 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
Present: 
 
Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar, HCJ 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018 
Against the order dated 18.01.2018 
passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore in 
W.P. No.26022 of 2017 
NAB thr. It Chairman, Islamabad 
 
 
 
…Petitioner(s) 
VERSUS 
Murad Arshad & others  
 
 
 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the Petitioner(s): 
Mr. Imran ul HAq, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB a/w  
Mr. Zawar Manzoor, I.O. 
 
For the Respondent(s):  
Ms. Ayesha Hamid, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
 
 
22.10.2018 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
Mushir Alam, J.- Through instant petition, NAB through its Chairman has 
approached this Court seeking leave to appeal against the judgment dated 
18.01.2018 rendered in Writ Petition No.26022 of 2017, whereby learned 
Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Lahore was pleased to the enlarge 
the Respondent No.1 Murad Arshad to post arrest bail. 
2. 
 
Globaco (Pvt.) Ltd. under arrangement with Defence Housing 
Authority launched a subsidized scheme, for JCOs, NCOs and army 
personals under the banner of DHA City, Lahore for which the company was 
required to procure 25,000 Kanal of land, however the company only 
acquired 13,092 Kanal of land. It is the case of NAB that the company lured 
general public through campaign to invest in the project. However, it 
appears that on the basis of large number of complaints received from the 
general public by the NAB initially against the management of DHA City 
alleging cheating of public at large, while enquiry against such complaints 
was afoot another complaint was received from Defence Housing 
Authority, Lahore against Globaco (Pvt.) Ltd./Orange Holding (Pvt.) Ltd. 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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alleging corruption and corrupt practices. Initially enquiry was authorized 
by the DG NAB-L on 4.5.2005. Further enquiry was re-authorized on 
2.11.2015, which was later upgraded into investigation vide order of the 
competent authority on 7.4.2016, on the strength of which on 16.6.2016 
Interim Reference No. 32/16 was filed against Hammad Arshad and three 
other Co-accused persons, which did not include the name of Respondent 
No.1 Murad Arshad, before the Accountability Court No. IV, Lahore. 
3. 
 
Respondent No.1 apprehending his arrest filed Writ Petition 
No.707 of 2016, which was disposed of by the Lahore High Court, Lahore on 
26.01.2016 observing that “if at any subsequent stage any need for arrest 
of petitioner accrues, then grounds of their arrest shall be communicated to 
them and in the said eventuality they would have a remedy to again 
approach this Court by way of a due application.”   
4.  
 
It appears that on the basis of interim reference, charge was 
framed on 1.3.2017 and the trial against the accused person nominated 
therein commenced. From the record it reflects that role of the Respondent 
No.1 Murad Arshad came into prominence when during course of 
continuing investigation and trial it revealed that being director in M/s 
Orange properties Private Ltd, which was holding company of Globaco 
(Pvt.) Ltd.;  he is instrumental and in active connivance with his brother and 
co-accused Hammad Arshad and other co-accused persons have enriched 
themselves by diverting colossal sums of money received from general 
public into the account of various companies of which they were directly 
and indirectly the beneficiary. Consequently grounds of arrest dated 
9.05.2017 (page 87 of the file) were served, through his chowkidar. He was 
arrested on 10.5.2017 and was produced before the Accountability Court 
and remand was obtained on 11.5.2017 Respondent No.1 was formally 
nominated in supplementary Reference filed on 21.8.2017.  
5. 
 
Respondent No.1 invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High 
Court on 15.5.2018 through Writ Petition No.26022 of 2017. Learned Bench 
after notice and hearing the parties was pleased to concede bail through 
impugned judgment dated 18.01.2018 mainly highlighting his role and 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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criminal liability (paragraphs 12 to 16 of the impugned Judgment) as 
shareholder and Director of offending company and of other companies he 
was statedly holding directorship and beneficial interest. Learned Bench 
relied upon the cases all invariably based on Salomon vs. Salomon and Co. 
Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22) and extended benefit of corporate veil to the 
Respondent No.1 holding that “that the Court could not figure out any 
direct and active participation/involvement of the Petitioner” and that vital 
decision were not taken by him,… that the investigation to his extent is 
complete and that “the role of the petitioner is yet to be properly figured 
out which is possible after recording of evidence against the petitioner.” The 
Court while conceding bail to the respondent was influenced by the fact the 
other co-accused Muhammad Hammad Arshad was originally charged in 
the Reference, when Respondent No.1 was not the accused and despite 
orders dated 26.01.2016 of the Court in earlier Writ Petition No.707 of 
2016 as noted above, NAB “had not even permitted him to approach the 
Court in violation of the direction/observation given by the Court”. 
6. 
 
