 
the same are intra vires the Constitution.  
27.   
Under Article 8 of the Constitution this Court is empowered 
to declare void any law or any custom or usage having the force of law 
if it is inconsistent with, or is in derogation of any of the Fundamental 
Rights. In the instant case, the petitioners have challenged the 
constitutionality of the NECOSA on the strength of arguments that it is 
in derogation of the Fundamental Rights. His specific argument for 
declaring the NECOSA unconstitutional is that right of appeal has not 
been provided against the Wage Award, therefore, it is against the due 
process of law and is also discriminatory in nature.  
28.   
Before dilating upon the respective contentions of the 
learned counsel for the parties, it is to be noted that under section 
9(1) of the NECOSA, the Federal Government vide notification No. 
Lab-II-I(19)/99 dated 8th July, 2000 constituted the Wage Board for 
fixing the rates of wages in respect of the newspaper employees in 
accordance with the provisions of the NECOSA. Hon’ble Mr. Justice 
Afrasiab Khan, former Judge of the Supreme Court was appointed as 
the Chairman of the Board vide notification No. I-19-99-Lab-II dated 
19th June, 2000. The petitioners, All Pakistan Newspapers Society, 
nominated five persons vide letter dated 26th January, 2000 as 
members of the Wage Board. Similarly, five members were nominated 
on behalf of the newspaper employees. For reference composition of 
the Board is given below: -   
Chairman  
CPs 987-989/2011 
24 
Mr. Justice Raja Afrasiab Khan 
Former Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan  
 
Employers Members 
(i) 
Mr. Hameed Haroon, President APNS and Chief 
Executive Officer, Pakistan Herald Publications (Pvt.) 
Ltd. 
(ii) 
Mir Shakil-ur-Rahman , Chief Editor Jang 
(iii) 
Mr. Arif Nizami, President, CPNE and Editor, The 
Nation, Daily Nawa-e-Waqat 
(iv) 
Mr. Arshad A. Zuberi, Editor Business Recorder 
(v) 
Syed Fasih Iqbal, Editor, Daily Balochistan Times 
 
Employees Members 
(i) 
Mr. Abdul Hameed Chhapra, Chairman, APNEC, 
Karachi 
(ii) 
Mr. I.H. Raashid, President PFUJ, Lahore 
(iii) 
Mr. Pervez Shaukat, Secretary General, APNEC, 
Rawalpindi 
(iv) 
Mr. Majid Fauz, President, Union of Balochistan 
Journalists, Quetta  
(v) 
Mr. Abdullah Jan, Assistant Secretary General, PFUJ, 
Peshawar 
 
Under section 9(2) of the NECOSA, both categories of the members 
were to advise the Chairman. Under section 9(3) of the NECOSA, the 
time limit fixed for giving an Award by the Board is 180 days. Under 
section 10(1) the Board, while fixing rates of wages in respect of 
newspaper employees [both journalists and non-journalists as per 
section 2(d)] is required to take into consideration the cost of living, 
prevailing 
rates 
of 
wages 
of 
comparable 
employment, 
the 
circumstances relating to the newspaper industry in different regions 
of the country and any other circumstances, which the Board may 
deem relevant. It is important to note that as per section 10(2) of the 
NECOSA, the Board is also empowered to fix the wages for timework 
and for piecework.  
29.   
The Board convened its first meeting on 29th August, 2000 
at Islamabad. The Members of the newspaper establishments 
boycotted the first meeting and a letter dated 24th April, 2000 was 
CPs 987-989/2011 
25 
addressed to the Director General (Internal Publicity), Ministry of 
Information, wherein without prejudice to, and subject to the 
conditions noted therein, it was stated that in absence of clear and 
categorical assurance in terms of the letter, the persons nominated will 
not participate in the proceedings of the Board and nomination would 
be deemed to have been withdrawn. The said conditions were as 
under: -  
“II.  7. 
The prior to being signed by the Chairman and 
publication in the official Gazette the Award must be 
circulated amongst the members, the members must be 
allowed to record their concurrence with or dissent from 
the Award and such concurrences and/or dissents must 
also be published along with the Award signed by the 
Chairman.  
III. 
That unless the above requests are acceded to the 
proceedings before the Board will neither be fair nor will 
they appear to be fair. That our members have no 
intention of being part of a Board or of participating in the 
proceedings thereof unless it conforms to the Fundamental 
Rights guaranteed by the Constitution, adopts the 
necessary procedural safeguards and does not deny due 
process both substantive and procedural to the members 
of the various newspaper establishment(s) that will appear 
before it in due course.”   
 
