 
 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALI, HCJ 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
MR. JUSTICE EJAZ AFZAL KHAN 
MR. JUSTICE MUSHIR ALAM 
MR. JUSTICE MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK 
 
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008, 60-L/2013, 
280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 25.6.2001/27.8.2002/2.6.2008/17.12.2012/ 
23.10.2013/7.4.2014/3.10.2014 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore/Peshawar High Court, 
Peshawar/Lahore High Court, Multan Bench/Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan 
Bench/Lahore High Court, Lahore/Peshawar High Court, D.I. Khan Bench passed in 
C.R.No.1611/2000, 
R.F.A.No.29/1996, 
R.F.A.No.230/2005, 
R.S.A.No.4/1996, 
R.F.A.No.185/2011, R.F.A.No.4/2014 and C.R.No.124-D/2014) 
 
 
Khushi Muhammad (deceased) through L.Rs.  
 
(in C.A.2564/2001) 
LDA through its D.G. 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.2658/2006) 
Fazal-e-Yasir etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.1670/2008) 
Kh. Muhammad Mehmood etc. 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.60-L/2013) 
Muhammad Yousaf etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.280-L/13) 
Muhammad Yousaf  
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.60/2014) 
Malik Akhtar Khan  
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.965/2014) 
Muhammad Ramzan  
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.218/2015) 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Mst. Fazal Bibi etc.  
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.2564/2001) 
Muhammad Latif etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.2658/2006) 
Qazi Hamidduddin  
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.1670/2008) 
Muhammad Yousaf etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.60-L/2013) 
Kh. Muhammad Mehmood etc. 
 
 
 
 
(inC.A.280-L/2013) 
Muhammad Younas etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.60/2014) 
Ashiq Hussain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.965/2014) 
Mst. Saira Bibi 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in C.A.218/2015) 
…Respondent(s) 
 
C.A.2564/2001 
For the Appellant:  
 
Raja Muhammad Ibrahim Satti, Sr. ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
 
For the Respondents: 
 
Malik Muhammad Qayyum, Sr. ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mian Hamid Farooq, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
 
 
C.A.2658/2006 
For the Appellant:  
 
Mr. Khurram Raza Chaudhry, ASC 
 
For Resp. No.12: 
 
 
Nemo 
 
 
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For Resp. No.16: 
 
 
Mr. Waqar Ahmed Sheikh, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Gulzar Hussain, Asstt. Director (Hort.), PHA 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Muhammad Tariq Nazir, Asstt. Law, PHA 
 
L.Rs. of Resp.1, 10 & 11:  
Ex-parte 
 
L.Rs. of Resp.2-9, 13-15:  
Ex-parte 
 
 
C.A.1670/2008 
For the Appellant:  
 
Mian Muhibullah Kakakhel, Sr. ASC 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
 
Mr. Abdul Sattar Khan, ASC 
 
 
C.A.60-L/2013 
For the Appellant:  
 
Ch. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Sr. ASC 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
 
Ch. Nusrat Javed Bajwa, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
(Resp.Nos.1-3(i-vi),4(A-D),7(iv-viii),10-19,24-
48,54(A-C),55,56(ii-v),57-65) 
 
For Respondent 7(i-iii): 
 
Mr. Zahid Hussain Khan, ASC 
 
 
C.A.280-L/2013 
For the Appellant:  
 
Ch. Nusrat Javed Bajwa, ASC 
 
For Respondents 1-4: 
 
Ch. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Sr. ASC 
 
L.Rs. of Resp. No.5:  
 
Not represented 
 
 
C.A.60/2014 
For the Appellant:  
 
Mr. Muhammad Munir Peracha, ASC 
 
For Respondents 1-2: 
 
Mr. Gulzarin Kiyani, Sr. ASC 
 
For Respondent No.3: 
 
Not represented 
 
 
C.A.965/2014 
For the Appellant:  
 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC 
 
For the Respondents: 
 
Ch. Muhammad Munir Akhtar Minhas, ASC 
 
 
C.A.218/2015 
For the Appellant:  
 
Mr. Gulzarin Kiyani, Sr. ASC 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
 
Syed Mastan Ali Shah Zaidi, ASC 
 
Dates of Hearing: 
 
 
08.02.2016, 09.02.2016 & 10.02.2016 
 
… 
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JUDGMENT 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J:- Through these matters we have 
been called upon to answer the question as to whether the time spent 
in pursuing an appeal before a wrong forum can be condoned and/or 
excluded from the prescribed period of limitation. In the above 
context certain ancillary and incidental propositions also require 
resolution:-  
 
(i) 
Whether Section 14 of the Act applies to appeals and if 
not, whether the principles enshrined therein (Section 14)  
can be made applicable while considering if a sufficient 
cause has been made out under Section 5 of the Act; 
(ii) 
Whether  the  institution  and  the  pendency  of  the  
appeal before a wrong forum i.e. one having no jurisdiction 
on account of wrong advice of the counsel constitutes a 
sufficient cause for condonation of delay in terms of 
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (the Act); 
(iii) 
Where an appeal which has been entertained by the staff 
of the court or the court itself which has no pecuniary 
jurisdiction and is ultimately returned to the appellant or is 
dismissed, whether this protects the appellant from the 
bar of limitation and/or constitutes a sufficient cause for 
the condonation of delay on the principle of actus curiae 
neminem gravabit; and 
(iv) 
Whether the discretion exercised by the court(s) below 
in condoning the delay cannot be interfered with by the 
higher court(s) unless the discretion is shown to have been 
exercised arbitrarily. 
 
It may be pertinent to mention here that this is not the first time that 
the superior Courts have been asked to provide answers to these 
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questions; on the contrary it has been a recurring issue coming before 
the courts time and again and unhappily there happen to be drastically 
divergent/conflicting views on the subject. Thus we wish to resolve the 
conflict so as to have a binding effect on all those concerned in terms of 
Article 189 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
(the Constitution). 
As the aforesaid propositions are common to all these matters we 
intend to resolve the same before examining and deciding the individual 
cases on their own merits. 
2. 
 
Extensive arguments have been made by the learned counsel 
for the parties for and against the propositions which are summarized 
hereinbelow; their pleas/counter-pleas and the law cited in support 
thereof (note: including case law researched by the Court staff) are reflected in the 
reasons of this opinion. The summations of the learned counsels who 
have objected to the condonation of delay/exclusion of time are briefly 
stated below:- 
 
(i) 
That Section 5 of the Act should be strictly construed 
and applied and that sufficient cause stipulated therein 
should not be tested on the conditions of Section 14 of the 
Act as it only applies to suits and not appeals; however some 
of the counsel have submitted that the limitations of the 
latter section should be referred to assess the existence of 
sufficient cause; 
 
(ii) 
An appellant who approaches the wrong forum (one 
lacking jurisdiction) should not be given the premium of his 
own negligence; especially in cases where the institution 
of an appeal  before  the  wrong  forum  is  tainted  with  
mala  fide intention; 
 
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(iii) 
When a lis is initiated beyond the prescribed period of 
limitation a vested right is created in favour of the opposite 
side which cannot be obliterated by giving a premium to a 
delinquent litigant; 
 
(iv) 
That the rule actus curiae neminem gravabit is a rule of 
administration of justice; it should not be used to favour a 
delinquent litigant to the prejudice of the opposite side in 
whose favour a vested right has been created; besides, where 
an appellant is unmistakably found to be negligent or 
lacking bona fide, to give him the benefit of the rule of actus 
curiae neminem gravabit would be a serious abuse of the 
rule which is meant for the administration of justice. 
 
3. 
 
On the other hand, the summations of the learned counsels 
supporting the proposition that the appeal filed by the litigant before a 
wrong forum on the mistaken/wrong advice of the counsel and the 
subsequent entertainment of such appeal by the office of the court or the 
court itself justifies condonation of delay are:- 
 
 
(i) 
That an appeal is an extension of a suit, and the entire case 
reopens before the appellate court, therefore, Section 14 of 
the Act can be resorted to for purposes of excluding the time 
spent before the forum having no jurisdiction, however, the 
conditions of the section have to be satisfied. Mr. Malik 
Muhammad 
Qayyum, 
learned 
ASC 
when 
specifically 
questioned in this regard has candidly conceded that Section 
14 would not be attracted, rather, the conditions stipulated 
therein if satisfied should be construed to be a sufficient 
cause in terms of Section 5 (this was also the submission of Mr. 
Gulzarin Kiyani, learned counsel appearing for the opposite side); 
 
(ii) 
That if the reason for approaching the wrong forum is the 
wrong advice of a legal expert whom a litigating party 
approaches with due diligence and in good faith, therefore, 
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no prejudice should be caused to such litigant and delay 
resulting due to mistaken advice should be condoned on this 
account simpliciter; 
 
(iii) 
It is the duty of the appellate court (including its staff) to refuse 
to entertain or admit an appeal when it does not fall within 
its pecuniary jurisdiction, but in the event of failure to do so 
the rule of actus curiae neminem gravabit would be duly 
attracted; 
 
(iv) 
Where a court whilst exercising its discretion has condoned 
the delay as per Section 5 of the Act, the higher court(s) shall 
not interfere in such discretionary exercise of power [note: this 
plea was raised by Mr. Malik Qayyum, learned ASC who has placed reliance on 
the following cases in this regard:- Muhammad Bashir and another Vs. 
Province of Punjab through Collector of District Gujrat and others (2003 
SCMR 83), P.M. Amer Vs. Qabool Muhammad Shah and others (1999 SCMR 
1049), Mrs. Zubaida Begum Vs. Mrs. S.T. Naqvi (1986 SCMR 261), Lahore 
Development Authority Vs. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another (PLD 2010 SC 705) 
and National Bank of Pakistan and others Vs. Shamoon Khan and others 
(2010 SCMR 1173)]. 
 
4. 
 
Before considering the propositions above, it is expedient to 
mention certain salient features which have been settled over a period 
of time by the superior Courts for the purposes of interpretation of the 
law of limitation. These are:- 
 
(i) 
The law of limitation is a statute of repose, designed to 
quieten title and to bar stale and water-logged disputes and 
is to be strictly complied with.1 Statutes of limitation by their 
very nature are strict and inflexible. The Act does not confer 
a right; it only regulates the rights of the parties. Such a 
regulatory enactment cannot be allowed to extinguish vested 
rights or curtail remedies, unless all the conditions for 
extinguishment of rights and curtailment of remedies are 
                                     
1 2016 PLC (CS) 195; 2010 PLC (Labour) 104; 2007 SCMR 1446; 2003 YLR 1837 and PLD 1962 (WP) Dacca 
381. 
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fully complied with in letter and spirit.2 There is no scope in 
limitation law for any equitable or ethical construction to get 
over them.3 Justice, equity and good conscience do not 
override the law of limitation.4 Their object is to prevent stale 
demands and so they ought to be construed strictly;5  
 
(ii) 
The hurdles of limitation cannot be crossed under the guise 
of any hardships or imagined inherent discretionary 
jurisdiction of the court.6 Ignorance, negligence, mistake or 
hardship does not save limitation, nor does poverty of the 
parties;7 
 
(iii) 
It is salutary to construe exceptions or exemptions to a 
provision in a statute of limitation rather liberally while a 
strict construction is enjoined as regards the main provision. 
For when such a provision is set up as a defence to an 
action, it has to be clearly seen if the case comes strictly 
within the ambit of the provision;8 
 
(iv) 
There is absolutely no room for the exercise of any imagined 
judicial discretion vis-à-vis interpretation of a provision, 
whatever hardship may result from following strictly the 
statutory provision. There is no scope for any equity. The 
court cannot claim any special inherent equity jurisdiction;9 
 
(v) 
A statute of limitation instead of being viewed in an 
unfavourable light, as an unjust and discreditable defence, 
should have received such support from courts of justice as 
would have made it what it was intended emphatically to be, 
a statute of repose.10 It can be rightly stated that the plea of 
limitation cannot be deemed as an unjust or discreditable 
                                     
2 PLD 2004 AJ&K 38. 
3 PLD 2005 Lah 129; PLD 1962 (WP) Dacca 381 and PLD 1958 (WP) Lah 936. 
4 PLD 2005 Lah 129. 
5 2013 CLC 403; 2003 YLR 1837 and PLD 1962 (WP) Dacca 381. 
6 AIR 1940 Rang 276 (FB) 
7 PLD 2003 SC 628; 2002 PLC (CS) 526; 2002 PLC (CS) 474; PLD 2002 SC 101; 1998 PLC (CS) 1007; 1988 
SCMR 1354 and 1987 PLC (CS) 200. 
8 25 Cal 496, 503. 
9 AIR 1935 All 323. 
10 Supra note 1. 
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defence.11 There is nothing morally wrong and there is no 
disparagement to the party pleading it.12 It is not a mere 
technical plea as it is based on sound public policy and no 
one should be deprived of the right he has gained by the 
law.13 It is indeed often a righteous defence.14 The court has 
to only see if the defence is good in law and not if it is moral 
or conscientious;15 
 
(vi) 
The intention of the Law of Limitation is not to give a right 
where there is not one, but to interpose a bar after a certain 
period to a suit to enforce an existing right.16 
 
(vii) 
The Law of Limitation is an artificial mode conceived to 
terminate justiciable disputes. It has therefore to be 
construed strictly with a leaning to benefit the suitor;17 
 
(viii) Construing the Preamble and Section 5 of the Act it will be 
seen that the fundamental principle is to induce the 
claimants to be prompt in claiming rights. Unexplained delay 
or laches on the part of those who are expected to be aware 
and conscious of the legal position and who have facilities for 
proper legal assistance can hardly be encouraged or 
countenanced.18 
 
5. 
 
Coming back to the issues in hand, it is desirable to 
reproduce the provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the Act which read as 
under:- 
“5. Extension of period in certain cases. Any appeal or 
application for a revision or a review of judgment or for 
leave to appeal or any other application to which this 
section may be made applicable by or under any enactment 
                                     
11 48 Cal 110 (PC); AIR 1933 PC 230. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid. 
14 AIR 1933 PC 230. 
15 54 All 1067 (PC); AIR 1935 All 323; 56 Cal 575. 
16 21 Cal 8, 18 (PC). 
17 AIR 1966 Pat 1 (FB). 
18 AIR 1966 Raj 213. 
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for the time being in force may be admitted after the 
period of limitation prescribed therefor, when the 
appellant or applicant satisfies the Court that he had 
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making 
the application within such period.  
(Emphasis supplied) 
(note:- shall not be admitted unless a sufficient cause is shown) 
Explanation. The fact that the appellant or applicant was 
misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court 
in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period of 
limitation may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this 
section. 
 
14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in Court 
without jurisdiction. (1) In computing the period of 
limitation prescribed for any suit, the time during which the 
plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another 
civil proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a 
Court of appeal, against the defendant, shall be excluded, 
where the proceeding is founded upon the same cause of 
action and is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, 
from defect of jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is 
unable to entertain it. 
(2) 
In computing the period of limitation prescribed for 
any application, the time during which the applicant has 
been prosecuting with due diligence another civil 
proceeding, whether in a Court of first instance or in a 
Court of appeal, against the same party for the same relief 
shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in 
good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction, or 
other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. 
Explanation I. In excluding the time during which a former 
suit or application was pending, the day on which that suit 
or application was instituted or made, and the day on which 
the proceedings therein ended, shall both be counted. 
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Explanation II. For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff 
or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be 
prosecuting a proceeding. 
Explanation III. For the purposes of this section 
misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed 
to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.” 
 
6. 
 
