IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
 
MR. JUSTICE TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI 
 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
 
MR. JUSTICE MUHAMMAD ATHER SAEED 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.679-L OF 2012 
(Against the order dated 9.8.2012 of the 
Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in Writ 
Petition No. 9871 of 2012) 
 
 
Rana Abdul Hameed Talib 
…Appellant 
VERSUS 
Additional District Judge, Lahore and others 
…Respondents 
… 
For the appellant:  
 
Mr. Qamar Zaman Qureshi, ASC 
 
For respondent No.3: 
 
Mr. Iqbal Mehmood Awan, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Faiz-ur-Rehman, AOR 
 
Date of hearing: 
 
 
9.1.2013. 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.- The primary proposition(s) 
involved in this appeal, with the leave of the Court dated 20.12.2012, 
is about the interpretation and the effect of non-compliance of the 
provisions of Section 9(b), independently, and also when read in the 
context of Section 8 of the Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009 (the Act, 
2009). In relation to the above proposition, the facts of the case are:- 
that on 18.1.2010, respondent No.3 brought an ejectment petition 
against the appellant under Act, 2009, on the ground(s), inter alia, of 
default in the payment of the rent due. The property in dispute is a 
room bearing No.21 Bashir Mansion, Turner Road, Lahore. The 
appellant filed an application for leave to contest the ejectment petition, 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 2 :-
which was dismissed and as a consequence thereof, eviction order 
dated 28.1.2011 was passed against him; appellant’s appeal was 
disallowed on 20.3.2012, and same is the fate of his constitution 
petition, which has been discarded by the learned High Court vide 
impugned judgment dated 9.8.2012. 
2. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellant has argued, that 
according to Section 8 of the Act, 2009, an existing tenancy has to be 
brought inconformity with the provisions of the Act and if the needful 
is not done, the Rent Tribunal, as per the mandate of Section 9, ibid 
shall not “entertain” any application either filed by the landlord or the 
tenant as the case may be, unless he (petitioner before the Tribunal) 
deposits a fine envisaged by the section and this has to be done even 
before an application is moved or at least the Rent Tribunal should 
pass an order to that effect, before issuing a notice to the other side; as 
the respondent-landlord of the case has failed to follow the mandatory 
provisions of law, therefore, his ejectment petition was not 
entertainable, and thus the Rent Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass 
the eviction order against the appellant. It is further argued that 
respondent No.3, during the pendency of the appeal filed by the 
appellant, before the District Judge, was directed by the said Court to 
deposit 10% of penalty in terms of Section 9 of the Act, 2009, but this 
was not permissible under the law and the inherent defect in the very 
‘entertaining’ of the application could not be allowed to be cured. In 
support of his contention that the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, 
2009 are mandatory and that the eviction application could not be 
entertained by the Rent Tribunal, reliance has been placed by the 
appellant’s learned counsel upon a judgment dated 25.5.2011 
rendered by this Court in Civil Petition No. 349-L of 2010 (Allah Ditta 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 3 :-
Sajid Vs. Muhammad Saleem Qureshi & others). It is further 
submitted that the property in issue vide notification dated 18.1.2010 
was taken over by Auqaf Department in terms of Section 7 of the West 
Pakistan Auqaf Ordinance, 1979 and, therefore, the relationship of 
tenancy between the parties has ceased to exist; and it is for this 
reason that the appellant had rightly denied the relationship of 
tenancy between the parties. This aspect of the matter has been totally 
ignored by all the forums below. 
3. 
 
On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.3 
states that the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, 2009 have to be read 
in conjunction and consonance with the provisions of Section 8, which 
provides that the existing tenancies should be brought inconformity 
with the mandate of the Act within a period of two years, which is the 
grace period for doing the needful. At the time when the eviction 
petition was filed by the respondent i.e. 18.1.2010, the two years 
period had not expired as yet, as the Act, 2009 was enforced on 17th 
November, 2009, thus, when such period matured, while the appeal 
was pending, the learned Court, was well within its jurisdiction as per 
the spirit of the Act, 2009, to issue the direction to the 
respondent/landlord for the deposit of fine under Section 9, which was 
duly paid (deposited) on or before 16.11.2011 and, therefore, 
respondent No.3 cannot be held to have violated the law. Meeting the 
argument of the appellant’s learned counsel about the Auqaf 
Department’s notification, it is submitted that the notification referred 
to above by the appellant’s counsel was challenged by respondent No.3 
vide Writ Petition No. 1474 of 2008, in which the operation of the same 
has been suspended. Moreover, admittedly the appellant was inducted 
into possession of the property by the said respondent and, therefore, 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 4 :-
the appellant is estopped under Article 116 of the Qanoon-e-Shahadat 
Order, 1894 to deny the relationship. 
4. 
 
