IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
 
   (Original/Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
Present 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, CJ.  
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Muhammad Sair Ali 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Ghulam Rabbani 
 
 
 
 
 
Constitution Petition No.24 of 2011 
 
Air League of PIAC Employees through its President 
Muhammad Usman Khan 
…Petitioner 
Versus 
 
Federation of Pakistan,  
M/o Labour and Manpower Division Islamabad etc. 
….Respondents 
 
 
For the petitioner  
: 
Mr. Abdul Hafeez Amjad, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
 
On Court Notice  
: 
Maulvi Anwar-ul- Haq, Attorney General 
 
Amicus Curiae 
 
: 
Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani, Sr. ASC 
 
Date of hearing 
 
: 
10.5.2011 
 
 
 
 
 
O R D E R 
 
 
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, CJ.— Instant petition has 
been filed under Article 184(3) of the Constitution of Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan, in which following prayer has been made:- 
 
It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that this 
Honourable Court may kindly be pleased to hold that 
IRA, 2008 stand protected up till 30th June, 2011 by 
virtue of Article 270AA of 18th Amendment of 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 
respondents No.3 and 4 be directed to continue with 
the proceedings for holding of secret ballot for the 
determination of CBA in accordance with law. 
2. 
Briefly stating facts of the case are that the petitioner, Air 
League of Pakistan International Airline Corporation Employees is an 
Industry-wise trade union registered under the Industrial Relations 
Laws 
with 
respondent 
No.3, 
National 
Industrial 
Relations 
Commission (NIRC). In the year 1969, to amend and consolidate 
the laws relating to the formation of trade unions, the regulation of 
Const.P.24/2011 
2 
relations between employers and workmen and to avoid and settle 
any differences or disputes arising between them or matters 
connected therewith or ancillary thereto  and in the national interest 
of country, to achieve the uniformity through Federal legislation, the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 [hereinafter referred to as 
“IRO, 1969”] was issued whereby the East Pakistan Trade Unions 
Act, 1965, the East Pakistan Labour Disputes Act, 1965, the West 
Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 and the West Pakistan 
Trade Unions Ordinance, 1968 were repealed in terms of section 67 
of the said Ordinance. However, the trade unions existing at the 
time of commencement of IRO, 1969, registered under the said 
repealed laws were deemed to be registered under IRO, 1969 and 
continued to be in force until altered or rescinded. Later on by 
means of Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972, section 22A 
of IRO, 1969 was inserted whereby National Industrial Relations 
Commission (NIRC) was constituted for settlement of disputes 
between the employers and the workers. In order to provide the 
mechanism for the functioning of NIRC, in terms of Section 22F of 
IRO, 1969, the National Industrial Relations Commission (Procedure 
and Functions) Regulations, 1973 were framed.  The IRO, 1969 was 
repealed by means of section 80 of the Industrial Relations 
Ordinance, 2002 [hereinafter referred to as “IRO, 2002]. However, 
it was provided that without prejudice to the provisions of sections 6 
and 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 every trade union 
registered under the repealed Ordinance would be deemed to be 
registered under IRO, 2002 and would continue until altered or 
rescinded. Subsequent thereto, the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 
[hereinafter referred to as “IRA, 2008”] was promulgated whereby 
the IRO, 2002 was repealed. In terms of section 87 of the said Act, 
the trade unions registered under the repealed ordinance were 
deemed to be registered under the said Act and continued in force 
until altered and rescinded. Clause (3) of the said section provided 
that the Act would, unless repealed earlier, stand repealed on 30th 
April, 2010.  
3. 
It is interesting to note that until 30th April, 2010 no 
legislation was made either to supercede the IRA, 2008 or to extend 
the period, for which the Act would remain operative. In the 
Const.P.24/2011 
3 
meantime, the parliament passed the Eighteenth Constitutional 
Amendment on 20.4.2010 whereby concurrent legislative list was 
omitted and all the matters mentioned therein came within the 
jurisdiction of the provinces for the purpose of making legislation 
and dealing with the said laws. Clause (6) of newly inserted Article 
270AA, provided that  the laws with respect to the matters 
enumerated in the said list (including Ordinances, Orders, rules, 
bye-laws, regulations and notifications and other legal instruments 
having the force of law) in force in Pakistan immediately before the 
commencement of the said amendment would continue to remain in 
force until altered, repealed or amended by the competent 
authority. Later on the Provincial Assemblies of all the four 
provinces made legislation in respect of the Industrial Relations, 
repealing the IRA, 2008. Province-wise detail of the same is as 
under:- 
(a) 
On 
13th 
June, 
2010 
the 
Punjab 
Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 2010 [PIRO, 2010] was 
issued. The Ordinance was to expire on 10th 
September, 2010, however, the life of the 
Ordinance was extended for a further period of 
ninety days through a Resolution passed by the 
Assembly on 23rd July, 2010. Same was repealed 
by the Punjab Industrial Relations Act, 2010 
[PIRA, 2010] on 9th December, 2010. 
(b) 
On 5th July, 2010, Industrial Relations (Revival 
and Amendment) Act, 2010 was promulgated by 
the province of Sindh, whereby the IRO, 2008 
was revived w.e.f. 1st May, 2010 as if it had never 
been repealed. 
 (c) 
On 14th July, 2010 the Khyber Pukhtunkhwa 
Industrial 
Relations 
Ordinance, 
2010 
[KIRO, 
2010] was promulgated. 
(d)  
On 
22nd 
July, 
2010, 
Balochistan 
Industrial 
Relations Ordinance, 2010 [BIRO, 2010] was 
issued, however, said Ordinance was repealed by 
Const.P.24/2011 
4 
the Balochistan Industrial Relations Act, 2010 on 
15th October, 2010.  
4. 
 
After 30th April, 2010 the Labour Courts, Labour 
Appellate 
Tribunal 
as 
well 
as 
National 
Industrial 
Relations 
Commission (NIRC) stopped its functions for the reason that no 
legislation was promulgated at Federal Level. This question came up 
before NIRC, Islamabad, which held that in terms of 18th 
Constitutional Amendment, the IRA, 2008 is intact and fully 
operative till altered or amended or repealed by the competent 
authority. 
5. 
 
As the Labour Courts as well as the Labour Appellate 
Tribunal stopped functioning, therefore, the Chief Justice, Lahore 
High 
Court 
initiated 
suo 
moto 
action 
and 
writ 
petition 
No.10746/2010 was disposed of on the basis of report submitted by 
the Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab wherein it was stated 
that IRA, 2008 stood protected upto 30.06.2011 in accordance with 
the protection provided under Article 270AA of the Constitution.  
6. 
 
The same controversy came before the High Court of 
Sindh by means of Constitution Petition No.D-1432 of 2010, wherein 
it was held that IRA, 2008 stood repealed on 30th April, 2010 by 
force of its section 87(3), whereas the IRO, 1969 came back into 
operation from the said date.  
7. 
 
The Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench while deciding 
ICA, 200/2008 held that IRA, 2008 has been protected till 30th June, 
2011in view of Article 270AA.  
 8. 
  
It is important to note that learned Islamabad High 
Court in writ petition No.4917/2010 titled as Tufail Ahmad v. Zaka 
Ullah Khalil, has held that in view of section 87 (3) of IRA, 2008, it 
stood repealed on 30.04.2010. As such the instant petition has been 
filed. 
9. 
  
Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view 
of protection provided under Article 270AA of the Constitution as 
substituted by the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment and in 
presence of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the IRA, 2008 
Const.P.24/2011 
5 
would remain operative and section 87(3) of IRA, 2008 would 
become redundant, inoperative and would be deemed to have never 
existed. Learned counsel further argued that section 87(3) was in 
conflict with Article 17 and 264 of the Constitution, therefore, 
provisions of Constitution would prevail. He stated that the law did 
not recognize vacuum in legislation and the NIRC, which was one of 
the important functionaries of the State could not be stopped from 
functioning rendering thousands cases of workers/labourers to be 
directly affected. He next contended that in Industrial Relational 
Advisors’ Association’s case the High Court of Sindh, though 
declared the IRA, 2008 to be repealed w.e.f. 30.4.2010 but relying 
upon section 6 of the General Clauses Act, restored the IRO,1969. 
The Islamabad High Court in Tufail Ahmad’s case while relying upon 
Industrial Relational Advisors’ Association’s case held that the IRA, 
2008 had repealed in terms of section 87(3) but the latter part of 
the judgment whereby the IRO, 1969 was restored was ignored. In 
order to substantiate his arguments he submitted that before 
declaring a Federal Statute to be non-existent and in order to arrive 
at just and proper decision, it was necessary for the Court to issue 
notice 
to 
the 
Federal 
Government, 
particularly 
under 
the 
circumstances, where the Ministry of Law and Parliamentary Affairs 
had opined that the IRA, 2008 stood extended till 30.6.2011 in 
terms of protection provided under clause (6) of Article 270AA  of 
the Constitution.  
10. 
  
Learned Attorney General has submitted that after the 
18th Constitutional Amendment matter relating to welfare etc. is the 
subject of the Provinces and the legislation has to be made by the 
Provinces and in view of the fact that the IRA, 2008 has lost its 
operation on account of in built provision of section 87(3), 
therefore, the NIRC cannot function any further.  
11. 
  
Mr. Mahmood Abdul Ghani, learned ASC appearing as 
Amicus Curiae contended that the IRA, 2008 was repealed by 
means of section 87(3) and after its repeal the IRA, 2002 or IRO, 
1969 could not revived as earlier the matters relating to welfare of 
labour and trade unions were mentioned in the Concurrent 
Legislative List, which have become provincial subject after the 
Const.P.24/2011 
6 
Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment and the authority to legislate 
had been transferred to the provinces. He further contended that 
after such repeal the NIRC as envisaged under IRA, 2008 (earlier 
under IRO, 2002 & IRO, 1969) would be deemed to have ceased to 
exist.  
12. 
  
We have heard the learned counsel and have gone 
through the relevant provisions of the Statute as well as the case 
laws cited at the bar.  
13. 
  
It is to be noted that initially the matters relating to 
welfare of labour and Trade Unions were mentioned in the 
Concurrent Legislative List at Items No.26 & 27, as such the Federal 
Government as well as the Provincial Governments both were 
competent to make legislation in that behalf. The Federal 
Government promulgated the IRO, 1969, which was repealed by the 
IRO, 2002 and same was also repealed by IRA, 2008. Section 87(3) 
of the IRA, 2008 provided that the said Act shall unless repealed 
earlier, stand repealed on 30.4.2010, hence, it was a temporary 
legislation, which was to die on 30.4.2010 automatically if it was not 
extended by legislative measure. Before the repeal of IRA, 2008, on 
20.4.2010 Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment was passed, 
whereby the Concurrent Legislative List was abolished and the 
matters relating to labour and Trade Unions were transferred to 
legislative competence of the Provincial Governments. However, 
clause (6) of Article 270AA of the Constitution provided that 
notwithstanding omission of Concurrent List by the Eighteenth 
Constitutional Amendment, all laws with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in the said Lists in force, immediately before 
the commencement of the said amendment would continue to 
remain in force, until altered, repealed or amended by the 
competent authority. In terms of said clause the IRA, 2008 
continued to be in force notwithstanding the abolition of the 
Concurrent Legislative List till 30.4.2010 when in terms of section 
87(3) it stood repealed.  
14. 
 
Now the question for consideration is what would be 
implication of section 87(3) of the IRA, 2008, especially after the 
Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment; would it continue to be in 
Const.P.24/2011 
7 
force even after 30.4.2010 in view of clause (6) of Article 270AA. It 
is to be mentioned here that the temporary law is also called 
“sunset law”. The sunset law has been defined in “World Book 
Dictionary” as “a law requiring a government regulatory agency to 
undergo periodic review for its continued usefulness; a law 
providing that state agencies created by a governor or a legislature 
be terminated after a specified period.” In “Advanced Law Lexicon: 
3rd Edition”  the term sunset law has been defined as “a statute 
under which a governmental agency or program automatically 
terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally 
reviewed”.  The High Court of Sindh, in Industrial Relations 
Advisors’ 
Association’s 
case 
has 
thoroughly 
dealt 
with 
the 
implication of sunset law and the repeal of a temporary legislation. 
Relevant 
paras 
from 
the 
said 
judgment 
are 
reproduced 
hereinbelow:- 
“19. The first question is whether the Act of 2008 is a 
temporary law or whether it is a permanent law. Mr. 
Khalid Anwar called it a "sunset" legislation. We have 
already quoted above section 87(3) of the Act of 2008. 
In Black's Law Dictionary "Sunset law" is defined in the 
following words:-- 
  
"Sunset law.--A statute or provision in a law that 
requires periodic review of the rationale for the 
continued existence of the particular law or the 
specific 
administrative 
agency 
or 
other 
governmental function. The legislature must take 
positive steps to allow the law, agency, or 
functions to continue in existence by a certain date 
or such will cease to exist." (Underlining added) 
  
20. Craies on Statute Law 7th Edition, on the subject of 
temporary and perpetual statutes, says as under:-- 
  
"Acts are also classified, by reference to their 
duration, as temporary or perpetual. 
  
(a) Temporary.--Temporary statutes are those on 
the duration of which some limit is put by 
Parliament. The Standing Orders of the House of 
Commons require a time clause to be inserted in 
such Acts. The Expiring Laws Continuance Acts 
always contain a specific date for the expiry of the 
continued Acts. 
  
(b) Perpetual.--Perpetual Acts are those upon 
whose continuance no limitation of time is 
expressly named or necessarily to be understood. 
Const.P.24/2011 
8 
They are not perpetual in the sense of being 
irrevocable." 
  
21. Crawford's Interpretation of Laws at page 103 states 
as under:-- 
  
"71. Permanent, or Perpetual, and Temporary 
Acts.---A permanent, or perpetual Act, is one 
whose operation is not limited to a particular term 
of time but which continues in force until it is duly 
altered or repealed. A temporary Act, on the other 
hand, is one whose life or duration is fixed for a 
specified period of time at the moment of its 
enactment and continues in force, unless sooner 
repealed, until the expiration of the time fixed for 
its duration. 
  
22. Mr. S.M. Zafar, in his Book Understanding Statutes 
primarily quoted from Crawford in respect of temporary 
Acts. A law may be temporary because of nature of 
Legislative power. For example power to legislate 
through Ordinances is quasi legislative powers: power is 
legislative but exercise is executive. The Constitution 
itself fixes life of such enactment. Then there may be 
Acts of Parliament which may also be temporary because 
either the Act itself or any other law provides for a  
terminal moment for the enactment. Since section 87(3) 
clearly stipulated a death knell moment for the Act of 
2008, notwithstanding it having been enacted as an Act 
of Parliament it has to be treated as a temporary law 
and has to be given effect accordingly.” 
15. 
 
