IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI 
MR. JUSTICE NASIR-UL-MULK 
MR. JUSTICE ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA 
MR. JUSTICE SARMAD JALAL OSMANY 
MR. JUSTICE AMIR HANI MUSLIM 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-
K/2009, 177-K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 
63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 
135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-K/2011, 232-
K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 39/2010 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
18.5.2009 passed by the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi in Constitution Petition D-
1933/2008) 
 
 
 
Pakistan Defence Officer Housing Authority and others 
… Appellants 
VERSUS  
Lt. Col. Syed Jawaid Ahmed 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. Khalid Javed, ASC  
 
For the Respondent: 
Mr. Shoaib Shaheen, ASC a/w respondent 
in person 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1150/2010 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
26.11.2010 passed by the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi in Constitution Petition No. D-
1713/2006) 
 
 
Pakistan International Airline through its Chairman 
… Appellant 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
2
VERSUS  
S.M. Nawaz and others 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Khalid Javed, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Arshad Ali Ch, AOR  
 
For the Respondents: 
In person 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1162/2012 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
24.9.2012 passed by the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi in Constitution Petition No. 
D-141/2011) 
 
 
M/s Pakistan through itst Chairman / CEO, Karachi 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Muhammad Aslam Chaudhry and others 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Sanaullah Noor Ghouri, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Arshad Ali Chaudhry, AOR 
 
 
For Respondent (1): 
In person 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 142-K/2009 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 17.4.2009 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
C.P. No. D-1690/2007) 
 
N.E.D. University of Engineering and Technology and others 
… Appellants 
VERSUS  
Hafeezullah Khawaja 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Khalid Javed, ASC  
 
For the Respondent: 
In person 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 177-K/2010 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 3.6.2010 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
CPs 
D-2705/2009, 
D-1768/2006, 
D-
1771/2006, D-1871/2006, D-1872/2006, D-
1894/2006, 
D-1895-, 
D-1896/2006, 
D-
1897/2006, D-2018/2006, D-2031/2006, D-
1918/2006, 
D-405/2006, 
D-563/2007, 
D-
574/2007, 
D-795/2007, 
D-871/2007, 
D-
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
3
1320/2007, D-1331/2007, D-1643/2007, D-
1648/2007, D-1951/2007 & D-2464/2007) 
 
 
M/s House Building Finance Corporation and another  
… Appellants 
VERSUS  
Shahid Mehmood Usmani 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. M.A. Rehman Qureshi, ASC 
 
 
For the Respondent: 
N.R.  
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 178-K/2010 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 3.6.2010 passed by 
the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in CPs D-2705/2009, 
D-1768/2006, 
D-1771/2006, 
D-1871/2006, 
D-
1872/2006, D-1894/2006, D-1895-, D-1896/2006, D-
1897/2006, 
D-2018/2006, 
D-2031/2006, 
D-
1918/2006, D-405/2006, D-563/2007, D-574/2007, D-
795/2007, D-871/2007, D-1320/2007, D-1331/2007, 
D-1643/2007, 
D-1648/2007, 
D-1951/2007 
& 
D-
2464/2007) 
 
Chairman Pakistan Steel Mills and others 
… Appellants 
VERSUS  
Sirjauddin Ghori 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. M.G. Dastagir, ASC  
 
For the Respondent: 
N.R.   
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 228-K/2010 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 30.9.2010 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
Constitution Petition No. 1549/2010) 
 
Pakistan International Airline and another 
… Appellants 
VERSUS  
Hamayun Raja 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. Munib Ahmed Khan, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Arshad Ali Chaudhry, AOR 
 
 
For the Respondent: 
N.R.   
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
4
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 57-K/2011 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
8.1.2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, 
Karachi in CP D-2122/2006) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mill through its Chairman 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Shakir Ali Khan and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Nadeem Azhar Siddiqui, ASC 
 
For the Respondents: 
N.R.  
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 63-K/2011 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
28.11.2010 passed by the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi in Constitution Petition No. D-
1489/2007) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Muhammad Rafiq Memon and others 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Munir Ahmed Khan, ASC 
 
For the Respondents: 
In person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 65-K/2011 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
20.12.2010 passed by the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi in Constitution Petition No. D-
1871/2006) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Noor Muhammad Awan and others 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Munib Ahmed Khan, ASC 
 
For the Respondents: 
N.R.  
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
5
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 66-K/2011 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
20.12.2010 passed by the High Court of 
Sindh, Karachi in Constitution Petition No. D-
1872/2006) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Noor Muhammad Awan and others 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Munib Ahmed Khan, ASC 
 
