IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Original Jurisdiction) 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, ACJ 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Maqbool Baqar 
Mr. Justice Manzoor Ahmad Malik 
Mr. Justice Sardar Tariq Masood 
Mr. Justice Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel 
Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah 
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
(Regarding registration of second FIR in respect of a police 
encounter wherein the petitioner’s son namely Mohsin Ali was 
killed at the hands of the local police) 
 
Mst. Sughran Bibi  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  … Petitioner                    
versus 
 
The State  
 
 
 
 
 
 
      … Respondent 
 
In attendance: 
Petitioner in person 
 
Mr. Ashtar Ausaf Ali, Attorney-General for 
Pakistan 
assisted 
by 
Barrister 
Asad 
Rahim, Mr. Muhammad Usman Rauf, 
Mirza Moiz Baig and Mr. Nousherwan 
Niazi, Advocates  
 
Mr. 
Qasim 
Ali 
Chauhan, 
Additional 
Advocate-General, Punjab 
 
Nemo. on behalf of the Advocate-General, 
Sindh 
 
Mr. Zahid Yousaf Qureshi, Additional 
Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa  
 
Mr. Ayaz Swati, Additional Advocate-
General, Balochistan 
 
Mr. Tariq Mehmood Jehangiri, Advocate-
General, Islamabad 
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
2
Mr. Saeedullah Khan, ASC 
Mr. Babar Nadeem, Advocate 
Mr. Abu Bakar Khuda Bakhsh, Additional 
Inspector-General of Police, Punjab 
 
Barrister Salman Safdar, ASC (Amicus 
Curiae)  
 
 
Date of hearing: 
09.05.2018 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, ACJ: 
If the first information 
to the police reporting commission of a cognizable offence under 
section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is called an 
FIR (First Information Report) then through the same logic the 
second information to the police in respect of commission of the 
same offence ought to be called an SIR and the third information 
regarding commission of the same offence may be called a TIR but 
there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for an SIR 
or a TIR. For reasons never exhaustively attended to before, parties 
to a criminal case other than the party which has already lodged 
an FIR about commission of a cognizable offence often insist upon 
registration of their own version regarding commission of the same 
offence through another FIR and it is argued that the different 
version of the same incident advanced by such a party is being 
reported to the police for the first time and, therefore, such new 
version regarding commission of the same cognizable offence is to 
be treated as the first information to the police about that version. 
In view of some conflicting judgments of different Courts, including 
this Court, on the issue the present Larger Bench has been 
constituted so as to put the controversy at rest through an 
authoritative pronouncement on the subject. The background in 
which this issue has cropped up before this Court through the 
present petition is briefly narrated in the following paragraph. 
 
2. 
On 21.03.2008, more than a decade ago, one Mohsin Ali had 
lost his life through the hands of the police and FIR No. 177 was 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
3
lodged by Zulfiqar, SI in respect of the said incident on the same 
day at Police Station Shahdara Town, District Lahore for offences 
under sections 324, 353 and 186, PPC read with section 34, PPC 
and section 13 of the Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965. It was 
alleged in that FIR that Mohsin Ali and others had launched a 
murderous assault upon a police party and in exercise of its right 
of private defence the police party had fired back resulting in death 
of Mohsin Ali. After completion of the investigation a Challan was 
submitted in that case before the Court of Session, Lahore for trial 
of the accused persons implicated therein. On 12.01.2010 the 
present petitioner namely Mst. Sughran Bibi (mother of Mohsin Ali 
deceased) instituted a private complaint in respect of the selfsame 
incident alleging that as a matter of fact Mohsin Ali had cold-
bloodedly been murdered by the local police by managing and 
staging a fake encounter. On 19.05.2010 a learned Additional 
Sessions Judge, Lahore seized of the case summoned 16 accused 
persons to face a trial in connection with the said private 
complaint. As per the legal norms the private complaint filed by the 
petitioner was taken up first for trial and on 18.06.2015 a Charge 
was framed against the summoned accused persons and, we have 
been informed, no progress has so far been made in that trial of 
the complaint case. Now through the present petition filed as a 
Human Rights Case under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 Mst. Sughran Bibi petitioner 
has sought issuance of a direction to the local police to register a 
separate FIR containing the different version of the same incident 
being advanced by her. 
 
3. 
The issue before us, to put it very simply, is as to whether a 
separate FIR can be registered for every new version of the same 
incident when commission of the relevant cognizable offence 
already stands reported to the police and an FIR already stands 
registered in that regard or not. An ancillary issue is that if no 
separate FIR can be registered for any new version of the same 
incident then how can such new version be recorded and 
investigated by the police. We have heard elaborate arguments on 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
4
these issues and have carefully gone through all the precedent 
cases cited before us on the subject. 
 
4. 
The emotionally charged and visibly grieved petitioner 
appearing in person has passionately submitted that her son 
namely Mohsin Ali was cold-bloodedly murdered by the local police 
through a managed and staged encounter whereafter an FIR 
containing a false story was registered at the local Police Station in 
respect of the incident at the instance of a police official depicting 
the deceased as the aggressor. She has maintained that in some 
ensuing administrative and judicial inquiries the local police were 
found to be guilty of a calculated murder but no separate FIR was 
registered in that regard at the petitioner’s instance which had led 
the petitioner to institute a private complaint in respect of her 
allegations and the accused persons in her private complaint have 
already been summoned by the trial court to face a trial in the 
complaint case. She has lamented and bemoaned that no progress 
has been made in that complaint case so far despite a Charge 
having been framed by the trial court against the accused persons 
about three years ago. In the end she has urged that justice would 
be served if a separate FIR is registered in terms of her version of 
the relevant incident and the persons being accused by her of the 
murder most foul are ordered to be arrested. 
  
5. 
The learned Attorney-General for Pakistan has taken us 
through different provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
1898 (usually referred to as Cr.P.C.) and the Police Rules, 1934 
and has maintained that the statutory scheme of the criminal law 
in vogue in the country envisages registration of only one FIR 
regarding an incident involving commission of a cognizable offence 
and every fresh version of the same incident brought to the notice 
of the investigating officer during the investigation of the case is to 
be recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C.. He has submitted that the 
investigating officer is legally obliged to investigate the case from 
every possible angle and to probe into every version of the incident 
brought to his notice and then he is to submit his final report in 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
5
the matter in terms of the facts found by him and not in terms of 
any particular version of the incident advanced by any person. The 
learned Attorney-General has referred to the judgments rendered 
by this Court in the cases of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram 
Khan and another (1975 SCMR 149), Kaura v. The State and others 
(1983 SCMR 436), Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government 
of Sindh and others (2001 SCMR 1556), Mst. Anwar Begum v. 
Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West, Karachi and 12 
others (PLD 2005 SC 297) and Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed 
Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 484) which are the only reported 
pronouncements of this Court on the issue under consideration 
and he has highlighted that not only contradictory views were 
expressed in such judgments but all such judgments were also 
completely shorn of any meaningful discussion about the issue 
with reference to the relevant statutory provisions. He has, thus, 
urged that a comprehensive treatment of the issue by this Court is 
called for so as to remove the prevailing confusion. The learned 
Additional Advocates-General, Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 
Balochistan and the learned Advocate-General, Islamabad Capital 
Territory have adopted the arguments addressed before the Court 
by the learned Attorney-General for Pakistan. Barrister Salman 
Safdar, ASC has assisted the Court as an amicus curiae and while 
approaching the issue from diverse angles he has maintained that 
ordinarily there is to be only one FIR in respect of an incident but 
there is no statutory bar against registration of multiple FIRs in 
respect of the same occurrence if different versions of the incident 
are advanced with different sets of accused persons and such 
versions disclose commission of different cognizable offences. He 
has also impressed upon the Court as to why people insist upon 
registration of separate FIRs qua their own versions of the incident 
and as to why the remedy of filing a private complaint is generally 
not considered to be an adequate alternate remedy in that regard. 
The learned amicus curiae has also extensively referred to the 
above mentioned five reported judgments of this Court available in 
the field and has respectfully highlighted the deficiencies in those 
judgments.         
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
6
 
6. 
After hearing the petitioner, the learned Law Officers and the 
learned amicus curiae, attending to all the statutory provisions 
relevant to the legal issue involved and perusing the precedent 
cases available on the subject we find that for a proper resolution 
of the controversy at hand it is imperative to correctly understand 
the scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Police 
Rules, 1934 regarding registration of a criminal case through an 
FIR and its investigation by the police and also to minutely 
examine all the precedent cases available on the subject. In the 
following paragraphs we undertake such an exercise to develop 
and elucidate such understanding of the scheme.    
 
7. 
As regards the precedent cases available on the subject there 
appears to be an utter confusion prevailing in the field and 
different Courts have in the past been taking different positions on 
the issue of registration of multiple FIRs in respect of commission 
of the same offence through different versions advanced in respect 
of the same occurrence. In the first category of the precedent cases 
it has been declared quite categorically that there is to be only one 
FIR in respect of an occurrence wherein a cognizable offence has 
been committed and any other version of the same incident 
advanced by any person during the investigation of the case is to 
be recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. The following cases decided 
by different High Courts fall in this category of cases:  
 
Mansur Ali and 2 others v. The State  
(1970 P.Cr.L.J. 287) 
 
“Another thing to be pointed out here is that there cannot be two 
first information reports in a case. It appears that the learned 
Additional Sessions Judge has used both the reports as first 
information reports in this case and marked them as Exhs. 1 and 
3. Section 154, Cr.P.C. contemplates only one first information 
report and only one such report can go into evidence in a case. 
Law never permits two first information reports to be admitted in 
evidence …”  
 
Kaura v. The State  
(NLR 1979 Criminal 3)  
 
“It is quite obvious from the above that the primary purpose of 
the F.I.R. is to inform about the commission of a cognizable 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
7
offence which a police officer is empowered to investigate under 
Section 156 Cr.P.C. … All other informations with regard to that 
occurrence coming out later in point of time have to be taken 
down as statements of those persons before the police under 
section 161 Cr.P.C. … The order to register a second F.I.R. in that 
situation, was not justified in law, even if there was a concession 
made on the part of the State.”  
 
Qazi Rehmat Ullah, General Secretary, Jamat-e-Islami, 
Rawalpindi v. Dr. Ghulam Hussain, Former Federal 
Minister for Railways and 13 others  
(1979 P.Cr.L.J. Note 36)  
 
Law does not require recording of as many reports as versions of 
same occurrence by different persons – Police Officer not to prefer 
one over another or to prefer one giving more complete picture – 
Priority to be considered in point of time and not in elaborateness 
of report or its being correct.  
 
Ghulam Siddique v. Station House Officer, Saddar, Dera 
Ghazi Khan and 8 others  
(PLD 1979 Lahore 263) 
 
“It is quite obvious that the primary purpose of the F.I.R. is to 
inform about the commission of a cognizable offence, which a 
Police Office is empowered to investigate under section 156, 
Cr.P.C. The Police Officer receiving that information may question 
the informant to find out his source of information about the 
names of the offenders and the witnesses and whether the 
informant himself was an eye-witness as laid down in rule 
21.1(4). All other informations with regard to that occurrence 
coming out later in point of time have to be taken down as 
statements of those persons before the police under section 161, 
Cr.P.C. The version given by Ghulam Siddiq, therefore, should 
have been considered as a statement under section 161, Cr.P.C. 
only. The order to register a second F.I.R. in that situation, was 
not justified in law, even if there was a concession made on the 
part of the State.”  
 
Muhammad Aslam v. Station House Officer, Police 
Station Mamun Kanjan, Faisalabad  
(PLD 1980 Lahore 116) 
 
“It will be seen that distinction is to be drawn between a version 
being given for purpose of defence only and a version being given 
by way of a grievance. In the former category, the accused and the 
offences are ordinarily the same and information in amplification 
of that recorded earlier is being conveyed. In the latter category of 
cases separate offences are disclosed and even the persons 
complained against may be different. The distinction is material 
for whilst in the former case the registration of an F.I.R. is 
required by law, in the latter it need not be recorded as an F.I.R. 
but as observed in Ghulam Siddique's case may be recorded as a 
statement under section 161 of the Cr.P.C.”  
 
Mushtaq Ahmad v. The S.H.O., Police Station, Munawan  
(1984 P.Cr.L.J. 1454) 
 
“When a case has been registered in respect of an occurrence, no 
second case can be registered giving a counter-version thereof by 
the accused persons. 
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
8
It is by now clearly established law that no direction can be 
issued for registration of a case when a F.I.R. has already been 
registered in respect of the occurrence for giving counter-version 
of the other side.”  
 
