IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
               (Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
Present: 
 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SHAKIRULLAH JAN 
 
MR. JUSTICE JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA 
 
MR. JUSTICE SARMAD JALAL OSMANY 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NOs. 239 TO 241 OF 2011 
(Against the consolidated judgment of the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi dated 3.6.2010 passed in C.Ps. Nos.D-
520/2009, D-2414/2007 & D-827/2007 respectively). 
 
Masood Ahmed Bhatti 
 
… Appellant (in CA 239/2011). 
Syed Muhammad Dilavez 
 
… Appellant (in CA 240/2011). 
Nasir Uddin Ghori 
 
 
… Appellant (in CA 241/2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
VERSUS 
Federation of Pakistan thr. Secretary, M/o Information 
Technology & Telecommunication etc. 
  
 
…Respondents (in all cases). 
 
For Appellants: 
 
In person, (in CAs 239 & 240/2011) 
 
 
 
For the Appellants: 
 
Mr. Abdur Rahim Bhatti, ASC a/w 
(in CA 241/2011):  
 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
 
For the Respondents:  
Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, ASC 
(PTCL, in all cases) 
 
 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
 
11.8.2011. 
 
J U D G M E N T 
 
JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA:- These appeals have been filed by three individual 
appellants who admittedly were civil servants employed by the Federation in the 
Telephone and Telegraph (‘T&T’) Department prior to the enactment of the Pakistan 
Telecommunication Corporation Act 1991 (the ‘PTC Act’). To provide context to the 
discussion which follows, the backdrop of this litigation may briefly be stated.  Nasir 
Uddin Ghori, the appellant in CA 241/2011 had earlier obtained a judgment from the 
Service Tribunal dated 28.5.2004 which held that he “will be deemed to have been 
promoted as ADE (B-17) with effect from the date of qualifying degree of B-Tech 
(Hons)”. The seniority list of the ADE cadre was also directed by the Tribunal, to be 
corrected accordingly. Since this judgment was not implemented by the respondent 
namely, Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (‘PTCL’), Mr. Ghori 
approached the High Court seeking implementation of the same but his Constitution 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
2
Petition No.D-827/2007 has been dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the Sindh 
High Court vide impugned judgment dated 3.6.2010. 
2. 
The other two appellants namely, Masood Ahmed Bhatti (CA 239/2011) and 
Syed Muhammad Dilavez (CA 240/2011) had different grievances against PTCL 
relating, inter alia, to pensionary benefits, promotion and a voluntary separation 
scheme.  They had approached the Sindh High Court through Constitution Petitions 
Nos.D-520/2009 and D-2414/2007. These two petitions have also been dismissed by the 
Sindh High Court through the same common judgment dated 3.6.2010 which has been 
impugned by Mr. Ghori.  The appellants have been non-suited by a learned Division 
Bench of the High Court on the short ground that their employment with PTCL is not 
governed by statutory rules and therefore, they are not entitled to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.  For reasons considered below 
and with great respect to the learned Judges, it has not been possible for us to agree with 
their conclusion. 
3. 
The learned Bench, through an elaborate judgment has concluded that PTCL “is 
and shall continue to be amenable to the jurisdiction of [the Sindh High] Court under 
Article 199 of the Constitution”. However, it has been held that “since PTCL does not 
have statutory rules, writ petitions of employees of PTCL are liable to be dismissed”. 
The merits of the individual cases set up by the three appellants have not been 
considered or adjudicated upon by the High Court. The Court has founded its decision 
on the case of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and others versus Tanweer-
ur-Rehman and others (PLD 2010 SC 676).  
4. 
From the foregoing narrative, it will be evident that the controversy between the 
appellants and PTCL which is now before us has been narrowed down considerably. 
PTCL supports the impugned judgment for the reason given therein by the High Court. 
The appellants on the other hand have challenged the finding of the Court by 
contending that the rules relating to the terms and conditions of employment of the 
appellants have statutory force and are, therefore, statutory rules.  It has thus been 
contended by them that the ratio of the cited precedent has been misapplied. 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
3
5. 
Since the judgment of the High Court is based on the case of Tanweer-ur-
Rehman supra, it firstly is to be seen if indeed the principle of law enunciated therein 
supports the conclusion in the impugned judgment.  Para 18 of the cited precedent is of 