There are a very large number of judgments which have been 
cited before us in support of the submissions that the Courts ought not 
to condone delays on account of mistaken advice of counsel, on account 
of pendency of a lis before the wrong forum and/or on account of some 
perceived or actual mistake of the Court. The aforesaid findings are 
variously stated in the following judgments of this Court: Rahim Bux Vs. 
Settlement Authorities and others (1968 SCMR 78), Ahmad Din Vs. 
Mst. Rasul Bibi (1968 SCMR 843), Rehmatullah and others Vs. Ulas 
Khan and others (1968 SCMR 975), Shah Muhammad Vs. Ghulam 
and another (PLD 1970 SC 196), Mst. Hajran Vs. Sardar Muhammad 
(PLD 1970 SC 287), Mohiuddin Vs. Settlement and Rehabilitation 
Commissioner Hyderabad, Karachi and Khairpur Divisions and 
another (1970 SCMR 428), Hakeem Abdul Rehman Vs. Noor 
Muhammad and another (1970 SCMR 582), Province of East 
Pakistan Vs. Abdul Hamid Darji and others (1970 SCMR 558), Fateh 
Ali Khan Vs. Subedar Muhammad Khan (1971 SCMR 354), 
Muhammad Nawaz and 3 others Vs. Mst. Sakina Bibi and 3 others 
(1974 SCMR 223), Ch. Muhammad Sharif Vs. Muhammad Ali Khan 
and others (1975 SCMR 259), Abdul Ghani Vs. Ghulam Sarwar (PLD 
1977 SC 102), Mst. Walayat Khan Vs. Khalil Khan and another (PLD 
1979 SC 821), Khalid Farooq and 3 others Vs. Hakim Nazar 
Muhammad and another (1979 SCMR 52), Mirza Muhammad Saeed 
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Vs. Shahab-ud-Din and 8 others (PLD 1983 SC 385), Mst. Mahmooda 
Begum and others Vs. Major Malik Muhammad Ishaq and others 
(1984 SCMR 890), Raj Muhammad Vs. Mst. Chan Bibi and others 
(1984 SCMR 1068), Rahim Bakhsh through Legal Heirs and others 
Vs. Mst. Pathani through Legal Heirs and others (PLD 1985 SC 324), 
Bashir Ahmad Vs. Government of the Punjab (1985 SCMR 333), Mian 
Aizad Bakhsh Vs. Sheikh Muhammad Afzal (1985 SCMR 1003), Nek 
Muhammad Vs. A.C. Jhelum and others (1986 SCMR 1493), Islam 
Din Vs. Allah Nawaz and others (1988 SCMR 2), Manzoor Hussain 
and 2 others Vs. Muhammad Ali and another (1989 SCMR 1498), 
Chief Administrator of Auqaf Vs. Muhammad Ramzan (PLD 1991 SC 
102), Ghulam Ali Vs. Akbar @ Akoor and another (PLD 1991 SC 957), 
Muhammad Tufail Danish Vs. Deputy Director F.I.A. and another 
(1991 SCMR 1841), Masud Ahmed and 2 others Vs. United Bank 
Limited (1992 SCMR 424), Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another Vs. 
Syed Siraj ud Din (1998 SCMR 2296), Raja Karamatullah and 3 
others Vs. Sardar Muhammad Aslam Sukhera (1999 SCMR 1892), 
Idris Ahmed Rizwani Vs. Federal Public Service Commission through 
Secretary (2000 SCMR 1889), Bashir Ahmed Vs. Muhammad Sharif 
and 4 others (PLD 2001 SC 228), Mst. Khauda Begum and two others 
Vs. Mst. Yasmeen and 4 others (PLD 2001 SC 355), Abdul Majeed and 
another Vs. Ghulam Haider and others (2001 SCMR 1254), Monazah 
Parveen Vs. Bashir Ahmad and 6 others (2003 SCMR 1300), Sheikh 
Muhammad Saleem Vs. Faiz Ahmad (PLD 2003 SC 628), Rehman-ud-
Din and another Vs. Sahibzada Jehanzeb (2004 SCMR 418), Shujat 
Ali Vs. Muhammad Riasat and others (PLD 2006 SC 140), Ghulam 
Qadir Vs. Ghulam Fareed and others (2006 SCMR 984), Muhammad 
Yousuaf and others Vs. Saeen Akhtar (2007 SCMR 1485), Atta 
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Muhammad Vs. Maula Bakhsh and others (2007 SCMR 1446), Lahore 
Development Authority Vs. Mst. Sharifan Bibi and another (PLD 
2010 SC 705), Dr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi Vs. Hydrocarbon 
Development and others (2012 SCMR 377), Mrs. Akram Yaseen and 
others Vs. Asif Yaseen and others (2013 SCMR 1099), Mst. Gul Jan 
and others Vs. Naik Muhammad and others (PLD 2012 SC 421), Dr. 
Pir Muhammad Khan Vs. Khuda Bakhsh and others (2015 SCMR 
1243), and Muhammad Wahid and another Vs. Nasrullah and another 
(2016 SCMR 179). 
7. 
 
In Shah Muhammad’s case (supra) the Supreme Court 
refused to condone the delay with reference to Sections 5 and 14 of the 
Act and observed that:- 
 
“……………Under that provision of law time can only be 
excluded where proceeding has been prosecuted with due 
diligence in good faith in a Court which, from defect of 
jurisdiction, or other cause of a like nature, is unable to 
entertain it. It is not disputed that in the present case the 
appellant was pursuing his remedy before a Court of 
competent jurisdiction. It was on his failure to get the 
necessary relief that he had filed an appeal against the ex 
parte decree passed against him. 
 
……………Merely because by his own choice he did not file 
an appeal against the original decree, it cannot be said that 
there is sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of 
the Limitation Act for not filing the appeal within time. The 
appellant was not diligent. He could file an application 
under Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C. and at the same time file an 
appeal against the original ex parte decree. This aspect of 
the question has been considered in several decisions 
of the Indian High Court in pre-Partition days and 
the consensus opinion is that where an application 
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under Order IX, rule 13, C.P.C. for setting aside on ex 
parte decree failed on the merits, the time spent in 
prosecuting the proceedings cannot be deducted under 
section 5 for the proper time allowed for filling an 
appeal………………”  
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
 8. 
 
In the case of Province of East Pakistan (supra) the Supreme 
Court refused to condone the delay and on the point of sufficient cause 
under Section 5 of the Act, observed as under:- 
 
“As to the legal aspect of the question, namely; as to what 
is or is not sufficient cause for the purposes of an 
application under section 5 of the Limitation Act, it is 
manifest that no hard and fast rule can be laid down nor it 
is desirable that this should be done. Each case has to be 
considered on its own facts. What may be sufficient in one 
case may well not be sufficient in another case, but this 
much is certain that where by lapse of time a valuable 
right has accrued to the other side, it should not be 
lightly taken away. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
This Court has furthermore repeatedly pointed out that in 
an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act it is the 
duty of the party seeking condonation to explain each day’ 
(sic day’s) delay, and unless this is done, the delay should 
not be condoned particularly, where valuable rights have 
accrued to the other sides (sic side).” 
 
Where delay was committed by the government in filing of appeal, it was 
the observation of the Supreme Court that:- 
 
“This Court has also in several cases had occasion to point 
out that so far as limitation is concerned the Government 
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cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from 
an ordinary litigant, because, of the fact that the 
Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation 
and conduct of their cases and its resources are much 
larger. If in spite of these facilities the Government cannot 
comply with the requirements of the law of limitation, then 
it is for it to take steps to have that law changed and not to 
ask the Courts to give a different interpretation to its 
provisions. In this view of the matter, the High Court’s 
decision in these two petitions is unexceptionable.” 
 
9. 
 
In Muhammad Nawaz’s case (supra) this Court did not accept 
that counsel’s poor advice would be a ‘sufficient cause’ for condonation of 
delay, and observed as under:- 
 
“3. 
Even if the above explanation is to be taken at its 
face value, it would not constitute a sufficient cause for the 
condonation of long delay that has taken place in the 
instant case. The initial obligation was of the petitioners to 
enquire about the decision in their appeal, or to arrange 
with their counsel to inform them about the decision if it is 
announced in their absence. Even if it be assumed that their 
counsel neglected to inform them that per se would not be a 
sufficient ground for condonation of delay, when a valuable 
right has accrued to the respondents Nos. 1 to 3. We are not 
satisfied that the petitioners were diligent or took due care 
in the matter.  
 
4. 
The petition is dismissed as barred by limitation.” 
 
10. 
 
In the case of Ch. Muhammad Sharif (supra) when 
considering an application for condonation of delay the High Court came 
to the conclusion that delay could only be condoned if the mistake was 
bona fide. The mistake was not found to be bona fide and wrong advice of 
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counsel was not accepted as a good ground for condonation of delay. 
This Court refused to grant leave while observing as under:- 
 
“We have heard the learned counsel at length and carefully 
examined all the decisions referred to by him and have 
come to the conclusion that this is a clear case in which the 
learned Advocate showed gross lack of care and his failure 
in such a case to acquaint himself with the relevant 
provisions of the law relating to the jurisdiction of the 
Courts amounted to negligence on his part.  
 
The learned counsel has relied on the decision of the Privy 
Council in Kunwar Rejendra Bahadur Singh V. Rai 
Rajeshwar Bali (AIR 1937 PC 276) to support his contention 
that action taken “in good faith on the advice of counsel 
honestly given” is a sufficient cause for condoning delay. 
The finding in that case was that the view taken by 
appellants’ counsel was not unreasonable and he could not 
be deemed to have been negligent in valuing the appeal. 
The facts here are altogether different. The correct value 
was known. 
 
In the case of Nazar Muhammad V. Mst. Shahzada Begum 
(PLD 1974 SC 22), this Court also followed the Privy 
Council but again that was a case in which the wrong 
period of limitation had been calculated even after 
reference to a recognized textbook on the law of limitation. 
There is no evidence here that the learned Advocate 
concerned consulted any book or law on the point.” 
 
11. 
 
In Abdul Ghani’s case (supra) the petitioner filed an appeal 
before the District Court which fell within the pecuniary jurisdiction of 
the High Court. On return of the memorandum of appeal by the District 
Court, the appeal was presented before the High Court but was 
dismissed on the ground of limitation. This Court also dismissed the 
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petition without condoning the delay. While applying Section 18 of the 
Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 the Court held:- 
 
“There is absolutely no ambiguity about this section. Even 
a layman would be able to understand it without any legal 
assistance whatsoever. But the petitioner claims to have 
been advised by an Advocate and the appeal was filed by an 
Advocate. Therefore, as the petitioner had himself valued 
his claim in his suit at a sum far exceeding Rs. 25,000, it is 
not possible to understand how any Advocate could have 
advised the petitioner to file his appeal in the District 
Court, and we find it difficult to believe that the petitioner 
was misguided by legal advice, but if he was, then we have 
to observe with regret that the petitioner’s Advocate acted 
with gross negligence in filing the appeal in the District 
Court.” 
 
With regard to the argument that it was the respondent’s fault for not 
objecting to the maintainability of the appeal the Court held that:- 
 
“This extraordinary submission is based on the assumption 
that defendants are under an obligation to give advice 
about the manner in which claims against them are to be 
prosecuted. Apart from the fact that this assumption is 
against reason, submission is self-defeating because there 
cannot be different standards for plaintiffs and defendants, 
and if the petitioner was not at fault for filing his own 
appeal in the wrong Court, by the same standard, the 
respondent cannot be blamed for not objecting immediately 
to what the petitioner did.” 
 
It was further held that such act would not constitute a sufficient cause 
in terms of Section 5 of the Act to hold that the same was beyond the 
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control of the parties concerned. The relevant portion of the judgment 
reads as follows:- 
 
“In any event, the conduct of other parties cannot help the 
petitioner to make out sufficient cause under section 5 of 
the Limitation Act. It is true that this section does not define 
sufficient cause but the meaning of this expression is too 
well known to need recapitulation, and we would only refer 
here to the observations of Kaikaus, J. on this question in 
Ata Ulla v. Custodian Evacuee Property (PLD 1964 SC 
236). “Under section 5…there has to be a finding of 
sufficient cause. In pre-partition India sufficient 
cause had been defined as circumstances beyond the 
control of the party and I do not know of any case 
wherein this definition of sufficient cause had been 
rejected”. We re-affirm these observations and we any (sic 
may) explain here that the burden is on the appellant to 
prove that his delay in filing his appeal was on account of 
circumstances beyond his control, because, as observed by 
Sir George Rankin in Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh v. 
Rai Rajeshwar Bali and others (AIR 1937 PC 276)…in 
applying section 5 (of the Limitation Act)…the analogy of 
section 14 (which applies only to suits) is an argument of 
considerable weight.” Section 14 permits the exclusion of 
time only for proceedings “prosecuted in good faith”, 
therefore in order to make out sufficient cause under 
section 5 an appellant must prove that he had acted in good 
faith in presenting his appeal in the wrong Court. Good 
faith has been defined in clause (7) of section 2 of the 
Limitation Act as: “‘good faith’: nothing shall be deemed 
to be done in good faith which is not done with due care 
and attention.” Now if an appellant proves that he filed his 
appeal in the wrong Court despite due care and attention it 
means that the presentation of the appeal in the wrong 
Court was on account of circumstances beyond his control. 
No doubt, what such circumstances are must depend on the 
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facts and circumstances of each case, and in Kunwar 
Rajendra Bahadur Singh’s case, Sir George Rankin set 
aside the finding of the Chief Court that the appellant’s 
Advocate had been very negligent in filing the appeal in the 
wrong Court because the facts relevant to the question of 
the Court in which the appeal was to be filed were very 
complicated. Similarly, an appellant can bring his case 
under section 5 if he can show that there is some ambiguity 
in the law governing the forum in which the appeal is to be 
filed. Or, to take another example, an appellant can rely on 
section 5, if he can show that he was misguided by the 
practice of the Court or by an erroneous judgment of the 
Court. But, in the instant case, the provisions of section 18 
of the West Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance are plain 
beyond any doubt and as there is also no complication 
whatsoever about the facts relevant to the question of the 
proper forum for filing the appeal, it is clear that the 
presentation of the appeal in the District Court was an act 
of gross negligence.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
In relation to the argument that the act of the court shall prejudice none, 
this Court held:- 
 
“In order to overcome these self-induced difficulties the 
petitioner has tried to throw the blame on the District Court 
and on the respondent's Advocate. Thus, for example, he 
has pleaded in his petition that it was the act of the 
District Court “which contributed towards expiry of 
limitation for filing appeal in the High Court”. We 
were astonished by this plea and even more by the fact that 
it was pressed because it is not Mr. Bilal's case that the 
petitioner was an infant or a lunatic whose interests the 
Court might have been under some duty to protect. But, 
according to Mr. Bilal, the petitioner had been misguided 
by the District Court because after admission the appeal 
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had been transferred from the Court of the District Judge, 
Multan to that of an Additional District Judge, Multan, 
therefore, the principle actus curiae nemonim (sic neminem) 
gravalsit (sic gravabit) was attracted. The argument is 
fallacious because the transfer from the Court of the 
District Judge to that of an Additional District Judge was 
by an administrative order and because this transfer was 
after the petitioner had deliberately filed his appeal in the 
wrong Court. And, in any case, the attempt to invoke the 
principle actus curiae nemonim (sic neminem) gravalsit (sic 
gravabit) assumes that the Court was under an obligation to 
advise the appellant how to prosecute his remedies against 
the respondent, we regret to say that this assumption is 
against reason.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
12. 
 
In the case of Mst. Mahmooda Begum (supra) this Court 
while considering the question of condonation of delay on account of time 
consumed before a wrong forum within the purview of Section 5 of the 
Act and on account of wrong advice of counsel held, as under:- 
 
“……………..the appeal fails primarily for the reason that 
it was not a case of ill-advice but extreme negligence on the 
part of the counsel, who had filed the appeal before the 
District Judge. A plain reading of section 18 of West 
Pakistan Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962, should have made 
it obvious to the counsel that any appeal whose valuation 
exceeded Rs. 25,000 should have been filed in the High 
Court. There was no room for any doubt as subsection (1) 
(a) of section 18 is so clearly worded that it is not 
susceptible to any other interpretation. The appeal was 
valued at Rs. 46,000 and, therefore, there was no room for 
any doubt as to the forum where it should have been 
presented. It is a case of gross ignorance of the law on 
the part of the counsel and as such it cannot be 
regarded as an ill-advice, and for this reason if the 
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appellants have suffered they can seek redress against 
their counsel, but this would not provide a reason for 
condonation of delay.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
13. 
 
In Syed Haji Abdul Wahid’s case, the question of limitation 
in the context of approaching a wrong forum was in issue. This Court 
held as under:- 
 
“15. From the preceding discussion, it emerges that the 
ratio decidendi in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar has been 
followed consistently. No doubt Abdul Ghani's case laid 
down that an advice given by the counsel against a clear 
provision of law would amount to gross negligence on the 
part of counsel and any action taken on such advice would 
not entitle the party to seek condonation of delay on the 
ground that he bonafidely acted on that advice, but the 
above rule laid down in Abdul Ghani's case did not exclude 
.from its purview condonation of delay by the Court under 
section 5 of the Limitation Act in a case where the appellant 
is able to establish that he acted in good faith in pursuing 
his appeal before the wrong Court, as is evident from the 
above quoted passage from Abdul Ghani's case. Therefore, 
notwithstanding, 
the 
fact 
that 
section 
14 
of 
Limitation Act, in terms does not apply to 
proceedings of an appeal, if the appellant is able to 
establish that he followed the remedy before a wrong 
forum in good faith, the Court may condone such 
delay in filing of the appeal treating it as ‘sufficient 
cause’ under section 5 of the Limitation Act. What 
would constitute ‘sufficient cause’ in such cases 
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each 
case. At this stage, we may mention here that in a 
later decision of this Court in the case of Sherin v. 
Fazal Muhammad (1995 SCMR 584) a Bench of this 
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Court consisting of 3 Hon'ble Judges, without 
referring to the decision in Abdul Ghani's case 
expressed the view on the question, whether the delay 
in pursuing remedy before a wrong forum visualized 
under section 14, which applies to suit, could be 
extended for condoning delay in filing the appeal 
under 
section 
5 
of 
the 
Limitation 
Act, 
as 
follows............... 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
(Note: Paras No. 4 to 6 of the Sherin case (supra) have been quoted 
with approval in this case; however we shall consider/quote the Sherin 
decision while discussing the situation that wrong advice does justify 
condonation of delay). 
 
