 
 
ORDER OF THE BENCH 
 
 
 
 
By majority of four to one, the Chancellor while exercising 
revisional powers under Section 11-A of the Act is not required to seek 
advice of the Chief Minister, therefore, on this legal point, view rendered in 
the cases of University of Punjab vs. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) and 
Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada (1999 SCMR 2189) is 
approved whereas the contrary view rendered in the case of, Rana Aamer 
Raza Ashfaq vs. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan (2012 SCMR 6), is not approved. 
 
2. 
 
By majority of three to two, the Appeal is allowed, the 
impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is remanded to the Lahore 
High Court to decide the Writ Petition No.1691 of 2012 filed by the 
Respondent No.1 on merits. It is expected that the Lahore High Court shall 
decide the Writ Petition within 03 months from the date of communication 
of this judgment, as the Petition relates to the year 2012.    
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
Islamabad the,_____________, 2016. 
Approved for reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Present: 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali, CJ 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Mian Saqib Nisar 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Amir Hani Muslim 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Iqbal Hameedur Rahman 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Khilji Arif Hussain 
 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013. 
(On appeal from judgment dated 15.01.2013 of the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore, passed in W.P.No.1691 of 2012).  
 
Dr Zahid Javed. 
 
 
 
 
 
…Petitioner. 
 
VS 
 
Dr Tahir Riaz Chaudhry and others.   
 
…Respondents. 
 
 
For the Petitioner:  
 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC. 
 
 
 
 
 
Raja Muhammad Afsar, AOR. 
 
For Respondent No.1: 
 
Mr. Abdul Rehman Siddiqui, ASC. 
 
For Respondent No.2: 
 
Mr. Tahir Munir Malik, ASC. 
 
For Respondent No.3: 
 
Nemo. 
 
On Court’s Notice:  
 
Mr Nisar Durrani, A.G Sindh. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Ayaz Swati, Addl.A.G Balochistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Razzaq A Mirza, Addl.A.G, Punjab. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Abdul Latif Yousafzai, A.G, KPK. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mian Muhammad Rauf, A.G, Islamabad. 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr Muhammad Waqar Rana,   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Addl. Attorney General for Pakistan. 
 
Amicus Curie: 
 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, ASC. 
 
 
 
 
 
Kh. Haris Ahmed, Sr.ASC. 
 
Date of hearing: 
 
 
03.03.2016. 
 
 
 
 
 
. . . . . . . . . . . . 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
2 
 
 
AMIR HANI MUSLIM, J. This Appeal, by leave of the 
Court, is directed against judgment dated 15.01.2013, passed by the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore, whereby the Writ Petition filed by the Respondent No.1 
has been allowed.  
 
2. 
 
The facts necessary for the present proceedings are that on 
29.04.2005, the University of Punjab got published an advertisement in the 
press, inviting applications to various positions including the post of 
Associate Professor in Social Work Department. The Appellant, amongst 
others, applied for the said post which he was offered. Through Office Order 
dated 07.11.2007, the Vice Chancellor of the University, in anticipation of 
the approval of the Syndicate and upon the recommendations of the 
Selection Board, exercised the powers vested in him under Section 15(3) of 
the University of the Punjab Act 1973, and appointed the Appellant to the 
said post on one year’s probation. 
 
3. 
 
The Respondent No.1 challenged the appointment of the 
Appellant made through Office Order dated 07.11.2007, before the Lahore 
High Court by filing Writ Petition No.319 of 2008, which was disposed of 
with the direction to the Syndicate of the University to decide the issue of 
appointment of the Appellant. Accordingly, the Syndicate of the University 
in its 1689th meeting held on 29.10.2011 considered the appointment of the 
Appellant and decided to cancel the said appointment. The Appellant filed 
Petition under Section 11-A of the University of the Punjab Act 1973, before 
the Chancellor challenging the order dated 29.10.2011 of the Syndicate of 
the University. The Petition was allowed by order dated 06.06.2012, and the 
appointment of the Appellant was restored with all consequential benefits.  
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
3 
 
4. 
 
Feeling aggrieved, the Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition 
before the Lahore High Court challenging the order dated 06.06.2012 of the 
Chancellor, which was allowed by the impugned judgment dated 15.1.2013, 
and consequently the order dated 06.06.2012, restoring the Appellant to his 
previous position, was set aside. The Appellant filed Civil Petition No.202 
of 2013 for Leave to Appeal before this Court in which leave to Appeal was 
granted on 15.04.2013. 
 
5. 
During the hearing of the aforesaid Appeal on 18.11.2013 by a two 
member Bench, it was noticed that the issue raised required hearing by a 
larger Bench and the Honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan was requested to 
constitute a five member Bench. The relevant portion of the order dated 
18.11.2013 by the said Bench is reproduced hereunder: 
“On one of the last dates of hearing the question of interpretation and 
applicability of Section 11(8) of the Act came up for consideration 
obviously in the context of Article 105 of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution), as also other relevant 
provisions of the Act, including Section 11-A and Section 43 therefore, 
thus a notice was issued to the learned Advocate General, Punjab, to 
appear in person and to answer the queries in relation thereto. During the 
course of hearing, the Acting Advocate General, Punjab has placed 
reliance upon the judgment reported as Rana Aamer Raza Ashfaq and 
another Vs. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan and another (2012 SCMR 6) to 
argue, that according to the enunciation of law therein, the 
functions/powers of the Governor even if acting as Chancellor are 
regulated in terms of Article 105 of the Constitution, but when queried, he 
has stated that in the judgment supra the earlier law on the subject having 
close nexus to the issue in hand reported as Federation of Pakistan 
through Secretary, Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, 
Islamabad Vs. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada and others (1999 SCMR 2189) 
seemingly it has eluded the attention of this Court; besides for the exercise 
of the functions of the Chancellor/the Governor specified in the Act, 
especially Section 11-A and Section 43, which are the relevant provisions, 
need deeper examination if such functions/powers are subject to the 
provisions of Article 105 of the Constitution. Moreover, the impact of the 
eighteenth amendment in the Constitution should also be taken into 
account which was not adverted to in the case of Rana Aamer Raza 
Ashfaq (supra). We think, that these propositions, which have emerged 
during the course of hearing, are of considerable importance and may in 
the given circumstances of the case need some elucidation of the Rana 
Aamer Raza Ashfaq’s case (supra) and/or reconsideration of the law 
enunciated therein, therefore we feel expedient that the matter be brought 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
4 
to the notice of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan for considering the 
desirability of constitution of a larger bench.”  
 
 
6. 
 
The larger Bench comprising of five members was constituted 
by the Honorable Chief Justice to resolve the issues raised in these 
proceedings. The Bench issued notices to the Attorney General for Pakistan 
and Advocate Generals of all four provinces under Order 27-A Rule 1, CPC, 
as well as appointed Messrs Makhdoom Ali Khan and Khawaja Haris ASCs 
as Amicus Curiae to assist this Court on the proposed issues which have far 
reaching effect. 
 
7. 
 
Mr. Sardar Muhammad Aslam learned ASC for the Appellant 
commenced his arguments by contending that the Chancellor of a Province, 
while exercising his functions under the University of the Punjab, Lahore 
Act 1973 (the “University Act”), is not required to act on the advice of the 
Chief Minister. The learned ASC for the Appellant referred to Articles 45, 
49, 51, 54, 56, 57, 59, 75, 89, 100, 145(2), 200, 208, and 234 of the 
Constitution and submitted that the said provisions enumerate the powers 
and functions vested in the President under the current constitutional set up. 
He contended that the functions that the President exercised under the 
foregoing provisions are those which require the President to act on the 
advice of the Prime Minister. While placing reliance on a judgment of this 
Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada 
and others, (1999 SCMR 2189), the learned ASC submitted that it has been 
held by this Court that the President of Pakistan, when hearing appeals from 
the decision of the Wafaqai Mohtasib, exercises quasi judicial powers and is, 
therefore, not required to seek the advice of the Prime Minister. He 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
5 
submitted that, similarly, the Governor of a Province / Chancellor of a 
University, in exercise of his functions under Section 11A of the University 
Act, also exercises quasi-judicial functions. He contended that if the 
Chancellor whilst exercising his revisional / appellate powers under the Act 
was required to seek the advice of the Chief Minister then it would loose all 
semblance of an independent application of judicial mind.   
 
