IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRESENT:
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN
MR. JUSTICE JAMAL KHAN MANDOKHAIL
CIVIL APPEAL NO.339 OFQ
(Against judgment dated 09.12.2015 of Lahore High
Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawaiphidi passed in Regular
Second Appeal No.03/2003)
Dadu Khan (deed.) thr. LRs and 3 others 
..Appellant(s)
VERSUS
Ghulam Abbas and 23 others 
...ReSpOfldeflt(S)
--
(
For the Appellaflts
For Respondents No. 1-2:
Respondents No.3-24
For the Federation:
For Province of Punjab:
Date of Hearing:
Ch. Afrasiab Khan, ASC
Mr. Muhammad Shoaib Abbasi, ASC
1x-parte
Mr. Sohail Mehmood, Addl.AGP
Mr. Qasim All Chohan, Addl AG, Pb
Shaukat lqbal, Naib-Tehsildar Jand
(Attock)
23 .06 .2022
JUDGMENT
IJAZ UL AHSANLIJ-. Through the instant Appeal,
the Appellants have challenged the judgment of the Lahore
High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi dated 09.12.2015
(hereinafter referred to as the "impugned Judgement")
wherein the judgement and decree of the Additional District
Judge, Attock (hereinafter referred to as the "Appellate Court")
was set aside and the judgement and decree of the Senior
Civil Judge, Attock (hereinafter referred to as the "Trial
Court") was restored.
I
2
cn Mpg,'. fib 339 C9WS
4
2. The necessary facts giving rise to this Us are that
in 1979, the predecessor-in- 1flte5t of the Appellants, Sher
Zaman, filed a suit for declaration to the effect that he may be
declared owner in possession of land measuring 135 Kanals
and 08 Marlas situated in Mithial, Tehsil Pindigheb, District
Attack (hereinafter referred to as the "Suit Land") and that the
entries in the revenue record showing the Central
Government as mortgagee of the suit land were wrong and
liable to be corrected. In the alternative, the predecessor-in-
interest of the Appellants prayed that redemption of the
mortgage may be decreed. It was averred in the plaint that
Sher Zaman was the grandson of one Sooba Khan. Sooba
Khan owned and possessed the suit land and subsequently
mortgaged the said land to one Amar Chand for a sum of
Rs.100/m Subsequently, the mortgage amount was paid to
the mortgagee through a receipt in 1892, but appropriate
entries could not be made in the revenue record until 1933.
After the fourth settlement of land in the area, a fardbadr was
prepared, the mutation for redemption of mortgage was
entered on 24.01.1933 but was subsequently cancelled on
25.09.1936. In the wake of the sub-Continent's partition,
Amar Chand migrated to India and the suit land was treated
as an evacuee property to the extent of Amar Chand's interest
by the Central Government. By operation of law, Amar
Chand's interest was transferred to the Central Government
which, in turn, transferred 23-kanals of the suit land to
Muhammad Sharif and rest of the suit land to Ghulam
Mustafa under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act of
.1
WS&&L f ucU91,I6 
3
1958 (hereinafter referred to as the "Land Settlement Act").
The suit of the Appellants was dismissed by the Trial Court
vide judgement dated 17.09.1981. On appeal, the suit of the
Appellants was partially decreed to the extent of 23 Kanals.
On second appeal before the High Court, the suit of the
Appellants was decreed as prayed for vide judgement and
decree dated 12.10.1998. However, the Supreme Court, vide
its judgement dated 19.11.1999, remanded the matter to the
Learned High Court for decision afresh. After the matter was
remanded to the High Court, the High Court further
remanded the matter to the Trial Court and allowed all the
parties to raise their respective factual and legal
pleas/grounds before the Trial Court. After pro and contra
evidence was led, the Trial Court, vide its judgement and
decree dated 31.10.2002 dismissed the suit of the Appellants
for the second time. On appeal, the Appellate Court set aside
the judgement and decree of the Trial Court and decreed the
suit of the Appellants vide its judgement and decree dated
27.12.2002. This judgement of the Appellate Court was
challenged before the High Court which, vide the impugned
judgement, set aside the judgement of the Appellate Court
and restored the judgement and decree of the Trial Court,
essentially dismissing the suit of the Appellants. It is against
the judgement of the High Court that the Appellants have
preferred the instant appeal.
3. 
The Learned Counsel for the Appellant has argued
that in light of the receipt dated 18.07.1892, the Appellants'
- -- 7
rn. APEM ? 
