IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION)
PRESENT:
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, HCJ
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN
Civil Appeal No.20 1 of 2020
Against judgment dated 18.09.2019 of Punjab
Service Tribunal at Bahawalpur, passed in Appeal
No.2362 of 2018.
Province of Punjab through its Special
Secretary, Specialized Healthcare & Medical
Education Department, Lahore, etc
VERSUS
Khadim Hussain Abbasi
Appellants
Respondent
For the Appellant(s) Syed Wajid Ali Gillani, Addl.AG, Pb.
For the Respondent(s) 
Mr. M. A. Rekmn Qureshi, ASC
Date of Hearing: 
13.04.2021
JUDGMENT
IJAZ UL AHSAN, J-. This appeal by leave of the
Court arises out of a judgment of the Punjab Service Tribunal
at Bahawalpur ("the Tribunal") dated 18.09.2019. Through the
impugned judgment, a Service Appeal bearing No.2362 of
2018 filed by the Respondent was partly allowed to the extent
that major penalty of compulsory retirement from service was
converted into minor penalty of forfeiture of past service for a
period of two years.
2. Briefly stated the facts necessary for disposal of
this Us are that the Respondent was serving as Chief
Technician, District Blood Unit, Sheikh Zayed Hospital,
Rahim Yar Khan. He was proceeded against departmentally
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Civil Appeal jVo.203 of 2020 
2
under Punjab Employees Efficiency, Discipline and
Accountability Act, 2006 ("PEEDA Act, 2006") on the
allegations of misconduct, illegal sale of blood, absence from
duty without leave and malpractices. An inquiry was
conducted in which the Respondent was found guilty of the
charges. Consequently, vide order dated 09.03.2017 major
penalty of compulsory retirement from service was imposed
upon him. He filed a departmental appeal which was rejected.
Therefore, he approached the Tribunal. During the course of
the hearing before the Tribunal the only argument made by
learned counsel for the Respondent was to the effect that
major penalty awarded to the Respondent may be converted
into a minor penalty. He also produced a copy of the
judgment dated 17.01.2019 passed by Magistrate, Section 30
Rahim Yar Khan who had acquitted the Respondent in the
criminal case registered against him. The Tribunal came to
the conclusion that the Respondent had been dealt with
harshly and the penalty imposed on him was not
commensurate with the gravity of the offence. It therefore vide
impugned judgment dated 18.09.2019 proceeded to allow the
Service Appeal in the manner noted above.
3. The Appellants were aggrieved of the said
impugned judgment and approached this Court by way of a
Civil Petition in which Leave to Appeal was granted on 03-03-
2020 in the following terms:
"We have heard the learned Additional Advocate
General, Punjab and have also gone through the case record.
Serious allegations of misconduct, involvement in illegal sale
of blood, absent from duty and involvement in malpractice
Civil A ppeal No.201 o12020 
3
were leveled against the Respondent by way of a charge
sheet dated 22.12.2016. A regular inquiry was conducted
into the matter, the Respondent was found guilty of the
aforesaid allegations and ultimately after following the codal
formalities, he was recommended to be dismissed from
service by the inquiry officer. However, the competent
authority after considering all aspects of the matter imposed
a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service upon
the Respondent, vide order dated 09.03.2017. The
departmental appeal filed by him against the said order was
rejected, vide order dated 22.05.2018. He then filed a service
appeal before the Punjab service Tribunal, Lahore. Although,
the Service Tribunal has found that allegations against the
Respondent stood established on record, but for no reason
given in impugned judgment dated 18.09.2019 interfered
with the penalty of compulsory retirement imposed upon the
Respondent by the department and converted the same into
forfeiture ofpast service for a period of two years.
2.
The learned Law officer has pointed out that by the
time the impugned judgment was passed, the respondent
had already received all benefits of his compulsory
retirement and thus this very appeal before the Service
Tribunal on such basis had become irifructuous.
