IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED 
MR. JUSTICE MAQBOOL BAQAR 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.1646 & 2000/2006 AND CIVIL PETITION NO.782-K/2009 
(Against the judgment dated 18.2.2009, 10.8.2006 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in C.P. 
No.D-2659/1994, C.P. No.34-D/1995) 
 
M/s MFMY Industries Ltd. 
 
 
 
        …in C.A.1646/2006 
M/s Sapphire Textile Mills Ltd.  
 
 
        …in C.A.2000/2006 
M/s Gatron Industries Ltd.  
 
 
 
        …in C.P.782-K/2009 
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
 
Federation of Pakistan through M/o Commerce etc.    …in C.A.1646/2006 
Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance etc. 
        …in C.A.2000/2006 
Pakistan through Secretary M/o Finance etc. 
        …in C.P.782-K/2009 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the appellant(s): 
Mr. Tariq Javed, ASC 
(in C.A.1646/2006) 
 
 
Mr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan, ASC 
(in C.A.2000/2006) 
 
For FBR: 
Mr. M. Bilal, Sr. ASC 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
 
Departmental 
Representative: 
 
For Federation:  
 
Imran Mehmood, MCB 
 
 
Mr. Sohail Mahmood, D.A.G. 
Date of hearing: 
21.04.2015 
… 
JUDGMENT 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.-  
CIVIL APPEALS NO.1646 & 2000/2006: 
  
  
 
These appeals are being disposed of on a short point i.e. 
whether the impugned judgment passed by the learned High Court is 
proper judicial dispensation or otherwise. The relevant facts in this context 
are:- the appellants filed constitution petitions before the learned High 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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Court of Sindh, whereby they assailed the imposition of import fee enforced 
through certain SROs on various grounds and also sought relief of refund 
of the amount already paid by them to the Customs Department on 
account of the above. The hearing in the matters took place on 22.3.2005 
and 4.5.2005 respectively and the judgment was reserved, which was 
ultimately announced on 10.8.2006 after a lapse and delay of almost one 
year and three months. The appellants had challenged the said judgment 
herein and leave was granted, inter alia, on the point(s) that since the 
impugned judgment had been passed in the matters after an inordinate 
delay, whether it was a case fit for remand of the matters to the learned 
High Court for hearing and decision afresh. 
2.  
 
Learned counsel for the appellants while arguing these appeals 
has confined today to the said point and submitted that because of such a 
long delay, the judgment in question is invalid and improper judicial 
dispensation and on this score alone the same (judgment) stands vitiated. 
This is the proposition requiring resolution vide the present verdict. 
3. 
 
