IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(ORIGINAL JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
 
SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
(Regarding Discussion in TV Talk Show 
with regard to a Sub-judice Matter) 
 
In attendance: 
Mr. Sohail Mehmood, DAG 
Mr. Faisal Fareed Hussain, ASC a/w 
Mr. Arshad Sharif in person. 
 
Mr. Faisal Siddiqui, ASC 
(For PBA) 
 
Mr. Saleem Baig, Chairman PEMRA 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
12.9.2018 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ.- While conducting a talk show titled 
‘Power Play’ on 28.08.2018 on ARY News, the anchor Mr. Arshad Sharif 
made certain comments and raised queries about a matter pending 
adjudication before this Court. Despite the fact that the panelists on the 
show repeatedly advised him that his comments may amount to 
encroachment upon the proceedings before this Court, Mr. Sharif insisted 
that the Chief Justice of Pakistan should call him before the Court in order 
for him to point out the contradictions in the affidavit filed by Former 
President, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, and to further respond to his queries. In the 
above background, this Court initiated the instant suo motu proceedings 
against Mr. Arshad Sharif. A summary/excerpt of this program is 
reproduced below (as provided in pages 3 to 6 of the main paperbook):- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Notice was issued to Mr. Sharif vide order dated 29.08.2018 to explain his 
position in this regard, particularly considering the fact that the content of 
his show could potentially cause prejudice to a matter sub judice before this 
Court, not only in the minds of the public at large but also the Bench seized 
of the matter. Mr. Sharif appeared and tendered an unconditional and 
unqualified apology before the Court. 
2.  
 
Apart from the foregoing, vide order dated 29.08.2018, this 
Court also issued notice to the Pakistan Broadcasters Association (PBA) to 
explain whether there exists any code of professional ethics for the media 
and whether the same was being followed and if not, what kind of action 
should be initiated against the delinquents. Pursuant thereto, the learned 
Deputy Attorney General, learned counsel for PBA and the Chairman, 
Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) appeared. At the 
outset, this Court was informed that about 24 other television (TV) 
programmes were aired the same day, i.e. 28.08.2018, with similar content 
although the prejudicial remarks made therein were not as serious as those 
made in ‘Power Play’. When questioned whether the conduct of Mr. Sharif 
and other media persons conducting their programmes on any sub judice 
matters was acceptable under international standards of responsible 
journalism, a significant number of media personnel present in Court were 
unable to justify the same. When questioned, Mr. Sharif agreed that as a 
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journalist he lacked the legal acumen to analyze a document submitted as 
evidence in the matter pending before this Court. He admitted that he lacked 
expertise and knowledge of the law of evidence, etc., and in discussing a 
purely legal issue, he risked causing serious prejudice to the case. Mr. Faisal 
Fareed learned counsel for Mr. Sharif also agreed that there was a need for a 
code of conduct for the print and broadcast media relating to matters 
pending before Courts. At this juncture, Mr. Faisal Siddiqi, learned counsel 
for PBA, pointed out that in fact a statutory code of conduct already exists 
namely, the Electronic Media (Programmes and Advertisements) Code of 
Conduct, 2015 (the Code of Conduct), which was notified by the Federal 
Government vide S.R.O. No.1(2)/2012-PEMRA-COC on 19.08.2015 in 
exercise of its powers under Section 39 of the Pakistan Electronic Media 
Regulatory Authority Ordinance, 2002 [the Ordinance, as amended by the Pakistan 
Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (Amendment) Act, 2007]. He submitted that the 
Code of Conduct came into being on the basis of consensus reached between 
PBA, other stakeholders and the Federal Government pursuant to a case 
before this Court titled Hamid Mir and another Vs. Federation of Pakistan 
and others (Const. P. No.105 of 2012, etc.) and enjoys the force and 
blessings of an order of this Court dated 18.06.2015. He pointed out that 
Clause 4(3) of the Code of Conduct (reproduced below) prohibits airing of 
subjective commentary on sub judice matters by media licensees. He also 
stated that if implemented in its letter and spirit, the Code of Conduct 
enjoins upon licensees the duty to strictly monitor implementation and 
compliance therewith. Be that as it may, the learned counsel present and the 
Chairman, PEMRA agreed that despite existence of the Code of Conduct 
since 2015, and the punitive measures available in Section 33 of the 
Ordinance for violations of its provisions, sub judice matters are being openly 
discussed in talk shows thereby acting as de facto Courts, announcing what 
they deem would and should amount to justice. A prime example of such 
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conduct is the episode of the programme ‘Power Play’ hosted by Mr. Sharif 
from which these suo motu proceedings were initiated. 
3. 
 
In light of the above, it is deemed appropriate to scrutinize the 
issue of commentaries on sub judice matters as it has become a recurring 
problem and professional standards (national and international) of media reporting 
on such matters are being disregarded. First and foremost, it is important to 
lay out the essential elements of the particular programme presently under 
consideration which triggered the risk of causing serious prejudice to the 
relevant sub judice case:- 
 
i) 
Documents/affidavits which are or may be relevant to a 
pending proceeding were deliberated upon; 
 
ii) 
Two affidavits of the former President, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari 
were placed before the guests in the programme and the 
fate of the pending trial was discussed by asking them to 
determine which of the two was the correct affidavit, 
insisting that the two were mutually contradictory and 
implying that at least one did not reflect the truth; 
 
iii) 
A shadow of doubt was cast on the veracity of statements 
made and documents submitted by the person involved in 
the ongoing proceedings; and  
 
iv) 
Despite being told that his leading questions amounted to 
a ‘media trial’ in a sub judice matter, the anchor, Mr. 
Sharif, repeatedly insisted on grounds of his mistaken 
belief that it was his duty as a journalist to inquire from 
experts 
to 
determine 
the 
veracity 
of 
these 
documents/affidavits.   
 
It is in the light of the above circumstances and the absolutely flawed belief 
of the anchor regarding his responsibility as a journalist which leads us to 
the conclusion that the journalist community and media at large is either 
misinformed or if not misinformed have silently tolerated such demeanor for 
so long that the internationally accepted standards for responsible 
journalism are so far from their line of sight that they fail to see its limits 
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that they so carelessly and recklessly exceed without so much as a speck of 
remorse. 
4. 
 