particular relevance in this context. It sets out the circumstances which led to the 
Court’s finding that the regulations which were under consideration in the said case 
could not be treated as being statutory in nature. The test laid down for deciding if the 
regulations were in fact statutory, was stated with great clarity. These regulations had 
been framed by the Board of Directors of the Pakistan International Airlines 
Corporation (‘PIAC’) under the PIAC Act 1956.  It was observed by the Court that “if 
the relationship between the [PIAC] and its employees is regulated by statutory 
provisions and if there is any breach of such provisions, an employee ... may maintain 
an action for reinstatement”. It was further observed that “the PIAC has regulations 
which have been framed by the Board of Directors of the PIAC, pursuant to the power 
contained in section 30 of the [PIAC] Act; however, there is nothing on record to 
indicate that these regulations have been framed with the previous sanction of the 
Central Government or that they were gazetted and laid before the National Assembly 
in terms of section 31 of the [PIAC] Act”. This finding of the Apex Court was, in turn, 
based on the case titled Raziuddin v. Chairman, PIAC (PLD 1992 SC 531).  In short, the 
reason for holding that the regulations in question were not statutory was that the 
requirements of sections 30 and 31 of the PIAC Act had not been complied with. 
6. 
The observations in the case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman supra have necessitated an 
examination of sections 30 and 31 of the PIAC Act to see if these provisions have any 
parallel or relevance in the present appeals. It is quite clear from the PIAC Act that in 
order for the regulations to have statutory force, it was necessary that the same be 
framed “with the previous sanction of the Central Government”. Additionally, under 
section 31 of the PIAC Act, the regulations were required to be gazetted and laid before 
the National Assembly. It is only because these contentious regulations had not been 
framed with the previous sanction of the Central Government and had not been 
published in the official Gazettee, that the Court came to the conclusion the regulations 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
4
were not statutory in nature. It follows from the cited judgment that if in fact the 
regulations had fulfilled the requirements of sections 30 & 31 of the PIAC Act, there 
would have been no dispute or contention as to the statutory status of the said 
regulations.  The circumstances of the present appeals (considered below) are very 
different from the facts in Tanweer-ur-Rehman’s case. 
7. 
The learned Division Bench of the Sindh High Court which passed the 
impugned judgment has not considered the relevant provisions in the PTC Act and the 
Reorganization Act relating to the service of employees.  This exercise, in our view, 
was necessary for deciding the question as to whether the rules of employment 
applicable to the three appellants had statutory status and also to see if Tanweer-ur-
Rehman’s case was distinguishable.  It is, as noted above, not in dispute that prior to the 
establishment of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation (the ‘Corporation’) 
under the PTC Act in 1991, the appellants were civil servants.  It is also not a matter in 
contention that at that time (prior to 1991) the appellants were governed by the various 
rules and regulations governing the services of civil servants. The Civil Servants 
(Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973 and the Civil Servants (Appointment, 
Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973 provide instances of rules which, among others 
were applicable to the relationship between the appellants and their employer namely, 
the Federal Government.   Such rules undeniably, were statutory, having been framed 
under rule-making powers granted to the Federal Government, inter alia, under the 
Civil Servants Act 1973.  
8. 
In 1991, the PTC Act was legislated by Parliament. It was by virtue of section 3 
of the PTC Act that the Corporation was established.  The PTC Act also contained 
provisions in respect of the employees of the T&T Department such as the present 
appellants.  These employees were referred to as ‘Departmental Employees’ as defined 
in section 2 (e) of the PTC Act.  Section 9 of the PTC Act expressly stipulated that 
“notwithstanding anything contained in any law, contract or agreement, or in the 
conditions of service, all departmental employees shall, on the establishment of the 
Corporation, stand transferred to, and become employees of the Corporation, on the 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
5
same terms and conditions to which they were entitled immediately before such 
transfer”.  The Corporation, however, was authorized to take disciplinary action against 
such employees. 
9.     