Similarly, they also did not attend the second meeting held on 3rd 
October, 2000 at Chamba House Lahore and the third meeting held on 
30th & 31st October, 2000 at Quetta and ultimately they ended their 
boycott and took part in the deliberations of the Wage Board during 
the meeting held on 13th & 14th November, 2000 at Peshawar. Pending 
process of the completion of the proceedings of the Wage Board, an 
interim relief was given to the employees. Again, for the second time, 
the representatives of the owners boycotted the Wage Board meeting. 
CPs 987-989/2011 
26 
As the decision of the Wage Board had to be given within 180 days of 
its constitution, therefore, the Chairman visited different places, 
collected evidence and also procured the evidence of financial experts, 
namely, Dr. A.R. Kamal and Dr. Muhammad Irfan and on the basis of 
deliberations and the material so collected, gave the decision.  
30.   
As 
far 
as 
question 
of 
declaring 
the 
NECOSA 
unconstitutional on the ground of non-provision of right of appeal 
against the decision of the Board is concerned, it is necessary to bear 
in mind the questions as to whether there is any dispute between two 
parties in an adversarial litigation against each other, which requires to 
be decided by the Board, and as to whether the claim of entitlement of 
one of the parties is against the State or any State agency, which 
requires determination by the Board or the Board is performing a 
legislative act where there is no existing right or dispute to be decided 
between the parties. As it has been pointed out while noting the 
history of all the Wage Board Awards in this country, somewhat similar 
position has prevailed in the neighbouring country with the difference 
in the composition of the Board and the duties assigned to the 
members. Initially, in the said country as well, the Working Journalists 
(Conditions of Service and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1955 was 
promulgated, which was subsequently amended in 1974 in pursuance 
whereof separate wage boards were constituted in respect of working 
journalists and non-working journalists under sections 9 and 13, 
however, in both the categories of the Board, the Chairman and the 
members were to perform their functions collectively whereas under 
the NECOSA though they have to work collectively, but the members 
are to give advice, on the basis of which decision is to be given by the 
Chairman.  
CPs 987-989/2011 
27 
31.   
Article 9 of the Constitution provides that no person shall 
be deprived of life or liberty save in accordance with law. The word 
‘life’ has been interpreted by this Court in various cases, notably 
Shehla Zia v. WAPDA (PLD 1994 SC 693), Arshad Mehmood v. 
Government of Punjab (PLD 2005 SC 193), Moulvi Iqbal Haider v. 
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 394), Bank of Punjab v. Haris 
Steel Industries (Pvt.) Ltd. (PLD 2010 SC 1109), In Re: Suo Motu Case 
No.13 of 2009 (PLD 2011 SC 619). It has been held that the word ‘life’ 
is very significant as it covers all facets of human existence. Life 
includes all such amenities and facilities which a person born in a free 
country is entitled to enjoy with dignity, legally and constitutionally. 
Further, the right to life also includes the right to livelihood. Under 
Article 3 of the Constitution, the State is bound to ensure the 
elimination of all forms of exploitation and the gradual fulfillment of 
the fundamental principle, from each according to his ability to each 
according to his work; therefore, a right person is required to be 
engaged in the right job and there should not be any exploitation 
whatsoever. The scheme of the NECOSA is required to be understood 
with reference to the object and purpose of the legislation. It has 
already been pointed out that the NECOSA is the result of amendment 
in the Working Journalists (Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 1960, 
and for this reason, its Preamble recites that it is an Act to repeal and, 
with certain amendments, re-enact the Working Journalists (Conditions 
of Service) Ordinance, 1960; therefore, for the purpose of ascertaining 
the object we have to read the Preamble of the Ordinance No. XVI of 
1960, which provided that “whereas it is expedient to regulate certain 
conditions of service of working journalists and other persons in 
newspaper establishments.” In both the enactments, there was no 
CPs 987-989/2011 
28 
difference in the definition of the term “newspaper establishment”. 
According to section 2(e) of the NECOSA, it means “an establishment 
under the control of any person or body of persons, whether 
incorporated or not, for the production, printing or publication of one 
or more newspapers or for conducting any news agency or syndicate.” 
And, in both the laws, same is the position in respect of the definition 
of the term “wages”, which according to section 2(h) of the NECOSA 
means wages as defined in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and 
includes any gratuity or other payment declared as wages by the 
Board. Clause (i) ibid provides that all words and expressions used but 
not defined in the Act and defined in the Ordinance shall have the 
meanings respectively assigned to them in the Ordinance. As it has 
been pointed out that one of the objects of promulgating the 
Ordinance of 1960 and the NECOSA was to regulate certain conditions 
of service of working journalists and other persons employed in 
newspapers, therefore, to achieve the object of regulating their 
conditions of service, the newspaper establishments have been bound 
down under section 3 of the NECOSA to furnish to a newspaper 
employee at the time of his appointment or transfer or promotion an 
order in writing showing the terms and conditions of his service. This is 
one of the substantive provisions of the NECOSA to ensure that the 
terms and conditions of service of the newspaper employees are 
documented. Similarly, to provide security of job the newspaper 
establishment under section 4 is required not to terminate the services 
of a newspaper employee without good cause shown through a notice, 
in writing, of such termination (a) of one month, if the total period of 
continuous service of the newspaper employees with the newspaper 
establishment is not less than three months but less than two years; 
CPs 987-989/2011 
29 
(b) of two months, if the total period of such service is not less than 
two years but less than three years; and (c) of three months, if total 
period of such service is not less than three years. Section 5 of the 
Ordinance cast a duty upon a newspaper establishment to constitute, 
for the benefit of its working journalists, a Provident Fund in the 
prescribed manner. Similarly, the rights of the newspaper employees 
have also been protected in line with the provisions of the Factories 
Act, 1934 and their entitlement to receive full wages, medical cover, 
etc., have been protected/secured under sections 6, 7 & 8 of the 
NECOSA. Under section 10 of the NECOSA, guidelines for fixing the 
wages have been provided. Any such right, if in force in any manner, 
would give rise to adverse dispute between the newspaper employee 
and the newspaper establishment as a natural person providing 
service to the newspaper establishment. They, as a matter of right, 
under Article 9 of the Constitution are entitled to the purpose of 
securing their lives. Thus, on the same analogy when they are 
performing their duties in different newspaper establishments; would 
they not be entitled to the wages of the work performed by them? In 
the past, as it has been noted above, there had been unrest between 
the newspaper establishments and the newspaper employees, may be 
working journalists or the non-working journalist, thus, it was not 
possible to fully enforce Article 19 of the Constitution, which provides 
that every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and 
expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any 
reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of 
Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part 
thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or 
CPs 987-989/2011 
30 
morality, or in relation to contempt of court, commission of or 
incitement to an offence.  
32.   
The Fundamental Right guaranteeing freedom of press has 
been considered in a number of cases. Reference may be made to 
Independent Newspaper Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman Fourth 
Wage Board Award (1993 SCMR 1533) and I.E. Newspaper (Bombay) 
P. Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1986 SC 515). In the latter judgment, a 
joint petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution was filed by 
certain companies, their shareholders and their employees engaged in 
the 
business 
of 
editing, 
printing 
and 
publishing 
newspapers, 
periodicals, magazines, etc. challenging the validity of imposition of 
import duty on the newsprint imported from abroad under section 12 
of the Customs Act, 1962 etc. The case was remanded to the 
Government with certain observations and arrangements pending 
decision with the latter but on the question of freedom of the press it 
was held that “in today's free world freedom of Press is the heart of 
social and political intercourse. The press has now assumed the role of 
the public educator making formal and non-formal education possible 
in large scale particularly in the developing world where television and 
other kinds of modern communication are not still available for all 
sections of society. The purpose of the press is to advance the public 
interest by publishing facts and opinions without which a democratic 
electorate cannot make responsible judgments. Newspaper being 
surveyors of news and views having a bearing on public administration 
very often carry material which would not be palatable to 
Governments and other authorities.” Similarly, In re: Harijai Singh 
(AIR 1997 SC 73), it has been held that freedom of press is always 
regarded as an essential pre-requisite of a democratic form of 
CPs 987-989/2011 
31 
Government and also mother of all liberties in a democratic society.  
Without freedom of press, truth cannot be attained.  It is considered 
necessary not only for the mental health and the well being of society, 
but also for the full development of the personality of the individual. 
Under Article 19, not only the newspaper owners but the citizens at 
large also enjoy the right of receiving independent news and views 
along with articles, etc. Any disturbance in this industry is bound to 
cast negative aspersion and it would also be developing a perception, 
which is against the democratic norms and this is the reason that due 
to certain defects in the Ordinance of 1960, the smooth functioning of 
the newspaper industry was not possible. It is reported that on 25th 
April, 1969, the second Wage Board was constituted with late Mr. 
Justice Sajjad Ahmad Jan as its Chairman, who unfortunately had to 
resign, reportedly not for a good reason. He was succeeded by Mr. 
Justice A.S. Farooqi, Judge of the High Court of West Pakistan in 
October, 1969.  
33.   
Be that as it may, as discussed hereinbefore, by means of 
the NECOSA, with a view to remove the defects from the Ordinance of 
1960 important amendments were brought about in the said 
Ordinance. The new law provided a mechanism for fixing the wages 
after advice rendered to the Chairman by the representatives of the 
newspaper employees and the newspaper establishments. A perusal of 
section 9 of the NECOSA, makes it abundantly clear that the Board has 