8. 
 
Learned counsel for the Appellant further contended that under 
the University Act, the Chancellor performs various functions which could 
be demarcated as administrative and quasi-judicial functions. The 
Chancellor revisional / appellate functions, the learned ASC contended, 
would fall within the latter category, in exercise whereof, it was not 
necessary for the Chancellor to seek the advice of the Chief Minister. 
 
9. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. ASC learned Amicus Curiae at 
the very outset contended that the Governor of a Province does not exercise 
quasi judicial powers. He referred to Tariq Pirzada Case (ibid) and 
submitted that he would beg to differ with the ratio of the aforesaid 
pronouncement of this Court insofar as it holds that the President, when 
hearing representations / appeals from a decision of the Wafaqi Mohtasib, 
exercises quasi-judicial functions. He submitted that the office of the 
ombudsman was created with the object that no government should 
countenance maladministration and the ombudsman is a statutory check 
upon the government and that is all. He contended that it cannot be termed 
as a judicial function because there is no power of enforcement of its 
decision. He submitted that a judicial function has to be exercised by 
authorities other than those that are executive. He contended that when 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
6 
quasi-judicial authorities are created, the officers who preside over such 
authorities can only be appointed with the consultation of the Chief Justice 
of Pakistan or by the Chief Justice of a province. 
10. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan Sr.ASC submitted that the office of 
the Governor is a constitutional office and when the Constitution talks of the 
functions of the Governor it is talking of its constitutional functions and not 
of functions outside the Constitution. However he contended that functions 
conferred upon the Governor outside the Constitution by a statute, would 
inherently be functions conferred upon him as a persona designata and he 
would not be acting in terms of Article 105 of the Constitution. He 
submitted that a law can be passed by a provincial assembly, the elected 
representatives of the people, in the exercise of their legislative powers 
whereby they specify that a certain person should be appointed to a statutory 
post and consequently the functions that person exercises would indeed be 
statutory functions. He contended that in the facts and circumstances of this 
case the appointment of the Chancellor is statutory but if the statute itself 
provides that the Chancellor, whilst exercising his statutory functions, is 
subject to Article 105 of the Constitution, then there can be no question 
about the law being ultra vires. 
11. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan next submitted that pursuant to the 
position in terms of the statutory provisions of the Act prior to the 
amendment whereby Section 11(8) was inserted, the Chancellor would 
undoubtedly be exercising statutory functions without the advice of the 
Chief Minister. In support of his submission he placed reliance upon a 
judgment of this Court in the case of University of the Punjab, Lahore vs. 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
7 
Chaudhry Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) and a judgment of the Indian 
jurisdiction in the case of Dr. S.C. Barat and another v. Hari Vinayak 
Pataskar and others (AIR 1962 Madhya Pradesh 73.)   
12. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan continued his arguments by 
identifying the functions and powers of the Governor under the Constitution. 
He submitted that the Governor was appointed by the President under 
Article 101 of the Constitution, whereas Article 105 r/w Article 48(2) of the 
Constitution stipulates that the Governor in discretionary matters is not 
bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. The learned Amicus demarcated 
the functions of the Governor enumerated in the Constitution as those non 
discretionary functions performed on the advice of the Chief Minister, in 
terms of Article 105 of the Constitution, and those discretionary functions 
that can be performed without the advice of the Chief Minister. He 
submitted that the functions of the Governor under Article 110 (Right of 
Governor to address Provincial Assembly), Article 128 (Power of Governor 
to promulgate Ordinances), Article 129 (The Provincial Government), 
Article 131 (Governor to be kept informed), Article 132 (Provincial 
Ministers), Article 139 (Conduct of business of Provincial Government) and 
Article 140 (Advocate General for a Province) of the Constitution were all 
non discretionary in nature. Conversely he submitted that the provisions of 
the Constitution under which the Governor was vested with discretion, either 
by the specific use of the word “discretion” or by the very structural nature 
of the function being performed, were Article 112(2) (Dissolution of 
Provincial Assembly), Article 116(2)(b) (Governors assents to Bills), Article 
130(7) (vote of confidence), and Article 133 (Chief Minister continuing in 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
8 
office) of the Constitution. He submitted that in addition to the aforesaid 
discretionary powers of the Governor, Article 234 of the Constitution goes a 
step further and by its sub-clause (2) explicitly excludes the application of 
Article 105 of the Constitution.  
13. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan further contended that Article 105 of 
the Constitution itself provides for exceptions to the said Article which are 
embedded in the constitutional structure. He contended that Article 105 r/w 
Article 48 of the Constitution creates certain exceptional discretionary 
powers which may arise by the specific words used in the Constitution i.e. 
where the word “discretion” is used or by the very structure of the 
constitution itself i.e. vote of confidence, vote of no confidence, Chief 
Minister continuing in office, dissolution of the assembly etc. He submitted 
that while the constitutional rule is that the Governor is bound by the advice 
of the Chief Minister, the constitutional exception is that in certain matters 
he is not bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. He submitted that 
insofar as Section 11(8) of the University Act is concerned, the legislature 
whilst referring to Article 105 of the Constitution, is referring to the 
constitutional role and not the constitutional exceptions.  
14. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan submitted that Section 11(8) of the 
University Act states that in the performance of his functions under the Act, 
the Chancellor shall act and be bound in the same manner as the Governor of 
a province acts and is bound under Article 105 of the Constitution.  He 
submitted that Section 11-A is also a function performed by the Chancellor 
under the Act, therefore, Section 11-A will be subject to Section 11(8) of the 
University Act. He further submitted that Section 11-A, whereby revisional 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
9 
power is vested with the Chancellor, is not judicial or quasi judicial in nature 
but to the contrary is executive supervisory power. He submitted that the 
only way Section 11-A could override Section 11(8) is if it is held that 
Section 11-A is a special power vested in the Chancellor while Section 11(8) 
is general in nature, therefore, the former would override the latter.  
15. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan the learned Amicus further developed 
his argument by contending that there are two interpretations which may be 
given to Section 11(8) and 11-A of the University Act. According to literal 
interpretation rule, the revisional powers of the Chancellor under Section 11-
A of the Act are nothing more than one of the functions that the Chancellor 
exercises under the Act and are therefore, subject to Section 11(8) of the 
Act. He further contended that the purposive interpretation on the other hand 
would be that the office of Chancellor was created to keep it away from the 
political expediencies of the day and consequently in these matters there 
would be no interference warranted from the Provincial Government and the 
Chancellor has to apply his own mind in the capacity of an independent 
statutory 
functionary. 
He, 
however, 
submitted 
that 
a 
purposive 
interpretation, rendering Section 11-A independent of 11(8) of the Act, 
should only be resorted to if holding otherwise would lead to an absurdity. 
He further submitted that if the latter course of interpretation is taken, then 
this Court will be making the assumption that the Governor will never act 
out of political expediency and the Government will always act out of 
political expediency.  
16. 
 