Heard. Before dilating upon the proposition in hand, I feel 
constrained to briefly highlight the importance of judiciary/judicature as a 
vital component of the State. A State, as understood today, constitutes 
three foundational organs i.e. Legislature, Executive and Judicature. In 
ordinary parlance, these (organs) are also known to be the three pillars of the 
State.  The political philosophers, jurists, constitutional experts and even 
judicial opinions pronounced all over the world (specially in the countries having the 
democratic system/set up for governance) are unanimous in their views that the 
entire structure of the State is founded, built upon, and secured only on 
account of the said pillars. And due to lack/absence or imbalance in 
respect of any of these organs/pillars, the very concept of State is periled 
and its existence is put at risk. 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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The main object and function of the legislative branch of the State is 
to make laws, which (laws) obviously define and prescribe the rights and 
obligations of the citizens/persons and the duties of the State; these laws 
ordain the functions which the State can and has to perform vide various 
organs thereto. The legislative limb also enables a broader mechanism for 
State governance by drawing policies and issuing and passing resolutions 
on numerous important aspects expedient for the effective functioning of 
the State. It may also provide for a machinery through which laws and 
directives etc. are or should be implemented and enforced. It (legislature) 
formulates and constitutes the positive law of the State.  
Whereas the object of executive is to not only carry out and run the 
affairs of the State in accordance with the laws made by the legislature and 
any policy/direction given to it, but also comply with laws, follow the 
established rules, norms and standards expedient and necessary for the 
due administration of the State. Thus, it (executive) is responsible for the 
governance of the State and for carrying out its affairs in consonance with 
the Rule of law.  
According to the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 
(the Constitution), the executive authority of the Federation shall be exercised in 
the name of the President by the Federal Government, consisting of the 
Prime Minister and the Federal Minister. The executive authority shall act 
through the Prime Minister who shall be the Chief Executive of the 
Federation (see Article 90 of the Constitution). Furthermore President shall appoint 
Federal Ministers and Ministers of State from amongst the members of 
Majlis Shoora on the advice of the Prime Minister (see Article 92). Thus it is 
clear that the top echelon of the State administration comes into being 
through and from the Parliament, which comprises of the chosen 
representatives of the people. These chosen representatives simultaneously 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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act as the legislators and the administrators. The administrative/executive 
branch, having thus been elected by the people of State, while performing 
its functions keeps in view its political expediencies, the commitments 
made to the electorate per its manifesto and the policies which seem 
necessary in its own judgment for its future political interests; inter alia  for 
these factors and in the exuberant pursuit of its goals, the executive may  
compromise the well established rules of governance which not only results 
in misuse and abuse of authority, but may also lead to violation of the 
rights of the citizens consciously or inadvertently or cause violation of the 
social, economic and political rights of the people in general or in particular 
of those who do not agree with the government in power.  
Anyhow, as highlighted above, according to the constitutional setup 
of our country, executive primarily emanates out of the legislative branch of 
the State i.e. out of the chosen representative of the people, therefore, there 
remains no strict separation of power between the legislature and the 
executive. Rather practically there is considerable harmony and also 
collaboration between these two branches of the State. These branches at 
times support and bolster each other and while they do so, the possibility 
that either of the two branches exceeds its jurisdiction and empowerment 
or misuses the same cannot be ruled out. For example, on account of some 
executive expediency, the legislature, on the behest of the executive, may 
pass certain laws, which otherwise may not conform to the parameters (ultra 
vires) of constitutionality, but are simply promulgated with the object of 
meeting executive exigencies. Likewise, the elements of abuse, excessive 
use of power, arbitrary exercise of power, whimsical, non-transparent, 
unfair and unreasonable action(s) on part of the executive including the 
violation of fundamental rights have been commonly noticed and also 
interfered with by the judiciary to protect and safeguard the rights of the 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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citizens/persons, who are affected on account of such abuses and misuses. 
It is in the aforementioned circumstances that where the legislature or the 
executive branch has erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction and is 
responsible for any of the deviations indicated above, that an affected 
person for the purposes of seeking redressal of his grievance against such 
wrong and/or for enforcing his rights under the law, including his 
fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution, comes forth to the 
judicature by knocking at its door (note: in the context of above, I am purposely not 
making reference to any private litigation between two individuals). This is the last resort 
for a beleaguered and aggrieved person. It is thus that the judicature is 
conceived, perceived and is meant to act as the final arbiter not only vis-à-
vis the interpretation of the Constitution, the statutory law(s), but is to also 
ensure that RULE OF LAW is adhered to and the rights of the 
citizens/persons approaching the courts are determined and enforced 
against the Might of the State. It is commonly and jurisprudentially known 
all over the republican and democratic world that the courts are the 
guardians of the Constitution and are responsible for preserving and 
securing the rights of the aggrieved citizens/persons as against the State. 
 
The discussion above briefly provides for the importance of the 
judicial branch of the State. Besides, the pivotal, cardinal and important 
role of the judicature can be assessed from the quote of Hazrat Ali (R.A.) 
who avowed “a society with kufr may be sustained but not the one where there is 
injustice”. In Asma Jillani’s case (PLD 1972 SC 139 @ 182), Chief Justice 
Hamood-ur-Rahman while impressing upon the role of judiciary remarked 
“It is this that led Von Hammer, a renowned orientalist, to remark that under the Islamic 
system the law rules through the utterance of justice, and the power of the Governor carries 
out the utterance of it”. I am also reminded to mention here (as it is commonly 
known, but I have no authentic version of it), that during the second world war, a 
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question was posed to Winston Churchill, Britain Prime Minister, whether 
Britain would win the war or not, he responded to the effect that if there 
was a functional judiciary in Britain, there was no doubt that Britain would 
win. Once Justice Thurgood Marshall, Judge of the Supreme Court of the 
United States of America while commenting on the importance of the 
judiciary remarked, “The greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever inflicted upon an 
ungrateful and a sinning people was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a dependent judiciary”. In 
furtherance to this, I would also like to add here that judiciary which lacks 
courage to do justice without fear and favour, is biased, suffers from the 
vice of self-interest, is tardy, indolent and incompetent and has no urge, 
will, passion and ability to decide the cases/disputes before it 
expeditiously, it falls in the romance of aggrandizement and populism is a 
danger to the State and the society. Whereas, a great virtue of a judicial 
functionary is that he applies the rules of balancing and proportionality 
while performing his functions and discharging his duties.  
Provided above, are some good illustrations of the importance and 
significance of the judiciary in a society and within a State. I may like to 
add here that one of the most important differences between developed 
countries on one hand and developing or under developed countries on the 
other is the respect for, adherence to and enforcement of THE RULE OF 
LAW. I have no doubt in my mind that this ideal can only be achieved 
through an independent and capable judiciary, which is beyond the reach, 
control and influence of other branches of the State. The judicature has to 
act as a natural umpire who keeps a check on the exercise of power by 
other organs of the State so as to ensure that the rights of citizens/persons 
are not affected and trampled contrarily to law. 
4.  
 