Wali Muhammad and 4 others v. The State and another  
(1985 P.Cr.L.J. 1342)  
 
“It is true that in respect of one and the same occurrence, only 
one F.I.R. should be recorded and that where the accused 
persons set up a counter version, the same should be investigated 
by the police on the case file of the same F.I.R. and not by 
recording any subsequent F.I.R. It is also true that where a 
counter version is set up by the accused, the police should find 
out the truth and submit the challan only in respect of the 
version found true by them and not submit both the versions to 
the Court for trial.”  
 
Hafiz Haji Muhammad v. The Superintendent of Police 
Dera Ghazi Khan and others  
(1986 P.Cr.L.J. 2167) 
 
“Since a criminal case stands already registered against the 
petitioner, he seems to overawe the police and others by getting a 
case registered against them so that proper investigation may not 
be carried out. He has an alternate remedy of filing a private 
complaint. He may pursue the same.”  
 
Ghulam Mustafa v. S.H.O. and others  
(KLR 1987 Cr.C. 134)  
 
“In these circumstances I am not inclined to exercise discretion in 
favour of the petitioner when according to his own showing a case 
stands already registered in respect of the afore-said vehicle at 
Police Station Sharqpur. If the petitioner has any claim to the 
vehicle in question he may approach the Investigating Officer who 
can take into consideration his version as well.”  
 
Muhammad Younas v. Senior Superintendent of Police, 
Faisalabad and others  
(1987 P.Cr.L.J. 1464)  
 
“It is contended that the complainant-party was guilty of 
aggression and had caused fire-arm and other injuries to 
Muhammad Younas and Khushnood and despite the fact that 
their medico-legal reports were produced before the Investigating 
Officer with the request of registering a counter-case he has 
refused to do so. It is further stated that the Investigating Officer 
has even refused to receive the medico-legal certificates or to 
record their statements. 
 
In the above circumstances, S.S.P. Faisalabad is directed to issue 
necessary orders to the S.H.O. Police Station Dijkot for carrying 
out the investigation faithfully and to record the statements of the 
aforementioned persons and the petitioner without any addition 
or omission and also to receive their medico-legal certificates. He 
is also directed to proceed strictly in accordance with law and 
place the correct version before the Court.” 
 
Rahmat Ullah v. Station House Officer and others  
(1987 P.Cr.L.J. 2197(2)) 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
9
 
“I do not feel inclined to direct S.H.O. to register the case for the 
reasons that the challan in case of murder against Munawar Ali 
and others, having been sent up the case is at trial stage and the 
prosecution evidence has partly been recorded; that the S.H.O. 
has stated that Rehmat Ullah was examined by the police and on 
his own showing he had not seen the occurrence; that Munawar 
Ali, the victim of murderous assault has neither approached the 
police for the registration of the counter-case nor has he moved 
any petition before this Court for direction to the S.H.O. to 
register the case and that adequate alternative remedy of 
complaint was/is available to the petitioner.”  
 
Sharifan Bibi v. M. Ilyas etc.  
(KLR 1987 Cr.C. 739)  
 
“In view of the circumstances aforementioned and particularly the 
fact that the challan in the case under section 302/34 P.P.C has 
already been submitted in Court and that an alternative remedy 
of filing a private complaint is available to the petitioner I am not 
inclined to issue the direction prayed for by her.”  
 
Muhammad Azim v. The S.H.O. Police Station Abbas 
Nagar and 4 others  
(1988 P.Cr.L.J. 41) 
  
“Conversely, in Kaura v. The State and others 1983 SCMR 436 it 
has been held that when a case has been registered in respect of 
previous occurrence, then the registration of a fresh case is not 
called for notwithstanding divergent version contained therein 
and the Police is not only competent but also duty bound to 
unearth true facts and trace real culprit. This principle 
enunciated in the said ruling was followed in Mushtaq Ahmad v. 
The S.H.O., Police Station, Munawan 1984 PCr.LJ 1454 and Wali 
Muhammad and 4 others v. The State and others 1985 PCr.LJ 
1342. The facts of this case are peculiar. The petitioner and 
others have been challaned in the case registered by Muhammad 
Sadiq and prosecution evidence has been summoned on 27-9-
1987. The counter-version stated by Muhammad Azeem has 
already been investigated by the Police and in the circumstances 
a second F.I.R. shall not serve any useful purpose. The private 
complaint is efficacious remedy for Muhammad Azeem, if he so 
likes. I, therefore, decline to issue a direction for the registration 
of second F.I.R. regarding the counter version put forth by 
Muhammad Azeem and dismiss this writ petition.”  
 
Malik Muhammad Anwar Khan v. The State and 4 
others  
(1988 P.Cr.L.J. 986)  
 
“In the circumstances discussed above, I do not feel persuaded to 
interfere in the matter at this stage but would direct the police to 
carry out the investigation faithfully, record statements of the 
petitioner and the injured persons and to receive their medico-
legal certificates. They are further directed to proceed strictly in 
accordance with law and place correct version before the Court by 
bringing to book all those who are found to have participated in 
the occurrence. If the petitioner feels dissatisfied with the role of 
the police he may resort to an appropriate remedy in the Court of 
competent jurisdiction in accordance with law by filing a 
complaint which by no means is less efficacious remedy than the 
registration of case with the police.”  
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
10
 
Ch. Zafaryab v. Mian Bashir Ahmad, S.H.O./Inspector 
Police Station Shalimar Lahore, etc.  
(NLR 1990 U.C. 38)  
 
“The learned counsel, however, submits that the version of the 
first informant is false and the counter version of the petitioner 
represents the true and correct factual position. This counter 
version has however, not been placed before the police as 
according to the SHO the petitioner did not join the investigation. 
… Let the petitioner appear and place his version before the 
Superintendent of Police who shall give it due consideration in 
accordance with law.” 
 
Yousif v. The State  
(NLR 1990 U.C. 149)  
 
“In these provisions, once the investigating machinery is set in 
motion after registration of FIR, there is no room for filing of 
second FIR but the investigation can continue without hindrance 
even if in the result of the investigation culprits are found to be 
different persons who are not mentioned in FIR.”  
 
“In the instant case therefore we hold that there was no need or 
justification for the Investigating Officer to file himself as a 
complainant of second FIR because even without doing so he was 
quite competent under the law to continue the investigation and 
arrest persons against whom there was material to connect them 
with the offence regardless of the fact whether they were named 
in FIR as accused persons or not.”  
 
Sadiq Masih v. S.H.O. and others  
(1994 P.Cr.L.J. 295)  
 
“It is now well-settled that when an F.I.R. stands already 
registered regarding an incident, no direction for registering 
second F.I.R. based on cross-version put forth by other side can 
be issued because it is not so provided in law, as has been held 
by a Division Bench of this Court in Mushtaq Ahmad's case 1984 
PCr.LJ 1454.”  
 
Arif Khan v. Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirwala 
District Khanewal and 2 others 
(2006 P.Cr.L.J. 1937)  
 
“The only point in this case which requires determination is 
whether in presence of first F.I.R., second F.I.R. can be registered 
or not.”  
 
“Rule 24.1 of the Police Rules, 1934, deals with the recording of 
the first information relating to an offence, whether cognizable or 
non-cognizable. It is provided therein that every such information 
shall be recorded in writing, by the officer incharge of the police 
station. The Police Officer thus, is obliged to record in writing 
every information relating the commission of any offence. The 
only distinction made here is that the information disclosing 
commission of a cognizable offence is to be recorded in the First 
Information Report Register as well as station diary under Rule 
24.1(2) while the information with regard to non-cognizable 
offence is to be recorded in the station diary only under Rule 
24.3. The information given by respondent No.3 in the shape of 
cross-version disclosed a commission of non-cognizable offence, 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
11
as such it should have been considered as a statement under 
section 161, Cr.P.C. the order to register a second F.I.R. in that 
situation was not justified in law.”  
 
“…plea was to be investigated and recording of cross-version, if 
any, was the proper answer rather than registering a separate 
F.I.R.”  
 
“In view of the above circumstances, I am of the view that the 
learned Additional Sessions Judge was not justified in giving 
direction to respondent No. 2 to record F.I.R. as it was a case of 
cross-version which was ordered to be recorded.”  
 
Syed Wahid Bux Shah alias Chacho Shah and another 
v. The State  
(2011 MLD 64)  
 
“Admittedly first F.I.R. No. 21 of 2008 was registered by brother of 
deceased Ghulam Qadir and that F.I.R. was fully investigated and 
challan was submitted in the Court of law, which is pending 
adjudication. … In existence of first F.I.R. which was lodged by 
the brother of deceased Ghulam Qadir second F.I.R. by his cousin 
cannot be considered as true. In the above circumstances, the 
impugned order, dated 20-11-2009, passed by learned Civil 
Judge and Judicial Magistrate, Thull, is set aside. The 
proceedings arisen out of Crime No. 184 of 2009, of Police Station 
Thull are also hereby quashed.”  
 
 
8. 
The second category of the precedent cases comprises of 
those cases decided by different High Courts wherein it has been 
held that after registration of an FIR a new version of the same 
incident depicting a different story and a different set of accused 
persons can be recorded through a separate FIR and the following 
cases fall in this category:  
 
Sawant v. S.H.O., Police Station Saddar, Kasur and 
another  
(PLD 1975 Lahore 733)  
 
“The basic question of law involved in this case is whether the 
police can refuse to register a case on the basis of the counter 
version given on behalf of the accused party on the ground that 
they consider that version to be false.”  
 
“In my view, the correct legal procedure for the police should have 
been to record the F.I.R. containing the counter version and to 
have investigated it. If they found that the evidence adduced by 
the petitioner did not sustain the charge they could have 
submitted a report to the Magistrate for cancellation of the case.”  
 
Akram Ali Shah v. Station House Officer, Police Station 
Kotwali, Kasur and 2 others  
(PLD 1979 Lahore 320)  
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
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“It cannot be laid down as a proposition of law that if one F.I.R. 
pertaining to a particular occurrence has been registered then 
another F.I.R. containing the counter-version of the same 
occurrence cannot or ought not to be registered.”  
 
“On the other hand, however, if the accused of a particular case 
have a counter version by way of a grievance, then unless a 
formal F.I.R. containing that grievance exists, the accused of the 
counter case could get away without any punishment therefore in 
a situation of the latter type the existence of a counter F.I.R. 
would appear to be equitable, as a private complaint is 
erroneously not given the due importance. This view is consistent 
with the practice established over centuries of submitting challan 
in cross-cases in a Court of law.”  
 
Mirza v. The S.H.O.  
(1982 P.Cr.L.J, 171)  
 
“The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that according to 
petitioner's version the members of the opposite party have 
committed cognizable offences, therefore, the respondent was 
under a statutory obligation to register the case. On the other 
hand, the learned counsel for the respondent S.H.O. vehemently 
argues that as the same occurrence has been reported through 
F.I.R. No. 185 dated 10th August, 1981 there is no question of 
recording another F.I.R. and the investigating agency can be 
directed to take down the petitioner's version during the 
investigation. … In the circumstances, I accept this petition and 
direct the respondent S.H.O. to receive a written complaint from 
the petitioner and act in accordance with section 154 Cr.P.C.”  
 
Abdul Ghani v. S.H.O., P.S. Saddar, Sheikhupura and 
others  
(1983 P.Cr.L.J. 2172)  
 
“It may well be that the occurrence reported about is the same 
but then there are two cross-versions of the occurrence and not 
two different versions of the same occurrence. The version on the 
basis of which the F.I.R. has already been registered is distinct .... 
whereas the version given by the petitioner is totally on a different 
premises ….”  
 
“In the context of the above position it appears that the 
respondent is under statutory obligation to register the case and 
proceed with the investigation in accordance with law.”  
 
Muhammad Ibrahim v. S.H.O. Police Station Mansehra 
and another  
(1983 Law Notes (Peshawar) 686)  
 
““In the circumstances we are of the view that the SHO 
(respondent no.1) has failed in his duty by not registering and 
investigating the counter version of the case given in the report of 
the petitioner.”  
 
Halim Sarwar v. S.H.O., Police Station Headmarala and 
2 others 
(PLJ 1984 Cr.C. (Lahore) 369)  
 
“Even if an FIR has been registered on the basis of one sided 
version, registration of a second FIR showing a different grievance 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
13
could not be refused by the Police Officer in proper performance 
of his legal duty under Section 154 Cr.P.C.”  
 