to perform the function of fixing of rates of wages of the newspaper 
employees keeping in view the parameters of the guidelines provided 
in section 10 of the NECOSA for the purpose of payment of wages to 
them in future, as is manifest from the provision of section 11(1) of 
the NECOSA, according to which the decision of the Board is to be 
CPs 987-989/2011 
32 
published within a period of one month from the date of its receipt by 
the Federal Government in the prescribed manner. The decision of the 
Board published under sub-section 1 shall come into operation on such 
date, as may be specified in the decision, and where no date is so 
specified, it shall come into operation on the date of its publication and 
shall remain in force till it is modified or varied by a later decision of 
the Board published in the manner provided in sub-section (1). A plain 
reading of this provision of law, keeping in view the principle of 
interpretation that ordinary and natural meanings have to be assigned 
to the language employed in the legislation because it would help in 
finding out the object and the purpose for which the same has been 
enacted.  
34.   
Thus, no other interpretation can be given to this provision 
of the NECOSA except that it is making reference to a certain 
eventuality, which will happen in future. According to Mr. Salman 
Akram Raja, learned ASC, the Award applies prospectively whereas Mr. 
Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, learned counsel for the petitioners has stated 
that the Seventh Award has been made applicable retrospectively, 
with effect from 1st July, 2000. We have pointed out to him that the 
Award has to come into operation on the date specified in the decision, 
in this case, from the 1st of the month in which the Wage Board was 
constituted, i.e., 8th July, 2000, therefore, the Award has been made 
applicable from the said date. Similarly, no adversarial dispute was 
referred to the Wage Board to resolve or decide any controversy 
between the parties in respect of a pending dispute. It is to be 
observed that when there is adversarial nature of litigation between 
the parties, then it is only the judicial forum which decides the same 
like the property cases, etc. The learned counsel for the petitioners 
CPs 987-989/2011 
33 
himself candidly conceded that the Wage Board does not perform 
judicial or quasi-judicial function, rather it performs only a delegated 
executive function of the legislature– be it Federal or the Provincial – 
of fixing the wages of newspaper employees, as is done by a Pay 
Commission in fixing salaries of the Government/civil servants. M/S 
Salman Akram Raja and Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, ASCs as well as the 
learned Attorney General for Pakistan stated that the Board performs a 
legislative act.   
35.   
Mr. Pirzada vehemently contended that the NECOSA is void 
and liable to be struck down for having failed to provide even a single 
right of appeal from any adjudicatory or directory orders or actions, 
interim or final made thereunder, though it has been authoritatively 
ruled by this Court that at least one right of appeal is an essential 
component of any statute. To strengthen his argument, the learned 
counsel submitted that the decision of the Wage Board is to be 
deemed Award of Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations 
Commission (NIRC), but the same could not be questioned/challenged 
by way of appeal/review/revision or otherwise under the provisions of 
the NECOSA despite the fact that the NIRC Awards could be 
questioned before a larger Bench of the Commission. He further 
submitted that the orders of the Implementation Tribunal for 
Newspaper Employees (hereinafter referred to as “ITNE”) were also 
not appealable, therefore, the proceedings of the Tribunal suffered 
from that very defect. Reliance was place, inter alia, on Pakistan v. 
General Public (PLD 1989 SC 6).    
36.   
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, learned ASC submitted that 
whenever rates were fixed, it was for the future. Had it been a judicial 
finding, an appeal would be required. The Board does did not decide 
CPs 987-989/2011 
34 
an existing dispute. It is clarified in the judgment of the Indian 
Supreme Court reported as AIR 1962 SC 12  that the Wage Board 
implements the policy of the law, the wages determination is done 
with prospective effect, which is in the nature of rule making [in this 
case, the subordinate agency is the Wage Board]. There are three 
kinds of decisions, to be considered and distinguished. First is 
resolution of dispute between two conflicting parties, which is purely a 
judicial act. Second is a decision by an administrative body that allows 
or disallows an entitlement claim against the State or a State Agency, 
example of which is the case of Arshad Mehmood v. Government of 
Punjab (PLD 2005 SC 193), where the bus owners complained that 
they were unfairly barred from plying buses on certain routes. They, 
therefore, sought enforcement of entitlement against the State. Third 
is a legislative function, where there is no existing right or dispute 
which is being determined. The Wage Board is given the power to 
determine wages. There is no existing dispute or right to be 
determined by it. The proceedings of the Board are neither judicial nor 
quasi-judicial, which is accepted around the world – whether it is price 
of essential commodities, or anything else. In such a case, rules are 
laid down for general applicability, may be for a particular industry, 
class, etc., which are to have prospective effect. They are akin to rules 
of conduct, which can be challenged in appropriate proceedings, either 
under Article 199 or Article 184(3) of the Constitution, if it is shown 
that the Board has acted in a perverse manner. That would be a 
different kind of challenge, which is available against a legislative 
activity and the right of appeal would come in where individual right is 
determined one way or the other. All such cases, including General 
Public, Arshad Mehmood and Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of 
CPs 987-989/2011 
35 
Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 602) relate to the first two categories, and not 
the third category.  
37.   
In the case of Pakistan v. General Public (PLD 1989 SC 6), 
right of appeal was provided in the cases where there was likelihood of 
conviction of a person in the service of Pakistan Army, Navy or Air 
Force, but the statutes which were examined, i.e. Pakistan Army Act, 
1952, Pakistan Air Force Act, 1953 and Pakistan Navy Ordinance, 1961 
were not declared unconstitutional for non-provision of right of appeal. 
However, following the dictum laid down in the said case, the said laws 
were amended and right of appeal was made available to the persons 
against whom an adverse order or conviction would be passed. As far 
as the second judgment passed by a seven-member Bench in Arshad 
Mehmood’s case is concerned, section 69-A of the Motor Vehicles 
Ordinance, 1965 was found to be violative of Article 18 of the 
Constitution, and while disposing of the case four months’ time was 
given to the Government of the Punjab for making necessary 
amendments in the law. As far as Mubeen-us-Salam’s case (supra) is 
concerned, again this Court did not declare the relevant law as 
unconstitutional or void because the right of appeal was not available 
to the persons who were deemed to be civil servants in terms of the 
Service Tribunals Act, 1974. However, observations were made that in 
such a situation, before approaching the Service Tribunal, they can 
avail right of appeal before the department/administrative authority. It 
is to be borne in mind that in the said case, no action was declared 
illegal for want of right of appeal, except that it was held that (a) the 
cases, which have been decided finally by this Court in exercise of 
jurisdiction under Article 212(3) of the Constitution shall not be 
opened, and if any review petition, miscellaneous application or 
CPs 987-989/2011 
36 
contempt application, filed against the judgment is pending, the same 
shall be heard independently and shall not be affected by the ratio of 
that judgment; (b) the proceedings instituted either by an employee 
or by an employer, pending before this Court, against the judgment of 
the Service Tribunal, not covered by category (a) before this Court or 
the Service Tribunal shall abate, leaving the parties to avail remedy 
prevailing prior to promulgation of section 2-A of the Services 
Tribunals Act, 1974; (c) the cases or proceedings which are not 
protected or covered by this judgment shall be deemed to have abated 
and the aggrieved person may approach the competent forums for 
redressal of their grievances within a period of 90 days and the bar of 
limitation provided by the respective laws, shall not operate against 
them till the expiry of stipulated period; (d) the cases in which the 
order of Service Tribunal has been implemented shall remain intact for 
a period of 90 days or till the filing of appropriate proceedings, 
whichever is earlier; and (e) the Service Tribunal shall decide pending 
cases under section 2-A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1974 in view of 
the above observations. However, if any of the cases is covered by 
clause (c) ibid, a period of 90 days shall be allowed to an aggrieved 
party to approach the competent forum for the redressal of its 
grievance.  
38.   
It is true that denial of right of appeal is violative of the 
due process of law in matters where judicial powers are being 
exercised by a functionary discharging judicial or quasi-judicial 
functions, if the same are being exercised by the executive or the 
administration as it has been highlighted hereinabove. And as per 
Injunctions of Islam, denial of right of appeal in adversarial 
proceedings, both civil and criminal, is considered against the due 
CPs 987-989/2011 
37 
process of law and norms of justice, but in exercise of legislative 
powers or legislative activities, no right of appeal can be extended 
before the forums, higher in status, within the legislative body which 
had passed the order or entered into any legislative activity. However, 
power of judicial review would be available to the superior Courts 
under Article 199 or Article 184(3) of the Constitution for the purpose 
of examining the constitutionality of the legislation or sub-legislation. 
This Court has exercised power of judicial review in a good number of 
cases, e.g., Dr. Mubashir Hassan v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2010 
SC 265) and Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879). Para 171 of the latter judgment is 
reproduced hereinbelow: -  
“171.  
It is clear from the above survey of the case 
law that it is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence 
that Courts must always endeavour to exercise their 
jurisdiction so that the rights of the people are guarded 
against 
arbitrary 
violations 
by 
the 
executive. 
This 
expansion of jurisdiction is for securing and safeguarding 
the rights of the people against the violations of the law by 
the executive and not for personal aggrandizement of the 
courts and Judges. It is to this end that the power of 
judicial review was being exercised by the judiciary before 
3rd November, 2007. Indeed the power of judicial review 
was, and would continue to be, exercised with strict 
adherence to the principles governing such exercise of 
power, remaining within the sphere allotted to the 
judiciary by the Constitution.”  
 