In view of the above discourse, when the judiciary enjoys such 
a special position, privilege and status in the functioning of the State, it is 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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also saddled with the onerous duty of discharging its functions efficiently, 
effectively and with utmost diligence and care. One of the responsibilities in 
this context, universally known, is the duty of the Judge to decide the cases 
expeditiously, because it is a known jurisprudential concept that “justice 
delayed is justice denied”. The courts must, thus, exercise all the authority 
conferred upon them to prevent any delays which are being caused at any 
level by any person whosoever. I am mindful of the fact that in any 
litigation there are certain procedural implications without which there 
shall be no discipline left for the regulation of a lis before a court. These 
procedural and legal aspects of the matter are equally important, which 
must be followed in letter and spirit. However, barring such time that is 
consumed for adherence with these legal and procedural aspects, the 
courts are bound to decide the matter as promptly as possible especially 
once the trial and the hearing of the case(s) is complete (note: in the trial case) 
and in appeals, revisions and constitutional matters, once the hearing of 
the matter (when arguments are concluded) has taken place and has been 
concluded.  
5. 
 
Termination of a lis undoubtedly is through a verdict of a court 
which is a decision disposing of a matter in dispute before it (the Court) and 
in legal parlance, it is called a “JUDGMENT”. It is invariably known that a 
Judge finally speaks through his judgment.  According to Black’s Law 
Dictionary, a judgment has been defined to mean “A court’s final determination of 
the rights and obligations of the parties in a case” and per Henry Campbell Black, A 
Treatise on the Law of Judgment “An action is instituted for the enforcement of a right or 
the redress of an injury. Hence a judgment, as the culmination of the action declares the existence of 
the right, recognizes the commission of the injury, or negatives the allegation of one or the other. But 
as no right can exist without a correlative duty, nor any invasion of it without a corresponding 
obligation to make amends, the judgment necessarily affirms, or else denies, that such a duty or such 
a liability rests upon the person against whom the aid of the law is invoked”. These definitions 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 8 :-
are adequately self-explanatory. In our procedural law (civil), judgment as 
defined in Section 2(9) of Code of Civil Procedure means “the statement given by 
the judge of the grounds of a decree or order”.  It should be emphasized here that a 
judgment should supply adequate reasons for the conclusion reached and 
arrived at and should be reflective of application of proper judicial mind by 
the Judge and it should not be a mechanical and not speaking judgment in 
nature. 
It may be reiterated that without a judgment, there is no concept of 
justice and/or fruitful outcome of litigation which without any fear of 
contradiction means that the State lacks an effective justice system. In 
such a situation, I would, rather, go to the extent of saying that if the 
Judge/the Court does not pronounce a judgment for resolving the legal and 
factual issues involved in a dispute before it at all, the very purpose of the 
judicial branch of the State will be frustrated and eroded. If there is no 
judgment in terms of law, the entire judicial setup shall be rendered farce 
and illusionary, which obviously shall in turn disturb the equilibrium 
between the pillars of the State upon which it rests, resulting into serious 
impairment of the functioning of the State. 
6. 
 