Fateh Sher v. S.H.O etc.  
(1984 Law Notes (Lahore) 1169)  
 
“No doubt, it was held in the aforementioned cases reported as 
PLD 1979 Lahore 320, PLD 1980 Lahore 116 and 1982 P.Cr.L.J. 
171 that if the accused of a particular case have counter-version 
by way of a grievance and the counter-version discloses 
commission of cognizable offence, it is the duty of the Station 
House Officer to register a counter FIR and in case of his failure 
to do so, he can be commanded by this Court to perform his 
statutory obligation. However, there is no dearth of case-law on 
the point that so far as this Court is concerned, it is not 
necessary that in each and every case, where there is an omission 
to perform a statutory duty, a direction must issue. Facts and 
circumstances of each case have to be taken into account and it 
has also to be seen if filing of a private complaint, in the 
circumstances of the case, is not as adequate or efficacious a 
remedy as the registration of a case.”  
 
Karim Bibi v. Station House Officer, Police Station 
Rajana (Faisalabad) and others  
(1985 P.Cr.L.J. 213)  
 
[The investigating officer] “did not take down the counter-version 
nor made any investigation on that line despite the same having 
been brought to his notice in the form of various applications.”  
 
“… it is enough that the version of Mst. Karim Bibi was not taken 
down and in that respect the A.S.I. did not perform his statutory 
duty under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. His 
failure to do so was illegal. Consequently the petition is accepted 
and it is directed that let an F.I.R. be registered on the statement 
of Mst. Karim Bibi.”  
 
Ghulam Hussain v. Siraj-ul-Haq and others  
(1987 P.Cr.L.J. 1214)  
 
“As regards the last contention, the petitioner has made allegation 
in the report against police and army personnels. The incident is 
admitted and F.I.R. has also been registered. There is no bar of 
recording a second F.I.R. of the same incident giving counter-
version of the incident.”  
 
Mst. Rehmi etc. v. S.H.O. Basirpur etc.  
(KLR 1987 Cr.C. 442)  
 
“From the above observations, it would be quite clear that 
informations can be laid one after the other, to be recorded as 
F.I.Rs. if these disclose separate cognizable offences, the second 
or later not being the mere amplification of the first but the 
disclosure of other criminal activities. Recording of a second F.I.R. 
or a direction to that effect therefore depends upon the 
circumstances of each case. Counter cases are often recorded and 
tried. No hard and fast rules or principles can be laid down as to 
when a second FIR can or should be recorded. The matter has to 
be seen in the context of the totality of the circumstances and the 
allegations. … But if a new case is made out or allegations of a 
cognizable case are levelled showing a genuine grievance, then 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
14
the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case registered and 
investigation made.”  
 
“Therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge fell in 
error in directing the registration of a case on the motion of the 
side who had lost a life simply because the other side who had 
suffered an injury on a finger had succeeded to get a FIR recorded 
earlier.”  
 
Manzoor Hussain (Chaeywala) v. Station House Officer, 
etc.  
(NLR 1989 Cr.L.J. 39)  
 
“… learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has vehemently 
urged that the mere fact that an FIR has already been registered 
does not debar the petitioner to lodge the second FIR in respect of 
the same offence and that it is the statutory duty of the officials 
respondents to record the same. … There cannot be any cavil with 
proposition of law laid down in the above cited cases …”  
 
Abdul Rehman v. S.H.O. Police Station Karianwala, 
Tehsil and District Gujrat and another  
(1989 Law Notes (Lahore) 885)  
 
“The law enjoins upon the police to register the counter version 
and to proceed with the investigation in accordance with law. The 
respondent S.H.O. is directed to register a case on the basis of the 
counter version and to proceed with the investigation according to 
law.” 
 
Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto and another v. Government of 
Sindh and another  
(PLD 1997 Karachi 119) 
 
“Reference to the case-law, therefore, indicates that there is no 
hard and fast rule that a second F.I.R. cannot be registered in 
respect of a different version given by an aggrieved party of the 
same occurrence. If information is subsequently given to a police 
officer, which discloses a different offence, also cognizable by the 
police, then unless it is a mere amplification of the first version, it 
must be recorded by the police. Therefore, direction to the police 
to record a second F.I.R. would depend upon the circumstances 
of each case. If true facts in respect of an occurrence are not 
reflected by the first F.I.R., then refusal to record a genuine 
version of the same occurrence would not be justified. The 
question has, therefore, to be examined in the light of the 
circumstances of a particular case.”  
 
Muhammad Ishaque v. S.P. Jaffarabad and another  
(PLJ 1998 Quetta 1)  
 
“The conclusion of the above discussion would be that the police 
was under bounded duty to have registered the counter-version of 
the petitioner through a separate F.I.R. Then, it was duty of the 
SSP to conduct impartial and honest investigation through an 
independent police officer of the second version as directed by Mr. 
Justice Javed Iqbal. I, therefore, agree with his conclusions.”  
 
Mst. Razia Sultana alias Gogi Butt v. Deputy Inspector-
General of Police and others  
(1999 P.Cr.L.J. 694)  
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
15
 
“I would express that the case-law is not bereft of the judicial 
decisions to the effect that in the presence of the registration of a 
criminal case the order for the registration of the 2nd F.I.R. about 
the same occurrence can be passed by the High Court … 
However, in the circumstances of this matter when case F.I.R. No. 
442, dated 8-9-1998 registered at Police Station Nawan Kot under 
section 436, Pakistan Penal Code is under investigation wherein 
the version of the petitioner can be recorded thereof, there is no 
legal and factual necessity to pass the order in the matter. … I 
declare that there is no legal justification to pass the order for the 
registration of the 2nd First Information Report as required and 
desired by Mst. Razia Sultana alias Gogi Butt petitioner.”  
 
Ahmad Yar v. Station House Officer, Shah Kot, District 
Sahiwal and 8 others  
(2007 P.Cr.L.J. 1352)  
 
“As held by the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the 
case Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station 
Kalri West Karachi and 12 others PLD 2005 SC 297 and Mrs. 
Ghanwa Bhutto and another v. Government of Sindh and another 
PLD 1997 Kar. 119, also relied upon by the learned Single Judge 
in the impugned order, there is no embargo with regard to 
registration of second F.I.R. in respect of different version given 
by the aggrieved party of the same occurrence and the only 
impediment is that second F.I.R. should not contain the facts for 
the mere amplification of the first version.”  
 
Muhammad Azam v. Inspector-General of Police, 
Islamabad and 2 others  
(PLD 2008 Lahore 103) 
 
“Similarly, it has been repeatedly held by superior Courts of the 
country that where a different, opposite or a cross version is put 
forth by the complainant which discloses commission of 
cognizable offence, second F.I.R. is not barred. In this regard, 
reference may be made to PLD 1978 Lahore 187 and Miss 
Ghanwa Bhuttoo and others vs. Government of Sindh and others, 
PLD 1997 Karachi 119.”  
 
Mst. Allah Rakhi v. D.P.O. Gujranwala and 5 others  
(2009 MLD 99)  
 
“Insofar as the registration of the second F.I.R. is concerned, by 
now, it has been settled that there is no bar against the 
registration of second F.I.R. regarding the same occurrence, 
rather, in the case of Mrs. Ghanwa Bhutto (supra), the order of 
registration of third of F.I.R. was passed by Hon'ble Karachi High 
Court, which was upheld by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the 
case of Wajid Ali Durani and another (supra).”  
 
9. 
The third category of the precedent cases is where different 
High Courts have clarified that a separate FIR is to be registered if 
the new version being advanced pertains to a different occurrence 
or discloses commission of a different cognizable offence. The 
following cases fall in this category of cases: 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
16
 
Muhammad Rafique v. Ahmad Yar and another  
(NLR 1982 Criminal 638)  
 
“In the present case, however, the earlier F.I.R. … relates 
altogether to a different incident and transaction …. The F.I.R. 
sought to be lodged … was not a counter version … and it 
therefore, cannot be said that Ahmad Yar as an accused in the 
earlier case was trying to give his own version in respect of the 
same incident or transaction.”  
 
“In the present case, the learned Single Judge has exercised his 
discretion [by ordering registration of second F.I.R.] which he 
undoubtedly possessed and nothing has been shown … to 
warrant interference in the Intra Court Appeal.”  
 
Allah Ditta and 3 others v. The S.H.O., P.S. Basirpur, 
District Okara and 3 others  
(PLD 1987 Lahore 300)  
 
“From the above observations, it would be quite clear that 
informations can be laid one after the other, to be recorded as 
F.I.Rs. if these disclose separate cognisable offences, the second 
or later not being the mere amplification of the first but the 
disclosure of other criminal activities. Recording of a second F.I.R. 
or a direction to that effect, therefore, depends upon the 
circumstances of each case. Counter cases are often recorded and 
tried. No hard and fast rules or principles can be laid down as to 
when a second FIR can or should be recorded. The matter has to 
be seen in the context of the totality of the circumstances and the 
allegations. … But if a new case is made out or allegations of a 
cognizable case are levelled showing a genuine grievance, then 
the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case registered and 
investigation made.” 
 
Pervez Akhtar v. The State  
(1989 P.Cr.L.J. 2199)  
 
“In this view of the matter, being bound by the principle laid 
down by this Court in Akram Shah's case PLD 1979 Lah. 320, 
Muhammad Aslam's case PLD 1979 Lah. 907, Malik Muhammad 
Aslam's case PLD 1981 Lah.138, Mirza's case 1982 PCr.LJ 171 
and Abdul Ghani's case 1983 PCr.LJ 2172, 1 do not see any 
illegality in the registration of the second F.I.R. at the instance of 
Fazal Din. Since the two versions contained in the two F.I.Rs. are 
different versions of two different occurrences and not two 
versions of the same occurrence and recoveries have to be made 
from the five accused, I would not like to interfere in this matter.”  
 
Firdous Barkat Ali v. The State  
(1990 P.Cr.L.J. 967)  
 
“The second First Information Report which was filed on the basis 
of the written complaint included certain fresh instances 
concerning the involvement of the present applicant. The second 
First Information Report in the circumstances could competently 
be lodged. In any event the argument that the second First 
Information Report is merely a statement of a witness under 
section 161, Criminal Procedure Code can always be raised before 
the trial Court and it is up to the trial Court to thrash out the 
facts and determine whether the second First Information Report 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
17
would amount to a statement under section 161, Criminal 
Procedure Code or a new complaint giving information of newly-
detected instances of misappropriation.”  
 
Muhammad Latif v. S.H.O., Police Station Saddar, 
Dunyapur and 14 others  
(1993 P.Cr.L.J. 1992)  
 
“It is now a settled proposition of law that informations can be 
laid one after the other, to be recorded as F.I.Rs. if these disclose 
separate cognizable offences, the second or later not being the 
mere amplification of the first but the disclosure of other criminal 
activities. Although recording of a second F.I.R. or a direction to 
that effect depends upon the circumstances of each case but 
counter-cases are often recorded and tried. No hard and fast rules 
or principles can be laid as to when a second F.I.R. can or should 
be recorded. The matter has to be seen in the context of the 
totality of the circumstances and the allegations. After the 
registration of the first F.I.R. if a new case is made out or 
allegations of a cognizable case are levelled showing a genuine 
grievance, then the aggrieved party is entitled to have his case 
registered and investigated.”  
 
Hamayun Khan v. Muhammad Ayub Khan and 4 others  
(1999 P.Cr.L.J. 1706)  
 
“It was, therefore, obligatory upon the police to register a separate 
report there being no bar of the first F.I.R. as a new case was 
made out by the respondent disclosing allegations of separate 
cognizable offences, as recording of a second F.I.R. shall depend 
upon the facts of each case and the matter is to be seen in the 
context of totality of the circumstances and the allegations made 
in second F.I.R. Reliance is placed on the case of Muhammad 
Latif v. S.H.O. and others 1993 PCr.LJ 1992.” 
 
Muhammad Anwar, Sub-Inspector, Railway Police 
Lahore v. Station House Officer, Railway Police, Kasur 
and 2 others  
(PLD 1999 Lahore 50)  
 
“There is no cavil with the proposition that when two or more 
versions with regard to one incident or offence are given after 
recording of the F.I.R., second F.I.R. cannot be recorded on the 
basis of every subsequent version but if in a case it is found that 
a counter version is given by a party which discloses a distinct 
and separate offence, another F.I.R. will have to be registered and 
shall be investigated upon.”  
 