3.
The contentions raised by the learned Additional
Advocate General, Punjab need consideration. Leave to
appeal is therefore granted to consider inter alia the same."
4.
The learned Additional Advocate General, Punjab
appearing for the Appellants submits that the judgment of the
Tribunal is not in consonance with the law declared by this
Court in various judgments including Inspector General
(Prisons) NWFP, Peshawar & others v. Syed Jaffer Shah, ex-
Assistant Superintendent Jail & others (2009 PLC (CS) 47)
and a flurry of recent judgment rendered by this Court. He
maintains that the impugned judgment is devoid of any
reason and relies on philanthropic ideas rather than any
sound, legal or judicial principles. He submits that charges of
0
CiuilA ppeajf'Jo.201 of 2020 
4
misconduct, illegal sale of blood from the Blood Bank,
tampering with the record, etc stood fully established in
addition to unauthorized absence from duty for more than 75
days. Therefore, there was neither reason nor justification for
the Tribunal to interfere with the punishment imposed by the
departmental authorities after following due process of law.
He further maintains that neither any reason nor justification
was given by the Tribunal for finding the punishment
disproportionate to the gravity of offence. It has further been
pointed out that it is settled law that acquittal in criminal
proceedings has no impact on the departmental proceeding as
the two can simultaneously proceed and the result of one has
no bearing on the outcome of the other unless the
departmental proceedings have not been independently
conducted and solely and exclusively rely on the criminal
proceedings, which is not the case here. In this regard, the
learned Law Officer has relied upon Nazir Ahmed v. Capital
City Police Officer (2011 SCMR 484), Muhammad Igbal v.
District Police Officer (2011 SCMR 534), Shahid Wazir v.
Secretary, Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas and States of
Frontier Regions Division (2006 SCMR 1653) and Shahid
Masood Malik v. Habib Bank Limited (2008 SCMR 1151). He
finally submits that the Respondent had already received his
pensionary benefits, gratuity and GP Fund etc without protest
and had thereby accepted the penalty imposed by the
Department. In such circumstances, the Service Appeal filed
by the Respondent had in any event become infructuous and
the Tribunal committed serious error in ignoring and
Ciuil Appeal No.201 of 2020 
5
overlooking this fact and proceeding to reduce his penalty
without recording any reasons for the same.
5.
Learned ASC for the Respondent on the other
hand has attempted to defend the impugned judgment. He
submits that the Respondent has long service record with the
Appellants and the punishment awarded to him was
disproportionate to the gravity of the offence. However, when
confronted with the fact that the Respondent had been found
guilty of illegal sale of blood from the Blood Bank, tempering
with the record and unauthorized absence from duty, he has
not been able to offer any cogent or reasonable defence.
6.
We have heard the learned Additional Advocate
General Punjab, learned ASC for the Respondent and have
gone through the record with their assistance.
7.
The record indicates that the Respondent was
proceeded against under PEEDA Act, 2006 on the allegations
of misconduct, illegal sale of blood, tempering with the record
of the Blood Bank and unauthorized absence from duty for at
least 75 days. An inquiry was conducted against him in which
he was found guilty of all charges. Surprisingly enough, the
only defence taken before the Tribunal was that the
punishment may be reduced from major penalty to a minor
penalty. No effort whatsoever was made to deny or contest the
charges against the Respondent. This constituted admission
of charges which were admittedly of a very serious nature.