CQ' 2015 
4
rights to redeem the suit land had been exercised and Amar
Chand no longer had any interest in the suit land as a
mortgagee. Since the mortgage had been redeemed by the
predecessor-in-interest of the Appellants, the Central
Government could not been become subsequent mortgagee of
the land by operation of law in the absence of Amar Chand's
mortgage interest in the land. He has relied, inter a/ia, on a
judgement of this Court passed in Muhammad Hanif and
another vs. Chulam Rasool etc. (2005 SCMR 1004) to support
his arguments. He further contends that the Appellants had
been non-suited by the Learned High Court by holding their
suit incompetent in light of an order of this Court passed in
Member BOR Punjab and another vs. Mst. Siddigan through
L.Rs and others (2015 SCMR 1721) whereas in a judgement
passed by bhis Court in Malik Raees vs. Abdul Mannan and
another (1992 SCMR 1822), the jurisdiction of the Civil Court
for redemption of mortgage is not ousted if the Central
Government is vested with mortgagee rights by operation of
the Land Settlement Act. He prayed that the impugned
judgement may be set aside and the judgement and decree of
the Appellate Court be restored.
4.
The Learned Counsel for Respondents No.1 & 2 on
the other hand has defended the impugned judgement.
5.
Notice was issued to the Attorney General for
Pakistan as well as the Advocate General of Punjab to assist
with the matter since after the passing of the Land Settlement
Act, the suit land to the extent of Amar Chand's mortgage
1
..
-
rights had been vested with the Central Government. The
Additional Attorney General as well as the Additional
Advocate General Punjab were heard and both of them have
defended the impugned judgement.
6. We have heard the learned counsels for the parties
at length and gone through the case record with their
assistance. The following questions need to be determined by
this Court:-
1. Did the Central Government haue mortgagee rights in
the suit land? if it did, its effect thereof? If it did not,
its effect thereof?
ii. 
Was the Quit Court the competent forum to adjudicate
the instant matter?
DID THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ANY
MORTGAGEE RIGHTS IN THE SUIT LAND? IF IT DID,
ITS EFFECT THEREOF? IF IT DID NOT, ITS EFFECT
THEREOF?
7. In order to ascertain if there were any mortgagee
rights in the suit property, it may be prudent to first
determine what a mortgage is and what rights accrue once a
mortgage deed is executed between two parties.
Under the law, mortgage is defined under the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 (hereinafter referred to as the "TPA 1882")
in Section 58 of the said Act. The same is reproduced below
for ease of reference:
58. Mortgage mortgagor mortgagee, 'mortgage-
money and mortgage defined
(a) A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in
specific immovable property for the purpose of
securing the payment of money advanced or to be
advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt
or the performance of an engagement which may give
I
.1
rise to a pecuniary liability. The transferor is called a
mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal
money and interest of which payment is secured for
the time being arc called the mortgage-money and
the instrument (if any) by which the transfer is
effected is called a mortgage-deed.
In essence, a mortgage is a contract between two parties (i.e.
a borrower/ mortgagor and a lender/ mortgagee) where a
capital sum of money is lent in exchange for a proprietary
interest in land. It is important to note that unlike other
proprietary interests in land, a right accrues to both the
mortgagor and a mortgagee once a mortgage deed has been
executed between two parties. These interests are: 1) the
mortgagor's/ borrower's right to have the land
redeemed/ returned once the capital money lent has been
repaid; and 2) the mortgagee's/ lender's right to possess and
acquire the property if the capital money lent is not repaid as
stipulated in the mortgage deed. The proprietary rights of
both the mortgagor and mortgagee are independent
proprietary interests and there is oftentimes no bar on the
parties to transfer and/or sell their respective rights in the
mortgage to subsequent parties.
Relying on the averments made by the Appellants to the
extent that possession had never been handed over to Amar
Chand during the life of the mortgage and that they had
always been in possession of the suit land, the mortgage in
question would be deemed to be a simple mortgageas is
defined in sub-section (b) of Section 58, TPA 1882. It is
reproduced below for reference: -
c-mt Afx4L K) ,g (* I
(b) Simple mortgage
Where, without delivering possession of the
mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds himself
personally to pay the mortgage money, and agrees
expressly or impliedly, that, in the event of his failing
to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee shall
have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be
sold and the proceeds of sale to be applied, so far as
may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage
money, the transaction is called a simple mortgage
and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee.