14. 
 
In the case reported as Dr. Syed Sibtain Raza Naqvi (supra) 
this Court while refusing to condone the delay held as under:- 
 
“8. On perusal of section 14 of the Act, it appears that time 
spent in pursuing the proceedings before wrong appellate 
forum, cannot be excluded, for the purposes of filing of an 
appeal and in case appeal is barred by time the provision of 
section 5 of the Act can only be invoked, that too, by 
showing the sufficient cause. 
9. The two expressions “due diligence” and “good faith” in 
section 14 do not occur in section 5 of the Act which enjoins 
only “sufficient cause”. The expressions “due diligence” 
and “good faith” used in section 14 of the Act cannot be 
equated with the expressions “sufficient cause” used in 
section 5 of the Act. If it were so, the Legislature could have 
used identical expressions in both sections particularly 
when “good faith” has been defined in section 2(7) of the 
Act. The power to condone the delay and grant an extension 
of time under section 5 of the Act is discretionary, whereas 
under section 14 of the Act, exclusion of time is mandatory 
on the satisfaction of the condition prescribed in it. 
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10. The principle that appeal is continuity of original 
proceeding before the appellate Court, as held in the cases 
of Sherin v. Fazal Muhammad, (1995 SCMR 584) and 
Tasneem Ismail v. Wafi Associates, (2007 SCMR 1464), is 
of no help to the petitioner. The law of limitation takes away 
the rights of parties, the same must be construed liberally, 
but without any violation to the intent of legislature. 
Limitation Act is to be read as a whole and its provisions 
are to be construed harmoniously. 
11. On reading Section 14 of the Act along with section 
2(10), it appears that legislature specifically excluded the 
appeal or an application from the purview of “Suit”. We 
left no doubt in our mind that benefit of section 14 of the Act 
cannot be extended to exclude the time consumed in 
prosecuting an appeal before wrong forum having no 
jurisdiction, for the purposes of filing an appeal before a 
forum having jurisdiction.” 
 
15. 
 
In the case of Mst. Gul Jan (supra) many cases with different 
facts were before this Court in which the main proposition was whether 
in a case where an appeal lies before this Court and no such appeal has 
been filed, this can Court entertain a petition seeking leave to appeal 
under Article 185(3) of the Constitution. It was held by this Court, as 
under:- 
 
“We may conclude by observing that the practice of filing a 
petition for leave to appeal before this Court under Article 
185(3) of the Constitution where an appeal is competent 
before this Court under Article 185(2) of the Constitution 
or under any statute but has become barred by time 
amounts to hoodwinking or deceiving the spirit as well as 
the express provisions of Article 185(3) of the Constitution 
and such practice must be brought to an end. It must be 
made clear to all that if an appeal competent before this 
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Court has not been filed within the period of limitation 
prescribed for filing of the same then the only remedy 
available in that regard is to file a time-barred appeal and 
seek extension of time or condonation of delay in filing of 
the same in terms of rule 2 of Order XII or rule 1 of Order 
XXII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980. It must also be 
made clear to all through this judgment that no petition for 
leave to appeal filed under Article 185(3) of the 
Constitution can be entertained by the office of this Court in 
any case where an appeal is competent before this Court 
under Article 185(2) of the Constitution or under any 
statute and that no such incompetent petition for leave to 
appeal, even if erroneously entertained by the office of 
this Court can be converted into or treated as an 
appeal except in the case of an incompetent petition 
for leave to appeal filed within the period of 
limitation for filing a competent appeal. As regards the 
present appeals and petitions there is no denying the fact 
that in all these cases appeals were competent before this 
Court under Article 185(2) of the Constitution or under 
some statute but the matters had been brought to this Court 
in the shape of petitions for leave to appeal filed under 
Article 185(3) of the Constitution at a time when the remedy 
of appeal had become barred by time. All these petitions 
thus 
filed 
were, 
therefore, 
incompetent 
and 
not 
maintainable at the time of their institution.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
16. 
 
The summary of the above case law is as under:- 
 
(i) 
That condonation of delay can only be allowed within the 
purview of Section 5 of the Act, when a case for sufficient 
cause has been made out within the scope thereof; 
 
(ii) 
Wrong advice of the counsel per se does not constitute a 
sufficient cause for condonation of delay; 
 
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(iii) 
Section 14 of the Act is not attracted to appeals but is 
confined to suits, etc. only; however the principles of the 
section, such as due diligence and good faith can be resorted 
to, in order to satisfy the condition of sufficient cause 
postulated by Section 5; 
 
(iv) 
The rule of actus curiae neminem gravabit should not be 
extended to give benefit to the litigant who, on account of 
wrong advice by counsel, has approached an appellate forum 
having no jurisdiction. 
 
17. 
 
We now consider various judgments cited by the counsel for 
the parties or researched by our office for the proposition that in the 
situation where a wrong forum of appeal has been approached time can 
be condoned; they include Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur Singh Vs. Rai 
Rajeshwar Bali and others (AIR 1937 PC 276), The Province of East 
Pakistan Vs. Muhammad Hossain Mia (PLD 1965 SC 1), General 
Secretary, P.W.R. Union (Workshop), Lahore Vs. The Registrar, Trade 
Unions and others (PLD 1969 Lhr. 1080), Akbar Vs. Sadiq and others 
(1972 SCMR 23), Nazar Muhammad and another Vs. Mst. Shahzada 
Begum and another (PLD 1974 SC 22), Raja Muhammad Ayub and 
others Vs. Muhammad Ijaz Khan and others (1982 SCMR 1105), 
Muhammad Hasham Khan Vs. The Chairman, Baluchistan Service 
Tribunal and others (PLD 1983 SC 262), Mrs. Zubaida Begum Vs. 
Mrs. S.T. Naqvi (1986 SCMR 261), Sherin and 4 others Vs. Fazal 
Muhammad and 4 others (1995 SCMR 584), Ali Muhammad Vs. 
Muhammad Shafi (PLD 1996 SC 292), P.M. Amer Vs. Qabool 
Muhammad Shah and 4 others (1999 SCMR 1049), Karachi Electric 
Supply Corporation Ltd Vs. Lawari and 4 others (PLD 2000 SC 94), 
Abdul Majeed and others Vs. Hameeda Bibi and 4 others (2002 SCMR 
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416), Muhammad Bashir Vs. Province of Punjab through Collector of 
District Gujrat and others (2003 SCMR 83), Noora through L.Rs. Vs. 
Ahmad (2005 SCMR 1933), Mst. Bas Khana and others Vs. 
Muhammad Raees Khan and others (PLD 2005 Pesh 214), Mst. Farah 
Naz Vs. Judge Family Court Sahiwal and others (PLD 2006 SC 457), 
Abdul Majid and others Vs. Mst. Zubeda Begum and others (2007 
SCMR 866), House Building Finance Corporation and others Vs. Syed 
Muhammad Ali Gohar Zaidi (2007 PLC (C.S.) 870), National Bank of 
Pakistan and others Vs. Shamoon Khan and others (2010 SCMR 
1173), and Farman Ali Vs. Muhammad Ishaq and others (PLD 2013 
SC 392).  
18. 
 
The brief facts of the case of Kunwar Rajendra Bahadur 
Singh (supra) are, that the appellant (of the case) filed an application before 
the Assistant Commissioner for partition which was dismissed; he 
brought an appeal before the District Judge valued at Rs.1000/-. The 
District Judge returned the memorandum of appeal for presentation to 
the Chief Court. The memorandum of appeal along with an application 
under Section 5 of the Act for condonation of delay was moved. The 
application was dismissed and so was the appeal as being barred by 
time. The Privy Council advised His Majesty that the appeal should be 
allowed, the order and decree of the Chief Court be set aside, and the 
appeal be remanded to the Chief Court for admission notwithstanding 
that the period of limitation was exceeded. The Privy Council in view of 
Sections 5 and 14 of Act, held as under:- 
 
“6. The question of negligence being out of the way, their 
Lordships are of opinion that the facts of the present case 
disclose sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5, 
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Limitation Act. They are of opinion that in applying 
Section 5 to such a case as the present, the analogy of 
Section 14 (which applies only to suits) is an 
argument of considerable weight. Mistaken advice 
given by a legal practitioner may in the circumstances 
of a particular case give rise to sufficient cause within 
the section though there is certainly no general 
doctrine which saves parties from the results of 
wrong advice. In the circumstances of this case the 
respondents had very little reason to complain of the 
delay and the bona fides and diligence of the 
appellant cannot be impugned.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
19. 
 
In Nazar Muhammad’s case (supra) this Court held that:- 
 
“The explanation of the respondent is that she was given 
mistaken advice by a legal practitioner and, therefore, it 
was a sufficient ground for condoning the delay. In support 
of the respondents’ contention, Mr. Raja Muhammad 
Anwar, learned counsel for the respondents, has relied on a 
decision of the Privy Council in Kumar Rajendra Bahadur 
Singh v. Rai Rajeshwar Bali and others (AIR 1937 PC 276). 
It was held in that case that a mistaken advice by a counsel 
may be considered to be a sufficient ground within section 5 
of the Limitation Act for condoning the delay. There is no 
counter-affidavit 
by 
the 
appellants. 
In 
these 
circumstances, we would accept the explanation of 
the respondents and hold that there was sufficient 
ground to condone the delay under section 5 of the 
Limitation Act. Accordingly, the delay is condoned 
and appeal is held to be within time.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
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20. 
 
In the judgment rendered in the case of Muhammad 
Hasham Khan (supra) a four member bench of this Court condoned the 
delay in filing an appeal:-  
 
“The legal question regarding application of section 5 of 
Limitation Act where section 14 thereof did not apply in 
terms is not difficult to understand in cases like the present 
one. No doubt it was held in Shah Muhammad v. Ghulam 
and another (1) that section 14 of the Limitation Act nor 
section 5 thereof, could be attracted in that case ; (sic case;) 
which involved filing of an appeal under section 96 of the 
C.P.C. as also an application for setting aside an ex parte 
decree under Order IX, rule 13 of C.P.C. But it cannot be 
said that section 5 of the Limitation Act did not 
apply because section 14 was not in terms applicable 
to a particular proceedings. The underlying principles 
would not ordinarily be excluded when considering a 
case under section 5 of the Limitation Act……………” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
21. 
 
The brief facts of Sherin’s case (supra) are that the 
respondents sued the appellants for declaration and permanent 
injunction and alternative relief for possession was also prayed for. The 
suit was decreed on 21.2.1984. The appellants preferred an appeal in the 
before the District Judge which was returned on 1.12.1985, for 
presentation before the High Court, as the appeal was found to be 
beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge. It was re-filed in 
the High Court and dismissed through the judgment dated 26.6.1989 as 
barred by time. This Court framed the following proposition at the time of 
granting leave:- 
  
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“What should be the standard of care and diligence 
required of appellants when preferring their appeals and 
whether any duty is cast on the Court officials entertaining 
the appeals to record objections as regards defect of 
jurisdiction etc., and, if so, within what period of time.” 
 
This Court discussed the criteria of “due diligence” under Section 14 of 
the Act and keeping in view the illiteracy of the appellant and non-return 
of appeal by the Court within a reasonable time held that:- 
 
4. 
The appellants' case is that they entrusted the case 
to their learned counsel, who after completion of the file, 
instituted the same in the Court of the learned District 
Judge; that the appellants themselves were not posted with 
the knowledge of the provisions of law as to the pecuniary 
jurisdiction of the District Judge to entertain the appeal; 
and they wholly depended on their counsel. The delay has 
been thus, sought to be excused on the plea that the appeal 
was instituted in the District Court on the mistaken advice 
of the counsel. In order to plead that the latter was not 
negligent, it has been asserted that the value of the suit for 
the purposes of the court-fee and jurisdiction was neither 
incorporated in the decree sheet nor explicitly shown in the 
judgment of the trial Court. Conversely, the learned counsel 
for the respondents has dubbed it a case of gross 
negligence on the part of the appellants and their counsel, 
and added that the mistaken advice of the counsel cannot 
furnish a good ground for condonation of delay. 
 
5. 
Diligence is a state of human conduct. What should 
be the standard for assessing the behaviour of an appellant 
to style him as diligent. Because of fluidity of the notion of 
diligence, it is difficult to set up a precise yardstick. 
Whether or not litigant has acted diligently and with care, 
would differ from case to case. Speaking broadly, a person 
may be said to have acted diligently, when he has informed 
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himself of all relevant factors, taken all obvious steps and 
precautions, characterized by a degree of effort, as in a 
given situation, a reasonable person would do. But, the 
epithet of “reasonable”, opens wide the measure of 
application of this yardstick, on the factual plane, for the 
word “reasonable” is not susceptible of any precise 
definition. Etymologically, it signifies according to reason, 
which expression itself is open to difference of opinion. 
Whether or not a person has acted diligently, in ultimate 
analysis, would depend on the circumstances of each case 
and cannot be determined on the foundation of any judicial 
syllogism. 
 
6. 
The criterion of “due diligence” for enlargement of 
time is prescribed by section 14 of the Limitation Act, which 
upon its terms applies only to the suits and applications and 
not to the appeals. On the other hand section 5 is 
applicable to the appeals but it does not apply to suits. The 
question of condonation of delay, therefore, has to be 
examined on the basis of section 5 and not section 14 of the 
Limitation Act. Not unoften, while examining the question 
of condonation of delay, in filing the appeal, the Courts 
have been invoking the principles underlying section 14 of 
the Act. The High Court has declined to condone the delay 
entirely on the touchstone of section 14. It is, however, to be 
remembered that expression “due diligence” and “good 
faith” appearing in section 14 do not figure in section 5. 
The condition prescribed in the latter section for its 
applicability is “sufficient cause” but what is sufficient 
cause is not capable of connotation, with exactitude and 
would differ from case to case. We may observe that filing 
of appeal in a wrong Court on account of mistaken advice 
tendered by the counsel canvassed on behalf of the 
appellants for condonation of delay by itself would not 
attract section 5 but when the litigant and the counsel have 
acted with due care and caution and their conduct does not 
smack of negligence, the institution of the appeal in the 
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wrong forum may constitute a “sufficient case” (sic cause) 
within the meaning of section 5 for condonation of the 
delay.” 
 
About the act of the Court while considering the quantum of delay it was 
held:- 
 
“14. 
The stage is now set down to evaluate the effect of 
the learned District Judge’s failure in returning the 
memorandum of appeal to the appellants with reasonable 
dispatch. It is correct that the appellants themselves were at 
fault, in filing the appeal in the District Court, which was 
not possessed of the pecuniary jurisdiction to hear it. But, 
let the appellants’ mistake be there, a searching question 
needs to be asked had the learned District Judge, no reason 
to look into the existence or otherwise of the jurisdictional 
facts upon which the entertaining of the appeal by him was 
dependent, though not in depth, but at least prima facie; 
through a preliminary enquiry confined only to the cursory 
examination of the record before him. We are unable to 
show him any indulgence, in this regard. We are sure had 
he glanced through the record, the agony of the appellants 
would not have prolonged. In Hari Ram v. Akbar Hussain 
(ILR 29 All. 749) a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court 
had the occasion to adjudicate upon the defendants’ 
objection in a pre-emption suit that mistake in court-fee by 
a party is not covered by section 28 of the Court Fees Act, 
1870, and it applied only when a document not properly 
stamped, was received and used by the Court or Office by 
mistake or inadvertence. The objection was repelled with 
the observations which are quite instructive:-- 
 
“The mistake may in its origin be the mistake of the 
plaintiff; by the time the plaint has been registered, 
the mistake has become the mistake of the Court. If 
the Court or the Munsarim discovered the plaintiff’s 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 31 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
mistake before registration of the plaint, the plaint 
would at once be rejected under section 54 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure and never registered at 
all.” 
 