We are in full agreement with the conclusion given by 
the learned High Court on the question of repeal of IRA, 2008 w.e.f. 
30.4.2010. It is pertinent to mention here that clause (6) of Article 
270AA provides that notwithstanding the omission of Concurrent 
Legislative Lists all laws with respect to any of the matters 
enumerated in the said lists shall continue to remain in force until 
altered, repealed or amended by the competent authority. It is clear 
from the language that as the Concurrent Legislative List was 
abolished, therefore, protection was provided to all the permanent 
laws enacted by the Parliament on the subjects mentioned in the 
said list. Although the protection was provided to IRA, 2008 by the 
said clause but it did not have any effect on section 87(3), which 
remained operative in its full force. Therefore, it killed the said Act 
on 30.4.2010.  
16. 
 
The High Court of Sindh, while forming an opinion 
regarding the effect of repeal of a temporary legislation and revival 
Const.P.24/2011 
9 
of the previous law has relied upon various judgments. To arrive at 
a just and proper conclusion it would be appropriate to have a 
glance on the said case-laws to make comparison of the facts of 
those judgments with that of instant case. 
(i) 
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ebrahim D. Ahmad (1992 
PTD,1353) 
In the year 1959 section 15BB of the Income Tax Act was enacted 
whereby certain exemptions were provided from 1.4.1959 to 
13.6.1965. Later on by means of Finance Ordinance, 1972, 
subsection (4AA) was added to section 15BB and was given effect 
from 1st April, 1959 the date of insertion of 15BB. The said 
Ordinance was laid before the Assembly but subsection (4AA) was 
not approved and hence it lapsed. The President under Article 
297(1) of the Interim Constitution, 1972 promulgated the Post-
Constitution President’s Order 5 of 1972, whereby the Ordinances 
issued by the President before 31st December, 1972 were provided 
permanence. The matter came before this Court when this Court 
held “In the effort to revive and revitalize the Finance Ordinance XXI 
of 1972 in fact subsection (4AA) of section 15BB was made effective 
from 1-4-1959, a date far more in retrospect than was the limiting 
date prescribed in the Constitution. All these defects made the post 
Constitution President's Order No.5 of 1972 of no avail so far as 
revival of subsection (4AA) is concerned.”  
 
(ii) Pir Sabir Shah v. Shad Muhammad Khan (PD 1995 SC 66)  
At the instance of Parliamentary Party, References under section   
8-B of the Political Parties Act, 1962 were filed against the members 
of the Provincial Assembly of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). The 
Election Commission of Pakistan by majority of 2 to 1 dismissed the 
said References. The matter came up before this Court when the 
effect of repeal of Ordinance XXX of 1993 whereby some 
amendments were made in Section 8-B, was considered. This Court 
held that in view of the above discussed legal position there is no 
doubt in my mind that on the repeal of Ordinance XXX of 1993, 
which was never placed before the Assembly for approval and which 
stood repealed on the expiry of 4 months period from the date of its 
promulgation in accordance with the provisions of Article 89 ibid, 
the amendment introduced in section 8-B by Ordinance, XXX of 
1993 stood removed from the statute book with the consequence 
the original provisions of section 8-B of the Act stood revived on 
such repeal. 
 
(iii) 
Federation of Pakistan v. M. Nawaz Khokhar (PLD 2000 SC 
26): 
  
On 18th November, 1996 Ehtesab Ordinance (CXI), 1996 was 
promulgated which was further amended by Ordinance (CXXIII), 
1996, Ordinance VII of 1997 and Ordinance XI of 1997. Ordinance 
CXI amended as aforesaid was repealed and replaced by Ordinance 
XX of 1997, which was repealed by Ehtesab Act, IX of 1997. The 
said Act was amended through Ordinance II of 1998, which stood 
repealed on 3rd June, 1998 as it was not passed by the Parliament. 
Writ petitions were filed before the Lahore High Court challenging 
the vires of these Ordinances/Acts. The writ petitions were disposed 
Const.P.24/2011 
10 
of and the matter came up before this Court when it was held that 
“the contention appears to be correct. Ordinance II of 1998 was 
promulgated on 4-2-1998. It is not disputed that Ordinance II of 
1998 was not passed by Majlis-e-Shoora. Under Article 89 of the 
Constitution, this Ordinance stood repealed on 3-6-1998. We have 
already held that an. Ordinance promulgated under Article 89 of the 
Constitution is a temporary legislation, therefore, the amendments 
made in the Act by Ordinance II of 1998 stood obliterated and 
original provisions in the Act stood revised on repeal of Ordinance II 
of 1998.”. 
 
(iv) 
State v. Muhammad Sharif (PLD 1960 Lah. 236)  
The Essential Commodities (Control of Distribution) Order, 1953 was 
promulgated under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 
of 1946. The said Act was to remain in force for a particular period 
but was subsequently extended by a number of statutes. By means 
of Ordinance X of 1955, the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) 
Act was repealed, however, under section 17 of the said Ordinance, 
orders made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act 
were protected. Later, the Ordinance X of 1955 was repealed by 
Essential Supplies Ordinance IV of 1956, which was repealed and 
substituted by Ordinance V of 1956. This Ordinance was repealed 
and substituted by Ordinance XXI of 1956. Subsequently, the 
Ordinance XXI of 1956 was replaced by the Essential Supplies Act, 
containing the same provisions as the Ordinance. The respondent 
was charged for an offence under section 6 of the Control of 
Essential Commodities Ordinance (V) of 1956 read with section 4 of 
the Essential Commodities (Control of Distribution) Order, 1953. 
The Magistrate, acquitted him on the ground that the Ordinance V of 
1956, under section 6 of which he was being prosecuted, had 
expired six weeks after the meeting of the National Assembly in 
September 1956, i.e., on the 18th of November 1956, and as the 
Ordinance was only a temporary statute, there could not be any 
prosecution under an expired Ordinance. An appeal before this 
Court was filed by the State against the acquittal of respondent. The 
Curt observed that in view of Full Bench Judgment in Crown v. 
Haveli (PLD 1949 Lah. 550) a prosecution under Essential 
Commodities Ordinance V of 1956 could not be continued after the 
date of expiry, i.e. the 18th of November 1956. The Court ultimately 
held that “if the Ordinance was to expire on the 18th of November 
1956 and the effect of its expiry was to make it non-existent, except 
for transactions past and closed, the mere repeal of it a day before 
its expiry could not have given it greater effect than it could 
originally have. There does not seem to be any objection to the 
proposition that by a repeal a statute will not have effect for a 
longer term than it would otherwise have had. All that section 6 of 
the General Clauses Act means is that in spite of the repeal a 
statute is deemed to be in force in respect of the particular matters 
enumerated in that section, i.e., its original life would continue in 
spite of the repeal, but section 6 certainly does not mean that by 
the repeal it would be in force even after the period for which it was 
legally to be in force as enacted. We are not inclined, therefore, to 
accept the argument that on account of the repeal, this prosecution 
could have continued.”. 
Const.P.24/2011 
11 
 
(v) 
The Sargodha Bhera Bus Service Limited v. The Province of 
West Pakistan (PLD 1959 SC 127) 
 