It was argued by Mr.Imran ul Haq, learned Special Prosecutor 
NAB, that the respondent No.1 and his brother co-accused are the 
Directors of M/s Orange Holdings (Pvt.) Ltd. which is holding company of 
Globaco (Pvt.) Ltd.; which by launching subsidized housing scheme under 
the banner of DHA City Lahore, essentially for the families of JCOs, NCOs 
and Army Personals, lured and induced members of public at large to invest 
Rs.15.476/- billion out of which major amount of Rs.13.2/- billion were 
directly transferred in the bank accounts of their various companies of 
which both the brothers were holding controlling and beneficial shares.  It 
is argued that large number of commercial plots and amenity plots were 
fraudulently got transferred through the help of other co-accused persons 
by deceiving Bank of Punjab and DHA authorities and transferred land in 
favour of Bank of Punjab to offset liability of their company as detailed in 
the supplementary reference filed through CMA No.6523 of 2018. It was 
argued that NAO, 1999 is a special law, all offences are non bailable, even 
the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code regulating bail and or even 
suspension of sentence are specifically excluded in application by virtue of 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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section 9(b) of the NAO, 1999.  According to him, grant of bail in respect of 
offences committed under the NAO, 1999 is an exception. According to him 
Respondent cannot be allowed to take shield behind the corporate veil, 
which aspect of the matter was not considered by the High Court. 
7. 
 
Learned ASC for the Respondent No.1 supports the impugned 
judgment. It was urged that the Respondent No.1 was roped in the subject 
Reference much later through supplementary Reference dated 21.8.2017. 
He has no dominating control over the affairs of the company. It was urged 
that impropriety if at all was that of a limited liability company and other 
nominated and apprehended co-accused are already facing the trial. 
According to learned ASC, Respondent No.1 was merely meager share 
holder in the company cannot be saddled with personal and or criminal 
liability if any of the company, which has separate juristic entity. It was 
urged that the arrest was violative of the order dated 26.1.2016 passed by 
the Lahore High Court in earlier Writ Petition No.707 of 2016, as all along 
the Respondent No.1 was appearing before the Investigation Officer, there 
was no occasion to cause his arrest. 
8. 
 
We have heard the arguments and perused the record. The 
Respondent No.1 invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court 
under Article, 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 challenging his 
arrest made on 10.5.2017, warrants of arrest dated 9.5.2017 and remand 
Order dated 11.5.2017 being against the provisions of the Constitution, 
illegal, without jurisdiction and against the order of the High Court and also 
sought protective bail to enable him to approach High Court in terms of 
Order dated 26.1.2016 passed in W.P. No.707 of 2016. 
9. 
 
It is a matter of record that the Murad Arshad, Respondent 
No.1 herein, is one of the Director and shareholder in various companies as 
detailed in paragraph No.24 of the supplementary Reference No.32/2016 
dated 21.8.2017 and holds beneficial interest therein alongwith his brother 
Hammad Arshad, who is already facing trial along with other co-accused 
persons. Respondent No.1 is nominated in subject Reference unveiling land 
scam and syphoning money through various companies under the cover of 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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DHA City project, Lahore. The project was to be executed by Globaco (Pvt.) 
Ltd., a subsidiary of Orange Holding (Pvt.) Ltd., in both the companies 
Respondent No.1 was holding directorship and shareholding with his 
brother co-accused in the matter. He apprehending his arrest filed Writ 
Petition No.707 of2016, seeking protection against arrest which was 
disposed of on 26.01.2016 observing,  
“The learned officer, on the basis of information 
furnished by the I.O., has contended that till now no 
document towards arrest of the Petitioners is 
available with the NAB and that arrest of the 
petitioners would only be required, when any such 
document is issued by the competent authority” 
……….. “It is made clear that if at any subsequent 
stage any need for arrest of petitioners accrues, then 
grounds of their arrest shall be communicated to 
them and in the said eventuality they would have a 
remedy to again approach this Court by way of a due 
application.”   
10. 
 