The learned Amicus Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan reiterated that 
the statutory function of the Chancellor under the Act was not circumscribed 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
10
earlier but post insertion of Section 11(8), it has been circumscribed and the 
new statutory dispensation provides that the Chancellor should act on the 
advice of the Chief Minister. He submitted that if the Chancellor is given a 
statutory function independent of his constitutional functions, then Article 
105 would clearly not apply, but the legislature by introducing Section 11(8) 
of the Act has essentially legislatively overruled the Sardar Ali Case (ibid), 
therefore, the current legislative scheme mandates that Article 105 of the 
Constitution will be attracted to the exercise of the Chancellor statutory 
functions as well.  
17. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan concluded his arguments by bringing 
to our attention that the Governor under the Constitution is a federal 
appointee and for constitutional purposes, he is the representative of the 
Federation. He submitted that if the purposive interpretation is resorted to by 
us and Section 11A of the University Act is construed independently of 
Section 11(8) every time the province gives the Governor a function to 
perform, which under the purposive interpretation he could examine 
independently, this could tantamount to permitting federal interference in 
provincial matters, consequently creating a situation where a federal 
nominee would be interposed between the Provincial Government and the 
University. This he contended would inevitably lead to a conflict between 
the Federal and Provincial Governments. He submitted that this point had 
been attended to in the Judgment of this Court in the case of Rana Aamer 
Raza Ashfaq vs. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan (2012 SCMR 6).  
 
18. 
 
Mr. Khawaja Haris Ahmed Sr.ASC Amicus Curiae submitted 
that the law laid down by this Court in the Rana Aamer Raza Case (ibid) 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
11
was the correct enunciation of law and that he endorsed the arguments of 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan. He submitted that upon a reading of Article 105 
of the Constitution, although the Governor is bound by the advice of the 
Chief Minister, there are certain exceptions as stated in Article 48(2) of the 
Constitution, which are essentially in exercise of the Governor’s 
discretionary powers. He submitted that what must be examined is whether 
there are discretionary functions exercised by the Chancellor under the 
University Act as well. He contended that under the Constitution, the 
Chancellor in exercise of some of his functions, by virtue of certain 
constitutional exceptions, is not bound by the advice of the Chief Minster 
with respect to those matters in which he has discretionary powers. He 
submitted that similarly the Chancellor, whilst exercising his powers / 
functions under the Act, would also not be bound by the advice of the Chief 
Minister in matters in which he has discretion.  
19. 
 
Mr. Khawaja Haris Ahmed further submitted that Section 11-A 
of the Act vests revisional powers in the Chancellor, which powers he 
submitted were by their very nature discretionary, and that the discretionary 
powers of the Chancellor exercised under the University Act will not come 
within the mischief of Section 11(8) of the Act. He submitted that this Court 
ought to examine what provisions in the University Act qualify as 
discretionary powers of the Chancellor. These discretionary powers, he 
submitted, would not be hit by Section 11(8) as opposed to those functions 
of the Chancellor strictly performed under the Act. He submitted that 
exceptions to Article 105(1) are given in 105(5) read with Article 48(2) and 
if Section 11(8) of the Act is legislation by reference to Article 105 of the 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
12
Constitution, then the concept of a discretion based bifurcation of the powers 
of the Governor, being subject to the advice of the Chief Minister, would 
also have to be imported and read into Section 11(8) of the Act. 
 
20. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Waqar Rana, learned Additional Attorney 
General submitted that prior to the insertion of Section 11(8) of the 
University, whereby Article 105 has been incorporated by reference, there 
was a possibility that the Governor and the Provincial Government would be 
considered two separate bodies and there would be a likelihood of conflict 
and therefore a need arose to incorporate 11(8) in the Act.  He submitted that 
as Article 105 of the Constitution has been specifically mentioned in Section 
11(8) of the Act, the same has to be followed in letter and spirit. He 
submitted that if there was an exception to the applicability of Article 105 of 
the Constitution in terms of the powers exercised by the Chancellor under 
the Act, it ought to have been expressly mentioned. Otherwise, if an 
interpretation is placed that in exercise of his revisional powers the 
Chancellor is acting on his own then this may defeat the provisions of 
Section 11(8). He further submitted that had this been the intent of the 
legislature that the Chancellor would be acting on his own without seeking 
the advice of the Chief Minister, then nothing stopped the legislature from 
expressly providing for the same. He submitted that the law laid down by 
this Court in the Rana Aamer Raza Case (ibid) is the correct enunciation of 
law and in all matters the Chancellor / Governor is bound by the advice of 
the Chief Minister. He placed reliance in support of his contentions on a 
judgment of this Court in the case of Pakistan Burmah Shell Ltd. vs. 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
13
Nasreen Irshad (1989 SCMR 1892), and on two judgments of the Indian 
jurisdiction reported as 2006 2 SCC 1 and 2010 SCC 331.  
 
21. 
 
Mr. Razzak Ali Mirza learned Additional Advocate General 
Punjab submitted that it was the stance of the Provincial Government, as per 
his instructions, that the powers vested with the Chancellor under Section 
11-A of the Act were discretionary in nature. He submitted that the advice of 
the Chief Minister would not be attracted when the Chancellor is called upon 
to judicially determine the rights of the employees of the University or when 
the Chancellor acts in a quasi judicial manner.  
 
22. 
 
Mr. Nisar Durrani Advocate General Sindh endorsed the 
arguments of Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan Amicus Curiae and submitted that 
the law laid down by this Court in the case of Rana Aamer Raza (ibid) is the 
correct enunciation of law. 
 
23. 
 
Mr. Abdul Latif Yousafzai, learned Advocate General KPK 
submitted that when the Governor exercises powers under the Constitution 
he is bound by the advice of the Chief Minister, however, when the 
Chancellor whilst acting under the University Act exercises quasi-judicial 
and discretionary functions which are statutory in nature, he is not bound by 
the advice of the Chief Minister. In support of his submission he placed 
reliance upon a 5 member bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in the 
case of Aurangzeb Shaafi Burki vs. Province of Punjab (2011 PLC (C.S.) 
735.. 
 
24. 
 
Mr. Ayaz Swati, the learned Additional Advocate General 
Balochistan submitted that the legislation governing universities in 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
14
Balochistan did not have a provision in pari materia to that of Section 11(8) 
of the University Act. Although the Governor of the Province acts as 
Chancellor for Universities in Balochistan as well, yet there was no 
legislation by reference to Article 105 of the Constitution, hence the 
legislative framework to the extent of the province of Baluchistan was 
distinguishable from that of the other Provinces.  
 
25. 
 
Mian Muhammad Rauf, AG Islamabad endorsed the arguments 
of Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, the learned Amicus Curiae. He drew our 
attention to an opinion of this Court in the case reported as Reference No.2 
of 2005 by the President of Pakistan (PLD 2005 SC 873) to stress the point 
that there are certain functions which the Governor performs which are 
discretionary in nature thereby not requiring the advice of the Chief 
Minister.  
 
26. 
 
Although Sardar Muhammad Aslam learned ASC for the 
Appellant had addressed this Court extensively on the lis at hand, however 
the AOR for the Appellant requested that he be allowed to make his 
submissions with respect to some factual matters including the procedural 
history of the case before the High Court, a request that we acceded to. He 
submitted that the Appellant in lieu of the advertisement for the post of 
Associate Professor at the University was the only candidate who applied 
and the selection board headed by the Vice Chancellor, including 3 foreign 
consultants, had recommended his appointment. He further contended that 
the Respondent had earlier filed a similar writ petition before the High Court 
(Respondent No.1 in this appeal) which had been unconditionally 
withdrawn. He submitted that this Court must examine the effect of there 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
15
being two High Court orders, one of dismissal on account of unconditional 
withdrawal and one of acceptance, regarding the same matter.  
 
27. 
 
Mr. Abdul Rehman Siddiqui learned ASC for the Respondent 
No.1 submitted that he adopts the contentions of Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, 
the learned Amicus Curiae. With respect to the submissions of the AOR for 
the Appellant, he contended that the earlier writ petition had been filed 
prematurely by the Respondent (petitioner before the High Court) whilst his 
revision was pending before the Governor. He submitted that subsequent to 
the passing of the order by the Governor on the revision petition, the 
Respondent herein instituted a fresh writ petition before the High Court. 
Replying to the contentions of the AOR with respect to the merits of the 
Appointment of the Appellant, the learned ASC for the Respondent 
submitted that the Appellant was appointed by the Vice Chancellor of the 
University in anticipation of approval by the Syndicate. The Syndicate did 
not provide the required approval on account of the Appellant lacking the 
requisite degree, experience and documentation. Insofar as the broader 
question of law is concerned, learned ASC for the Respondent submitted 
that Article 105 of the Constitution was imported into Section 11(8) of the 
Act, therefore, no exceptions to Section 11-A can be read into the statute.  
 