Facts of the case were that up to 17th December 1956 taxes were 
realised under the Punjab Motor Vehicles Taxation Act (IV of 1924). 
Later, the Governor of West Pakistan promulgated Ordinance No. 
XXXV of 1956 under Article 102 of the Constitution 1956. The West 
Pakistan Provincial Assembly met on the 28th of January 1957 and 
the Ordinance was actually laid before it on the 8th of March 1957, 
but the Assembly was itself suspended by the President under 
Article 193 of the late Constitution. The Ordinance, therefore, was 
only valid for six weeks beyond the 28th January 1957 under Article 
102 of the Constitution, and ceased to operate on the 11th March 
1957. The Act in which the Ordinance was embodied in the form of 
a statute (Act XXXII of 1958) was passed by the Legislative 
Assembly and the assent thereto of the Governor was first published 
in the Official Gazette on the 24th April, 1958. Appeals before this 
Court were filed against orders of High Court of West Pakistan, 
Lahore, for an order restraining the collection of payment of taxes 
under the Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1924. This court held that 
“the powers of legislation of the Governor, therefore, were of a 
transitory, temporary and contingent nature. They are, no doubt, 
co-extensive with those of the Provincial Assembly, as argued by 
Mr. Brohi, but this can be said only with regard to the field of 
legislation as regards the Provincial list and the concurrent list of 
subjects as given in the Fifth Schedule to the late Constitution. But 
it is evident that the powers of the Assembly are more extensive„ 
inasmuch as it was empowered to enact permanent Acts at all times 
not subject to any limitations as the Governor's powers are meant 
to be by Article 102, which are to C be exercised in emergency and 
with temporary effect only, and carry with them the implication that 
when a permanent Act is repealed by an Ordinance, the Act will 
revive on the expiry of the Ordinance.”. 
(vi) 
Gooderham & Worts v. C.B.Corporation (Air 1949 PC 90) 
The Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act, 1932 was amended on 23rd 
May, 1933 by virtue of Act, 1933 whereby requirement of the 
consent of Governor in Council to a lease provided. The Act, 1933 
was temporary and was to expire on 30th April, 1934 by virtue of 
section 4 of the same. By two successive Acts passed in 1934 and 
1935 the date of expiry of the Act of 1932 was extended to 30th 
April, 1934 and 30th June, 1935. Finally by the Act of 5th July, 1935 
its operation was further extended to 31st Mary, 1936. The Court 
held as under:- 
"The result is that on 31st March 1936, the temporary 
legislation contained in the first Act of 1933 repealing 
provisions of the principal Act of 1932 and substituting other 
provisions came to an end not by repeal of the temporary 
legislation but by the efflux of the prescribed time. No 
question as to the revival of the temporarily repealed 
provisions of the principal Act of 1932 by the repeal of 
repealing legislation arises. The repeal effected by the 
temporary legislation was only a temporary repeal. When by 
the fiat of Parliament the temporary repeal expired the 
Const.P.24/2011 
12 
original legislation automatically resumed its full force. No re-
enactment of it was required. This is what subsection (3) of 
the Act of 5th July 1935, was designed to make clear. The 
principal statute of 1932 is to be read on and after 1st April 
1936, as if the temporary legislation had never been enacted; 
it is to be in force as if there had been no temporary 
legislation affecting its provisions." 
(vii) State Of Orrissa vs Bhupendra Kumar Bose (AIR 1962 SC 
945) 
During December, 1957 to March, 1958, elections were held for the 
Cuttack Municipality under the provisions of the Orissa Municipal 
Act, 1950 Orissa (XXXIII of 1950). The elections were challenged 
before the High Court which were set aside and orders of injunction 
were issued. As a result of the findings made by the High Court 
during the course of the said judgment the validity of elections to 
other Municipalities were exposed to the risk of challenge, therefore, 
the Governor of Orissa promulgated the Ordinance I of 1959,  on 
January 15, 1959. Sections 4 and 5(1) of the said Ordinance were 
declared unconstitutional by the High Court. The matter came up 
before the Indian Supreme Court when the issue was raised that the 
Ordinance having lapsed on 1st April, 1959, the appeals themselves 
had become infructuous. The Court observed that “it is true that the 
provisions of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act in relation to the effect 
of repeal do not apply to a temporary Act. As observed by Patanjali 
Sastri, J., as he then was, in S. Krishnan v. The State of Madras(1) 
the general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that, in the 
absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which are 
being taken against a person under it will ipso facto terminate as 
soon as the statute expires. That is why the Legislature can and 
often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by enacting in 
the temporary statute a saving provision, the effect of which is in 
some respects similar to that of s. 6 of the General Clauses Act. 
Incidentally, we ought to add that it may not be open to the 
Ordinance making authority to adopt such a course because of the 
obvious limitation imposed on the said authority by Art. 213(2) 
(a).”. It was further observed that “in other words, this decision 
shows that in some cases the repeal effected by a temporary Act 
would be permanent and would endure even after the expiration of 
the temporary Act. We have referred to this aspect of the matter 
only by way of analogy to show that no inflexible rule can be laid 
down about the effect of the expiration of a temporary Act. …… In 
our opinion, having regard to the object of the ordinance and to the 
rights created by the validating provisions, it would be difficult to 
accept the contention that as soon as the Ordinance expired the 
validity of the elections came to an end and their invalidity was 
revived.”. 
 
(viii) Qudrat Ullah vs Municipal Board, Barelly (AIR 1974 SC 396) 
The U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 was a 
temporary law. Its operational period was extended from time to 
time by frequent amendments, till at last it was to expire on 
September 30, 1972. Some time before this date, the Uttar Pradesh 
Const.P.24/2011 
13 
Urban Buildings (Regulation of letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, 
a permanent statute, was put on the Statute Book which by s. 43 
repealed the Act of 1947 and by s. 2 excluded from the scope of the 
protection of the Act accommodation belonging to local bodies. The 
question of applicability of section 6 of General Clauses Act in case 
of a temporary law was considered by the Indian Supreme Court. 
The Court ultimately held as under: - 
"25. We may mention as an additional reason for our 
conclusion that the provisions of S. 6 of the General Clauses 
Act in relation to the effect of repeal do not ordinarily apply to 
a temporary Act. Stating this proposition, Gajendragadkar, J. 
as he then was indicated the consequence of repeal of a 
temporary Act. In State of Orissa v. Bhupendra Kumar, AIR 
1962 SC 945, the learned Judge continued: 
  
"As observed by Patanjali Sastri, J, as he then was in S. 
Krishnan v. State of Madras, 1951 SCR 621 (AIR 1951 
SC 301), the general rule in regard to a temporary 
statute is that in the absence of special provision to the 
contrary, proceedings which are being taken against a 
person under it will ipso facto terminate as soon as the 
statute expires. That is why the Legislature can and 
often does, avoid such an anomalous consequence by 
enacting in the temporary statute a saving provision, 
the effect of which is in some respects similar to that of 
S.6 of the General Clauses Act." 
 
