IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Sardar Tariq Masood 
 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
(Against the judgment dated 09.03.2007 passed by the Peshawar 
High Court, Abbottabad Bench in Criminal Revision No. 27 of 
2006) 
 
 
Tariq Mehmood 
…Appellant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
versus 
 
Naseer Ahmed, etc. 
 
  
 
 
     …Respondents 
 
 
For the appellant: 
Mr. Mushtaq Ali Tahirkheli, ASC 
 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR  
 
For respondent No. 1: 
Nomo.  
 
For the State: 
Mian 
Arshad 
Jan, 
Additional 
Prosecutor-General, 
Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa 
 
Date of hearing: 
 
 
26.01.2016 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.: The issue in this case is 
whether or not compounding of a criminal offence at the stage of 
bail can still be given effect to at the stage of trial when at the stage 
of trial the compounding has been resiled from by one of the 
parties. We have found that the precedent cases on the subject 
available thus far have not stated the legal position in this respect 
quite clearly and, therefore, we have decided to make an effort to 
remove all ambiguities confounding the issue and to state the 
correct legal position as lucidly as we can.     
 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
2
 
2. 
The necessary facts giving rise to the present appeal are that 
Tariq Mehmood appellant is an accused person in case FIR No. 105 
registered at Police Station Narra, District Abbottabad on 
25.08.2005 for an offence under section 302, PPC in respect of an 
alleged murder of one Safeer Ahmed. The said FIR had been lodged 
by Naseer Ahmed complainant who is a brother of Safeer Ahmed 
deceased. Apprehending his arrest in connection with this case the 
appellant applied for pre-arrest bail before the learned Sessions 
Judge, Abbottabad on 03.09.2005 and the appellant’s application 
was marked to the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, 
Abbottabad who admitted the appellant to ad-interim pre-arrest 
bail. During the pendency of that application a compromise deed 
was executed on 12.09.2005 and the same was signed by Naseer 
Ahmed complainant and a respectable person of the area wherein 
it had been stated that the heirs of Safeer Ahmed deceased had no 
objection to confirmation of the appellant’s ad-interim pre-arrest 
bail or to his acquittal in the main case. On the basis of the said 
compromise deed an application was filed by Naseer Ahmed 
complainant before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, 
Abbottabad on 28.10.2015 requesting for recording of statements 
of the heirs of Safeer Ahmed deceased through a Commission for 
confirming the factum of compromise between the parties and on 
the same date the said application was allowed by the learned 
Additional Sessions Judge-II, Abbottabad and a local Advocate was 
appointed as the Commission. On 29.10.2005 the Commission 
recorded a joint statement of the heirs of Safeer Ahmed deceased 
and in that statement the heirs of the deceased maintained that 
they had no objection to confirmation of the appellant’s ad-interim 
pre-arrest bail or to his acquittal. On 31.10.2005 the Commission 
submitted a report before the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, 
Abbottabad and on 12.11.2005 the Commissioner got his 
statement recorded before the said court confirming that the heirs 
of the deceased had no objection to confirmation of the appellant’s 
ad-interim pre-arrest bail but the Commissioner said nothing in 
that statement regarding the heirs of Safeer Ahmed deceased 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
3
having no objection to the appellant’s acquittal in the main case. 
On the same day, i.e. on 12.11.2005 the appellant’s ad-interim 
pre-arrest bail was confirmed by the learned Additional Sessions 
Judge-II, Abbottabad. Upon completion of the investigation of this 
case a Challan (report under section 173, Cr.P.C.) was submitted 
before the Court of Session, Abbottabad on 20.11.2005 and the 
learned Sessions Judge, Abbottabad kept the case to his own court 
for trial. On 28.02.2006 an application was submitted by the 
appellant under section 345(6), Cr.P.C. seeking his acquittal in this 
case on the basis of the compromise already entered into by the 
parties at the stage of bail but on 30.08.2006 the learned Sessions 
Judge, Abbottabad dismissed the said application of the appellant 
because by that time the heirs of the deceased had resiled from the 
compromise. The appellant filed Criminal Revision No. 27 of 2006 
before the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench against the 
said order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Abbottabad but 
the appellant’s revision petition was dismissed by a learned Judge-
in-Chamber of the Peshawar High Court, Abbottabad Bench on 
09.03.2007. Thereafter the appellant filed Criminal Petition No. 
123 of 2007 before this Court wherein leave to appeal was granted 
on 03.07.2013. Hence, the present appeal before this Court.  
 