After having shed some light on the importance of  judgments, 
it is essential to note that in pure civil litigation which emanates from the 
institution of a suit/lis, a Trial Judge, if there are triable issues for the 
resolution of which the evidence is required, (note: subject to delinquency of the 
parties and the consequences for not producing the evidence thereof) (the court) after recording 
of the evidence, is supposed to pronounce the judgment per Order 20 Rule 
1(2), which reads as:- “the Court shall, after the case has been heard, pronounce 
judgment in open court, either at once or on some future day not exceeding thirty days, 
which due notice shall be given to the parties or their advocates”. The judgment thus 
has to be given by the Trial Court within the prescribed period of 30 days, 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 9 :-
after the hearing of the case has been concluded. It may be relevant to 
mention here that with the commencement of the trial in a civil lis, the 
hearing of the case also starts. And with the conclusion of the trial, the 
hearing also concludes. The conclusion of the trial or the hearing means 
that the parties have concluded and completed their evidence. There is no 
specific provision in the CPC which confers the right upon the parties to 
make oral arguments before the trial Court, but per convention, the oral 
submissions of the parties are also heard, which exercise however, must be 
concluded within 30 days time from the conclusion of the trial, as 
prescribed by law. If the parties, despite the opportunity granted by the 
court to make oral submissions, do not avail the same, the court is not 
bound to wait indefinitely for them and keep on adjourning the matter. This 
is highly deprecated and should be discouraged, rather the Court should 
pronounce the judgment without their arguments and this (such judgment) 
shall not be in violation of the rule of hearing. 
 
In my view, the expression “not exceeding thirty days” makes it 
mandatory for the Trial Court to render its judgment within the prescribed 
time period. If the same is not done, without a sufficient cause i.e. a cause 
beyond the control of the Judge, the judgment is impaired in value if not 
invalid and disciplinary action can be taken against a Judge who is found 
habitual in delaying his judgments beyond that period, obviously following 
proper legal steps for such action and in any case at least this vice of the 
judge must adversely reflect in his ACR’s. 
However, in the case(s) of appeal against the judgment and decree of 
the Trial Court, the provisions relevant in the context of judgment are Order 
41 Rule 30, CPC, which read as follows:- 
 
“The Appellate Court after hearing the parties or their pleaders 
and referring to any part of the proceedings whether on appeal 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 10 :- 
or in the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred to 
which reference maybe considered necessary, shall pronounce 
judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of 
which notice shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.” 
 
From a reading of the above, it is conspicuous that the appellate Court after 
hearing (note: obviously the hearing means oral arguments) the parties or their 
pleaders, as the case may be, shall pronounce the judgment at once or on 
some future day. This future day by no stretch of legal interpretation or on 
the settled rules and norms of justice can be construed to mean an 
indefinite period. Rather the rule of reasonableness of time required for 
the performance of a judicial act in the normal and ordinary course 
necessary for doing justice should be attracted and pressed into service and 
read into it.  
If the first appeal against the decree or order (subject to the pecuniary 
jurisdiction) is being heard by the District Judge (Additional District Judges included), 
and it is only the oral summations which are being addressed by the 
parties/pleaders and heard by the court and no fresh evidence is being 
recorded (subject to additional evidence as discussed in Order 41 Rule 27 CPC), as the long 
exercise of a trial is now over; the record is complete; the matter is ripe in 
all respects for a decision, and the Judge is only required to render the 
judgment after hearing the summations, thus he has to do the same within 
reasonable time. This reasonable time, to my candid consideration, should 
not be more than 45 days. I am enlarging the margin of 15 days (i.e. 30 days + 
15 days) because the same Judges also act as Sessions Judges and have to 
conduct session trials and render decisions in criminal matters and other 
judicial work also, thus given them the margin of other assignments the 
noted time is most reasonable and quite sufficient for the appellate court 
(District Judges) to compose the judgment. This rule and adherence to time, 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 11 :- 
should equally apply to the judgments in relation to the revisional as also 
review jurisdiction of these court(s) or where the court(s) is exercising any 
other special jurisdiction in cases of civil nature before it. If the judgments 
are not announced within such reasonable time as stated above, same 
consequences should follow which are prescribed for the trial court Judges 
in respect of action(s) proposed against them and the impairment of the 
judgment(s). I find it expedient to mention here that this rule should also 
extend to all the special courts (forums), tribunals either constituted under 
the Federal or the Provincial laws and set up which are presided over by the 
serving or retired judges of the subordinate judiciary and even to those 
forums which are presided over by the ex-judges of the High Courts (note: 
however if some time has been fixed by the law for the disposal of any matter before the special 
forum, such law should take precedence over this rule of reasonableness of time set out in this 
opinion). It also requires mention here that in quite a large number of cases it 
has been experienced that the cases are adjourned for the arguments for 
umpteen, indefinitely numerous occasions, therefore to curb this menace 
the Judges of the District Judiciary and the special forum throughout the 
country while pronouncing their judgments should record a note at the 
end/bottom thereof, as to how many times the case was listed for hearing 
of the arguments and was adjourned so that the High Courts which have 
supervisory authority over the said Judiciary must stay abreast about the 
performance of the Judges; the causes for the delay and should take 
measures and the steps to rectify the causes and the reasons in this behalf. 
Moreover this Court as the apex Court of the country and being the 
paterfamilias must also know what is the state of affair in the Judiciary at 
the lower ebb and the manner in which the cases are being dealt with and 
conducted at the trial and appellate/revisional stage. The special courts 
and the forums should also made such endorsements at their judgments 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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too. No lethargy or casual attitude is tolerable and the times have come to 
take appropriate stern and positive actions for speedy justice, rather simple 
rhetorics.  
7. 
 