At the heart of the debate is the need for a balance to be struck 
between freedom of expression and the administration of justice. In the 
context of International law and Pakistan’s international commitments in 
this regard, lies the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) to which Pakistan is a signatory since 2008. While Article 19 of the 
ICCPR protects, inter alia, the right to hold opinions without interference, the 
right to freedom of expression and right to impart information (although Pakistan 
has made reservations to Article 19 ibid stating that it shall be so applied to the extent that it is not 
repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and Sharia 
laws), Article 14 thereof protects the administration of justice, particularly the 
right to a fair trial and the principle of presumption of innocence until 
proven otherwise, and provides in part that:- 
 
“(1) All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. 
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of 
his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law. The 
press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial 
for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national 
security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the 
private lives of the Parties so requires, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances 
where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but 
any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law 
shall be made public except where the interest of juvenile 
persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern 
matrimonial disputes or guardianship of children. 
 
(2) Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the 
right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to 
law.” 
[Emphasis supplied] 
 
Pursuant to the above Article, to the extent of international commitments of 
Pakistan, the right of presumption of innocence under Article 14(2) of the 
ICCPR and the power of the Courts to exclude the press and public from all 
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or part of the trial in the interest of justice and in order to protect a person’s 
right to a fair trial by an impartial judiciary, trumps the right of expression 
under Article 19 of the ICCPR in the light of the fact that Pakistan has 
specifically made reservations to Article 19 ibid to the extent that it conflicts 
with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution) 
and Shariah laws.  
5. 
 
For a closer perusal of the international standards laid down for 
reporting or commentary on sub judice matters in other countries, the laws 
prevailing in the United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), 
Australia and India have been touched upon in this judgment. However at 
the very outset, we find it pertinent to mention that under the law prevailing 
in Pakistan as well as the other jurisdictions examined below, there are two 
means of dealing with prejudicial comments on sub judice matters: (1) 
imposing prior restraints on discussions/comments by the media or any 
other form of publication; and/or (2) imposing sanctions in the form of sub 
judice contempt, for interference in the administration of justice. It is also 
worthy to note certain distinctions between the prevailing laws in these 
countries and the law in Pakistan with regard to freedom of information and 
the protection of the right to a fair trial. In USA, after the First Amendment 
to the US Constitution, freedom of press and right to information is 
recognized as an absolute right, as can be gauged from the language thereof 
reproduced below:- 
 
“Article [I] (Amendment 1 – Freedom of expression and 
religion).  
Congress shall make no law…abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press…” 
 
This is in stark contrast to the fundamental rights of freedom of speech and 
information guaranteed under Article 19 and 19A of our Constitution, the 
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language used in which specifically subjects both these rights to ‘reasonable 
restrictions’ imposed by  law:- 
 
“19. 
Freedom of speech, etc. Every citizen shall have the 
right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be 
freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions 
imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the 
integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, 
friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or 
morality, or in relation to contempt of court, commission of or 
incitement to an offence. 
  
19A.  Right to information. Every citizen shall have the right 
to have access to information in all matters of public 
importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions 
imposed by law.” 
[Emphasis supplied] 
 
The aforementioned difference in the constitutional provisions of the USA 
and Pakistan need to be kept in mind when considering American cases 
such as Bridges Vs. California [314 US 252 (1941)] in which it was held 
that any restrictions on the press prior to a trial or proceeding or during its 
pendency are prima facie unlawful. Nevertheless, in light of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution and the due process and equal 
protection clauses contained therein, in certain cases where a display of 
irresponsible journalism has led to tainting the presumption of innocence of 
a person prior to trial, it has been deemed necessary to ‘neutralize’ the effect 
of prejudicial comments on sub judice matters through neutralizing 
techniques/procedural safeguards which broadly fall into three categories: 
(1) the availability of procedural protections during trial to the concerned 
individual; (2) placing of limitations on statements made by lawyers, court 
officers and law enforcement officers; and (3) Bench-Bar agreements. The 
first category includes procedural safeguards, such as, where the Court 
deems it necessary, it may adjourn the case till the threat of prejudice abates 
or transfer the case to another jurisdiction, or if the need arises the Court 
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may on its accord, order sequestration of jury or the judge may issue certain 
instructions to the jury or caution the press against reporting certain 
matters etc., or it may place a limit on the number, position and activity of 
the press in the Courtroom {Sheppard v. Maxwell [348 US 333 (1966)]}. In this 
category of neutralizing methods, where a person involved in a sub judice 
matter apprehends prejudice during a trial due to the media attention on it 
he may request for in-camera hearing, alternatively, where he feels that the 
Court has failed to place adequate procedural protections to protect his right 
to a fair trial, he may move for a new trial or appeal against the conviction. 
The second category entails placing certain standards for regulating 
information which may be released to the press by attorneys, court officers 
and law enforcement officers prior to the proceedings, for example, 
prohibiting the release of prior criminal record of the accused, prohibiting 
any opinion with regards to the guilt of the person involved or prohibiting the 
release of an opinion on the merits of the case, although the first two 
categories of these safeguards differ from State to State. The third category 
entails agreements between the Bench, Bar and broadcasters such as radio, 
newspapers or television channels etc. which places on them voluntary 
regulations and the responsibility of safeguarding certain information with 
regards to the trial or prevent discussion thereof. However, these safeguards 
to ‘neutralize’ the effect of prejudicial comments are not available to every 
sub judice matter and may be imposed on a case to case basis where the 
same is deemed necessary {Near v. Minnesota Ex Rel. Olson, County Attorney [283 US 697 
(1931)]}. 
6.  
 
In the absence of a written constitution, there exists no 
constitutional provision for the protection of the right to speech or 
information in the UK, and it is the Courts and the Parliament that carve out 
the permissible protections and limits to the same through judgments and 
legislation including, for instance, common law principles that have evolved 
over the years, the Freedom of Information Act, 2000 and the Contempt of 
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Court Act, 1981 (Act of 1981). A brief historical background of the common law 
principles in this regard is essential in order to comprehend as to how the 
law of sub judice contempt has evolved in the UK. The approach of the UK 
Courts as well as the Legislature has been to promote the protection of the 
administration of justice, while striking a fair balance with the protection of 
right of expression and information. One of the most lauded judgments 
which prompted the debate of the unacceptability of a simultaneous ‘media 
trial’ in a pending proceeding as well as the common law rule of ‘sub judice 
contempt’ in the UK was that of Lord Denning in the case of Attorney 
General v. Times Newspaper ([1973] 1 All ER 815) wherein he laid down 
the outer ambit of the sub judice contempt rule in the following words:- 
 
“It is undoubted law that, when litigation is pending and 
actively in suit before the court, no one shall comment on it in 
such a way that there is a substantial danger of prejudice to the 
trial of the action, as for instance by influencing the judge, the 
jurors or the witnesses, or even by prejudicing mankind in 
general against a party to the cause…Even if the person making 
the comment honestly believes it to be true, still it is contempt of 
court proceedings…To that rule about fair trial, there is this 
further rule about bringing pressure to bear on a party, none 
shall, by misrepresentation or otherwise, bring unfair pressure 
to bear on one of the parties to a cause so as to force him to 
drop his compliant, or give up his defense, or to come to a 
settlement on terms which he would not otherwise have been 
prepared to entertain…We must not allow trial by newspaper or 
‘trial by television’ or trial by any medium other than the courts 
of law.” 
 