For the Respondent (1): In person 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 83-K/2011 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 5.3.2011 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
Constitution Petition No. D-574/2007) 
 
Port Bin Qasim Authority through its Chairman and another 
… Appellants 
VERSUS  
Irshad Ahmed and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. M.G. Dastagir, ASC  
 
For the Respondents: 
Mr. Muhammad Aqil Awan, Sr. ASC  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 91-K/2011 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
8.10.2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, 
Karachi 
in 
Constitution 
Petition 
No. 
871/2007) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd  
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Muhammad Sadiq and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. M.G. Dastagir, ASC 
 
For the Respondent (1): In person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
6
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 135-K/2011 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 2.12.2010 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
Constitution Petition No. D-1771/2006) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Arshad Nadeem 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Shaukat Ali Sh, ASC 
 
For the Respondent: 
Syed Amjad Hussain, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 136-K/2011 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 31.3.2011 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
C.P. No. D-2498/2010) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd through its Chairman 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Abid Hussain and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Muhammad Ikram Siddiqui, ASC 
 
For the Respondents: 
N.R.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 137-K/2011 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 6.4.2011 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
C.P. No. D-1770/2006) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Qazi Ghulam Rehmani and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Muhammad Ikram Siddiqui, ASC 
 
For the Respondents: 
Syed Amjad Hussain, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 188-K/2011 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
10.5.2011 passed by the High Court of Sindh, 
Karachi in CP 3316/2010) 
 
M/s Pakistan State Oil Company Ltd and others 
… Appellants 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
7
VERSUS  
Imran Hassan Khan and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellants: 
Mr. Muhammad Humayun, ASC 
 
 
For the Respondents: 
Mr. Muhammad Aqil Awan, Sr. ASC  
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 232-K/2011 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 16.5.2011 
passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in 
Constitution Petition No. D-1643/2007) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Mirza Hassan Ali 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Shaukat Ali Sh, ASC 
 
For the Respondent: 
N.R.  
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 75-K/2012 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
19.7.2012 passed by the High Court of Sindh, 
Larkana in Constitution Petition No. D-
381/2012) 
 
S.M.E. Bank Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Akbar Ali Abbasi and another 
… Respondents 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Agha Faqeer Muhammad, ASC 
 
For the Respondent (1): In person 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 82-K/2012 
(On 
appeal 
from 
the 
judgment 
dated 
18.4.2012 passed by the High Court of Sindh, 
Karachi in C.P. No. D-1667/2010) 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 
… Appellant 
VERSUS  
Miss Shakeela Naz 
… Respondent 
 
For the Appellant:  
Mr. Sanaullah Noor Ghori, ASC 
 
For the Respondent: 
N.R.   
 
 
 
 
 
Date of Hearing:  
02.05.2013 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
8
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
 