(ix) 
Ameer-Un-Nissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (AIR 1955 SC 
352) 
In the said case various 'Firmans' issued by the Nizam were 
challenged. The Court assuming the 'Firmans' issued by the Nizam 
in the nature of legislative enactments determining private rights 
somewhat on the analogy of private Acts of Parliament held as 
under: - 
“24.  The result will be the same even if we proceed on the 
footing that the various 'Firmans' issued by the Nizam were in 
the nature of legislative enactments determining private rights 
somewhat on the analogy of private Acts of Parliament. We 
may assume that the 'Firman' of 26-6-1947 was repealed by 
the 'Firman' of 24-2-1949, and the latter 'Firman' in its turn 
was repealed by that of 7-9-1949. Under the English Common 
Law when a repealing enactment was repealed by another 
statute, the repeal of the second Act revived the former Act 
'ab initio'. But this rule does not apply to repealing Acts 
passed since 1850 and now if an Act repealing a former Act is 
itself repealed, the last repeal does not revive the Act before 
repealed unless words are added reviving it: vide Maxwell's 
Interpretation of Statutes, p. 402 (10th Edition). 
 
It may indeed be said that the present rule is the result of the 
statutory provisions introduced by the Interpretation Act of 
1889 and as we are not bound by the provisions of any 
English statute, we can still apply the English Common Law 
rule if it appears to us to be reasonable and proper. But even 
Const.P.24/2011 
14 
according to the Common Law doctrine, the repeal of the 
repealing enactment would not revive the original Act if the 
second repealing enactment manifests an intention to the 
contrary. In the present case the 'Firman' of 7-9-1949, does 
not repeal the earlier 'Firman' of 24-2-1949, 'simpliciter' but 
makes a further provision providing for fresh enquiry and 
report which presupposes the continuance of the repeal of the 
original 'Firman' of 26-6-1947.” 
(x) 
 Hansraj Moolji v. The State Of Bombay (AIR 1957 SC 497) 
The India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, was passed 
on June 27, 1940 , and was an Act to make emergency provisions 
with respect to Government of India and Burma. On April 1, 1946, 
the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 1946 was 
issued. By the said order the period of emergency referred to in s. 3 
of the India and Burma (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940, was 
extended from June 27, 1940, to April 1, 1946. The Ordinance in 
question was promulgated on January 12, 1946, and was therefore 
within the said period. The question came up before the Indian 
Supreme Court as to whether the High Denomination Bank Notes 
(Demonetisation) Ordinance, 1946 (Ordinance No. III of 1946), was 
in operation on July 11, 1953, when the offence under s. 7 read 
with s. 4 thereof was committed by the appellant therein. The Court 
held as under: - 
“Even though the Governor-General's Acts and the Ordinances 
promulgated by him were thus equated with the Acts passed 
by the Federal Legislature or the Indian Legislature as the 
case may be, the period of duration thereof had to be 
determined. Every statute for which no time is limited is called 
a perpetual Act, and its duration is prima facie perpetual. It 
continues in force until it is repealed. (Vide Craies on Statute 
Law, 5th Ed. p. 374; Halsbury's Laws of England, Hailsham 
Ed., Vol. XXXI, p. 511, para. 664). If an Act contains a proviso 
that it is to continue in force only for a certain specified time, 
it is called a Temporary Act. This result would follow not only 
from the terms of the Act itself but also from the fact that it 
was intended only as a temporary measure. This ratio has 
also been applied to emergency measures which continue 
during the subsistence of the emergency but lapse with the 
cessation thereof. It was therefore contended that Ordinances 
promulgated under the emergency powers vested in the 
Governor-General would be in operation during the period of 
emergency but would cease to be in operation once the 
emergency was declared to have ended. In the instant case 
before us the Ordinance in question was promulgated in 
exercise of the emergency powers vested in the Governor- 
General under s. 72 of the 9th Sch. of the Government of 
India Act, 1935, and it was urged that the Ordinance thus 
promulgated would cease to be in operation after the 
emergency was declared to have ended on April 1, 1946, by 
the India and Burma (Termination of Emergency) Order, 
1946, in spite of the words of limitation " for the space of not 
more than six months from its promulgation " having been 
Const.P.24/2011 
15 
omitted from s. 72 by s. 1(3) of the India and Burma 
(Emergency Provisions) Act, 1940.” 
 
It is pertinent to mention here that in the above noted case-law 
although the question was with regard to revival of the repealed law 
after the expiry of temporary law but in all the said cases except in 
the Gooderham & Worts’s case, the amending law was not repealed 
by virtue of in built mechanism as provided in section 87(3) of IRA, 
2008. In Gooderham & Worts’s case certain amendments were 
made in the original law by virtue of an Act which ultimately expired 
leaving the original legislation to resume its full force but in the 
instant case the IRO, 1969 was repealed by the IRO, 2002, which 
then was repealed by IRA, 2008. Thus, the said cases have no 
consonance with the facts of the instant case. Further, as we are 
testing the case at the touchstone of Article 264, therefore, law laid 
down in the above said judgments is also not applicable  for the 
reasons that under Article 264 only action has to be survived and 
not the law. On the other hand facts of the case in Muhammad Arif 
v. State (1993 SCMR 1589) are somewhat similar to the instant 
case. In the said case, the Special Courts for Speedy Trials 
Ordinance (II of 1987) was promulgated by the President of 
Pakistan on 26-7-1987. The said Ordinance was repealed and 
replaced by the Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1987 which 
was to remain in force for a period of one year. Later, by means of 
Special Courts for Speedy Trials (Amendment) Ordinance, 1988, 
subsection (2) of section 1 of the Act was amended by substituting 
the words "two years" for the words "one year". The said Ordinance 
was not placed before the National Assembly in terms of clause (2) 
of Article 89 of the Constitution and, therefore, it stood expired on 
the expiry of four months from its promulgation i.e. on 12-2-1989. 
However, the President issued identical Ordinance No. XXXVIII of 
1991 and Ordinance No.II of 1992. The court held as under: -  
 
12. At this stage it may be appropriate to point out that there 
is a marked distinction between a temporary enactment and a 
permanent enactment. In the case in hand, the Act was a 
statute of a temporary nature as subsection (2) of section 1 of 
it provided that it was to operate for a period of one year from 
the date on which it was assented to by the President. The 
rules of interpretation of such statutes are different from 
those which are permanent. 
16. 
…………… The general rule in regard to a temporary 
statute is that in the absence of special provision to the 
contrary, proceedings which were taken under it, would ipso 
facto terminate. The case of Wicks v. Director of Public 
Prosecutor supra decided by the House of Lords has dealt with 
a statute where the law-maker while enacting it expressed 
contrary intention in section 11 (3) thereof by providing that 
its expiry shall not affect operation thereof as respects things 
previously done or omitted to be done. There is nor similar 
provision in the Act in issue. It was to operate only for one 
year from the date on which it was assented to by the 
President in terms of section 1(2) thereof unless it was 
extended by the Parliament. The effect of promulgation of 
Ordinance XIX of 1988 was that the life of the Act was 
extended for a period of four months i.e. up to 12-2-1989. 
Const.P.24/2011 
16 
Since in the present case the Special Court recorded 
conviction on 11-4-1989 when the Act and Ordinance XIX of 
1988 already stood lapsed, the judgment of the Special Court 
was coram non judice as has been held by the High Court. 
 
17. 
 