 Heard. For the purposes of resolving the key proposition 
and the ancillary question(s) which may come up for answer(s) in the 
matter, I find it expedient to briefly touch upon the meaning and 
concept of a lease/tenancy; how it is created, and in reference thereto, 
the relevant law in force from time to time and the development thereof; 
in other words the legislative history and the object of the law on the 
subject. In this context there can be no two opinion that the 
lease/tenancy has its genesis (note: except the statutory tenancies) in a 
contract between two parties, the lessor and the lessee. According to 
Black’s Law Dictionary (Eight Edition) lease is defined as: “a contract 
by which a rightful possessor of real property conveys the right to use 
and occupy the property in exchange for consideration, for a fixed period, 
or for a period terminable at will”. Whereas, the tenancy means “the 
possession or occupancy of land under a lease; a leasehold interest in 
real estate”. In our law, as per Section 105 of the Transfer of Property 
Act, 1882 (TP Act, 2009), the lease is defined as:- 
“105. Lease defined.- A lease of immovable property 
is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property, made 
for a certain time, express or implied, or in perpetuity, 
in consideration of a price paid or promised, or of 
money, a share of crops, service or any other thing or 
value, to be rendered periodically or on specified 
occasions to the transferor by the transferee, who 
accepts the transfer on such terms.” 
 
Section 107 of the Act ibid stipulates, as to how a lease is made, and 
reads as:- 
“107. Leases how made.- A lease of immovable 
property from year to year, or for any term exceeding 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 5 :-
one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only 
by a registered instrument. 
 
All other leases of immovable property may be 
made either by a registered instrument or by oral 
agreement accompanied by delivery of possession. 
 
Where a lease of immovable property is made 
by a registered instrument, such instrument or, where 
there are more instruments, than one each such 
instrument shall be executed by both the lessor and 
the lessee: 
 
Provided ……………………………”. 
 
Section 108 of the Act (supra) provides for the rights and liabilities of the 
lessor and a lessee and certain other sections stipulates, the effect of 
the expiry of the lease period, such as the concept of holding over and 
the tenancy at sufferance. Besides the noted enactment, according to 
Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 “leases of immovable property, 
from year to year, or for any term exceeding one year reserving a yearly 
rent;” 
shall 
be 
affected 
through 
compulsorily 
registrable 
document/instrument and if not so done, as per Section 46 of the Act, 
it (such document) shall not operate to create, etc. any right, title or 
interest, whether vested or contingent to or in the immovable property, 
whether in present or in future. Obviously meaning, that without a 
registered instrument, no valid lease beyond the period of one year 
shall validly be effected. It may be of some interest to mention here, 
that in the ordinary and common parlance, the terms lease and 
tenancy, more or less are taken to be analogous, however, if any 
distinction for the above two concepts/terms is required/expedient, 
reference can be made to Ramzan and 5 others vs. Member, Board 
of Revenue and others (1991 CLC 2125); besides, the distinction is 
also aptly elucidated in a book titled Legal Terms and Phrases (2006 
Edition) by M. Ilyas as under:- 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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“The word, ‘lease’ would employ a contract of 
occupation of land for fixed term, whereas the word 
‘tenancy’ implies that occupier would hold land till 
same was terminated expressly or by implication.” 
  
5. 
 