It is clear from this legal provision, that the rules relating to the terms and 
conditions of employment of the appellants were given statutory status. This status was 
on a higher plane than the status of regulations framed by way of subordinate legislation 
under section 20 of the PTC Act.  Consequently, whatever rules were in place 
governing the employment of the appellants in the T & T Department, were adopted by 
reference in the statute itself and were made applicable to and binding on the 
Corporation. There can be little doubt that by virtue of section 9 ibid such rules acquired 
statutory status having been sanctified by the PTC Act itself. We can, therefore, 
conclude without difficulty that the rules of employment which were applicable to the 
appellants during their service with the Corporation were statutory rules. 
10. 
Thereafter in 1995 and 1996, after a series of Ordinances, the Pakistan 
Telecommunication Corporation (Reorganization) Act 1996 (the “Reorganization Act”) 
was passed. These statutes split up the Corporation into five distinct entities. The 
biggest of these five entities in terms of assets and employees was PTCL. It may be 
noted, at this stage, that PTCL was incorporated as a limited liability company under the 
Companies Ordinance, 1984 as per mandate in section 34 of the Re-organization Act.  
The other four entities were crated by the Reorganization Act itself.  These were, first, 
the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (the ‘Authority’) under Section 3, second, 
the Pakistan Telecommunication Employees Trust (the ‘Trust’) under Section 44, third, 
the National Telecommunication Corporation (the ‘NTC’) under Section 41 and fourth, 
the Frequency Allocation Board (the ‘Board’) under Section 42 of the Reorganization 
Act.  As the title and other provisions of the Reorganization Act indicate, its object was 
to ‘reorganize’ the Corporation.  This law was also meant to ensure the transition of the 
Corporation and its affairs to the five entities referred to above and to provide statutory 
cover for such transition. 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
6
11. 
We have already observed that between 1991 and 1996 when the Corporation 
was in existence, the rules of employment applicable to the appellants were statutory 
rules having been given such status by virtue of section 9 of the PTC Act.  What now 
needs to be seen is the effect of the Reorganization Act on the rules of employment 
applicable to the appellants and to determine if such rules underwent any change so as 
to relegate their status to that of non-statutory rules.  However, before making this 
determination it is necessary to take note of certain provisions of the Reorganization 
Act which have relevance to the issue at hand.  The first such provision relates to 
“Telecommunication Employees”.  This term has been defined in Section 2 (t) of the 
Reorganization Act.  It means such employees “of the Corporation who are transferred 
to the employment of the Company under this Act, other than those to whom sub-section 
(3) of Section 36 applies”.  Section 36 (3) relates only to those persons who were 
employees of the Corporation but subsequent to be Reorganization Act have been 
transferred to or employed by the Authority, the NTC, the Trust or the Board.  Since the 
present appellants were neither transferred to nor employed by any of these four 
entities, Section 36 (3) has no application to them. 
12. 
Reverting back to the provisions of Section 2(t) of the Reorganization Act the 
appellants would fall within the definition of “Telecommunication Employees” if 
transferred to PTCL under the Reorganization Act.  Section 35 of the Reorganization 
Act is most relevant for the purpose of determining the status of the appellants in terms 
of the said Act and also for the purpose of ascertaining if the rules of their employment 
can be categorized as statutory rules.  In view of their relevance to the controversy 
before us, sub-sections (1) and (2) of section 35 ibid are reproduced as under: - 
“35. 
Vesting of the rights, property and liabilities of the Corporation. 
– (1) The Federal Government may, by orders, direct that all or any 
property, rights and liabilities to which the Corporation was entitled or 
subject to immediately before such orders, and identified therein, shall, on 
such terms and conditions as the Federal Government may determine, 
vest in – 
(a) 
the Company; 
(b) 
the National Telecommunication Corporation (NTC); 
(c) 
the Authority; 
(d) 
the Trust; or 
(e) 
the Board through the Federal Government, 
and become the property, rights and liabilities of the respective entity. 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
7
(2) 
An order issued under sub-section (1) shall specify the employees 
of the Corporation who shall, as from the effective date of the order, be 
transferred to and become employees of the entity referred to in the order: 
  