28. 
 
We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, the learned 
Advocate Generals, as well as the learned Additional Attorney General for 
Pakistan and have perused the record with their assistance.  The question 
requires to be answered in these proceedings is whether the Chancellor while 
exercising revisional powers under Section 11-A of the Act is bound to act 
and or seek advice of the Government/ Chief Minister in view of the 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
16
language of Section 11 (8) of the Act. Sections 11-A and 11 of the Act are 
reproduced as under: 
11. Chancellor.-(1) The Governor of the Punjab shall be the 
Chancellor of the University. 
 
(2) The Chancellor or his nominee shall preside at the 
Convocation of the University and the meetings of the Senate. 
 
(3) If the Chancellor is satisfied that the proceedings of any 
Authority are not in accordance with the provisions of this Act, 
the Statutes, the Regulations, or the Rules, he may, after calling 
upon such Authority to show cause why such proceedings 
should not be annulled, by order in writing, annal the 
proceedings. 
 
(4) Every proposal to confer an honorary degree shall be 
subject to confirmation by the Chancellor. 
 
(5) The Chancellor shall have the power to assent to such 
Statutes as are required to be submitted to him by the Senate or 
withhold assent or refer them back to the Senate for re-
consideration. 
 
(6) The Chancellor may remove any person from the 
membership of any Authority if such person:- 
 
(i) 
has become of unsound mind; or 
 
(ii) 
has been incapacitated to function as member of 
such Authority; or 
 
(iii) 
has proceeded outside Punjab for a period 
exceeding six months; or 
 
(iv) 
has ceased to hold the position, office or 
qualification which was pre-requisite for his 
election/appointment as member of such Authority; 
or 
 
(v) 
has been convicted by a court of law for an offence 
involving moral turpitude; 
 
(vi) 
has failed to attend three consecutive meetings of 
the authority; or 
 
(vii) has accepted any assignment which involves his 
absence from the University for a continuous 
period of six months or more. 
 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
17
(7) 
 
[ Repealed] 
 
(8) 
In the performance of his functions under the Act the 
Chancellor shall act and be bound in the same manner as the 
Governor of a Province acts and is bound under Article 105 of 
the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
  
 
11-A. Revisional powers of the Chancellor.- The Chancellor 
may, of his own motion or otherwise, call for and examine the 
record of any proceedings in which an order has been passed 
by any authority for the purpose of satisfying himself as to the 
correctness, legality or propriety of any finding or order and 
may pass such orders as he may deem fit.   
 
 
 
29. 
 
A bare reading of Section 11 of the Act prescribes functions of 
the Chancellor whereas Section 11-A confers revisional powers upon him. A 
three member Bench in the case of University of Punjab vs. Sardar Ali 
reported in (1992 SCMR 1093), while interpreting Section 11 (8) of the Act 
has held that Sub-Section 8 of Section 11 relates to the manner in which the 
Chancellor shall act in discharge of his duties and provides that he would be 
bound by the advice of the Chief Minister in the same manner as provided 
under Article 105 of the Constitution. However, it was concluded that 
powers conferred on the Chancellor under Section 11-A are independent of 
any restrictions contained in Section 11(8) of the Act which are relatable to 
his functions under the Act. Following the judgment in the case of Dr S.C 
Barat and another vs. Hari Vinayak Pataskar (AIR 1962 MP 73), this Court 
has further held that the powers and duties of the Chancellor conferred under 
the Act are not akin to the powers and duties of the office of the Governor. 
The judgment concluded that the appointments of the Respondents 
(employees) fall within the domain of the Chancellor notwithstanding the 
language of Sub-Section 8 of Section 11 of the Act.  
 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
18
30. 
 
The second judgment rendered by another three Member Bench 
of this Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Tariq 
Pirzada (1999 SCMR 2189), in a way endorses the same view, interpreting 
the powers conferred on the President under Article 32 of the Establishment 
of Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order. It concluded that 
powers exercised by the President as Appellate Authority are quasi judicial 
in nature and that Article 48 of the Constitution does not debar the President 
from exercising appellate powers conferred on him under the aforesaid order 
independently. However, the view taken in the aforesaid two judgments was 
not endorsed by a four Member Bench of this Court in the case of Rana 
Aamer Raza Ashfaq vs. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan (2012 SCMR 6), where 
this Court has held that the Chancellor under the Act was bound by the 
advice of the Government/Chief Minister while exercising revisional and or 
appellate powers. In fact the Bench in this judgment only interpreted Section 
11 (8) of the Act which relates to the functions of the Chancellor and held 
that in discharge of his functions under the Act, he is bound by the advice of 
the Chief Minister/Government. In this judgment this Court has considered 
the case of Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada (1999 
SCMR 2189), but the learned Bench did not take note of the earlier 
judgment in the case of University of Punjab vs. Sardar Ali reported in 
(1992 SCMR 1093) and rendered conflicting judgment by holding that while 
exercising revisional powers, the Chancellor was bound to seek/act on the 
advice of the Government/Chief Minister.  
 
31. 
 
In order to appreciate the contentions of the parties on the 
conflicting views recorded in the aforesaid judgments, it would be necessary 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
19
for us to examine the scheme of the Act. Generally speaking the statutes 
confer powers, functions and duties on different statutory authorities. These 
are distinct concepts of administrative law, which have been developed by 
the Courts over a long period and have different jurisprudential overtone and 
consequences. Even in the case of Federation of Pakistan vs Durrani 
Ceramics and others (2014 SCMR 1630), a distinction of the nature has been 
drawn. A bare perusal of Sections 11 (8), 11-A, 15, 24, 26, 28 and 29 of the 
Act would instantly indicate that the legislature has consciously used three 
distinct concepts in different provisions of the Act. While the restriction 
envisaged in Section 11 (8) is relatable to functions, Section 11-A refers to 
powers of the Chancellor. Thus the restrictions envisaged in Section 11 (8) 
would be applicable to cases where functions are discharged by the 
Chancellor, but would not extend in cases of exercise of powers conferred 
on him such as is the case under Section 11-A. Section 11 spells out the 
functions of the Chancellor. The term “Function” in its ordinary parlance 
means an act in which the Authority does not have the discretion whereas 
the term “Power” implies exercise of discretion by the Authority.  
 
32. 
 
The term ‘Function’ as defined in Words and Phrases 
(Permanent Edition - 17A) is that the word “function” is derived from the 
Latin “functus’ which is the past participle of the verb ‘fungor’, which 
means to perform, execute, administer. The most usual signification of the 
term “function” is the fulfillment or discharge of a set duty or requirement; 
exercise of a faculty; that power of acting in a specific way which appertains 
to a thing by virtue of its special constitution.  “Function” is that mode of 
action or operation which is proper to any organ, faculty, office, structure, 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
20
etc; and is the kind of action or activity, proper to a person or thing.  
“Function’ is not patentable, but function shows the explanation of the form, 
the result, the means of obtaining the result, and the operation and co-
operation of the elements to produce the result. “Function” performed by an 
authority is inherent and goes by the office. 
 
33. 
 
The term ‘Power’ as defined in Words and Phrases (Permanent 
Edition - 33) simply connotes the discretionary authority to perform. Unless 
otherwise defined by statute, a “Power” is “General” when it is exercisable 
in favor of any person that a donee may select and is “special”, “limited”, or 
“particular” when it is exercisable only in favor of persons or a class of 
persons designated or described in the instrument creating the power. 
“Power” is a lawful ability to accomplish a given purpose. “Power” 
conferred on an authority is derived or drawn from the law.  
 