I shall now turn to the hearing of the first and/or second 
appeals by the High Court(s), and the hearing of the cases before it in its 
revisional and constitutional jurisdiction. As the first appeals against 
decrees and mostly the constitutional cases and ICAs are heard by a 
Division Bench(s) of the High Courts, so as to enable the two Judges to 
deliberate, confabulate and compose the judgment(s), or record dissent 
and/or 
exchange 
draft 
judgments, 
the 
reasonable 
time 
for 
the 
pronouncement of judgments should be 90 days. This time period (90 days) 
shall also be reasonable time for the High Courts, for the reason that Article 
201 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 mandates 
“Subject to Article 189, any decision of a High Court shall, to the extent that it decides a 
question of law or is based upon or enunciates a principle of law, be binding on all courts 
subordinate to it”. Thus for proper enunciation of law, considerable research, 
brooding and pondering may be required. 90 days time in view of said 
Article should, therefore, also be good and adequate for the composition of 
the judgments by the High Court(s) in the above matters and also in first 
appeal against order or second appeals, and in the cases before it in its 
revisional  or review jurisdiction, or any of the special jurisdictions of the 
High Court(s) (note: subject to the principle if the law has fixed a time for the conclusion of the 
proceedings and pronouncement of judgment under any special law, this has to take precedence over 
the 90 days)  
  
If the Judges cannot compose and deliver the judgments within the 
above (reasonable) time, then they for sufficient reasons, to be recorded (by 
them) should set out the case for re-hearing. However, because of the high 
status of the judges of the High Courts, it is not expected that the learned 
Judges shall fix the matters for rehearing in routine just to cover up the 
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lapse in composing the judgment within 90 days, rather I am sure that it 
shall definitely be for genuine reasons, reflected in the order of rehearing as 
to why the judgment could not be written and pronounced. However, 
pronouncement of judgment by the High Court after a lapse of time period 
of 90 days if the matter for any reason is not put for any rehearing per se 
shall not be invalid, though it may be frowned upon. But again it does not 
mean that learned High Court has indefinite time to pronounce the 
judgment after hearing of the matter. In my opinion, the maximum time 
within which the judgment should come is 120 days. Otherwise the 
judgment shall stand weakened in quality and efficiency, if not invalid 
altogether and therefore when challenged before this Court, the Court shall 
decide whether it should sustain or set aside on the simple and short 
ground of inordinate delay.   
8. 
 