The learned Judge had strong reservations on trial by any medium besides 
the Courts of law. This translated into his belief in a complete prohibition on 
any discussions by the press/media during the time when a proceeding is 
‘active’ before any Court, i.e. not only when the Court has taken cognizance 
of the matter, but when proceedings have commenced therein. Evidently 
therefore, according to the principles enunciated by him, while a mere risk 
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or potential danger was sufficient to trigger protection by the law, a “real or 
substantial danger of prejudice to the trial of the case or to the settlement of it” could only 
exist when a proceeding is actively ongoing before the Court and hence only 
in such circumstances could complete prohibition on publication with 
regards to it be justifiably placed. He strongly maintained that the Court 
should simultaneously also not be oblivious of the interest of the public in 
matters of national concern and freedom of press to make fair comment on 
such matters, adding that:- 
 
“Our law of contempt does not prevent comment before the 
litigation is started, nor after it has ended. Nor does it prevent it 
when litigation is dormant and is not being actively pursued. If 
the pending action is one which, as a matter of public interest, 
ought to have been brought to trial long ago, or ought to have 
been settled long ago, the newspapers can fairly comment on 
the failure to bring it to trial or to reach a settlement. No person 
can stop comment by serving a writ and letting it lie idle; nor 
can he stop it by entering an appearance and doing nothing 
more. It is active litigation which is protected by law of 
contempt, not the absence of it.” 
 
Hence, he clarified that before such proceedings become ‘active’, and after a 
final decision has been announced by the Court(s), the press is free to 
discuss or comment on the matter concerned. To put it simply, dormant 
proceedings 
are 
free 
for 
comment 
or 
discussion 
by 
the 
media/publications/press, but ongoing proceedings are not. Although this 
decision of the Court of Appeal was unanimously overturned by the House of 
Lords for an even narrower view by five Law Lords (Lord Reid, Lord Morris of Borth-
Y-Gest, Lord Diplock, Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord Cross of Chelsea);1 the latter view too 
was overturned on appeal to the European Court of Human Rights2 which, 
in a decision increasingly in favor of public interest and freedom of 
expression held that the law of contempt may be used for “maintaining the 
                                       
1 ([1973] 3 W.L.R. 298). 
2 The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom [(1979) 2 EHRR 245]. 
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authority and impartiality of the judiciary”. Lord Reid’s opinion in the House of 
Lords judgment holds importance with regard to the matter before us since 
he held that what was regarded as most objectionable was “that a newspaper or 
television programme could seek to persuade the public, by discussing the issues and 
evidence in a case before the Court, whether civil or criminal, that one side is right and the 
other is wrong.” In 1974, the Phillimore Committee submitted its report on 
contempt of Court, inter alia, on account of prejudicial comments on sub 
judice matters wherein it concluded that it was “necessary to preserve the principle 
of the law of contempt, as a means of preventing or punishing conduct which tends to 
obstruct, prejudice or abuse the administration of justice.”  
7. 
 
Several years after this report, the law of sub judice contempt 
was codified in the Act of 1981 and in line with the abovementioned 
principles, the rule of strict liability was created in Section 2 thereof whereby 
any conduct, regardless of intent, which tended to interfere in the course of 
justice, constituted contempt. The prohibited conduct in this rule included 
any publication (speech, writing, broadcasting or any other communication to the public at 
large) which creates a substantial risk that the course of justice in the 
concerned pending proceedings will be seriously impeded or prejudiced. In 
other words, under UK law the protection afforded to sub judice matters 
against publication in the form of speech, broadcasted content or any other 
widely circulated publication, extends to any proceeding wherein the mere 
danger of substantial prejudice exists and where the concerned pending 
proceedings are active [Section 2(3) of the Act of 1981], i.e. they had not remained 
dormant for a considerable period of time. The only defense to this was if the 
publisher or broadcaster despite having taken reasonable care was not 
aware of the fact that the relevant proceedings were ‘active’. In Odhams 
Press Ltd., ex p. Attorney-General ([1956] 3 All ER 494), the Divisional 
Court stated that “The test is whether the matter complained of is calculated to interfere 
with the course of justice, not whether the authors and printers intended that result.” In the 
UK, prejudicial comments which amount to interference with the right to fair 
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trial or constitute ‘trial by media’ in a civil or criminal proceeding fall in the 
category of criminal contempt, as opposed to civil contempt where an 
individual disobeys a court order. It is given the same weightage as that of 
scandalizing the Court, which also constitutes criminal contempt as both 
these result in undermining public confidence in the Courts and lack of faith 
in the judiciary to protect their lawful rights, including the right of 
presumption of innocence unless proven guilty. The same has been 
emphasized by Lord Diplock in Attorney General v. Leveller Magazine Ltd. 
([1979] AC 440) in the following words:- 
 
“[A]lthough criminal contempts of court may take a variety of 
forms they all share a common characteristic: they involve an 
interference with the due administration of justice, either in a 
particular case or more generally as a continuing process. It is 
justice itself that is flouted by contempt of court, not the 
individual court or judge who is attempting to administer it.” 
 
8. 
 
In Australia, although no constitutional provision for protection 
of the right of freedom of speech or information exists nor is there any 
statutory law with regards to sub judice matters, much uncertainty has 
prevailed in the Courts with regards to the balancing of the right to 
information in public interest matters and the right to fair trial and thus to 
cure this ambiguity, certain measures were identified in the 2003 report of 
the New South Wales Law Reform Commission (NSWLRC), which focused 
specifically on issues arising within contempt by publication and rules 
regarding sub-judice contempt. These measures largely consisted of adopting 
a ‘substantial risk’ rule similar to that in the UK, however emphasis was 
maintained on using the right to information in public interest as a defense 
although the burden of proving the same lies on the publisher. Applying the 
traditional common law rule, in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
judgment of John Fairfax Publications Pty. Ltd. v. Doe [(1995) 37 NSWLR 
81], Kirby P. stated:- 
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“[I]t would be a complete misreading of the recent development 
of constitutional law in Australia to suggest that the implied 
constitutional right of free communication deprives courts such 
as this of the power and, in the proper case, the duty to protect 
an individual’s right to a fair trial where it is, as a matter of 
practical reality, under threat. Whatever limitations may be 
imposed by the constitutional development protective of free 
communication upon certain matters upon the law of 
contempt…I could not accept that the constitutional implied 
right has abolished the longstanding protection of fair trial from 
unlawful or unwarranted media or other intrusion. Fair trial is 
itself a basic right in Australia.” 
 