34. 
 
Now the next question would be whether the powers conferred 
under Section 11-A of the Act are administrative powers and/or quasi 
judicial powers to be exercised by the Chancellor. The word “Quasi” is 
defined ‘as if’, as though, as it were, in a manner, in a certain sense or 
degree, seeming, seemingly, analogous to and it may mean resemblance. 
The quasi judicial power is a duty conferred by words or by implication on 
an officer to look into facts and to act on them in the exercise of discretion, 
and it lies in the judgment and discretion of an officer other than a judicial 
officer. A “quasi judicial power” is one imposed on an officer or an 
authority involving the exercise of discretion, judicial in its nature, in 
connection with, and as incidental to, the administration of matters assigned 
or intrusted to such officer or authority. A “quasi judicial act” is usually not 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
21
one of a judicial tribunal, but of a public authority or officer, which is 
presumably the product or result of investigation, consideration, and human 
judgment, based on evidentiary facts of some sort in a matter within the 
discretionary power of such authority or officer. A quasi judicial power is 
not necessarily judicial, but one in the discharge of which there is an element 
of judgment and discretion; more specifically, a power conferred or imposed 
on an officer or an authority involving the exercise of discretion, and as 
incidental to the administration of matters assigned or entrusted to such 
officer or authority.  
 
35. 
 
After examining the terms “Function”, “Power” and “Quasi 
Judicial Power” we revert back to Article 105 of the Constitution, which 
provides that the Governor under the Constitution, who is persona designata 
Chancellor of the University, has to act on the advice of the Chief Minister. 
Article 105 (1) provides that the Governor is bound to act on the advice of 
the Chief Minister. This Article starts with the prefix ‘subject to the 
Constitution’. In fact, under the scheme of the Constitution, there are 
provisions where the Governor is bound by the advice of the Chief Minister, 
but then there are exceptions where the Governor being the nominee of the 
President is not required to follow the advice of the Chief Minister or where 
the power has been conferred on the Governor to act independently or under 
the Constitution.  
 
36. 
 
The argument of learned Sr.ASC, Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, 
that since Section 11(8) has been introduced by an amendment, restricted the 
powers of the Chancellor provided under Section 11-A to act on the advice 
of the Chief Minister in the manner provided under Article 105 of the 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
22
Constitution, therefore, Section 11(8) of the Act is applicable to Section 11-
A and the powers exercised by the Chancellor can only be exercised by him 
on the advice of the Chief Minister. He further submits that the Revisional 
powers of the Chancellor in terms of Section 11-A of the Act are not quasi 
judicial in nature but are administrative in nature, therefore, the Chancellor 
has no discretion to decide a revision or appeal independently. We are not 
persuaded by these arguments for more than one reason. Section 11(8) was 
amended on 12.03.1975, by Act XVI of 1975. To start with the Revisional 
powers conferred under Section 11-A of the Act on the Governor 
(Chancellor) of the Province are not qua his position as the Governor of the 
Province but a statutory functionary namely, the Chancellor, who for the 
time being happens to be the Governor of the Province as well. Had this not 
been so, the Rules of Business of the Punjab Government would have also 
specifically adverted to this category of cases which are required to be 
decided by the Governor qua his position as Governor. It is similar to the 
cases where the Judges of the High Courts are appointed as Members of the 
Tribunals such as the Tribunal which hears appeals against the orders passed 
by Returning Officers prior to the general elections under the Representation 
of Peoples Act, 1976.  
   
37. 
 
The next contention of the learned Amicus Curiae that powers 
conferred on the Chancellor under Section 11-A are not quasi judicial is also 
not persuasive. In the foregoing paras, we have discussed that the term 
“Quasi Judicial Power” refers to powers which cannot be delegated and are 
to be exercised by the Persona Designata mentioned in the statute. Such 
powers, functions or duties can neither be delegated to any other person or 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
23
authority nor can be exercised on the recommendation of any other authority 
or person. The powers, functions and duties provided under the scheme of 
the Act are to be performed or discharged by the person or authority 
designated by the statute and none other. Any other interpretation would 
lead to absurd results; for instance while the entire proceedings including the 
personal hearing shall be conducted by the person or authority specified in 
the statute (Chancellor), yet the decision, which may be contrary to his own 
findings, shall be taken by the Government (Chief Minister). This would be 
a completely sham exercise. We are neither prepared to do gross injustice to 
the plain language of the statute nor attribute such outcome to the legislative 
intent. The more logical interpretation which comports with the legislative 
intent is to look at the particular provision of the statute and determine the 
nature of powers, functions and duties conferred by the statute. If it is in the 
nature of quasi judicial power, then the Persona Designata is required to act 
personally and not on the basis of any advice by any other person or 
authority.  
 
38. 
 
Where the Tribunal or an Authority is conferred with quasi 
judicial powers by the Statute, the duty to act fairly, justly by a proper 
application of mind to the facts of the case after providing opportunity of 
hearing to the person affected is far greater than compared to cases the 
powers conferred by the Statute is of purely administrative nature involving 
the multiple options to the authority and consideration of policy issues.  
 
39. 
 
Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, learned Sr.ASC, was of the view that 
the Governor (Chancellor) while exercising revisional powers under Section 
11-A or under any other provision of the Act has to seek the advice of the 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
24
Chief Minister. This view does not appeal to reason. If such interpretation is 
attached to the provisions of Section 11(8) and the powers conferring 
discretion under Section 11-A on the Chancellor are restricted in the manner 
that the Chancellor shall seek advice of the Government, after hearing the 
party and before deciding the Revision, this by itself would be violative of 
Article 10-A of the Constitution and against all the natural norms established 
in the legal parlance. We have noticed that the scheme of the Act has not 
been adverted to by the Honourable Bench while deciding the case of Rana 
Aamer Raza Ashfaq vs. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan (2012 SCMR 6), instead it 
has concluded that functions in terms of Section 11(8) or otherwise provided 
by the Act were synonymous to the powers of the Chancellor conferred by 
the Act.  
 
40. 
 
As we have also noticed that the earlier judgment in the case of 
University of Punjab vs. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) has not been 
considered in the judgment of Rana Aamer Raza Ashfaq (supra), which was 
directly on point. In the judgment of University of Punjab (supra), it has 
been held that Section 11 (8) relates to the manner in which the Chancellor 
shall act in discharge of his duties. All that Sub-Section 8 of Section 11 
provides is that the Chancellor (Governor) shall be bound by the advice of 
the Chief Minister in the manner as he is bound in the discharge of his 
functions under Article 105 of the Constitution. Mere reference to Article 
105 of the Constitution in Section 11 (8) does not take away the revisional 
powers of the Chancellor conferred on him under Section 11-A of the Act. 
Section 11 (8) provides that “the Chancellor shall act and be bound in the 
same manner as the Governor of a Province acts and is bound under Article 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
25
105 of the Constitution”. This clearly manifests that the restriction is 
relatable to the function of the Chancellor whereas Section 11-A empowers 
the Chancellor to exercise his discretion, when he hears revision and or 
appeal. In other words, the Chancellor, who is Persona Designata under the 
Act, is conferred power but in a different capacity which cannot be termed 
identical to that of the office of the Governor. Looking from another angle, 
the Punjab Government has introduced the Punjab University Employees 
(Efficiency & Discipline) Statutes, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as Statutes 
of 1975. The Statute of 1975 is made applicable to the Universities 
Employees except holders of such posts as specified by the Chancellor and 
regulates the terms and conditions of the Employees of the Universities of 
Punjab. This Statute confers powers of appointments, promotions and 
actions against Employees of the Universities. Sections 12,15,17 and other 
provisions confer powers on the Chancellor for hearing Revisions and 
Appeals preferred by the Employees against the orders of the competent 
authorities. If Section 11 (8) is interpreted in the manner as advanced by the 
learned ASC, it would mean that if an employee prefers a Revision or 
Appeal by invoking the provisions of the Act or Statutes of 1975, the 
Chancellor cannot pass an order unless he reverts back to the Chief Minister 
and or the Government for its advice. The case of University of Punjab vs. 
Sardar Ali referred to hereinabove has focused this issue while interpreting 
Section 11(8) of the Act and held that the Chancellor will apply his mind 
and decide the appeals or revisions independently and Section 11(8) will not 
come in his way. 
 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
26
41. 
 