The rights of both the mortgagor as well as the mortgagee are
also enumerated in the TPA 1882. The relevant portion of
section 60 deals with the right of the mortgagor to redeem the
property he has mortgaged. It is reproduced below: -
60. Right of mortgagor to redeem
At any time after the principal money has become
due, the mortgagor has a right, on payment or
tender, at a proper time and place, of the mortgagee-
money, to require the mortgage (a) to deliver to the
mortgagor the mortgage deed and all documents
relating to the mortgaged property which are in the
possession or power of the mortgagee, (b) where the
mortgagee is in possession of the mortgaged
property, to deliver possession thereof to mortgagor,
and (c) at the cost of the mortgagor either to re-
transfer the mortgaged property to him or to such
third person as he may direct, or to execute and
(where the mortgage has been effected by a registered
instrument) to have registered an acknowledgment in
writing that any right in derogation of his interest
transferred to the mortgagee has been extinguished:
Provided that the right conferred by this section has
not been extinguished by the act of the parties or by
[decreel of a Court.
The right conferred by this section is called a right to
redeem and a suit to enforce it is called a suit for
redemption.
Nothing in this section shall be deemed to render
invalid any provision to the effect that, if the time
fixed for payment of the principal money has been
allowed to pass or no such time has been fixed, the
mortgagee shall be entitled to reasonable notice
before payment of tender of such money.
(Underlining is ours)
Mortgages are regulated in the province of Punjab by the
Punjab Redemption and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act,
 - 
I
qi..oqJnflzfli 
S
1962 (hereinafter referred to as the "Mortgage Act"). For the
purposes of the present appeal, it may be prudent to
reproduce the relevant portions of the Mortgage Act for ease
of reference. Section 1 of the Mortgage Act deals with the
extent of the Act. It is reproduced below: -
1. Short title, cxLent and commencement
(1) This Act may be called the [Punjab] Redemption
and Restitution of Mortgaged Lands Act, 1964.
(21 It extends to the whole of the province of
[the Punjab], exce pt the Tribal Areas.
(3) It shall come into force in such areas and from
such dates as Government may, by notification in
the official Gazette, direct. (Underlining is ours)
Section 2 of the Mortgage Act deals with definitions. It is
reproduced below:
2. Definitions
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,
the following expressions shall have the meaning
hereby respectively assigned to them that is to say-
(a) 'Board of Revenue" means the Board of Revenue
established under the [Punjabi Board of Revenue Act,
1957;
(b)"Collector" means the Collector of the district in
which the mortgaged land or any part thereof is
situated, and shall include any Revenue
Officer specially empowered b y the Board of Revenue
to perform the duties of a Collector, for the purposes
of this Act;
[(c) "Commissioner' means a Commissioner of a
Division appointed under the Punjab Land Revenue
Act, 1967 (XVII of 1967) and includes an Additional
Commissioner;]
(d)"Government" means the [Provincial Government
of the Punjab];
(e)"land" means land which is not occupied as the
site of any building in a town or village and is
occupied or let for agricultural purposes or for
purposes subservient to agriculture or for pasture,
and includes-
(i) the sites of buildings and other structures
on such land;
-
I
Ct M?SAL .fl Cr20 6 
9
(ii) a share in the profits of an estate or
holding;
(iii) a right to receive rent;
(iv) any right to water enjoyed by the owner or
occupier of land as such; and
(v) all trees standing on such land;
( "mortgagor" or mortgagee" includes the assiee
and the representative in interest of such
"mortgagor" or "mortgagee" as the case may be;
(g) "prescribed" mcans prescribed by rules made
under this Act. (Underlining is ours)
Section 3 of the Mortgage Act deals with petitions for
redemption of mortgaged land. It is reproduced below: -
3. Petition for redemption
After the principal money becomes due and before a
suit for redemption is barred, a mortgagor of land
not exceeding fifty acres in area or of land the
principal money secured by which does not exceed
five thousand rupees, ma y apply to the Collector for
an order directing that the mortgage be redeemed
and that he be put in possession.
Explanation I- The area of any share in the common
land of the village or of sub-division appertaining
thereto and mortgaged with the land, shall not be
taken into consideration while determining the area
of the land mortgaged.
Explanation II- This section shall not apply to
usufructuary mortgage effected for a specific number
of years and intended to terminate without the
repayment of any part of its consideration
Section 3 falls within Chapter 11 (i.e. Redemption of
Mortgages) of the Mortgage Act. The Mortgage Act has not
barred the jurisdiction of Civil Courts to adjudicate on
matters pertaining to redemption of mortgages insofar as
Chapter If is concerned.