Reference in this respect may also be made to the case of Khan 
Asfandyar Wali v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2001 SC 607), wherein 
this Court, while examining the question as to whether right of appeal 
can be granted to a person charged for an offence under the National 
CPs 987-989/2011 
38 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999, declared that in absence of any 
provision in the aforesaid Ordinance to release an accused on bail, the 
latter can approach the High Court for grant of bail under Article 199 
of the Constitution. As far as challenging the validity of the Wage 
Award due to absence of right of appeal, if at all available to the 
petitioners, i.e. APNS, is concerned, in this behalf reference may 
beneficially be made to the case of Independent News Corporation and 
others v. Chairman 4th Wage Board and Implementation (1993 SCMR 
1533). Similarly, the power of judicial review was also invoked by the 
petitioners to challenge the Sixth Wage Award before the Lahore High 
Court in the case of Pakistan Herald Publications v. Federation of 
Pakistan (1998 CLC 65). There are few other cases as well, in which 
the power of judicial review of the Superior Courts was invoked, such 
as the cases of Shamas Textile Mills Ltd. v. Province of Punjab (1999 
SCMR 1477), Nabi Bux Khoso v. Pakistan Television Corporation (PLD 
1982 Karachi 725), Tika Ramji v. State of U.P.[1956 SC 676 (S) AIR V. 
43 C. 112 Oct.], Express Newspapers Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1958 
SC 578), The P.T.I. v. Union of India (AIR 1974 SC 1044), U.C. Bank 
v. Their Workmen (AIR 1951 SC 230), Expess Newspapers v. 
Somayajulu (AIR 1964 SC 279), S.R. Corpn. v. Industrial Tribunal (AIR 
1968 SC 529), Hochticf Gammon v. Industrial Tribunal (AIR 1964 SC 
1746), B. Coleman & Co. v. P.P. Das Gupta (AIR 1970 SC 426), etc.     
39.   
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC, learned counsel for the 
respondents vehemently argued that the function of fixation of wages 
of the newspaper employees being performed by the Board is neither 
judicial/quasi-judicial nor executive in nature rather it is of a legislative 
character. To substantiate his plea, he relied upon the cases of 
Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 578), Shri 
CPs 987-989/2011 
39 
Sitaram Sugar Company v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1277), Union 
of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. (AIR 1987 SC 1802), G.K. Krishna v. 
State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1975 SC 583), S.I. Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of 
India (AIR 1976 SC 460), R.K. Gorg v. Union of India (1981) 4 SCC 
675)], Pallavi Refractories v. Sigareni Collieeries Co. Ltd. [(2005) 2 
SCC 277], Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc. (348 U.S 483(1955)], Adkins 
Et. Al v. Children’s Hospital [261 U.S. 525 (1923)], Narottamdas 
Harjiwandas v. State of MP (AIR 1964 MP 45), Prentis v. Atlantic 
Coastline [211 U.S. 210 (1908)] and Australian Boot Trade Employees 
Federation v. Whybrow & Co. [10 C.L.R. 266 (1910)].  
40.   
In this connection, reference may be made to Cooley's 
Constitutional Limitations, 8th Edn., Vol. I, at p. 185, under the 
caption “the powers which the legislative department may exercise”, 
which brings out the distinction between a “legislative” and a “judicial 
act” in the following words: -  
“On 
general 
principles, 
therefore, 
those 
inquires, 
deliberations, orders, and decrees, which are peculiar to 
such a department, must in their nature be judicial acts. 
Nor can they be both judicial and legislative; because a 
marked difference exists between the employment of 
judicial and legislative tribunals. The former decide upon 
the legality of claims and conduct, and the latter make 
rules upon which, in connection with the constitution, 
those decisions should be founded. It is the province of 
judges to determine what is the law upon existing cases. 
In fine, the law is applied by one, and made by the other. 
To do the first, therefore, is to compare, the claims of 
parties with the law of the land before established - is in 
its nature judicial act. But to do the last - to pass new 
rules for the regulation of new controversies - is in its 
nature a legislative act; and if these rules interfere with 
the past, or the present, and do not look wholly to the 
future, they violate the definition of a law as "a rule of civil 
conduct", because no rule of conduct can with consistency 
operate upon what occurred before the rule itself was 
promulgated. … It is the province of judicial power, also to 
decide private disputes between or concerning persons; 
but of legislative power to regulate public concerns, and to 
make laws for the benefit and welfare of the State. Nor 
does the passage of private statutes, when lawful, are 
enacted on petition, or by the consent of all concerned; or 
CPs 987-989/2011 
40 
else they forbear to interfere with past transactions and 
vested rights." 
 
41.   
Stason and Cooper in their treatises on “Cases and other 
materials on Administrative Tribunals” point out at pages 150 that 
“one of the great difficulties of properly classifying a particular function 
of an administrative agency is that frequently - and, indeed; typically - 
a single function has three aspects. It is partly legislative, partly 
judicial and partly administrative. Consider, for example, the function 
of rate-making. It has sometimes been characterised as legislative, 
sometimes as judicial. In some aspects, actually, it involves merely 
executive or administrative powers. For example, where the Interstate 
Commerce Commission fixes a tariff of charges for any railroad, its 
function is viewed as legislative. But where the question for decision is 
whether a shipment of a mixture of coffee and chicory should be 
charged the rate established for coffee or the lower rate established 
for chicory, the question is more nearly judicial. On the other hand, 
where the problem is merely the calculation of the total freight charges 
due for a particular shipment, the determination can fairly be 
described 
as 
an 
administrative 
act.” 
Robson's 
Justice 
and 
Administrative Law, 3rd Edn., at p. 608 states “an example of a 
subordinate body of this type is a Wage Council, which is not an 
administrative tribunal but a subordinate legislative authority.” 
Barbare Wootton in “Social Foundations of Wage Policy: Modern 
Methods of Wage Determination” at p. 88 observes that “Both 
arbitration tribunals and courts of inquiry share – with one important 
difference - the tripartite structure of statutory wage councils; they are 
composed of equal numbers of representatives of employers and of 
workers under an independent Chairman, in some cases, together with 
additional independent members. The essential difference between 
CPs 987-989/2011 
41 
their structure and that of statutory wage authorities is that the 
representative members of the latter are chosen from within the 
industry concerned, whereas employers and workers on arbitration 
tribunals come from outside the industry whose disputes they have to 
resolve; if in any case technical knowledge of a particular industry is 
required, this is normally supplied by the help of assessors who take 
no part in the final Award. This difference between the constitution of 
wage boards and that of arbitration tribunals clearly implies a 
corresponding distinction between the legislative function of the former 
and the judicial function of the latter. The wage board drafts law for its 
own industry, whereas the arbitration court gives judgment on matters 
submitted by others. The choice of industrial arbitrators unconnected 
with the industries the merits of whose claims they must pledge, is 
evidently intended as a guarantee that they, like other judges, will be 
free from bias arising from personal interest.” Schwrtz in his book 
“Administrative Law”, says, “If a particular function is termed 
“legislative” or “rulemaking” rather than “judicial” or “adjudication”, it 
may have substantial effects upon the parties concerned. If the 
function is treated as legislative in nature, there is no right to notice 
and hearing, unless a statute expressly requires them. If a hearing is 
held in accordance with a statutory requirement, it normally need not 
be a formal one … …. The characterization of an administrative act as 
legislative instead of judicial is thus of great significance. … … … …  The 
key factor in the Holmes analysis is time: a rule prescribes future 
patterns of conduct; a decision determines liabilities upon the basis of 
present or past facts.” 
42.   
In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. Ltd., [211 U.S. 210 
(1908)] it is held that “a judicial inquiry investigates, declares, and 
CPs 987-989/2011 
42 
enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past facts and under 
laws supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. 
Legislation, on the other hand, looks to the future and changes 
existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to 
all or some parts of those who are subject to its power. The 
establishment of a rate is the making of a rule for the future, and 
therefore, is an act legislative not judicial in kind. That question 
depends not upon the character of the body, but upon the character of 
the proceedings. The nature of the final act determines the nature of 
the previous enquiry.” [emphasis supplied]  
43.   
In 1918, in the case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, [247 U.S. 
251 (1918)] the Supreme Court of United State of America held 
unconstitutional the federal child-labor law passed two years earlier. In 
1923, in Adkins v. Children's Hospital [261 U.S. 525 (1923)] the Court 
voided a District of Columbia minimum wage law for women on the 
ground that such a law was ‘a naked, arbitrary exercise’ of legislative 
power in violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States [295 U.S. 495 (1935)] unanimously struck down the National 
Industrial Recovery Act, holding that it exceeded the federal 
government’s power under the Commerce Clause and that it was an 
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority to the executive 
branch. One year later the Court in Morehead v. New York, [298 U.S. 
587 (1936)] ruled that a New York minimum wage law was 
unconstitutional. Based on these decisions it appeared that the Court 
would not sanction a bill similar to the one that Hugo Black had 
proposed earlier on minimum wages and maximum hours. The 
Supreme Court in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish [300 U.S. 379 (1937)] 
CPs 987-989/2011 
43 
upheld a Washington state minimum wage law for women and minors 
similar to the New York statute it had overturned. Adkins’s case was 
specifically overruled as the court emphasized the need for minimum 
wage regulation. And finally, in Wolff Co. v. Industrial Court [262 U.S. 
522] it was held that the mere declaration by the legislature that a 
particular kind of property or business is affected with a public interest 
is not conclusive upon the question of the validity of the regulation and 
invalidity of the wage-fixing provision of the compulsory arbitration 
statute of Kansas as applied to a meat packing establishment. The 
power of a legislature, under any circumstances, to fix prices or wages 
in the business of preparing and selling food was seriously doubted, 
but the court concluded that, even if the legislature could do so in a 
public emergency, no such emergency appeared, and, in any event, 
the power would not extend to giving compulsory continuity to the 
business by compulsory arbitration. The matter is one which is always 
open to judicial inquiry. [emphasis supplied]  
44.   
At this juncture, it is necessary to examine the case of 
Adkins v. Children's Hospital [261 U.S. 525 (1923)] in some detail. 
There, the question presented for determination before the Court was 
the constitutionality of the Act of 19th September, 1918, providing for 
the fixing of minimum wages for women and children in the District of 
Columbia. The Act provided for a board of three members, to be 
constituted, as far as practicable, so as to be equally representative of 
employers, employees and the public. The Board was authorized to 
have public hearings, at which persons interested in the matter being 
investigated may appear and testify, to administer oaths, issue 
subpoenas requiring the attendance of witnesses and production of 
books, etc., and to make rules and regulations for carrying the Act into 
CPs 987-989/2011 
44 
effect. The Court held that it has been said that legislation of the kind 
now under review is required in the interest of social justice, for whose 
ends freedom of contract may lawfully be subjected to restraint. The 
liberty of the individual to do as he pleases, even in innocent matters, 
is not absolute. It must frequently yield to the common good, and the 
line beyond which the power of interference may not be pressed is 
neither definite nor unalterable, but may be made to move, within 
limits not well defined, with changing need and circumstance. Any 
attempt to fix a rigid boundary would be unwise, as well as futile. But, 
nevertheless, there are limits to the power, and when these have been 
passed, it becomes the plain duty of the courts in the proper exercise 
of their authority to so declare. To sustain the individual freedom of 
action contemplated by the Constitution is not to strike down the 
common good, but to exalt it, for surely the good of society as a whole 
cannot be better served than by the preservation against arbitrary 
restraint of the liberties of its constituent members. Finally, it was 
concluded that it follows from what has been said that the Act in 
question passes the limit prescribed by the Constitution, and, 
accordingly, the decrees of the court below were affirmed.  
45.   
In Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc. [348 U. S. 483 (1955)], 
it was held as under: -  
The day is gone when this Court used the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to strike down state 
laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions 
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of 
harmony with a particular school of thought. See Nebbia v. 
People of State of New York, 291 U. S. 502; West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379; Olsen v. State of 
Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U. 
S. 236; Lincoln Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 
335 U. S. 525; Daniel v. Family Sec. Life Ins. Co., 336 U. 
S. 220; Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. State of Missouri, 342 
U. S. 421. We emphasize again what Chief Justice Waite 
said in Munn v. State of Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, "For 
CPs 987-989/2011 
45 
protection against abuses by legislatures, the people must 
resort to the polls, not to the courts." 
46.   
Reference may also be made to the case of Australian Boot 
Trade Employees Federation v Whybrow & Co [(1910) HCA 8; (1910) 
10 CLR 266] from the Australian jurisdiction, where the High Court of 
Australia, which is the apex Court of that country, held as under: -   
“The function of a tribunal, of whatever kind, is to declare 
and administer the law, not to make it — dicere non dare 
leges. Nothing could be more unfortunate than that an 
idea should arise that this Court, or any other Court, 
Federal or State, has a legislative authority. The legislative 
and judicial powers of a sovereign State are exercised by 
different agencies, whose operations are in different 
planes, and cannot come in conflict with one another. The 
judicial agency must obey the behests of the legislative, 
and that may make provisions for enforcing the judgments 
of the judiciary, but does not, by doing so, alter their 
intrinsic character. The suggested conflict is therefore 
impossible. In support of this view we were invited to 
accept the argument that, although the Commonwealth 
Parliament has admittedly no power to interfere directly 
with the domestic industry or police power of a State, and 
cannot delegate a power which itself it does not possess, 
yet it may by appointing a Judge and calling him an 
arbitrator empower him to interfere. The statement of the 
argument is its own answer, and I waste no more words 
upon it.  
………………………………… It is well to begin by clearing the 
ground of one or two matters. We have had before us the 
Statutes under which these Wages Boards have been 
appointed, and under which they have made their 
determinations. In New South Wales they are termed 
awards, but the substance of the thing done is the same 
under each State Statute. The Wages Boards are not 
tribunals of arbitration but subsidiary legislative bodies 
deriving their authority from the State legislatures. Their 
determinations are obligatory, not merely on parties or 
organizations at variance, but on all citizens within their 
range, whether the jurisdiction covers a whole State or a 
limited area merely. The rates of wages, when fixed by the 
Boards, are to all intents and purposes the law on the 
subject. They are as distinct from the judgment of a Court 
as they are from the award of an arbitrator.  
……………………………. 
Nevertheless, 
although 
the 
term 
“arbitration” of itself does not necessarily indicate that the 
decision is a judgment in the ordinary sense, there are 
some awards which do partake of that nature. And to 
ascertain them and differentiate them from awards of 
other character some guiding principle is essential. There 
CPs 987-989/2011 
46 
is one clear and decisive principle which at once 
distinguishes between judicial and legislative action.  
……………………………. If the dispute is as to the relative rights 
of parties as they rest on past or present circumstances, 
the award is in the nature of a judgment, which might 
have been the decree of an ordinary judicial tribunal acting 
under the ordinary judicial power. There the law applicable 
to the case must be observed. If, however, the dispute is 
as to what shall in the future be the mutual rights and 
responsibilities of the parties—in other words, if no present 
rights are asserted or denied, but a future rule of conduct 
is to be prescribed, thus creating new rights and 
obligations, with sanctions for non-conformity—then the 
determination that so prescribes, call it an award, or 
arbitration, determination, or decision or what you will, is 
essentially of a legislative character, and limited only by 
the law which authorizes it. If, again, there are neither 
present rights asserted, nor a future rule of conduct 
prescribed, but merely a fact ascertained necessary for the 
practical effectuation of admitted rights, the proceeding, 
though called an arbitration, is rather in the nature of an 
appraisement or ministerial act. 
There are some authorities, if authorities were needed, of 
high character which exemplify the propositions I have 
stated. As recently as 1908, the Supreme Court of the 
United States, in a case to which on a former occasion I 
referred, had to consider the distinction between a judicial 
and a legislative act. In Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co. 
[(1908) 211 U.S., 210, at p. 226.], Holmes J. whose 
personal distinction as a lawyer no less than his official 
position entitles his opinions to the greatest respect, in 
delivering the decision of the Court, said:—"A judicial 
inquiry investigates, declares and enforces liabilities as 
they stand on present or past facts and under laws 
supposed already to exist. That is its purpose and end. 
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future and 
changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be 
applied thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its 
power. The establishment of a rate is the making of a rule 
for the future, and therefore is an act legislative not 
judicial in kind." 
………………… It is upon such considerations that I agree with 
the view that the decision of a Wages Board, made under 
the authority of a law, is of legislative character. It is part 
of the law of the land, just as is an Act fixing rates of 
taxation, 
though 
the 
compulsive 
and 
enforcement 
provisions are found elsewhere. As expressed in Knoxville 
v. Knoxville Water Co.[(1909) 212 U.S. 1, at p. 8.], "the 
function of ratemaking is purely legislative in its character, 
and this is true, whether it is exercised directly by the 
legislature itself or by some subordinate or administrative 
body, to whom the power of fixing rates in detail has been 
delegated. The completed Act derives its authority from 
CPs 987-989/2011 
47 
the legislature and must be regarded as an exercise of the 
legislative power." The Wages Board determination, 
precisely like a State industrial award, has just as much 
authority as, and no more than, the State Act itself. 
[emphasis supplied]  
 