Mr. Khawaja Haris learned Amicus Curiae in fact has argued 
that the powers of Chancellor cannot be restricted by Section 11(8) while he 
exercises the Revisional powers under Section 11-A of the Act. He has 
relied upon the language of Section 11(8) and said that even in the scheme 
of Constitution, the Governor has been given discretion to exercise some of 
the powers independently and has not been made to responsible to act on the 
advice of the Chief Minister of the Province on all the issues. He contended 
that in the like manner the Chancellor is not bound by the advice of the 
Chief Minister in the matters where the Chancellor has been conferred 
powers as discussed.    
 
42. 
 
From the aforesaid discussion, we are clear in our minds that 
the principles enunciated in the judgments rendered by this Court in the 
cases of University of Punjab vs. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) and 
Federation of Pakistan vs. Muhammad Tariq Pirzada (1999 SCMR 2189), 
are in consonance with the spirit of the provisions of the Act and the 
conflicting view in the case of Rana Aamer Raza Ashfaq vs. Dr. Minhaj 
Ahmad Khan (2012 SCMR 6) is not the good law.  Section 11-A or the other 
provisions of the Statute of 1975 under which Chancellor exercises 
revisional or appellate powers, are independent and do not make it 
obligatory on him to seek and or act on the advice of the Chief Minister in 
terms of Section 11(8) of the Act. 
 
43. 
 
We have also perused the additional note of one of the 
Honourable Judge of this Court in the case of Rana Aamer Raza Ashfaq, 
who while concurring with the findings of the bench has concluded that by 
the 18th Amendment, the concurrent list was abolished and the ‘subject of 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
27
Education’ went within the exclusive legislative domain of the Province. 
The Honourable Judge, while interpreting different provisions of the 
Constitution has held that after the 18th Amendment, if the power of the 
Governor (Chancellor) is not curtailed in terms of Section 11(8), it may lead 
to conflict of interest between the Federation and the Province. The Hon’ble 
Judge was persuaded to reach such a conclusion on the ground that under the 
scheme of the Constitution, the Governor is the nominee of the President and 
is also bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. According to the Hon’ble 
Judge that after abolition of the concurrent list, the President may ask the 
Governor (Chancellor) to act contrary to the advice of the Chief Minister on 
the subject of Education. We, with profound respects, differ with the view of 
the Honourable Judge. Under the scheme of the Constitution, the Governor 
has to perform certain functions provided therein. The Article 105 of the 
Constitution opens with the prefix “subject to Constitution” and specifies the 
functions of the Governor performed by him on the advice of the Chief 
Minister but the scheme of the Constitution also includes the President who 
may make such provision as he thinks fit for discharge of functions of the 
Governor “in any contingency not provided for in this part”. Therefore, the 
functions of Governor in terms of Article 105(1) would be distinct from the 
functions of the Governor, which he has to discharge in terms of Article 
101(5) of the Constitution. Both these provisions of the Constitution are 
independent of each other and mutually exclusive. There are other 
provisions of the Constitution which confer powers on the Governor to 
exercise his discretion without seeking advice of the Chief Minister/ or act 
on the directives of the President.  Since 1975 till date, the Provincial 
Governments have been legislating laws on Education and the Federation 
C.A.No.359 of 2013 
 
28
has never intervened. This approach of the Hon’ble Judge perhaps is not in 
conformity with the scheme of the Constitution. We, for the aforesaid 
reasons, do not endorse the view of the Hon’ble Judge. 
 
44. 
 
Before parting with the judgment, we acknowledge the able 
assistance extended by both the learned Amicus Curiae, Additional Attorney 
General for Pakistan and Advocate Generals of the Provinces and the 
Counsels representing the parties.  
 
45. 
 
For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal is allowed and the 
judgment of the Lahore High Court allowing the Writ Petition of the 
Respondent is set aside. The matter is remanded to the High Court for 
hearing the Writ Petition on merits to be decided within three months from 
the date of communication of the orders. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
Announced in open Court on _____________________.  
  
(Approved for Reporting) 
 
 
 
Judge 
Sohail/** 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J:- I have had the benefit of going 
through the judgment rendered by my learned brother, Justice Amir Hani 
Muslim, however I beg to differ with the opinion expressed therein, and 
therefore take the liberty to present my dissenting view.  
2. 
 
The key question involved in the matter is whether the 
Chancellor of the University of Punjab (University), is bound by the advice of 
the Chief Minister of Punjab in terms of Section 11(8) of the University of 
Punjab Act, 1973 (the Act), while exercising his (Chancellor’s) powers under 
Section 11-A of the Act.  
3. 
 
The facts of the case and the arguments put forth by the 
learned counsel for the appellant, the learned amici curiae, learned law 
officers for the Federation and the respective Provinces, and the learned 
counsel for the respondents have been succinctly expressed in my 
brother’s opinion, and thus for the sake of brevity the same are not 
reproduced here. 
4.  
 
Heard. In order to resolve the proposition at hand, the 
relevant provisions of law are reproduced below:- 
 
University of Punjab Act, 1973 
 
“11. 
Chancellor.– (1) The Governor of the Punjab shall 
be the Chancellor of the University. 
 
(2) 
The Chancellor or his nominee shall preside at the 
convocation of the University and the meetings of the 
Senate. 
 
(3) 
If the Chancellor is satisfied that the proceedings of 
any Authority are not in accordance with the provisions of 
this Act, the Statutes, the Regulations, or the Rules, he may, 
after calling upon such Authority to show cause why such 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
2 
 
proceedings should not be annulled, by order in writing, 
annul the proceedings. 
 
(4) 
Every proposal to confer an honorary degree shall 
be subject to confirmation by the Chancellor. 
 
(5) 
The Chancellor shall have the power to assent to 
such Statutes as are required to be submitted to him by the 
Senate or withhold assent or refer them back to the Senate 
for re-consideration. 
 
(6) 
The Chancellor may remove any person from the 
membership of any Authority if such person:- 
 
(i) 
has become of unsound mind; or 
(ii) 
has been incapacitated to function as member of 
such Authority; or 
(iii) 
has proceeded outside Punjab for a period 
exceeding six months; or 
(iv) 
has ceased to hold the position, office or 
qualification which was pre-requisite for his 
election/appointment as member of such Authority; 
or 
(v) 
has been convicted by a court of law for an offence 
involving moral turpitude; 
(vi) 
has failed to attend three consecutive meetings of 
the authority; or 
(vii) 
has accepted any assignment which involves his 
absence from the University for a continuous period of 
six months or more. 
 
 
  
Provided that no order under this subsection 
shall be passed unless the person to be affected 
thereby is afforded an opportunity of being heard; 
 
(7) 
[Repealed] 
 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
3 
 
(8) 
In the performance of his functions under the Act 
the Chancellor shall act and be bound in the same manner 
as the Governor of a Province acts and is bound under 
Article 105 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of 
Pakistan. 
 
11-A. Revisional powers of the Chancellor.– The 
Chancellor may, of his own motion or otherwise, call for 
and examine the record of any proceedings in which an 
order has been passed by any authority for the purpose of 
satisfying himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety 
of any finding or order and may pass such orders as he may 
deem fit. 
 
Provided that no order under this section shall be 
passed unless the person to be affected thereby is afforded 
an opportunity of being heard.” 
 