Be that as it may, prior to 1959, the leases/tenancies 
subject to the aforestated laws were regulated by the terms and 
conditions of the contract between the lessor and the lessee. And the 
issues in relation thereto arising between the landlord(s) and tenant(s) 
were sorted out by the civil courts of plenary jurisdiction or the 
revenue courts as the case may be. However, vide West Pakistan 
Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance, 1959) enforced 
on 23.2.1959, a vital and drastic change was brought into the law on 
the subject of tenancies, inasmuch as, certain urban properties were 
taken out of the preview of the general law and also the jurisdiction of 
the civil courts. The tenancies existing at that time, either contractual 
or statutory, as also the future tenancies/leases coming into being 
thereafter, were to be governed and regulated in material aspects by 
the provisions of the 1959 Ordinance as envisaged thereby. The 
specific 
contractual 
terms 
and 
conditions 
of 
the 
existing 
tenancies/leases were almost rendered nugatory and redundant; 
neither the rent could be increased as per the contract between the 
parties, nor the landlord could seek the eviction of the tenant in terms 
of the stipulations of the lease document. A special forum of Rent 
Controller was established to determine the issues between the 
landlord(s) and the tenant(s), strictly as provided by the said 
Ordinance. However, it may be pertinent to mention here, that unlike 
the Act neither the lease/tenancy was defined nor a mechanism was 
provided in the Ordinance as to how the future tenancies/leases shall 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 7 :-
be created or constituted. It was quite obscure and unclear, if the 
provisions of the TP Act and the Registration Act shall have due and 
efficacious 
application 
in 
relation 
to 
the 
creation 
of 
future 
tenancies/leases after the enforcement of 1959 Ordinance. And even if, 
the two noted laws were not strictly adhered to, whether it shall make 
any difference; this was so because the eviction of a tenant, which 
emerged to be the main area of dispute (litigation) inter se, the landlord 
and tenant (under the Ordinance ibid) was no more (in many ways) regulated 
by the tenancy instrument(s) duly executed between them or TP Act, 
but the provisions of the said Ordinance. This was so because Section 
13 of the (supra Ordinance, 1959) categorically mandated that “a tenant in 
possession of a building or rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of a 
decree passed before or after the commencement of this Ordinance, or otherwise, and 
whether before or after the termination of the tenancy, except in accordance with the 
provisions of this section”. It may be stated here with emphasis, that for 
the eviction of a tenant on the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the 
Ordinance, 1959, the expiry of the period of tenancy as agreed upon between 
the parties was absolutely irrelevant (emphasis supplied), for example, if the 
period of lease/tenancy either existing or future, (as agreed upon between 
the parties) was for a term of three years and such period has expired, 
the landlord yet was precluded to seek the eviction of his tenant, on 
account of the expiry of the lease period, rather was only entitled to 
ask for the eviction on the grounds specifically mentioned in the 
Section 13 ibid (note:- if however the tenancy was for a fixed period the landlord under 
the said section could not ask for eviction on account of his personal need, till the expiry of 
that period, which looks quite anomalous). 
6. 
 
This law remained in vogue for a considerable period and 
had its own pros and cons, which I do not feel are relevant to be 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 8 :-
specified and discussed here. But it seems expedient to highlight (even 
at the cost of repetition), that no particular mechanism/procedure, or 
form for entering into a lease and was prescribed by the Ordinance 
1959, and moreover Section 13 thereof, had an overriding effect in 
many ways over the laws in force at that time, therefore the above 
provisions of TP Act, the Registration Act, and the contractual 
stipulations between the parties, as mentioned earlier had practically 
lost its efficacy. In the said scenario, as also to avoid the expenses of 
requisite stamp duty(ies) and registration fee(s) etc. the tenancies 
through unregistered instrument and oral in nature became rampant, 
which as experienced subsequently, gave rise to numerous vice(s), and 
depravity. The foremost being usual and casual denial of the 
relationship(s) of tenancy by the tenant on number of scores. In this 
context, the setting up of the defence of adverse title; and being put 
into the possession of the property on account of some alleged 
agreement(s) to sell or by some third party etc. was (were) a common 
phenomena. Besides, the issues, about the rate of rent; the nature of 
the property, as also the use for which it was rented out, the subletting, 
got more and more complexed. There was considerable mess and 
confusion(s) and grey areas in the field. Above all, it was an eminent 
public perception that Ordinance, 1959 is a law, which is too pro the 
tenants. 
7.  
 
It seems that in order to eliminate the confusions and to 
sort out the vice(s) which had emerged and surfaced in relation to the 
disputes, inter se the landlord and tenants under the Ordinance, and 
with a view to meet the present day exigencies and to draw a balance 
for regulating the relationship inter se the landlord(s) and the tenant(s), 
the legislature thought expedient to enforce a new law, which should 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 9 :-
be self serving and comprehensive in nature, on the subject. Thus, 
firstly an Ordinance was enforced in 2007, followed by an Act, titled 
Punjab Rented Premises Act, 2009. In this law(s) inter alia in order to 
exclude, rather virtually preclude the creation of leases/tenancies 
orally or through unregistered instruments, which earlier in practical 
terms was not impermissible, and such a situation had added, to the 
flummox and abundance to the rent litigation, and the prolongation 
thereof, had augmented to the miseries of the litigant, that Section 5 
seems to have been introduced, which provides a mechanism, as to 
how a tenancy for the purpose of the Act ibid (2009) shall be created; 
the section reads as under:- 
“5.    Agreement between landlord and tenant.– (1) 
A landlord shall not let out a premises to a tenant 
except by a tenancy agreement. 
 
(2) 
A landlord shall present the tenancy 
agreement before the Rent Registrar. 
 
(3) 
The Rent Registrar shall enter the 
particulars of the tenancy in a register, affix his 
official seal on the tenancy agreement, retain a copy 
thereof and return the original tenancy agreement to 
the landlord. 
 
(4) 
The entry of particulars of the tenancy 
shall not absolve the landlord or the tenant of their 
liability to register the tenancy agreement under the 
law relating to registration of documents. 
 
(5) 
A tenancy agreement entered in the 
office of a Rent Registrar or a certified copy thereof 
shall be a proof of the relationship of landlord and 
tenant. 
 
