IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
MR. JUSTICE MAQBOOL BAQAR 
 
Civil Appeal Nos. 939/2004, 144-K-145-K of 2009, 
HRC Nos.20691-S of 2013 & 48247-S of 2013 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 29.10.2002 & 04.10.2006, 
respectively passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi & High Court 
of Sindh, Hyderabad Circuit passed in HCA No.114/1993, Const. 
P.D-219 & 337 of 2004)   
 
Dilawar Hussain, etc.  
 
 
 
 
 (In CA 939/2004) 
DDO (Revenue), etc.  
 
 
 
 
       (In CA 144-K/2009) 
DDO (Revenue), etc.  
 
 
 
 
       (In CA 145-K/2009) 
Applications by Dilawar Hussain Rajabali  
 (In HRC 20691-S/2013  
  & HRC 48247-S/2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       … Appellants 
VERSUS 
 
The Province of Sindh & others 
 
 
 
 (In CA 939/2004) 
Shahabuddin Shah 
 
 
 
 
       (In CA 144-K/2009) 
Balocho 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       (In CA 145-K/2009) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 … Respondent(s) 
 
For the Appellant(s): 
 
     Syed Shahenshah Hussain, ASC  
 
 
 
 
 
     (In CA 939/04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     Mr. Adnan Karim, Addl. AG Sindh 
 
 
 
 
 
     Mr. Khair Muhammad, AC Sanghar 
 
 
 
 
 
      (In CA 144-K&145-K/09)  
For the Respondent(s):  
     Mr. Ghulam Mohiuddin Qureshi, ASC 
     Mr. Mazhar Ali B.Chohan, AOR. 
      (In CA 144-K & 145-K/09) 
 
 
 
 
 
     Mr. Adnan Karim, Addl.AG Sindh 
 
 
 
 
 
     Mr. Abdul Ghaffar Sheikh, AC Korangi 
  
 
 
 
 
     Muhammad Ibrahim Junejo, Mukhtiarkar 
 
 
 
 
 
     (In CA 939/04) 
Date of Hearing:  
 
     14.01.2016 
 
* * * * * * * * * * 
 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
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JUDGMENT  
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.- These appeals, by leave of the 
Court, are being disposed of together as the same legal points are 
involved therein. 
Civil Appeal No.939 of 2004: 
2. 
 
The facts in relation to the instant appeal are that the land 
owned by the appellants was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 
1894 (the Act) through notifications under Section 4 thereof dated 
2.2.1960 and 5.3.1960 respectively. The Land Acquisition Collector 
(LAC) announced the award on 17.12.1960 which was assailed by the 
respondents through a reference. The Referee Court enhanced the 
compensation vide judgment dated 27.8.1970. Being dissatisfied with 
the increase in compensation, the appellants approached the learned 
High Court in appeal and further enhancement was accorded to them 
through judgment dated 26.9.1977; and on their appeal before this 
Court compensation was yet further increased vide judgment dated 
18.2.1987. The appellants then filed an execution petition for recovery 
of their dues (enhanced compensation) before the learned High Court (which was 
the executing court) and also for the first time sought additional 
compensation under Section 28-A of the Act, which reads as under:- 
 
“28-A. Additional Compensation.– In addition to the 
compensation fixed on the basis of market value as 
prevailing on the date of notification under Section 4, 
an additional amount of fifteen percent per annum of 
the compensation so fixed shall be paid from the date 
of the notification under Section 4 to the date of 
payment of the compensation.” 
 
The Executing Court vide order dated 31.5.1993 while interpreting the 
provisions of Section 28-A held that it (section) would not apply to past 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 3 :-
and closed transactions. In this context the relevant portion of the order 
reads as:- 
 
“It is, therefore, clear that Section 28-A in the Act, 
introduced through the amendment of 1984 is 
applicable to pending proceedings so long as it does 
not inter-act on past and closed transactions. Still, 
what may, in the present context, be such 
transaction? It would seems to be just and fair and in 
line with the spirit of the amendatory law as regards 
awards, rendered prior to the amendment but pending 
examination at subsequent levels, to say that to the 
extent 
a 
land-owner 
had 
already 
received 
compensation antecedent to the amendment, even 
though under protest, the question of permitting 
solatium on the amount or amounts already so paid, 
before the amendment, be treated as a transaction 
past and no additional payment may accrue following 
upon the amendment on such disbursement of 
compensation, duly paid and received. However, 
where compensation is enhanced and enhanced 
compensation is not received or paid and, during the 
time intervening, the amendatory law has appeared 
on the statutes book any subsequent payment 
including that already due before the amendment but 
not paid would carry a further solatium at the rate of 
15% per annum from the date of notification upto the 
date of actual payment of compensation.” 
 