The Tribunal has for reasons best known to it chosen to
ignore such a vital and material aspect of the case. Although
a
Civil Appeal No.201 of 2020 
6
the judgment of Magistrate, Section 30 Rahirn Yar Khan was
produced before the Tribunal, whereby the Respondent had
been acquitted of the criminal charges, nothing turns on the
same in view of the independent inquiry conducted by the
Department and clear and categorical findings of the
departmental authorities holding the Respondent guilty of the
charges leveled against him. This Court has repeatedly held
that departmental proceedings and criminal prosecution are
not mutually exclusive, can be proceeded independently and
acquittal in criminal proceedings does not affect the outcome
of the departmental proceedings. It may be noted that
departmental proceedings are undertaken under a different
set of laws, are subject to different procedural requirements
are based upon different evidentiary principles and a different
threshold of proof is to be met. Criminal proceedings on the
other hand are undertaken under a different set of laws, have
different standards of proof are subject to different procedural
requirements and different thresholds of proof are required to
be met. Therefore, acquittal in criminal proceedings cannot
and does not automatically knock off the outcome of the
departmental proceedings if all legal and procedural
formalities and due process have been followed
independently. In this context, reference may usefully be
made to the cases of Nazir Ahmed; Muhammad Iqbal; Shahid
Wazii-; and Shahid Masood Malik (ibid).
8. Further, without reference to the specific charges
against the Respondent which stood established against him,
Civil Appeal No.201 of 2020 
7
the Tribunal completely ignored the fact that he had in effect
admitted the charges and accepted his guilt before it.
However, the learned Tribunal nevertheless thought it fit to
launch upon a discussion of philosophy of punishment in a
vague, ambiguous and abstract manner which has no place
in judicial verdicts. Further, the Tribunal without discussing
the facts and circumstances of the case proceeded to observe
that, "the guilt and the quantum of severe punishment in the
absence of tangible material is against the principle of natural
justice to award severe punishment, fair and transparent
method should be adopted, the punishment imposed under
these circumstances is too harsh".
9. We are at a loss to understand how and on what
basis the Tribunal came to the conclusion that there was
absence of "tangible material" in the case of the Respondent
against whom all charges stood established in a properly
constituted inquiry and who had for all intents and purposes
admitted his guilt even before the Tribunal. Further, the
Tribunal did not bother to elaborate how the process was
"unfair" or "lacked transparency". No reasons whatsoever
were recorded let alone cogent for conclusion of the Tribunal
that the punishment was harsh, considering the seriousness
of the charges against the Respondent. Paragraphs 8 and 9 of
the impugned judgment have no nexus or connection with the
facts of the case as very briefly narrated in the earlier part of
the impugned judgment. There is total lack of discussion of
facts of the case, procedure followed and the finding of guilt
Civil A ppeal No.201 012020 
8
recorded by the departmental authorities and how there was
absence of tangible material or any procedural impropriety.
We are constrained to hold that in passing the impugned
judgment, the Tribunal has completely ignored and
disregarded the basic and foundational principles of law laid
down by this Court in various judgments spelling out the
parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 5 of the
Service Tribunals Act, 1973. In this regard, reference may
also be made to the case of Inspector General (Prisons) NWFP,
Peshawar & others (ibid) where the practice of undue and
unwarranted interference in the penalties awarded by the
departmental authorities has been deprecated. In a recent
judgment of this Court reported as Government of Pakistan v.
Nawaz Ali Sheikh (2020 SCMR 656) it was held as under:
"13. No doubt, under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act,
the Service Tribunal enjoys powers to modify any Appellate
order but such power is to be exercised carefully judiciously
and with great circumspection by assigning cogent, valid and
legally sustainable reasons justifying such modification. We
fail to understand how and from where the Service Tribunal
derived the authority and jurisdiction to arbitrarily and
whimsically grant the relief that it has ended up granting to
the Respondent.
14. All Courts and Tribunals are required to act strictly in
accordance with law and all orders and judgments passed
by them must be entrenched and grounded on the
Constitution, the law and the rules. No Court, Authority or
Tribunal had any jurisdiction to grant any relief in favour of
any person which is not based upon the foundation of the
Constitution, the law and the rules. We notice that the
Service Tribunal has not assigned any reason whatsoever in
accepting the appeal of the Respondent in the manner noted
above, which it was required to do to justify the reduction in
penalty. In this regard, reference may usefully be made to
the case of "Chairman Dr. A. 0. Khan, Research Laboratories
Civil A ppeal No.201 of 2020
and another. v. Malik Muhammad Hamid Ullah Khan" (2010
SCRIP 302) as well as a judgment of this Court passed in
Civil Appeal No.1343 of 2017 in the case of Secretary,
Revenue, Division, Federal Board of Revenue, Islamabad
and another. v. Asf Y ousaf and another."