Thus, as evident from the above paragraph, to uphold the right of fair trial 
the Australian Courts impose publication bans through the exercise of their 
inherent jurisdiction to regulate their own proceedings.  
9. 
 
The law in India regarding protection of the right to fair trial and 
protection from prejudicial comments with regards to sub judice matters, in 
some ways is similar to the law in Pakistan since in the Indian Constitution 
as well, the right to freedom of speech has been made subject to reasonable 
restrictions by law in terms of Article 19(2) thereof. In In Re: Harijai Singh 
and others [1996 (6) SCC 466] the Indian Supreme Court held that 
journalists do not hold any special freedom of expression or immunity from 
the law and their right to expression is also a qualified one:- 
 
“9. 
…It, therefore, turns out that the press should have the 
right to present anything which it thinks fit for publication. 
 
10. 
But it has to be remembered that this freedom of press is 
not absolute, unlimited and unfettered at all times and in all 
circumstances as giving an unrestricted freedom of the speech 
and expression would amount to an uncontrolled licence. If it 
were wholly free even from reasonable restraints it would lead 
to disorder and anarchy. The freedom is not to be mis-
understood as to be a press free to disregard its duty to be 
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responsible. Infact, the element of responsibility must be present 
in the conscience of the journalists. In an organised society, the 
rights of the press have to be recognised with its duties and 
responsibilities towards the society. Public order, decency, 
morality and such other things must be safeguarded. The 
protective cover of press freedom must not be thrown open for 
wrong doings…It is the duty of a true and responsible journalist 
to strive to inform the people with accurate and impartial 
presentation of news and their views after dispassionate 
evaluation of the facts and information received by them and to 
be published as a news item. The presentation of the news 
should be truthful, objective and comprehensive without any 
false and distorted expression.” 
 
The High Court of Orissa in the case of Bijoyananda Patnaik Vs. 
Balakrushna Kar and another (AIR 1953 Orissa 249) observed that “[i]t is 
not necessary that the mind of the Judge should be affected”, rather anything that “has 
a reasonable tendency to prejudice and obstruct the orderly administration of justice” could 
constitute contempt. Furthermore, the High Court of Punjab in the judgment 
reported as Rao Harnarain Singh Sheoji Singh Vs. Gumani Ram Arya 
(AIR 1958 Punjab 273) held that:- 
 
“20. …It is little realised that improper news items and 
comments regarding causes which are either pending or about 
to be taken up before Courts of law, very often hamper and 
hinder the proper functioning of the Courts. Taking of sides in 
criminal cases, suggesting innocence or guilt of accused 
persons can cause grave prejudice, by either influencing the 
minds of Judges, Jurors, witnesses, or by creating a climate of 
sympathy for, or prejudice against the accused. It is but 
essential, that those, who are engaged in the administration of 
justice, should be free from outside influence, and the judicial 
machinery should be left unaffected by popular feelings as to 
guilt or innocence of persons being tried or awaiting trial on a 
criminal charge. The legal machinery, according to our law for 
adjudging the culpability of accused persons, or in civil causes, 
for determining the rights of the parties, carefully excludes from 
consideration facts and circumstances, other than those which 
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are presented in a formal manner, according to the rules of 
procedure and evidence. The decision rests on the material on 
the record, and extraneous matters, howsoever palpable, or 
seemingly important, are kept severely outside the judicial 
purview. Any outside comment upon a pending case, and any 
criticism of the parties or the witnesses, which is calculated to 
influence the decision, has to be placed under a legal ban. 
Journalists, whether out of good or evil intentions, who intrude 
themselves on the due and orderly administration of justice, are 
guilty of contempt of Court and can be subjected to summary 
punishment. The Courts do not countenance any interference 
which is calculated to impede, embarrass or obstruct the 
administration of justice. Any publication, which has a tendency 
to foil or thwart a fair and impartial trial, or any conduct, 
which in any manner prejudices or prevents judicial 
investigation, whether by intimidation of or by reflection on the 
Court, counsel, parties or witnesses, in respect of a pending 
cause, constitutes contempt of Court.” 
 
Therefore, like the approach of the Courts in the UK and the USA, the Indian 
Courts too hold the view that judges are not immune from influence when 
prior to the proceedings the judges seized of the matter come across any 
publication that promotes the perspective of one of the parties involved 
therein. In the case of Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Limited and 
others Vs. Securities and Exchange Board of India and another [(2012) 
10 SCC 603] the Supreme Court of India held that excessive prejudicial 
publicity leading to usurpation of functions of the Court not only interferes 
with the administration of justice which is sought to be protected under 
Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution, it also interferes with legal 
proceedings by encroaching upon the right to be presumed innocent until 
proven otherwise and therefore, superior courts are duty-bound under their 
inherent jurisdiction to protect the presumption of innocence which is now 
recognized by them as a human right. One method of protecting this right by 
the Courts is by imposing ‘prior restraint’, i.e. limitations be put in place 
prior to the proceedings or placing a ban or delaying publication of 
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prejudicial publications for the duration of the trial/proceeding, although 
such prior restraints are imposed only where there exists a substantial 
danger or risk of causing prejudice to the proceeding sub judice at the time 
and this is not a blanket protection available to all sub judice matters but is 
imposed on a case to case basis. The concept of prejudicing a sub judice 
matter was recently given hype in the case relating to the airing of a 
controversial documentary titled as ‘India’s Daughter’ regarding the 
infamous 2012 gang rape in India wherein, in relation to placing a ban on 
the documentary ‘India's Daughter’ it was held that while the proceedings 
against the accused in the Delhi gang rape were sub judice, the said 
documentary which reflected that the accused showed no remorse for their 
conduct, amounted to substantial danger of influencing the judges seized of 
the matter as it explored an aspect of the matter which should otherwise be 
determined during the proceedings.3 In the case of State of Maharashtra 
Vs. Rajendra Jawanmal Gandhi [(1997) 8 SCC 386] it was held that “A trial 
by press, electronic media or public agitation is the very antithesis of rule of law.” Thus, 
similar to the view of the Courts in the UK and the USA, it is strongly 
opposed to ‘trial by media’ in a sub judice matter, as also observed in R. K. 
Anand Vs. Registrar, Delhi High Court [(2009) 8 SCC 106]:- 
 
“…What is trial by media? The expression "trial by media" is 
defined to mean: 
 
The impact of television and newspaper coverage on a person's 
reputation by creating a widespread perception of guilt 
regardless of any verdict in a court of law. During high 
publicity court cases, the media are often accused of provoking 
an atmosphere of public hysteria akin to a lynch mob which not 
only makes a fair trial nearly impossible but means that, 
regardless of the result of the trial, in public perception the 
accused is already held guilty and would not be able to live the 
rest of their life without intense public scrutiny…” 
                                       
3 As referred to and described by the Delhi District Court in a case titled Satyaveer Singh Rathi Vs. M/s. Zee 
Television Ltd. (judgment dated 23.01.2016 passed in CS No. 324/2013). 
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While we may not share the strong views in the above quoted paragraph 
entirely, it is not uncommon for the media to sensationalize issues of public 
importance and deduce guilt before any substantial finding has been 
recorded regarding the person undergoing trial/investigation/inquiry, and 
where this results in the mere risk of a substantial danger of the judges 
seized of the matter no longer remaining impartial, the right to fair trial of 
the person facing trial/investigation is irreparably lost.  
10. 
 