3. 
In support of this appeal the learned counsel for the 
appellant has submitted that it had never been disputed by any 
party that at the stage of confirmation of the appellant’s ad-interim 
pre-arrest bail by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, 
Abbottabad the heirs of Safeer Ahmed deceased had entered into a 
compromise with the appellant and that they had stated before the 
Commissioner that they had no objection to confirmation of the ad-
interim pre-arrest bail of the appellant besides having no objection 
to his acquittal. According to the learned counsel for the appellant 
once a genuine compromise had been entered into by the heirs of 
the deceased with the appellant and such compromise had also 
partly been acted upon then the heirs of the deceased could not 
thereafter be permitted to resile from the same and such 
compromise enured to the benefit of the appellant even during the 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
4
trial before the trial court for the purpose of seeking acquittal. He 
has maintained that if the application of the appellant for pre-
arrest bail had been decided by the learned Additional Sessions 
Judge-II, Abbottabad then the learned Sessions Judge, Abbottabad 
should not have kept the case of the appellant to his own court for 
trial and the trial of the appellant should also have been marked 
by the learned Sessions Judge, Abbottabad to the learned 
Additional Sessions Judge-II, Abbottabad so that the earlier 
compromise arrived at between the parties could have been given 
effect to by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Abbottabad 
even during the trial. The learned counsel for the appellant has 
pointed out that in the case of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah v. Syed 
Sabir Hussain Shah and others (1998 SCMR 466) a 2-member 
Bench of this Court had declared that a compromise in a criminal 
case entered into at the stage of bail is to enure to the benefit of 
the accused person even at the stage of trial but later on in the 
case of Muhammad Akram v. Abdul Waheed and 3 others (2005 
SCMR 1342) another 2-member Bench of this Court had taken a 
different view of the matter and had declared that a compromise 
entered into between the parties to a criminal case at the stage of 
bail is to have no value at the stage of trial and it is only that 
compromise which has been entered into or is validly subsisting 
during the pendency of the trial which can be accepted by a trial 
court for the purposes of recording acquittal of an accused person. 
The learned counsel for the appellant has maintained that in the 
later case of Muhammad Akram the earlier case of Syed Iftikhar 
Hussain Shah had not even been referred to by this Court and, 
thus, the judgment passed in the case of Muhammad Akram can 
only be treated as per incuriam. As against that the learned 
Additional Prosecutor-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa appearing for 
the State has maintained that the case of Muhammad Akram 
decided subsequently by this Court had proceeded on the correct 
legal lines and the same had been followed by the Peshawar High 
Court, Abbottabad Bench in the case in hand and, thus, there is 
hardly any occasion for this Court to set aside the impugned 
judgment passed by the High Court.  
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
5
 
4. 
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, going 
through the record of the case and attending to the precedent 
cases available on the subject we have observed that the matter of 
resiling from a compromise in a criminal case has been a subject of 
some controversy in different cases decided by different courts in 
the Indo-Pak sub-continent and we have also noticed that the 
actual reasons generating such controversy had never been clearly 
discussed or spelt out in such cases. In the cases of Kumarasami 
Chetty v. Kuppusami Chetty and others (AIR 1919 Madras 879(2)), 
Ram Richpal v. Mata Din and another (AIR 1925 Lahore 159), 
Jhangtoo Barai and another v. Emperor (AIR 1930 Allahabad 409), 
Dharichhan Singh and others v. Emperor (AIR 1939 Patna 141), Mt. 
Rambai w/o Bahadursingh v. Mt. Chandra Kumari Devi (AIR 1940 
Nagpur 181), Godfrey Meeus v. Simon Dular (AIR (37) 1950 Nagpur 
91), Prithvi Bhagat and another v. Birju Sada (AIR 1962 Patna 316), 
Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and another v. Syed Iftikhar Hussain 
Shah and another (1995 MLD 563), Nabi Bakhsh, etc. v. Rehman 
Ali, etc. (PLJ 1999 Cr.C. (Lahore) 721), Barish Ali and 2 others v. 
Chaudhry Mushtaq Ahmed, Additional Sessions Judge Depalpur 
District Okara and 6 others (PLJ 2002 Cr.C. (Lahore) 1009), Mst. 
Maqsooda Bibi v. Amar Javed, etc. (NLR 2003 Criminal 545) and 
Manzoor Ahmed and another v. The State, etc. (NLR 2004 SD 1060) 
it had been held by different High Courts that a compromise 
between the parties to a criminal case, duly entered into and acted 
upon, cannot be allowed to be resiled from by any party and the 
stage at which such compromise had been entered into is 
immaterial. In some of the said cases a compromise entered into 
even at the stages of investigation or bail was not allowed to be 
resiled from at the stage of trial. We have carefully gone through 
the judgments rendered in the said precedent cases and have 
noticed that in the said judgments it had never been clearly 
mentioned or spelt out that the provisions of section 345, Cr.P.C. 
governing the matter of compounding of offences have two distinct 
parts and they pertain to cases which can be compounded without 
the permission of a court and cases in which compounding of the 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
6
offence can be brought about only with the permission of a court. 
It may be advantageous to reproduce the relevant portions of 
section 345, Cr.P.C. for facility of understanding: 
 