Rana Ghulam Mustafa v. Station House Officer, Police 
Station Civil Line, Lahore and 2 others  
(PLD 2008 Lahore 110)  
 
“From reading the language of section 154, Cr.P.C. it is clear that 
information can be laid before the S.H.O. about an occurrence at 
any time even if already an F.I.R. stands registered about the 
same occurrence. In such circumstance, there is no bar laying 
information one after the other, to be recorded as F.I.R. if such an 
information discloses commission of a separate cognizable 
offence. The second or later information should not be merely an 
amplification for the first F.I.R. but is should be a disclosure of a 
different criminal activity. Recording of a second F.I.R. or a 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
18
direction to that effect, therefore, depends upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. No. hard and fast rules or principles 
can be laid down as to when a second F.I.R. can or should be 
recorded. The matter has to be seen in the context of the totality 
of the circumstances and the allegations.”  
 
Independent Media Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. through 
Attorney and another v. Prosecutor General, Quetta and 
7 others  
(PLD 2015 Balochistan 54)  
 
“The moot question for consideration arises as to whether 
investigation and further proceedings on the basis of all the FIRs 
is permissible? Though a straitjacket formula cannot be laid 
down, yet the only test whether 75 FIRs can be permitted to exist. 
In such case, the Court has to examine the facts and 
circumstances giving rise to all the FIRs and the test of sameness 
is to be applied to find out whether all the FIRs relate to the same 
incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the 
incidents, which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If 
the answer is in the affirmative, the second or the remaining FIRs 
are liable to be quashed. However, in case, the contrary is proved, 
where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in 
respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is 
permissible.”  
 
Pervaiz Rasheed and others v. Ex-officio Justice of 
Peace and others  
(2016 YLR 1441)  
 
“It is well settled proposition of law that second FIR can be 
registered if a distinct and separate cognizable offence is disclosed 
or if any aggrieved person got reservation about the first FIR 
grousing that contents of the FIR already registered does not 
disclose the true picture of the occurrence. However, second FIR 
cannot be registered if it is just an amplification or elaboration of 
earlier.”  
  
Imtiaz Ali v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary 
and 8 others  
(2017 MLD 132)  
 
“It is well settled that lodgment of second FIR against the same 
offence is neither prohibited nor restricted by the law, 
nevertheless the controverting set of allegations narrated in 
second FIR must emanate a quite separate and distinct offence, 
and same should be examined prudently in the purview of facts 
stated regarding the incident in earlier FIR as well as 
documentary evidence collected and statements of PWs recorded 
under section 161, Cr.P.C. by earlier Investigating Officer, to curb 
and defeat the fabrication of events with mala fide intention and 
false involvement of any innocent person.”  
 
 
10. 
The Privy Council and this Court have also dealt with the 
issue at hand in the following cases: 
 
Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad  
(AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council 18)  
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
19
 
“The argument as their Lordships understood was that the only 
information report under Ss. 154 to 156, Criminal P.C., was that 
recorded on 31st August 1941, that the allegations recorded at a 
later stage of 5th September were not an information report, but a 
statement taken in the course of an investigation under Ss. 161 
and 162 of the Code, that there was therefore no reported 
cognisable offence into which the police were entitled to enquire, 
but only a non-cognisable offence which required a Magistrate’s 
order if an investigation was to be authorized. Their Lordships 
cannot accede to this argument. They would point out that the 
respondent in his case treats each document as a separate 
information report and indeed, on the argument presented on his 
behalf, rightly so, since each discloses a separate offence, the 
second not being a mere amplification of the first, but the 
disclosure of further criminal activities.”  
 
Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and 
another  
(1975 SCMR 149)  
 
“Jamshed Ahmad petitioner has felt aggrieved by the order of a 
learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, dated 8-7-1974, 
whereby his petition under Clause 22 of the Letters Patent read 
with section 154 of the Cr.P.C. praying for the issuance of a 
direction to respondent No. 1 who is S.H.O., Police Station, City 
Khanpur, Rahimyar Khan, for the registration of a case under 
section 
467/468/420/471/109/114/116, 
P.P.C. 
read 
with 
section 81/82 of the Registration Act and conduct of preliminary 
investigation by some higher police officer was dismissed in limine 
on the ground that in respect of the same transaction a case had 
already been registered with the petitioner as one of the accused 
therein. 
 
2.  
In support of the petition for leave, learned counsel 
contended that respondent No. 1 was under an obligation to 
register the case at the instance of the petitioner reflecting his 
own version of the incident notwithstanding the fact that in 
respect of the same transaction a case had already been 
registered. In support of this, learned counsel has relied on the 
plain language of the statutory provision contained in section 
154, Cr.P.C. 
 
3.  
We are not impressed by the argument. A perusal of the 
record shows that on receipt of the petition, the learned Judge 
had called for a report from respondent No. 1 who gave three 
reasons for the non-registration of the case at the instance of the 
petitioner: Firstly, that no case could be registered against the 
Tehsildar/Sub-Registrar, whom the petitioner wanted to rope in 
as one of the accused-persons, without the previous approval of 
the 
Provincial 
Anti-Corruption, 
Council/Divisional 
Anti-
Corruption 
Committee. 
Secondly, 
that 
according 
to 
his 
information the report sought to be recorded was false, and 
Thirdly, that a case of forgery and cheating etc. was already under 
investigation in respect of the same transaction, the petitioner 
having been named as one of the accused therein. 
 
4.  
The petition could be thrown out on the short ground that 
the High Court was under no obligation to grant the relief prayed 
for by the petitioner. It was a matter resting entirely in its 
discretion and there is nothing to indicate that it was improperly 
exercised. Even otherwise, by no means does the impugned order 
shut the door on the petitioner who is at liberty to initiate 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
20
criminal proceedings by lodging a complaint. The position is too 
well known to be reiterated that the Supreme Court does not sit 
as a Court of appeal and interferes only in cases of grave 
injustice, the present case being certainly not one of those. The 
petition is, therefore, dismissed.” 
 
Kaura v. The State and others  
(1983 SCMR 436)  
 
“It appears to us that once the case was registered vide FIR 23 … 
the registration of a fresh report notwithstanding the divergent 
version contained therein was not called for inasmuch as the ball 
had already been set rolling and the police was not only 
competent but also duty bound to unearth the true facts and 
trace the real culprits.”  
 
Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. Government of 
Sindh and others 
(2001 SCMR 1556)  
 
“These two petitions for leave to appeal are directed against the 
judgment dated 7-11-1996 passed by the High Court of Sindh at 
Karachi whereby the learned Judges gave direction to the S.H.O., 
Clifton Police, Karachi, to register another F.I.R. sought to be 
lodged by Mst. Ghanwa Bhutto and Mst. Badrunnisa in respect of 
the incident in which their husbands, namely, Mir Murtaza 
Bhutto and Ashiq Jatoi lost their lives.” 
 
“3.  
As however, widows of the deceased were not satisfied and 
felt that the two previously registered F.I.Rs did not reflect the 
true facts, they filed Constitutional Petition in the High Court of 
Sindh, seeking direction to the Clifton Police Station to record 
another F.I.R. disclosing the true facts of the incident. During the 
hearing of the Constitutional Petition, the petitioners wanted to 
be impleaded as respondents to the petition, but the High Court 
declined such request. The Constitutional Petition was resisted on 
behalf of the State on the grounds that the two earlier F.I.Rs. in 
respect of the same incident having been already registered at the 
same police station, the lodging of third F.I.R. by the widows of 
the deceased was not warranted in law and that if the petitioners 
were not satisfied, they had an alternate remedy of filing a direct 
complaint in the Court.” 
 
“In the result, the learned High Court allowed the Constitutional 
Petition and gave direction to the Clifton Police Station to register 
a third F.I.R. at the behest of the widows of the deceased. Hence, 
these petitions.” 
 
“6.  
We see no force in the contentions raised by the learned 
counsel. Perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the learned 
High Court would show that the first contention of the learned 
counsel was precisely raised before the learned High Court, who 
dealt with it elaborately and repelled it for the reasons shown in 
the judgment, to which no exception can be legitimately taken 
and the learned High Court in the circumstances of the case, was 
within its jurisdiction in giving the direction to the police for 
registering another F.I.R. at the instance of the aggrieved widows 
of the deceased. Moreover, admittedly, since lodging of the third 
F.I.R., regular challan has been submitted in the Court in which 
the petitioners have been named as accused persons and the trial 
is yet to take place.”  
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
21
“Similarly, the contention that the learned High Court has not 
followed the view expressed by this Court in 1983 SCMR 436 is 
misconceived, as perusal of the impugned judgment would also 
show that in the circumstances pointed out in the judgment the 
learned High Court had correctly appreciated the views expressed 
in several cases by the superior Courts including the case 
referred to by the counsel in giving the direction for registering 
another F.I.R.” 
 
Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police 
Station Kalri West, Karachi and 12 others  
(PLD 2005 SC 297)  
 
“7.  
Admittedly, petitioner from the day of incident has been 
agitating that the murder of her husband was managed by his 
real brothers, namely, Abdul Khaliq, Abdul Malik and Latif in 
league with respondents Siddiq, Saifur Rehman, Muhammad 
Raza-ul-Haq, 
Akbar 
Ali 
and 
S.I. 
Malik Nazir. 
In 
such 
circumstances, the veracity and truthfulness of F.I.R. lodged by 
respondent Muhammad Yousuf, the Manager of the Company, 
became highly doubtful and the petitioner was right in asking for 
registration of another F.I.R. at her own version. It is on record 
that 
she 
had 
been 
moving 
applications 
and 
making 
representations to the high-ups in the police but because of 
influence of private respondents, all in vain, therefore, she rightly 
invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the learned High Court 
and urged for registration of the case at her own version which 
apparently was not disposed of in legal manner. No doubt, 
exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution 
is discretionary with the High Court but according to the 
principles laid down by the Superior Courts, the discretionary 
powers must be exercised in good faith, fairly, justly and 
reasonably 
having 
regard 
to 
all 
relevant 
circumstances. 
Examining the case of petitioner in the light of above principles, 
we are of the considered opinion that the High Court has not only 
exercised its jurisdiction improperly but also disposed of petition 
without adverting to the grievance of the petitioner only on 
technical grounds. This Court in the case of Wajid Ali Khan 
Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others 2001 
SCMR 1556 maintained the order of High Court whereby 
registration of third F.I.R. was allowed on the ground that the two 
F.I.Rs earlier registered by police do not reflect the true facts of 
the case. It has also been held in this case that if information 
given to a police officer, which discloses a different offence was 
also cognizable by the police, then unless it is a mere 
amplification of the first version, must be recorded by the police. 
 
In the case of Muhammad Ishaque referred (supra), the petitioner 
therein approached the learned High Court for registration of 
second F.I.R. as the police has refused to register his version with 
regard to a cognizable offence under section 154, Cr.P.C. By 
majority view, it was held that it was the duty of the police to 
register counter version of the petitioner through a separate F.I.R. 
and also directed for impartial and honest investigation by the 
police.”  
 
“10.  
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the considered 
opinion that in the instant case petitioner has been able to make 
out a case for registration of second F.I.R.” 
 
Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi and others  
(PLD 2016 SC 484) 
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
22
“3.  
Regarding this incident, an FIR was earlier lodged with 
misleading and incorrect statement of facts, therefore, she filed 
an application under Section 22-A Cr.P.C. before the Justice of 
Peace/Sessions Judge Pishin with the following assertions: ---” 
 
“5.  
We have heard arguments of the learned ASC for the 
appellants. He contended that indeed there is no specific 
prohibition under the provisions of Cr.P.C. which precludes 
registration of another FIR with respect to the same incident; 
nevertheless, depending upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case, such practice has been deprecated particularly when 
the proceedings in a criminal case arising out of earlier FIR have 
reached at an advanced stage; however, this important legal 
aspect has not been duly taken into consideration by the High 
Court in its impugned judgment. He, however, could not refer to 
any case law in support of his argument that registration of 
another FIR is unwarranted by any specific provision of law. 
 