Now coming to the judgments to be rendered by the apex Court 
of the country. The cases/matters by this Court are heard in benches. 
Usual cases are heard by a three members’ bench, though two members’ 
benches also hear the matters. The rule of 90 days should also ordinarily 
extend to those (cases) heard by two member benches of this Court and if the 
matter is not decided within this time, the case should be fixed for 
rehearing. This is what I would do for myself.  
But as the cases are heard by the larger Bench particularly a Bench 
of three and above, the rule of 90 days should not be attracted because this 
Court, being the apex Court of the country has to enunciate law on very 
important legal and constitutional propositions, which law is binding on all 
the courts and other organs of the State (see Article 189). Therefore for laying 
down the LAW, a lot of effort, research, deliberations and confabulations 
are required. This is the final court of the country which is saddled with the 
duty of laying down the correct law therefore more responsibility is cast on 
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the Court and utmost care is required to pursue the law which is free from 
any flaw(s). Thus the judgments sometimes after being drafted are shelved 
for a while for further thinking, rethinking about its implication, the effect 
and impact on the State, society, culture, pending cases and the system of 
governance, the rights of the citizens etc. This Court settles the 
jurisprudence of the country and the development and true interpretation 
of law. Numbers of drafts are therefore prepared for discussion and in put; 
different opinions are to be recorded in the same judgment on different 
points of law by the Judges of the Bench; there are dissents recorded. It is, 
thus, left to the Judge(s) of this Court to decide for themselves as to what 
minimum time frame shall be needed for composing and pronouncing the 
judgment as the judges of the superior courts cannot be said to be unaware 
or unmindful about their responsibility of providing speedy justice and the  
expediency of dispensation of the justice. And of course the mandate of 
Article X of the Judges Code of Conduct, which they have sworn (vide their 
oath) to follow and abide by in letter and spirit. And the said Article 
stipulates:-  
“In this judicial work a Judge shall take all steps to decide 
cases within the shortest time, controlling effectively efforts 
made to prevent early disposal of cases and make every 
endeavor to minimize suffering of litigants by deciding cases 
expeditiously through proper written judgments. A Judge who 
is unmindful or indifferent towards this aspect of his duty is not 
faithful to his work, which is a grave fault.” 
 
9. 
 
Furthermore, in the context of the judgments in general and in 
particular to be delivered by the superior courts, it is my firm and well 
thought-out view that if there is an inordinate delay in pronouncement of 
judgment after hearing of the matter, especially on account of lapse of 
considerable and reasonable time, such as six months and beyond, the 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
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Judges shall not be in a position to exactly recall and record with precision 
and exactitude as to what propositions of law and facts were argued before 
them. This shall have reflection upon the rule of audi alteram partem, 
which is a fundamental and salutary rule of justice and postulates that if 
someone has been denied appropriate opportunity of hearing in a case, any 
verdict/decision given against such person/party shall not be laudable. 
This rule is quite known and established in our jurisprudence (note: I do not 
find it expedient to unnecessarily reiterate the importance of this rule here) and the legal 
consequences qua the violation thereof by a Court are also well established. 
Besides, it may be mentioned here, that hearing means a meaningful, 
purposeful and effective hearing which enables a Judge to understand the 
legal and factual proposition involved in the matter as opposed to an 
illusionary and cursory hearing conducted barely as a formality and to 
bring on record mere compliance of the rule of hearing. If effective hearing 
is not provided, it shall tantamount to non-hearing of the party concerned 
and the legal consequences of non-hearing of parties shall follow. 
10. 
 
Be that as it may, in quite a number of cases where judgments 
have been withheld by the Courts (by any Court) for a considerable period of 
time, it has been frowned and disapproved, for example in the case reported 
as Muhammad Ovais and another Versus Federation of Pakistan 
through Ministry of Works and Housing Pakistan, Islamabad and 
others (2007 SCMR 1587) it has been ordained:- 
 
“6. 
With regard to the writing of judgment, the directions 
can be found under Order XX, rule 1(2) of the C.P.C. It lays down 
imperatively that, after the case has been heard, the Court shall 
pronounce judgment in the open Court either at once or on some 
future date not exceeding thirty days, for which due notice shall be 
given to the parties or their Advocates. The Code applies to the 
High Court as well but if its application is relaxed in the exercise 
of constitutional jurisdiction, one can conclude that the judgment 
be pronounced on some future date, to be reasonably calculated. 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 16 :- 
Though, strictly speaking, departure from thirty days is not 
justified otherwise. Abdul Aziz, C.J. in Pathana v. Mst. Khandal 
PLD 1952 BJ 38 had observed that a judgment, with reference to 
Order XX, rule 1, C.P.C., delivered after five months of hearing 
arguments is tantamount to delivering judgment without hearing 
the parties. A Full Bench of this Court in Syed Iftikhar-ud-Din 
Haider Gardezi v. Central Bank of India Limited 1996 SCMR 669 
has maintained that the term "future date" cannot be determined 
by a Court unreasonably. This was with reference to Order XLI, 
rule 30, C.P.C. In the case aforesaid, a judgment pronounced 
eight months after hearing of arguments was held to be 
unreasonably delayed and the case was remanded to the High 
Court for rehearing and re-deciding the matter. We have given our 
anxious consideration to the law involved and also the principle of 
propriety and hold that when the delay in pronouncement of 
judgment is not expected to be unreasonable either in the exercise 
of original or in appellate jurisdiction, why it should be so allowed 
and interpreted in case of constitutional jurisdiction, especially, 
when Code of Civil Procedure is held applicable. 
7.  
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
8. 
Even if, we go to the condition of prejudice caused to a 
party by delayed pronouncement of judgment, though not provided 
in law, yet the decision would depend upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. It is only adhered to for the sake of 
argument, whereas, the verdict in 1996 SCMR 669 is to prevail 
any way. The unreasonable delay of ten months in the instant case 
in pronouncement of judgment by the learned High Court has 
caused prejudice as well. In the lengthy arguments addressed 
before us on merits, we were referred to a bulk of documentary 
evidence going to the very route of the case which was never found 
mentioned in the impugned judgment of the High Court. This 
omission seems to be caused only and only due to the delay of ten 
months in question.” 
 