The foregoing discussion of the law in various other jurisdictions 
with regards to sub judice contempt as well as the common law principles on 
the protection of right to fair trial in sub judice matters reveals that the 
international community at large gives the right to fair trial the highest 
priority and that measures have been taken either vide statutory law or 
common law principles to ensure that the right to freedom of speech and 
expression is safeguarded so long as it does not encroach upon any person’s 
right to be treated in accordance with the law without any extraneous 
influences. At the heart of this sub judice rule lies the view that an essential 
element of fair trial is an impartial judiciary and one simply cannot turn a 
blind eye to the fact that comment on a sub judice matter in the media or 
any other widely circulated publication has at least the potential of having 
an indirect effect on the minds of the judges seized of a matter. Although 
judges have the ability to ignore any irrelevant considerations while 
adjudicating a matter, the mere risk or danger of causing prejudice to a 
pending matter is sufficient for the law to step in to protect the right of the 
one being adversely affected. While public interest may at times require that 
information be provided regarding a certain case, strict guidelines with 
regards to such publication are necessary to be imposed so as to ensure that 
the fundamental rights of all persons are given equal weightage including the 
accused or those involved in such proceedings. The International community 
in terms of Article 14 of the ICCPR as well as the law in their respective 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 20 :-
jurisdictions on sub judice contempt is in consensus to the extent that 
anything in the nature of pre-judgment of a case or specific issues thereof is 
objectionable and although it is believed that the mass media and 
broadcasters would do their best to be fair in their comments but there is 
always the possibility of ill-informed, inconsiderate or careless comments 
that may prejudice sub judice proceedings and this potential or risk of 
substantial danger of pre-judgment is sufficient to trigger the protection of 
the law with regards to the right of a person to an impartial judiciary, due 
process and right to put forth his defense before anyone else gives his 
subjective opinion on the same. Therefore, we deem it expedient that strict 
guidelines be implemented to prevent any prejudicial comments on pending 
cases; believing that this will in no manner take away from the freedom of 
the press/mass media/broadcasters and will only aid in upholding the rule 
of law and fair and impartial trials in the larger interest of justice.  
11. 
 
Under Pakistani law, prejudicial comments on sub judice 
matters are dealt with through prior restraint and/or contempt of Court 
proceedings. The latter is rooted in the provisions in the Constitution which 
read as under:- 
 
“204. Contempt of Court. – (1) In this Article, “Court” means 
the Supreme Court or a High Court. 
(2) 
A Court shall have the power to punish any person who, 
(c) 
does 
anything 
which 
tends 
to 
prejudice 
the 
determination of a matter pending before the Court.” 
 
The above constitutional provision is similar to the provisions on sub judice 
contempt in the Act of 1981 of the UK, except that the said statute requires 
further that these pending proceedings be ‘active’ and a ‘substantial danger’ 
must exist with regards to prejudicing the pending trial/proceedings. 
However, in light thereof, while we reserve our inherent jurisdiction under 
the above constitutional provision (which shall be elaborated below), the approach of 
imposing prior restrictions on the media and other publications with regards 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 21 :-
to all sub judice matters is the more logical approach. This is because 
contempt laws cannot erase the prejudice caused to a sub judice case nor 
can it erase the damage caused to the case of the person involved in such 
proceedings, particularly, since the Code of Conduct already exists which is 
in consonance with Article 14 of the ICCPR which promotes the right of 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty and the right to a fair trial 
before an impartial judge/judiciary. With regards to imposing prior 
restraints on the media, it must be clarified that while in the UK there is a 
complete ban on discussions on sub judice matters and in the USA and India 
publications may be banned or delayed, the Code of Conduct in fact takes a 
relatively more lenient approach by allowing the media to provide 
information about sub judice matters and only subjective and prejudicial 
commentary is prohibited as is elaborated upon later in this judgement. No 
doubt, Article 19 of the Constitution ensures to every citizen the right to 
freedom of speech and expression and that there shall also be freedom of the 
press, however these rights and freedoms have been specifically made 
subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by law. The same is the case with 
Article 19A of the Constitution which guarantees every citizen the right to 
have access to information in all matters of public importance but subject to 
regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law. At this juncture, we 
find it appropriate to reproduce various extracts from the judgment reported 
as Pakistan Broadcasters Association and others Vs. Pakistan Electronic 
Media Regulatory Authority and others (PLD 2016 SC 692) which are 
germane to the instant matter:- 
 
“11. No doubt freedom of speech goes to the very heart of a 
natural right of a civilized society to impart and acquire 
information about their common interests. It helps and 
individual in self accomplishment, and leads to discovery of 
truth, it strengthens and enlarges the capacity of an individual 
to participate in decision making and provides a mechanism to 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 22 :-
facilitate achieving a reasonable balance between stability and 
social change. 
 
12. The concept of freedom of media is based on the premise 
that the widest possible dissemination of information from 
diverse and antagonistic sources is sine qua non to the welfare 
of the people. Such freedom is the foundation of a free 
government of a free people. Any attempt to impede, stifle or 
contravene such right would certainly fall foul of the freedom 
guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan.  
13. However even the core free speech, which propagates 
social, political or economic ideas, promotes literature or 
human though, though fully protected, is subject to reasonable 
restrictions 
contemplated 
under 
Article 
19 
of 
the 
Constitution…” 
 
However, this Court went further and elaborated upon the phrase 
‘reasonable restriction’ and held as under:- 
 
“16. Undoubtedly no one can be deprived of his fundamental 
rights, such rights being incapable of being divested or 
abridged. The legislative powers conferred on the State 
functionaries can be exercised only to regulate these rights 
through reasonable restrictions, and that too only as may be 
mandated by law and not otherwise. The authority wielding 
statutory powers conferred on it must act reasonably (emphasis 
supplied) and within the scope of the powers so conferred.  
 