Aggrieved of the above, the appellants filed an appeal before the High 
Court and the learned Division Bench of the Court held:- 
 
“………………………We are inclined to agree with 
Mr. Sharif that the question of amount of 
compensation payable from the date of Notification 
under 
Section 
4 
till 
the 
entire 
amount 
of 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 4 :-
compensation is determined is a single transaction 
and additional compensation under Section 28-A 
would have to be calculated by bifurcating the unpaid 
amount from that which has already been received by 
the land owner. 
 
…………………………By incorporating Section 28-A, 
the legislature apparently intended to compensate 
such 
land 
owners 
by 
providing 
additional 
compensation and at the same time deter acquiring 
from delaying payment. However, it cannot be 
assumed that it permitted a owner to take a premium 
on the basis of the entire amount of compensation 
inclusive to amounts already pocketed by him. It may 
also be noticed that the legislature has not used the 
expression “final payments” and in a given case 
there could be several dates of payments of different 
amounts falling short of the payments to be made 
upon final determination. 
 
…………………………For the foregoing reasons, we 
dismiss the Appeal directing the parties that the 
Appellants were entitled to receive the additional 
compensation under Section 28-A for the unpaid 
amount of the compensation from the date of 
notification under Section 4 of the Act till the final 
payment of the compensation is made to the 
Appellants. There will be no orders as to costs.” 
 
Leave in this case was granted vide order dated 28.7.2004 primarily to 
consider whether:- 
 
“…………………………the petitioners would be 
entitled, in view of the above said provision of law, 
to claim benefit of additional compensation under 
the ibid Act on the entire amount of compensation 
from the date of notification issued under Section 4 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 5 :-
of the Land Acquisition Act till final payment of 
compensation is made to the petitioners or only on 
the amount of compensation which was not paid 
upto the time of promulgation of Ordinance 
No.XXIII of 1984?”. 
 
3. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that the 
language of Section 28-A leaves no room for doubt that the additional 
compensation is payable from the date of notification under Section 4 of 
the Act till the date of the payment of compensation. He states that to 
interpret the section in a manner whereby the compensation shall only 
be payable on the unpaid amount is not a valid construction of the said 
section; this is tantamount to reading into the provision which cannot 
be done as the provision is clear and the rule of literal interpretation of 
statutes should be resorted to rather than looking into the intent of the 
legislature. He states that the person whose land is acquired is ipso jure 
entitled to compensation as per the provisions of Section 34 of the Act 
with regard to interest and thus the additional amount of compensation 
under Section 28-A is also available to him as a matter of right. He 
relies on the Construction of Statutes (1940) by Crawford, Government 
of Sindh and 2 others Vs. Syed Shakir Ali Jafri and 6 others (1996 
SCMR 1361), Province of Sindh through Collector of District Dadu 
and others Vs. Ramzan and others (PLD 2004 SC 512), and Land 
Acquisition Officer and Assistant Commissioner, Hyderabad Vs. Gul 
Muhammad through Legal Heirs (PLD 2005 SC 311). 
4. 
 
Learned Additional Advocate General, Sindh has submitted 
that the provisions of Section 28-A do not have any retrospective effect. 
As the award was announced on 17.12.1960 and the appellant had 
already received a substantial amount of compensation before the 
enforcement of the said section, therefore, he could not ask for a 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 6 :-
premium over the amount so received. He submitted that Section 28-A 
was challenged before the learned Federal Shariat Court and was 
declared repugnant to the injunctions of Islam vide judgment reported 
as In re: The Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) (PLD 1992 FSC 398) 
and pursuant thereto the law was repealed by virtue of the Land 
Acquisition (Sindh Amendment) Act, 2009 (Act XVI of 2010)1 (the 
“repealing Act”).  
5. 
 
Heard. Before considering the plea(s) raised by the learned 
counsel for the appellants, we deem it proper to dilate upon the 
submission of the learned Additional Advocate General about the 
declaration of Section 28-A as against the injunctions of Islam, its 
repeal and effect thereof. The provisions of the Act came under scrutiny 
before the Federal Shariat Court, in its suo moto jurisdiction, to 
consider whether those were in accordance with the injunctions of 
Islam and the Court vide judgment dated 27.3.1984 made some 
declarations and recommendations with regard to bringing the said law 
in conformity with Islamic principles and one of the recommendations 
stated:- 
 
“In addition to the compensation fixed on the basis 
of market value as prevailing on the date of 
notification under section 4, an amount of 15% per 
annum shall be paid as additional compensation to 
the person found entitled to compensation from the 
date of notification under section 4 to the date of 
payment of compensation.” 
 