In Shri Sitaram Sugar Company v. Union of India (AIR 1990 SC 1277), 
the Indian Supreme Court held as under: -   
“45. Price fixation is in the nature of a legislative action 
even when it is based on objective criteria rounded on 
relevant material. No rule at natural justice is applicable to 
any such order. It is nevertheless imperative that the 
action of the authority should be inspired by reason. 
52. 
The true position, therefore, is that any act of the 
repository of power, whether legislative or administrative 
or quasi-judicial, is open to challenge if it is in conflict with 
the Constitution or the governing Act or the general 
principles of the law of the land or it is so arbitrary or 
unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever 
have made it. 
58. 
Price fixation is not within the province of the courts. 
Judicial function in respect of such matters is exhausted 
when there is found to be a rational basis for the 
conclusions reached by the concerned authority. As stated 
by Justice Cardozo in Mississippi Valley Barge Line 
Company v. United States of America, 292 US 282-290, 78 
Led 1260, 1265: "The structure of a rate schedule calls in 
peculiar measure for the use of that enlightened judgment 
which the Commission by training and experience is 
qualified to form ..... It is not the province of a court to 
absorb this function to itself ..... The judicial function is 
exhausted when there is found to be a rational basis for 
the conclusions approved by the administrative body”.” 
 
In Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. [(1987) 2 SCC 720], it was 
held as under:-  
“ ..... legislative action, plenary or subordinate, is not 
subject to rules of natural justice. In the case of 
Parliamentary legislation, the proposition is self-evident. In 
the case of subordinate legislation, it may happen that 
Parliament may itself provide for a notice and for a hearing 
.......... But where the legislature has not chosen to 
provide for any notice or hearing, no one can insist upon it 
and it will not be permissible to read natural justice into 
such legislative activity .......... It is true that, with the 
proliferation of delegated legislation, there is a tendency 
for the line between legislation and administration to 
vanish into an illusion. Administrative, quasi-judicial 
decisions tend to merge in legislative activity and, 
conversely, legislative activity tends to fade into and 
CPs 987-989/2011 
48 
present an appearance of an administrative or quasi-
judicial activity". 
"A price fixation measure does not concern itself with the 
interests of an individual manufacturer or producer. It is 
generally in relation to a particular commodity or class of 
commodities or transactions. It is a direction of a general 
character, not directed against a particular situation. It is 
intended to operate in the future. It is conceived in the 
interests of the general consumer public. The right of the 
citizen to obtain essential articles at fair prices and the 
duty of the State to so provide them are transformed into 
the power of the State to fix prices and the obligations of 
the producer to charge no more than the price fixed. 
Viewed from whatever angle, the angle of general 
application, the prospectiveness of its effect, the public 
interest served, and the rights and obligations flowing 
therefrom, there can be no question that price fixation is 
ordinarily a legislative activity". 
In the case of Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. (AIR 1987 SC 
1802), it was held as under: - 
7. 
The third observation we wish to make is, price 
fixation is more in the nature of a legislative activity than 
any other. It is true that, with the proliferation of 
delegated legislation, there is a tendency for the line 
between legislation and administration to vanish into an 
illusion. Administrative, quasi-judicial decisions tend to 
merge in legislative activity and, conversely, legislative 
activity tends to fade into and present an appearance of an 
administrative or quasi-judicial activity. Any attempt to 
draw a distinct line between legislative and administrative 
functions, it has been said, is 'difficult in theory and 
impossible in practice'. Though difficult, it is necessary that 
the line must sometimes be drawn as different legal fights 
and consequences may ensue. The distinction between the 
two has usually been expressed as 'one between the 
general and the particular'. 'A legislative act is the creation 
and promulgation of a general rule of conduct without 
reference to particular cases; an administrative act is the 
making and issue of a specific direction or the application 
of a general rule to a particular case in accordance with 
the requirements of policy'. 'Legislation is the process of 
formulating a general rule of conduct without reference to 
particular 
cases 
and 
usually 
operating 
in 
future; 
administration is the process of performing particular acts, 
of issuing particular orders or of making decisions which 
apply general rules to particular cases.' It has also been 
said "Rule making is normally directed toward the 
formulation of requirements having a general application 
to all members of a broadly identifiable class" while, "an 
adjudication, on the other hand, applies to specific 
individuals or situations". But, this is only a broad 
distinction, not necessarily always true. Administration and 
CPs 987-989/2011 
49 
administrative adjudication may also be of general 
application and there may be legislation of particular 
application only. That is not ruled out. Again, adjudication 
determines past and present facts and declares rights and 
liabilities while legislation indicates the future course of 
action. Adjudication is determinative of the past and the 
present while legislation is indicative of the future. The 
object of the rule, the reach of its application, the rights 
and obligations arising out of it, its intended effect on past, 
present and future events, its form, the manner of its 
promulgation are some factors which may help in drawing 
the line between legislative and non-legislative acts. A 
price fixation measure does not concern itself with the 
interests of an individual manufacturer or producer. It is 
generally in relation to a particular commodity or class of 
commodities or transactions. It is a direction of a general 
character, not directed against a particular situation. It is 
intended to operate in the future. It is conceived in the 
interests of the general consumer public. The right of the 
citizen to obtain essential articles at fair prices and the 
duty of the State to so provide them are transformed into 
the power of the State to fix prices and the obligation of 
the producer to charge no more than the price fixed. 
Viewed from whatever angle, the angle of general 
application the prospectivity of its effect, the public 
interest served, and the rights and obligations flowing 
therefrom, there can be no question that price fixation is 
ordinarily 
a 
legislative 
activity. 
Price-fixation 
may 
occasionally assume an administrative or quasi-judicial 
character when it relates to acquisition or requisition of 
goods or property from individuals and it becomes 
necessary to fix the price separately in relation to such 
individuals. Such situations may arise when the owner of 
property or goods is compelled to sell his property or 
goods to the Government or its nominee and the price to 
be paid is directed by the legislature to be determined 
according to the statutory guidelines laid down by it. In 
such situations the determination of price may acquire a 
quasi-judicial 
character. 
Otherwise, 
price 
fixation 
is 
generally a legislative activity. We also wish to clear a 
misapprehension which appears to prevail in certain circles 
that price-fixation affects the manufacturer or producer 
primarily and therefore fairness requires that he be given 
an 
opportunity 
and 
that 
fair 
opportunity 
to 
the 
manufacturer or producer must be read into the procedure 
for price-fixation. We do not agree with the basic premise 
that price fixation primarily affects manufacturers and 
producers. Those who are most vitally affected are the 
consumer public. It is for their protection that price-
fixation is resorted to and any increase in price affects 
them as seriously as any decrease does a manufacturer, if 
not more.  
27. 
We are unable to agree with the submissions of the 
learned counsel for the respondents either with regard to 
the applicability of the principles of natural justice or with 
CPs 987-989/2011 
50 
regard to the nature and the scope of the enquiry and 
review contemplated by paragraphs 3 and 27 while making 
our preliminary observations, we pointed out that price 
fixation is essentially a legislative activity though in rare 
circumstances, as in the case of a compulsory sale to the 
Government or its nominee, it may assume the character 
'of an administrative or quasi-judicial activity. Nothing in 
the scheme of the Drugs (Prices Control) Order induces us 
to hold that price fixation under the Drugs (Prices Control) 
Order is not a legislative activity, but a quasi-judicial 
activity which would attract the observance of the 
principles of natural justice. Nor is there anything in the 
scheme or the provisions of the Drugs (Prices Control) 
Order which otherwise contemplates the observance of any 
principle of natural justice or kindred rule, the non-
observance of which would give rise to a cause of action to 
a suitor. What the order does contemplate however is 
'such enquiry' by the Government 'as it thinks fit'. A 
provision for 'such enquiry' as it thinks fit' by a subordinate 
legislating body, we have explained earlier, is generally an 
enabling provision to facilitate the subordinate legislating 
body to obtain relevant information from any source and it 
is not intended to vest any right in any body other than 
the subordinate legislating body. In the present case, the 
enquiry contemplated by paragraph 3 of Drugs (Prices 
Control) Order is to be made for the purposes of fixing the 
maximum price at which a bulk drug may be sold, with a 
view to regulating its equitable distribution and making it 
available at a fair price. The primary object of the enquiry 
is to secure the bulk drug at a fair price for the benefit of 
the ultimate consumer an object designed to fulfil the 
mandate of Art. 39(b) of the Constitution. It is primarily 
from the consumer public's point of view that the 
Government is expected to make its enquiry. The need of 
the consumer public is to be ascertained and making the 
drug available to them at a fair price is what it is all about. 
The enquiry is to be made from that angle and directed 
towards that end. So, information may be gathered from 
whatever source considered desirable by the Government. 
The enquiry, obviously is not to be confined to obtaining 
information from the manufacturers only and indeed must 
go beyond. However, the interests of the manufacturers 
are not to be ignored. In fixing the price of a bulk drug, 
the Government is expressly required by the Order to take 
into account the average cost of production of such bulk 
drug manufactured by 'an efficient manufacturer' and allow 
a reasonable return on 'net worth'. For this purpose too, 
the Government may gather information from any source 
including the manufacturers. Here again the enquiry by the 
Government need not be restricted to 'an efficient 
manufacturer' or some manufacturers; nor need it be 
extended to all manufacturers. What is necessary is that 
the 
average 
cost 
of 
production 
by 
'an 
efficient 
manufacturer' must be ascertained and a reasonable 
return allowed on 'net worth'. Such enquiry as it thinks fit 
is an enquiry in which information is sought from whatever 
CPs 987-989/2011 
51 
source considered necessary by the enquiring body and is 
different from an enquiry in which an opportunity is 
required to be given to persons likely to be affected. The 
former is an enquiry leading to a legislative activity while 
the latter is an enquiry which ends in an administrative or 
quasi-judicial decision. The enquiry contemplated by 
paragraph 3 of the Drug (Prices Control) Order is an 
enquiry of the former character. The legislative activity 
being a subordinate or delegated legislative activity, it 
must necessarily comply with the statutory conditions if 
any, no more and no less, and no implications of natural 
justice can be read into it unless it is a statutory condition. 
Notwithstanding that the price fixation is a legislative 
activity, the subordinate legislation had taken care here to 
provide for a review. The review provided by paragraph 27 
of the order is akin to a post decisional hearing which is 
sometimes 
afforded 
after 
the 
making 
of 
some 
administrative orders, but not truly so.”  
In Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1975 SC 
460), it was held as under: -  
13. 
The petitioners did not challenge the price fixation on 
the ground that a quasi-judicial procedure had to be 
adopted before prices are fixed even if such price fixation 
affects, as it must each factory. Price fixation is more in 
the nature of a legislative measure even trough it may be 
based upon objective criteria found in a report or other 
material. It could not, therefore, give rise to a complaint 
that a rule of natural justice has not been followed in fixing 
the price. Nevertheless, the criterion-adopted must be 
reasonable. Reasonableness, for purposes of judging 
whether there was an "excess of power" or an "arbitrary" 
exercise of it, is really the demonstration of a reasonable 
nexus between the matters which are taken into account in 
exercising a power and the purposes of exercise of that 
power. This was made clear by this Court in the two cases 
cited on behalf of the appellants Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd 
v. Unions of India [AIR 1974 SC 366]: The Panipat 
Cooperative Sugar Mills V. the Union of India [AIR 1973 SC 
537]. 
In Prag Ice & Oil Mills v. Union of India [(1978) 3 SCC 459], it was 
held as under:-  
"We think that unless, by the terms of a 'particular 
statute, or order, price fixation is made a quasi-judicial 
function for specified purposes or cases, it is really 
legislative in character in the type of control order which is 
now before us because it satisfies the tests of legislation. 
A legislative measure does not concern itself with the facts 
of an individual case. It is meant to lay down a general 
rule applicable to all persons or objects or transactions of 
CPs 987-989/2011 
52 
a particular kind or class. In the case before us, the 
Control Order applies to sales of mustard oil anywhere in 
India by any dealer. Its validity does not depend on the 
observance of any procedure to be complied with or 
particular types of evidence to be taken on any specified 
matters as conditions precedent to its validity. The test of 
validity is constituted by the nexus shown between the 
order passed and the purposes for which it can be passed, 
or in other words by reasonableness judged by possible or 
probable consequences.” 
 
In the case of Pallavi Refractories v. M/S. Singareni Collieries Co. Ltd. 
[(2005) 2 SCC 227], it was held as under: -   
13. 
This Court in Union of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. 
[AIR 1987 SC 1802] has held that price fixation is 
generally a legislative activity. It may occasionally assume 
an administrative or quasi-judicial character when it 
relates to acquisition or requisition of goods or property 
from individuals and it becomes necessary to fix the price 
separately in relation to such individuals. Such situations 
may arise when the owner of the goods is compelled to sell 
goods to the Government or its nominee and the price is to 
be determined according to the statutory guidelines laid 
down 
by 
the 
Legislature. 
In 
such 
situations, 
the 
determination of price may acquire a quasi judicial 
character but, otherwise, price fixation is generally a 
legislative activity. After observing thus, the Court held 
that price fixation is neither the function nor the forte of 
the Court. The Court is neither concerned with the policy 
nor with the rates. But in appropriate proceedings it may 
enquire into the question, whether relevant considerations 
have gone in and irrelevant considerations kept out while 
determining the price. In case the Legislature has laid 
down the pricing policy and prescribed the factors which 
should guide the determination of the price then the Court 
will, if necessary, enquire into the question whether policy 
and factors were present to the mind of the authorities 
specifying the price. The assembling of raw materials and 
mechanics of price fixation are the concern of the 
Executive and it should be left to the Executive to do so 
and the Courts would not revaluate the consideration even 
if 
the 
prices 
are 
demonstrably 
injurious 
to 
some 
manufacturers and producers. ………  
14. 
A Constitution Bench of this Court in M/s. Shri Sita 
Ram Sugar Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [AIR 1990 SC 1277] 
(in paras 57 & 58) has held that in judicial review the 
Court is not concerned with the matters of economic 
policy. The Court does not substitute its judgment for that 
of the Legislature or its agent as to the matters within the 
province of either. The Legislature while delegating the 
powers to its agent may empower the agent to make 
findings of fact which are conclusive provided, such 
CPs 987-989/2011 
53 
findings satisfy the test of reasonableness. In all such 
cases, the judicial enquiry is confined to the question 
whether the findings of facts are reasonably based on 
evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the 
laws of the land. The Court only examines whether the 
prices determined was with due regard to the provisions of 
the Statute and whether extraneous matters have been 
excluded while making such determination. It was further 
observed that price fixation is not within the province of 
the Courts. Judicial function in respect of such matters 
stands exhausted once it is found that the authority 
empowered to fix the price has reached the conclusion on 
rational basis.”  
 
In the case of Narottamdas Harijwandas v. State of Madhya Pradesh 
(AIR 1964 MP 45), it was held as under: -  
“In our opinion, it cannot be argued with any degree of 
force that the purpose and end of the Act is to investigate, 
declare and enforce liabilities under any law supposed to 
be already existing. It only prescribes a rule of conduct 
when it fixes minimum rates of wages in certain 
employments. In enacting the legislation, the Legislature 
has not attempted to exercise any judicial power. It has 
only discharged a function of legislative character. There is 
no analogy between the nature of the functions performed 
by wage boards constituted under the Working Journalists 
(Conditions of Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 
1955, 
and 
the 
functions 
discharged 
by 
the 
State 
Legislature in placing the Act on the statute book, and the 
observation of the Supreme Court in the case of 1959 SCR 
12 : (AIR 1958 SC 578) (supra), that it is impossible to 
state that "the functions performed by the wage boards 
are necessarily of a legislative character'' is of no 
assistance to the petitioners.”  
 