6.  
The learned Additional Advocate General Balochistan in 
his submissions did not oppose findings of the High Court of 
Balochistan in the impugned judgment. He referred to before us 
the judgments in the cases of Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. 
Government of Sindh and others (2001 SCMR 1556) and Mst. 
Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police Station Kalri West, 
Karachi and 12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297), which lay down a 
general principle in this regard as under: 
 
“no definite rule could be laid down barring the 
registration of another F.I.R. when a different 
version of the same occurrence is given by an 
aggrieved party. Moreover, any direction to the 
police to record another F.I.R. would depend on the 
facts and circumstances of each case, however, 
refusal to record/register a genuine version of the 
same occurrence is unwarranted in law.” 
 
7.  
In another earlier case Kaura v. The State and others 
(1983 SCMR 436) while dismissing the CPLA, the Court had 
suggested the aggrieved party to move the High Court for review 
of its order regarding registration of another FIR with the 
observation that the police was not only competent but also duty 
bound to unearth the true facts and trace the real culprits while 
conducting investigation of the crime. This judgment was taken 
into notice in the case of Mst. Anwar Begum (supra) but not 
commented upon, while in the other case of Wajid Ali Khan 
Durani (supra) similar contention of the learned counsel was 
repelled as being misconceived. It was further held that in the 
circumstances discussed, the learned High Court correctly 
appreciated the view expressed in several other cases of the 
superior Courts for giving direction to register another FIR. 
 
8.  
We have considered submissions of the learned ASC for 
the appellants on short controversy involved in the matter 
relating to registration of another FIR. In the instant case, perusal 
of contents of the earlier FIR lodged at the instance of Ali 
Muhammad Defedar Levies on 09.06.2010 and the contents of 
other FIR lodged by Respondent No.1 on 27.08.2015, in terms of 
the impugned judgment, reveals two entirely different and 
conflicting stories about the actual occurrence. It is, thus, 
obvious that in case prosecution leads its evidence on the basis of 
contents of earlier FIR and the investigation made on that basis, 
then from no stretch of imagination the grievance of Respondent 
No.1, attributing criminal liability of whole occurrence to the 
complainant and his party ("the appellants" herein), could be 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
23
considered or adjudicated upon by the Court. In such 
circumstances, considering the allegations of Respondent No.1 
about mala fide of the complainant in the earlier FIR so as to 
exonerate himself from the liability of Qatl-i-amd of her son, 
followed by distorted and collusive investigation, the impugned 
judgment of the High Court directing registration of another FIR 
seems fully justified and in accordance with law, wherein no 
specific bar or prohibition is provided in this regard. The two 
cases referred to by the learned Additional Advocate General 
Balochistan in support of the impugned judgment also fully 
support this view. 
 
9.  
The whole gambit of controversy in hand revolves around 
the import and application of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. hence for 
ready reference it will be useful to reproduce the same as under: 
 
“154. Information in cognizable cases.-Every 
information relating to 
the commission of a 
cognizable offence if given orally to an officer-in-
charge of a police station, shall be reduced in 
writing by him or under his direction and be read 
over to the informant; and every such information, 
whether given in writing or reduced to writing as 
aforesaid, shall be signed by the person giving it, 
and the substance thereof shall be entered in a book 
to be kept by such officer in such form as the 
Provincial Government may prescribe in this behalf.” 
 
10.  
As could be seen from the plain reading of above 
reproduced provision of law, the requirement of Section 154 
Cr.P.C. is to enter every information of commission of a 
cognizable offence, whether given orally or in writing to the 
officer-in-charge of the police station, which shall then be reduced 
into writing and signed by the person giving it and the substance 
thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in the 
form prescribed by the Provincial Government in this behalf. 
Meaning thereby, that it is not a legal requirement for provider of 
such information to canvass the whole scene of occurrence of a 
cognizable offence giving description and details of accused, 
details of weapons used by them, their specific role, motive 
behind the occurrence, and the names of eye-witnesses etc. But it 
is a matter of common experience that usually the entries made 
in Section 154 Cr.P.C. book, as per practice, contain invariably all 
such details so much so that in the ordinary parlance/sense it is 
considered as the gist of the prosecution case against the 
accused. In such state of affairs, if a collusive, mala fide or 
concocted FIR, registered at the instance of some individual with 
some ulterior motive, is taken as sacrosanct, it is likely to divert 
the whole course of investigation in a wrong direction and spoil 
the entire prosecution case on that premise. The Court while 
considering the crucial point of registration of another FIR cannot 
remain oblivious of these ground realities so as to non-suit the 
aggrieved party from agitating his grievance in an honest manner, 
or ensure regulating proper investigation of a crime in the right 
direction, or apprehend the real culprits and brought them before 
the Court of law for justice. 
 
11.  
Though our criminal legal system proceeds on the 
presumption of honest, God fearing and fair police officers, 
impartial and honest investigation system, but this is far from 
reality in the society we live in. In such circumstances when the 
Courts feel that due to mala fide, dishonest, colourful and 
motivated acts or omissions, entire investigation of the crime has 
been misled or it is going to be misled and on that account the 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
24
case of the prosecution is likely to fail, then they are not denuded 
of their powers to order recording of another FIR disclosing a 
different version to check such nefarious design meant to save 
the 
real 
culprits 
vis-a-vis 
misleading 
the 
investigation/prosecution, at any appropriate stage of the 
proceedings. However, where need be, such powers are to be 
exercised with extreme care and caution and not in a routine 
manner so as to merely fulfill the wish of an individual who, as 
per his whims, is not satisfied either with the contents of earlier 
FIR or the direction of investigation based thereon or wants 
registration of another FIR with some ulterior motive. It is more 
so important in the circumstances when the procedure of direct 
complaint under Section 200, Cr.P.C. is also provided to meet 
such eventualities. However, it may be clarified here that there 
may be circumstances where registration of another FIR will be 
the only proper course as adopting the alternate course provided 
in Section 200, Cr.P.C. may not be equally efficacious and 
effective for the aggrieved person. The case law on the subject, 
which has been referred to above, lend support to the view that 
provisions of Section 154, Cr.P.C. are to be read in a pragmatic, 
holistic and realistic manner in order to ensure that its true spirit 
and object is achieved and it is not abused at the hands of 
individuals or police, who may be adamant to make mockery of 
this system. It is for these reasons that no definite principle can 
be laid down barring the registration of another FIR. 
 
12.  
It is unfortunate to note that in the instant case due to 
one-sided version disclosed in earlier FIR No.17/2010, the 
investigating agency never bothered to look into the crime from 
another angle as narrated in the other FIR dated 27.08.2015, 
which means that as per assertions of Respondent No.1, the 
alleged culprits could have otherwise escaped from their criminal 
liability successfully at the very initial stage without even being 
charged for the offence on the basis of misleading contents of 
earlier FIR. The short and long of the above discussion is that the 
impugned judgment of the Balochistan High Court warrants no 
interference.” 
 
 
11. 
The confusion gripping the issue, we observe so with great 
respect and deference, is because of the fact that in none of the 
precedent cases detailed above the actual scheme of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Police Rules, 1934 regarding 
registration of a criminal case through an FIR and its investigation 
by the police had been examined in any detail and we venture to 
undertake such examination in the following paragraphs. 
 
12. 
Section 154, Cr.P.C. is the legal provision under which an 
FIR is registered in respect of commission of a cognizable offence 
and the relevant part of that provision reads as follows: 
 
“154. Information in cognizable cases. Every information 
relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given orally to 
an officer incharge of a police station, shall be reduced to writing 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
25
by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant, 
and every such information, whether given in writing or reduced 
to writing as aforesaid shall be signed by the person giving it, and 
the substance thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by 
such officer in such form as the Provincial Government may 
prescribe in this behalf. ---” 
 
It is straightaway to be noticed that the heading of this section 
speaks of “cognizable cases” meaning thereby that after entering 
the first information relating to commission of a cognizable offence 
in the prescribed book, i.e. after registration of an FIR the matter 
becomes a “case”. We have found the learned Attorney-General to 
be entirely justified in maintaining that an FIR is essentially an 
“incident report” which informs the police for the first time about 
an occurrence in which some cognizable offence has been 
committed and after registration of the FIR the occurrence is 
treated as a “case” and thereafter every step taken in the ensuing 
investigation under sections 156, 157 and 159, Cr.P.C. is a step 
taken in that case. The steps to be taken during the investigation 
of 
the 
case 
include 
gathering 
of 
information 
about 
the 
circumstances of the case and such information may or may not be 
in accord with the facts narrated in the FIR. Section 160, Cr.P.C. 
quite clearly indicates that and the same reads as under: 
  
“160.  Police officer’s power to require attendance of 
witnesses.-- Any police officer making an investigation under 
this Chapter may, by order in writing, require the attendance 
before himself of any person being within the limits of his own or 
any adjoining station who, from the information given or 
otherwise, appears to be acquainted with the circumstances of 
the case; and such person shall attend as so required.” 
 
This section clearly dispels the impression that the investigating 
officer is to be guided or controlled by the contents of the FIR or 
that the investigation to be conducted by him is driven by any duty 
to establish that the story of the incident contained in the FIR is 
correct. In fact, to the contrary, after registration of the FIR the 
investigating officer is to embark upon an exercise to discover the 
actuality of the matter irrespective of the version of the incident 
narrated by the first informant through the FIR and in the process 
he is expected to collect information from any number of persons 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
26
who appear to him “to be acquainted with the circumstances of the 
case”. Every new information received by him during the 
investigation of the case or every new circumstance in which the 
relevant offence was committed coming to his notice during the 
investigation of the case is not to require registration of a separate 
FIR because such further information or knowledge is a part of 
investigation of the same case which had taken birth at the time of 
registration of the FIR. Section 161, Cr.P.C. also deals with 
examination of any person supposed to be acquainted with the 
facts and circumstances of the case. The said section reads as 
follows: 
 
“161. Examination of witnesses by police. (1) 
Any 
police 
officer making an investigation under this Chapter or any police 
officer not below such rank as the Provincial Government may, by 
general or special order, prescribe in this behalf, acting on the 
requisition of such officer, may examine orally any person 
supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of 
the case. 
 
(2) 
Such person shall be bound to answer all questions 
relating to such case put to him by such officer, other than 
questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose 
him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. 
 
(3) 
The police officer may reduce into writing any statement 
made to him in the course of an examination, under this section, 
and if he does so he shall make a separate record of the 
statement of each such person whose statement he records.”  
 
 
The “case” already stands registered through an FIR and thereafter 
any person can supply any information about the facts and 
circumstances of the case to the investigating officer. There is no 
bar in the matter against an information which may disclose 
circumstances and culprits different from those mentioned in the 
FIR. According to section 173(1)(b), Cr.P.C. the action taken under 
section 173(1), Cr.P.C. by the officer-in-charge of the police station 
is to be communicated through the public prosecutor “to the 
person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission 
of the offence was first given”. This by itself is a recognition of a 
possibility that any other information about commission of the 
relevant 
offence 
(including 
information 
about 
different 
circumstances and different culprits) may also be provided to the 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
27
investigating officer by any other person as well during the course 
of investigation of the case commenced upon registration of the 
first information received, i.e. the FIR and no fresh FIR needs to be 
registered on the basis of a new information provided by a different 
person.  
 
13. 
The same distinction between a “case” and an “information” 
about commission of an offence also appears to be writ large in the 
relevant Police Rules, 1934 as well. Rule 24.1 of the said Rules in 
Chapter XXIV dealing with ‘Information to the Police’ speaks of 
“information relating to an offence” received under section 154, 
Cr.P.C. and Rule 24.5 makes that distinction absolutely clear. Rule 
24.5 of the said Rules provides as follows: 
 
“24.5. First Information Report Register.-- (1) 
The 
First 
Information Report Register shall be a printed book in Form 24.5 
(1) consisting of 200 pages and shall be completely filled before a 
new one is commenced. Cases shall bear an annual serial 
number in each police station for each calendar year. -------” 
 
It is clear from Rule 24.5 reproduced above that commission of a 
cognizable offence, when reported to the police through the first 
information and registered in the FIR register, is treated as a “case” 
bearing an annual serial number and such “case” carries the same 
number for ever irrespective of any number of different versions 
received by the police regarding commission of the said offence or 
any number of different circumstances or sets of culprits brought 
to the notice of the investigating officer during the investigation of 
the “case”. At this stage an analogy may be apt vis-à-vis 
registration of motor vehicles. After rolling out of a motor vehicle 
from the assembly line and before it is brought on the road such 
motor vehicle is required by the law to be registered with the 
relevant authority and upon such registration the relevant motor 
vehicle is allocated a registration number. After its registration and 
allocation of a registration number such motor vehicle is to carry 
the same registration number throughout its life and utility even 
when its ownership changes hands, its user is transferred to 
different persons, its colour is changed or its shape is modified at 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
28
any subsequent stage. Similarly, the FIR number allocated to a 
criminal case is the number of that case in the police record and 
till culmination of the case the said criminal case is to carry the 
same number and is to be identified by that number alone. This by 
itself is a sure indication of the scheme of the law that in respect of 
an incident involving commission of a cognizable offence there is to 
be only one FIR and every step taken during the investigation of 
the case is to be with reference to that FIR. Rules 24.12 to 24.18 
deal with Special Reports submitted and received by different 
officers during the investigation of a case and Rule 24.17 reads as 
follows: 
 
“24.17. Continuation and final reports.-- (1) Each successive 
special report in the same case shall bear the same number as 
the first report and shall be distinguished by the addition of a 
capital Roman letter in the order of the alphabet. 
 