It is pursuant to the above that Section 28-A was inserted in the Act 
vide Land Acquisition (Sind Amendment) Ordinance XXIII of 1984 
notified in the Gazette of Sindh on 30.9.1984. However, the aforesaid 
                                       
1 PLD Unreported Statutes, 2010 Sindh Statutes page 97. 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 7 :-
judgment of the Federal Shariat Court was assailed before the Shariat 
Appellate Bench of this Court and the judgment was set aside. 
Thereafter, the Federal Shariat Court took up the matter for 
reconsideration and vide its judgment dated 30.4.1992 specifically 
declared Section 28-A as violative of Islamic injunctions. The relevant 
portion of the said judgment reads as under:- 
 
“34. In this respect, it is also noticeable that the 
Government of Balochistan as well as the 
Government of Sindh by Act XIII of 1985 amended 
on 9-10-1985 and Sindh Ordinance XXIII of 1984 as 
amended on 30-9-1984 respectively, the Land 
Acquisition Act, 1894, in pursuance of the decision 
dated 27-3-1984 of this Court, a new section 28-A 
was 
added 
which 
provided 
for 
additional 
compensation in the following words:-- 
 
“28-A. Additional compensation.---In addition to the 
compensation fixed on the basis of market 
value as prevailing on the date of 
notification under section 4, an additional 
amount of fifteen per cent per annum of the 
compensation so fixed shall be paid from the 
date of the notification under section 4 to the 
date of payment of the compensation.” 
 
We are afraid, the above provision in the 
Balochistan Act XIII of 1985, and Sindh Ordinance 
XXIII of 1984 is not sustainable in the light of the 
Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Qur’an 
and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (p.b.u.h.) as 
discussed in the judgment on Riba, referred to 
above. Even otherwise, in view of the setting aside of 
this Court’s judgment dated 27-3-1984 by the 
Shari’at Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court the 
earlier judgment of this Court does not hold the field 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 8 :-
and the view having not been adopted by us in our 
present judgment, Sindh Ordinance XXIII of 1984 
and Balochistan Act XIII of 1985 call for their 
repeal, which also stand nullified by the judgment of 
the Supreme Court, referred to above.” 
 
Pursuant to the above, Section 28-A was repealed by the repealing Act, 
mentioned above, which reads as under:- 
 
“4. Omission of Section 28-A of Act No.I of 1894.--- 
In the said Act, section 28-A shall be omitted and 
shall be deemed to have been so omitted as if it 
had never been enacted.”   
 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
It is evident that repeal of Section 28-A ibid is a departure from the 
normal words employed to repeal the provisions of law. Why is this so? 
Perhaps because the amendment was not brought about by the 
Provincial Assembly on its own, but rather on the recommendation of 
the Federal Shariat Court, which judgment as mentioned above was set 
aside by the Shariat Appellate Bench of this Court and thereafter the 
Federal Shariat Court itself declared that amendment a nullity. Besides, 
there is the use of ‘deeming’ terminology whereby a legal fiction is 
created and secondly there is a retrospectivity given to the repeal of said 
section in that it is to be treated as it had never been enacted i.e. we are 
required to go back to a point of time viz 1984 and imagine that Section 
28-A had never been brought into effect. As opposed to this unique 
repeal of said section we must consider the effects of Article 264 of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (the Constitution) 
which is couched in identical terms as Section 6 of the General Clauses 
Act, 1897. Article 264 of the Constitution is reproduced herein below:- 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 9 :-
“264. Effect of repeal of laws.− Where a law is 
repealed, or is deemed to have been repealed, by, 
under, or by virtue of the Constitution, the repeal 
shall not, except as otherwise provided in the 
constitution,- 
 
(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the 
time at which the repeal takes effect;  
 
(b) affect the previous operation of the law or 
anything duly done or suffered under the law; 
 
(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability 
acquired, accrued or incurred under the law; 
 
(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment 
incurred in respect of any offence committed against 
the law; or 
 
(e) affect any investigation legal proceeding or 
remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, 
obligation, 
liability, 
penalty, 
forfeiture 
or 
punishment;  
 
and any such investigation, legal proceeding or 
remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, 
and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may 
be imposed, as if the law had not been repealed.” 
 
In the normal course of our jurisprudence when a provision of law is 
repealed protection is accorded to the previous operation of the repealed 
enactment and to those rights which may have accrued under the 
enactment so repealed. However, in these unique circumstances the 
question arises whether the appellants will be entitled to any 
compensation under the repealed Section 28-A given that the said 
section was repealed in terms of the repealing Act with effect from 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 10 :-
29.10.2009 on which date the appellants were still in the process of 
agitating their rights/claims under Section 28-A and therefore they 
cannot even claim the benefit of a past and closed transaction. In this 
regard we may rely on the case cited as Mehreen Zaibun Nisa Vs. Land 
Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC 397), wherein this 
Court (at page 433) interpreted a deeming clause as under:- 
 
“When a statute contemplates that a state of affairs 
should be deemed to have existed, it clearly 
proceeds on the assumption that in fact it did not 
exist at the relevant time but by a legal fiction we 
are to assume as if it did exist. The classic statement 
as to the effect of a deeming clause is to be found in 
the observations of Lord Asquith in East End 
Dwelling Company Ltd v. Finsbury Borough 
Council (1) namely: 
 
“Where the statute says that you must 
imagine the state of affairs, it does not say 
that having done so you must cause or 
permit your imagination to boggle when it 
comes to the inevitable corollaries of that 
state of affairs.” 
 
