In the Supreme Court of Pakistan 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
Present: 
Mr. Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali 
Mr. Justice Iqbal Hameedur Rahman 
Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa 
 
Civil Appeal No.1038 of 2000. 
(On appeal from judgment of Lahore High Court, Lahore, 
dated 30.6.2000, passed in Writ Petition No.914 of 2000)  
 
The Chairman, National Accountability Bureau 
…Appellant 
Versus 
Fehmida Begum & others 
… Respondents 
 
For the appellant: 
Raja M. Ibrahim Satti, Sr. ASC. 
Mr. Fauzi Zaffar, Addl.DPG NAB. 
 
 
For respondents No.1&2: 
Mr. M.A. Siddiqui, ASC. 
 
 
Respondents No.3 to 8: 
Ex-parte. 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
10.11.2014. 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
Anwar Zaheer Jamali, J.- This civil appeal with leave of the Court 
in terms of the order dated 16.8.2000, is directed against the judgment dated 
30.6.2000, passed by a five member Bench of the Lahore High Court, in Writ 
Petition No.914/2000, whereby the said petition filed by respondent No.1 was 
allowed and consequently the pending proceedings in Reference No.8/2000, 
against respondent No.2, Mukhtar Hussain, the husband of the petitioner, were 
quashed with a majority of three to two.  
2. 
The controversy involved in the said petition revolved around the 
interpretation of “person” as defined in sub-section (o) of Section-5 of the 
National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 (in short “the NAB Ordinance”), 
which at the relevant time read as under:- 
“(o) 
“Person” includes in the cause of a corporate body, the sponsors, 
Chairman, Chief Executive, Managing Director, elected Directors, by whatever 
C.A No.1038 of 2000. 
2
name called, and guarantors of the company or any one exercising direction or 
control of the affairs of such corporate body, but will not include employees 
appointed and designated as Director or Chief Executive; and in the case of any 
firm, partnership or sole proprietorship, the partners, proprietor or any person 
having interest in the said firm, partnership or proprietorship concern or 
direction or control thereof.” 
3. 
As per the majority view of the Lahore High Court, respondent 
No.2, being employee of the Company, despite being a guarantor, was not liable 
for prosecution before the NAB Court in such capacity. While as per the separate 
dissenting notes of the other two Hon’ble Judges, despite being an employee of 
the company, respondent No.2 being also a guarantor as regards the loan, which 
was the subject matter of the NAB reference, the proceedings in the NAB Court 
against him could not have been quashed and he was liable to face such 
prosecution. 
4. 
Raja M. Ibrahim Satti, learned Sr. ASC for the appellant in his 
submissions, referred before us the definition of “person” under the NAB 
Ordinance, as reproduced above and contended that the mere fact that as per 
the assertions of the petitioner, respondent No.2 was also an employee of the 
said company, his status of being a guarantor on behalf of the company would 
not change. Thus, he will still be liable to face prosecution before the 
Accountability Court in his capacity as a guarantor of the company. In addition to 
it, he also referred before us the judgment in the case of Abdul Aziz Memon v. 
State (PLD 2013 SC 594), wherein, inter alia, the definition of “person”, though it 
was slightly amended during the pendency of these proceedings, has been 
thoroughly examined and regarding its scope and application, the following 
observations have been made:- 
“16. 
 For what has been discussed above we hold and declare that the 
provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are applicable even 
to a person who is not holder of a public office and also to a person who has 
not aided, assisted, abetted, attempted or acted in conspiracy with holder of a 
C.A No.1038 of 2000. 
3
public office and the words "any other person" appearing in section 9(a) of the 
said Ordinance are to be understood and applied accordingly. For removal of 
any doubt or ambiguity it is clarified that a stand alone private person can be 
proceeded against under the said Ordinance if the other conditions mentioned 
in that Ordinance in that respect are satisfied.” 
5. 
Conversely, learned ASC for respondents No.1 & 2, has strongly 
supported the majority view of the three Hon’ble Judges contained in the 
impugned judgment as regards the scope and application of sub-section (o) to 
section-5 of the NAB Ordinance so as to extend benefit of acquittal to 
respondent No.2 in terms of the said judgment. However, when he was 
confronted with the ratio of the judgment in the case of Abdul Aziz Memon 
(supra), the learned ASC had no plausible defence to offer except to agitate that 
during the intervening period, the definition of “person” has been drastically 
amended. In this context, he however did not controvert that under the old 
definition of “person”, at the relevant time, the guarantor of a company was 
fully covered, as also under the amended definition of “person”. Faced with this 
situation, he further argued that the proceedings in Reference No.8/2000, 
wherein respondent No.2 was one of the accused, have already been disposed of 
by the Accountability Court, therefore, no fruitful purpose will be served in case 
the impugned judgment is set aside at this stage, and respondent No.2 is called 
upon to face the proceedings in the said reference after lapse of more than 14 
years. 
6. 
In reply to it, learned ASC for the appellant has brought to our 
notice the fact that an appeal against the said order of the Accountability Court 
is pending before the Lahore High Court, and contended that the impugned 
judgment as regards the interpretation of “person” defined in sub-section (o) to 