Provided that such order shall not vary the terms and conditions 
of service of such employees to their disadvantage. 
(the underlining is ours). 
 
13.  
Mr. Abdul Rahim Bhatti, learned ASC submitted that there was no order issued 
under section 35 supra whereby any employees of the Corporation were transferred to 
or became employees of PTCL.  Learned counsel for PTCL, however, controverted the 
submission and was, therefore, asked to refer to the order, if any, issued under sub-
section (2) whereby the appellants became employees of PTCL.  He produced before us 
S.R.O.115(I)/96 dated 7.2.1996 and contended that the order contained in this 
Notification (the ‘Vesting Order’) was an order under Section 35 (2) of the 
Reorganization Act.  Although the said Notification was issued, under the Pakistan 
Telecommunication (Reorganization) Ordinance 1995, prior to the passing of the 
Reorganization Act, it has been expressly saved. Under section 59(2) of the 
Reorganization Act the Vesting Order was to remain in force “unless amended, varied, 
withdrawn, rescinded or annulled by a person or authority competent to do so under 
this [Reorganization] Act”.  It is not disputed that the Vesting Order has not been 
amended, varied, etc. and, therefore, remains in full force and effect.  Certain relevant 
extracts from the Vesting Order will facilitate our understanding of the scheme whereby 
the Corporation was restructured and reorganized into the five entities referred to above.  
The Vesting Order, to the extent relevant for our purposes stipulates as under: - 
“ 
 
       Islamabad , the 7th Feb.1996. 
ORDER 
S.R.O.115(I)/96 –  In exercise of the powers conferred by section 35 of the 
Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Ordinance, 1995 (CXV of 
1995), hereinafter referred to as “the said Ordinance” and in 
supersession of its Order No.S.R.O.1(1)/96, dated the 1st January, 1996, 
the Federal Government is pleased to direct that- 
(1) 
all properties, rights and liabilities (including business 
undertaking, goodwill, contingent rights and liabilities) to 
which 
the 
Pakistan 
Telecommunication 
Corporation 
(Corporation) was entitled and subject to, after the transfer of 
the properties, rights and liabilities to the Authority, National 
Telecommunication 
Corporation, 
Pakistan 
Telecommunication 
Employees 
Trust 
and 
Frequency 
Allocation Board through the Federal Government, on the 
31st of December, 1995, with effect from the 1st January, 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
8
1996, vest in and has [sic] become the properties, rights and 
liabilities of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company 
Limited (Company); 
(2) 
all 
employees 
of 
the 
Pakistan 
Telecommunication 
Corporation, after the transfer of the employees to the 
Pakistan 
Telecommunication 
Authority, 
National 
Telecommunication Corporation and Frequency Allocation 
Board of the Federal Government, on the 31st of December, 
1995, stood transferred to and has [sic] become the 
employees of the Pakistan Telecommunication Company 
Limited with effect from the 1st January, 1996”. 
 