In the remarkable 17 member judgment of this Court reported as 
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Ministry of Law, Justice 
and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad Vs. Dr. Mubashir Hassan and 
others (PLD 2012 SC 106) the following question was formulated (at 
page 126):- 
 
“Issue No (iv) Whether the effect of repeal of an 
Ordinance or law in terms of Article 264 of the 
Constitution and section 6 of the General Clauses 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 11 :-
Act is the same as that of an Ordinance or law being 
declared non est and null and void.” 
 
The earlier judgment of this Court reported as Jannat-ul-Haq and 2 
others Vs. Abbas Khan and 8 others (2001 SCMR 1073) was quoted 
with approval wherein, inter alia, it was held (at page 1081):- 
 
“……………………Similarly operation of a law 
declared to be repugnant to the Injunctions of 
Qur’an and Sunnah or anything done or suffered 
thereunder before a specified date or continuation of 
suits pending on the specified date also does not 
amount to the repeal of law…………………………” 
 
The judgment of the Peshawar High Court reported as Muhammad 
Iqbal and 17 others Vs. Ghaunsullah Khan and 17 others (2002 CLC 
1533) was also reproduced with approval, wherein it was held (at page 
1537):- 
 
“7. 
A perusal of the abovequoted provisions of 
the Constitution and the General Clauses Act would 
reveal that the expression “ceased to have effect” 
cannot be held synonymous with repeal as is 
envisioned by Article 264 of the Constitution and 
section 6 of the General Clauses Act. In the former 
eventuality even pending cases cannot be dealt 
with in accordance with the law which has 
been so held repugnant to the Injunctions of 
Islam and ceases to have effect after the date 
mentioned in the decision while in the latter 
eventuality a proceeding pending in a Court or 
any 
such 
right, 
privilege, 
obligation 
or 
liability, acquired, accrued or incurred under 
any enactment so repealed are fully protected 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 12 :-
unless a different intention appears from 
repealing enactment.” 
 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
In the present circumstances, the Federal Shariat Court found the 
provisions of the Section 28-A to be repugnant to the Injunctions of 
Islam. The preamble of the repealing Act states that the Federal Shariat 
Court has directed that certain amendments be made to the Act in its 
application to the Province of Sindh. The plain words of section 4 of the 
repealing Act indicate the intention of the legislature that this Section 
28-A is non est and therefore as per the ratio of the Dr. Mubashir 
Hassan case (supra) the appellants cannot be granted the benefit of 
Section 28-A as claimed in the instant appeal. It is settled law that 
appeal is a continuation of the original lis and therefore there is no past 
and closed transaction which may have afforded them protection in the 
event of the Section 28-A being declared to have “never been enacted”. 
But as this point has not been taken into consideration by the forums 
below, and this too is not a point on which leave was granted, therefore, 
we do not intend to refuse this appeal on the above score alone. 
6. 
 
As the case has been argued at length before us we are 
minded to give our opinion as to the scope of Section 28-A had it been 
applicable to the appellants. The object of Section 28-A has been 
explained in the judgment reported as Syed Saadi Jafri Zainabi Vs. 
Land Acquisition Collector and Assistant Commissioner (PLD 1992 
SC 472) in the following terms:- 
 
“7. 
A perusal of section 28-A will show that it is 
mandatory in nature and provides for additional 
compensation from the date of publication of 
notification under section 4 to the date of payment 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 13 :-
of compensation. The main purpose of making this 
provision is to discourage the tendency to delay the 
payment of compensation in time and to ensure that 
the party whose property has been acquired, is duly 
compensated without unnecessary loss of time. It is 
the duty of the Collector that on making an award 
under section 11 he should tender payment of the 
compensation awarded by him to person entitled to 
it according to the award unless he is prevented by 
any reason provided in section 31. In case the party 
is not available or does not consent to receive, the 
Collector shall deposit the amount of compensation 
in the Court to which a reference under section 18 
would be submitted. Therefore, after the award has 
been made there should be no delay in making 
payment or depositing the compensation in the 
Court.” 
 
7. 
 