A perusal of the above quoted passages makes it abundantly clear that 
the wage fixation is a legislative function, and not a judicial or quasi-
judicial act or an administrative function.  
47.   
In India, the working journalists were scattered all over 
the country. They agitated that some means should be found to enable 
them to have their wages, salaries, other allowances, retirement 
benefits, rules of leave and other conditions of service, enquired into 
CPs 987-989/2011 
54 
by some impartial agency or authority, which was empowered to fix 
just and reasonable terms and conditions of service for working 
journalists as a whole. The Government of Uttar Pradesh on 18th June, 
1947 and the Government of Central Provinces & Berar on 27th March, 
1948, appointed committees to enquire into the conditions of work of 
the employees of the newspaper industry. The matter remained 
pending when eventually the Working Journalists (Conditions of 
Service) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1955 was passed. Under 
section 8 of the Act, the Central Government vide notification dated 
2nd May, 1956 constituted a Wage Board for fixing rates of wages in 
respect of working journalists in accordance with the provisions of the 
said Act. The decision of the Wage Board was published in the 
Extraordinary Gazette on 11th May, 1957. The Commissioner of 
Labour, Madras issued circular dated 30th May, 1957, calling upon the 
managements of all the newspaper establishments in the State to send 
him the report of the gross revenue for three years, i.e., 1952, 1953 
and 1954, within a period of one month from the date of the 
publication of the Board's decision. The newspaper owners challenged 
the vires of the said Act before the Indian Supreme Court by means of 
Constitution Petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution in the case of 
Express Newspaper Ltd. v. Union of India (AIR 1958 SC 578). One of 
the questions for consideration before the Court was as to whether the 
functions performed by the Board were administrative, judicial, quasi-
judicial or legislative in character. The Court after detailed analysis of 
the nature and functioning of the Wage Boards established around the 
world held that:-  
“116.…… it is impossible to state that the functions 
performed by the wage boards are necessarily of a 
legislative character. It is no doubt true that their 
CPs 987-989/2011 
55 
determinations bind not only the employers and the 
employees in the present, but they also operate when 
accepted by the appropriate government or authorities 
and notified in accordance with law, to bind the future 
employers and employees in the industry. If that were the 
only consideration the dictum of Justice Holmes cited 
above would apply and the functions performed by these 
wage boards would be invested with a legislative 
character. This is however not all, and regard must be had 
to the provisions of the statutes constituting the wage 
boards. If on a scrutiny of the provisions in regard thereto 
one can come to the conclusion that they are appointed 
only with a view to determine the relations between the 
employers and the employees in the future in regard to 
the wages payable to the employees there would be 
justification for holding that they were performing 
legislative functions. If, however, on a consideration of all 
the relevant provisions of the statutes bringing the wage 
boards into existence, it appears that the powers and 
procedure exercised by them are assimilated to those of 
Industrial Tribunals or their adjudications are subject to 
judicial review at the hands of higher Tribunals exercising 
judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it cannot be predicated 
that 
these 
wage 
boards 
are 
exercising 
legislative 
functions. Whether they exercise these functions or not is 
thus to be determined by the relevant provisions of the 
statutes incorporating them and it would be impossible to 
lay down any universal rule which would help in the 
determination of this question.  
117. Even if on the construction of the relevant provisions 
of the statute we come to the conclusion that the 
functions performed by a particular wage board are not of 
a legislative character, the question still remains whether 
the functions exercised by them are administrative in 
character or judicial or quasi-judicial in character, because 
only in the latter event would their decision be amenable 
to the writ jurisdiction or to the special leave jurisdiction 
above referred to.  
118. There is no doubt that these wage boards are not 
exercising purely judicial functions. They are not courts in 
the strict sense of the term and the functions which they 
perform may at best be quasi-judicial in character. The 
fact that they are administrative agencies set up for the 
purpose of fixation of wages do not necessarily invest their 
CPs 987-989/2011 
56 
functions with an administrative character and in spite of 
their being administrative bodies they can nevertheless be 
exercising quasi-judicial functions if certain conditions are 
fulfilled. 
123. There is considerable force in these contentions, but 
we do not fell called upon to express our final opinion on 
this question in view of the conclusion which we have 
hereafter reached in regard to the ultra vires character of 
the decision of the Wage Board itself. We are however 
bound to observe that whatever be the character of the 
functions performed by the wage boards whether they be 
legislative or quasi-judicial, if proper safeguards are 
adopted of the nature discussed earlier, e.g., provision for 
judicial review or the adopting of the procedure as in the 
case of the recommendations of the wage councils in the 
United 
Kingdom, 
or 
the 
reports 
of 
the 
advisory 
committees which come to be considered by the 
administrator under the Fair Labour Standards Act of 1938 
in the United States of America, no objection could ever 
be urged against the determinations of the wage boards 
thus arrived at one the score of the principles of natural 
justice having been violated.”  
48.   
In response, Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC 
submitted that it is true that the NECOSA does not give right of appeal 
to an individual against the Award given by the Board, but, in fact, it 
lays down a mechanism akin to arbitration proceedings where the 
Chairman of the Wage Board does not pass any unilateral order, rather 
there is equal representation of employees and employers on the 
Board. He further submitted that if it was an order of a judge or an 
individual, the legislature would have provided right of appeal. In the 
present case, there were 11 years of litigation before different forums, 
and though there was an allegation of bias against Justice Gandapur, 
ITNE, but no such allegation was ever made against Justice Raja 
Afrasiab Khan, Chairman of the Seventh Wage Board.  
49.   
In view of the stand taken by the petitioners’ counsel 
himself that Wage Board is neither judicial nor quasi-judicial body as it 
CPs 987-989/2011 
57 
exercises executive/administrative function, we have gone through the 
relevant provisions, i.e. sections 9, 10 & 11 of the NECOSA, and the 
ratio decidendi of the judgments noted hereinabove. Keeping in view 
the nature of the task assigned to a Wage Board of fixation of wages is 
neither judicial/quasi-judicial nor executive/administrative function, 
but partakes of legislative activity and the Chairman being the 
delegate of the Federal Government, with the advice and consultation 
of the members of the newspaper establishments and newspaper 
employees, gives its decision fixing the wages of different categories of 
the 
newspaper 
employees 
including 
working 
and 
non-working 
journalists. As far as the process of performing a legislative activity is 
concerned, it is to be done following the guidelines provided in section 
10 of the NECOSA. We tend to agree with Mr. Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, 
learned ASC that if this Court comes to the conclusion that a right of 
appeal is necessary to honour the requirements of due process of law 
in terms of Article 10A of the Constitution, the question would be as to 
whom right of appeal will be available against the Award of Wage 
Board because the petitioners being the representatives of the 
newspaper 
establishments 
and 
the 
respondents 
being 
the 
representatives 
of 
the 
newspaper 
employees 
are 
themselves 
associated with the Chairman equally in the process of fixing the 
wages, therefore, a possibility cannot be ruled out that in such a 
situation whenever any demand of any of the members is not 
accepted, they would be agitating the matter against the Chairman 
and remaining members and so on and so forth and this process 
ultimately would never come to an end, thus, the object for which the 
law has been promulgated would be squarely defeated. To buttress the 
plea so taken by him, one can imagine whether the Parliamentarians 
CPs 987-989/2011 
58 
are ever heard of filing appeal against legislation done by them. It is to 
be noted that in the instant case as well during proceedings before the 
Wage 
Board 
the 
representatives 
of 
the 
newspaper 
establishments/owners boycotted twice as it has been highlighted 
hereinabove and they offered to end the boycott subject to fulfillment 
of their demands. It may not be out of context to note that the vires of 
the Award on the ground of its acceptability on factual side has not 
been challenged except before the High Court or before this Court 
raising technical objection that the Award is not sustainable. 
Incidentally, not a single affidavit was filed before the High Court on 
behalf of the petitioners to controvert the factual aspect of the Award 
relating to fixation of the wages, which have been allowed. Contrary to 
it, the respondents filed affidavits in support of their contention that 
the Award did not suffer from any factual defect. Therefore, for want 
of adequate material, the NECOSA cannot be declared ultra vires the 
Constitution, being contrary to Article 18 of the Constitution as well as 
Article 3 as the wages of the newspaper employees have been fixed 
following the object and purposes of the legislation. The contents of 
the Award suggest to hold that full opportunity was given to the 
stakeholders to put forward their respective viewpoint, enabling the 
Board to reach a correct conclusion. In this connection, the Chairman 
and Members of the Wage Board travelled to different cities in the 
country, recorded the evidence, inasmuch as evidence of the experts 
was also obtained and calculations made for the purpose of fixing rates 
keeping in view the ground realities. These facts also indicate that to 
lay down a formula for the purpose of fixing the rates of wages, the 
activities so undertaken by the Wage Board, when examined in the 
light of above facts and circumstances, strengthen the argument of Mr. 
CPs 987-989/2011 
59 
Salman Akram Raja, learned Counsel that all such bodies and 
functionaries who have been assigned the task, being a body 
exercising 
sub-legislative 
powers, 
get 
involved 
themselves 
in 
performing legislative activity and same is the ratio decidendi of the 
judgments, which have been referred to hereinabove.  
50.   
As far as appeal is concerned, it is continuation of the 
original proceedings and it provides a mechanism for the scrutiny of 
the findings/determination already recorded by a subordinate forum 
whereas the wage determination, which is done with a view to 
regularize its payment to the newspaper employees, being a legislative 
activity is open to judicial review before the superior Courts if violation 
of any provision of the Constitution is made out. The learned counsel 
for the petitioners submitted that assuming that the determination of 
wages was a legislative activity having prospective effect, under the 
Seventh Award, the wages were fixed retrospectively, inasmuch as the 
same were ordered to be paid from 1st July, 2000. In reply, the 
learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the wages 
determined under the Award dated 25th October, 2001 have been 
ordered to be paid from the date of the constitution of the Board, and 
not from an earlier date, therefore, the same could not be said to have 
retrospective effect. We agree with the learned counsel for the 
respondents that the direction to pay the wages determined under the 
Award from the date of constitution of the Board does not make it a 
retrospective activity. The argument of the learned counsel for the 
petitioners, therefore, cannot be accepted.   
51.   
The learned counsel for the petitioners himself submitted 
that the Wage Board is not performing a judicial or quasi-judicial 
function, and on the contrary executive powers of determining the 
CPs 987-989/2011 
60 
wages have been conferred upon the Board, which, according to him, 
undermines access to justice and does not satisfy the irreducible or 
minimum requirement of administration of justice, besides being 
violative of the fundamental principle of trichotomy of power and 
independence of the judiciary. In view of the admission of the learned 
counsel that the Board is performing a function, which is neither 
judicial nor quasi-judicial, the argument that it is violative of the 
principle of access to justice is not well founded. Reference in this 
behalf may be made to the cases of Mehram Ali v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445) and Iftikhar Ahmed v. President, 
National Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 53). In the first mentioned 
case, it has been held that the right of “access to justice to all” is a 
Fundamental Right, which cannot be exercised in absence of an 
independent judiciary providing impartial, fair and just adjudicatory 
framework i.e. judicial hierarchy. The Courts/Tribunals, which are 
manned and run by executive authorities without being under the 
control and supervision of the High Court in terms of Article 203 of the 
Constitution can hardly meet the mandatory requirement of the 
Constitution. On the touchstone of the above, it cannot be argued that 
departure has taken place from the process of access to justice. As it 
has been held hereinabove that the Wage Board determines the wages 
of the newspapers employees like a Pay Commission, therefore, hardly 
it is possible to stress that process of access to justice while 
discharging legislative activities has been denied. There is no cavil with 
the 
proposition 
that 
when 
the 
individual 
rights 
are 
being 
determined/decided by a forum exercising judicial function, aggrieved 
person is entitled to right of appeal, but if powers are exercised other 
than judicial or administrative as a delegatee on behalf of the Federal 
CPs 987-989/2011 
61 
Government empowered to give Award as per supporting legislation, 
like framing of the rules, which is not carried out by the legislature but 
by the authority in the concerned statute.  
52.   
Constitutionality of the ITNE was also questioned on behalf 
of the petitioners, contending that no judicial or quasi-judicial powers 
are available to the ITNE for recording evidence and effecting recovery 
of the wages, therefore, the authority so conferred upon the ITNE is 
against the concept of due process of law, inasmuch as the functions 
being performed by the ITNE do not specify the irreducible minimum 
requirement for safe administration of justice as well and is 
tantamount to setting up a forum, which is much beyond the status of 
parallel judicial system. Thus, sections 12A and 13 may be declared 
violative of Article 4 and the Fundamental Right enshrined in Article 9 
of the Constitution. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the 
respondent contended that the ITNE so far has not awarded conviction 
nor any such order if passed has been challenged or brought before 
this Court, therefore, to the extent of powers of the ITNE under section 
13(1)(a) in the instant proceedings need not to be examined. As far as 
the remaining powers of the Tribunal are concerned, the same are of 
administrative nature, meant for the purpose of implementation of the 
decision of the Board.  
53.   
We tend to agree with the learned counsel that as 
presently no matter relating to awarding of punishment under section 
55 of the IRO 1969 has been brought before us, therefore, 
examination of the said provisions will be undertaken in some other 
appropriate case.  
54.   
As far as the powers conferred upon the Tribunal under 
section 13(4) of issuing direction which a Labour Court is empowered 
CPs 987-989/2011 
62 
to issue under section 51(1) of IRO 1969 for recovery of wages as 
arrears of land revenue of public demand, it is an admitted feature of 
the case that in this behalf the Tribunal is performing function of 
effecting recovery of the wages which has already been determined by 
the Board. Such powers, if exercised, cannot be considered contrary to 
the due process of law or against Article 9 of the Constitution because 
on the revenue side as well as in banking matters or the Cooperative 
Societies Act, such powers are available to the authorities mentioned 
therein as Collectors of Revenue, therefore, we are of the opinion that 
the Tribunal cannot be debarred from implementing the Award in 
absence whereof it would not be possible to implement the Award 
because the Chairman of the Board becomes functus officio after 
pronouncement of the Award, which the Board has to do in 180 days 
of its constitution, and its publication in the official gazette. If the 
Award is not implemented, the whole exercise undertaken in this 
behalf shall be a futile one because no remedy is available to 
implement the same. Therefore, under the special circumstances, and 
keeping in view the background on the basis of which the newspaper 
employees have been treated as a separate class from the other 
employees working in different industries would be left with no 
remedy. It is a cardinal principle of law that where there is a right, 
there is a remedy.  
55.   
It is also contended by the learned counsel with 
vehemence that objection was raised on the procedure being followed 
during the proceedings of the Board as there was a perception of bias. 
He has relied upon certain documents, i.e. letter dated 24th April, 2000 
addressed to the Director General (Internal Publicity), Ministry of 
Information (relevant excerpt reproduced hereinabove) letter dated 
CPs 987-989/2011 
63 
17th December, 2000 addressed to the Chairman of the Board on the 
manner of proceedings of the Board, letters dated 20th August, 2001 
and 25th, October, 2001 addressed to the then Minister of Labour for 
repeal of the NECOSA, etc., letters dated 22nd December, 2001 and 
16th May, 2002 addressed to the Secretary Information, and letter 
dated 15th August, 2002 addressed to the Secretary, Ministry of 
Labour, but in our considered opinion attempts have been made to 
persuade the Court at a belated stage that the Award should be set 
aside on the perception of bias. Firstly, this ground was never pleaded, 
and secondly, provision of interim relief, holding inquiry in absence of 
the petitioners, instead of reflecting upon the conduct of the Board 
goes against the petitioners because they were not cooperating with 
the Board, inasmuch as they had twice boycotted the proceedings. As 
held in Asif Ali Zardari v. The State (PLD 2001 SC 568), bias is said to 
be of three different kinds: -   
(a)  A Judge may have a bias in the subject-matter which 
means that he is himself a party or has direct connection 
with the litigation, so as to constitute a legal interest.  
A ‘legal interest’ means that the Judge is ‘in such a position 
that a bias must be assumed’.  
(b)   Pecuniary interest in the cause, however, slight, will 
disqualify the Judge, even though it is not proved that the 
decision has in fact been affected by reason of such 
interest. For this reason, where a person having such 
interest sits as one of the Judges the decision is vitiated.  
(c)  
A Judge may have a personal bias towards a party owing 
to relationship and the like or he may be personally hostile 
to a party as a result of events happening either before or 
during the trial. Whenever there is any allegation of 
personal bias, the question which should be satisfied is - 
“Is there in the mind of the litigant a reasonable 
CPs 987-989/2011 
64 
apprehension that he would not get a fair trial?” The test is 
whether there is a ‘real likelihood of prejudice’, but it does 
not require certainty.’ ‘Real likelihood’ is the apprehension 
of a reasonable man apprised of the facts and not the 
suspicion of fools or ‘capricious persons’.  
 