(6) 
Any agreement which may be executed 
between the landlord and the tenant in respect of the 
premises shall be presented before the Rent Registrar 
in the same manner as provided in sub-section (2).” 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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It is expedient to mention here, that in all the erstwhile laws on the 
subject, such a stipulation was never the requirement of the law. 
Anyhow, it is clear from the language of sub-section (1) that a specific 
command has been given to the landlord that he “shall not let out a 
premises to a tenant except by a tenancy agreement”, and as per definition 
clause section 2(m) “a tenancy agreement means an agreement in writing by 
which landlords let out a premises to a tenant” meaning thereby, that the 
very creation and the subsistence of a valid tenancy has been made 
subservient and subject to the execution of a written tenancy 
agreement, which agreement the landlord is obliged to present before 
the Rent Registrar for the registration [see Section 5(2)]. The above 
mandate of law, is fortified by the factum that the certified copy of the 
tenancy agreement has been made the proof of relationship of tenancy 
[see Section 5(5)]. In my opinion, through this mechanism an effort has 
been made, to do away with the possibility of any grey areas and the 
confusions in regard to the creation of tenancies and the issues related 
and having nexus thereto. 
8.  
 
Further, in line with the above stated object and with a 
view to ensure precision, leaving wee room for uncertainty, even in 
regard to the contents of such tenancy agreement(s), Section 6 of the 
Act, 2009 stipulates as under:- 
“6. 
Contents 
of 
tenancy 
agreement.–(1) 
A 
tenancy agreement shall contain, as far as possible, 
the following: 
(a) 
particulars of the landlord and the 
tenant; 
 
(b) 
description of the premises; 
 
(c) 
period of the tenancy; 
(d) 
rate of rent, rate of enhancement, due 
date and mode of payment of rent; 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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(e) 
particulars of the bank account of the 
landlord, if the rent is to be paid through 
a bank; 
(f) 
the purpose for which the premises is let 
out; and 
(g) 
amount of advance rent, security or 
pagri, if any. 
 
(2) 
If the tenure of the tenancy is fixed but a rent is fixed only 
for a part of the tenure, in the absence of any stipulation to the 
contrary in the tenancy agreement, the rent shall be deemed to 
remain the same for the whole of the tenure.” 
 
Be that as it may, pursuant to the resolution of the proposition 
herein involved (note: mentioned in the opening para of the judgment), I would also 
like to add here that both, Ordinance, 2007 and Act, 2009 were given 
immediate effect in the words “it shall come into force at once” and on 
the enforcement of the latter enactment, as per Section 35 of the Act, 
2009 (Section 35 of the Ordinance, 2007 also), the Punjab Urban Rent 
Restriction Ordinance was repealed, besides according to Section 4 of 
the Act, 2009, this law has an overriding effect on any law for the time 
being in force. However, all the matters which were pending 
adjudication under the repealed law were preserved and saved to be 
decided according to the earlier law, but (such matters) were transferred 
to the forum i.e. Rent Tribunal, constituted under the new enactment 
(note:- see section 35). From the object clause of these two new legislations 
and from the parts/sections thereof (note: which have been mentioned above or shall 
be referred in the succeeding part of the judgment), it is clear that all the existing 
tenancies, may be oral or the one constituted vide registered or 
unregistered instruments, or for that matter, even statutory tenancies, 
in respect of which the disputes between the landlord and tenant had 
not yet even arisen, were also brought into the net and purview of Act, 
2009 and made amenable to the jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal with 
immediate effect (a specific forum created under the Act, 2009 for that purpose). In 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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other words the existing tenancies were not set apart or separated or 
saved to be dealt with under the repealed law, except the pending 
matters. Rather in relation to the disputes in respect of the existing 
tenancies arising in future, were to be adjudged under the provisions 
of Act, 2009, from the date of its enforcement. Resultantly in order to 
keep the conformity and parity with respect to the class/category of 
cases which might come before the Rent Tribunal in future, (obviously 
under Act 2009 now), and for the purposes of catering for and for securing 
the rights and liabilities of the landlord(s) and the tenant(s) qua 
previous (existing) tenancy(ies), Section 8 of Act, 2009 mandates as:- 
“8. 
Existing tenancy.- An existing landlord and 
tenant shall, as soon as possible but not later than 
two years from the date of coming into force of this Act, 
bring the tenancy in conformity with the provisions of 
this Act.” 
 
9. 
 