The aforesaid principles were reiterated by this
Court in the case of Chief Postmaster Faisalabad v.
Muhammad Afzal (2020 SCMR 1029) where it was held as
under:
"There is no cavil with the proposition that under
Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, the Tribunal enjoys
powers to modify any order passed by the departmental
authorities but such power is required to be exercised
carefully, judiciously and after recording reasons for the
same. In the present case, the penalty in question had been
imposed by the departmental authority on the basis of
established charges and the major penalty of dismissal from
service was imposed upon him in accordance with the law
and the rules. In these circumstances, we are at a loss to
understand how and from where the Tribunal derived the
authority to exercise a power in favour of the Respondent in
such an arbitrary unstructured and whimsical manner. We
have found the exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal to be
wholly without any lawful authority whatsoever, specially so
where no reasons, let alone cogent have been assigned for
exercise ofjurisdiction in this manner by the Tribunal.
8. All Courts/Tribunals seized of matters before them are
required to pass orders strictly in accordance with the
parameters of the Constitution, the law and the rules and
regulations lawfully framed under the law. No Court has any
jurisdiction to grant arbitrary relief without the support of
any power granted by the Constitution or the law. This basic
and fundamental principle of jurisprudence appears to have
eluded the attention of the Tribunal which has clearly
exceeded its jurisdiction power and authority in granting
relief to the Respondent.
10. 
Further, the principles of law settled by this Court
in the cases reported as Government of the Punjab v.
Civil A ppeal No.201 or2020 
10
Muhammad Arshad (2020 SCMR 1962) and District Police
Officer v. Muhammad Hanif (2020 SCMR 1610) are also to
the same effect as laid down in the cases of Chief Postmaster,
Faisalabad and Government of Pakistan (ibid).
11. We therefore find that the Tribunal has not only
exceeded its jurisdiction but exercised the same in a mariner
which is in complete violation of the settled principles of law
on the subject. Further, in converting the major penalty of
compulsory retirement from service into a minor penalty of
forfeiture of past service for a period of two years, the
Tribunal has failed to assign any cogent, legally sustainable
and valid reasons to support its finding. As such, the
impugned judgment can safely be termed as a non speaking
judgment which does not meet the test of a judicial verdict.
We have repeatedly held that although the Service Tribunal
has the discretion to interfere in questions of quantum of
punishment, such discretion can neither be arbitrarily and
capriciously exercised nor are powers of the Tribunal
unqualified or unlimited. Where the Tribunal exercises its
discretion to interfere in the penalty awarded by the
competent authorities, such discretion has to be exercised in
a circumscribed, restricted, carefully calibrated and
structured manner duly supported by legally sustainable
reasoning, which is conspicuous by its absence in the instant
case. We therefore find that the impugned judgment of the
Tribunal is not sustainable in law or fact and is liable to be
set aside.
herein.
Civil Appeal No.201 012020 
11
4
12.
For reasons recorded above, we allow this Appeal,
set aside the impugned judgment of the Tribunal dated
18.09.20 19 and restore the penalty of compulsory retirement
from service imposed upon the Respondent by the
departmental authorities vide order dated 09.03.2017.
13.
Let a copy of this judgment be transmitted to
Chairman, Punjab Service Tribunal, Lahore for its circulation
amongst all members of the Tribunal for their perusal and
adherence to the principles of law enunciated and reiterated
ISLAMABAD, THE
13th April, 2021
ZR! 7Approved For Ing'