However as noted in the narrative, the grounds of arrest, 
which according to NAB could not be served on the Respondent No.1, who 
avoided to associate with investigation and circumvented to receive such 
grounds of arrest, same were delivered to his gatekeeper/chowkidar. We 
have noted that such facts are narrated by the Respondent No.1 in 
paragraph 17 of his Writ PetitionNo.26022 of 2017.  
11. 
 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is a special law, it has 
been enacted with an objective to combat white collar crime of high 
magnitude, it provides for taking effective measures for the detection, 
investigation, prosecution and expeditious trial of offences as enumerated 
under section 9 of the NAO, 1999 made punishable under section 10 read 
with schedule thereof. All offences under the NAO, 1999 are made non-
bailable  not withstanding general provisions of Code of Criminal 
Procedure, 1898  viz. Sections  426, 491, 497, 489 and 561-A thereof, which 
regulate power of Courts to suspend sentence, pass order in the nature of 
habeas corpus, pre-arrest, post-arrest bail, inherent power of the High 
Court in furtherance of power under the Code to, prevent abuse of process 
of Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice by virtue of non-obstinate 
provisions of Section 9(b) of the NAO, 1999. Jurisdiction and authority of 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Courts of general criminal jurisdiction, High Court and this Court to concede 
bail under the NAO, 1999 either pre-arrest or post arrest etc. has remained 
under judicial scrutiny since its very promulgation. There are chain of 
authorities dilating on such aspect of the case right from the full Bench of 
the Lahore High Court in the case of Anwar Saifullah vs. The State and 4 
others (PLD 2000 Lahore 564) wherein it was held that “the High Court had 
jurisdiction under Article, 199 of the Constitution to grant bail to a person 
accused of an offence under NAB Ordinance in appropriate cases.” This 
Court affirmed such position in the case of Anwar Saifullah Khan vs. The 
State and 3 others (2001 SCMR 1040) and by a larger Bench (four members) 
in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali  and others vs. Federation of Pakistan 
through Cabinet Division and others (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 607) and 
such view has since been followed consistently, in the case of Ghulam Ali 
vs. The State through AG, NWFP, Peshawar and another (2003 SCMR 597)  
keeping in sight the amended provision section 9(b)  of NAO, 1999 at page 
604 it was held “…..the legal position regarding maintainability of bail 
application under section 497 Cr.P.C before the High Court in case under 
NAB Ordinance, would remain as such and an accused of such an offence 
cannot maintain a bail application before the High Court under Section 497 
Cr.P.C.”  One may find detailed discussion on such aspect of the matter in a 
very recent pronouncement of this Court reported as Olas Khan vs. 
Chairman, NAB (PLD 2018 Supreme Court 40). 
12. 
 
 We have noted that the learned Bench of the Lahore High 
Court in the impugned judgment has laid much emphasis on the doctrine of 
‘corporate veil’ and based on such doctrine in a lengthy discussion 
extended benefit of bail to the Respondent No.1. Pakistan by and large is 
under influence of common law doctrine and the principle that body 
corporate has a separate and distinct entity, and shareholders cannot be 
held liable for the act of corporate entity as propounded in the leading 
English case reported as Salomon vs. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22], 
though well entrenched in common law jurisdiction, which is based on 
public policy and grounded on public good. It was for quite some time 
sacredly followed in common law jurisdiction, indeed veil of incorporation 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-7- 
 
 
cannot be pierced as a matter of course in each and every case and there 
has to be some justifiable reasons, which may warrant in doing so. “That is, 
because of the corporate veil, shareholders are not responsible for paying the 
debts of the corporation (beyond the level of their own investment) and generally 
are not legally liable for any crimes the corporation might commit. While the 
corporate veil protects shareholders, it may be disregarded under certain 
circumstances, notably if a shareholder assisted the corporation in the 
commission of a crime”. (see corporate veil as defined at https://financial-
dictionary. thefreedictionary.com) 
13. 
 