Thus, from the above stated legal position and the factual 
backdrop, it is my candid opinion that the nature, the interpretation 
and the effect of Section 9 in relation to the proposition in hand, (note: 
stated at the very outset of this judgment) has to be reckoned and made, keeping in 
view the aforementioned object(s) of the law, not only with respect to 
those tenancies coming in being in future, but also those existing (prior 
to the new law). And this has to be done on account of the collective 
reading of Sections 9, as also the other provisions of the Act mentioned 
earlier, including 5, 6, 7 ibid, and thus it should be determined and 
adjudged, as to whether the said Section (9) is a mandatory or a 
directory provision of law and the effect thereof.  
 
Before proceeding further with the matter, it may be expedient to 
state here, that Sections 12 and 13 of the Act, 2009, also have an 
important bearing and nexus to the proposition of this case, which 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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sections define and prescribe the statutory obligations of the landlord 
and a tenant towards each other, including, for example, the duty of 
the landlord to provide the copy of the tenancy agreement to the tenant 
[see section 12(1)(a)] and the obligation of the tenant to handover vacant 
possession of the premises to the landlord on the determination (expiry) 
of the tenancy [see section 13(1)(d)]. Besides, these two provisions also 
envisage the remedies available to both the above named (landlord and 
tenant), if there is any breach of such obligation on either of their parts. 
In this context reference can also be made to another important 
provision of the Act, 2009 i.e. Section 10, which provides that no 
agreement to sell etc., after the execution of the tenancy agreement 
(emphasis supplied) between the parties (landlord and tenant) shall affect, the 
relationship of tenancy, unless the tenancy is revoked by a written 
agreement entered before the sub-Registrar in accordance with the 
provisions of Section 5 of the Act, 2009. Moreover, in Section 15 of the 
Act, 2009 which prescribes the grounds for the eviction of a tenant, the 
expiry of period is now a new addition, which is one of the grounds of 
eviction, and this is in sharp contrast to the earlier law (1959 Ordinance), 
because the expiry of period of tenancy was irrelevant, as the express 
provisions of Section 13 thereof, provided that no tenant shall be 
evicted except as per the provisions of the said Section (13 ibid) and the 
expiry of tenancy period was not one of the grounds stipulated therein. 
10. 
 
Reverting to the proposition in hand, it seem expedient at 
this stage to reproduce Section 9 of the Act 2009, which reads as 
under:-  
“9. 
Effect of non-compliance.- If a tenancy does 
not conform to the provisions of this Act, the Rent 
Tribunal shall not entertain an application under this 
Act- 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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(a) 
on behalf of the tenant, unless he 
deposits a fine equivalent to five percent 
of the annual value of the rent of the 
premises in the Government treasury; 
and 
(b) 
on behalf of the landlord, unless he 
deposits a fine equivalent to ten percent 
of the annual value of the rent of the 
premises in the Government treasury.” 
 
Upon the unmistakable reading of the Section and especially 
when conjointly read with all other relevant provisions (referred to supra) it 
seems that all these are integrated provisions, having nexus to the very 
purpose of the Act as described above, and the palpable object of the 
law is to compel the parties to enter into a tenancy agreement within 
the purview and scope of the provisions of Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the 
Act, 2009 (read together). Therefore, a penalty has been provided by the 
law for the breach of the obligations, envisaged thereby, in that, where 
the tenancy agreement is not so entered and registered and a landlord 
or the tenant approach the Tribunal for the enforcement of his right(s) 
under the Act, 2009 he has to pay a fine. The definition (of fine) whereof 
is “a sum of money as a penalty by a Court of law” OR “a punishment to pay a 
sum of money for the breach of the law”. As it is a penalty and a 
punishment which has been imposed by the law itself, thus the 
Tribunal is left with no discretion to wave it off, exonerate or absolve a 
party coming before it, from such a fine. Anyhow for the present, the 
fundamental and critical moot points are:- (a) what is the point of time 
when such fine is to be imposed by the Rent Tribunal? (b) What is the 
effect if the fine is not deposited as imposed by the Rent Tribunal? (c) 
Whether the Rent Tribunal shall have no jurisdiction to receive the 
application at all, or it can so receive, but shall not proceed with the 
matter until that fine is paid? In my view the resolution of the last 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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proposition (proposition c) shall also make the answer to the first two 
propositions easier and clear; therefore I shall take upon this in 
priority. In this regard, the syntax of the expression “the Rent Tribunal 
shall not entertain an application under this Act” appearing in Section 9 ibid 
and specially the word Entertain is of immense significance. But as 
the word has not been defined under the Act 2009, therefore in order 
to comprehend the same, resort should be had to the dictionary 
meaning and the case law in which the word has been legally 
construed and elucidated.  
 