* * * * * * * 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
 
“105. Governor to act on advice, etc. 
(1) Subject to the Constitution, in the performance of his 
functions, the Governor shall act on and in accordance 
with the advice of the Cabinet, or the Chief Minister 
 
Provided that within fifteen days the Governor may 
require the Cabinet or, as the case may be, the Chief 
Minister to reconsider such advice, whether generally 
or otherwise, and the Governor shall, within ten days, 
act in accordance with the advice tendered after such 
reconsideration. 
 
(5) The provisions of clause (2) of Article 48 shall have 
effect in relation to a Governor as if reference therein 
to “President” were reference to “Governor”.  
 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
4 
 
48. President to act on advice, etc. 
(1) ……………………………………………………………… 
 
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1), the 
President shall act in his discretion in respect of any 
matter in respect of which he is empowered by the 
Constitution to do so and the validity of anything done 
by the President in his discretion shall not be called in 
question on any ground whatsoever.”  
 
An analysis of the proposition at hand requires an examination of the role 
and functions of the Chancellor of the University. The Chancellor, as 
envisaged by Section 10 of the Act, is the highest ranking officer of the 
University, and exercises numerous functions and/or powers as 
prescribed by the Act (see, inter alia, Section 11(3) to 11(6) specially). His functions 
and powers include, inter alia, the power to nominate members of the 
Senate, Syndicate, etc., to remove any person from the membership of the 
Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council, etc., and to review orders of the 
Syndicate. Section 11(8) of the Act, in which reference has been made to 
Article 105 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
(Constitution), binds the Chancellor, in the performance of his functions 
under the Act, by the advice of the Chief Minister, as the Governor of a 
Province is bound under Article 105 ibid.  
5. 
 
This allows us to segue into a discussion about the interplay 
between the offices of Governor and Chancellor. The office of the Governor 
is a constitutional one and therefore his functions are constitutional. The 
office of the Chancellor is a statutory one created by the Act and therefore 
his functions are statutory. Hence, functions conferred upon the 
Governor, or more accurately the person who acts as the Governor, by 
any law other than the Constitution, would be in the nature of functions 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
5 
 
conferred upon a persona designata. The persona designata doctrine, is 
that non-judicial functions can be conferred on judges in their personal 
capacity. The Latin phrase means that a person is considered as an 
individual rather than as a member of a class. Originally the idea was that 
a judge, in his personal capacity, could be appointed to an office involving 
the performance of administrative or executive functions including 
functions which were quasi-judicial in their nature. In this case the 
Governor, a member of the executive, as persona designata, would be 
exercising administrative powers of a Chancellor, when deciding matters 
under the provisions of Section 11-A of the Act. The duties and powers of 
the Chancellor are not conferred upon the Governor, but upon the person 
who happens to occupy the office of Governor. The Chancellor does not 
perform his functions or act in exercise of powers available to him as 
Governor under the Constitution and is not bound by the advice of the 
Chief Minister as per Article 105 of the Constitution, rather since the 
appointment of the Chancellor is statutory, the functions and powers 
would be controlled by the statute, and the Chancellor would be bound by 
the advice of the Chief Minister as per Section 11(8) of the Act. This is 
manifest from a plain reading of Section 11(8) which draws a parallel with 
Article 105 by using the words “in the same manner as…” This fine distinction 
which may appear illusory is in fact very real and important and thus 
needs to be appreciated. This reasoning is bolstered by the fact that the 
statutory position of Chancellor under the Act could just as easily have 
been conferred upon anyone else, such as a Provincial Minister, a 
Provincial Secretary, or a retired Judge of the Supreme Court or a High 
Court, and the statute could have placed a limitation that he (Chancellor) 
would be bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. To this extent, the 
judgment reported as University of the Punjab, Lahore and 2 others Vs. 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
6 
 
Ch. Sardar Ali (1992 SCMR 1093) in which a judgment from across the 
border reported as Dr. S. C. Barat and another Vs. Hari Vinayak 
Pataskar and others (AIR 1962 Madhya Pradesh 73) was relied upon 
and cited with approval, is the correct enunciation of law.  
6. 
 
Going further, under Article 105(1) of the Constitution, the 
Governor is to act on and in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet or 
the Chief Minister. According to Article 105(5) read with Article 48(2) of the 
Constitution, the Governor, in respect of matters in which he is 
empowered by the Constitution to exercise his discretion, is not bound by 
the advice of the Cabinet or the Chief Minister. At this juncture it may be 
pertinent to mention that the Constitution itself draws a distinction 
between those functions of the Governor in which he has no discretion 
and is bound by the advice of the Chief Minister, in other words the 
Governor’s constitutional duties and powers, and those functions in which 
the Governor is empowered to exercise his discretion and is therefore not 
bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. The articles of the Constitution 
which spell out discretionary powers of the Governor where he is not 
bound by the advice of the Chief Minister can be identified thus: either the 
article itself contains the word “discretion” or the exercise of discretion is 
spelt out from the wording/language of the article, or the structure of the 
function conferred upon the Governor in the article is such that it 
demands that the Governor exercise his discretion without the advice of 
the Chief Minister, or the particular article explicitly excludes the 
application of Article 105. The interpretation of the said article unfolds the 
constitutional rule that the Governor is bound by the advice of the Chief 
Minister and the constitutional exception is that the former is not 
bound by the advice of the latter in certain matters which have been 
placed solely within the former’s domain. When Article 105 of the 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
7 
 
Constitution is referred to in Section 11(8) ibid it embodies both, the 
constitutional rule and the constitutional exception. But for this purpose 
it is not the constitutional provisions which require exposition rather the 
Act simpliciter.  
7. 
 
A bare reading of Section 11(8) of the Act clearly provides 
that the Chancellor would be bound by the advice of the Chief Minister in 
the performance of the former’s functions “under the Act”. This 
unequivocally stipulates the constitutional rule (embodied in the Act) and 
means that any functions undertaken or carried out by the Chancellor 
under the Act would be subject to the advice of the Chief Minister. What is 
now required to be ascertained is whether there are any exceptions to the 
said rule. All the learned counsel who argued the matter before us have 
not relied upon any other provision of the Act to indicate the same except 
Section 11-A. The submission of the counsel for the appellant is that this 
section confers a revisional power upon the Chancellor which is a quasi-
judicial function therefore it should be interpreted to mean an 
independent power of the Chancellor. Mr. Makdoom Ali Khan, learned 
amicus, has argued that it is one of the functions of the Chancellor under 
the Act and that it is not his discretionary power so as to fall within the 
exception. Mr. Khawaja Haris Ahmed, the other learned amicus, has 
submitted that the very nature of the revisional power makes it a 
discretionary power of the Chancellor. In view of the above, the entire 
controversy revolves around the interpretation of Section 11-A.  
8. 
 