The Courts in various jurisdictions adopted progressive 
approach under compelling circumstances to scrutinize such legal attire 
piercing the veil of incorporation to identify the real schemers and players 
indulged in such acts of omission and commission and seeking refuge 
behind such cloak and got away unchecked and unaccountable for the 
wrong done. However, such doctrine is no more treated sacred or revered 
rule of thumb, Lord  Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd v. Beasley [1956] 1 QB 
702, at page 712 held that “No Court in this land will allow a person to keep 
an advantage which he had obtained by fraud.  No judgment of a Court, no 
order of a Minister, can be allowed to stand it if has been obtained by fraud.  
Fraud unravels everything.  The Court is careful not to find fraud unless it is 
distinctly pleaded and proved; but once it is proved, it vitiates judgments, 
contracts and all transactions whatsoever...” In the case of Littlewoods Mail 
Order Stores Ltd.  vs. Inland Revenue Commissioners [(1969)1 W.L.R 1241], 
Lord Denning, spearheaded to dilute such legal fiction and opined that "the 
doctrine laid down in Soloman's case has to be watched very carefully. It 
has often been supposed to cast a veil over the personality of a limited 
company through which the Courts cannot see. But that is not true. The 
Courts can, and often do, pull off the mask." One may gainfully see 
Woolfson vs. Strathclyde Regional Council [1978] SC(HL) 90, Adams & 
others  vs. Cape Industrial PLC and another [(1990) CH 433],  Trustor AB vs. 
Smallbone [(No 2) (2011) 1 WLR 1177], Standard Charter Bank vs.  Pakistan 
National Shipping Corp and others [(2003) 1 AC 952]. In the case of  Life 
Insurance Corp of India vs. Escorts Ltd. and others [(1986) 1 Supreme Court 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Cases 264] at the conclusion of para-90 at page-336 Indian Supreme Court 
identified four key instances when corporate veil can be pierced “i) where a 
statute itself contemplates lifting the veil, or ii) fraud or improper conduct is 
intended to be prevented, or iii) a taxing statutory beneficent statute is 
sought to be evaded or iv)  where associated companies are inextricably 
connected as to be in reality, part of one concern.  List of instances where 
veil of incorporation could be lifted as noted in cited case, is merely 
illustrative and not exhaustive. Case of Union Council, Ali Wahan, Sukkur vs.  
Associated Cement (Pvt.) Limited (1993 SCMR 468) is quite illustrative of 
circumstances in which veil could be lifted. In the case reported as Standard 
Chartered Bank vs. Pakistan National Shipping Corporation of Pakistan 
reported as [2003] 1 AC 952= [2003] 1 All ER 173 defence of the director of 
PNSC signing the Bill of Lading sought to avoid personal liability saying it 
was act of the Company was not accepted.  
14. 
 
Veil of incorporation and circumstances under which it could 
be lifted depends on facts and circumstances of each case and statutory 
regime applicable to such facts. Then the Courts do keep in sight the 
purpose and object a statutory regime intends to achieve and remedy the 
mischief  under which  acts of omission and or commission seemingly of a 
body corporate could be pressed into service as against personal criminal 
liability and or civil obligation of a Partner, Director, Shareholder, promoter 
or employee of a company, corporation and or firm whatever attire it may 
choose to wear or a Court may look behind such attire to identify real 
person who is exercising and managing the control and the affairs of such 
body corporate or firm or any combination thereof etc. that is under 
scrutiny viz-a-viz public interest and affectees of act of omission and 
commission of such legal entities etc. under relevant statutory regime. In 
many a jurisdiction including Pakistan many a times corporate attire is 
being abused for covert purposes to fleece innocent public, commit fraud, 
launder crime money, convert ill-gotten gain and conveniently getting away 
with it and escape criminal liability etc; Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its Report titled as “Corporate 
Vehicle for Illicit Purpose (2001)  in  Executive Summary, at page-7 noted 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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“….While corporate vehicles play an essential role in the global economic 
system, these entities may, under certain conditions, be misused for illicit 
purposes, including money laundering, bribery/corruption, hiding and 
shielding assets from creditors, illicit tax practices, self-dealing/defrauding 
assets/diversion of assets, market fraud and circumvention of disclosure 
requirements, 
and 
other 
forms 
of 
illicit 
behavior”  
(www.oecd.org/daf/ca/43703185.pdf). Pakistan, fully cognizant of such happing, 
made headway in framing law that permits piercing the corporate veil and 
foisting criminal liability and civil obligation on real actors, perpetrators and 
natural persons behind such legal attire for instance section 38 of Drug Act, 
1940 now section 34 of the Drug Act, 1976 whereunder “every director, 
partner and officer of the company. Corporation, firm with whose 
knowledge and consent the offence was committed”, is held liable for the 
offence under the Drug Act, 1976 [Superintendent of Police, Federal 
Investigation Agency, Lahore and another vs. Akhtar Hussain Bhutta (PLD 
1978 Supreme Court 193)]. Under section 5 of the NAO, 1999 definition of 
accused includes (d) “Associates”, and in Clause (o) definition of “person” 
thereof, is defined to means: 
 
 
“(d)  
Associates” means:-- 
(i) 
any [person] who is or has been managing the 
affairs [of] or keeping accounts [for] the 
accused or who enjoys or has enjoyed any 
benefit from the assets. 
 