In Black’s Law Dictionary Eighth Edition entertain is defined to 
mean “To bear in mind or consider; esp., to give judicial consideration to 
<the court then entertained motions for continuance>. To amuse or 
please. To receive (a person) as a guest or provide hospitality to (a 
person). Parliamentary law. To recognize and state (a motion); to receive 
and take into consideration (emphasis supplied) <the chair will entertain the 
motion>”. Concise Oxford Dictionary Eleventh Edition, defines it as 
“Provide with amusement or enjoyment, show hospitality to. Give 
attention to or consideration to (emphasis supplied)”. In the Indian case law, 
the word has been construed, as in Nepram Kali Singh vs. Mutum 
Chana Singh and another (AIR 1955 Manipur 39):-   
 
“The word “entertain” means “to receive and take into 
consideration.” The rule thus clearly means that no 
Court would be competent to receive any plaint which 
is based on unregistered document after promulgation 
of the rules referred to above and so it becomes quite 
clear that jurisdiction to entertain suits on the basis of 
unregistered document was expressly taken away by 
these rules and in the present case there was no 
question of irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction.” 
 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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In 
M/s 
Lakshmiratan 
Engineering 
Works 
Ltd. 
vs. 
Asst. 
Commissioner (Judicial) I, Sales Tax, Kanpur Range Kanpur and 
another (AIR 1968 Supreme Court 488), it enunciated:- 
 
“The word ‘entertain’ is explained by a Divisional 
Bench of the Allahabad High Court as denoting the 
point of time at which an application to set aside the 
sale is heard by the court. The expression ‘entertain’, 
it is stated does not mean the same thing as the filing 
of the application or admission of the application by 
the Court. A similar view was again taken in Dhoom 
Chand Jain v. Chamanlal Gupta, AIR 1962 All 543 in 
which the learned Chief Justice Desai and Mr. Justice 
Dwivedi gave the same meaning to the expression 
‘entertain’. It is observed by Dwivedi, J. that the word 
‘entertain’ in its application bears the meaning 
‘admitting to consideration’.” 
This view has been followed in Hindusthan Commercial Bank Ltd. 
vs. Punnu Sahu (dead) through legal representatives (AIR 1970 
Supreme Court 1384):-  
 
“These decisions have interpreted the expression 
“entertain” as meaning ‘adjudicate upon’ or ‘proceed 
to consider on merits’. This view of the High Court has 
been 
accepted 
as 
correct 
by 
this 
Court 
in 
Lakshmiratan Engineering Works Ltd. v. Asst. Commr., 
Sales Tax, Kanpur, AIR 1968 SC 488. We are bound 
by that decision and as such we are unable to accept 
the contention of the appellant that Cl.(b) of the 
proviso did not apply to the present proceedings.”  
In our jurisdiction, in the case reported as Amjad Ali alias 
Amjadulla Talukdar and others vs. Asadulla and another (PLD 
1952 Dacca 301) it has been held:-  
“In my view the word “entertain” as used in section 
16 of the Act means “to receive and to take into 
consideration” and, therefore, it signifies initially the 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
-: 17 :-
duty of the Court, when proceedings is sought to be 
started before it.” 
 
In All Pakistan Newspapers Society and others v. Federation of 
Pakistan and others (PLD 2004 SC 600), the apex court has 
construed the expression “entertain” as under:- 
“Thus with reference to these rules in the instant case, 
expression ‘entertain’ would be defined in its ordinary 
dictionary meanings i.e. ‘to receive’. This definition seems to 
be more appropriate because the learned Single Judge in 
Chamber 
has 
directed 
the office 
‘to entertain 
the 
Constitution petition, register it and fix before the Bench’. 
Needless to observe that the Hon’ble Judges responsible to 
administer justice are fully aware about the relevant 
provisions of law on the subject and unless it is proved 
otherwise, it would be deemed that orders have been 
passed in accordance with law. Since Order XXV, Rule 7 of 
the Rules 1980 is mandatory in nature.” 
 
In Ch. Bashir Ahmad and 4 others vs. Province of Punjab through 
Collector, Sargodha and 4 others (1990 MLD 986), a Division 
Bench of the Lahore High Court while surveying the case law both 
from Indian and our jurisdiction held:- 
“16. 
It would be legitimate to accept the dictionary 
meaning of the word ‘entertain’ used by the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan in its judgment. Therefore, the 
expression ‘that no appeal can or should be 
entertained’ would signify that the appeal would not 
be given any judicial consideration by the Court.” 
In Pakistan Steel Peoples Workers’ Union vs. Registrar of Trade 
Unions, Karachi and 6 others (1992 PLC 715), it has been held:-   
 
“This contention is devoid of force as the expression 
“entertain” used in section 22 of the Ordinance means 
not merely filing of an application or initiation of 
proceedings but would mean ‘adjudicate upon’ or 
proceed to consider on merits. The word “entertain” 
does not mean the same thing as the filing of the 
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application or admission of the application by the 
Registrar of Trade Unions.” 
 