Illustration-- 
The first special report of the murder of X is No. 
20. The next special report shall be numbered 20-A, the next 20-
B and so on. -------” 
 
This Rule again makes it evident that the case and its number in 
the police record remains the same whatever development may 
take place during the investigation of the case and that is also true 
of any new version advanced or any new set of culprits introduced 
during the progress of the investigation. 
 
14. 
Chapter XXV of the Police Rules, 1934 deals with 
‘Investigation’ and Rule 25.1 falling in that Chapter provides as 
follows: 
 
“25.1. Powers to investigate.-- (1) An 
officer-in-charge 
of 
a 
police station is empowered by Section 156, Criminal Procedure 
Code to investigate any cognizable offence which occurs within 
the limits of his jurisdiction. 
 
(2) 
He is also empowered under Section 157(1), Criminal 
Procedure Code, to depute a subordinate to proceed to the spot to 
investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and, if 
necessary, to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the 
offenders. -------” 
 
This Rule shows that the power to investigate is relatable to the 
offence and is not confined to the circumstances reported to the 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
29
police through the first information reduced to writing as an FIR. 
The first information only sets the ball rolling and according to this 
Rule the investigation to follow is about “the facts and 
circumstances of the case”, not just those reported by the first 
informant but including any other information received through 
any other informant or source. This aspect of the matter comes out 
very clearly through Rule 25.2(3) which reads as under: 
 
“(3) 
It is the duty of an investigating officer to find out the 
truth of the matter under investigation. His object shall be to 
discover the actual facts of the case and to arrest the real offender 
or offenders. He shall not commit himself prematurely to any view 
of the facts for or against any person.” 
 
This Rule should suffice to dispel any impression that investigation 
of a case is to be restricted to the version of the incident narrated 
in the FIR or the allegations leveled therein. It is quite evident from 
this Rule that once an FIR is registered then the investigating 
officer embarking upon investigation may not restrict himself to 
the story narrated or the allegations leveled in the FIR and he may 
entertain any fresh information becoming available from any other 
source regarding how the offence was committed and by whom it 
was committed and he may arrive at his own conclusions in that 
regard. The final report to be submitted under section 173, Cr.P.C. 
is to be based upon his final opinion and such opinion is not to be 
guided by what the first informant had stated or alleged in the FIR. 
It is not unheard of that sometimes in the final report submitted 
under section 173, Cr.P.C. the first informant is put up before the 
court as the actual culprit.  
 
15. 
The confusion prevailing in the matter of registration of 
multiple FIRs in respect of the same offence stems from a 
misunderstanding that an FIR is the version of the incident 
reported to the police whereas the legal position is that an FIR to 
be registered under section 154, Cr.P.C. is only an information 
about commission of a cognizable offence and not an information 
about the circumstances in which such offence was committed or 
by whom it was committed. If the information supplied to the 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
30
police not only reports commission of a cognizable offence but also 
contains a story as to how and by whom the offence was 
committed then such further information is just a version of the 
informant and during the investigation the investigating officer is 
free to entertain any number of versions advanced by any number 
of persons and it is his duty “to discover the actual facts of the 
case and to arrest the real offender or offenders. He shall not 
commit himself prematurely to any view of the facts for or against 
any person” as mandated by Rule 25.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934 
reproduced above. All subsequent or divergent versions of the 
same occurrence or the persons involved therein are to be received, 
recorded and investigated by the investigating officer in the same 
“case” which is based upon the one and only FIR registered in 
respect of the relevant “offence” in the prescribed book kept at the 
local police station. 
 
16. 
Now we turn to the judgments rendered by this Court so far 
on the issue of registration of multiple FIRs in respect of 
commission of the same cognizable offence depicting different 
versions of the same incident. In the case of Jamshed Ahmad v. 
Muhammad Akram Khan and another (1975 SCMR 149) this Court 
had found the High Court to be justified in refusing to order 
registration of a second FIR because an FIR already stood 
registered in respect of “the same transaction” and the case was 
already under investigation.  
 
17. 
In the case of Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 
436) this Court had categorically held that a case had already been 
registered through an FIR and, therefore, registration of another 
FIR “was not called for” merely because the subsequent 
information supplied to the police contained a divergent version of 
the same incident. It was observed by this Court that “the ball had 
already been set rolling and the police was not only competent but 
also duty bound to unearth the true facts and trace the real 
culprits.”  
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
31
18. 
The subsequent case of Wajid Ali Khan Durani and others v. 
Government of Sindh and others (2001 SCMR 1556), however, 
struck a different note and, therefore, the same requires a close 
scrutiny. It was alleged in that case that the two FIRs already 
registered with the local police in respect of the same incident “did 
not reflect the true facts” and, therefore, another FIR ought to be 
registered “disclosing the true facts of the incident” and in that 
backdrop the High Court had ordered the local police to register a 
third FIR in respect of the selfsame incident. When the said order 
of the High Court was assailed before this Court it was upheld and 
maintained simply by observing that “the learned High Court in 
the circumstances of the case, was within its jurisdiction in giving 
the direction to the police for registering another F.I.R. at the 
instance of the aggrieved widows of the deceased. Moreover, 
admittedly, since lodging of the third F.I.R., regular challan has 
been submitted in the Court in which the petitioners have been 
named as accused persons and the trial is yet to take place.” This 
Court had gone on to observe that “Similarly, the contention that 
the learned High Court has not followed the view expressed by this 
Court in 1983 SCMR 436 is misconceived, as perusal of the 
impugned judgment would also show that in the circumstances 
pointed out in the judgment the learned High Court had correctly 
appreciated the views expressed in several cases by the superior 
Courts including the case referred to by the counsel in giving the 
direction for registering another F.I.R.” A careful examination of 
the said judgment handed down by this Court shows three things: 
firstly, it was presumed without referring to any legal provision or 
basis that the High Court had the jurisdiction to order registration 
of a third FIR in respect of the same incident; secondly, the third 
FIR had already been registered on the basis of the impugned order 
passed by the High Court and upon completion of the investigation 
on the basis of the third FIR a Challan had already been submitted 
before the trial court for holding a regular trial of the accused 
persons implicated through the third FIR; and, thirdly, the 
judgment passed by this Court earlier on in the case of Kaura v. 
The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) had not been correctly 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
32
appreciated. We understand, and it is submitted with great 
respect, that in that case this Court did not feel persuaded to 
interfere in the matter primarily because the case had already 
reached the trial court after completion of the investigation stage 
and it was presumably on account of that development that this 
Court had paid little attention to the legal issues involved in 
registration of multiple FIRs in respect of the same incident. It, 
thus, appears to us that the said judgment had proceeded on the 
basis of its own peculiar facts and, therefore, the same could not 
readily be treated as the law declared. 
 
19. 
The case of Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police 
Station Kalri West, Karachi and 12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297) was a 
case in which the High Court had refused to order registration of a 
second FIR regarding an incident in respect of which an FIR 
already stood registered with the local police but this Court issued 
such an order. In this case a second FIR containing a different 
version was ordered by this Court to be registered because it was 
found that “the veracity and truthfulness of F.I.R. lodged by 
respondent Muhammad Yousuf, the Manager of the Company, 
became highly doubtful and the petitioner was right in asking for 
registration of another F.I.R. at her own version”. The investigation 
of the case was still in progress when this Court had observed in 
that case that the veracity and truthfulness of the FIR originally 
registered was “highly doubtful” which observation, it is submitted 
with deep reverence, was not only presumptuous but also 
premature. Apart from that while issuing an order regarding 
registration of a second FIR this Court had referred to the 
judgment of this Court passed in the case of Wajid Ali Khan Durani 
and others v. Government of Sindh and others (2001 SCMR 1556), it 
had made no mention of the judgments rendered by this Court in 
the cases of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and 
another (1975 SCMR 149) and Kaura v. The State and others (1983 
SCMR 436) and it had placed reliance upon the case of Muhammad 
Ishaque v. S.P. Jaffarabad and another (PLJ 1998 Quetta 1) 
decided by a High Court. Unfortunately no provision of the Code of 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
33
Criminal Procedure, 1898 or of the Police Rules, 1934 was 
discussed in that judgment and as a matter of fact no discussion 
of the relevant law had taken place in the said judgment of this 
Court at all. 
 
20. 
The last of the precedent cases from this Court is the case of 
Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 
484) wherein the High Court had ordered registration of a second 
FIR containing a different version of the same incident and this 
Court had upheld that order of the High Court. In that judgment 
this Court had observed in the very beginning that “Regarding this 
incident, an FIR was earlier lodged with misleading and incorrect 
statement of facts, therefore, she filed an application under Section 
22-A Cr.P.C. before the Justice of Peace/Sessions Judge Pishin 
with the following assertions: ---”. With utmost respect, this Court 
could have been more circumspect before making an observation 
about misleading or incorrect nature of the facts asserted in the 
original FIR especially when the stage of the case was premature 
and the investigation of the case was still in progress. This Court 
had then gone on to notice the case of Kaura v. The State and 
others (1983 SCMR 436) but unfortunately the ratio decidendi of 
that case was not even adverted to. It appears that the main 
consideration persuading this Court in favour of registration of a 
second FIR about the same incident was what was observed in the 
following paragraph of the judgment: 
 
“8.  
We have considered submissions of the learned ASC for 
the appellants on short controversy involved in the matter 
relating to registration of another FIR. In the instant case, perusal 
of contents of the earlier FIR lodged at the instance of Ali 
Muhammad Defedar Levies on 09.06.2010 and the contents of 
other FIR lodged by Respondent No.1 on 27.08.2015, in terms of 
the impugned judgment, reveals two entirely different and 
conflicting stories about the actual occurrence. It is, thus, 
obvious that in case prosecution leads its evidence on the basis of 
contents of earlier FIR and the investigation made on that basis, 
then from no stretch of imagination the grievance of Respondent 
No.1, attributing criminal liability of whole occurrence to the 
complainant and his party ("the appellants" herein), could be 
considered or adjudicated upon by the Court.---” 
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
34
It appears that the Court was not properly assisted on that 
occasion and it was erroneously made to understand that the 
police are to investigate the case only on the lines asserted in an 
FIR and then it is to lead evidence before the trial court only in 
terms of the accusations made in the FIR. As already noticed in the 
preceding paragraphs of the present judgment, the scheme of the 
law is totally the opposite of it and according to the same after 
commencement of an investigation on the basis of an FIR the 
investigation officer is to collect every possible information about 
the facts and circumstances of the case, he is to receive or record 
any information in that regard becoming available from any source 
whatsoever, he is not to prematurely commit himself to any 
particular version of the incident and after finding out the actual 
facts the final report under section 173, Cr.P.C. is to be submitted 
not in terms of the allegations leveled in the FIR but in accordance 
with the actual facts discovered during the investigation. 
 