(ii) 
any 
association 
of 
persons, 
body 
of 
individuals, partnership firm or private limited 
company within the meaning of Companies 
Ordinance, 1984, of which [the accused] is or 
has been a member, partner or director or 
which 
has 
been 
promoted, 
floated, 
established or run by the accused, whether 
singly or jointly, with other persons”. 
 
(iii) 
a trustee of any trust declared by the accused, 
or of which the accused is also a trustee or a 
beneficiary; and” 
 
(iv) 
a benemidar”.  
(o) 
“Person”, [unless the contest otherwise so 
requires] includes in the case of a [company 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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or a body corporate], the sponsors, Chairman, 
Chief Executive, Managing Director, elected 
Directors by whatever name called, and 
guarantors of the company [for body 
corporate] or any one exercising direction or 
control of the affairs of such [company or a 
body corporate], […..] and in the case of any 
firm, partnership or sole proprietorship, the 
partners, proprietor or any person having any 
interest in the said firm, partnership or 
proprietorship concern or direction or control 
thereof.      
   
Above provisions sufficiently demonstrate that all those persons who are 
found to be handling the affairs of a corporate and or legal entity in 
whatever legal attire or façade used  to carry out any commercial and or 
other activity and commit any wrong and or act of omission and or 
commission  which come within the mischief of any clause of section 9 and 
punishable under section 10 read with schedule thereto gives sufficient 
power to NAB authorities to lift the veil of incorporation and trace out the 
real actors and mastermind behind such façade.   
15. 
 
It appears that on the basis of interim reference, charge was 
framed on 1.3.2017 and the trial against the accused person nominated 
therein commenced. 
16. 
 
In a case reported as Hema Mishra vs. State of Uttar Pardesh 
and others (2014) 4 Supreme Court Cases 453 = AIR 2014 Supreme Court 
1066 in somewhat similar circumstances in paragraph-13 the Indian 
Supreme Court noted that provisions similar to Section 438 Code of Criminal 
Procedure (for Pre-arrest bail) was expressly done away with in the State of 
Uttar Pradesh, the High Court is burdened with large number of writ 
petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking pre-
arrest bail. (the legality of was upheld in Kartar Singh vs. State of Punjab 
[(1994) 3 Supreme Court Cases 569)]. In Paragraphs-17 and 37 it was held 
as follows:  
(17) Though it cannot be said that the High Court has no 
jurisdiction to entertain an application for bail under 
Article 226 of the Constitution and pass orders either way, 
relating to the cases under the Act 1987, that power 
should be exercised sparingly, that too only in rare and 
appropriate cases in extreme circumstances. But the 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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judicial discipline and comity of courts require that the 
High 
Courts 
should 
refrain 
from 
exercising 
the 
extraordinary jurisdiction in such matters;  
…. 
…. 
37. Thus, such a power has to be exercised very cautiously 
keeping in view, at the same time, that the provisions of 
Article 226 are a devise to advance justice and not to 
frustrate it. The powers are, therefore, to be exercised to 
prevent miscarriage of justice and to prevent abuse of 
process of law by authorities indiscriminately making pre-
arrest of the accused persons. In entertaining such a 
petition under Article 226, the High Court is supposed to 
balance the two interests. On the one hand, the Court is 
to ensure that such a power under Article 226 is not to be 
exercised liberally so as to convert it into Section 438, 
Code of Criminal Procedure proceedings, keeping in mind 
that when this provision is specifically omitted in the State 
of Uttar Pradesh, it cannot be resorted to as to back door 
entry via Article 226. On the other hand, wherever the 
High Court finds that in a given case if the protection 
against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount to gross 
miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for 
arrest pending trial, the High Court would be free to grant 
the relief in the nature of anticipatory bail in exercise of its 
power under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is again 
clarified that this power has to be exercised sparingly in 
those cases where it is absolutely warranted and 
justified”. 
17. 
 