8. It is important to note that at the time the
mortgage deed between Sooba Khan and Amar Chand was
executed in 1888 (i.e. before the UK's Land Property Act of
1925 was passed), it was normally assumed that once a
10
mortgagor had mortgaged his land, he had divested himself of
all interest in the land in lieu of the monies lent to him by the
mortgagee. This meant that Sooba Khan no longer had any
interest in the land until and unless he had paid the entire
Rs. 100/- lent to him by Amar Chand. The rationale behind
the entire divestiture of the land was that the mortgagor
would do everything in his power to repay the loan lent to him
in order to be reinvested with his proprietary interest in the
mortgaged land. If the capital sum had been paid by 1933, as
was claimed by the Appellants, then there was no need for the
revenue officials to cancel the mutation which cancelled the
mortgage in 1936. It can therefore be reasonably be presumed
that the capital sum had not been paid by 1936 and that
payment of the capital sum was still due on the Appellants.
However, keeping in view the equities of the parties when
entering into a mortgage deed, the mortgagor of a mortgage
would still retain the equitable right to redeem the property.
Under the law, that equitable remedy has been safeguarded
by Section 4 read with Section 3 of the Mortgage Act. Section
4 of the Mortgage Act reads as follows:-
4. Deposit of amount due under mortgage
The mortgagor shall in his application declare what
sum is to the best of his knowledge due under the
mortgage and deposit such sum with the Collector at
the time of making the application. (Underlining is
ours).
Admittedly, the Appellants have consistently taken the stance
that they had paid the capital sum back to Amar Chand in
1892 and therefore had been reinvested with their proprietary
interest in the land. If that is the case, then the Appellants
11
never filed a suit for redemption prior to the passing of the
Mortgage Act on the strength of Section 60 of the TPA 1882 in
order to redeem the suit land. Even after the Mortgage Act
was passed, the Appellants had failed to approach the
concerned Collector and file an application under Section 3 of
the Mortgage Act in order to redeem their property. Instead,
the Appellants instituted their declaratory suit in 1979 i.e.
ninety-one years after the mortgage had been made and forty-
three years after the mutation for cancellation of mortgage
had been cancelled by the revenue authorities. If the
averments of the Appellants are to be accepted, then the
mortgage was redeemed and a suit for declaration was the
correct course of action. If a suit for declaration was the legal
remedy available to the Appellants under the law, then the
suit of Appellants was blatantly time-barred in light of Article
120 the Limitation Act of 1908 since the suit had been filed
well after the six-year limitation period prescribed for the
filing of declaratory suits. On being confronted as to whether
the suit of the Appellants was time-barred or not if the
mortgage had indeed been redeemed in 1892, the Learned
Counsel for the Appellants has contended that limitation
would stop running in terms of Section 13 of the Limitation
Act, 1908 since Amar Chand had migrated to India after 1947
and therefore had become absent for the purposes of the said
Section. Section 13 of the Limitation Act is reproduced
below:-
13. Exclusion of time of defendants absence from
Pakistan etc. and certain other territories
It
Ct? 339 CW2OIO 
2
In computing the period of limitation prescribed for
any suit, the time during which the defendant has
been absent from [Pakistan] and from the territories
beyond [Pakistan] under the administration of [the
[Federal] Government] shall be excluded.
We are afraid that the benefit of the said provision is not
attracted to the instant case since the Appellants have no
grievance against Amar Chand and their only grievance is
against the present Respondents. Therefore, Amar Chand
would not fall within the definition of a "defendant" for the
purposes of the Section 13 and as a result, limitation would
still run even after 1947. Even otherwise, the alternative suit
for redemption of the Appellants would be incompetent if it is
accepted that the Appellants had redeemed the property in
1892 since there would be no rights that would be left to
redeem. Therefore, it would seem that the Appellants still
retained the right to redeem the mortgage even after failing to
exercise their right to redemption within the prescribed period
of limitation. As a natural corollary, if the Appellants had the
right to redeem the land, then the subsequent mortgagee i.e.
the Central Government which had stepped into the shoes of
Amar Chand had been invested with all the mortgagee rights
associated with the suit land after the Land Settlement Act
was passed.
WAS THE CIVIL COURT THE COMPETENT FORUM TO
ADJUDICATE THE INSTANT MATTER?
9. If the Appellants had the right to redeem the suit
land, the next question would be whether the Civil Courts
were the competent forum for adjudicating the instant matter.