345. 
Compounding offences. (1) The 
offences 
punishable 
under the sections of the Pakistan Penal Code specified in the 
first two columns of the table next following may be compounded 
by the persons mentioned in the third column of that table:- 
 
--------------------- 
--------------------- 
 
 
(2) 
The offences punishable under the sections of the 
Pakistan Penal Code specified in the first two columns of the table 
next following may, with the permission of the Court before which 
any prosecution for such offence is pending, be compounded by 
the persons mentioned in the third column of that table:- 
 
--------------------- 
--------------------- 
 
 
(2-A) 
Where an offence under Chapter XVI of the Pakistan Penal 
Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860), has been committed in the name 
or on the pretext of karo kari, siyah kari or similar other customs 
or practices, such offence may be waived or compounded subject 
to such conditions as the Court may deem fit to impose with the 
consent of the parties having regard to the facts and 
circumstances of the case. 
 
 
(3) 
When any offence is compoundable under this section, the 
abetment of such offence or any attempt to commit such offence 
(when such attempt is itself an offence) may be compounded in 
like manner. 
 
 
(4) 
When the person who would otherwise be competent to 
compound an offence under this section is under the age of 
eighteen years or is an idiot or a lunatic, any person competent to 
contract on his behalf may with the permission of the Court 
compound such offence. 
 
 
(5) 
When the accused has been convicted and an appeal is 
pending, no composition for the offence shall be allowed without 
the leave of the Court before which the appeal is to be heard. 
 
 
(5-A) 
A High Court acting in the exercise of its power of revision 
under section 439 and a Court of Session so acting under section 
439-A, may allow any person to compound any offence which he 
is competent to compound under this section.  
 
 
(6) 
The composition of an offence under this section shall 
have the effect of an acquittal of the accused with whom the 
offence has been compounded.  
 
 
(7)  
No offence shall be compounded except as provided by 
this section. 
 
 
Subsection (1) of section 345, Cr.P.C. enlists the offences which 
may be compounded by the specified persons without any 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
7
intervention of any court and in some of the above mentioned 
precedent cases it had been clarified that compounding in such 
cases takes effect from the moment the compromise is completely 
entered into by the parties, the relevant court which is to try the 
offence in issue is left with no jurisdiction to refuse to give effect to 
such a compromise and a party to such a compromise cannot 
resile from the compromise at any subsequent stage of the case. 
On the other hand subsection (2) of section 345, Cr.P.C. deals with 
cases in which the offences specified therein can be compounded 
only with the permission of the court and in all such cases any 
compromise arrived at between the parties on their own at any 
stage is not to take effect at all unless the court permits such 
compromise to be given effect to and the relevant court for the 
purpose is the court before which prosecution for the relevant 
offence is pending. Subsection (5) of section 345, Cr.P.C. goes on to 
provide that when an accused person has been convicted and an 
appeal is pending no composition of the offence can be allowed 
without leave of the court before which the appeal is to be heard 
and subsection (5-A) of section 345, Cr.P.C. provides for a court of 
revisional jurisdiction to allow a person to compound any offence 
which he is competent to compound under section 345, Cr.P.C. 
Subsection (7) of section 345, Cr.P.C. categorically declares that no 
offence can be compounded except as provided by section 345, 
Cr.P.C. It is in this context that the Lahore High Court, Lahore had 
declared in the case of Rana Awais and others v. S.H.O., Police 
Station People’s Colony, Faisalabad and others (2001 P.Cr.L.J. 241) 
that in a case falling in the category of cases specified in 
subsection (2) of section 345, Cr.P.C. any private composition of an 
offence by the parties has no legal value as in such cases the 
offence can only be compounded with the permission of the court 
before which prosecution for the relevant offence is pending. A 
similar view had earlier on been taken in the cases of Naurang Rai 
v. Kidar Nath and another (29 Cr.L.J. 1928), In re M. S. 
Ponnuswamy Ayyar (AIR 1937 Madras 825), Thunki w/o Deoman 
and another v. Bajirao Sitaram Dhoke (AIR 1956 Nagpur 161) and 
State of U.P. v. Nanhey (AIR 1968 Allahabad 394). This was also the 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
8
view clearly taken and expressed by this Court in the case of 
Muhammad Akram v. Abdul Waheed and 3 others (2005 SCMR 
1342). It had been observed by this Court in that case as follows: 
 
“4.  
We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner 
who, inter alia, contended that the Court below had not 
considered the case in its proper perspective and that the 
affidavits filed by the P.Ws. as well as the injured to this effect 
have not been considered; that the compromise once effected is 
binding on the parties and the petitioner is entitled to acquittal 
under section 249-A, C.P.C. 
  