We feel that omission on the part of learned District 
Judge to take timely action is the major cause of 
refiling of the appeal by the appellants, in the High 
Court, out of time. They have been the victim of the 
act of the Court which furnishes “sufficient cause” 
under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation 
of 
delay. 
The 
fact 
that 
after 
receiving 
the 
memorandum of appeal from the District Court, some 
time was consumed by the appellants, in presenting it 
to the High Court, in the circumstances of the case is 
inconsequential. We are, therefore, inclined to 
condone the delay in presenting the memorandum of 
appeal to the High Court.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
22. 
 
In the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd 
(supra) the brief facts are that the suit which was valued at more than 
Rs.50,000/-, was decreed. An appeal was filed before the District Judge. 
Ultimately, the memorandum of appeal was returned and was presented 
before the High Court, which was dismissed on the point of limitation. 
This Court condoned the delay and while analysing Sections 5 and 14 of 
the Act held as under:- 
 
“4. 
The view taken by this Court that, despite section 14 
of the Limitation Act, if appellant is able to establish that he 
followed the remedy before a wrong forum in good faith 
with due care and caution, the Court may condone such 
delay in filing of the appeal treating it as sufficient cause 
under section 5 of the Limitation Act is confirmed, but we 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 32 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
may also reiterate that filing of an appeal in a wrong 
Court on account of mistaken advice tendered by the 
counsel for condonation of delay by itself would not 
attract section 5 as held in Sherin v. Fazal 
Muhammad (supra).” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
On the point of mistaken advice of the counsel, it was held by this Court, 
as under:- 
 
“This Court made it clear in the case of Sherin v. Fazal 
Muhammad (supra) that filing of an appeal in a wrong 
Court on account of mistaken advice tendered by the 
counsel canvassed on behalf of the appellant for 
condonation of delay by itself would not attract section 5 of 
the Limitation Act, but when the litigant and the counsel 
have acted with due care and caution and their conduct 
does not smack of negligence, the institution of the appeal 
in the wrong forum may constitute sufficient cause within 
the meaning of section 5 for condonation of delay.” 
 
23. 
 
In Abdul Majid’s case (supra) the question involved was 
whether the time spent in filing and pursuing a review petition 
constituted a “sufficient cause” for condonation of delay in filing an 
appeal. This Court discussed “sufficient cause” and observed that:- 
 
“The existence of “sufficient cause” is sine qua non for 
condonation of delay. Insofar as ‘sufficient cause” is 
concerned neither it can be defined precisely nor a specific 
yardstick can be fixed for its determination as it varies from 
case to case. It can, however, be said with certainty that 
every cause for condonation of delay cannot be equated 
with that of “sufficient cause” which in our view amounts to 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 33 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
cogent reasoning, convincing justification and satisfactory 
explanation.” 
  
 
The Court considered the criterion of “due diligence” as elaborated in 
Sherin’s case (supra) with reference to Sections 5 and 14 of the Act and 
held as under:- 
 
“The case in hand has been examined on the touchstone of 
the criterion as mentioned hereinabove and we are of the 
view that since valuable rights have been accrued in favour 
of respondents it cannot be snatched on the ground that a 
review petition was filed in good faith as appeal could have 
been filed conveniently. In other words the respondents 
should not be deprived of the valuable rights which they 
have acquired due to the laches and negligence of the 
appellants. In this regard we are fortified by the dictum as 
laid down in Rehmatullah v. Ulas Khan 1968 SCMR 975; 
Abdul Hamid v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore 
1968 SCMR 120; Rahim Bux v. Settlement Authorities 1968 
SCMR 78 and Ahmad Din v. Mst. Rasool Bibi 1968 SCMR 
843.” 
 
24. 
 
In the case of House Building Finance Corporation with 
reference to the jurisdiction of a service tribunal to condone delay and 
the applicability of Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, it was observed by this 
Court as under:-  
 
“10. 
We have given our anxious thought to the 
submission of the learned counsel. Technically speaking, he 
may be correct that the provisions of section 14 (ibid) are 
restricted to suits, the fact remains that the broad principles 
of this provision can always be extended to proceedings of 
civil nature before a Court or Tribunal with a view to 
secure the ends of justice and to suppress the mischief. 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 34 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
 
………………In any event, the Tribunal having condoned 
the delay by exercise of its discretion, this Court is always 
slow and reluctant to interfere with the exercise of 
discretion in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. 
We would, therefore, repel the contention of the learned 
counsel for the Corporation that appeal preferred before 
the Tribunal should have been dismissed as barred by 
time.” 
 
25. 
 
The summary of the above case law is:  
 
(i) 
In some of the judgments, the appeal has been treated as 
continuation of the suit and it has been held that the 
provisions of Section 14 ibid would be attracted per se; 
 
(ii) 
In another sub-set of these judgments it has been held that 
though section 14 ibid would not apply per se but the 
principles prescribed therein would be taken into account by 
the court for the purposes of determining sufficient cause 
in terms of Section 5 of the Act; 
 
(iii) 
Another view if that the institution of the appeal before a 
wrong forum may constitute sufficient cause on the 
touchstone of Section 5, independent of Section 14; 
 
(iv) 
On account of entertainment of appeal by the court staff or 
where the court itself entertains the same, issues pre-
admission notice(s) or admits it for regular hearing, the rule 
of actus curiae neminem gravabit shall be attracted and on 
this score the time spent before the wrong appellate forum 
shall be condoned. 
 
26. 
 
We now move on to consider judgments from the Indian 
jurisdiction. In the case of Ramlal and anothers Vs. Rewa Coalfields 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 35 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
Ltd. (AIR 1962 SC 361) while expressing its view on applications made 
under Section 14 of the Act held as under:- 
 
“In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon 
to consider the effect of the combined provisions of 
Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, 
considerations which have been expressly made material 
and relevant by the provisions of S. 14 cannot to the same 
extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with 
applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 
without reference to S. 14.  
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
27. 
 
The question involved in the judgment reported as Mata Din 
Vs. A. Narayanan (AIR 1970 SC 1953) was whether delay can be 
condoned under Section 5 of the Act on the ground of mistake of 
counsel. The Supreme Court answered the said question in the following 
terms:- 
 
“The law is settled that mistake of counsel may in certain 
circumstances be taken into account in condoning delay 
although there is no general proposition that mistake of 
counsel by itself is always a sufficient ground. It is always a 
question whether the mistake was bona fide or was merely a 
device to cover an ulterior purpose such as laches on the 
part of the litigant or an attempt to save limitation in an 
underhand way.” 
 
28. 
 
In the judgment reported as State of Kerala Vs. Krishna 
Kurup Madhava Kurup (AIR 1971 Ker 211) the High Court of Kerala 
while referring to Mata Din’s case (supra) held:-  
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 36 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
“I am of the view that legal advice given by the members of 
the legal profession may sometimes be wrong even as 
pronouncement on questions of law by courts are sometimes 
wrong. An amount of latitude is expected in such cases for, 
to err is human and lay men, as litigants are, may 
legitimately lean on expert counsel in legal as in other 
departments, without probing the professional competence 
of the advice. The court must of course, see whether, in such 
cases there is any taint of mala fides or element of 
recklessness or ruse. If neither is present, legal advice 
honestly sought and actually given, must be treated as 
sufficient cause when an application under Section 5 of the 
Limitation Act is being considered. The State has not acted 
improperly in relying on its legal advisors.”  
 
29. 
 
The case of M/s. Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. 
Smt. Nirmala Devi and others (AIR 1979 SC 1666) entailed the facts in 
that the petitioner filed an appeal before the High Court beyond the 
period of limitation due to mistake in calculation of the period of 
limitation by the petitioner’s counsel. The Indian Supreme Court while 
citing with approval the view expressed in the case of State of Kerala 
(supra) held that:- 
 
 “A company relies on its Legal Adviser (sic Advisor) and 
the Manager’s expertise is in company management and not 
in law. There is no particular reason why when a company 
or other person retains a lawyer to advise it or him on legal 
affairs reliance should not be placed on such counsel. Of 
course, if there is gross delay too patent even for layman or 
if there is incomprehensible indifference the shield of legal 
opinion may still be vulnerable.” 
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 37 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
30. 
 
In the judgment reported as Badlu and another Vs. Shiv 
Charan and others [(1980) 4 SCC 401] the Supreme Court was of the 
following view:- 
 
“There could be no doubt that if the appellants filed an 
appeal before the Additional District Judge due to a mistake 
of law or fact resulting from a bona fide but mistaken 
advice given to them by their lawyer, this would be a good 
ground for condoning the delay. Moreover, it is well settled 
that if a litigant is pursuing a bona fide civil proceeding 
with due diligence and in good faith in any appeal or 
revision he is entitled to the exclusion of the time taken in 
such proceeding. The combined effect of Sections 5 and 14 
of the Limitation Act would, therefore, undoubtedly entitle 
the appellants to exclude the time taken by them while the 
appeal was pending before the Additional District Judge.” 
 
31. 
 
In the case of Ghasi Ram and others Vs. Chait Ram Saini 
and others [(1998) 6 SCC 200] the Supreme Court held that:- 
 
“No doubt, when a party proceeds contrary to a clearly 
expressed provision of law, it cannot be regarded as 
prosecuting the other civil proceeding in good faith. It is 
based on sound principle of law. But the said rule cannot be 
enforced in rigidity in every case. Each case has to be 
judged on its own merits……………If, on examining the 
facts, it is found that there was no lack of due care, there is 
no reason why the plaintiff-appellant should not be 
accorded the benefits of Section 14 of the Act. Does the 
interest of justice demand that the plaintiff should be 
refused the benefit of Section 14 of the Act on account of the 
negligence on the part of his counsel, ill-advising him to file 
a revision instead of filing a fresh suit? An illiterate litigant 
cannot be made to suffer when he is ill-advised by his 
counsel.” 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 38 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
 
32. 
 
In Consolidated Engineering Enterprises Vs. Principle 
Secretary, Irrigation Department and others [(2008) 7 SCC 167] the 
Supreme Court held:- 
 
“While considering the provision of Section 14 of the 
Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted 
and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to 
advance the cause of justice rather than abort the 
proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element 
of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In 
fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar 
of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a 
wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes 
clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to 
exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious 
activity……………The principle is clearly applicable not 
only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in 
the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain 
it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the 
wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic of) 
law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention 
of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the 
equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest 
extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a 
wrong court, should be excluded.” 
 
33. 
 
In the case of J. Kumaradasan Nair & Anr. Vs. IRIC Sohan 
& Ors. (AIR 2009 SC 1333) the Supreme Court while referring to the 
cases of Ghasi Ram (supra) and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises 
(supra) held as follows:- 
 
“12. 
The question which arises for consideration is as to 
whether only because a mistake has been committed by or 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 39 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
on behalf of the appellants in approaching the appropriate 
forum for ventilating their grievances, the same would 
mean that the provision of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of 
the Limitation Act, which is otherwise available, should not 
be taken into consideration at all. The answer to the said 
question must be rendered in the negative. The provisions 
contained in Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act are 
meant for grant of relief where a person has committed 
some mistake. 
 
 
The provisions of Sections 5 and 14 of the 
Limitation Act alike should, thus, be applied in a broad-
based manner. When sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the 
Limitation Act per se is not applicable, the same would not 
mean that the principles akin thereto would not be applied. 
Otherwise, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act 
would apply. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that 
the same would be applicable to a case of this nature. 
 
13. 
There cannot furthermore be any doubt whatsoever 
that having regard to the definition of ‘suit’ as contained in 
Section 2(l) of the Limitation Act, a revision application 
will not answer the said description. But, although the 
provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act per se 
are not applicable, in our opinion, the principles 
thereof would be applicable for the purpose of 
condonation of delay in filing an appeal or a revision 
application in terms of Section 5 thereof.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
34. 
 
Having discussed in detail the case law pertaining to the 
propositions at hand from the sub-continent, we proceed to a 
resolution of the said propositions. 
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 40 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
Question No.1:- Whether Section 14 of the Act applies to appeals and if not, whether 
the principles enshrined therein (Section 14) can be made applicable while considering 
if a sufficient cause has been made out under Section 5 of the Act. 
 
35. 
 
In the preponderance of the cases cited above it has been 
categorically held that the application of Section 14 ibid is restricted to 
suits and the provision shall not be attracted to appeals. However the 
ratio of some cases is that because an appeal is the continuation of 
a suit therefore on the basis thereof the section can be extended to 
appeals. But there are catena of judgments (which are cited by both the sides and 
also researched by our office) propounding the view that although Section 14 
has no direct application to appeals the principles enshrined therein can 
be taken into consideration by the courts while deciding whether a 
sufficient cause for condonation of delay has been established in terms 
of Section 5. As per the salutary rule of interpretation of statutes, for 
construing a provision/section the ordinary dictionary meaning should 
be assigned to a word/expression appearing therein; however if such 
word/expression has been defined in the statute itself it should be given 
the same restrictive meaning. From the word the “suit” which appears in 
Section 14, it is abundantly clear that the said section applies to suits 
and there is no mention of appeal or revision etc. “Suit” has been 
defined in Section 2(10) of the Act (definition clause) as:- 
 
“2(10)  
“suit” does not include an appeal or an 
application:” 
 
Thus from a plain reading there is no ambiguity that Section 14 is 
exclusively and solely restricted to suits and suits alone. If it is taken to 
apply to appeals also, this would be tantamount to reading into the 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 41 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
section the word “appeal” which does not appear in the said section and 
such a reading would be contrary to the definition of the word “suit” in 
the statute. It is not permissible in law to defeat the express provisions of 
law by resorting to any rule of interpretation which would have the 
convoluted effect of rendering an appeal a continuation of the suit for the 
purposes of attracting the application of Section 14. Besides as per the 
rule of casus omissus, the courts are not entitled to read words into an 
Act of Parliament unless clear reasons for it are found within the four 
corners of the Act itself.19 In the instant case we do not find any such 
reasons. It may pertinent to state here that while referring to Section 
2(10) ibid it was held in the judgment of this Court reported as Dr. Syed 
Sibtain Raza Naqvi (supra), that:- 
 
“11. 
On reading Section 14 of the Act along with section 
2(1), it appears that legislature specifically excluded the 
appeal or an application from the purview of “Suit”. We 
left no doubt in our mind that benefit of section 14 of the 
Act cannot be extended to exclude the time consumed in 
prosecuting an appeal before wrong forum having no 
jurisdiction, for the purposes of filing an appeal before a 
forum having jurisdiction.” 
 
This is an apt expression of law and the judgments of this Court which 
provide to the contrary (that the provisions of Section 14 are applicable to appeals) are 
per incuriam because in none of those cases was Section 2(10) ibid 
noticed or its effect considered. Thus our candid and firm opinion is that 
the application of Section 14 is restricted to suits only and has no direct 
and independent application to cases where an appeal has been filed 
before a wrong forum.  
                                     
19 (1910) 79 LJKB 955 and AIR 1980 SC 485.  
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 42 :- 
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36. 
 
Coming to the second part of this question; whether the 
principles of Section 14 ibid can be resorted to for the purposes of 
determining sufficient cause. We have given due and thoughtful 
consideration to all three views and are of the opinion that for the 
purposes of determining whether sufficient cause for condonation of 
delay is made out, no hard and fast rule can be laid down; there cannot 
and should not be a simple test for determining the same. The 
establishing of sufficient cause is not amenable to mathematical 
formulae. Courts are called upon in individual cases to apply their 
judicial faculties to the facts placed before them and weigh the same in 
order to decide whether that ephemeral threshold has been crossed 
which means that the petitioner has convincingly established sufficient 
cause for condonation of delay. This is the reason that in the precedent 
case law, the superior courts have held that it would be unwise and 
unadvisable to state for all times to come that what may or may not 
constitute a sufficient cause; each case ought to be decided on its own 
merits vis-à-vis the plea of sufficient cause. For the purposes of 
determining whether in a given case sufficient cause has been made out 
when an appeal has been filed before a wrong forum, there does not 
seem to be any bar in law that the conditions or the limitation prescribed 
by Section 14 ibid cannot be looked into. However as stated later, while 
attending to question No.2, the conditions laid down in the section must 
be satisfied and established on the record. Mr. Gulzarin Kiyani also 
adopted this position and he has relied upon the case of Ramlal, Motilal 
and Chhotelal (supra) in this regard. Mr. Malik Muhammad Qayyum 
appearing for the other side which pleaded in favour of the proposition 
that time should not be condoned, has refrained from adopting the 
position that the principles of Section 14 cannot be resorted to at all. 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 43 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
Only Mr. Munir Piracha has adopted such a stance but we are not 
persuaded to agree with him for the reason that the term sufficient cause 
has to be given the widest possible amplitude and in so doing the 
conditions/principles of Section 14 ibid cannot be left out.  
 