Now, attending to the arguments of the learned counsel for 
the appellants that by applying the rule of literal interpretation due 
effect to Section 28-A be given and the appellants be allowed additional 
compensation on the enhanced amount assessed by the Courts 
(Referee/Appellate Courts), suffice it to say that the plain wording of said 
section does not stipulate that the additional compensation is to be 
paid even in cases where the enhancement has been made by the 
Courts. Obviously in such a situation where a section cannot be given 
its due effect while reading its plain word(s); the cardinal principle of 
interpretation is to be resorted to which has two intertwined aspects: 
one, the wording of the statute itself; and second, the purpose of the 
enactment. Thus the question before us is whether the object and 
purpose of the amendment (insertion of Section 28-A ibid) in the Act and the 
intention of the legislature in respect of the amendment should be given 
precedence or whether the provision should be given effect through a 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 14 :-
literal construction. Where the language of the section is ambiguous, is 
the Court barred from examining it in order to discover its true purpose 
and intent (especially where the provision has been brought into the statute through an 
amendment)? Construction of Statutes (1940) by Crawford, relied upon by 
the learned counsel for the appellants in support of a literal 
interpretation,  actually encourages a discernment of the purpose of the 
statute and the intention of the legislature; the relevant extract reads as 
follows:- 
 
“Since the purpose of construction is to ascertain 
the legislative intent, this constitutes the major step 
in the process of interpreting statutes…ascertaining 
the intention of the legislature forms the very heart 
of the interpretative process………………………The 
first source from which the legislative intent is 
to be sought is the words of the statute. Then 
an examination should be made of the context, 
and the subject matter and purpose of the 
enactment.” 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
In the case reported as Union of India Vs. Sankalchand Himatlal 
Sheth and another (AIR 1977 SC 2328) (5 member bench) at paragraphs 
11 and 55 it has been held as under:- 
 
“11. 
The normal rule of interpretation is that the 
words used by the legislature are generally a safe 
guide to its intention……………………………But if 
the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the 
sense that they can reasonably bear more than one 
meaning, that is to say, if the words are semantically 
ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is 
patently incompatible with the other provisions of 
that instrument, the court would be justified in 
construing the words in a manner which will make 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
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the particular provision purposeful. That, in essence 
is the rule of harmonious construction. In M. 
Pentiah v. Veeramallappa, AIR 1961 SC 1107 at p. 
1115 this Court observed: 
 
"Where the language of a statute, in its 
ordinary meaning and grammatical construction 
leads to, a manifest contradiction of the apparent 
purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience 
or absurdity, hardship or injustice presumably not 
intended, a construction may be put upon it which 
modifies the meaning of the words, and even the 
structure of the sentence………………………” 
 
…………………………In the view which I am 
disposed to take, it is unnecessary to dwell upon 
Lord Denning's edict in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. 
v. Asher (1949) 2 All ER 155 at p. 164 that when a 
defect appears in a statute, a Judge cannot simply 
fold his hands and blame the draftsman, that he must 
supplement the written word so as to give force and 
life to the intention of the legislature and that he 
should ask himself the question how, if the makers of 
the Act had themselves come across the particular 
ruck in the texture of it, they would have 
straightened it out. I may only add, though even that 
does not apply, that Lord Denning wound up by 
saying, may be not by way of recanting, that “a 
Judge must not alter the material of which the Act is 
woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.” 
 
“…………………………language at best is an 
imperfect medium of expression and a variety of 
significations may often lie in a word of 
expression…………………………It was said by Mr. 
Justice Holmes in felicitous language in Towne v. 
Eisner (1917) 245 US 418 that “a word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 16 :-
a living thought and may vary greatly in colour and 
content according to the circumstances and the time 
in which it is used". The words used in a statute 
cannot be read in isolation: their colour and content 
are derived from their context and, therefore, every 
word in a statute must be examined in its context. 
And when I use word ‘context’, I mean it in its 
widest sense “as including not only other enacting 
provisions of the same statute but its preamble, the 
existing state of the law, other statutes in pari 
materia and the mischief which-the statute was 
intended to remedy". The context is of the greatest 
importance in the interpretation of the words used in 
a statute. "It is quite true" pointed out by Judge 
Learned Hand in Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F 2d 809 
"that as the articulation of a statute increases, the 
room for interpretation must contract; but the 
meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the 
separate words, as a melody is more than the notes, 
and no degree of particularity can ever obviate 
recourse to the setting in which all appear, and 
which all collectively create." Again, it must be 
remembered that though the words used are the 
primary, and ordinarily the most reliable, source of 
interpreting the meaning of any writing, be it a 
statute, a contract, or anything else, it is one of the 
surest indexes of a mature and developed 
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the 
dictionary, but to remember that a statute always 
has some purpose or object to accomplish, whose 
sympathetic and imaginative discovery, is the surest 
guide to its meaning. The literal construction should 
not obsess the Court, because it has only prima facie 
preference, the real object of interpretation being to 
find out the true intent of the law maker and that can 
be done only by reading the statute as an organic 
whole, with each part throwing light on the other 
and bearing in mind the rule in Heydon's case 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
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(1854) 76 ER 637 which requires four things to be 
"discerned and considered" in arriving at the real 
meaning : (1) what was the law before the Act was 
passed; (2) what was the mischief or defect for 
which the law had not provided; (3) what remedy 
Parliament has appointed; and (4) the reason of the 
remedy. There is also another rule of interpretation 
which is equally well settled and which seems to 
follow as a necessary corollary, namely, where the 
words, according to their literal meaning – 
“produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or 
inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that 
the intention could not have been to use them in 
their ordinary signification”, the Court would be 
justified 
in 
"putting 
on 
them 
some 
other 
signification, which, though less proper, is one 
which the Court thinks the words will bear.” Vide 
River War Comrs v. Adamson, (1877) 2 AC 743.” 
 