5.  
We have considered the contentions of the learned 
counsel for the petitioner and carefully scanned the record 
available. Admittedly the petitioner was granted bail solely on 
the ground that the complainant party including injured filed 
affidavits in favour of the petitioner; that he may be released on 
bail. Subsequently, after completion of the investigation, police 
submitted charge-sheet against him before the trial Court 
where the case is pending for trial. The trial Court and the 
learned High Court rightly rejected the application of the 
petitioner. 
  
6.  
The impugned judgment is well-reasoned and is entirely 
in accordance with the law, which does not call for any 
interference by this Court. However, for ready reference the 
relevant paragraph of the impugned judgment is reproduced 
below:--- 
  
"(3)  
I have heard the learned counsel for the 
petitioner at length, also have gone through the 
impugned order as also the contents of this 
petition. Under subsection (2) of section 345, 
Cr.P.C. the offences mentioned in the first two 
columns given in the said section may, with the 
permission of the Court before whom any 
prosecution for such offence is pending, be 
compounded by the persons mentioned in the 
third column given thereunder. It is an admitted 
position that compromises were effected during 
the pendency of petition for bail before arrest, 
when the prosecution of the offences was not 
pending before the learned trial Court. Such a 
compromise cannot be made basis for acquittal 
of the petitioner as under section 345(2), Cr.P.C. 
it is the trial Court which has to satisfy itself and 
grant permission to compound the offence being 
tried by it. I find no illegality or jurisdictional 
error in the impugned orders and maintain the 
same. The case-law cited by the learned counsel 
for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts 
and circumstances of this case." 
  
7.  
For the facts, circumstances and reasons stated 
hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the petition 
is without merit and substance, which is hereby dismissed and 
leave declined.” 
  
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
9
5. 
In the present case the offence involved is that under section 
302, PPC which falls squarely within the ambit of subsection (2) of 
section 345, Cr.P.C. and, therefore, a compromise arrived at 
between the parties at the stage of bail, when even the Challan had 
not been submitted before the trial court, could not validly have 
been accepted as a compromise and the trial court could not have 
accepted any such compromise when before the trial court the 
heirs of the deceased were not willing to abide by the earlier 
agreement entered into by them with the present appellant. Apart 
from that there was no verification of the list of heirs of the 
deceased available before the trial court, the heirs of the deceased 
had not appeared before the trial court for getting their statements 
recorded in support of the compromise, the Commissioner before 
whom the heirs of the deceased had acknowledged the factum of 
compromise had not appeared before the trial court and, thus, 
there was no verified, valid or subsisting compromise before the 
trial court for according the requisite permission to compound the 
offence in terms of the requirements of subsection (2) of section 
345, Cr.P.C. If the requirements of subsection (2) of section 345, 
Cr.P.C. did not stand fulfilled then, as expressly forbidden by 
subsection (7) of section 345, Cr.P.C., the trial court could not 
have accepted the application filed by the appellant for his 
acquittal on the basis of the claimed compromise. In this view of 
the matter the impugned judgment passed by the High Court in 
the present case has been found by us to be unexceptionable and 
completely in accord with the provisions of subsection (2) of section 
345, Cr.P.C. read with subsection (7) of section 345, Cr.P.C. 
besides being in line with the law clearly declared by this Court in 
the above mentioned case of Muhammad Akram.  
 