0
'I
t 4L P O9fl1k 
13
In that respect, it may he prudent to reproduce Section 25 of
the Land Settlement Act. It reads as follows: -
25. Bar of jurisdiction
Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no civil or
revenue Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of
any matter which the Central Government or an
officer appointed under this Act is empowered by or
under this Act to determine, and no injunction or
process or order shall be granted by any Court or
other authority in respect of any action taken or to
be taken in exercise of any power conferred by or
under this Act.
In order to challenge an order passed under the Land
Settlement Act, the relevant provision of the Land Settlement
Act is Section 18. It is reproduced for ease of reference: -
18. Appeals
(1) Any person aggrieved by an order under this Act
may prefer an appeal to-
(a) the Deputy Settlement Commissioner
where an order has been passed by an
Assistant Settlement Commissioner;
(b) the Additional Settlement Commissioner
where an order, not being an order, passed in
appeal under clause (a), has been passed by
the Deputy Settlement Commissioner;
(c) the Settlement Commissioner where an
order, not being an order passed in appeal
under clause (b) or in revision under
subsection (3) of section 19, has been passed
by an Additional Settlement Commissioner;
and
(d)the Chief Settlement Commissioner, where
an order, not being an order passed in appeal
under clause (e) or in revision under
subsection (2) of section 19, has been passed
by a Settlement Commissioner.
(2) The appeal shall be presented within sixty days of
the date of the order appealed against, in such form
and manner as may be prescribed.
Settlement Laws were subsequently repealed in 1975 by
virtue of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws
(Repeal) Act, 1975, (hereinafter referred to as the "Repealing
CMI .sccAL on?aP2!6 
14
Act'). Section 2 of the Repealing Act is of paramount
importance for the purposes of the present appeal. It is
reproduced below for ease of reference:-
2. Repeal of certain laws
(1) The following Acts and Regulations are hereby
repealed, namely:-
(i) the Registration of Claims (Displaced
Persons) Act, 1956 (III of 1956);
(ii) the Pakistan Rchabilitation Act, 1956;
(iii) the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee
Property) Act, 1957;
(iv)the Displaced Persons (Compensation and
Rehabilitation) Act, 1958;
(v) the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement)
Act, 1958;
(vi)the Scrutiny of Claims (Evacuee Property)
Regulation, 1961; and
(vii)the Price of Evacuee Property and Public
Dues (Recovery) Regulation, 1971.
(2) Upon the rcpeal of the aforesaid Acts and
Regulations, all proceedings which, immediately
before such repeal, may be pending before the
authorities appointed thereunder shall stand
transferred for final disposal to such officers as may
be notified by the joovernment] in the official Gazette
and all cases decided by the Supreme Court or [the
Lahore High Court] after such repeal which would
have been remanded to any such authority in the
absence of such repeal shall be remanded to the
officers notified as aforesaid.
(3) Any proceedin gs transferred or remanded to an
officer in pursuance of sub-section (2) shall be
disposed of by him in accordance with the provisions
of the Act or Regulation hereb y repealed to which the
proceedings relate.
(4) The final orders passed under sub-section (3)
shall be executed by the [Board of Revenue] in
accordance with the provisions of the Act or the
Regulation hereby repealed to which the proceedings
related. (Underlining and highlighting is ours)
Section 4 of the Repealing Act lays down the manner of how
residual work dealing with the repealed acts and laws are to
be disposed of. It is reproduced below for reference:-
15
4. Disposal of residual work
All the work regarding documentation, both for the
urban and rural properties, recovery of outstanding
transfer price, rent or mortgage money of such
property already disposed of and discharge of
miscellaneous liabilities out of these recoveries,
which may remain pending immediately before the
repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations shall
stand transferred to the [Board of Revenuel.
Admittedly, the Appellants never challenged the mutation
which vested in the Central Government's mortgagee rights in
the suit property, until 1979 by approaching the Civil Court.
There is also nothing on the record to suggest that the
Appellants had ever approached the competent Revenue
Officials for resolving their grievance in light of the ouster of
jurisdiction in Section 25 of the Settlement Act. It was held by
a three-member bench of this Court in Member BOR PunjqM
and another vs. Mst. Siddipari through LRs and others (supra)
that:-
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that
as Pujara Ram and Roshan Das had failed to pay the
balance consideration, therefore, the land was
resumed as per the terms and conditions of auction.
However, when queried, neither the terms and
conditions pertaining to auction of government land
in relevant period nor any resumption order of the
land in dispute has been placed on the record.