More recently, “The Judge in a Democracy” by Aharon Barak2 sets out 
the merits of purposive construction which ought to consider the 
context of the statute as well as principles, values, and the 
fundamental views of society rather than a literal or textual 
interpretation of a statute. 
An analysis of the cases of Syed Shakir Ali Jafri (supra), 
Ramzan (supra) and Gul Muhammad (supra) does not support any 
enunciation of law wherefrom it can be said that some bar or fetter has 
been placed upon the court in interpreting the said provision by seeking 
out its object and purpose whilst also taking into account its literal 
meaning. 
8. 
 
In fact, a purposive approach in interpretation has been 
approved and employed to achieve the intent of the legislature while 
                                       
2 2006 Edition, Chapter 5. 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 18 :-
interpreting certain provisions of the Constitution in the cases reported 
as Messrs Gadoon Textile Mills and 814 others Vs. WAPDA and 
others (1997 SCMR 641), Rana Aamer Raza Ashfaq and another Vs. 
Dr. Minhaj Ahmad Khan and another (2012 SCMR 6), Province of 
Sindh through Chief Secretary and others Vs. MQM through Deputy 
Convener and others (PLD 2014 SC 531) and Dr. Raja Aamer Zaman 
Vs. Omar Ayub Khan and others (2015 SCMR 1303). In Gadoon 
Textile Mills (supra) it has been stated: 
 
“To interpret is to understand. For a purposive 
construction of the statutory and constitutional 
provisions, the courts now freely make use of their 
parliamentary history, policy statements of the 
movers of the Bills and the concerned ministers in 
particular. That is interpreting the constitutional 
provisions in light of the well-known circumstances 
that produced them. Even in England, the historic 
rule that the court must not look at the 
parliamentary history of legislation as an aid to the 
interpretation of a statute has been recently relaxed 
in Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart (1993) 1 ALL 
ER 42).” 
 
In Reference No.01 of 2012 (PLD 2013 SC 279) this Court opined:- 
 
 
 
 
“34. 
The function of the Court, while interpreting 
the statute, is to discover the true legislative intent. 
Having ascertained the intention, the Court must 
strive to interpret the statute as to promote/advance 
the object and purpose of the enactment. For this 
purpose, where necessary, the Court may even 
depart from the rules that plain words should be 
interpreted 
according 
to 
their 
plain 
meaning………………………” 
 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 19 :-
It is also a fundamental rule of interpretation that while interpreting an 
amended provision, the object and purpose of the amendment must 
necessarily be looked into, as has been done by this Court in the case 
reported as Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance and 
others Vs. M/s Noori Trading Corporation (Private) Limited and 14 
others (1992 SCMR 710). In this context Crawford propounds as 
follows:- 
 
“………………………..in construing the amended 
statute, the court should consider the change sought 
to be affected by the legislature. The amendatory act 
should be construed in relation to the condition 
created by the amended act as well as the objects 
and purposes of the act itself as therein defined. In 
short, regard must be had for the law as it was 
before being amended, and the amendatory act 
should be construed to repress the evils under the 
old law and to advance the remedy provided by the 
amendment.” 
 
The “cardinal rule of construction of statutes” (which as we observe below 
encompasses the purposive rule of interpretation) was explicitly referred to by this 
Court in the judgment reported as Mumtaz Hussain Vs. Dr. Nasir 
Khan and others (2010 SCMR 1254) wherein it was held as under:- 
 
“…………………………while interpreting an Act, 
the intent of the Legislature is of supreme 
importance. The cardinal rule of the construction of 
Acts of Parliament is that the words of the Act 
should be construed according to the intention 
expressed in the Acts themselves. The word “intent” 
essentially include two concepts – that of purpose 
and that of meaning. In many cases, the Court will 
endeavour to ascertain the legislative purpose but, 
only as a step in the process of discovering the 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 20 :-
legislative intent. And it is perhaps possible that the 
legislative intent and legislative purpose may 
coincide. Moreover, so far as legislation is 
concerned, the law maker may have several 
purposes in mind when they enact a given law. The 
fact which can be taken into account in ascertaining 
the intention of the Legislature is the history of the 
Act, the reason which led to the passing of the Act, 
the mischief which had to be cured, as well as the 
cure proposed and also other provisions of the 
Statute.” 
 