section-5 of the NAB Ordinance, has affected a large number of NAB cases. 
Therefore, in the light of the judgment in the case of Abdul Aziz Memon (supra) 
C.A No.1038 of 2000. 
4
and the law, its applicable interpretation is to be corrected by this Court as of 
duty. He further contended that the trial of respondent No.2 before the 
Accountability Court in Reference No.8/2000 will of course be subject to its 
revival/resurrection by the appellate Court, thus, its earlier disposal cannot be 
made basis for disposal of this appeal without proper adjudication on the 
relevant question of law involved in it. 
7. 
We have carefully considered the above noted submissions, 
which, on facts, are not disputed. Thus, now the only point for consideration in 
this appeal before us is the true import and interpretation of the word “person” 
as contained in sub-section (o) of section 5 of the NAB Ordinance. The majority 
view of the Lahore High Court, observed that by using the word “includes” in the 
definition of “person” the intention of the legislature was to restrict the meaning 
of “person” to sponsors, Chairman, Chief Executive, Managing Director, elected 
Directors, by whatever name they are called, and guarantors of the corporate 
body or anyone exercising direction or control of the affairs of such a corporate 
body. It was further observed that the definition of “person” contains an 
exclusionary element as well, whereby employees of a corporate body appointed 
or designated as Directors are excluded from the definition for the purposes of 
the NAB Ordinance to save the employees of a corporate body from 
unwarranted prosecution under the Ordinance. The Lahore High Court thus held, 
by way of majority, that as Respondent No. 2 was neither a sponsor nor the 
owner of the defaulting corporate body; nor did he exercise any dominative 
influence in the workings of the company, therefore, he was not a “person” as 
defined in sub-section (o) of section 5 of the NAB Ordinance. 
8. 
We are, however, unable to agree with the majority view of the 
Lahore High Court. The observations of the High Court, as summarized 
hereinabove, appear to be contrary not only to the purpose and preamble of the 
C.A No.1038 of 2000. 
5
NAB Ordinance, but also to settled principles of statutory interpretation. As per 
the preamble, one mischief that the Ordinance sought to curb was recovery of 
outstanding amounts from those persons who committed default in the 
repayment of amounts to Banks, Financial Institutions, Government Agencies 
and other agencies. Admittedly, Respondent No. 2 was the surety or guarantor 
of the loan facilities etc., availed by Ittefaq Foundry (Pvt.) Ltd., which form the 
subject matter of the instant case. The terms of the guarantee executed by 
Respondent No. 2 have been reproduced by the two learned Judges of the 
Lahore High Court, in their respective dissenting notes. According to the terms of 
the guarantee, Respondent No. 2’s responsibility under the guarantee is that of a 
principle debtor and he is liable under the guarantee until all moneys due from 
Ittefaq Foundry (Pvt.) Ltd. have been paid. Therefore, once the company 
defaulted in its liability to repay the loan amount, it was the obligation of 
Respondent No. 2 to repay the said amount. As rightly pointed out by one of the 
learned judges of the Lahore High Court, in his dissenting note, if the personal 
guarantees of the nature executed by Respondent No. 2 were to be read in the 
exclusionary clause of the definition of “person” it would have disastrous effects 
on the recovery of loans advanced by banks.  
9. 
Furthermore, the Lahore High Court in holding, by way of 
majority, that Respondent No. 2 was not a “person” for the purposes of the NAB 
Ordinance since he “was neither sponsor nor owner of the defaulting corporate 
entity; nor he exercise any dominative influence in the working of defaulting 
Company” seems to have overlooked the fact that the NAB Ordinance applies 
with equal force to guarantors of a company as to sponsors or “owners” of a 
company. It may be noted that a person may be a Director or employee of the 
company while at the same time be a guarantor as well. The NAB Ordinance only 
provides for exclusion of those individuals from the definition of “person” who 
C.A No.1038 of 2000. 
6
are in fact employees but have been appointed as the Chief Executive or 
Directors of the company. In the instant case, Respondent No. 2 was not only a 
Director of Ittefaq Foundary (Pvt.) Ltd., but he was also its guarantor. Therefore, 
the question of the applicability of the exclusion contained in sub-section (o) of 
section 5 of the NAB Ordinance does not arise in the instant case.   
10. 
We are further fortified in our view, that Respondent No. 2 is a 
“person” for the purposes of the NAB Ordinance, by the judgment in the case of 
Abdul Aziz Memon (supra), the relevant portion of which has been reproduced 
above. It may be observed at this point that although the definition of “person” 
appearing in sub-section (o) of section 5 of the NAB Ordinance has been 
amended from time to time, however, admittedly, the amendments have 
brought no material change in the scope of the said word, in the context of 
guarantors of a company. 
11. 
The upshot of the above discussion is that this appeal is allowed 
and the judgment of the three Hon’ble Members of the Bench of the Lahore High 
Court, passed in Writ Petition No.914/2000 dated 30.6.2000, is set aside. 
However, any further proceedings against respondent No.2 in NAB Reference 
No.8/2000, will be subject to the fate of the appeal pending before the Lahore 
High Court. 
 
 
 
 
Announced. 
Islamabad, 
25th November, 2014. 
 
 
Judge 
 
Not approved for reporting. 
�ا� 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