It is evident from the above extract that all properties, rights and liabilities of the 
Corporation were vested in PTCL with effect from 1.1.1996 except for those transferred 
to the remaining four entities. Likewise, all employees of the Corporation other than 
those transferred to the other four entities referred to above, stood transferred and 
became employees of PTCL with effect from 1.1.1996 by virtue of the Vesting Order.   
14. 
We may now consider the effect of this transfer of the appellants to PTCL 
alongwith the assets and liabilities of the Corporation and the implications of such 
transfer on the nature of the rules of employment applicable to the appellants from the 
date (i.e. 1.1.1996) they became employees of PTCL.  The proviso to Section 35 (2) of 
the Reorganization Act provides a clear answer to this controversy.  It specifies that 
even after the transfer of the appellants to PTCL their terms and conditions of service 
which existed on 1-1-1996, would be the base and bare minimum in matters of their 
employment with PTCL. These terms and conditions were imposed on PTCL by the 
Reorganization Act, as a legal obligation and the Vesting Order was issued by the 
Federal Government “in exercise of powers conferred by section 35” of the 
Reorganization Act. The Federal Government, it will be noted, had been granted limited 
powers only; the constraint on it was that the terms and conditions of service of 
employees of the Corporation could not be varied to their disadvantage. PTCL, as the 
recipient of the properties and rights of the Corporation, also assumed the liabilities of 
the Corporation. Such liabilities necessarily included the liabilities owed to the 
employees, arising from the terms and conditions of their service as these could not be 
varied to their disadvantage. 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
9
15. 
Thus it is evident that at the moment of transition when the appellants ceased to 
remain the employees of the Corporation and became the employees of PTCL, they 
admittedly were governed by rules and regulations which had been protected by the 
PTC Act.  The said rules, therefore, by definition were statutory rules as has been 
discussed above.  PTCL, no doubt, could make beneficial rules in relation to its 
employees which were in addition to the rules of employment prevailing on 1-1-96.  
However, by virtue of the aforesaid proviso, PTCL had no power to “vary the terms 
and conditions of service” of its employees who were previously employees of the 
Corporation, “to their disadvantage”.  Even the Federal Government was debarred by 
virtue of section 35 ibid, from varying such terms and conditions of service to the 
disadvantage of the appellants. 
16. 
An easy and uncomplicated test becomes available to us to help determine the 
status of the employment rules governing the appellants.  If the current employer of the 
appellants viz. PTCL is constrained by legislation such as section 35 (2) of the 
Reorganization Act, and as a consequence, cannot vary the existing rules to the 
disadvantage of the appellants, because of such legislation, it must follow that such law 
has the effect of saving the rules which existed when the appellants became employees 
of PTCL.  Such existing rules, having been protected by section 35 (2), therefore, can 
only be categorized as statutory rules. 
17. 
Section 36 of the Reorganization Act also has relevance in determining the 
controversy which arises in these appeals. Sub section (2) of Section 36 gives protection 
to the terms and conditions of service of employees such as the appellants who stood 
transferred from the Corporation to PTCL on 1-1-96. Their terms and conditions of 
service cannot be altered adversely by PTCL “except in accordance with the laws of 
Pakistan or with the consent of the transferred employees and the award of appropriate 
compensation”. When this legal provision is read together with section 35, it becomes 
abundantly clear that by operation of the Reorganization Act, the terms and conditions 
of service of the appellants as on 1-1-96 stood conferred on them as vested rights under 
the said law. 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
10
18. 
Learned counsel for PTCL stressed certain provisions of section 36 of the 
Reorganization Act to contend that the employment rules applicable to the appellants 
could not be treated as statutory rules. In particular, he adverted to the proviso to section 
36 (1) ibid wherein it has been stipulated “that the Federal Government shall guarantee 
the existing terms and conditions of the service and rights including pensionary 
benefits” of employees who stood transferred from the Corporation to PTCL. It was 
submitted on behalf of PTCL that there would be no occasion or necessity for the 
Federal Government to provide a guarantee as aforesaid, if PTCL stood saddled with 
the liability of pensionary benefits and the terms and conditions of service of employees 