Question No.2:- Whether the institution and the pendency of the appeal on the wrong 
advice of the counsel before a wrong forum i.e. one lacking jurisdiction constitutes a 
sufficient cause for condonation of delay in terms of Section 5 supra. 
 
37. 
 
The purpose of the laws of limitation is to establish certainty 
in the affairs of men, to bring repose and to bring an end to litigation 
after a certain time period has expired from accrual of an actionable 
right. Both Sections 5 and 14 of the Act are exceptions to the laws of 
limitation. A person claiming under the aforesaid exceptions must 
establish that he or she is not disentitled to the discretionary relief which 
may be awarded by the Court. Therefore a claimant seeking condonation 
of delay must explain the delay of each and every day to the satisfaction 
of the Court, establish that the delay was caused by reasons beyond the 
person’s (or counsel’s) control and that he was not indolent, negligent or 
careless in initiating and pursuing the actionable right which had 
accrued in his favour. The “borrowed” applicability of the provisions of 
Section 14, where its principles are taken into account to set the 
standard for sufficient cause, proceeds on the conditions precedent of 
due diligence and good faith which must be present before the court 
grants condonation of delay on the basis of time spent before wrong fora; 
even if such principles are not taken into consideration the court is not 
supposed to exercise its discretion in any arbitrary, whimsical and 
fanciful manner but has to see if a case was made out by the appellant 
which prevented and precluded him from approaching the right forum of 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 44 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
appeal. The overwhelming case law cited in the earlier part of this 
opinion concludes that the institution and the pendency of an appeal 
before a wrong forum on counsel’s wrong advice i.e. one having no 
jurisdiction does not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of 
delay in terms of Section 5 of the Act, but there is considerable case law 
that supports the contrary view. In my opinion, the gulf betwixt the 
divergent views must be bridged by employing proportionality and 
balancing. It can neither be held that condonation is absolutely ruled out 
in such a situation nor that the appellant shall be entitled to 
condonation as a matter of course and right, rather the Court must look 
into the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether sufficient 
cause has been made out. Because any exercise of discretionary 
jurisdiction in favour of a person seeking relaxation of the application of 
the laws of limitation as of right etc. would be prejudicial to the interests 
of the respondent. A valuable vested right accrues in favour of the 
respondent the moment a relevant period of limitation expires in that the 
respondent is then free from the hanging sword of an actionable claim. In 
order to wrest away this valuable right from a respondent the person 
seeking condonation of delay must establish sufficient cause. However, 
sufficient cause is a term wide enough to encompass within it the 
principles enshrined in Section 14 of the Act or indeed independent 
thereto. Time spent pursuing an appeal before a wrong forum, in good 
faith and with due diligence ought in our view to constitute sufficient 
cause for condonation of delay. But the act of approaching a wrong 
forum must be accounted for: it should be established that due to some 
honest, bona fide and genuine ambiguity in the law or in fact, a party or 
his counsel was led astray in terms of approaching a wrong forum. Mere 
incompetence of the counsel, inadvertence, negligence or ignorance of 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 45 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
law attributable to him and/or overlooking of the record by the counsel 
cannot constitute sufficient cause ipso facto, but the factor(s) which 
misled the legal counsel, including any ambiguity in the law, causing 
him to file the appeal before the wrong forum must be indicated. Mere 
wrong advice of counsel is not an adequate ground per se to constitute 
sufficient cause because if this rule is accepted, the centuries tested rule 
that ignorance of law is no excuse would stand violated. Besides, the 
above factors which caused ambiguity and misled the appellant (or his 
counsel as the case may be) have to be stated with clarity and precision in the 
application for condonation of delay and proved on the record. 
38. 
 
We are cognizant of the fact that a client is at a disadvantage 
with reference to a counsel on account of asymmetric information. There 
may be instances where there is a different period of limitation applicable 
to different fora of appeal, and an appellant whose appeal is time barred 
before an appropriate forum may instead deliberately approach another 
forum (knowing it to be the wrong forum) in order to lay claim that time spent 
before a wrong forum ought to be condoned on account of the fact that 
appellant had approached it (forum) on the advice of counsel. All Courts 
must keep these considerations in mind when deciding whether or not 
delay caused by virtue of alleged wrong advice by counsel should be 
condoned. Though legal counsel are professionals of some learning who 
are required to be au fait with the basics of law in terms of where to file 
an action, we are deeply conscious of the fact that at times certain 
counsel may unwittingly mislead litigants. Poor advice by a counsel may 
well cause hardship to a litigant and compromise his ability to seek 
redress in law. But hardship caused to a person on account of poor 
advice of counsel does not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation 
of delay per se. Courts must insist that applications for condonation of 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 46 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
delay must specify with particularity as to what factors misled the 
counsel and gave him cause to form his unfortunate opinion with respect 
to the (wrong) forum adopted and thereafter the said factors must be 
proved on record. It is then for the court to decide if, on the basis of such 
factors, sufficient cause has been made out or not. A case in point which 
could possibly constitute sufficient cause is where whilst drawing the 
decree, the trial court on account of some clerical inadvertence/omission 
gives a valuation different from the actual valuation for the purposes of 
appeal, due to which a counsel is misled into believing that the appeal 
should be filed in the court as per the valuation in the decree sheet, 
which is in fact incorrect.  
 
Therefore we are fortified in our view that mistaken advice of 
counsel does not constitute a sufficient cause for condonation of delay as 
a matter of course and routine and/or is automatic and per se, rather as 
mentioned above, the appellant has to specify the reasons with clarity 
and precision which prevailed with the counsel and led him to commit 
the mistake and such application must also be supported by an 
affidavit.  
 
Question No.3:- Where an appeal which has been entertained by the staff of the court 
or the court itself which has no pecuniary jurisdiction and is ultimately returned to the 
appellant or is dismissed, whether this protects the appellant from the bar of limitation 
and/or constitutes a sufficient cause for the condonation of delay on the principle of 
actus curiae neminem gravabit. 
 
39. 
 
The noted maxim which connotes “an act of the court shall 
prejudice no man” is founded upon justice and good sense; and affords 
a safe and certain guide for the administration of law and justice. It is 
meant to promote and ensure that the ends of justice are met; it 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 47 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
prescribes that no harm and injury to the rights and the interest of the 
litigants before the court shall be caused by the act or omission of the 
court. This rule of administration of justice is meant for the benefit of 
both sides of litigants before the court and it would be illogical to 
conceive that the rule would or should be applied for the advantage of 
one litigant to the prejudice and disadvantage of the other. It is the duty 
of the court to act as a neutral arbiter between the parties and to provide 
justice to them through strict adherence to law and keeping in mind the 
facts of each case. The rule is neither meant to provide a premium to the 
negligent litigant who finds himself on the wrong side of limitation for 
unfounded reasons and nor to impair the rights of the other side. The 
principles of proportionality and balancing have to be kept at the 
forefront by the court whilst applying this rule. The Court must see 
what fault, if any, has been committed by the court on account of which 
a litigant has been made to suffer; then the court must consider 
whether the benefit of the rule can or should be extended to a negligent 
litigant who has failed to make out a sufficient cause in terms of Section 
5 of the Act as explained above. In our candid opinion the principle actus 
curiae neminem gravabit has no application where a litigant approaches a 
wrong forum and such appeal is entertained by the staff of the court or 
by the court or even admitted to regular hearing. Thus no condonation of 
delay can be availed by the appellant on the basis of this principle. 
 
Question No.4:- Whether the discretion exercised by the courts below in condoning the 
delay cannot be interfered with by the higher court unless the discretion is shown to 
have been exercised arbitrarily. 
 
40. 
 
Discretion exercised by a court below is not open to 
interference by a higher court unless it has been exercised arbitrarily. In 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 48 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
the case of Muhammad Bashir (supra) this Court upheld the condonation 
of delay by the High Court in terms of Section 5 of the Act in the 
following terms:-  
 
“On a careful consideration of the pros and cons of the 
controversy between the parties and in-depth consideration 
of the submissions advanced at the Bar, we are firmly of the 
view that exercise of discretion in the case in hand does not 
suffer from any inherent defect of law, arbitrariness, lack of 
jurisdiction or acting on surmises and conjectures. Suffice 
it to point out that the High Court was fully satisfied with 
the sufficiency of cause shown by the respondents for 
condonation of delay for vital and sound reasons. We are, 
therefore, not inclined to interfere with the exercise of 
discretion by the High Court, which is neither illegal nor 
unreasonable or against the settled norms of jurisprudence. 
 
For   these   reasons,   this   appeal   fails   and   is   hereby 
dismissed.” 
 
Similarly in the case of Province of East Pakistan (supra) this Court 
held:- 
 
“…………..It lies, in the discretion of the High Court to 
condone or not to condone the delay under section 5 of the 
Limitation Act. With such a discretionary order this Court 
does not ordinarily interfere unless it is satisfied that the 
discretion has been exercised arbitrarily, whimsically 
or perversely or in such a manner as to divert the 
law into wrong channels……………” 
[Emphasis added] 
 
41. 
 
We find ourselves in complete agreement with such 
statements of law. In the exercise of its discretionary power the court is 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 49 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
not empowered to act upon whim and caprice: rather the discretion of 
the court is circumscribed by the law, recognized norms of justice, 
fairplay, equity, logic, rationality and reasonableness. Where the Court 
has passed an order in exercise of its discretion by condoning the delay, 
on the basis of sufficient cause which has been made out, it does not 
behove a superior court to interfere in the matter, however the unbridled, 
arbitrary and perverse exercise of discretion does not render it immune 
to the scrutiny and correction by the superior court; thus where no 
sufficient cause on record has been made out yet the discretion for the 
condonation of delay is exercised subjectively and whimsically it is the 
duty of the superior court to rectify the defect in the exercise of 
discretion. Such duty is duly mandated by the provisions of Section 3 of 
the Act. 
42. 
 
Having answered the legal propositions involved in the 
matter, we now examine each case on the touchstone of our answers to 
the propositions. 
 
Civil Appeal No.2564/2001 
43. 
 
The relevant facts of this case are that the predecessors-in-
interest of the appellants, namely Khushi Muhammad and Muhammad 
Ashiq (defendants in the suit) purchased the suit property through a registered 
sale deed dated 10.5.1976 from Mst. Haleema Begum (vendor)  for 
consideration of Rs.100,000/-. The predecessor-in-interest of the 
respondents, Allah Din (plaintiff in the suit) filed a suit against Khushi 
Muhammad etc. for possession through pre-emption on 11.5.1977 in the 
Civil Court, being an owner in the estate. The plaintiff contended that the 
sale actually took place against a consideration of Rs.90,000/- but it was 
shown as Rs.100,000/- in the sale deed to frustrate his right of pre-
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 50 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
emption. Moreover, the suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction 
was valued at Rs.90,000/-. The defendants filed a written statement 
wherein they claimed to have a superior right of pre-emption, being 
tenants of the suit land. After framing of issues and recording of 
evidence, the suit was dismissed by the learned Trial Court on 18.2.1985 
on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish a superior right of 
pre-emption. The appeal filed by the plaintiff before the District Court on 
(or about) 25.3.1985 was accepted by the Appellate Court vide judgment 
and decree dated 7.9.1985 and the suit of the respondent was decreed. 
The defendants filed a regular second appeal (RSA) on 14.9.1985 before 
the learned High Court which was accepted vide judgment dated 
23.12.1992 with the observation that the Additional District Judge was 
not vested with the pecuniary jurisdiction to decide the matter and it was 
directed that the memorandum of appeal which was originally filed on 
25.3.1985 be returned to the plaintiff by the learned Additional District 
Judge to be presented before the proper forum. Pursuant to the 
judgment dated 23.12.1992, the memorandum of appeal was returned to 
the respondent on 2.2.1993 by the Court of the Additional District 
Judge. The plaintiff resubmitted the same before the District Judge on 
the same day i.e. 2.2.1993, because during the pendency of the appeal, 
on 14.6.1986 Section 18(1)(a) of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 
(Ordinance) was amended and the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District 
Court was enhanced from Rs.50,000/- to Rs.200,000/- and it was in this 
background that the appeal was again entertained by the District Court. 
This fresh filing of the appeal was supported by an application under 
Sections 5 and 14 of the Act for condonation of delay. Meanwhile, the 
respondents (legal heirs of Allah Din, the plaintiff) also filed a petition challenging 
the order of the learned High Court dated 23.12.1992 before this Court 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 51 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
which (petition) was converted into Civil Appeal No.734 of 1993 and 
ultimately dismissed on 21.4.1998 with the observation that the 
judgment of the learned High Court was in accordance with law. 
Thereafter, the District Court accepted the application for condonation of 
delay on 6.11.1999 in the following terms:- 
 
“5. 
The technicalities and omission on the part of the 
Court and the parties themselves laboring under wrong 
impression about jurisdiction until award of first appellate 
decree by the Court of District Judge, are to justify the 
sufficient cause as enunciated by Section 5 of the Limitation 
Act. For this reliance can be placed upon PLD 1998 Lahore 
page 503 and 1995 SCMR page 584. The application is 
granted and the appeal is considered within time.” 
 
Aggrieved of the above order, the appellants filed a civil revision before 
the learned High Court which (revision) was dismissed vide judgment 
dated 25.6.2001 inter alia on the ground that the respondents were 
prosecuting their case with due diligence, in good faith and were entitled 
to condonation of delay; besides, the appeal was filed on the same day 
that it was returned i.e. 2.2.1993. The appellants challenged this order in 
C.P. No.2127/2001 (now C.A.2564/2001) in which leave was granted on 
23.11.2001 to consider whether the respondents were entitled to seek 
condonation on account of the time spent before the wrong forum under 
Section 14 of the Act and if not, whether a case for condonation of delay 
in terms of Section 5 of the Act had been made out. 
44. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Satti, learned counsel for the 
appellants has made reference to the judgment of this Court dated 
21.4.1998 passed in Civil Appeal No.734/1994 and stated that the 
respondents’ plea that sufficient cause has been made out was 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 52 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
conclusively discarded by this Court and that such decision operates as 
res judicata between the parties. He submitted that the plaintiff 
(predecessor-in-interest of the respondents) had himself valued the suit for the 
purposes of jurisdiction at Rs.90,000/- and this jurisdictional value also 
appeared in the decree sheet. Consequently, the appeal initiated before 
the learned District Judge was before a wrong forum, lacking pecuniary 
jurisdiction. No factors could be said to have misled the respondents’ 
counsel to file the appeal before a wrong forum. 
45. 
 
On the contrary, Mr. Malik Muhammad Qayyum, counsel for 
the respondents has made reference to the contents of the application 
filed by the respondents under Sections 5 and 14 of the Act before the 
learned District Judge as also the affidavits of the counsel of the 
respondents before the Trial and Appellate Court. Ch. Ahmed Farooq, 
Advocate, who was the counsel for the plaintiff before the Trial Court 
deposed that through a bona fide mistake he inadvertently mentioned in 
the plaint the jurisdictional value of the suit as Rs.90,000/-. Muhammad 
Yaqoob Ch. Advocate, counsel for the respondents before the Appellate 
Court (in the first round of afore-mentioned litigation) deposed that in ground No.10 
of the memorandum of appeal he had specified the correct valuation as 
per the law, and that the filing of the appeal before the learned District 
Judge at the relevant time was on account of the bona fide belief with 
respect to the correct jurisdictional value according to him. It is thus 
argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the aforesaid 
error of approaching the wrong forum was a result of bona fide mistake 
of the learned counsels for the respondents (at the Trial and Appellate stage) and 
the respondents were misled on account of such mistaken advice. 
46. 
 
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have 
considered the submissions made by them. It may be reiterated that the 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 53 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
judgment of the learned High Court returning the memorandum of 
appeal had been challenged by the respondents before this Court in Civil 
Appeal No.734/1994 which was dismissed by this Court on 21.4.1998. 
There was a lengthy discussion about the merits of the case, 
considerable law was cited and finally the Court came to the following 
conclusion:- 
 
“From the entire record it is quite apparent that till filing of 
appeal on 25.3.1985, there was hardly any doubt about 
jurisdictional value of the suit fixed by the appellants. From 
all these facts and circumstances it can be gathered that 
normally at the relevant time appeal filed by the appellants 
before Additional District Judge was not competent”. 
 