Except for the bald allegation by the petitioner there
is no material to show if the auction purchaser had
defaulted in the payment of any balance
consideration or that the revenue authorities took
any action to confront or penalize the same. Anyhow,
entries in the revenue record show seizing of the land
in dispute by the rehabilitation authorities prior to
1957 who treated the property as an evacuee
property and in 1966 transferred it in favour of the
predecessor-in-interest of the respondents. It
Rerence is made to Azizuddin v. Muhammad Ismail
(1985 SCMR 666). Reference can be made to the
judgment dated 1-10-2014 of this Court passed in
Civil Appeal No.514/2008 tided tNasir Fahimuddin
and others v. Charles Philips Mills son of Patrick
_____ 
- 
T 1
I.
16
Mills, resident of 4/2-A, Habib Ullah Road, Lahore
and others; besides the law laid down in
Muhammad Din and S others v. Province of the
Punjab through Collector and others (PLD 2003 Lab.
441)...
However, no challenge was thrown by the petitioner
or Mst. Hafeezan Khanum either before the
Custodian or before the Rehabilitation Department
against the issuance of the allotment order of 1966
or issuance of RL-11 to the respondent allottee. In
such circumstances the petitioner cannot take up
the plea that the allotment made in favour of the
respondents is invalid for any reason. Indeed, we are
not convinced that the property was resumed
because as mentioned above there is neither any
order of resumption available on record, nor are the
terms and conditions of auction postulating that
auctioned land could be resumed for non-payment of
one instalment. Admittedly, only a small amount was
payable by Pujara Ram etc; and without a clear legal
basis, the presumption of cancellation of auction sale
and resumption of auctioned land is a harsh
measure that we cannot approve. Resultantly, we do
not find this case to be fit for interference. Dismissed
accordingly. (Underlining and Highlighting is ours)
It would have been appropriate for the Appellants to challenge
the allotment made by the then Settlement Officers by
exercising their right to appeal provided in Section 18 of the
Land Settlement Act. However, the Appellants never
challenged these allotments and also failed to approach the
competent forum (i.e. the competent Revenue Officer after the
Repealing Act) for redressal of their grievances qua the suit
land. While there may be no ouster of jurisdiction in the
Mortgage Act with respect to redemption of property, there is
a clear ouster of jurisdiction with respect to mortgaged land
that has subsequently been declared an evacuee property
under Section 25 of the Land Settlement Act read with
Section 2 of the Repealing Act.
9. We have gone over the judgements relied on by the
Learned Counsel for the Appellants and found them to be
distinguishable on facts. The same are of no help to the
I
c MflAL AU a,c OF1 
17
Appellants seen in the context of the present Appeal. The
Learned Counsel for the Appellant has failed to point out any
ground which could reasonably persuade us to take a view
different from the one taken by the High Court and to hold
that the Revenue Department was not the competent forum
and that the Civil Court had exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate on the matter. The Learned Counsel also could not
point out any mis-reading or non-reading of evidence by the
High Court. We therefore conclude that even if the Appellants
may have had the equitable right to redeem their property,
their right to redeem the property stood extinguished after
non-payment of the mortgage money within sixty years of the
mortgage (i.e. till 1976 after taking into consideration the
limitation period that stood frozen (from 1947 to 1960)until
the suit land was allotted to the predecessor-in-interest of
Respondents No.5 to 11 for the first time in 1960).Even
otherwise, the entire proceedings before the Civil Court were
corarn non judice in light of the ouster of jurisdiction as per
Section 25 of the Settlement Act. The Trial Court as well as
the Learned High Court had rightly dismissed the suit of the
Appellants owing to a lack of jurisdiction to adjudicate the
matter.
10. In light of what has been discussed above, the
Learned Trial Court, and subsequently, the Learned High
Court had correctly come to the conclusion that the Civil
Court was not the appropriate forum for adjudicating the
present matter. As a result, the Learned High Court had
-I
cAt A Ft€AL O tOfl9 2016 
18
It
rightly set aside the judgement of the Appellate Court and
restored the judgement and decree of the Trial Court. The
Impugned Judgement dated 09.12.2015 passed by the Lahore
High Court, Rawalpindi Bench, Rawalpindi is accordingly
upheld. This appeal is accordingly
ISLAMABAD. THE
23 of June, 2022
Kh 1 Sahibzada, LC 261*
7SAPPROVED FcownNG*
-1 
-.