21. 
In the same judgment this Court had further observed as 
follows: 
 
“10.  
As could be seen from the plain reading of above 
reproduced provision of law, the requirement of Section 154 
Cr.P.C. is to enter every information of commission of a 
cognizable offence, whether given orally or in writing to the 
officer-in-charge of the police station, which shall then be reduced 
into writing and signed by the person giving it and the substance 
thereof shall be entered in a book to be kept by such officer in the 
form prescribed by the Provincial Government in this behalf. 
Meaning thereby, that it is not a legal requirement for provider of 
such information to canvass the whole scene of occurrence of a 
cognizable offence giving description and details of accused, 
details of weapons used by them, their specific role, motive 
behind the occurrence, and the names of eye-witnesses etc. But it 
is a matter of common experience that usually the entries made 
in Section 154 Cr.P.C. book, as per practice, contain invariably all 
such details so much so that in the ordinary parlance/sense it is 
considered as the gist of the prosecution case against the 
accused. In such state of affairs, if a collusive, mala fide or 
concocted FIR, registered at the instance of some individual with 
some ulterior motive, is taken as sacrosanct, it is likely to divert 
the whole course of investigation in a wrong direction and spoil 
the entire prosecution case on that premise. The Court while 
considering the crucial point of registration of another FIR cannot 
remain oblivious of these ground realities so as to non-suit the 
aggrieved party from agitating his grievance in an honest manner, 
or ensure regulating proper investigation of a crime in the right 
direction, or apprehend the real culprits and brought them before 
the Court of law for justice.” 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
35
 
In this paragraph of the judgment the scheme of the law did not 
appear to be correctly presented before the Court and the Court 
was led to understand that investigation of a case by the police is 
to be driven exclusively or predominantly by the FIR originally 
registered whereas the legal position, as already discussed by us 
above, is to the contrary. As a matter of fact the scheme of the law 
did not support the Court’s observation that the version of the first 
informant advanced through his FIR is to “non-suit” any other 
version of the same incident advanced by any other person or party 
to the case. In the same vein, the reference made by the Court to 
the so-called “ground realities”, a subjective notion, could have 
been avoided while interpreting legal provisions and enunciating 
the law. 
 
22. 
It was also observed by this Court in the same judgment 
that: 
 
“11.  
Though our criminal legal system proceeds on the 
presumption of honest, God fearing and fair police officers, 
impartial and honest investigation system, but this is far from 
reality in the society we live in. In such circumstances when the 
Courts feel that due to mala fide, dishonest, colourful and 
motivated acts or omissions, entire investigation of the crime has 
been misled or it is going to be misled and on that account the 
case of the prosecution is likely to fail, then they are not denuded 
of their powers to order recording of another FIR disclosing a 
different version to check such nefarious design meant to save 
the 
real 
culprits 
vis-a-vis 
misleading 
the 
investigation/prosecution, at any appropriate stage of the 
proceedings. However, where need be, such powers are to be 
exercised with extreme care and caution and not in a routine 
manner so as to merely fulfill the wish of an individual who, as 
per his whims, is not satisfied either with the contents of earlier 
FIR or the direction of investigation based thereon or wants 
registration of another FIR with some ulterior motive.---” 
 
The first thing said in this paragraph was that in our society the 
police officers are no longer “honest, God fearing and fair” and the 
system of investigation is no longer “impartial and honest”. We feel, 
with great regard, that making of such sweeping remarks or 
recording of such pervasive observations about the police or any 
other department of public service as a whole was unnecessary 
besides being uncharitable. Interpretation of law by this Court 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
36
ought not to be premised on damning generalizations which are 
nothing but subjective. The second thing said in this paragraph 
was that a subsequent FIR may be ordered to be registered “when 
the Courts feel that due to mala fide, dishonest, colourful and 
motivated acts or omissions, entire investigation of the crime has 
been misled or it is going to be misled and on that account the 
case of the prosecution is likely to fail”. What it meant was that at 
such a premature stage of the case the Courts are to pass a value 
judgment and record a finding that the original FIR lodged by a 
person about commission of a cognizable offence is “mala fide, 
dishonest, colourful and motivated” and that the “entire 
investigation of the crime has been misled or it is going to be 
misled and on that account the case of the prosecution is likely to 
fail”. Such an approach sets up the Courts as monitors or 
supervisors of the investigation, a role which the law forbids and 
the precedent loathes. The third thing said in this paragraph was a 
word of caution according to which “However, where need be, such 
powers are to be exercised with extreme care and caution and not 
in a routine manner so as to merely fulfill the wish of an individual 
who, as per his whims, is not satisfied either with the contents of 
earlier FIR or the direction of investigation based thereon or wants 
registration of another FIR with some ulterior motive.” While 
making these observations no guidance had been provided as to 
how “extreme care and caution” is to be exercised, as to how the 
jurisdiction is not to be exercised “in a routine manner” and as to 
how, without delving deep into the facts and circumstances of a 
case at the investigation stage, the Courts are to detect, decipher 
or fathom the motivation on the part of the person seeking 
registration of another FIR according to his own version of the 
incident. 
 
23. 
Towards the end of that judgment this Court had observed 
as under: 
 
“12.  
It is unfortunate to note that in the instant case due to 
one-sided version disclosed in earlier FIR No. 17/2010, the 
investigating agency never bothered to look into the crime from 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
37
another angle as narrated in the other FIR dated 27.08.2015, 
which means that as per assertions of Respondent No.1, the 
alleged culprits could have otherwise escaped from their criminal 
liability successfully at the very initial stage without even being 
charged for the offence on the basis of misleading contents of 
earlier FIR. The short and long of the above discussion is that the 
impugned judgment of the Balochistan High Court warrants no 
interference.” 
 
It appears that this Court was heavily influenced by the assertion 
of the party seeking registration of a second FIR that “the alleged 
culprits could have otherwise escaped from their criminal liability 
successfully at the very initial stage without even being charged for 
the offence on the basis of misleading contents of earlier FIR.” 
Acceptance of such an assertion by this Court indicates that the 
Court laboured under an impression that any other version of the 
same incident advanced by any other party can be brought on the 
record of the investigation only through an FIR to be registered 
under section 154, Cr.P.C. and such divergent version can be 
investigated by the police only after registration of a separate FIR 
in that regard. Such an impression entertained by this Court on 
that occasion, it is submitted in all humility, was not correct and 
the same ran counter to the scheme of the law referred to in the 
earlier part of the present judgment. 
 
24. 
The discussion made above leads us to an inescapable 
conclusion that the judgments delivered by this Court in the cases 
of Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another (1975 
SCMR 149) and Kaura v. The State and others (1983 SCMR 436) 
came closer to the scheme of the relevant law whereas the 
judgments handed down by this Court in the cases of Wajid Ali 
Khan Durani and others v. Government of Sindh and others (2001 
SCMR 1556), Mst. Anwar Begum v. Station House Officer, Police 
Station Kalri West, Karachi and 12 others (PLD 2005 SC 297) and 
Ali Muhammad and others v. Syed Bibi and others (PLD 2016 SC 
484) drifted away from that scheme and in fact contributed 
towards disturbing and distorting the same and that had been 
occasioned mainly due to the reason that the Court had not been 
assisted on those occasions properly and the scheme of the law on 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
38
the subject with reference to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 
and the Police Rules, 1934 had not been brought to its notice at 
the time of deciding those cases. 
 
25. 
During the course of hearing of this petition we had inquired 
from the petitioner as to why she was insisting upon registration of 
a separate FIR in respect of her version of the incident especially 
when she had already instituted a private complaint containing her 
version of the incident and the accused persons in her private 
complaint had already been summoned by the trial court to face a 
trial and a Charge had been framed against them. In response to 
that query the petitioner had categorically stated that she wanted 
the accused persons in her version of the incident to be arrested 
and recoveries to be affected from them which was not possible 
through the medium of a private complaint. Such understanding of 
the law on the part of the petitioner, which understanding is also 
shared by a large section of the legal community in our country, 
has been found by us to be erroneous and fallacious. By virtue of 
the provisions of section 202(1), Cr.P.C. a court seized of a private 
complaint can “direct an inquiry or investigation to be made by any 
Justice of the Peace or by a police officer or by such other person 
as it thinks fit”. If in a given case the court seized of a private 
complaint deems it appropriate to direct an investigation to be 
carried out in respect of the allegations made then the powers 
available during an investigation, enumerated in Part V, Chapter 
XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 read with section 
4(1)(l) of the same Code, include the powers to arrest an accused 
person and to affect recovery from his possession or at his 
instance. Such powers of the investigating officer or the 
investigating 
person 
recognize 
no 
distinction 
between 
an 
investigation in a State case and an investigation in a complaint 
case.  
 
26. 
The impression entertained by the petitioner that if a 
separate FIR is registered in terms of her version of the incident 
then the accused persons nominated by her would automatically 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
39
be arrested has been found by us to be not only misconceived but 
also discomforting. The law does not permit arrest of a person 
merely on the basis of a bald allegation levelled against him. The 
powers of the police to arrest a person accused of commission of 
an offence are provided in sections 54 and 55, Cr.P.C. and some 
provisions in the Police Rules, 1934 also deal with the same. 
Writing for a Full Bench of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in the 
case of Khizer Hayat v. Inspector-General of Police (Punjab), Lahore 
and seven others (PLD 2005 Lahore 470) one of us (Asif Saeed 
Khan Khosa, ACJ) had observed on the subject as follows:    
 
“20. 
------- The powers of arrest in both the said sections are 
the same but they relate to different situations. In the case of 
Abdul Qayyum v. S.H.O., Police Station Shalimar, Lahore (1993 
P.Cr.L.J. 91) this Court had an opportunity to attend to the 
requirements of section 54, Cr.P.C. and it was observed by this 
Court as follows: 
 
“Under the provisions of clause first of section 54, 
Cr.P.C., the Police Officer can arrest a person in 
the following four conditions:- 
(a) 
The accused is involved in a cognizable 
offence; 
(b) 
Against the accused a reasonable complaint 
has been made for the said offence; 
(c) 
A credible information is received by the 
Police Officer that he is involved in a cognizable 
offence; and 
(d) 
Reasonable suspicion exists that the said 
person is involved in the cognizable offence. 
 
The expression ‘credible information’ is not 
a technical legal expression importing that the 
information 
must 
be 
given 
upon 
oath 
or 
affirmation. It includes any information which in 
the judgment of the officer to whom it is given 
appears entitled to credit in the particular instance 
and which he believes. The credible information 
mentioned therein need not be in writing. ------- 
 
The object of section 54, Cr.P.C. is to give 
the widest powers to the Police Officers to arrest 
the persons who are involved in cognizable cases 
and the only limitation placed upon their power is 
the necessary requirement of reasonability and 
credibility to prevent the misuse of the powers by 
the Police Officers. 
 
As the powers mentioned above given to the 
Police 
Officers 
under 
section 
54, 
Cr.P.C. 
encroaches upon the liberty of a person, this wide 
power has to be construed, interpreted and defined 
strictly. A general definition of what constitutes 
reasonableness in a complaint or suspicion and 
credibility of information cannot be given. Both 
must depend upon the existence of tangible legal 
evidence within the cognizance of the Police Officer 
and, he must judge whether the evidence is 
sufficient to establish the reasonableness and 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
40
credibility of the charge, information or suspicion. 
It has been laid down by this Court in 1992 
P.Cr.L.J. 131: ‘An arrest which is beyond the 
provisions of section 54, Cr.P.C. would be illegal 
and void per se’.” 
 
Prior to that in the case of Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Boota 
and another (PLD 1975 Lahore 729) this Court had observed that 
 
“The words “reasonable suspicion” (in section 54, 
Cr.P.C.) do not mean a mere vague surmise, but a 
bona fide belief on the part of the Police Officer that 
an offence has been committed or is about to be 
committed. Such belief has to be founded on some 
definite averments tending to show suspicion on 
the person arrested. --- The action of a police 
Officer under section 54, Cr.P.C. must be guarded 
inasmuch as he should first satisfy himself about 
the credibility of the information which, as stated 
already, should relate to definite facts. It was not 
at all the intention of the law-giver that the Police 
Officer should at his own sweet will arrest anybody 
he likes, although he may be a peace loving citizen 
of the country.” 
 
The Hon’ble Sindh High Court had also observed in the case of 
Muhammad Siddiq v. Province of Sindh through Home Secretary, 
Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1992 Karachi 358)(DB) that 
 
“It will thus be seen that the first sub-clause of 
section 54(1), Cr.P.C. a person can be arrested 
without a warrant in the following circumstances:- 
(a) 
If he be concerned in any cognizable 
offence. 
(b) 
Against whom a reasonable complaint has 
been made.  
(c) 
Against whom credible information has 
been 
received 
that 
he 
is 
concerned 
with 
commission of such offence. 
(d) 
If reasonable suspicion exists about him 
being so concerned. 
 
It is true that a Police Officer has been 
conferred sufficient powers to arrest a person in 
the investigation of a cognizable offence if he be 
concerned with commission of such offence. But 
such a power can be exercised only in those cases 
where a Police Officer is possessed of some 
evidence indicating involvement of a person under 
the four situations mentioned in section 54(1), 
Criminal Procedure Code.” 
 