In our considered view the above decision settles the issue in that the 
stance of the respondents in approaching the District Court as having 
the pecuniary jurisdiction was rejected; the notion that the counsel for 
the respondents had inadvertently fixed a wrong valuation in the plaint 
and therefore their counsel in appeal could of his own volition change the 
valuation to “the correct valuation” was also rejected. Even otherwise, as 
far as the question of filing of appeal by the respondents’ counsel before 
the wrong forum and a case for sufficient cause in that context being 
made out, it may be pertinent to mention here that there was no reason 
for the counsel of the respondent, whilst filing the appeal, to be misled by 
any fact or the law because the jurisdictional value was clearly 
mentioned in the plaint as Rs.90,000/- by the respondents. Such value 
was also clearly reflected in the decree passed by the learned Trial Court, 
whereby the suit of the respondents was dismissed. Thus the appeal 
should have been filed before the learned High Court as, at the relevant 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 54 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
point of time, it was such Court which had the pecuniary jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal on account of the jurisdictional value fixed in the plaint 
and decree sheet. At best, it is the case of the respondents that incorrect 
valuation had been made in the plaint due to inadvertence; but it 
transpires from the record that an objection was raised by the 
appellants/defendants about the incorrect valuation and that was the 
most opportune moment for the respondents having been put to notice 
about the so-called inadvertent incorrect valuation to ratify the said 
mistake but instead the respondents joined the issue. No attempt was 
ever made by the respondents during the course of trial to correct the 
valuation by seeking an amendment in the plaint. The trial court gave a 
finding on issue No.1 and retained the value of the suit filed by the 
respondents, which valuation squarely and duly appeared in the decree 
sheet; it was thus on the basis of the valuation of the suit fixed by the 
respondents in the plaint themselves and reflected in the decree which 
had to determine the forum of appeal. Thus at the time of passing the 
decree there was no ambiguity which could mislead the respondents’ 
counsel into filing the appeal before the District Court. Whilst answering 
Proposition No.2 we have already held that inadvertence, negligence, 
mistake simpliciter etc. of the counsel does not constitute a sufficient 
cause. And the respondents have not been able to make out a case 
beyond mere inadvertence. As regards the plea of exercise of discretion 
raised by the respondents’ counsel, we are of the considered view that in 
the instant matter the condonation of delay has been granted to the 
respondents by both the courts below for on the basis of arbitrary and 
whimsical reasons, that the exercise of discretion being against settled 
principles can always be interfered with. In view of the above this appeal 
is allowed; by setting aside the orders/judgments impugned the appeal of 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 55 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
the respondents before the District Court is dismissed as being barred by 
time. 
 
Civil Appeal No.2658/2006 
47. 
 
Respondents No.1 to 9 are the plaintiffs of the suit for 
declaration and possession filed inter alia against the appellant. The 
value of the suit for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction was 
categorically mentioned in the plaint at Rs.8,000,000/- (eighty lacs). The 
suit after being contested was decreed by the trial court on 22.2.1994. 
The appellant applied for certified copies of the judgment and decree on 
8.3.1994, which (copies) were prepared and delivered on 26.4.1994. The 
appellant filed a regular first appeal (RFA) on 8.5.1994 before the District 
Court in which an order was passed on 23.6.1994 that the value of the 
suit for the purpose of jurisdiction was Rs.8,000,000/- and the 
memorandum of appeal was accordingly ordered to be returned to the 
appellant for presentation before the learned High Court. The appellant 
received the memorandum of appeal on 2.1.1996 from the District Court 
and filed the RFA before the learned High Court on 8.1.1996 along with 
an application under Section 5 of the Act for condonation of delay of the 
time consumed before the wrong forum. The learned High Court vide 
impugned judgment dated 27.8.2002 dismissed the appeal of the 
appellant on the ground of limitation holding that no sufficient cause for 
delay had been made out. 
48. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that it was 
through the inadvertent mistake of the counsel that the appeal had been 
filed before the wrong forum, suffice it to say that as declared earlier, 
such mistaken advice, even if unintentional, simpliciter does not 
constitute a sufficient cause in terms of Section 5 of the Act, instead 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 56 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
there have to be cogent reasons, clearly spelt out and proved on the 
record, for that purpose. We have perused the application for 
condonation of delay and as rightly observed by the learned High Court 
in the impugned judgment, the said application contains a mere 
narration of the facts leading up to the filing of the appeal before the 
learned District Judge, and there are no plausible reasons or 
justifications given for the filing of such appeal before the wrong forum, 
apart from a feeble assertion that “the delay for filing the Regular First Appeal 
was not intentional on the part of the petitioner”. As regards the averment in the 
said application that the time period from the date of filing of the appeal 
before the wrong forum till the return of the memorandum of appeal for 
filing before the correct forum should be condoned “because the petitioners’ 
appeal remained pending before Additional District Judge”, we may observe (as held 
in the earlier part of this opinion) that mere pendency of an appeal before the 
wrong forum especially when no sufficient cause has been made out 
shall not be a ground per se or simpliciter for condonation of delay. 
Besides as mentioned above the memorandum of appeal was ordered to 
be returned on 23.6.1994 and the appellant never approached the Court 
for receiving the same within reasonable time rather, after considerable 
lapse of time of about 18 months, it was received on 2.1.1996. There 
is/was no explanation for such delay, i.e. 18 months and 10 days. It is 
not the case of the appellant that after the order of return of the 
memorandum of appeal it approached the Court promptly and it was the 
Court which took delayed in returning the memorandum of appeal. In 
light of the above, interference with the impugned judgment of the 
learned High Court is not warranted, thus the appeal merits dismissal. 
 
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 57 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
Civil Appeal No.1670/2008 
49. 
 
The respondent is the plaintiff who pre-empted the sale of 
the suit house in favour of the appellants by clearly valuing his suit for 
the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction at Rs.1,200,000/- (twelve lacs). 
The suit after being contested was decreed on 2.10.2004 in the plaintiff’s 
favour. The appellants applied for certified copies of judgment on 
7.10.2004, which were delivered on 10.12.2004, after which they filed an 
appeal before the learned District Judge on 5.1.2005, which was 
admitted to regular hearing on 26.9.2005 and returned on 26.9.2005 for 
lack of pecuniary jurisdiction. Subsequently, the appellants filed an 
appeal before the learned High Court on 18.10.2005 which was 
dismissed by the Court through the impugned judgment dated 2.6.2008 
with the observation that the value of the suit property for the purpose of 
jurisdiction was specifically mentioned in the plaint as Rs.1,200,000/-, 
hence, there was no confusion about the appellate forum and negligence 
of counsel was no ground for condonation of delay (note:- even on merits, it was 
found that the appellant had failed to establish his case). Aggrieved, the appellants 
approached this Court, hence the instant appeal with the leave of the 
Court. 
50. 
 
Heard. As is clear from the impugned judgment of the 
learned High Court no reasons were assigned by the appellants in their 
application seeking condonation of delay which could constitute a 
sufficient cause within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 
1908 as enunciated in the earlier part of this judgment. 
A perusal of the plaint (paragraph No.6) indicates that the value of the 
suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction was clearly stated as 
Rs.1,200,000/-. The judgment of the learned Trial Court reflects the 
amount of Rs.1,200,000/- as the sale consideration paid by the 
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-: 58 :- 
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appellants which is resultantly the market value of the suit house, and 
the decree sheet prepared by the learned Trial Court also mentions the 
value of Rs.1,200,000/-. Furthermore, the memorandum of appeal filed 
before the learned District Judge also categorically states the appeal to 
be valued at Rs.1,200,000/- for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. 
There was no ambiguity regarding the law because at the relevant point 
in time, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge was capped at 
Rs1,000,000/- by virtue of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 (as it is a KPK 
matter). In light of the foregoing aspects of the matter, there can be no 
justifiable reason for filing the appeal before the District Judge. With 
respect to the justification given by the learned counsel for the appellants 
before the learned High Court that such mistake was inadvertent; suffice 
it to say that sheer inadvertence, negligence and/or mistake (albeit bona 
fide) is not recognised as a sufficient cause for condonation of delay, and 
neither does it reflect exercise of due diligence on behalf of the appellants 
or their counsel. As regards the plea that it was the duty of the learned 
District Court to have examined the pecuniary jurisdiction and the Court 
was at fault for not returning the memorandum of appeal on time, we 
find the idea risible; we have already held in the earlier part of this 
opinion that the same is not a valid reason for the condonation of delay 
of time spent before a wrong forum. In light of the above, we are of the 
forthright view that the learned High Court was correct in refusing to 
condone the delay; therefore, this appeal is hereby dismissed. 
 
Civil Appeals No.60-L/2013 and 280-L/2013  
51. 
 
These two appeals have been filed against a common 
judgment of the Lahore High Court hence will be dealt with together. The 
appellants of Civil Appeal No.60-L/2013 are the plaintiff/pre-emptors 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 59 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
(respondents in Civil Appeal No.280-L/2013) while the appellants of Civil Appeal 
No.280-L/2013 are the defendants/vendees (respondents in Civil Appeal No.60-
L/2013). For the sake of convenience, Civil Appeal No.280-L will be used as 
our reference point. 
The respondents filed a suit for possession through pre-emption 
regarding the suit land against the appellants (vendees) and the 
mortgagees, whereas the subsequent purchasers, appellants No.20 to 30, 
were impleaded afterwards. The respondents’ claim was that the 
consideration amount of the sale was Rs.100,000/- but in order to 
frustrate and prejudice their right of pre-emption, an exaggerated price of 
Rs. 353,000/- was entered in the record, out of which Rs.118,000/- was 
shown to be payable to mortgagees of the suit land. The value of the suit 
for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction was fixed as Rs.6,559.20/- 
(six thousand five hundred and fifty nine rupees and twenty paisas). After the trial of the 
case the suit was decreed in favour of the appellants (plaintiffs) on 
23.2.1976 subject to payment of Rs.353,000/- less the amount already 
deposited by them as Zar-e-Panjam on or before 24.04.1976, failing 
which the suit would stand dismissed with costs. The learned trial court 
also held that out of this consideration Rs.118,000/- would be received 
by the mortgagees. Aggrieved, the respondents filed an appeal on 
15.6.1976 before the learned High Court challenging the decree to the 
extent of decretal amount only. The appeal was admitted for regular 
hearing on 1.7.1976 but the learned Division Bench on 28.1.1990 
remitted the appeal to the District Court due to lack of pecuniary 
jurisdiction. Such decision however was reviewed by the learned High 
Court on an application (CM No.1-C of 1990) filed by the appellants and 
instead of remitting the appeal, vide order dated 6.2.1990 it was directed 
that the memorandum of appeal be returned to the respondents for 
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-: 60 :- 
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presenting the same before the competent court by 13.2.1990. The 
respondents received the memorandum of appeal on 13.02.1990 and 
filed the same before the learned District Judge that very day. The appeal 
was heard by the learned District Judge on 20.9.1995 when the 
respondents counsel made a statement to the effect that as the value of 
the property has increased thus the respondents were ready to deposit 
the decretal amount of Rs.353,000/- and would withdraw the appeal; 
however in the same breath it was requested that time for the deposit of 
the balance pre-emption amount, as directed by the trial court (note:- the 
time given by the trial court in this behalf was till 24.4.1976, failing which the suit would stand 
dismissed) may be extended. The learned District Judge vide judgment 
dated 20.9.1995 dismissed the appeal as having been withdrawn. The 
request for extension of time for payment of the decretal amount was 
declined. The court also declined the verbal request for condonation of 
delay in filing the appeal. Aggrieved of the above judgment of the learned 
District Judge, the respondents filed a regular second appeal before the 
learned High Court on 20.12.1995 which was allowed on 17.12.2012 
through the impugned judgment. Delay has been condoned on the 
ground that at the time of filing the appeal before the High Court 
(admittedly the wrong forum) the respondents were minors; their guardian acted 
on the wrong advice of learned counsel; the High Court (in the earlier round of 
litigation) while returning the appeal allowed the respondents time up to 
13.2.1990, which was filed by them before the District Judge the same 
day. All these factors according to the High Court constitute a sufficient 
cause for condonation of delay. 
 
It may be relevant to mention that as regards the merits, the 
learned High Court restored the judgment and decree of the learned Trial 
Court with the modification that the appellants may/will deposit the 
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-: 61 :- 
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market price of the suit land as fixed by the District Price Committee 
prevailing on 13.11.2012 within two months from the date of 
announcement of the judgment. Both parties being aggrieved of the 
impugned judgment have filed separate appeals which are now before us 
for determination.  
52. 
 
Heard. The respondents being minors at the relevant point of 
time had duly filed the suit through a next friend; the same is the 
position of their appeal(s) before the High Court and learned District 
Judge; they were duly represented on both the occasions by a person 
(next friend) who was pursuing their best interests thus any alleged mistake 
of the next friend cannot be considered to be a sufficient cause for the 
condonation of delay. It is an admitted position on the record that the 
respondents themselves valued their suit for the purposes of court fee 
and jurisdiction at Rs.6,559.20. This value was not varied by the trial 
court. No reasons are established on the record which misled the counsel 
to give wrong advice in filing the appeal before the learned High Court; in 
fact no application in this context to establish sufficient cause for the 
condonation of delay was moved. Above all the decree in this case was 
passed by the trial court on 23.2.1976, the respondents applied for the 
copy on 8.3.1976, the copy was delivered on 5.4.1976, the appeal before 
the High Court was filed on 15.6.1976 and admittedly by that time the 
appeal before the District Court was barred by time. It seems obvious, or 
at any rate more than likely, that to cross the bar of limitation an 
abortive attempt was made to file the appeal before the High Court which 
lacked pecuniary jurisdiction. Simply because the appeal was filed before 
the District Judge the same day that the memorandum of appeal was 
returned does not by itself satisfy the test of Section 5 ibid; besides the 
direction of the learned High Court to file the appeal before the District 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 62 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
Court by 13.2.1990 cannot be construed in any manner to mean that the 
delay has been impliedly condoned. 
 
In the light of the above, we allow this appeal, set aside the 
impugned judgment of the High Court condoning the delay in filing of the 
appeal by the respondents before the District Court, with the 
consequence that the order of the Additional District Judge dated 
28.9.1995 is restored, in that the appeal of the respondents filed before 
the District Court stands dismissed as being barred by time. As Civil 
Appeal No.280-L/2013 has been allowed, Civil Appeal No.60-L/2013 
being against the decision of the High Court for enhancement of the sale 
price of the suit land in the circumstances is rendered infructuous and is 
disposed of accordingly. 
 
Civil Appeal No.60/2014 
53. 
 
The appellant/plaintiff is a pre-emptor of the suit land whose 
suit against the respondents after being contested was dismissed by the 
trial court on 14.12.2010. The value of the suit for purposes of court fee 
and jurisdiction fixed in the plaint is Rs.1,700,000/- (seventeen lacs). The 
appellant applied for certified copies of the judgment on 22.12.2010 
which (copies) were delivered to him on 24.12.2010 and the appeal was 
filed on 4.1.2011 before the District Court which was admitted to regular 
hearing on 10.1.2011. However, the appeal was returned on 1.7.2011 for 
want of pecuniary jurisdiction. Thereafter the appellant filed the appeal 
before the learned High Court on 6.7.2011 along with an application for 
condonation of delay under Sections 5 and 14 of the Act. The learned 
High Court vide the impugned judgment dated 23.10.2013 refused to 
condone the delay and dismissed the application for condonation of delay 
and the appeal as being barred by time on the ground that the suit was 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 63 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
clearly valued at Rs.1,700,000/- for the purpose of jurisdiction and that 
negligence of counsel does not constitute a sufficient cause and neither 
does an act of the Court (as it is a KPK matter). Aggrieved the appellant 
preferred the instant appeal with the leave of this Court. 
54. 
 
Heard. The application for condonation of delay filed by the 
appellant (note:- which seemingly is unsupported by an affidavit), does not propound 
any plausible reason for filing the appeal before the learned District 
Judge. The application is essentially a bald factual narration leading to 
the filing of appeal before the wrong forum, save for the plea that it was 
the fault of the District Court that the appellant’s appeal was entertained 
despite lack of pecuniary jurisdiction which has resulted in the 
appellant’s suffering. In light of the view expressed in the earlier portion 
of this opinion regarding the principle of actus curiae neminem gravabit; 
the same is not attracted to the instant case and the plea raised by the 
appellant in his application for condonation of delay on that account in 
no way constitutes a sufficient cause to exclude the time spent before the 
wrong forum. There is no justification whatsoever provided in the said 
application indicating as to why the appellant or his counsel were led 
into believing that the appeal was to be filed before the District Court, 
when the plaint itself describes the value of the suit as Rs.1,700,000/-. 
The view of the learned High Court is unexceptionable, calling for no 
interference, therefore, the appeal is hereby dismissed. 
 
Civil Appeal No.965/2014 
55. 
 