In Divisional Superintendent, P.W.R. Multan vs. Abdul Khaliq 
(1984 SCMR 1311), it has been held:- 
“The word “entertain” in legal parlance means 
‘adjudicate upon’ or ‘proceed to consider on merits’. 
This can only be achieved if the application is not hit 
by limitation for that closes the door for entry into the 
field of any adjudication or decision on merits.”  
 
 
From the above definitions and the survey of case law (supra) it 
is quite clear that the ministerial staff of the Rent Tribunal or for that 
matter the Tribunal itself, shall not refuse to receive an application of 
the landlord/tenant, as the case may be, when brought before it, 
rather on the first date when the matter comes before the Tribunal for 
the purposes of proceeding with it, the Tribunal shall ascertain from 
the applicant (of the case) if a validly executed and registered tenancy 
agreement (as per the provisions of Act 2009) is there and its availability on the 
record. If that not being so, whether the applicant has deposited the 
amount of fine as envisaged by Section 9 ibid. If both these aspects are 
missing, the Rent Tribunal shall halt further proceeding in the matter 
(emphasis supplied). No notice shall be issued to the respondent of the case 
and the applicant shall first be required and directed first to deposit 
the fine by specifying the exact amount as assessed by the Tribunal on 
the basis of the assertion of the applicant with regard to the rate of 
rent, within a specified period of time to be mentioned in the order. If 
the amount is deposited by the applicant/petitioner of the case within 
such period or the time further extended by the Tribunal, the matter 
shall be proceeded with further, otherwise the application shall be 
dismissed. However such dismissal shall not operate as a bar in the 
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way of the applicant to initiate the case afresh after depositing the fine 
or having a tenancy agreement (executed and registered according to law). It 
may be emphatically held that no proceeding to determine the case on 
merit shall be conducted and continued by the Court, until and unless 
the fine is deposited by the applicant. This is the mandate of the law 
and the provision ibid (Section 9) is mandatory, which has to be given 
effect in letter and spirit, keeping in view the purpose and the object of 
the Act 2009. This, obviously is the interpretation and the effect of 
Section 9, when considered independent of Section 8 of the Act 2009, 
and shall apply to the future tenancies (emphasis supplied). 
11. 
 
Now considering the effect of Section 9 with regard and 
reference to the existing tenancies in the context of Section 8, it may 
be mentioned that Ordinance, 2007/Act, 2009 have come into force on 
16th November, 2007 and 17th November, 2009 respectively (see section 
1(3) – it shall come into force at once). From the language of Section 8 (of these 
laws), it is clear that both the landlord/tenant are statutorily duty 
bound to bring the existing tenancies in conformity with the provisions 
of the said laws, the expression “An existing landlord and tenant shall” 
appearing in the section, leave no room for any other interpretation in 
this behalf. Furthermore, the expression of the section “as soon as 
possible” postulates that the needful should be done quickly, promptly 
and before long, therefore, for all intents and purposes, the date of the 
enforcement (coming into force) of these laws is the statutory starting point 
of time, for bringing the existing tenancy in conformity with the Act, 
2009; while in view of the expression “not later than two years” the law 
has prescribed the cutoff date for the purposes of doing the needful. 
However the question shall be; whether the applicant(s)/petitioner(s) 
having existing tenancy who shall approach the Rent Tribunal for the 
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enforcement of his rights under the provisions of the Act, 2009, is 
exempted from the fine for a period of two years; a moratorium of two 
years has been provided to him and/or the section shall remain 
dormant, inapplicable and inactive in such case (existing tenancy cases) for 
two years period and the landlord/tenant may approach the Rent 
Tribunal for the purposes of availing his rights and remedies under the 
Act 2009, but without paying the Fine? In order to resolve this 
proposition(s) we again have to revert to the object and spirit of the Act, 
2009 as elucidated above (Ordinance, 2007 as well) and also keep in view 
the various provisions of the Act, 2009, to which reference has earlier 
been made, specifically Sections 12, 13 and 15. Because under these 
provisions immediately on the coming into force of the laws, certain 
rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant are conferred 
upon and created, including the entitlement (right) of landlord to seek 
the eviction of the tenant (see Section 15) on the grounds, out of which 
some grounds are foundationally dependent on the tenancy agreement, 
such as for example (a) the period of tenancy has expired (b) the tenant 
has committed breach of a term or condition of tenancy agreement; 
thus as upon the enforcement of the Act, 2009 and according to 
Section 35 of the said Act, vide which only pending proceedings 
were/are saved to be adjudged under the Ordinance, 1959, whereas all 
the future disputes inter se the tenant and the landlord from the 
commencing day of the Act are to be determined as per the provisions 
of the Act, 2009, as according to Section 12, if the landlord fails to or 
neglects to fulfill his obligation mentioned in the section, the tenant 
has the right to approach the Rent Tribunal for the redressal of his 
grievance and the Tribunal has the power to pass orders in terms of 
Section 12(4). Likewise, if the tenant in terms of Section 13 does not 
Civil Appeal No. 679-L of 2012 
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fulfill and abide by his obligations, the landlord can take recourse to 
his legal remedy by approaching the Tribunal. Above all, as mentioned 
earlier the landlord can seek the eviction of the tenant on the ground 
enumerated in Section 15, and it is conspicuously noted that unlike 
Section 13 of the Ordinance, 1959, the personal requirement, 
reconstruction etc. are not now one of the grounds, available to the 
landlord for seeking eviction of the tenant. From the above it is vivid 
and undoubtedly clear that on the enforcement of the Act, 2009 all the 
rights and remedies shall be available to the tenant or the landlord as 
the case may be, and it shall be ludicrous to conceive and interpret 
although he can avail the remedies and enforce such rights and duties, 
but shall not be obliged to pay the fine in terms of Section 9 ibid 
because two years time is available to him. In my view Sections 9 and 
8, when both are read together alongwith the provisions of Act, 2009 
and the object and spirit of the said enactment, leads to no other 
reasonable construction of the two sections (while in interaction), that the 
landlord/tenant can bring the existing tenancies inconformity with the 
Act within two years period and in this regard Section 8 should be 
construed independent and insulated from Section 9 and applied 
only in time with the sole object of bringing the tenancy in line with the 
provisions of the said Act. But where the applicant/petitioner 
(landlord/tenant) want to avail the remedy of that law (Act 2009), and 
exercise his right to enforce the duties of the opposite side, he shall be 
obliged to pay the fine as mentioned in Section 9 ibid as in the case of 
future tenancies; notwithstanding it is an existing tenancy or 
otherwise. In this behalf no exemption or moratorium etc. on the basis 
of two years period mentioned in Section 8 shall be available to him. 
And if the fine is not paid by the petitioner/applicant the fallout and 
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the consequences of failure of the non-compliance as envisaged by 
Section 9 for the future tenancy cases, as has been prescribed above, 
shall be duly attracted to such petition(s)/application(s) as well. 
12. 
 