Next question, which has cropped up is that what would 
be effect of repeal of IRA, 2008. Learned counsel for the petitioner 
has vehemently argued that in terms of section 6 of General Clauses 
Act and Article 264 of the Constitution, the IRO, 1969, which was 
permanent legislation, would be revived. It is to be noted that 
section 6 of the General Clauses Act applies to the cases where any 
enactment is repealed by the General Clauses Act or any other 
Central Act, therefore, the same is not applicable in the instant case 
because of reason that IRA, 2008 was not repealed by any other 
legislation rather it stood repealed on the expiry of period 
mentioned in section 87(3) of the Act. Similarly, Article 264 of the 
Constitution provided that where a law is repealed or is deemed to 
have been repealed, by, under, or by virtue of Constitution, the 
repeal shall not affect the previous operation of law or anything duly 
done or suffered under the law; affect any right, privilege, obligation 
or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the law; affect any 
penalty forfeiture of punishment incurred in respect of any offence 
committed against the law; or affect any investigation legal 
proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, 
obligation, liability, penalty forfeiture or punishment. However, it 
shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which 
the repeal takes effect. Article 264 of the Constitution shall not be 
applicable in the instant case firstly; for the reason that the IRA, 
2008 was not repealed by, under, or by virtue of the Constitution, 
rather it died on expiry of the statutory period. Secondly; the 
purpose of Article 264 of the Constitution is to provide protection to 
the operation of law, rights, liabilities accrued, and penalties 
incurred in respect of any repealed law and does not state that it 
would provide protection to the laws previously in force. Article 264 
of the Constitution is in a language that deals with the effect of 
repeal of laws and, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, 
nothing will be revived which was not in force or existing at the time 
when the repeal takes effect. The IRA, 2008, was repealed by its 
own force in terms of section 87(3). Had it been an Ordinance 
Const.P.24/2011 
17 
issued under Article 89 of the Constitution, on the expiry of its 
statutory period the repealed law would have been revived but the 
provisions of this Article would not be applicable here because IRA, 
2008 is not an Ordinance and has been enacted by the Act of 
Parliament, therefore, no sooner did it lapse on 30.4.2010, no other 
law earlier repealed including IRO, 1969 could occupy the field. In 
addition to it, the mandate of section 6 of General Clauses Act and 
Auricle 264 of the constitution had not provided that on account of 
repeal, the law previously in field would stand revived as these 
provisions in broader sense had attached finality to the actions 
which were already done. The finding given by the High Court of 
Sindh that the after the repeal of IRA, 2008, the IRO, 1969 came 
back in operation, is not tenable. Thus it is held that the IRO, 1969 
would not be revived after the repeal of IRA, 2008. 
18. 
 
As already stated above, the IRO, 1969 was repealed by 
the IRO, 2002, which then was repealed by IRA, 2008. However, 
the IRA, 2008 stood repealed after the completion of its statutory 
period provided in section 87(3) and not by any other legislation, 
federal or provincial, therefore, neither the IRO, 2002 nor the IRO, 
1969 could revive on the strength of section 6 of the General 
Clauses Act or Article 264 of the Constitution. Furthermore by 
means of Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment the Concurrent 
Legislative List was abolished and the Federal Government had lost 
the power to legislate regarding Labour Welfare and Trade Unions, 
which subject devolved upon the provinces. It is to be noted that 
presently, no Federal Legislation can be made on the Labour 
matters except recourse to the provisions of Article 144(1) of the 
Constitution, which provide that  if one or more Provincial 
Assemblies pass resolutions to the effect that Majlis-e-Shoora 
(Parliament) may by law regulate any matter not enumerated in the 
Federal Legislative List in the Fourth Schedule, it shall be lawful for 
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) to pass an Act for regulating that 
matter accordingly, but any Act so passed may, in respect to the 
Province     to which  it applies,   be  amended  or  repealed  by  Act  
of      the Assembly  of  that  Province.  The   Trade  Unions,   which   
are     operating  within   one  province,   can   be   dealt       with  
under    the   Labour    Laws   enacted   in   that  province  and  the  
Const.P.24/2011 
18 
workman can also avail the appropriate remedy provided under the 
said legislation.  
19. 
  
In view of the declaration so made hereinabove, the 
next question arises that after expiry of IRA, 2008 on 30.4.2010, 
which provision of law would take effect for the interregnum period? 
It is to be noted that as stated earlier after the Eighteenth 
Constitutional Amendment, the Provincial Assemblies enacted the 
respective laws on the subject of labour and Trade Unions after 
about two months of expiry of IRA, 2008 and there is a vacuum for 
the said period. This Court had dealt with the issue of applicability of 
laws during the interregnum period when any law was repealed or 
declared ultra vires. In the case of Government of NWFP v. Said 
Kamal Shah (PLD 1986 SC 360) certain provisions of the NWFP, 
Preemption Act, 1950, alongwith some other laws were declared 
repugnant to Injunction of Islam and recommendations were made 
to bring the said laws in conformity with the Injunction of Islam, till 
31st July, 1986. In pursuance of the decision of the Court, the NWFP 
Preemption Act, 1987 was promulgated on 28th April, 1987. In 
terms of its section 35 the NWFP Preemption Act, 1950 was 
repealed however, the judgments and decrees passed by the Court 
under the Repealed Act of 1950 were saved. When the legality of a 
decree passed by the Civil Judge on 15th April, 1987 was questioned 
on the ground that the same was passed after the cut off date i.e. 
31st July, 1986 and before the promulgation of NWFP Preemption 
Act, 1987 this Court in the case of Sarfraz v. Muhammad Aslam 
Khan(2001 SCMR 1062) held that on 28th April, 1987 in pursuance 
of the directions of this Court the Act was promulgated and till then 
the NWFP Preemption Act, 1950 was holding the field as it was 
repealed from the commencement of the Act, therefore, any 
proceedings conducted and decree passed during this period would 
not be rendered without jurisdiction and void; Article 203-D(3)(b) of 
the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan did not provide that 
if any law had been declared against the Injunctions of Islam the 
proceedings instituted under the said law would also come to an end 
on the date fixed by the Court for making such law in consonance 
with the Injunctions of Islam; at the best its effect would be that the 
fresh suits of preemption after the stipulated date would not be 
Const.P.24/2011 
19 
instituted under the law which has been found contrary to the 
Injunctions of Islam but the claimants would be entitled for the 
enforcement of their rights under the Muhammadan Law, like the 
Provinces of Sindh and Balochistan where no statutory laws 
governing preemption suits were applicable. It was further observed 
that undoubtedly a right of preemption is a substantial right of an 
individual and it could not be taken away merely due to repeal of 
law under which suit for its enforcement was filed; at the best such 
newly enacted law would be deemed to have retrospective effect by 
necessary implication because such change would only be deemed 
to be procedural. 
20. 
  
Next question is as to whether the Industrial Relations 
Laws made by the provinces would have retrospective effect or not? 
At this stage it would be appropriate to have a glance on the 
definition of “workman” as provided in various Labour Laws. As per 
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the “workman” means any person 
employed (including an apprentice) in any industry to do any skilled 
or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, 
for the purpose of any proceedings under this Act in relation to an 
industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute but 
does not include any person employed in the naval, military or air 
service of the Crown. The definition of “workman” remained almost 
the same in the subsequent Ordinances/Acts with a little addition or 
alteration. The same definition of “worker” and “workman” have 
been provided in the Provincial Legislation made on the subject, 
which is holding the field. Interestingly, almost the same definition 
of “workman” has been provided in the West Pakistan Industrial and 
Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, 
namely, “workman” means any person employed in any industrial or 
commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or 
clerical work for hire or reward. As the same definition of workman 
has been provided in the Industrial Relations Laws as well as 
Standing Orders, therefore, both the laws are applicable to the 
persons falling within the definition of “workman”. Order 12(3) of 
the said Orders provides that in case a workman is aggrieved by the 
termination  of a service or removal, retrenchment, discharge or 
dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of 
Const.P.24/2011 
20 
section 25-A of the IRO, 1969. It is clear that the West Pakistan 
(Standing 
Order) 
Ordinance, 
1968 
provides 
rights 
to 
the 
workmen/labourers whereas the Provincial Industrial Relations Laws 
provide mechanism for the enforcement of the said rights and 
unless otherwise provided or intended, the Industrial Relations Laws 
are procedural in nature.    
21. 
 