(Note: We may, however, find that the same Hon’ble 
Judge in a subsequent part of his opinion seems to have 
departed from the above view)  
 
Reference may be made with good effect to the case cited as Oliver 
Ashworth (Holdings) Ltd. Vs. Ballard (Kent) Ltd ([1999] 2 All ER 
791) wherein it has been stated by Law, LJ: 
 
“By way of introduction to the issue of statutory 
construction I should say that in my judgment it is 
nowadays misleading—and perhaps it always was—
to seek to draw a rigid distinction between literal 
and purposive  approaches to the interpretation of 
Acts of Parliament. The difference between 
purposive and literal construction is in truth one of 
degree only. On received doctrine we spend our 
professional lives construing legislation purposively, 
inasmuch as we are enjoined at every turn to 
ascertain the intention of Parliament. The real 
distinction lies in the balance to be struck, in the 
particular case, between the literal meaning of the 
words on the one hand and the context and purpose 
of the measure in which they appear on the other. 
Frequently there will be no opposition between the 
two, and then no difficulty arises. Where there is a 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 21 :-
potential clash, the conventional English approach 
has been to give at least very great and often 
decisive weight to the literal meaning of the enacting 
words. This is a tradition which I think is weakening, 
in face of the more purposive approach enjoined for 
the interpretation of legislative measures of the 
European Union and in light of the House of Lords' 
decision in Pepper v. Hart [1993] A.C. 593. I will 
not here go into the details or merits of this shift of 
emphasis; save broadly to recognise its virtue and 
its vice. Its virtue is that the legislator's true purpose 
may be more accurately ascertained. Its vice is that 
the certainty and accessibility of the law may be 
reduced or compromised. The common law, which 
regulates the interpretation of legislation, has to 
balance these considerations.” 
 
The cardinal principle of construction entails two features: (i) meaning, 
and (ii) object and purpose.  “Meaning” refers to what the precise words 
of the statute [or its particular provision(s)] denote whereas “object and 
purpose” refers to the reason, rationale, objective, aim, underlying 
principle, or raison d'être of the statute. Thus, such interpretive 
approach necessarily combines both the literal and purposive approach 
in discerning the legislative intent. That is to say, the intention of the 
legislature is discovered, determined and understood by bearing in 
mind the meaning of the words used in the statute, while taking into 
consideration the purpose and object of the statute and also the 
mischief which the statute sought to curb.3 
9. 
 
Clearly, the intent of the legislature carries significant weight 
for purposes of construing Section 28-A. In the light of the object and 
purpose of the said section mentioned above (Syed Saadi Jafri Zainabi’s case), 
                                       
3 See AIR 2007 SC 1563 and AIR 2001 SC 724 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 22 :-
and also the history as to how and why this amendment was brought 
about, it is not a provision simpliciter which can be said to provide 
compensation to the persons whose land has been acquired as 
compulsory charges or interest which are provided under other sections 
of the Act (see Section 34 of the Act); rather this enactment prescribes an 
inducement to compel the acquiring agency to make prompt payment of 
the amount of compensation assessed. In other words, this provision 
does not provide an additional premium for the benefit of the land 
owner. Obviously as an “inducing” provision it has to be given a narrow 
effect; it is to be limited to the extent of the amount which has not so 
far been paid to the land owners (i.e. only payable on the outstanding amount). In 
the above context, various scenarios may arise, for instance, where the 
amount of compensation has been assessed by the LAC but payment is 
not made within reasonable time on that assessment; the land owner 
shall be entitled to compensation at the rate provided under Section 28-
A from the date of issuance of the notification under Section 4 till the 
final payment is made. On the other hand, where partial payment is 
made promptly and some amount is left outstanding; in such 
eventuality, compensation would only co-relate to the amount unpaid. 
However, as mentioned earlier this amount shall not ipso jure be given 
to the land owner from the date of notification till the date of payment of 
the balance amount on the entire amount including the portion which 
has been received by him. Therefore we do not find any merit in this 
appeal which is accordingly dismissed. 
 
Civil Appeal Nos.144-K- & 145-K of 2009 
10.  
The facts of these cases are that the land of the respondents 
was acquired and the award was passed by the LAC on 5.12.1992. 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 23 :-
Being satisfied with the compensation so granted, they accepted the 
same and did not challenge it. However, on 8.9.2004 a constitutional 
petition was filed by the respondents before the learned High Court 
seeking additional compensation as per the provisions of Section 28-A 
ibid. This was allowed by the learned High Court through the impugned 
judgment dated 4.10.2006. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the 
appellants approached this Court and leave was granted vide order 
dated 11.06.2009 to consider:- 
 
“whether respondents’ constitutional petitions were 
not hit by the principle of laches.” 
 