The question which may however arise is; what should be 
the fate of those petition(s)/application(s), in relation to existing 
tenancies, which have been entertained by the Rent Tribunal(s) under 
the impression that for two years period the provisions of Section 9 are 
not attracted, because of Section 8 ibid. And the matters are either 
pending before the Rent Tribunal where some (considerable) proceedings 
having already taken place, or the Rent Tribunal has finally decided 
the matter before it by overruling the objection of the respondent in the 
context of Section 9 and the further challenge thereto is pending in 
appeal or before the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction, or 
even before this Court. In my opinion all such Courts seized of the 
matter shall halt the proceedings and should direct the original 
petitioner/applicant of the case to first pay the fine as mandated by 
Section 9, by determining the exact amount payable and by fixing the 
period in which the needful should be done; and if the amount of fine 
is paid, the case/matter shall be proceeded and decided on merits, if 
however, the order is not complied and the needful is not done the 
original petition/application, of the landlord or the tenant as the case 
may be, shall be dismissed; with all the consequences to follow which 
have been highlighted above, while considering the effect of non-
compliance of the order passed by the Rent Tribunal where a direction 
is issued for the deposit of the fine. 
 
It may be pertinent to mention here, that where the order passed 
on the original side (petition/application) has attained finality and the 
execution proceedings are pending, the executing forum shall stop 
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further proceedings in the matter and shall first direct the execution 
petitioner to pay the fine in the mode and the manner provided above 
(note: by determining the amount and fixing the time) and till the time such fine is 
deposited/paid, the execution proceedings shall remain stayed. 
However, where the order is already executed, the rule of past and 
closed transaction shall be attracted and no order shall be annulled on 
the basis the fine envisaged by Section 9 ibid has not been paid. 
13. 
 
Before parting it may however be observed that on account 
of the various provisions of the Act mentioned above, as it is the 
primary obligation of the landlord to create the tenancy through a valid 
tenancy agreement inconformity with the Act, 2009, it is for this 
reason that a failure on his part entails double the amount i.e. ten 
percent of the fine as compared to five percent by the tenant. Anyhow, 
as in the present case the fine already stands paid by the respondent 
at the appellate stage, therefore, Section 9 supra shall in view of the 
reasoning given in this discourse shall not render the judgments of the 
forums below invalid on this account. 
14. 
 
In the light of the above, this appeal has no merits which 
is hereby dismissed. 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 21.6.2013 at Lahore 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING 
Waqas Naseer/* 