In the case of Mst. Razia Pervez and another v. The Senior 
Superintendent of Police, Multan and 5 others (1992 P.Cr.L.J. 131) 
this Court had observed as follows: 
 
“No doubt, the Police Officer can arrest a person 
where a reasonable suspicion exists of his having 
been concerned in any cognizable offence but 
power given to the Police Officer under this section 
(section 54, Cr.P.C.) being an encroachment on the 
liberty of a citizen is not unlimited. It is subject to 
the condition stated therein. An arrest purporting 
to be under this section would be illegal unless the 
circumstances specified in the various clauses of 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
41
the section exist. This section does not give free 
licence to a Police Officer to arrest anybody he may 
like. In order to act under this section, there must 
be a reasonable suspicion of the person to be 
arrested having been concerned in a cognizable 
offence. An arrest of a citizen in a reckless 
disregard of the conditions imposed in this section 
would make the arrest and detention of the subject 
illegal and the Police Officer arresting or detaining 
the subject would be exposed to prosecution under 
the Pakistan Penal Code and also for departmental 
action under the relevant rules.”  
  
The above mentioned precedent cases clearly show that an arrest 
of a person in connection with a criminal case is not to be a 
matter of course and the power to arrest is conditional upon 
fulfillment of the requisite legal requirements. 
 
21. 
One of the cardinal principles of criminal law and 
jurisprudence is that an accused person is presumed to be 
innocent until proved guilty before a court of law. However, of late 
we have noticed a growing tendency on the part of the 
complainant party to insist upon arrest of an accused person 
nominated by it in the F.I.R. and an increasing willingness, nay 
eagerness, on the part of the investigating officer of a criminal 
case to affect arrest of the accused person even before initiating 
or launching a proper investigation of the allegations levelled in 
the F.I.R.. Such an approach has been found by us to be 
absolutely against the spirit of the relevant law, to be wrought 
with inherent dangers to cherished liberty of citizens who may 
ultimately be found to be innocent and to amount to putting the 
cart before the horse! It had been observed by the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Brig. (Retd.) F. B. Ali and 
another v. The State (PLD 1975 Supreme Court 506) that  
 
“In my view the mere lodging of an information 
does not make a person an accused nor does a 
person against whom an investigation is being 
conducted by the police can strictly be called an 
accused. Such a person may or may not be sent up 
for trial. The information may be found to be false. 
An accused is, therefore, a person charged in a 
trial. The Oxford English Dictionary defines an 
“accused” as a person “charged with a crime” and 
an “accusation” as an “indictment”. Aiyer in his 
Manual of Law Terms also gives the same meaning. 
I am of view, therefore, that a person becomes an 
accused only when charged with an offence. The 
Criminal Procedure Code also uses the word 
“accused” in the same sense, namely; a person 
over whom a Court is exercising jurisdiction.”  
 
Even the Hon’ble Federal Shariat Court had remarked in the case 
of Mst. Asho and 3 others v. The State (1987 P.Cr.L.J. 538) that 
 
“Mere leveling accusations against a person in 
F.I.R. does not make him an accused person 
unless and until some evidence implicating such 
person in the commission of the offence is 
available.” 
 
We may add in this context that a general impression entertained 
by some quarters that an arrest of a suspect or an accused 
person is necessary or sine qua non for investigation of a crime is 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
42
misconceived and the same portrays scant knowledge of the 
relevant statutory provisions. We may briefly allude to such 
statutory provisions here. Section 46, Cr.P.C. provides as to how 
an arrest is to be made, section 54, Cr.P.C. deals with arrest by a 
police officer without a warrant, section 55, Cr.P.C. pertains to 
arrest of vagabonds, etc. by an officer in charge of a Police 
Station, section 59, Cr.P.C. caters for a situation where a private 
person may affect an arrest and section 151, Cr.P.C. authorizes a 
police officer to arrest a person in order to prevent commission of 
a cognizable offence. Section 169, Cr.P.C. visualizes a situation 
where a suspect may be released if the investigating officer finds 
no sufficient evidence or reasonable ground for suspicion against 
him. The parameters of such arrests are essentially those already 
discussed in the above mentioned precedent cases. According to 
Article 4(1)(j) of the Police Order, 2002 it is a duty of every police 
officer to “apprehend all persons whom he is legally authorised to 
apprehend and for whose apprehension sufficient grounds exist”. 
Rules 24.1, 24.4 and 24.7 of the Police Rules, 1934 (which are 
still in vogue due to the provisions of Article 185 of the Police 
Order, 2002) clearly contemplate situations where an information 
received by the police regarding commission of a cognizable 
offence may be doubted or even found false. Rule 25.2(1) of the 
Police Rules authorizes an investigating officer to associate “any 
person” with the investigation and Rule 25.2(2) categorically 
provides that “No avoidable trouble shall be given to any person 
from whom enquiries are made and no person shall be 
unnecessarily detained”. Rule 25.2(3) clinches the issue by 
clarifying that “It is the duty of an investigating officer to find out 
the truth of the matter under investigation. His object shall be to 
discover the actual facts of the case and to arrest the real offender 
or offenders. He shall not commit himself prematurely to any view 
of the facts for or against any person” (emphasis has been 
supplied by us). As if this were not enough, Rule 26.1 emphasizes 
that “Section 54, Code of Criminal Procedure, authorizes any 
police officer to arrest without a warrant any person who has 
been concerned in any cognizable offence or against whom a 
reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has 
been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having 
been so concerned. The authority given under this section to the 
police to arrest without a warrant is, however, permissive and not 
obligatory. Whenever escape from justice or inconvenient delay is 
likely to result from the police failing to arrest, they are bound to 
do so; but in no other cases. The law allows a police officer to 
apply to a magistrate for a warrant or a summons instead of 
making the arrest immediately, and this discretion shall be 
exercised whenever possible and expedient. The law also allows a 
police officer in any bailable case to take security under section 
170, Criminal Procedure Code from an accused person to appear 
before a magistrate without first arresting him” (emphasis has 
been supplied by us). Rules 26.2 and 26.9 provide further 
guidelines to the police officers involved in investigation of crimes 
requiring them not to unnecessarily interfere with the liberty of 
suspects “until the investigation is sufficiently complete” and “the 
facts justify arrest”. According to Rule 26.1 the facts justifying an 
immediate arrest may include a possibility of the suspect 
escaping from justice or inconvenient delay likely to result from 
the police failing to arrest.  
 
22. 
All the statutory provisions and the precedent cases 
mentioned above manifestly point towards the intention of the law 
that a suspect is not to be arrested straightaway upon 
registration of an F.I.R. or as a matter of course and that, unless 
the situation on the grounds so warrants, the arrest is to be 
deferred till such time that sufficient material or evidence 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
43
becomes available on the record of investigation prima facie 
satisfying the investigating officer regarding correctness of the 
allegations levelled by the complainant party against such 
suspect or regarding his involvement in the crime in issue. If the 
law itself requires an investigating officer to be generally slow in 
depriving a person of his liberty on the basis of unsubstantiated 
allegations then insistence by the interested complainant party 
regarding his immediate arrest should not persuade the 
investigating officer to abdicate his discretion and jurisdiction in 
the matter before the whims or wishes of the complainant party. -
------ It must always be remembered that delaying the arrest till 
after formation of an opinion regarding prima facie correctness of 
the allegation against a suspect goes a long way in deterring false, 
frivolous and motivated complaints and also that there may not 
be any adequate recompense or reparation for an unjustified 
arrest. It would be preposterous and a mockery of justice if a 
person may be deprived of his liberty first and later on the 
allegations against him may be found by the arresting agency 
itself to be bogus, trumped up or false. That surely would be, as 
observed above, putting the cart before the horse.”  
 
Enunciation of the law in the above mentioned case ought to 
suffice for the purpose of dispelling the impression entertained by 
the petitioner in the present case that registration of a second FIR 
in terms of her version of the incident would automatically entail 
arrest of the accused persons nominated by her. 
 
27. 
As a result of the discussion made above we declare the legal 
position as follows: 
 
(i) 
According to section 154, Cr.P.C. an FIR is only the first 
information to the local police about commission of a cognizable 
offence. For instance, an information received from any source that 
a murder has been committed in such and such village is to be a 
valid and sufficient basis for registration of an FIR in that regard. 
  
(ii) 
If the information received by the local police about 
commission of a cognizable offence also contains a version as to 
how the relevant offence was committed, by whom it was 
committed and in which background it was committed then that 
version of the incident is only the version of the informant and 
nothing more and such version is not to be unreservedly accepted 
by the investigating officer as the truth or the whole truth.  
 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
44
(iii) 
Upon registration of an FIR a criminal “case” comes into 
existence and that case is to be assigned a number and such case 
carries the same number till the final decision of the matter. 
 
(iv) 
During the investigation conducted after registration of an 
FIR the investigating officer may record any number of versions of 
the same incident brought to his notice by different persons which 
versions are to be recorded by him under section 161, Cr.P.C. in 
the same case. No separate FIR is to be recorded for any new 
version of the same incident brought to the notice of the 
investigating officer during the investigation of the case. 
 
(v) 
During the investigation the investigating officer is obliged to 
investigate the matter from all possible angles while keeping in 
view all the versions of the incident brought to his notice and, as 
required by Rule 25.2(3) of the Police Rules, 1934 “It is the duty of 
an investigating officer to find out the truth of the matter under 
investigation. His object shall be to discover the actual facts of the 
case and to arrest the real offender or offenders. He shall not 
commit himself prematurely to any view of the facts for or against 
any person.” 
 
(vi) 
Ordinarily no person is to be arrested straightaway only 
because he has been nominated as an accused person in an FIR or 
in any other version of the incident brought to the notice of the 
investigating officer by any person until the investigating officer 
feels satisfied that sufficient justification exists for his arrest and 
for such justification he is to be guided by the relevant provisions 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and the Police Rules, 
1934. According to the relevant provisions of the said Code and the 
Rules a suspect is not to be arrested straightaway or as a matter of 
course and, unless the situation on the ground so warrants, the 
arrest is to be deferred till such time that sufficient material or 
evidence becomes available on the record of investigation prima 
facie satisfying the investigating officer regarding correctness of the 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
45
allegations levelled against such suspect or regarding his 
involvement in the crime in issue. 
 
(vii) 
Upon conclusion of the investigation the report to be 
submitted under section 173, Cr.P.C is to be based upon the 
actual facts discovered during the investigation irrespective of the 
version of the incident advanced by the first informant or any other 
version brought to the notice of the investigating officer by any 
other person. 
 
28. 
As an FIR had been registered in the present case regarding 
the same occurrence and the offences allegedly committed therein 
and upon completion of the investigation of the case a Challan had 
been submitted before the trial court and as the present petitioner 
had instituted a private complaint depicting her version of the 
same incident and after summoning of the accused persons 
nominated therein a trial is already in progress in connection with 
that private complaint, therefore, ordering registration of another 
FIR based upon the petitioner’s version of that very incident is not 
legally warranted. This petition is, thus, dismissed.   
 
29. 
Before parting with this judgment we are constrained to 
observe that the occurrence in the present case had taken place 
more than a decade ago and the trial court is seized of the trial of 
this case for the last many years but unfortunately no significant 
progress has been made by the trial court in the trial of the case so 
far. The delay caused and the apathy displayed in the matter has 
been found by us to be shocking, to say the least. The trial court 
is, therefore, directed to conclude the trial of this case within the 
next four months without fail and then to submit a report in that 
regard before the Registrar of this Court for our perusal in 
Chambers. 
 
30. 
The office of this Court shall send copies of this judgment to 
the Inspectors-General of Police of all the Provinces and the 
Islamabad Capital Territory who are directed to apprise all the 
Human Rights Case No. 10842-P of 2018 
46
Station House Officers of all the Police Stations in the country of 
the law declared by this Court through the present judgment and 
to make sure that the law so declared is followed in its letter and 
spirit.  
 
(Asif Saeed Khan Khosa) 
Acting Chief Justice 
 
(Mushir Alam) 
Judge 
 
(Maqbool Baqar) 
Judge 
  
(Manzoor Ahmad Malik) 
Judge 
 
(Sardar Tariq Masood) 
Judge 
 
(Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel) 
Judge 
  
(Sajjad Ali Shah) 
Judge 
 
 
Announced in open Court at Islamabad on 23.05.2018. 
 
 
(Asif Saeed Khan Khosa) 
Acting Chief Justice 
Islamabad 
May 23, 2018 
Approved for reporting. 
Arif 