Section 11-A does not provide that the revisional power so 
exercised by the Chancellor shall be in his “discretion”; it also does not 
provide a specific exclusion that whilst exercising the revisional power the 
Governor shall not be bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. Should 
the exercise of discretion be spelt out from the words of the section or 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
8 
 
discretion should be read into it? Does the structure, purpose and object 
of the function exercised by the Chancellor require that he not be bound 
by the advice of the Chief Minister? In this context, it is salutary to recall 
that the power of revision is a supervisory power, jurisdiction, or function 
of an authority, be it executive or judicial/quasi-judicial. In the exercise of 
executive supervisory power a superior executive officer/authority may, 
either suo moto or when approached by someone affected by any 
action/order of a subordinate authority, in appropriate proceedings 
available under the law (note: if revisional powers are provided under the law) correct 
the action or order.  Correspondingly a superior judicial forum may 
exercise its supervisory power/function in aid of a person aggrieved by the 
order of a subordinate judicial forum. But these two revisional 
jurisdictions, one on the executive side and the other on the judicial side, 
occupy different spheres and the two do not overlap. The exercise of the 
revisional power on the executive side remains purely administrative in its 
own hierarchy, whilst the exercise of the judicial power retains its judicial 
character. Only for the reason that the power of the Chancellor as per 
Section 11-A has been described to be a revisional power does not make 
him a judicial/quasi-judicial authority. It may be pertinent to mention 
here that according to Section 11(3) ibid the Chancellor, if satisfied that 
the proceedings of any authority are not in accordance with the provisions 
of the Act etc. may, after calling upon such authority to show cause why 
such proceedings should not be annulled, annul such proceedings by 
order in writing. It is nobody’s case that this is a discretionary power of 
the Chancellor and that while exercising this power/function he is not 
bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. When we compare the 
revisional power envisaged by Section 11-A and the one referred to above 
[Section 11(3)], these are akin and both are administrative in nature. I beg to 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
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differ with the distinction drawn by my brother in his opinion between 
Section 11 which provides for “functions” and Section 11-A which provides 
a “power” and on the basis whereof my learned brother restricts the 
applicability of Section 11(8) to the former and does not extend it to the 
latter. With profound respect, I am not persuaded that the applicability or 
otherwise of Section 11(8) rests upon the distinction between “function” 
and “power”. The argument that while exercising his functions under 
Section 11 the Chancellor is bound by the advice of the Chief Minister but 
while exercising power under Section 11-A the Chancellor is not bound by 
such advice on account of an element of discretion involved in the exercise 
thereof, overlooks the fact that the word “power” has been used in Section 
11(5) itself. How can the word “Chief Minister”  be read instead of the word 
“Chancellor” for purposes of all provisions in Section 11, but not Section 
11-A, especially when Section 11(5) also stipulates a power of the 
Governor? To my mind the bifurcation between “functions” and “powers” 
of the Chancellor is ephemeral and cannot be used to determine the 
applicability of Section 11(8). 
9. 
 
I find myself unable to agree that Section 11-A is a quasi-
judicial function and therefore it would be absurd that though the 
Chancellor has discretion, he would still be bound by the advice of the 
Chief Minister. In my considered view, the power of revision under Section 
11-A is not of a quasi-judicial nature but an executive supervisory power, 
conferred upon the highest ranking officer in the University hierarchy, i.e. 
the Chancellor, in order to serve as a check and balance mechanism to 
ensure that the Senate, Syndicate, Academic Council, etc. pass orders in 
accordance with law and propriety. In this respect, the illustration quoted 
by Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan has much force, in that Article 45 of the 
Constitution, whereby the President is empowered to grant pardon, is not 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
10 
 
a judicial/quasi-judicial function, rather it is the exercise of a prerogative 
conferred upon the Head of State by the Constitution, on the advice of the 
Government, to pardon a person or commute a sentence etc., and so 
ultimately it is an executive function. Likewise, on the statutory plane, the 
office of the Ombudsman is essentially an executive function, which 
(Ombudsman) serves as a statutory check on the Government to so as to curb 
instances of maladministration. In this regard the enunciation of law in 
the judgment reported as Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, 
Establishment Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad Vs. 
Muhammad Tariq Pirzada and others (1999 SCMR 2189) to the extent 
that the President exercised quasi-judicial powers while deciding 
representations under the Ombudsman law, does not seem to be the 
correct exposition of law for the reason that the very functions of the 
Ombudsman are not of a judicial nature, since the Ombudsman simply 
holds a probe into maladministration by a Government agency and makes 
recommendations which is very different from the orders a judicial officer 
passes, and from those recommendation(s), a representation lies to the 
President. Further there is no power of enforcement of the Ombudsman’s 
recommendations, and neither is there any mechanism for enforcement of 
the President’s decision. I do not find that it would negate the spirit and 
purpose of the power of revision or lead to any manifest absurdity to make 
the Chancellor bound by the advice of the Chief Minister in respect of the 
exercise of power under Section 11-A. The argument that it would render 
the Governor’s power redundant is in fact quite contrary to our 
constitutional scheme and democratic structure, wherein the executive 
functions are primarily exercised by the Prime Minister or the Chief 
Minister as the case may be. The Governor is a representative of the 
Federation. On the touchstone of separation/trichotomy of powers it is 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
11 
 
incomprehensible as to how the Governor can be given the discretion to 
interfere in the executive functions of the Province.  
10. 
 
Coming back to the reasons as to why I am of the view that 
Section 11(8) controls Section 11-A of the Act, Section 11(8) specifically 
provides for the exercise of certain functions by the Governor and refers to 
Article 105 of the Constitution which is to be followed in letter and spirit.  
The provisions of Act do not provide for any exception that allows the 
Governor to act otherwise than in accordance with the advice of the Chief 
Minister. If there was meant to be an exception to this general rule of 
being bound by the advice of the Chief Minister, then such an exception 
would/should have been expressly mentioned in the statute or else fall 
into one of the categories outlined above. The interpretation that whilst 
exercising his powers of revision under Section 11-A the Governor is to act 
on his own without the advice of the Chief Minster would defeat the 
mandate of the clear provisions of Section 11(8). Furthermore, Section 11-
A was inserted by the University of the Punjab (Amendment) Ordinance, 
1982, approximately nine years after the promulgation of the Act; had the 
Legislature so wanted, it could have framed the section ibid as a non-
obstante clause, but this was not done, making it patently clear that the 
intention of the Legislature was to render Section 11-A subject to the 
already existing Section 11(8). 
11. 
 
The argument that the office of the Chancellor was created to 
keep such matters away from political expediencies and considerations in 
order to forestall the Government of the day from interfering in the affairs 
of the University and further that the Chancellor has to apply his 
independent mind; suffice it to say that the very fact that the Governor is 
to act as the Chancellor as persona designata negates this argument, 
which (argument) assumes that the Chancellor, who is the Governor, will not 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
12 
 
be influenced by political considerations and conversely that the 
Government (Chief Minister) will act whilst keeping political concerns at the 
forefront. We cannot assume that making the Chancellor bound by the 
advice of the Chief Minister would necessarily lead to the powers under 
Section 11-A being exercised in favour of the University. The University is 
a statutory body and the Chancellor a statutory functionary. Section 11-A 
does not provide for a quasi-judicial function but an administrative or 
executive supervisory function, therefore even the principle of separation 
of powers is not violated.  
12. 
 
Moreover, by interpreting Sections 11(8) and 11-A of the Act 
in such a way so as to empower the Chancellor with the sole discretion 
whilst exercising revisional powers would essentially result in the 
Federation interfering with Provincial autonomy as mentioned above. The 
Governor is for all constitutional intents and purposes, a Federal 
appointee and a representative of the Federation in the respective 
Province. Since the Eighteenth Amendment, education has become a 
Provincial subject, thus no interpretation can be placed upon the Act 
which does violence to the Constitutional scheme and the Federation 
cannot be allowed to interfere and impinge upon the autonomy of the 
Province, as has been highlighted by my learned brother, Justice Asif 
Saeed Khan Khosa, in his note in the judgment reported as Rana Aamer 
Raza Ashfaq Vs. Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan (2012 SCMR 6), which I 
believe is the correct exposition of law. 
13. 
 
In light of the above, the crux of this opinion is that the 
Chancellor is bound by the advice of the Chief Minister in view of Section 
11(8) of the Act, and that the said section governs the powers exercised by 
the Chancellor under Section 11-A of the Act. Therefore, while deciding 
the revision petition of the appellant under Section 11-A ibid, the 
Civil Appeal No.359 of 2013 
 
13 
 
Chancellor ought to have sought the advice of the Chief Minister on the 
matter and would have been bound by the same. The Chancellor whilst 
deciding the revision himself has not acted in accordance with law, thus 
the view taken by the learned High Court in this regard in the impugned 
judgment is correct and does not warrant interference by this Court, in 
the light whereof, this appeal is dismissed.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
