IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN  
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Dost Muhammad Khan 
 
Civil Appeal No.482/2014 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 30.9.2013 passed  
by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in C.P.No.265/2012). 
 
1. 
Mst. Shahista Bibi  
2. 
Abdul Qayyum 
 
 
 
 
 
…Appellants    
VERSUS 
 
1. 
The Supdt. Central Jail 
2. 
I.G. (Prisons) Balochistan, Quetta 
3. 
The Secretary, Home & Tribal Affairs Deptt. 
 
Govt. of Balochistan, Quetta. 
 
 
 
…Respondents  
 
For the appellants: 
Malik Asmatullah Kasi, ASC 
 
 
For the respondents: 
Mr. Iqbal Khattak, APG 
 
Date of hearing:  
19.9.2014 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
Dost Muhammad Khan, J. – Leave to appeal was 
granted to the appellants namely (i) Mst. Shahista Bibi (widow) of 
Allah Dad and (ii) Abdul Qayyum son of Allah Dad (Late), presently 
confined in Central Jail Mach.  
2. 
  
The order, granting leave dated 24.03.2014, speaks 
that keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in the 
cases of Shah Hussain vs. State (PLD 2009 SC 460) and Hassan v. 
State (PLD 2013 SC 793), the case of the appellants needs 
consideration.  
3. 
  
As the appellants have not questioned their conviction 
and sentences awarded to them by the trial Court, affirmed by the 
High Court of Balochistan, Quetta and confirmed by this Court by 
dismissing their appeal on merits, but in this appeal the appellants 
have sought the relief of section 35 read with S. 397 Cr.P.C.  
4. 
  
Relevant but brief facts sufficient for disposal of this 
appeal are that appellant No.2 was booked in the following crimes, 
by PS City Quetta:- 
C.A. 482/14 
2
(i) 
In case FIR No. 16/1987 Quetta U/Ss 3, 4, 5 & 6  
of 
 
the Explosive Substances Act, 1908  
R/W Ss. 120-
 
B/436/307/34 PPC; 
(ii) 
 In case FIR No.17/1987, U/Ss 3, 4, 5, & 6 of the 
 
Explosive Substances 
Act, 1908 R/W Ss. 
436, 
 
302, 307/34 PPC,  
(iii) 
In case FIR No. 26/198, U/Ss 4 & 5 of the 
 
Explosives Substances Act, and  
(iv) 
 In case FIR No.27/1987 U/Ss 4 & 5 of the Explosive 
 
Substances Act, 1908. 
In each of the four cases, appellant No.2 was awarded death 
sentence U/S 3/6 of the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 and U/S 
302 PPC, while for the rest of the offences, he was awarded 25 
years R.I with fine and 7 years R.I. with fine on four counts. 
However, the learned Judge of the Special Court did not direct that 
all the sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently according 
to the scheme provided in section 35 Cr.P.C. Now when the death 
sentences have been commuted to life imprisonment, the same 
definitely exceed the human life, the average of which is upto 70/75 
years at the most in Pakistan. In the first round, this Court also 
dismissed all the four appeals of appellant No.2, however, the death 
sentence in case FIR No. 16/1987 and FIR No.17/1987 was altered 
to life imprisonment by the Government of Pakistan.  
5. 
  
On December 22, 2005 a letter was addressed to the 
Registrar of this Court by the Regional Director of Human Rights 
Commission of Balochistan that the sentences of imprisonment 
awarded, would never expire in his life time and the matter be 
brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan.  
6. 
  
After calculation of various sentences of imprisonment 
per jail record, the release of the appellant was cited as 
19.05.2273. However, after hearing the arguments this Court vide 
order dated October 17, 2011 dismissed CMA No.28(Q) of 2006 
along with Human Rights Case No.3078/2006 and Civil Petition 
No.1393/2010.  
7. 
  
With considerable vehemence the learned counsel, 
while relying on the principle laid down in the case of Shah Hussain 
(ibid) and that of Hassan and others (aforementioned), urged that 
after spending many years in Death-Cell, the sentence/sentences 
given 
to 
the 
appellant/appellants 
were 
commuted 
by 
the 
C.A. 482/14 
3
Government of Pakistan to life imprisonment, therefore, the 
expectancy of life has become a strong phenomenon to attract the 
beneficial and fair interpretation of this Court in the above two 
reported judgments to their case.  
 
It is by now well embedded and deeply entrenched universal 
principle of law that while interpreting the provision of punitive law, 
Courts are required to strive in search of an interpretation, which 
prefer the liberty of a person instead of curtailing the same and that 
too unreasonably and unfairly unless, the statutory law clearly 
directs otherwise.  
8. 
  