6. 
The learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the 
case of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah v. Syed Sabir Hussain Shah 
and others (1998 SCMR 466) and also to two judgments passed by 
one of us (Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.) as a Judge of the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore in the cases of Manzoor Ahmed and another v. 
The State and 2 others (PLD 2003 Lahore 739) and Mst. Maqsooda 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
10
Bibi v. Amar Javed, etc. (NLR 2003 Criminal 545) to maintain that 
a compromise entered into at the stage of bail is to enure to the 
benefit of the accused person even at the stage of his trial. We note 
that the cases of Manzoor Ahmed and Mst. Maqsooda Bibi had been 
decided by one of us (Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.) at a time when 
the only judgment of this Court holding the field was that handed 
down in the case of Syed Iftikhar Hussain Shah v. Syed Sabir 
Hussain Shah and others (1998 SCMR 466) and in those 
judgments of the High Court the said judgment passed by this 
Court had expressly been referred to and followed. Till that time 
the judgment passed by this Court in the case of Muhammad 
Akram v. Abdul Waheed and 3 others (2005 SCMR 1342) had not 
been rendered and no other view of this Court was available in the 
field. After passage of the judgment by this Court in the case of 
Muhammad Akram the situation had undergone a sea change and, 
thus, the earlier judgments rendered by different High Courts are 
now to be examined or scrutinized on the basis of the law declared 
by this Court in the said case of Muhammad Akram. We find 
ourselves in complete harmony with the legal position declared by 
this Court in the said case and hold that in all cases covered by 
the provisions of subsection (2) of section 345, Cr.P.C. no 
compromise entered into by the parties privately can have any 
legal sanctity or validity vis-à-vis compounding of the relevant 
offence unless the court before which the prosecution for the 
relevant offence is pending grants a formal permission accepting 
the compromise between the parties and in all such cases if no 
prosecution is pending before any court when the compromise is 
entered into and no permission by the trial court is granted to 
compound the offence any compromise privately entered into 
between the parties cannot be accepted as valid compounding as is 
declared by subsection (7) of section 345, Cr.P.C. As regards the 
judgment passed by this Court in the case of Syed Iftikhar Hussain 
Shah v. Syed Sabir Hussain Shah and others (1998 SCMR 466) we 
have noticed that in the said case the injured victim had entered 
into a compromise with the accused person at the stage of bail, in 
furtherance of that compromise the injured victim had received 
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
11
monetary compensation from the accused person and the accused 
person had already been acquitted on the basis of the compromise 
before the matter had reached this Court. In that backdrop this 
Court had held as under:  
 
“It may be true that while accepting revision application, the 
learned Judge in Chambers should have directed the learned 
Sessions Judge to dispose of the case in accordance with law but 
it is submitted before us that the learned Sessions Judge has 
already acquitted the accused in the case which has not been 
challenged by the petitioner. Be that as it may, after reading the 
statement of the petitioner recorded by the learned Additional 
Session Judge while disposing of the pre-arrest bail application of 
respondents, we are in no doubt that a sum of Rs.4,000 was 
received by the petitioner as compensation for settlement of the 
case and as such it is not a fit case in which leave should be 
granted. The order of the learned Judge in Chamber is a just and 
proper order in the circumstances of the case and no case is 
made out for interference with this order. Petition is, accordingly, 
dismissed and leave to appeal is refused.” 
 
It was in those peculiar circumstances of the case that this Court 
had, in exercise of its discretion, refused to interfere in the matter 
of the accused person’s acquittal. The said decision of this Court 
had proceeded on the basis of the peculiar circumstances of that 
case and no declaration of law of general applicability had been 
made by this Court in the judgment passed in the said case. 
 
7. 
It may be relevant to mention here that section 309, PPC 
refers to waiver (afw) of right of Qisas in a case of Qatl-i-amd and 
section 310, PPC mentions compounding (sulh) in a case of Qatl-i-
amd and, thus, an issue may crop up in future that the law 
declared by us through the present judgment in terms of the 
provisions of subsection (2) of section 345, Cr.P.C. relates to 
compounding under section 310, PPC and not to waiver under 
section 309, PPC. We would like to make it clear that it has already 
been clarified by this Court in the case of Zahid Rehman v. The 
State (PLD 2015 SC 77) that the provisions of sections 309 and 
310, PPC are relevant only to cases of Qisas and not to cases of 
Ta’zir and a case is to be a case of Qisas only where the provisions 
of section 304, PPC stand attracted, i.e. where the accused person 
confesses his guilt before the trial court or where Tazkiya-tul-
Criminal Appeal No. 135 of 2013 
12
shahood of the witnesses is conducted by the trial court before trial 
of the accused person as required by Article 17 of the Qanun-e-
Shahadat Order, 1984. Be that as it may the fact remains that 
both such steps required to make a case one of Qisas are relevant 
to a trial court and, thus, even waiver or compounding provided for 
in sections 309 and 310 are relevant to a trial court and not to any 
stage before the case reaches the trial court. 
 
8. 
For what has been discussed above we have found the 
impugned judgment passed by the High Court to be based upon a 
correct understanding and application of the relevant law and also 
in accord with the legal position declared by this Court in the case 
of Muhammad Akram v. Abdul Waheed and 3 others (2005 SCMR 
1342) and, therefore, this appeal is dismissed.  
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
Islamabad 
26.01.2016 
Approved for reporting.  
Arif 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