18. However, in examining the reasonableness of any 
restriction on the right to freedom of expression it also should 
essentially be kept in mind as to whether in purporting to 
exercise freedom of expression one is infringing upon the 
aforesaid right of others…” 
 
12. 
 
This indicates that the rights provided in Articles 19 and 19A of 
the Constitution are in no manner unqualified rights and may be made 
subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions. Therefore, while they are to 
be safeguarded, they cannot be used as a casual excuse to trample on other 
fundamental rights of another, particularly those which guarantee citizens 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 23 :-
the right to be dealt in accordance with law and the right to fair trial and due 
process enshrined in Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution:- 
 
“4. Right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with 
law, etc. (1) To enjoy the protection of law and to be treated in 
accordance with law is the inalienable right of every citizen, 
wherever he may be, and of every other person for the time 
being within Pakistan. 
 
10A. Right to fair trial. For the determination of his civil rights 
and obligations or in any criminal charge against him a person 
shall be entitled to a fair trial and due process.” 
[Emphasis supplied] 
 
13. 
 
A balance therefore must be struck between the right to freedom 
of speech and information on one hand and the right to fair trial, to be dealt 
with in accordance with law and of due process on the other. No person 
must be deprived of his fundamental right to be tried by an impartial 
judiciary and unbiased judge and an objective and fair trial unless a certain 
allegation is proved against him strictly in accordance with the law. We find 
that the Code of Conduct, particularly Clause 4(3) thereof (reproduced later in this 
opinion), encompasses these principles. In Clause 4(3) ibid a balance has been 
struck with regards to programmes on sub judice matters. While on one 
hand such programmes are allowed to be aired thereby protecting the 
freedom of speech and the right to information; the requirement that they 
ought to be aired in an informative and objective manner and that no 
content should be aired which tends to prejudice the determination by a 
court, tribunal or any other judicial or quasi-judicial forum, ensures that the 
right to fair trial, to be dealt with in accordance with law and of due process 
are duly safeguarded. In fact, the Code of Conduct aids the broadcast media 
and distribution services in compliance of their responsibility under the 
Code of Conduct by providing pragmatic measures to ensure that they stay 
within the permissible boundaries of freedom of speech prescribed in the law 
when it comes to reporting sub judice matters. In order to regulate the rights 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 24 :-
under Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution, PEMRA has, under Section 4 
of the Ordinance, been entrusted with the responsibility to regulate the 
establishment and operation of all broadcast media and distribution services 
in Pakistan. Section 39 of the Ordinance empowers PEMRA to make rules, 
with the approval of the Government, to carry out the purposes of the said 
Ordinance while Section 19(5) thereof states that PEMRA shall devise a Code 
of Conduct for programmes and advertisements for compliance by the 
licensees. Pursuant thereto, PEMRA has issued the PEMRA Rules 2009 (the 
Rules) and the Code of Conduct (incorporated as Schedule A). According to Section 
20(f) of the Ordinance, a person who is issued a license under the Ordinance 
shall, inter alia, comply with the codes of programmes and advertisements 
approved by PEMRA. Furthermore, Rule 15(1) of the Rules provides that the 
contents of the programmes and advertisements which are broadcast or 
distributed by the broadcast media or distribution service operator shall 
conform to the provisions of Section 20 of the Ordinance, the Rules, the 
Code of Conduct and the terms and conditions of the license. This Code of 
Conduct to which reference is made multiple times in the Ordinance and the 
Rules that admittedly exists, was made with the blessings of the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan and the consensus of all the stakeholders and PEMRA, 
was duly notified by the Federal Government and incorporated in the Rules. 
The language of the Code of Conduct reflects that primary responsibility to 
comply therewith lies with the licensees which covenant with PEMRA that 
such compliance shall be ensured.  
14. 
 
Clause 4 the Code of Conduct is relevant for the purposes of the 
instant matter which reads as follows:- 
 
“4.  
News and current affairs programmes: - the licensee 
shall ensure that: 
(3) 
Programmes on sub-judice matters may be aired in 
informative manner and shall be handled objectively: 
 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 25 :-
Provided that no content shall be aired, which 
tends to prejudice the determination by a court, 
tribunal or any other judicial or quasi-judicial forum; 
 
(4)  
News shall be clearly distinguished from commentary, 
opinion and analysis; 
 
(6) 
Content based on extracts from court proceedings, 
police records and other sources shall be fair and 
correct;   
 
(9) 
News or any other programme shall not be aired in a 
manner that is likely to jeopardize any ongoing 
inquiry, investigation or trial.” 
 [Emphasis supplied] 
 
While Clause 4(3) of the Code of Conduct allows programmes on sub judice 
matters to be aired, thereby guaranteeing the rights enshrined in Articles 19 
and 19A of the Constitution mentioned above, the regulation and reasonable 
restrictions imposed are that such programmes are aired in an informative 
manner, are handled objectively [Clause 4(3) of the Code of Conduct], and that no 
content is to be aired which would tend to prejudice the determination by a 
Court, Tribunal or any other judicial or quasi-judicial forum [Proviso to Clause 
4(3) of the Code of Conduct]. Furthermore, Clause 4(6) of the Code of Conduct 
states that content based on extracts from court proceedings, police records 
and other sources shall be fair and correct, while Clause 4(9) thereof 
prohibits news or any other programme from being aired in a manner that is 
likely to jeopardize any ongoing inquiry, investigation or trial. Therefore, the 
foregoing clauses ensure that the freedom of speech and right to information 
(Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution) are protected, and at the same time provide 
that the discussion of sub judice matters must be conducted in a manner 
which does not negatively affect another person’s fundamental right to be 
dealt with in accordance with the law (Article 4 of the Constitution) and the right to 
fair trial and due process (Article 10A of the Constitution).  
15. 
 
It is imperative to clarify that there is a difference between 
causing prejudice to a sub judice matter as opposed to merely providing 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 26 :-
information regarding the case without going into its merits. In this regard, 
we find it expedient to discuss the meaning of ‘tend’ and ‘prejudice’ as 
provided in various treatises. The term ‘tend’ means “to serve, contribute or 
conduce in some degree or way…to have a more or less direct bearing or effect...to…have a 
tendency to an end, object or purpose” (as per Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition) whereas 
the term ‘prejudice’ on the other hand is defined as follows:- 
 
Chambers 21st Century Dictionary (June 1996):-  
“bias, injury, hurt, disadvantage.” 
 
Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition, Vol. 33):- 
“to the harm, to the injury, to the disadvantage of someone. 
Com. v. DeBellas, Pa., 9 Bucks 87, 91.” 
 
““Prejudice” imports formation of a fixed anticipatory 
judgment as contra-distinguished from those opinions which 
may yield to substantial evidence, and it includes the forming of 
an opinion without due knowledge or examination, though it 
does not necessarily indicate any ill feeling. In re Adoption of 
Richardson, 59 Cal. Rptr. 323, 251 C. A.2d 222.” 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th Edition):-  
“damage or detriment to one’s legal rights or claims.” 
 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 72:- 
“As a noun, “prejudice” is defined as meaning a bias or 
leaning toward one side or the other of a question from 
considerations other than those belonging to it; an 
unreasonable predilection prepossession for or against 
anything, especially an opinion or leaning adverse to anything, 
formed without proper grounds or before suitable knowledge; 
an opinion or judgment formed beforehand, or without due 
examination; 
  
As a noun “prejudice” has been held synonymous with 
“prejudgment”.” 
[Emphasis supplied]   
 
From the above definitions, it is clear that the phrase ‘tend to prejudice’ in 
the context of sub judice matters would mean that a sub judice matter is 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 27 :-
discussed in a manner which is likely to, or has a mere tendency to result 
in a pre-judgment or forming of an opinion to the disadvantage of any 
person involved therein, without proper grounds or knowledge with regards 
to such proceedings/investigation/inquiry. As observed in the above 
paragraphs, the mere tendency to cause substantial prejudice has been 
deemed sufficient in the UK for placing a complete ban on commentary by 
the press on sub judice matters throughout the period of its active pendency, 
while in the USA and India the same has been deemed as a sufficient ground 
to place prior restraints on case to case basis. The law in Pakistan by virtue 
of the Code of Conduct in fact places greater trust in its media and journalist 
community by trusting that they will provide objective information about 
pending proceedings while taking precautions that they do not pass 
subjective or prejudicial comments in such regard.  
16. 
 
The identical phrase ‘tends to prejudice’ contained in Clause 4(3) 
of the Code of Conduct is reflected in Article 204(2)(c) of the Constitution and 
therefore in our view, such phrase has the same meaning and parameters as 
discussed above. We find that the said powers of the Supreme Court or any 
High Court which have been conferred thereupon by the Constitution and 
therefore superlative to, and shall apply notwithstanding, the powers granted 
to PEMRA under the relevant statute, rules, and codes of conduct, etc., 
whenever the Supreme Court or any High Court is of the opinion that it is 
appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case for such Court to take 
cognizance of the matter and exercise its powers under Article 204 ibid.   
17. 
 
The oft-used term of ‘media trial’ is a real phenomenon and 
cannot be allowed. Where the fate of sub judice matters is being decided on 
public forums, not only the minds of the public are being influenced, but 
also potentially the minds of the judges seized of the sub judice matter, and 
lawyers and investigators, etc. involved in such matter, this would obviously 
tend to prejudice the sub judice matter. Most alarmingly, as had happened in 
the particular episode of ‘Power Play’ that caused this Court to take notice of 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 28 :-
the instant issue, evidence brought on the record in a sub judice case was 
critically examined and experts were invited to express their opinions on the 
veracity of such evidence and the possible fate of the case. Drawing 
assumptions, inferences and conclusions from evidence or the documents 
filed in a case and stepping into the shoes of a judge on broadcasted 
programmes may not only convict the accused in the eyes of the public 
regardless of whether he is ultimately exonerated by a Court, but certain 
comments or opinions may be voiced which could potentially instill bias and 
prejudice in the minds of the judges, particularly to those who are dealing 
with the sub judice matter, thereby violating the fundamental rights under 
Articles 4 and 10A of the Constitution of the persons involved in such 
matter. Taking support from Lord Diplock’s words, it is fair to state that 
prejudicial comments which interfere in the administration of justice, in a 
way amount to the flouting of justice itself, and must be treated as such by 
the society in the spirit of upholding the rule of law. Notwithstanding the fact 
that the alleged contemnor, Mr. Sharif has tendered an unqualified apology, 
we find it absolutely necessary to explicitly state that considering the 
pending proceedings before this Court, inter alia, regarding the inquiry by 
FIA against the former President, Mr. Asif Ali Zardari, the comments made 
on this particular episode of the programme ‘Power Play’ led to a substantial 
danger of prejudicing his case and thus potentially trampled upon his right 
to a fair trial and due process guaranteed under Article 4 and Article 10-A 
respectively of the Constitution.  
18. 
 
The Ordinance and the Code of Conduct mandate that licensees 
maintain a strict check on the programmes being conducted and periodically 
update PEMRA as to whether they are duly discharging this duty. The 
relevant provisions of the Ordinance are reproduced below:- 
 
“20. Terms and conditions of license.– A person who is issued 
a license under this Ordinance shall.– 
 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 29 :-
(f) 
comply 
with 
the 
codes 
of 
programmes 
and 
advertisements approved by the Authority and appoint an in-
house monitoring committee, under intimation to the Authority, 
to ensure compliance of the Code; 
 
26. Council of Complaints.– (5) The Councils may recommend 
to the Authority appropriate action of censure, fine against a 
broadcast or CTV station or licensee for violation of the codes 
of programme content and advertisements as approved by the 
Authority as may be prescribed.” 
 
The relevant clauses of the Code of Conduct read as under:- 
 
“4(10). Editorial Oversight: the licensee shall ensure that its 
representatives, hosts and producers shall discuss and review 
the contents of the programme prior to programme going on 
air/being recorded and ensure that its contents conform to, in 
letter and spirit, this Code of Conduct.” 
 
17. Monitoring committee:- Licensee shall comply with this 
Code and appoint an in-house monitoring committee under 
intimation to the PEMRA to ensure compliance of the Code.  
 
19. Facts and opinion:- The licensee shall ensure that:- (1) If 
during a talk show or news show a guest makes or asserts an 
opinion that is presented as a fact, on a serious issue, the 
channel and or its representative must intervene and protect the 
audience by clarifying this is an opinion and not a fact.  
 
(2) 
If the host/moderator is giving his or her own opinion, 
he or she must also clarify that this is a personal opinion and 
not a fact.  
 
 
 
20. Responsibility for compliance and training of employees:- 
(1) It shall remain the sole responsibility of the Licensee to 
ensure that the content aired by it complies with the Code.  
 
(2) 
Licensee shall arrange for regular training of its 
employees that may be helpful in performing their duties better.  
 