This case entails the following facts:- the respondent 
Hussain filed a suit for recovery of Rs.5,000,000/- as damages against 
the appellant. The appellant contested the suit, issues were framed and 
evidence was recorded, after which the learned Trial Court decreed the 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 64 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
suit to the extent of Rs.800,000/- vide judgment and decree dated 
18.11.2011. The appellant preferred an appeal before the District Judge 
on 23.12.2011 which was admitted to regular hearing. Upon an 
application filed by the respondent for dismissal of the appeal for want of 
pecuniary jurisdiction, the learned District 
Court 
returned the 
memorandum of appeal to the appellant through order dated 30.10.2013 
for presentation before the correct forum as the suit was valued at 
Rs.5,000,000/-. The appellant applied for certified copies of the 
documents on 2.11.2013 which were prepared on 11.11.2013 and were 
delivered on 27.11.2013. On receipt of the certified copies, the appellant 
moved an application for receipt of original file on 29.11.2013 which 
(application) was disposed of through order dated 2.12.2013 for the return 
of documents after the receipt of certified copies. The appellant again 
applied for the certified copies of the file which were delivered to him on 
30.12.2013 and on the same day, he received the original file. The 
appellant presented the appeal before the learned High Court on 
9.1.2014 along with an application under Section 5 of the Act for 
condonation of delay. The appeal was dismissed by the learned High 
Court through the impugned judgment dated 7.4.2014 on the ground 
that even after return, the appeal was filed beyond the period of 
limitation and no explanation was given in the affidavit. Aggrieved, the 
appellant filed the instant appeal with the leave of this Court. 
56. 
 
Heard. We find that the explanation set out in the appellant’s 
application for condonation of delay (paragraph No.4 thereof) that the mistake 
in filing the appeal before the learned District Court was neither 
intentional nor deliberate is not persuasive. It is worthy to note that the 
value of Rs.5,000,000/- is clearly reproduced in the title itself, paragraph 
No.14 and the prayer of the plaint. Paragraph No.18 particularly provides 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 65 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
“That the value of the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction is fixed for 
Rs.50,00,000/-…” The figure of Rs.5,000,000/- also finds mention in the 
decree sheet of the learned Trial Court. The above leaves no room for 
doubt or confusion that the value of the suit for the purposes of 
pecuniary jurisdiction was indeed Rs.5,000,000/- and accordingly the 
appeal should have been filed before the learned High Court. The ‘reason’ 
that the mistake was unintentional simpliciter is not a sufficient cause 
within the purview of Section 5 of the Act as has been held in the earlier 
portion of this opinion. No case for interference has been made out; the 
appeal is hereby dismissed. 
 
Civil Appeal No.218/2015 
57. 
 
The appellant/plaintiff filed a pre-emption suit against the 
respondent/defendant in respect of the suit property which was 
purchased by the respondent through registered sale deed dated 
7.5.2008 against a price of Rs.2,500,000/- but as per the contention of 
the appellant, the actual consideration fixed and paid was Rs.500,000/- 
and the suit was accordingly valued for the purpose of jurisdiction at 
Rs.500,000/-. The respondent contested such valuation and issue No.5 
was framed on the basis thereof.  The learned Trial Court decreed the 
suit vide judgment and decree dated 29.6.2011 by fixing the sale price as 
Rs.2,500,000/-. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal (RFA 
No.53/2011) before the learned High Court on 19.7.2011 while the appellant 
filed an appeal (RCA No.138/XIII/2011) before the learned District Court on 
25.7.2011. The learned District Court vide order dated 26.7.2011 
returned the appeal of the appellant for presentation before the correct 
forum on the ground that the value of the property for the purpose of 
Court fee and jurisdiction was Rs.2,500,000/-. The appellant accepted 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 66 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
this position and filed an appeal (RFA No.63/2011) before the learned High 
Court on 17.8.2011. Both of the appeals (of the appellant and respondent) were 
returned by the learned High Court vide judgment dated 8.10.2013 to 
the parties for presentation before the proper forum on the ground that 
the valuation of the suit for the purpose of Court fee and jurisdiction was 
given as Rs.500,000/- in the plaint, hence, as per Section 18 of the 
Ordinance the appeal(s) was maintainable before the District Court, in 
spite of the fact that the learned Trial Court fixed the market value of the 
property as Rs.2,500,000/-, because the forum of appeal was to be 
determined on the basis of the valuation given in the original plaint. The 
respondent presented the appeal along with an application for 
condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Act before the learned 
District Court on 22.10.2013 which (appeal) was dismissed on 3.7.2014 as 
being time-barred. It is pertinent to note that the appellant pursuant to 
the order dated 8.10.2013 neither received memorandum of appeal nor 
filed the same before the learned District Court, therefore, to his extent, 
matter ended. Aggrieved of the judgment dated 22.10.2013, the 
respondent filed a civil revision before the learned High Court which 
(revision) was allowed vide the impugned judgment dated 3.10.2014 with 
the observation that the respondent was a victim of the act of the Court 
which was sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The appellant 
challenged the above order before this Court, hence the instant appeal 
with the leave of this Court. 
58. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellant argued that there was no 
confusion regarding the value of the suit for the purpose of filing the 
appeal as such value was clearly stated in the plaint; there was no 
finding by the learned Trial Court amending the value of the suit which 
could be said to have taken precedence over the value set out in the 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 67 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
plaint. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent submitted 
that the reason for the respondent filing the appeal before the learned 
High Court as opposed to the learned District Court was that the learned 
Trial Court in respect of issue No.5 regarding the market value of the suit 
property had held it to be Rs.2,500,000/- and it was this factor that 
misled the respondent into believing that the appeal should have been 
filed before the learned High Court. 
59. 
 
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Upon a 
perusal of the plaint, it is manifest from the title and paragraph No.1 
thereof that the appellant had valued the suit property at Rs.500,000/-. 
Paragraph No.6 specifically mentions Rs.500,000/- as the value of the 
suit for the purposes of pecuniary jurisdiction. Such valuation was 
categorically denied by the respondent through her written statement 
(paragraphs No.1 and 6 thereof) asserting it to be Rs.2,500,000/-. It is in light of 
this divergent pleas that the learned Trial Court framed issue No.5 in 
that “What is the market value of the suit property?” and held as follows:- 
 
“The burdon (sic burden) of proof this issue is on the 
plaintiff. The plaintiff in the plaint assert that the value of 
the suit property is no more than Rs. 5,00000/-, but in order 
to deprive the plaintiff rights of the plaintiff an incorrect 
amount of Rs. 25,00000/- were mentioned as sale 
consideration in Vasiqa # 1431, dated 07.05.2008. The 
plaintiff has failed to produce in the Court any witness in 
this regard. Moreover, none of the official witness is called 
for in this respect to produce the average price table 
regarding this issue, meaning thereby the plaintiff himself 
admitted the fact that the value of the suit property is Rs. 
25,00,000/-. So, Rs. 25,00,000/- is fixed as market value of 
the suit property. So, the issue is decided in negative.” 
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 68 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
Keeping in view the above finding of the trial court, which determination 
was duly reflected in the decree sheet as well, the respondent was 
justified in considering that the value of the suit for the purposes of 
jurisdiction had been changed/modified by the trial court, thus leading 
him to prefer an appeal before the High Court whereas the appellant 
[whose appeal had already been returned by the District Court and who 
in compliance with the said order himself filed an appeal before the High 
Court] raised an objection that the High Court lacked the pecuniary 
jurisdiction and sought the return of respondent’s appeal and succeeded 
in this behalf. But the learned High Court while passing the order of 
return remained oblivious that in a suit for pre-emption of a house (urban 
property) the value of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction is the sale 
consideration of the suit property; thus as per the finding of the trial 
court on issue No.5, when it was held that the sale consideration was 
Rs.2,500,000/- this modified the jurisdictional value automatically. We 
have considered the decree sheet prepared by the trial court which is 
absolutely in consonance with the finding of the trial court on the said 
issue. The market value of the suit property at Rs.2,500,000/- has been 
clearly indicated therein, thus for all intents and purposes the above 
became the changed value for the purposes of jurisdiction of the forum of 
appeal. In fact the respondent had rightly filed the appeal before the High 
Court in the first instance and the earlier order of the High Court dated 
8.10.2013 returning the appeal was/is bad in law. In this manner the 
respondent has been compelled to file his appeal before the District 
Court which had no jurisdiction on account of the increase in the sale 
price of the property by the trial court. Therefore for the purposes of 
doing complete justice we set aside the judgment of the High Court dated 
8.10.2013 and hold that the original RFA No.53/2011 of the respondent 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 69 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
be deemed to be pending before the High Court and be decided on 
merits. We must express our dismay that the respondent for no mistake 
on his part has been made to run from pillar to post for pursuing his 
statutory right of appeal. In light of the above, this appeal is dismissed. 
60. 
 
To recapitulate, Civil Appeals No.2564/2011, 2658/2006, 
1670/2008, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 are dismissed, Civil 
Appeal No.280-L/2013 is allowed and Civil Appeal No.60-L/2013 is 
disposed of as having been rendered infructuous. 
 
 
 
  CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on __________________ at ___________________ 
 
Not Approved For Reporting 
Waqas Naseer/* 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 70 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
 
 
EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.-  I have gone through the scholarly written 
judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar and respectfully 
agree with the answers to questions Nos. 1, 2 and 4. I, however, don’t agree with 
the answer to question No. 3. The question reads as under:-  
“Question No. 3:- 
Where 
an 
appeal 
which 
has 
been 
entertained by the staff of the court or the court itself which has 
no pecuniary jurisdiction and is ultimately returned to the 
appellant or is dismissed, whether this protects the appellant from 
the bar of limitation and/or constitutes a sufficient cause for the 
condonation of delay on the principle of actus curiae neminem 
gravabit.”      
 
2. 
 
The answer reads as under :-  
“39. 
The noted maxim which connotes “an act of the court 
shall prejudice no man” is founded upon justice and good sense; 
and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of 
law and justice. It is meant to promote and ensure that the ends 
of justice are met; it prescribes that no harm and injury to the 
rights and the interest of the litigants before the court shall be 
caused by the act or omission of the court. This rule of 
administration of justice is meant for the benefit of both sides of 
litigants before the Court and it would be illogical to conceive 
that the rule would or should be applied for the advantage of 
one litigant to the prejudice and disadvantage of the other. It is 
the duty of the Court to act as a neutral arbiter between the 
parties and to provide justice to them through strict adherence 
to law and keeping in mind the fact of each case. The rule is 
neither meant to provide a premium to the negligent litigant who 
finds himself on the wrong side of limitation for unfounded 
reasons and nor to impair the rights of the other side. The 
principles of proportionality and balancing have to be kept at 
the forefront by the court whilst applying this rule. The Court must 
see what fault, if any, has been committed by the court on 
account of which a litigant has been made to suffer; then the 
court must consider whether the benefit of the rule can or should 
be extended to a negligent litigant who has failed to make out a 
sufficient cause in terms of Section 5 of the Act as explained 
above. In our candid opinion the principle actus curiae neminem 
gravabit has no application where a litigant approaches a 
wrong forum and such appeal is entertained by the staff of the 
court or by the court or even admitted to regular hearing. Thus 
no condonation of delay can be availed by the appellant on 
the basis of this principle.”   
 
3. 
 
Before I deal with the answer it is worthwhile to know what does the 
maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit stand for, what is its origin, how has it 
been applied in the past and even today and what is the rationale behind it? 
This maxim so to speak, has been founded upon the principles of justice and 
good conscience. This maxim appears to be as old as the Court itself. The 
rationale behind this maxim is to undo the wrong or prejudice caused to a party 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 71 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
by the act of the Court. Its application assumed different forms and 
manifestations at different stages of the history. Even today this maxim is applied 
to undo an injury or injustice caused to a party by an act of the Court or by the 
laches or mistakes of its officers. It is also applied to restore what has been 
delayed or denied to a party by the act of the Court or negligence of the 
persons manning and managing it. In early eighties of 19th Century, Mr. Justice 
Harlan in the case of Robert Mitchell. v. A. M. Overman (103 U.S. 64-65) while 
delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States commented on 
the maxim in the words reading as under :-  
“The adjudged cases are very numerous in which have been 
considered the circumstances under which Courts may properly 
enter a judgment or decree as of a date anterior to that on 
which it is, in fact, rendered. We deem it unnecessary to present 
an analysis  of the authorities, some of which are cited in a note 
to this opinion, but content ourselves with saying that the rule 
established by the general concurrence of the American and 
English courts, is, that where the delay in rendering judgment or 
decree arises from the act of the court, that is, where the delay 
has been for its convenience, or has been caused by the 
multiplicity or press of business or the intricacy of the questions 
involved, or for any other cause not attributable to the laches of 
the parties, but within the control of the court, the judgment or 
decree may be entered retrospectively, as of a time when it 
should or might have been entered up. In such cases, upon the 
maxim, actus curiae neminem gravabit, which has been well 
said to be founded upon justice and good sense and to afford a 
safe and certain guide for the administration of justice, it is the 
duty of the court to see that the parties did not suffer by the 
delay. Whether a nunc pro tunc order should be made, depends 
upon the circumstances of the particular case. It should be 
granted or refused, as the justice of the cause may require. These 
principles control the present cause, Stutzman was alive when 
the cause was argued and submitted for decree. He was 
entitled at that time, or at the Term of submission, to claim its final 
disposition. A decree was not then entered because the case, 
after argument, was taken under advisement. The delay was 
altogether the act of the court, and its duty was to order a 
decree nunc pro tunc, so as to avoid entering an erroneous 
decree.”         
 
4. 
 
Act of the Court if considered in isolation may appear to have no 
nexus with the cause justifying extension of time for not preferring an appeal well 
within the time prescribed therefore or exclusion of time spent in prosecuting the 
suit in a wrong forum. But when it is considered with reference to the other facts 
and circumstances attending such cases, it is not only inextricably intertwined 
but has deep nexus with the cause justifying extension or exclusion of time as the 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 72 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
case may be. Wrong or mistaken advice of a counsel has been recognized as a 
sufficient cause for extension or exclusion of time eversince the enactment of the 
Limitation Act, 1877 and the Limitation Act, 1908 in India as is evident from the 
judgments rendered in the cases of Brij Indar Singh. Vs. Lala Kanshi Ram and 
others (AIR 1917 P.C. (From Lahore), Sunderbai and another. Vs. Collector of 
Belgaum and others  (AIR 1918 P.C.) (From Bombay), Kanwar Rajendra Bahadur 
Singh. Vs. Rai Rajeshwar Bali and others (AIR 1937 P.C. 276),  Mata Din. Vs. A. 
Narayanan (AIR 1970 SC 1953), State of Kerala. Vs. Krishna Kurup Madhava Kurup 
(AIR 1971 Ker 211), Badlu and another. Vs. Shiv Charan and others [(1980) 4 SCC 
401] and Ghasi Ram and others. Vs. Chait Ram Saini and others [(1998) 6 SCC 
200]. But what is wrong advice of a counsel in essence and substance? It, as far 
as I am capable to understand, is nothing but a wrong signal at a junction of a 
road to a desired destination, which misleads a wayfarer. What is entertainment 
of an appeal or a suit by a wrong forum in effect and consequence? It is also 
nothing but another wrong signal at another junction of such road. If a wrong 
advice like a wrong signal at one junction of the road could mislead a wayfarer, 
entertainment of an appeal or a suit by a wrong forum like another wrong signal 
at another junction of the road to the destination, could also mislead him. What 
to do in a situation thus emerging? Sections 5 and 14 of the Limitation Act answer 
the question by providing for extension of time for not preferring the appeal well 
within time prescribed therefor and exclusion of time spent in prosecuting the suit 
in a wrong forum. Whether it is the appeal or the suit the cause for preferring or 
prosecuting it in the wrong forum is mistaken view of its jurisdiction, which in the 
first instance finds expression in the advice of the counsel and then in the act of 
the Court entertaining such appeal or suit. If allowance could be given for 
mistaken view of the counsel I don’t understand why could it not be given for 
mistaken view of the Court entertaining the appeal or the suit. It would thus be 
unjust, unfair and unreasonable to treat the two differently simply because one 
finds expression in the act of the counsel and the other finds expression in the act 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 73 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
of the Court. The latter deserves all the more allowance firstly because the Court 
entertaining the appeal or the suit did not care to know that it lay outside its 
jurisdiction; secondly because it sat over it for months and months together 
instead of returning it for being presented in the Court of competent jurisdiction 
and thirdly because the appellant or the plaintiff went out of limitation on 
account of the aforesaid act of the Court.  
5. 
 