Testing the case on the above touchstone, it does not fall in any of the 
above categories of bias. Further, he has relied on the Pinochet case 
(2) reported as R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate 
[(1999) 1 All ER 577]. Briefly stated, the facts of the case were that 
Senator Pinochet brought the petition to set aside an order made by 
the House of Lords, allowing the appeal of the Commissioner of Police 
of the Metropolis and the Government of Spain from the decision of 
the Queen’s Bench, granting the petitioner judicial review by way of 
certiorari to quash the provisional warrant issued for the arrest of the 
petitioner to await his extradition to Spain. The grounds of the petition 
were that Lord Hoffmann’s links with Amnesty International, which had 
been granted leave to intervene in the appeal, gave the appearance of 
possible bias. It was held as under:-  
“The principle that a judge was automatically disqualified 
from hearing a matter in his own cause was not restricted 
to cases in which he had a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome, but also applied to cases where the judge’s 
decision would lead to the promotion of a cause in which 
the judge was involved together with one of the parties. 
That did not mean that judges could not sit on cases 
concerning charities in whose work they were involved, 
and judges would normally be concerned to recuse 
themselves or disclose the position to the parties only 
where they had an active role as trustee or director of a 
charity which was closely allied to and acting with a party 
to the litigation. In the instant case, the facts were 
exceptional in that AI was a party to the appeal, it had 
CPs 987-989/2011 
65 
been joined in order to argue for a particular result and the 
Law Lord was a director of a charity closely allied to AI and 
sharing its objects. Accordingly, he was automatically 
disqualified from hearing the appeal. The petition would 
therefore be granted and the matter referred to another 
committee of the House for rehearing per curiam.”  
 
The other case relied by the learned counsel in the above connection 
was R v Gough [(1993) 2 All ER 724] wherein the appellant claimed 
that the learned judge should on his own motion have required the 
prosecution to proceed on an indictment containing eight substantive 
counts of robbery and not on the conspiracy count. That submission 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal. The other ground of appeal was 
that by reason of the presence on the jury of a lady who was 
appellant’s brother’s next door neighbour, there was a serious 
irregularity in the conduct of the trial and for that reason the 
conviction of the appellant should be quashed. That too was rejected. 
In the appeal to the House of Lords, it was held as under: -  
“Except where a person acting in a judicial capacity had a 
direct 
pecuniary 
interest 
in 
the 
outcome 
of 
the 
proceedings, when the Court should assume bias and 
automatically disqualify him from adjudication, the test to 
be applied in all cases of apparent bias, whether concerned 
with justices, members of other inferior tribunals, jurors or 
arbitrators, was whether, having regard to the relevant 
circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the part 
of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the 
sense that he might unfairly regard or have unfairly 
regarded with favour or disfavour the case of a party to 
the issue under consideration by him …”  
 