transferred to it. From this provision, learned counsel wanted us to infer by implication 
that PTCL was left free to deal with its employees regardless of any constraints 
specified in sections 35 and 36 of the Reorganization Act.  This contention has no force. 
The guarantee does not change the nature or status of PTCL as the principal obligant 
required under law to adhere to the protected terms and conditions of service of 
transferred employees such as the appellants. The only effect of the guarantee is to 
ensure that in the event PTCL becomes incapable of fulfilling its obligations as to 
pensionary or other benefits, for reasons such as bankruptcy etc., the employees do not 
suffer from such event of default. It is important, at this point, to draw a distinction 
between employees who stood transferred to PTCL by virtue of section 35 ibid and the 
Vesting Order, on the one hand and those employees, who joined PTCL after 1-1-1996. 
The protection under the Federal Government guarantee would not be available to the 
latter category whose terms and conditions of service would be contractual in nature 
and would, therefore, be non-statutory. 
19. 
Since the decision in the case of Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam and others 
supra the employees of various government controlled organizations have found 
themselves faced with uncertainty as to the forum having jurisdiction to redress their 
employment related grievances.   Such uncertainty, as in these appeals, arises on the 
basis of whether or not their terms and conditions of service are statutory. We may, 
however, venture to state that this uncertainty, in many cases, stems from a lack of  
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
11
in-depth analysis of precedent rather than confusion or lack of clarity in a previously 
decided case. The present appeals highlight the validity of this observation.  It is likely 
the High Court did not receive adequate assistance at the Bar and, therefore, proceeded 
to rely on the case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman supra, to arrive at the conclusion that the 
terms and conditions of service governing the appellants, as a matter of law, were non-
statutory. The High Court, we say with respect, fell in error as it did not consider the 
circumstances noted above or the principle of law enunciated by this Court in terms of 
Article 189 of the Constitution. The case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman, in fact, supports the 
plea of the appellants that the circumstance considered above ought to have been 
examined alongwith the merits of each Constitution Petition because such examination 
was essential for the purpose of determining if the respective grievances of the three 
appellants were based on statutory rules.  
20.  
The case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman supra provides guidance in respect of the 
consequences which would follow where statutory rules of service are violated by any 
employer.  To this extent the said case does constitute precedent even in these cases.  
Thus, the High Court rightly relied on the observations made by this Court “that if any 
adverse action has been taken by the employer in violation of the statutory rules, only 
then such action should be amenable to writ jurisdiction”.  The difficulty in this case 
has only arisen because the reasoning in the case of Tanweer-ur-Rehman in respect of 
regulations framed by the Board of Directors of PIAC has been applied in these cases 
even though the same is not attracted.   
21. 
We can now consider the case titled Ejaz Ali Bughti vs P.T.C.L and others (2008 
PSC 1224).  Great stress was placed on this judgment by the learned counsel 
representing PTCL who contended that it was authority for the proposition that the 
employees of PTCL were not governed by statutory rules of service.  This submission, 
of course, is not correct as it is based on a cursory and superficial reading of the 
decision in the case.  It will be noted from the concluding paragraph of the cited 
judgment that the conclusion therein was based on a concession made by learned 
counsel representing the petitioner Ejaz Ali Bughti.  It was noted by the Court that he 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
12
conceded that PTCL did not have statutory rules providing for the terms and conditions 
of service of employees.  No argument was advanced in line with the above noted 
submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant Nasir Uddin Ghori which 
submissions were adopted by the other two appellants who were heard in person.  It is 
well settled that a concession made by a party binds such party alone. It cannot preclude 
others such as the present appellants, to argue their case on its merits. 
22. 
We can now take up the individual appeals for consideration in the light of the 
foregoing discussion. 
23. 
Civil Appeal No.241/2011, titled Nasir Uddin Ghori v. Federation of 
Pakistan and others. 
 