It is true that Sections 5 and 14 of the Act being distinct in their 
scope and application deal with distinct states and situations, but it is equally 
true that the distinction between the two disappears when both of them intend 
to undo any injury or injustice caused to the appellant or the plaintiff by the act 
of the counsel or by that of the Court and protect the lis having merit from being 
thrown out at the threshold without being considered. It was in view of this 
equation between the two that the principle justifying exclusion of the time spent 
in prosecuting the suit in a wrong forum was also applied to appeal if prosecuted 
in good faith and with due diligence. Judgments rendered in the cases of 
Consolidated 
Engineering 
Enterprises. 
Vs. 
Principle 
Secretary, 
Irrigation 
Department and others [(2008) 7 SCC 167] and J. Kumaradasan Nair & Anr. Vs. 
IRIC Sohan & Ors. (AIR 2009 SC 1333) are lucid and luminous examples in this 
behalf. It is correct that such act of the Court or its officials as highlighted in the 
main judgment authored by my learned brother Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar, 
invariably prejudices one and places the other party in advantage, but it has to 
be undone in line with the letter and spirit of sections 5 and 14 of the Act to 
ensure equilibrium in the administration of justice and avert injustice and its 
perpetuation. If impair of a right accruing to the other party could be a reason 
for denying premium to the appellant or the plaintiff on account of the act of 
the Court, it could also be a reason for denying premium to the appellant or the 
plaintiff on account of the act of the counsel. It would thus be against the 
principles of parity, propriety and proportionality to give premium to the act of 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 74 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
the counsel and deny it to the act of the Court. For being evenhanded is better 
than being lopsided while sitting in judgment on the matters of this nature.  
6. 
 
In the case of Rodger. v. The Comptoir d’ Escompte de Paris (1871) 
3 P.C. 465) the principle enshrined in the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit was 
also recognized as having much wider implications in the words reproduced below :-  
“One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care 
that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the suitors and 
when the expression ‘the act of the Court is used, it does not 
mean merely the act of the primary Court, or of any intermediate 
Court of Appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole from the 
lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to 
the highest Court which finally disposes of the case.” 
 
7. 
 
In the case of Jai Berham and others. Vs. Kedar Nath Marwari and 
others (AIR 1922 P.C. 269) the same principle was upheld by the Privy Council by 
holding as under :-  
“It is the duty of the Court under S. 144 of the Civil Procedure 
Code to “place the parties in the position which they would 
have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has 
been varied or reversed”. 
 
Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely 
under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of 
the Court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances 
towards all parties involved.”   
 
8. 
 
In East Suffolk Rivers Catchment Board. Vs. Kent and another (1941 
AC 74) Lord Atkin, after referring to some decisions of House of Lords, observed 
as under :-      
“I treat it therefore as established that a public authority whether 
doing an act which it is its duty to do, or doing an act which it is 
merely empowered to do, must in doing the act do it without 
negligence, or as it is put in some of the cases must not do it 
carelessly or improperly. Now quite apart from a duty owed to a 
particular individual which is the question in this case I suggest 
that it would be difficult to lay down that a duty upon a public 
authority to act without negligence or not carelessly or 
improperly does not include a duty to act with reasonable 
diligence by which I mean reasonable dispatch.”  
 
9. 
 
Lord Eldon in Pulteney. Vs. Warren (1801) 6 Ves. 73, 92 observed as 
under :-  
“If there be a principle, upon which Courts of justice ought to act 
without scruple, it is this; to relieve parties against that injustice 
occasioned by its own acts or oversights at the instance of the 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 75 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
party, against whom the relief is sought. That proposition is 
broadly laid down in some of the cases”.  
This view was approved of by the House of Lords in The East India 
Company v. Campion (1837) 11 Bli. (N.S.) 158.” 
 
10. 
 
In the case of Parker. Vs. Ellis (362 U.S. 574) the Supreme Court of 
the United States reaffirmed the dictum rendered in the case of Robert Mitchell. 
v. A. M. Overman (supra) by holding as under :-  
“It is the fault of the Courts, not Parker’s fault, that final 
adjudication in this case was delayed until after he had served 
his sentence. Justice demands that he be given the relief he 
deserves. Since the custody requirement, if any, was satisfied 
when we took jurisdiction of the case, I would grant the relief as 
of that date”.    
 
11. 
 
In the case of Sough Eastern Coalfields Ltd., Vs. State of M. P. and 
others (AIR 2003 SC 4482) while dilating upon the act of the Court and suffering 
of the parties therefrom held as under :-  
“26.    That no one shall suffer by an act of the court is not a rule 
confined to an erroneous act of the court; the 'act of the court' 
embraces within its sweep all such acts as to which the court 
may form an opinion in any legal proceedings that the court 
would not have so acted had it been correctly apprised of the 
facts and the law. The factor attracting applicability of restitution 
is not the act of the Court being wrongful or a mistake or error 
committed by the Court; the test is whether on account of an 
act of the party persuading the Court to pass an order held at 
the end as not sustainable, has resulted in one party gaining an 
advantage which it would not have otherwise earned, or the 
other party has suffered an impoverishment which it would not 
have suffered but for the order of the Court and the act of such 
party. The quantum of restitution, depending on the facts and 
circumstances of a given case, may take into consideration not 
only what the party excluded would have made but also what 
the party under obligation has or might reasonably have made. 
There is nothing wrong in the parties demanding being placed in 
the same position in which they would have been, had the court 
not intervened by its interim order when at the end of the 
proceedings the court pronounces its judicial verdict which does 
not match with and countenance its own interim verdict. 
Whenever called upon to adjudicate, the court would act in 
conjunction with what is the real and substantial justice. The 
injury, if any, caused by the act of the court shall be undone and 
the gain which the party would have earned unless it was 
interdicted by the order of the court would be restored to or 
conferred on the party by suitably commanding the party liable 
to do so. Any opinion to the contrary would lead to unjust if not 
disastrous consequences. Litigation may turn into a fruitful 
industry. Though litigation is not gambling yet there is an element 
of chance in every litigation. Unscrupulous litigants may feel 
encouraged to approach the Courts, persuading the court to 
pass interlocutory orders favourable to them by making out a 
prima facie case when the issues are yet to be heard and 
determined on merits and if the concept of restitution is excluded 
from application to interim orders, then the litigant would stand 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 76 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
to gain by swallowing the benefits yielding out of the interim 
order even though the battle has been lost at the end. This 
cannot be countenanced, we are, therefore, of the opinion that 
the successful party finally held entitled to a relief assessable in 
terms of money at the end of the litigation, is entitled to be 
compensated by award of interest at a suitable reasonable rate 
for the period for which the interim order of the court withholding 
the release of money had remained in operation.” 
 
12. 
 
In the case of Amarjeet Singh and others. Vs. Devi Ratan and others 
(AIR 2010 SC 3676) the Supreme Court of India commented on the maxim actus 
curiae neminem gravabit in the words as under :-  
“15. No litigant can derive any benefit from mere pendency of 
case in a Court of Law, as the interim order always merges in the 
final order to be passed in the case and if the writ petition is 
ultimately 
dismissed, 
the 
interim 
order 
stands 
nullified 
automatically. A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of 
his own wrongs by getting interim order and thereafter blame the 
Court. The fact that the writ is found, ultimately, devoid of any 
merit, shows that a frivolous writ petition had been filed. The 
maxim “Actus Curiae neminem gravabit”, which means that the 
act of the Court shall prejudice no one, becomes applicable in 
such a case. In such a fact situation the Court is under an 
obligation to undo the wrong done to a party by the act of the 
Court. Thus, any underserved or unfair advantage gained by a 
party invoking the jurisdiction of the Court must be neutralized, as 
institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any 
advantage on a suitor from delayed action by the act of the 
Court. (Vide Shive Shankar & Ors. v. Board of Directors, Uttar 
Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation & Anr.,  1995 Suppl. (2) 
SCC 726; M/s. GTC Industries Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1998 
SC 1566: (1998 AIR SCW 1089); and Jaipur Municipal Corporation. 
v. C. L. Mishra, (2005) 8 SCC 423)”. 
 
13. 
 
In the case of Hidayatullah. Vs. Murad A. Khan (PLD 1972 SC 69) this 
Court on its own helped the appellants out of the wrong caused to them by the 
act of the Court by holding as under :-  
“There was, as we have already pointed out, a very good and 
substantial reason for the extension of time, because, even 
assuming that no application was made by the appellants for 
such extension of time, the Court, in the interest of justice, was 
fully competent suo motu to extend the time when it had by its 
own act made it practically impossible for the appellants to 
comply with its original order by adjourning the application for 
furnishing security to the 6th of January, 1968.”  
 
14. 
 
In Hari Ram. Vs. Akbar Hussain  (ILR 29 All. 749) a full Bench of the 
Allahabad High Court held as under :-  
“The mistake may in its origin be the mistake of the plaintiff; by 
the time the plaint has been registered, the mistake has become 
the mistake of the Court. If the Court or the Munsarim discovered 
the plaintiff’s mistake before registration of the plaint, the plaint 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 77 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
would at once be rejected under section 54 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure and never registered at all”. 
 
15. 
 
In the case of Rashad Ehsan and others. Vs. Bashir Ahmad and 
another (PLD 1989 SC 146) this Court after considering a good number of 
judgments held as under :-  
“I, therefore, agree with the view of the Division Bench that the 
notice issued by the Collector and published in the newspaper 
which explicitly mentioned that the balance of the price shall be 
payable on confirmation of the sale had contributed to the 
delay. This public notice was undoubtedly in violation of the 
provisions of Order XXI, Rule 85 of the Civil Procedure Code. But 
the error was committed by the officer authorized to conduct 
the sale and to penalize the auction-purchaser for complying 
with the directions, even though erroneous, of the functionary 
conducting the sale is neither fair nor equitable. Accordingly the 
maxim “Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit” comes into play, with 
a view to obviate hardships and which may otherwise be the 
result of the errors of the Court itself. Thus, where a non-
compliance with the mandatory provisions of a law occurs by 
complying with the direction of the Court, which is not in 
conformity with the law, the party complying therewith is not to 
be penalized. Indeed, the law becomes flexible to absorb such 
abnormalities and treat the infractions as harmless. Where the 
directions issued while administering the law have been followed 
but it is found that the authority itself had acted in deviation of 
the law in some particulars, the party acting in accordance with 
such directions is not held to be blameworthy.”   
 
16. 
 
In the case of Sherin and 4 others. Vs. Fazal Muhammad and 4 
others (1995 SCMR 584) this Court after examining a great deal of case law held 
as under :-  
“It is to be noticed that all public authorities including the judicial 
functionaries while doing an act enjoined by law or merely 
empowered to do it must not do it improperly. An action may lie 
against a public authority for misfeasance or nonfeasance but 
for the sake of safe administration of justice and good sense no 
action lies for the breach of duty when the duty to perform is 
judicial or quasi-judicial. There may be a variety of reasons for 
omission or failure in performing such duty or exercising power 
with reasonable dispatch such as delaying tactics of the parties 
to the action multiplicity of pending cases in the Court or 
intricacies of questions of law and facts raised before it. As stated 
at page 75 in Broom’s Legal Maxims: “Cases, however, have 
occurred, in which injury was caused by the act of legal tribunal, 
as by the laches or mistake of its officer; and where, 
notwithstanding the maxim as to actus curiae, the injured party 
was without redress.” Presumably the need to mitigate the rigor 
of the hardship inflicted on a party in the course of administration 
of justice, by an act of the Court, led to the emergence of the 
norm that “the act of the Court shall prejudice no man”.  
 
And thus condoned the delay by holding as under :-  
“We feel that omission on the part of learned District Judge to 
take timely action is the major cause of refilling of the appeal by 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 78 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
the appellants, in the High Court, out of time. They have been 
the victim of the act of the Court which furnishes “sufficient 
cause” under section 5 of the Limitation Act, for condonation of 
delay. The fact that after receiving the memorandum of appeal 
from the District Court, some time was consumed by the 
appellants, in presenting it to the High Court, in the 
circumstances of the case is inconsequential. We are, therefore, 
inclined to condone the delay in presenting the memorandum of 
appeal to the High Court”.  
 
17. 
 
In the case of Syed Haji Abdul Wahid and another. Vs. Syed 
Sirjuddin (1998 SCMR 2296), this Court by approving the judgment rendered in 
the case of Sherin and 4 others. Vs. Fazal Mehmood and 4 others held as under :- 
“From the preceding discussion, it emerges that the ratio 
decidendi in Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar has been followed 
consistently. No doubt Abdul Ghani’s case laid down that an 
advice given by the counsel against a clear provision of law 
would amount to gross negligence on the part of counsel and 
any action taken on such advice would not entitle the party to 
seek condonation of delay on the ground that he bonafidely 
acted on that advice, but the above rule laid down in Abdul 
Ghani’s case did not exclude from its purview condonation of 
delay by the Court under section 5 of the Limitation Act in a case 
where the appellant is able to establish that he acted in good 
faith in the above quoted passage from Abdul Ghani’s case. 
Therefore notwithstanding, the fact that section 14 of the 
Limitation Act, in terms does not apply to proceedings of an 
appeal, if the appellant is able to establish that he followed the 
remedy before a wrong forum in good faith, the Court may 
condone such delay in filing of the appeal treating it as 
“sufficient cause” in such cases would depend on the facts and 
circumstances of each case”.  
 
18. 
 
In the case of Karachi Electric Supply Corporation Ltd. Vs. Lawari 
and 4 others (PLD 2000 Supreme Court 94) this Court after dealing with the 
expression sufficient cause, due diligence, good faith and act of the Court held 
as under :-  
“In the aforesaid admitted facts and circumstances, we are of 
the view that it is not a case where the appeal had been filed by 
the appellant before the District Judge only on account of 
mistaken advice of the counsel. Here the act and conduct of the 
District Judge and its office in entertaining the appeals on both 
occasions i.e. in the earlier round when the appeal was filed by 
the respondents and then when the appeal was filed by the 
appellant and District Judge deciding the appeals on both 
occasions on merits and not noting or raising the question of 
maintainability, and respondents on both occasions, are also 
factors which led the appellant in filing the appeal before the 
District Judge and pursuing the same there. In our view taking all 
the above, facts and circumstances together, a case of 
sufficient cause as required in section 5 of the Limitation Act had 
been made out and the appeal filed by the appellant before 
the High Court was not liable to be rejected on the ground of 
limitation.” 
 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 79 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
19. 
 
In the case of Mst. Bas Khana and others Vs. Muhammad Raees 
Khan and others (PLD 2005 Peshawar 214) a Division Bench of the Peshawar High 
Court in an identical situation held as under:- 
“Assuming for a while that the appellants did not act with 
due diligence by prosecuting their remedy in a wrong 
forum, could be put on the right track by the learned 
District Judge, the day the memorandum of appeal was 
presented before him. This is what preliminary hearing 
stands for. In any case when it was entertained and even 
admitted by the learned Judge without adverting to its 
competency on account of his pecuniary jurisdiction, all 
the time so consumed from its entertainment to its return in 
his Court, cannot be debited in the account of the 
appellants, and thus they cannot be allowed to suffer for 
the act of the Court. Had it been returned on the first date 
of hearing the appellants could have presented it in this 
Court well within time. Since the time was consumed due 
to the act of the Court, it will certainly constitute a sufficient 
cause for condonation of delay as according to the 
principle enshrined in the maxim actus curiae neminem 
gravabit, ‘an act of the Court shall prejudice none’.” 
The Bench while parting with the judgment observed as under:- 
“While parting with this judgment we will direct the Registrar 
of this Court to circulate a copy of this judgment to all the 
Courts of the learned District and Additional District Judges 
and the Clerks of the Court with the remarks that they 
should before entertaining any appeal ensure that it is 
within their pecuniary jurisdiction.” 
 
20. 
 
It thus follows that the maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit is the 
most vital part of our jurisprudence. Excluding it from the purview of sections 5 
and 14 of the Act would amount to excluding the most vital part of the 
jurisprudence which has grown over the centuries and earned recognition of the 
Courts ever since then. I, therefore, hold that the appellants going out of 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
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60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
limitation on account of the act of the Court are entitled to extension of time. 
Their appeals thus stand decided accordingly. However, it is directed that 
henceforth the Clerk of the Court while receiving appeal in the office and the 
learned District Judge hearing appeal in motion shall ensure that it is presented 
in a competent forum and in case it is otherwise he shall immediately return it for 
being presented in the Court of competent jurisdiction. Order of this Court be 
circulated to all the District Judges and the Clerks of Court for doing the needful. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
Civil Appeals No. 2564/2001, 2658/2006, 1670/2008,  
-: 81 :- 
60-L/2013, 280-L/2013, 60/2014, 965/2014 and 218/2015 
ORDER OF THE BENCH 
 
 
 
With the majority decision of four to one the result of the 
appeals is recorded in paragraph No.60 (supra) of the majority judgment. 
 
 
 
  CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
JUDGE 
 
Announced in open Court 
on 16.8.2016 at Islamabad 
Approved For Reporting 
Waqas Naseer/* 