56.   
The facts and circumstances of the said cases are quite 
different and are not attracted in the present case. As far as the 
Chairman is concerned, it has already been held that the Board 
CPs 987-989/2011 
66 
performs a function, which is a legislative activity and not a judicial or 
quasi-judicial act, as such, in the performance of his functions as 
Chairman, he is not a Judge even though he be or may have been a 
Judge. It is well settled that mala fides cannot be attributed to 
legislature. Even otherwise, bias, or the perception of bias has to be 
established, but here it appears that there was no bias because the 
petitioners were not cooperating with the Board, which is evident from 
the letters filed by them.  Another important thing in this behalf is that 
the notification of appointment of the Chairman was never challenged 
on the ground of bias or perception of bias, either when the matter 
came before this Court earlier in 2004, or before the High Court, 
therefore, at this stage, this argument is not available to the 
petitioners.  Thus, from this angle too, no case for interference with 
the Award or the proceedings of the Board is made out.  
57.   
Learned counsel next contended that legislature has 
completely abdicated its powers, as it has made excessive delegation 
of powers to the Wage Board without any guidelines. On the other 
hand, the learned counsel for the respondents stated that the 
petitioners have not shown with reference to any specific instances 
from the Award that the Board has acted in excess of the authority 
conferred upon it and not a word has been said about it. The Court will 
not enter into an academic exercise. Therefore, this argument fails 
because it has not been made with reference to any particular item in 
the Award. He has relied upon Muhammad Ismail & Co. v. Chief Cotton 
Inspector (PLD 1966 SC 388, Province of East Pakistan v. Sirajul Haq 
Patwari (PLD 1966 SC 854), Zaibtun Textile Mills v. Central Board of 
Revenue (PLD 1983 SC 358) and Abdur Rahim v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 1988 SC 670). The ratio decidendi of the aforesaid cases 
CPs 987-989/2011 
67 
is that it is only the essential legislative power that is incapable of 
being constitutionally delegated. Within the framework laid down by 
the legislating authority, power can be delegated to a subordinate 
agency to carry into effect the purposes of the enactment by making 
detailed rules in conformity with the policy thus laid down. What is 
prohibited by the Legislature is the delegation of its function to make 
the law but not the authority exercised under and in pursuance of the 
law itself to another agency in regard to the provision of details when 
by the very nature these are incapable of being laid down by the 
legislature itself. The legislature can delegate authority to subordinate 
or outside authorities for carrying laws into effect and operation. 
Considering the above line of authorities, it is not possible to uphold 
the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners. It is to be 
noted that under section 9 of the NECOSA the Chairman was 
appointed along with 10 members representing owners of the 
newspapers 
and 
the 
newspaper 
employees 
having 
equal 
representation to advise the Chairman for fixing the wages. The whole 
proceedings of the Board have been incorporated in the Award dated 
25th October, 2001, a perusal whereof indicates that after collecting 
evidence and thoroughly conducting inquiry and as a result of 
intensive efforts to achieve the object of the legislation the Award was 
given. The petitioners had never pointed out during the proceedings or 
thereafter as to how the Chairman exceeded his authority to support 
the argument that the Federal government had abdicated its 
authority/jurisdiction which was conferred upon the Board in terms of 
section 10. In fact, the petitioners had not participated in proceedings 
of the Board as they disassociated themselves twice from the 
proceedings as is evident from the contents of the Award and at one 
CPs 987-989/2011 
68 
stage they intended to join proceedings subject to accepting some of 
their conditions. Above all, when they gave the names of owners of the 
newspapers to represent them, even at that stage they incorporated in 
the letter dated 24th April, 2000 that prior to being signed by the 
Chairman and publication in the official gazette, the Award must be 
circulated amongst the members, the members must be allowed to 
record their concurrence with or dissent from the Award and such 
concurrences and/or dissents must also be published along with the 
Award 
singed 
by 
the 
Chairman, 
knowing 
well 
that 
the 
objections/demands so raised by them were not in terms of the 
NECOSA or the Working Journalists (Wage Board) Rules, 1960. It is 
pertinent to mention here that no rules have been framed under the 
NECOSA, therefore, as per section 24 of the General Clauses Act, the 
rules framed under the Ordinance of 1960 would be holding the field.  
58.   
Learned counsel also objected that as there was no 
industrial dispute, therefore, the Government, suo motu could not 
appoint the Wage Board for fixation of wages of the newspaper 
employees. The argument so raised by the learned counsel is not 
tenable as under section 9 (1) of the NECOSA, it is prerogative of the 
Federal Government to constitute whenever it so considers necessary 
by notification in the official gazette the Wage Board for fixing the 
wages of the newspaper employees. This very question engaged the 
attention of the Indian Supreme Court in the case of Express 
Newspapers (supra) wherein it was held that as the appointment of 
the Wage Board for the purpose of fixing the rates of wages could not 
be, and was not, challenged, as such the constitution of such a Wage 
Board is one of the appropriate methods for fixing the rates of wages 
of the newspaper employees.  
CPs 987-989/2011 
69 
59.   
In the instant case as well, vide notification dated 19th 
June, 2000 the Chairman was appointed, followed by another 
notification dated 8th July, 2000 in pursuance whereof the employer 
members and the employee members were appointed and no 
challenge was thrown to this notification, therefore, this argument is 
not available to the petitioners. Besides, in view of the plain language 
of section 9(1), there is hardly any need for the Government to wait 
till the time an industrial dispute is raised. In our opinion, the prior 
existence of an industrial dispute is absolutely unnecessary in view of 
various provisions of the NECOSA, which has been promulgated to 
regulate certain conditions of service of the newspaper employees as 
defined therein. As far as payment of the wages is concerned, it is one 
of the conditions of service of newspaper employees. The term “wage” 
has been defined in section 2(h) of the NECOSA, which means wages 
as defined in the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 and includes any 
gratuity or other payment declared as wages by the Board. The 
contention of the learned counsel in respect of directions contained in 
the Award relating to granting of grades, etc. to the newspapers has 
also no force because grading has been done in view of the ground 
realities based on evidence collected by the Board.  
60.   
Undoubtedly, 
the 
Chairman 
has 
control/powers 
as 
envisaged by section 10 of the NECOSA as has been pointed out 
hereinabove. It is pertinent to mention that this Court, in the case of 
Herald Publications Ltd. (supra) interfered in the Wage Award to the 
extent it was found beyond the scope/jurisdiction of the Board, but the 
Wage Board Award was kept intact. No demonstration has been made 
before us to substantiate that the petitioners led any evidence or 
produced any material being the representatives of the newspaper 
CPs 987-989/2011 
70 
establishments to persuade the Board not to award different grades or 
rates of wages to the newspaper employees, hence no other discussion 
in this behalf is called for.  
61.   
Learned counsel contended that all the newspapers 
(owners of the newspapers) do not have financial capacity to make the 
payment of wages to the newspaper employees as per the Award. This 
argument has been seriously controverted by the learned counsel for 
the respondents, particularly by Mr. Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui, ASC.  
According to him, the petitioners control 85% news publications in 
Pakistan, therefore, there is no match between them and the 
newspapers like Kohistan, Ta’amir, etc., or the newspapers being 
issued from the far-flung areas of D.I. Khan of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa or 
Mastung, Sibi, etc., of Balochistan. Be that as it may, this very 
contention had already been decided against the newspaper owners in 
the case of Herald Publications (supra) on the basis of the material 
brought before the Wage Board at that time. In this case as well, the 
employers/owners of the newspapers had pleaded before the Board 
that they had no capacity to pay the employees as per their demands. 
As per the expert opinion presented before the Board by Dr. A.R. 
Kamal, cost of living is 46.3 percent and per capita income is 51.8 
percent. Similarly, another expert Dr. Irfan opined that cost of living is 
47% while the per capita income is 52%. It is significant to note that 
despite non-producing material/data as was required to be filed by the 
newspaper establishments to assess their capacity to pay the wages 
fixed in the Award, at one stage, i.e. on 4th October, 2001 M/S Syed 
Fasih Iqbal and Mr. Arshad Zubari appeared on behalf of newspaper 
owners and urged that burden of inflation is to be shared by the 
owners and the newspaper employees in 60 : 40 ratio. According to 
CPs 987-989/2011 
71 
the owners, after deduction of the share of the workers @ 40%, the 
balance will come to 24%. On this formula, the owners concluded that 
they were ready to increase the wages of the workers to the extent of 
24%. Another concession was offered by the owners that 7% 
weightage may also be shared in 60 : 40 ratio, which will come to 
28% to 29%. It was further declared that if this formula was accepted 
they would have no objection if the decision of the Board was made 
operative w.e.f. 1st July, 2000. On the other hand, the representatives 
of the newspaper employees brought into the notice of the Board that 
the 4th Wage Award was given on the basis of overall 90% increase in 
the cost of living. The 5th Wage Award was announced on the basis of 
71% increase. Similarly, the 6th Wage Award was founded on the 
ground that the cost of living was 70%. The workers produced reliable 
evidence before the Board that prices of various articles had increased 
from 100% to 150%. This evidence was not rebutted by the owners. 
As the parties were not agreed, therefore, on the basis of material 
produced by the respondents and the oral assertions made by the 
petitioners, the Board decided that 50% increase in the cost of living 
would be made the basis of the increase in the wages of the 
newspaper employees.  
62.   
Since no material was produced as indicated hereinabove 
by the petitioners to show that financially they did not have the 
capacity to increase the wages, the Board though did not approve the 
rates of wages demanded by the employees, found out a middle way 
to fix the wages.  
63.   
The contention raised by the learned counsel on behalf of 
the petitioners that the NECOSA is a fraud on the Constitution, as 
according to him, though the Board is an independent body having 
CPs 987-989/2011 
72 
equal representation of both the sides but the members are denied the 
power to participate in the decision making as the Award is to be given 
by a single person “Chairman”.  
64.   
Again it is to be seen that at the time of constitution of the 
Board, no objection was raised nor any challenge was thrown in the 
Court to challenge the constitution of the Board while invoking power 
of judicial review of the superior Courts. Secondly, in view of the past 
experience prevailing since 1951 onward, on account of unrest in the 
newspaper industry and also to ensure that this industry functions 
smoothly and rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution 
were enforced/implemented, the representatives of the employers and 
the employees were engaged to provide advice in regard to the 
observation that no effective participation was made by the owners or 
their representatives as is evident from the facts and circumstances 
noted hereinabove.  
65.   
Learned counsel for the petitioners also contended that the 
NECOSA is a redundant and superfluous law in a heavily occupied field 
by incorporating several laws without which it cannot operate, such as 
the Provident Funds Act, 1925, the Factories Act, 1934, the Payment 
of Wages Act, 1936, West Pakistan Employees’ Social Security 
Ordinance, 
1965, 
the 
Industrial 
and 
Commercial 
Employment 
(Standing Orders), Ordinance 1968, the National Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 1969, etc. To elaborate his argument, he referred to 
sections 2(h), 5(5), 17 & 19 of the NECOSA as in these sections 
procedure for redressal of the grievances of the newspaper employees 
in the statutes named hereinbefore has been made applicable. He 
further contended that due to application of these laws, several other 
laws are also attracted, which shall be applicable to the newspaper 
CPs 987-989/2011 
73 
employees, namely, Employees Cost of Living Relief Act, 1973, 
Companies Profits Workers Act, 1968, Workers Welfare Fund 
Ordinance, 1971, Minimum Wages Ordinance, 1969, etc. As far as the 
laws mentioned in the later part of the argument are concerned, they 
have not been made applicable expressly, therefore, to their extent 
argument is based on presumptive consideration. As far as the 
question of redundancy and superfluity of the NECOSA is concerned, it 
is without substance. The scheme of the NECOSA makes it abundantly 
clear that a comprehensive procedural-cum-substantive Code has been 
provided to the newspaper employees by the legislature in view of the 
nature of their duties which they have to perform necessarily other 
than the workers or workmen as defined in the Factories Act or the 
West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Ordinance, 1968, therefore, by means of the NECOSA, their 
rights and obligations have been protected. This is not the only statute 
of its nature where Payment of Wages Act, etc., have been applied by 
following the process of adoption of laws, which is well settled 
approach in the modern jurisprudence. Reference in this behalf may be 
made to Re Wood’s Estate [(1866) 31 Ch. D. 607] wherein Lord Esher 
M.R. said, “If a subsequent Act brings into itself by reference some of 
the clauses of a former Act, the legal effect of that, as has often been 
held, is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had 
been actually written in it with the pen, or printed in it, and the 
moment you have those clauses in the latter Act, you have no 
occasion to refer to the former Act at all. Similarly, a statute may 
adopt all or only a part of another statute by express reference or by 
re-enactment of the former in verbatim or in substantially the same 
language.” [Understanding Statutes – Cannons of Construction, Edition 
CPs 987-989/2011 
74 
2008 by S.M. Zafar].  Therefore, no redundancy or superfluity can be 
attributed to the NECOSA on this score. In this behalf, argument of the 
learned counsel for the respondents being worth consideration is also 
to be noted that the Legislature is not debarred from promulgating 
such laws as general or special laws, vis-à-vis general civil laws, 
special rights, procedures, etc., therefore, the NECOSA is not 
superfluous and it cannot be declared ultra vires the Constitution.  
66.   
Learned counsel vehemently argued that as per section 
12A, a decision of the Board published under section 11 shall be 
deemed to be award of the Full Bench of the NIRC constituted under 
section 22A of the Ordinance [section 2(b) of the NECOSA]. Under 
section 38C of the IRO 1969, the Award shall remain in force for a 
period of three years or until it is modified or varied by a later decision 
of the Wage Board. Therefore, according to him, treating the Wage 
Board Award as having come to an end after the expiry of three years 
from 25th October, 2001, the date of its publication in the Gazette of 
Pakistan. The argument advanced by the learned counsel has been 
seriously controverted by the learned counsel appearing for the 
respondents as according to him, it has no force because the deeming 
clause in a statute is to be read to the extent of its application and not 
beyond it as in the instant case the Award is to be deemed award of 
the Full Bench of the NIRC, but it is not said that its period of 
enforcement will also be the same. In the case of Mubeen-us-Salam v. 
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 602), it has already been 
observed that the purpose of importing a deeming clause is to place an 
artificial construction upon a word/phrase that would not otherwise 
prevail and sometimes it is to make the construction certain. It was 
further held that a deeming clause is a fiction, which cannot be 
CPs 987-989/2011 
75 
extended beyond the language of the section by which it is created or 
by importing another fiction. Therefore, on the basis of such deeming 
clause, the period of enforcement of the Award cannot be fixed at 
three years. It is provided in section 11(2) that decision of the Board 
shall remain in force until it is modified or varied by a later decision of 
the Board. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned 
counsel emphasized that all the previous Awards were continued to 
remain in force for a period of five years, but in the instant case, a 
period of more than 10 years has passed, as such following the past 
practice, it may be held that the Award is no more applicable. The 
argument has no substance because no period of time has been fixed 
under section 11 of the NECOSA.  
67.   
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Newspaper Employees 
(Conditions of Service) Act, 1973 [NECOSA] is intra vires the 
Constitution. Consequently, the Seventh Wage Board Award dated 25th 
October, 2001 shall hold the field until it is modified or varied by a 
later decision of the Board published in the manner provided in section 
11(2) ibid. Accordingly, we are not inclined to interfere with the 
impugned judgments of the High Court of Sindh. All the three petitions 
are dismissed with costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, CJ 
 
 
 
 
TARIQ PARVEZ, J.   
 
GHULAM RABBANI, J.   
 
 
 
Announced in open Court on 19th October, 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING  