The 
question 
of 
applicability 
of 
any 
law 
with 
retrospective effect has been dealt with by this Court in the case of 
Gul Hassan and Co. v. Allied Bank of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 237) 
wherein after examining plethora of case law, Mr. Justice Saleem 
Akhtar, as he then was, observed that Statute providing change of 
forum, pecuniary or otherwise, is procedural in nature and has 
retrospective affect unless contrary is provided expressly or 
impliedly or it effects the existing rights or causes injustice or 
prejudice. The relevant para from the said judgment is reproduced 
hereinbelow:-  
“7.  
It is well-settled principle of interpretation of statute 
that where a statute affects a substantive right, it operates 
prospectively unless "by express enactment or necessary 
indictment" 
retrospective 
operation 
has 
been 
given. 
(Muhammad Ishaq v. State PLD 1956 SC (Pak.) 256 and 
State v. Muhammad Jamil, PLD 1965 SC 681). This principle 
was affirmed in Abdul Rehman v. Settlement Commissioner 
(PLD 1966 SC 362). However statute, which is procedural in 
nature, operates retrospectively unless it affects an existing 
right on the date of promulgation or causes injustice or 
prejudice the substantive right. In Adnan Afzal v. Capt. Sher 
Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187). same principle was re-affirmed and 
it was observed:- 
"The 
next 
question, 
therefore, 
that 
arises 
for 
consideration is as to what are matters of procedure. It 
is obvious that matters relating to the remedy, the 
mode of trial, the manner of taking evidence and forms 
of action are all matters relating to procedure. Crawford 
too takes the view that questions relating to jurisdiction 
over a cause of action, venue, parties pleadings and 
rules of evidence also pertain to procedure, provided 
the burden of proof is not shifted. Thus; a statute 
purporting to transfer jurisdiction over certain causes of 
action may operate retrospectively. This is what is 
meant by saying that a change of forum by a law is 
retrospective being a matter of procedure only. 
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that if in this case 
process any existing rights are affected or the giving of 
retroactive operation cause inconvenience or injustice, 
then the Courts will not even in the case of a 
procedural statute, favour an interpretation giving 
retrospective effect to the statute. On the other hand, if 
the new procedural statute is of such a character that 
Const.P.24/2011 
21 
its retroactive application will tend to promote justice 
without any consequential embarrassment or detriment 
to any of the parties concerned, the Courts would 
favourably incline towards giving effect to such 
procedural statutes retroactively." 
The same view was expressed in Ch. Safdar Ali v. Malik 
Ikram Elahi and another (1969 SCMR 166) and Muhammad 
Abdullah v. Imdad Ali (1972 SCMR 173), which was followed 
in Bashir.v. Wazir Ali (1987 SCMR 978), Mst. Nighat Yasmin 
v. N.B. of Pak. (PLD 1988 SC 391) and Yusuf Ali Khan v. 
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, Karachi (1994 
SCMR 1007). 
From the principle enunciated in these judgments it emerges 
that statute providing change (if forum pecuniary or 
otherwise is procedural in nature and has retrospective effect 
unless contrary is provided expressly or impliedly or it affects 
the existing right or causes injustice or prejudice.” 
 
22. 
  
At the cost of repetition, it is to be noted that the IRA, 
2008 stood repealed on 30.04.2010 by virtue of its section 87(3), 
whereas, the provincial legislation was made on 13th June, 2010; 5th 
July, 2010; 14th July, 2010; and 22nd July, 2010 for the provinces of 
Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pukhtunkhwa and Balochistan, respectively. 
Therefore, there was a period of about two months for which there 
was no legislation, Federal or Provincial, in force. The Labour Laws 
provide the procedure and mechanism for the resolution of disputes, 
registration of Trade Unions and establishment of Forum for the 
redressal of grievance of the labourers as well as employers, 
therefore, it is mainly a procedural law and in the light of the well-
settled principles of interpretation of Statutes as mentioned above, 
the procedural law has retrospective effect unless contrary is 
provided expressly or impliedly, the same would thus be applicable 
retrospectively w.e.f. 1.5.2010. Further, in the Province of Sindh, 
the Industrial Relations (Revival and Amendment) Act, 2010, the 
IRA, 2008 has been revived w.e.f. 1st May, 2010, therefore, the 
interregnum period has already been catered for.  
23. 
  
On the question of remedy before the NIRC, which was 
provided in terms of section 25 of the IRA, 2008 it is to be noted 
that the provision of NIRC was added for the first time in 1972 by 
making amendment in the IRO, 1969 by means of Ordinance IX of 
1972 whereby section 22A was inserted. The same was provided in 
IRO, 2002 and IRA, 2008. Now, in the province of Punjab, by means 
of section 47 of the PIRA, 2010 remedy has been provided before 
Const.P.24/2011 
22 
the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Similarly, in the province of 
Balochistan, under section 25 of the BIRA, 2010 remedy before the 
Industrial Relations Commission and in the province of  Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, in terms of sections 48 and 51 of KIRO, 2010 the 
remedy of appeal has been provided before the Labour Court and 
Labour Appellate Tribunal. In the province of Sindh, as the IRA, 
2008 has been revived, therefore, in terms section 25 of the same, 
the provision of NIRC has been continued. In the present 
circumstances, after the promulgation of provincial laws dealing 
with the Industrial disputes, the persons having any grievance can 
approach the appropriate forum provided under the respective 
provincial laws. 
24. 
  
In the Indian jurisdiction, Trade Unions and Industrial 
Labour Disputes are mentioned at Sr. No.22 of the List-III of the 
Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India, which form the joint 
domain of both the State Governments and Union Territory of India 
as well as the Central government of India under those subjects, 
therefore, the trade unions Act, 1926 has been promulgated by the 
Parliament to deal with the matters relating to registration of trade 
unions and trade disputes etc., whereas, in view of the Eighteenth 
Constitutional Amendment, Federal Legislation is not empowered to 
legislate for the nationwide trade unions, except for if need be, 
recourse to procedure laid down in Article 144(1) of the 
Constitution, which provides that one or more Provincial Assemblies 
may by resolutions empower the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) to 
regulate any matter not enumerated in the Federal Legislative List 
in the Fourth Schedule, through an Act, which may be amended by 
the Assembly of that Province.  
25. 
 