Since the promulgation of Ehtisab Act, 1997 as succeeded by 
NAO, 1999 jurisdiction of Trial Court i.e. Accountability Court has been 
expressly ousted to concede bail, which in turn has burdened all the High 
Courts with load of bail application under Article, 199 of the Constitution, 
1973. As held in the case of Hema Misra (Supra) jurisdiction under Article, 
199 of the Constitution has to be exercised with circumspection and 
caution as extraordinary jurisdiction is invoked and exercised to advance 
the cause of justice and not to frustrate it or to defeat the intent of law.  
The jurisdiction under Article, 199 of the Constitution, 1973 are therefore 
to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justice and abuse of NAO, 1999. 
Such jurisdiction is not to be exercised as a substitute of power under 
sections 426,491, 497,489 and 561-A of Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 
liberally and indiscriminately converting High Court into wholly Court of 
ordinary criminal jurisdiction. 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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18. 
 
Reverting to merits of the case, role of Respondent No.1 is 
detailed in investigation report and in paragraph-17 onwards of the 
Supplementary Reference No. 32/2016 dated 21.8.17, his name appears in 
Form-29 and Form-A of the offending companies. His signature appears on 
documents and on cheques of substantial amount deposited in the account 
of companies of which he is one of the shareholders and there is serious 
allegation that he in connivance with other co-accused not only transferred 
plots to the Bank of Punjab to offset liability of another company of which 
he is alleged to be one of the beneficiary,  in the wake of serious allegations 
of siphoning off and misappropriation of colossal amount of 10421 
members of the public as detailed in the supplementary reference and his 
role as an active participant and decision makers in running the affairs of 
Globaco Pvt. Ltd., he is alleged to have committed offence as defined under 
clause (iii), (iv), (vi), (ix) and (xii) of section 9 of NAO, 1999.  Respondent 
No.1 along with his brother co-accused Hammad Arshad already facing trial  
cannot under facts and circumstances, be given benefit of corporate veil 
when per definition clause 5 (d) and (o) of Section 5 of NAO, 1999 gives 
NAB authorities power to pierce the veil of incorporation and nail down the 
real persons under whose dictate and command affairs of errant corporate 
entity were conducted and to find out who is the actual and real actor and 
beneficiary of crime committed under the NAO, 1999. In this view of the 
matter sufficient material is available to connect the Respondent No.1 as 
exercising effective control of the errant companies cannot be exonerated 
from explaining his position and role as an “Associate” as defined in clause 
(d) and a “Person” within the contemplation of clause (o) of section 5 of the 
NAO, 1999. In the case of The State vs. Haji Kabeer Khan (PLJ 2005 
Supreme Court 950= PLD 2005 Supreme Court 364) after reviewing large 
number of cases, this Court recalled the bail granted by the High Court and 
relying on Khan Asfanyar Wali case (Supra) observing that “It is to be noted 
that under the NAB Ordinance there is no provision for grant of bail before 
arrest, therefore, this Court  while examining vires of section 9(b) of the NAB 
Ordinance in the case of Khan Asfanyar Wali case (ibid)  took view that High 
Court shall exercise this power sparingly in rare and exceptional 
Civil Petition No.1707 of 2018. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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circumstances for valid reason to be recorded in writing In this behalf 
reference can be made to the case of  Meeran Bux versus The State (PLJ 
1986 Supreme Court 83) and Murad Khan versus Fazal-e-Subhan and 
another (PLD 1983 Supreme Court 82). As such we are of the opinion that 
the powers for the grant of bail Court has to be exercised strictly keeping in 
view the observation made therein but it seems that the learned High Court 
had not recorded reasons indicating the exceptional circumstances for 
exercising extra ordinary constitutional jurisdiction in favour of respondent  
particularly in case in which accused had not been arrested and no ground 
of mala fide for bail before arrest has been attributed to the prosecution in 
the memo of petition.” such view has been consistently followed see case 
of Nisar Ahmed vs. The State and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 11) and 
as recently as in Olas Khan (Supra). 
19. 
 
In view of the forgoing reasons, the Petition was accepted vide 
short order dated 22.10.2018 which reads as follows: 
“For the reasons to be recorded later, by 
accepting this petition and setting aside the 
impugned order, it is held that the bail granted to 
respondent No.1 (an accused in Reference No.2 of 
2016) is absolutely against the principles for grant 
of bail which (bail) is hereby cancelled, therefore, 
he 
be 
arrested 
immediately 
in 
the 
aforementioned reference.” 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
Judge  
Judge 
Islamabad, the  
22nd of October, 2018 
 
 Approved for Reporting  
 