  
It is important to take into account firstly that the appellant Nasir Uddin Ghori 
had obtained a judgment dated 28.5.2004 from the Service Tribunal in the following 
terms:- 
“In view of the above facts the appeal is allowed and the Appellant will 
be deemed to have been promoted as ADE (B-17) with effect from the 
date of qualifying degree B-Tech (Hons). The seniority list of ADE 
should be corrected. Appellants’ subsequent promotion will be governed 
as per rules.” 
 
PTCL had filed an appeal (CA 331/2005) by leave of the Court to challenge the 
aforesaid judgment of the Service Tribunal. This appeal was dismissed on 25.6.2009 by 
means of the following order:- 
“Hafiz S.A. Rehman, learned Sr. ASC is present on behalf of appellants 
and does not press these appeals as, according to him, in view of the law 
laid down by this Court in case titled Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam v. 
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 602) and Muhammad Idrees v. 
Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 2007 SC 681), these 
appeals stand abated. 
These appeals are accordingly dismissed being not pressed. 
 
24. 
It is, therefore, clear from the above referred proceedings before the Service 
Tribunal and before this Court, that the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 
28.5.2004 had attained finality and had conclusively determined the rights and 
obligations of the parties inter se. It is only because the judgment of the Service 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
13
Tribunal had not been implemented by PTCL that Mr. Ghori was compelled to file 
Constitution Petition No. D-827/2007 in the High Court. Among other reliefs the 
appellant had sought enforcement of the judgment of the Service Tribunal and had 
prayed for a declaration that the “respondent is under obligation to implement the 
same”. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant now presses his 
right to the fruits of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 28.5.2004. The other 
reliefs mentioned in Constitution Petition No.827/2007 were not pressed by him. We 
are not in any doubt that for the reasons discussed above, the appellant Nasir Uddin 
Ghori was entitled to implementation of the judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 
28.5.2004. This appeal (CA 241/2011) is, therefore, allowed. The judgment of the High 
Court in Constitution Petition No.827/2007 is set aside and the respondent PTCL is 
directed to implement the aforesaid judgment of the Service Tribunal dated 28.5.2004 
within thirty days from today. 
25. 
Civil Appeal No.239/2011, titled Masood Ahmed Bhatti v. Federation of 
Pakistan and others. 
 
 
The appellant Masood Ahmed Bhatti had approached the High Court through 
Constitution Petition No.D-520/2009. It was, inter alia, alleged by him that termination 
of his services w.e.f. 10.3.2008 was invalid and also that PTCL had unilaterally and 
without his concurrence imposed a Voluntary Separation Scheme on him. Since this 
aspect of the appellant’s case and the other merits of his Constitution Petition were not 
discussed or adjudicated upon by the High Court, the impugned judgment to the extent 
it relates to the appellant, is set aside. The said petition shall be deemed pending before 
the High Court and shall be decided afresh in the light of this judgment. 
26. 
Civil Appeal No.240/2011, titled Syed Muhammad Dilavez v. Federation of 
Pakistan and others. 
 
 
The appellant Syed Muhammad Dilavez had also sought relief from the High 
Court by filing Constitution Petition No.D-2414/2007 alongwith others. The contents of 
the Constitution Petition and the relief sought by Mr. Dilavez, prima facie, indicate that 
his grievance was against violation by PTCL of his legally protected terms and 
conditions of service. The appellant, who appeared before us in person, requested that 
CAs 239 to 241/2011 
14
his rights be determined by this Court because he had been in Court seeking redress 
since 2007. We are afraid this request cannot be acceded to because the merits of the 
appellant’s Constitution Petition have, in the first instance, to be decided by the High 
Court after affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant and to PTCL. Since the 
merits of the appellant’s Constitution Petition were neither discussed nor adjudicated by 
the High Court, the impugned judgment to the extent it relates to the appellant, is set 
aside. The said petition shall be deemed pending before the High Court and shall be 
decided afresh in the light of this judgment.        
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
Islamabad, the 
A.Rehman. 
 
Announced on 7th October, 2011. 
 
 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING.                                                                                                        