In the Industrial Relations Laws initially the provision of 
NIRC was not provided till 1972 when the same was introduced by 
insertion of section 22A in the IRO, 1969. However, the same was 
provided in the subsequent legislations till IRA, 2008. Now after the 
promulgation of Provincial legislations in terms of Eighteenth 
Constitutional 
Amendment, 
the 
forum 
of 
Industrial 
Labour 
Commission/Labour Appellate Tribunal/ Labour Court has been 
provided for. Even otherwise, persons falling within the definition of 
Const.P.24/2011 
23 
“workman” have been provided remedy in terms of West Pakistan 
(Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. Order 12(3) of the said Orders 
provides that in case a workman is aggrieved by the termination  of 
a service or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may 
take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the 
IRO, 1969. However, section 80 of the PIRA, 2010 as well as the 
section 82 of the KIRO, 2010 provide that all cases pending before 
the NIRC constituted under the repealed IRA, 2008 shall stand 
transferred 
to 
Tribunal/Labour 
Court 
and 
Registrar 
having 
jurisdiction in the matter; the NIRC shall transfer the record of all 
the cases and trade Unions to the Tribunal/Labour Court or 
Registrar; the Tribunal, Labour Court or Registrar may continue the 
proceedings in a case transferred under this section from the stage 
at which it was pending before the NIRC. Similarly, section 86 of the 
BIRO, 2010 provides that all appeals and applications of any kind 
pending in any High Court immediately before the commencement 
of this Ordinance shall stand transferred to the Labour Appellate 
Tribunals from the date of the commencement of this Ordinance and 
it shall not be necessary for the Labour Appellate Tribunals to recall 
any witness or record any evidence that may have been recorded. 
As the NIRC has been abolished, therefore, new fora have been 
provided to the workers/workmen/labourers under the newly 
enacted Provincial Labour Laws. It is pertinent to mention here that 
the effect of change of forum have been discussed in the case of 
Adnan Afzal v. Sher Afzal (PLD 1969 SC 187), wherein claim for 
maintenance was made under section 488 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure before the City Magistrate which was ultimately 
transferred to the Court of the District Magistrate, where the 
respondent moved an application that in view of the provisions of 
the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, published in the Gazette 
on the 18th of July 1964, the proceedings should be filed, as the 
Family Court was  vested with exclusive jurisdiction under section 5 
thereof. The District Magistrate on the 9th of December, 1967, 
accepted the plea and directed the appellant to seek his remedy 
before the Family Court. The matter came up before this court and 
this court observed that the comparison of the concerned provisions 
indicates that the provisions of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act 
Const.P.24/2011 
24 
are of a more beneficial nature which enlarge not only the scope of 
the enquiry but also vest the Court with powers of giving greater 
relief with a right of appeal either to the District Court or to the High 
Court; Furthermore, the combined effect of sections 5 and 20 of the 
Act is clearly to give exclusive jurisdiction to the Family Courts 
without, diminishing or curtailing the rights already possessed by a 
litigant with regard to the scheduled matters. Ultimately the Court 
held that the Family Courts Act had changed the forum, altered the 
method of the trial and empowered the Court to grant better 
remedies; it has, thus, in every sense of the term, brought about 
only procedural changes and not affected any substantive right; 
according to the general rule of interpretation, therefore, a 
procedural statute is to be given retroactive effect unless the law 
contains a contrary indication; There is no such contrary indication 
in the West Pakistan Family Courts Act; therefore, the Act also 
affected the pending proceedings and the District Magistrate was 
right in holding that the Courts of Magistrates no longer had the 
jurisdiction either to entertain, hear or adjudicate upon a matter 
relating to maintenance; he was, however, wrong in dismissing the 
application, for, if he had no jurisdiction to adjudicate, the only 
order he could have passed on the application was to direct that the 
papers be returned to the applicant for presentation in the proper 
Court. In view of the law laid down in the said case, it is clear that 
mere change of forum does not affect the rights of a person.  
26. 
 
Under the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 1901 Council of 
Elders was provided for settling the disputes of civil nature between 
the individuals. Revision against the order of Council of Elders was 
maintainable before the Commissioner. However, by means of the 
Balochistan Civil Disputes (Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976 the 
Commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear the revision and in terms 
of paragraph-7 of the Regulation, the matters pending before the 
District Court or a Civil Court, subordinate thereto or in any Tribunal 
stood transferred to the Court of Qazi and Majlis-e-Shoora having 
jurisdiction in the matter, upon such transfer would be deemed to 
have been instituted therein and would be heard and determined 
accordingly. In the case of Mastak v. Lal (PLD 1991 SC 344), the 
validity of the order of the Commissioner passed in revision petition 
Const.P.24/2011 
25 
after the 18th February, 1977 when the Balochistan Civil Disputes 
(Shariat Application) Regulation, 1976 was extended to the area in 
dispute, was questioned. The Court after considering the matter in 
detail held as under:- 
11. Paragraph 7 of the Regulation definitely gives the 
impression that the Regulation was to have effect on the 
pending suits and appeals and to that extent it was 
retroactive. The only test laid down for transfer was as 
to whether the dispute is triable under the Regulation 
and if it was then it had to go to the Court competent to 
try it irrespective of the fact in which Court it was 
pending. Therefore, even appeals have to go back to the 
Court of Qazi for trial in accordance with Shariah and 
not to be transferred in the appellate jurisdiction of 
Majalis-e-Shura for disposal according to the law in 
force at the time the proceedings were instituted. To 
that extent, the express language of paragraph 7 of the 
Regulation makes the provisions of the Regulation 
applicable in the areas to which and when if is extended 
retroactive over all proceedings pending before any 
Tribunal, Court or District Court. 
12. In view of the reasons given for holding that appeal 
for the purposes of paragraph 7 includes the Revision 
preferred by a party invoking the power of the 
Commissioner under paragraph 48 of the F.C.R. and 
pending suits and appeals before any District Court or a 
Civil Court subordinate thereto, or any tribunal, in the 
nature of an appeal, would be liable to be transferred to 
the Court of Qazi for trial in accordance with the 
injunctions of Shariat. The fact that the appellant had 
instituted the Revision in the Court of Commissioner 
cannot stand in the way of such a transfer because at 
the time when he instituted the proceedings, that was 
the only remedy which could possibly be invoked by 
him. 
In the light of above case law, it is clear that during the interregnum 
period w.e.f. 30.4.2010, when no Industrial Relations Law was 
holding the field, the workers had remedy under the ordinary laws 
prevailing at that time, because in absence of a special law, the 
ordinary/general laws come forward to fill in the vacuum. 
27. 
 
Now turning towards the submission of the learned 
Amicus curiae on the vires of Provincial Labour Laws on the ground 
that there are many Institutions/Corporations which have their 
branches all over the country and there were countrywide Trade 
Unions but now Trade Union can only be registered under the 
legislation of a specific province. It is to be noted that instant 
proceedings have been initiated under Article 184(3) of the 
Const.P.24/2011 
26 
Constitution with a limited purpose of having a declaration that IRA, 
2008 on the basis of Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment stood 
protected and continued till 30th June, 2011, therefore, the vires of 
the same cannot be considered in such proceedings. However, as 
stated earlier Article 144(1) of the Constitution has provided 
mechanism for making central legislation in respect of matters not 
covered in the Federal Legislative List.   
28. 
 
Before parting with the judgment, we place our thanks 
on record for Mr. Mehmood Abdul Ghani, Sr. ASC who has assisted 
the Court to the best of his ability.  
29. 
 
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, it is held that IRA,  
2008 ceased to continue in force w.e.f. 30th April, 2010, as a 
consequence whereof petition is dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Judge  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
Announced in Open Court  
On 2.6. 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
Approved For reporting. 
 