11.  
The learned Additional Advocate General argued that the 
writ petition filed by the respondents was hit by laches, that it was a 
past and closed transaction and that the claim of the respondents was 
barred under the law and such bar could not be surmounted by 
invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the learned High Court. It is 
submitted that the rule of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver come in 
the way of the respondents as they had already accepted the amount of 
compensation awarded by the LAC and failed to challenge the same till 
14 years later.  
12.  
Answering the above, learned counsel for the respondents 
states that there is no estoppel against law; that the respondents were 
entitled to the additional compensation under the clear terms and 
mandate of Section 28-A; that it was the duty of the appellants to pay 
the compensation and thus, in order to seek enforcement of such a 
duty, the respondents could validly invoke the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the High Court in terms of Article 199 of the 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 24 :-
compensation had been awarded to an aggrieved person, the matters 
were brought to this Court and either they were not pressed or in some 
cases the Court declined relief to them. The respondents rely upon the 
case reported as Niaz Muhammad and others Vs. Assistant 
Commissioner/Collector, Quetta and others (2005 SCMR 394).       
13.  
Heard. While deciding Civil Appeal No.939 of 2004 above, we 
have held that the land owner shall not be entitled to receive additional 
compensation for the amount already received and that Section 28-A 
ibid would only be attracted to those cases where some amount 
remained unpaid/outstanding on account of delay by the acquiring 
authority. In these matters (Civil Appeal Nos.144-K- & 145-K of 2009) the 
respondents never claimed that some amount of the original 
compensation was outstanding on the basis of which they became 
entitled to receive the compensation in terms of Section 28-A. Besides, 
the doctrine of past and closed transaction comes in their way which 
(doctrine) has been adopted and applied in a catena of judgments 
including 
those 
reported 
as 
Pakistan 
International 
Airlines 
Corporation Vs. Aziz-Ur-Rehman Chaudhry and another (2016 
SCMR 14), Waris Vs. Muhammad Sarwar (2014 SCMR 1025) and 
Trustees of the Port of Karachi Vs. Organization of Karachi Port 
Trust Workers and others (2013 SCMR 238) in refusing to re-open or 
interfere with such transactions as they stood concluded.  
14.  
If the respondents thought they were entitled to the 
additional amount of compensation as per Section 28-A they should 
have moved the Collector to give them such compensation and this 
could have been done within the time prescribed by law and if not so 
prescribed, within a reasonable period of time. Likewise, the 
respondents could also have invoked the plenary jurisdiction of the Civil 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 25 :-
Court for the recovery of that amount within the prescribed period of 
limitation; the maximum period in this regard, if no other article of the 
Limitation Act, 1908 was attracted, was six years from the date of the 
award. Further, if they were not advised to file a civil suit they could 
have directly invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court 
within reasonable time if it was so permissible under the law. None of 
this was done. In fact, the respondents kept silent and slept over their 
rights for over fourteen years whereafter they decided to invoke the 
constitutional jurisdiction of the learned High Court directly which is 
discretionary in nature. We are not persuaded to hold that in these 
circumstances the rule of past and closed transaction as mentioned 
above is not attracted to the instant matters. The rule of laches (the point 
on which leave was granted) is/was duly attracted to the matter in hand 
because the petitioners (before the learned High Court) (respondents in CA 
No.144-K and 145-K/2009) have been unable to explain as to what steps they 
took to ascertain and agitate their right on the basis of the Section 28-A 
ibid before the competent authority before the filing of the constitutional 
petition. In the case of S. Sharif Ahmed Hashmi Vs. The Chairman, 
Screening Committee, Lahore and another (1980 SCMR 711) a four 
member bench of this Court refused to condone the delay of twelve 
years in approaching the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court 
and held that the case was squarely hit by the doctrine of laches. In the 
absence of any explanation as to why the rule of laches should not be 
duly applied the discretionary relief of issuance of a writ as envisaged 
by Article 199 of the Constitution should not have been granted, 
especially when the claim of the respondents to enforce their right 
under Section 28-A in the ordinary course before the LAC and the Court 
of plenary jurisdiction was barred by limitation. With regard to the 
Civil Appeal Nos.939/04, 144-K-145-K/09 etc. 
-: 26 :-
submission on behalf of the respondent that as it was the legal duty of 
the appellants to pay the amount under Section 28-A thus, for 
enforcing such duty and the right of the respondent neither rule of 
laches could be attracted nor the principles of estoppel could be 
resorted to, it may be mentioned that the discretionary relief in the 
nature of a writ cannot be granted to compel the appellants to perform 
its duty in favour of persons who are so indolent in matters relating to 
enforcement of their rights that they slept over the same for more than 
fourteen years and whose remedy in normal course was time-barred, as 
such, discretion is not exercisable in favour of those who slumber on 
their rights.. In light of the above, these appeals are allowed and the 
impugned judgments are set aside.  
 
HRC Nos.20691-S of 2013 & 48247-S of 2013 
 
15.  
As the main appeals stand decided, these cases are 
accordingly disposed of. 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in Open Court 
on 21.3.2016 at Karachi 
Approved For Reporting 
Ghulam Raza/* 
 
 
JUDGE 