Almost to the same is the ratio of the law laid down in the cases reported as 
Syed Iftikhar-ud-Din Haidar Hardezi and 9 others Versus Central Bank 
of India Ltd. Lahore and 2 others (1996 SCMR 669), Muhammad Latif 
Versus Member, Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner, 
Punjab, Lahore and 9 others (2003 CLC 1064) and Walayat Hussain 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 17 :- 
Versus Muhammd Hanif (1989 MLD 1012). Similar jurisprudence can 
also be found in the Indian Jurisdiction on the subject, where in the case 
reported as R.C. Sharma Versus Union of India and others (AIR 1976 SC 
2037), it has been held as under:- 
“The Civil Procedure Code does not provide a time limit for the period 
between the hearing of arguments and the delivery of a judgment. 
Nevertheless, we think that an unreasonable delay between hearing of 
arguments and delivery of a judgment, unless explained by exceptional 
or extraordinary circumstances is highly undesirable even when written 
arguments are submitted. It is not unlikely that some points which the 
litigant considers important may have escaped notice. But, what is more 
important is that litigants must have complete confidence in the results of 
litigation. This confidence tends to be shaken if there is excessive delay 
between hearing of arguments and delivery of judgments. Justice, as we 
have often observed, must not only be done but must manifestly appear to 
be done.” 
 
11. 
 
In the light of all that has been discussed and mentioned 
above, it is clear that unlike the cases before the Trial Court, the cases for 
which no specific period has been fixed by the statutory law for 
pronouncing the judgment, it is required of the learned Judges concerned  
of the District Judiciary that they should pronounce the judgments within 
the time enunciated by this opinion. And it is expected of the learned 
Judges of the High Courts to give respect to what time has been laid down 
herein. Otherwise, any judgment rendered may be questioned as not being 
meaningful, purposive and rather illusionary. Such a verdict shall neither 
fit in the concept, object and purpose of a judgment nor shall it meet the 
rule of proper dispensation of justice. But if any matter comes before this 
Court in which a judgment of the learned High Court is attacked as 
traveling beyond the period of six months, despite my holding it to be 
weakened in quality etc., but it shall not be invalid altogether, still it shall 
C.As.1646 & 2000 of 2006 & C.P.782-K of 2009 
-: 18 :- 
be open to this Court to examine if for some reason an exception can be 
taken to this opinion and if so such judgment may be upheld. However 
having examined the judgment impugned in this case which has been 
pronounced after a period of one year and three months, I find it to be 
against the rule of natural justice and it fundamentally does not meet with 
the concept of proper judicial dispensation, thus the same cannot be 
sustained and in such a situation the rule of vitiation of a judicial decision 
can be aptly resorted to; and is, therefore, set aside and the matter is 
remanded to the learned High Court for decision afresh. These appeals 
stand allowed in the terms noted above. 
 
CIVIL PETITION NO.782-K/2009: 
12.   
In this case, the impugned judgment has not been passed 
through independent application of mind, rather the Court has decided the 
matter simply on the basis of the judgments pronounced in the noted 
appeals, which have been set aside, thus the impugned judgment in this 
case also cannot be sustained. Resultantly this petition is converted into 
appeal and allowed, the impugned judgment is set aside and the matter is 
remanded to the learned High Court for decision afresh in accordance with 
law. 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
Islamabad, the 
JUDGE 
21st April, 2015 
Approved For Reporting 
Ghulam Raza/* 