Besides the provisions of section 35 Cr.P.C. the 
provisions of section 397 Cr.P.C. altogether provide entirely a 
different proposition widening the scope of discretion of the Court to 
direct that sentences of imprisonment or that of life imprisonment 
awarded at the same trial or at two different trials but successively, 
shall run concurrently. Once the Legislation has conferred the above 
discretion in the Court then in hardship cases, Courts are required 
to seriously take into consideration the same to the benefit of the 
accused so that to minimize and liquidate the hardship treatment, 
the accused person is to get and to liquidate the same as far as 
possible. In a situation like the present one, the Court of law cannot 
fold up its hands to deny the benefit of the said beneficial provision 
to an accused person because denial in such a case would amount 
to a ruthless treatment to him/her and he/she would certainly die 
while undergoing such long imprisonment in prison. Thus, the 
benefit conferred upon the appellant/appellants through amnesty 
given by the Government, if the benefit of directing the sentences 
to run concurrently is denied to him/them, would brought at naught 
and ultimately the object of the same would be squarely defeated 
and that too, under the circumstances when the provision of S. 397 
Cr.P.C. confers wide discretion on the Court and unfettered one to 
extend such benefit to the accused in a case of peculiar nature like 
the present one. Thus, construing the beneficial provision in favour 
of the accused would clearly meet the ends of justice and 
interpreting the same to the contrary would certainly defeat the 
same.  
C.A. 482/14 
4
9. 
  
It 
is 
also 
hard 
and 
fast 
principle 
relating 
to 
interpretation of criminal law, which curtails the liberty of a person 
that it should be construed very strictly and even if two equal 
interpretations are possible then the favourable to the accused and 
his liberty must be adopted and preferred upon the contrary one.  
10. 
  
In the cases of Khan Zaman v. The State (1987 SCMR 
1382), Juma Khan v. The State (1986 SCMR 1573) and Muhammad 
Ittafaq v. The State (1986 SCMR 1627) similar benefit was given to 
the accused while construing the provision of section 35(2) Cr.P.C.  
11. 
  
The Peshawar High Court widened this scope on sound 
reasons in the case of Altaf Hussain v. The State [PLJ 1987 Cr.C 
(Peshawar)437] extending the same benefit to an accused, who 
was already undergoing life imprisonment, awarded by the Special 
Military Court and directed that subsequent sentence of 5 years R.I. 
awarded by the Judge Special Court Anti-Corruption shall run 
concurrently with the life imprisonment.  
12. 
  
In this case, the appellants have already undergone all 
the sentences, so awarded and according to the calculation chart, 
provided in the petition, the total period of imprisonment comes to 
214 years and the total amount of fine imposed is Rs.17,20000/- or 
in default thereof to undergo imprisonment for a further period of 
11½ years R.I.  It was argued at the bar that after getting benefit 
of section 382-B Cr.P.C and various remissions, granted by the 
Federal, Provincial Governments and the Jail Authorities, the 
appellant/appellants have undergone sentence of 42 years 07 
month and 21 days on the date, the petition for leave to appeal was 
instituted and the unexpired portion of sentence yet to undergo by 
the appellant/appellants comes to 171 years 04 months and 09 
days. In our view, surely and without any fear of rebuttal, the 
above facts make out the case of detestable hardship, which in no 
circumstances, shall go unnoticed like in the past. Thus, a strong 
case has been made out to extend the prayed concession to the 
appellant/appellants. 
13. 
  
The plea of the learned counsel for the State that 
previously the review petition of the appellant was dismissed, 
therefore, it should be construed as a bar to entertain a second 
review petition being barred by law, is misconceived one. 
C.A. 482/14 
5
 
 We have attended to this plea but it is hardly entertainable 
being bereft of legal grounds and is based on erroneous reasons of 
the law and the rules on the subject because the previous review 
petition was with regard to the commutation of sentence from 
death to life. Even otherwise, for doing substantial justice in a true 
sense in hardship cases like the present one, technicality of law and 
rule shall not operate as an absolute bar in the way of the Court 
because giving preference to the technicality of law would defeat 
substantial justice and denial of justice to a person entitled to it, 
would be worst kind of treatment to be meted out to him and that 
too by the apex Court of the country.  
14. 
  
If the sentences are allowed to run consecutively, the 
appellant/appellants, as earlier discussed, would meet natural death 
during the imprisonment. This undeniable fact was even not 
disputed by the learned counsel for the State. The very object, for 
which the Government of Pakistan commuted the sentences of 
death to life imprisonment and the benefit so accrued to the 
accused would be denied to him/them in this way and that 
concession, thus given, would stand nowhere and may evaporate 
within no time like air bubbles vanish in the air within a twinkle of 
an eye.   
15. 
  
Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and it is directed that 
all the sentences awarded to the appellant/appellants shall run and 
shall 
be 
deemed 
to 
have 
run 
concurrently, 
besides 
the 
appellant/appellants shall have also to get the benefit of section 
382-B Cr.P.C and all the remissions whether granted by the 
Federal, Provincial Governments or the Jail Authorities, shall be 
extended to them.  
 
  
Appeal is allowed.  
 
Judge  
 
 
Judge  
 
 
Judge  
Islamabad, the   
19th September, 2014 
‘Nisar’ 
Approved For Reporting 