 
24. Standards of behavior:- (1) This Code presents the 
standards to be complied with by all the licensees and it shall 
always be the sole responsibility of the licensee to ensure the 
content aired by it is in compliance with the Code of Conduct. 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
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(2) 
This Code represents an affirmative declaration of 
understanding and compliance with the basic values and 
objectives that licensees, including its employees and officials 
shall adhere to, and these shall be observed in letter and 
spirit.” 
 
Clause 4(10) of the Code of Conduct is very important because by discussing 
and reviewing the contents of a programme prior to the time it is aired or 
recorded, the licensee can ensure that the contents of such programme 
conform to the Code of Conduct. Therefore, licensees can make certain that 
programmes on sub judice matters are aired in an informative manner and 
are handled objectively [Clause 4(3) of the Code of Conduct] and that content based 
on extracts from court proceedings, police records and other sources are fair 
and correct [Clause 4(6) of the Code of Conduct], and that no programme is aired or 
recorded which contains content that tends to prejudice the determination 
by a court, tribunal or any other judicial or quasi-judicial forum [Proviso to 
Clause 4(3) of the Code of Conduct] or that is likely to jeopardize any ongoing 
inquiry, investigation or trial [Clause 4(9) of the Code of Conduct]. Section 20(f) of 
the Ordinance mandates licensees to comply with the codes of programmes 
and advertisements approved by the Authority. A plain reading of Clauses 20 
and 24 of the Code of Conduct makes it crystal clear that the responsibility 
of ensuring compliance with the Code of Conduct is primarily that of the 
licensee, including its employees and officials. Licensees are also required to 
arrange regular training of its employees to ensure that they perform their 
duties better [Clause 20(2) of the Code of Conduct]. Section 20(f) of the Ordinance 
read with Clause 17 of the Code of Conduct requires the licensee to appoint 
an in-house monitoring committee (Monitoring Committee) under intimation to 
PEMRA to constantly ensure compliance of the Code of Conduct, while 
Clause 19 places on the licensee, the responsibility to ensure that any 
opinion expressed in a broadcasted programme is distinguished and 
presented in a manner that it is not mistaken as a fact by the average 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
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viewer/audience. Finally, Section 26(5) of the Ordinance provides that the 
Council of Complaints may recommend to PEMRA appropriate action of 
censure or fine against a broadcast station or licensee for violation of the 
Code of Conduct. The foregoing appears to be an adequate mechanism to 
prevent violations of the Code of Conduct by the media so long as such 
measures are practically and effectively adopted and enforced.  
19. 
 
There remains no ambiguity in our minds with regards to the 
laxity of the licensees in ensuring compliance with the Code of Conduct and 
of PEMRA as a regulatory authority in penalizing licensees on account of any 
violations of the Code of Conduct. If voluntary violations of the Code of 
Conduct or even negligence by the licensees to ensure adherence thereto is 
not penalized by PEMRA, the Code of Conduct will be reduced to a mere 
paper tiger and be rendered absolutely redundant. We therefore issue a writ 
of mandamus to PEMRA to ensure that the following parameters laid down 
in the law and the Code of Conduct are adhered to in letter and spirit and 
that no violations thereof shall be tolerated by PEMRA:- 
 
i) 
The Code of Conduct ensures that the freedom of speech and the 
right to information (Articles 19 and 19A of the Constitution) are 
protected, and at the same time provide that the discussion of 
sub judice matters must be conducted in a manner which does 
not negatively affect another person’s fundamental right to be 
dealt with in accordance with the law (Article 4 of the Constitution) and 
the right to fair trial and due process (Article 10A of the Constitution).  
 
ii) 
All licensees should be sent a notice/reminder of their basic 
ethics and objectives, standards and obligations under the Code 
of Conduct, particularly Clause 4(10) thereof, in that, editorial 
oversight should be observed prior to the airing of all 
programmes and any programme, the subject or content of 
which is found or deemed to be in violation of the Code of 
Conduct in its true letter and spirit, should not be aired by the 
licensee; 
 
iii) 
Any discussion on a matter which is sub judice may be aired but 
only to the extent that it is to provide information to the public 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 32 :-
which is objective in nature and not subjective, and no content, 
including commentary, opinions or suggestions about the 
potential fate of such sub judice matter which tends to prejudice 
the determination by a court, tribunal, etc., shall be aired; 
 
iv) 
While content based on extracts of court proceedings, police 
records and other sources are allowed to the extent that they are 
fair and correct, any news or discussions in programmes shall 
not be aired which are likely to jeopardize ongoing inquiries, 
investigations or trials; 
 
v) 
In compliance with Clause 5 of the Code of Conduct, all 
licensees should strictly ensure that an effective delaying 
mechanism is in place for broadcasting live programmes to 
ensure stern compliance with the Code of Conduct and Articles 
4, 10A and 204 of the Constitution;  
 
vi) 
In compliance with Clause 17 of the Code of Conduct, an 
impartial and competent in-house Monitoring Committee shall 
be formed by each licensee, with intimation to PEMRA which 
shall be duty bound to ensure compliance of the Code of 
Conduct;  
 
vii) 
With regards to the Monitoring Committee, we direct that 
licensees include (for each of its meetings) at least one practicing 
lawyer of at least 5 years or above practice, with adequate 
understanding of the law to advise the licensee regarding any 
potential violations of the Code of Conduct by programmes to be 
aired in the future; 
 
viii) 
In compliance with Clause 20 of the Code of Conduct, each 
licensee shall be required to hold regular trainings of its officers, 
employees, staff, anchors, representatives etc. with regards to 
ensure compliance with the Code of Conduct with the schedule 
and agenda of these regular trainings to be intimated to PEMRA 
through the Monitoring Committee;  
 
ix) 
If any licensee is found to have violated or failed to observe the 
Code of Conduct in its true letter and spirit, particularly Clause 
4 of thereof, and/or Articles 4, 10A and 204 of the Constitution, 
strict and immediate action should be taken against such 
licensee in accordance with Section 33 of the Ordinance. The 
 SUO MOTU CASE NO.28 OF 2018 
-: 33 :-
Supreme Court or any High Court retains the power to take 
cognizance of the matter and shall exercise its powers under 
Article 204 ibid where such Court is of the opinion that it is 
appropriate in the facts and circumstances of the case for it to 
do so; and 
 
x) 
The unconditional and unqualified apology tendered by Mr. 
Sharif is accepted in view of the fact that in our opinion it has 
been tendered sincerely and he has expressed remorse and 
regret promising not to repeat such reckless and irresponsible 
behaviour in the future. Mr. Sharif is also warned to be 
extremely careful in the future. 
 
In light of the foregoing, this matter is accordingly disposed of.  
 
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamabad, the 
12th of September, 2018 
Approved For Reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
M. Azhar Malik/* 