TASSADUQ HUSSAIN JILLANI, J.- This judgment 
shall dispose of the above titled appeals as the questions of law 
raised are common.  
BRIEF FACTS IN APPEALS: 
2. 
In Civil Appeal No. 39/2010 the respondent was 
serving as Vice Principal of Pakistan Defence Officers Housing 
Authority, Karachi. He was proceeded against departmentally inter 
alia on the ground that he violated service discipline by filing a 
constitution petition (bearing No. 1276 of 2008) seeking a direction 
that he may be ordered to be appointed as Principal. The enquiry 
culminated in the award of major penalty of termination of service. 
The High Court allowed the constitution petition on the ground 
that the order passed was not sustainable as the procedure 
prescribed in Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance 
2000 [hereinafter referred to as the ‘Ordinance 2000’] had not been 
followed. 
3. 
In Civil Appeal Nos. 177-K/2010, 178-K/2010, 65-
K/2011, 66-K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011 & 232-
K/2011 the respondents are employees of various organizations 
which are admittedly under the control of Federal Government. 
Those organizations included House Building Finance Corporation, 
Port Qasim Authority, Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation (Pvt) Ltd, 
S.M.E. Bank and Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. 
Respondents were proceeded against under the Ordinance, 2000 
and awarded major penalties. Some of them initially approached 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
9
the Federal Service Tribunal and their appeals before the Tribunal 
were held to have abated on account of judgment of this Court in 
Muhammad Mubeen-us-Salam Vs. Federation of Pakistan and 
others (PLD 2006 SC 602). They filed Constitution petitions and 
relying on a judgment of this Court in Civil Aviation Authority 
through its Director General Vs. Javed Ahmed and another (2009 
SCMR 956), the High Court of Sindh held that if an employee is 
proceeded under the Ordinance, 2000, the High Court is 
competent to consider as to whether the action taken was in 
accordance with law or not. A Division Bench of the High Court 
having 
decided 
the 
question 
of 
jurisdiction 
directed 
the 
Constitution petitions to be listed before the appropriate benches.  
4. 
In Civil Appeal No. 142-K/2009 the respondent was an 
employee of the NED University of Engineering & Technology, 
Karachi. 
He 
was 
proceeded 
against 
departmentally 
which 
culminated in the award of major penalty of termination from 
service. The court relied on Tanveer Hussain Vs. Divisional 
Superintendent, Pakistan Railways etc (PLJ 2006 SC 1092) & 
Federation of Pakistan through D.G. Military Lands and 
Cantonment Rawalpindi and others Vs. Syed Ibrahim Shah and 
others  (2007 PLC (C.S) 1288) to hold that the Ordinance, 2000 
being general law has overriding effect and the proceedings held 
under the University Statute of 1990 could not be sustained. The 
University, however, was given the option to proceed de novo 
against the respondent under the Ordinance 2000. 
5. 
In Civil Appeal No. 1150/2010 respondent was 
Manager Accounts in Pakistan International Airlines Corporation. 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
10
He was awarded major penalty of compulsory retirement. He 
challenged the said order before the Service Tribunal which partly 
allowed the appeal and altered the major penalty to minor penalty 
of withholding of increment for three years without cumulative 
effect. However, on account of the judgment in Mubeen ul Islam’s 
case (PLD 2006 SC 602), appeal before the Service Tribunal stands 
abated whereafter the respondent filed a constitution petition 
which was allowed by the High Court and respondent was directed 
to be reinstated but the Court observed that it would be open for 
the competent authority to reconsider the matter on the basis of 
the report of the Enquiry Committee after issuing respondent a 
show cause notice. 
6. 
In Civil Appeal No. 228-K/2010 respondent was 
employed as Baggage Attendant / Loader in the Pakistan 
International Airlines, Karachi Airport. He was proceeded against 
under section 3 of the Ordinance 2000 and was awarded major 
penalty of dismissal from service. The High Court allowed the writ 
petition and directed his reinstatement as it was of the view that 
no eyewitness appeared during enquiry and the enquiry stood 
vitiated on account of the enquiry officer’s bias. 
7. 
In Civil Appeal No. 57-K/2011 respondent was an 
employee of the Pakistan Steel Mills. He was proceeded against on 
charges of misconduct, which culminated in the award of major 
penalty of removal from service. The learned High Court allowed 
the Constitution petition and converted the penalty of removal 
from service into compulsory retirement as it found that the 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
11
penalty awarded was not proportionate to the charge. He was also 
held entitled to the beneifts of retirement.  
8. 
In Civil Appeals Nos. 63-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-
K/2011, and 82-K/2012, the respondents – writ petitioners were 
employees of the Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation. They were 
proceeded against departmentally and awarded various penalties. 
The Constitution petitions were disposed of inter alia holding that 
those Constitution petitions were maintainale as respondents had 
been removed under the Ordinance, 2000; that the charges levelled 
against them could not be proved and that the penalties awarded 
were not sustainable.  
9. 
In Civil Appeal No. 188-K/2011 respondent was an 
employee in the Pakistan State Oil. He was proceeded against 
departmentally in terms of the Ordinance, 2000 and awarded 
major penalty of dismissal from service. However, the learned High 
Court allowed the Constitution petition inter alia on the ground 
that the charges had not been established during inquiry and he 
was directed to be reinstated with all the consequential back-
benefits.  
10. 
In Civil Appeal No. 1162/2012 respondent was an 
employee of the Pakistan Steel Mills. He was proceeded against on 
charges of misconduct. The Constitution petition was allowed 
mainly on the ground that it was a case of no evidence and the 
allegations levelled had not been established. 
11. 
In Civil Appeal No. 75-K/2012, respondent was an 
employee of the S.M.E. Bank. He was proceeded against under the 
Ordinance 2000 and awarded major penalty of termination of his 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
12
service vide order dated 1.12.2000. The said order was however 
withdrawn by the competent authority; he was reinstated but later 
onfresh enquiry was held which culminated in the award of the 
same major penalty of dismissal from service vide order dated 
12.12.2001. He challenged the order in appeal before the Service 
Tribunal which was allowed vide order dated 19.3.2010. However 
the said order was challenged before this Court which set aside the 
order of the Service Tribunal vide judgment dated 11.6.2010. 
Meanwhile, respondent filed a representation before the Secretary 
Finance who vide order dated 2.12.2011 allowed the said 
representation and finding that he had been condemned unheard, 
reinstated him and left the question of payment of back benefits to 
a Committee constituted by the President of the Bank. The said 
Committee, however, did not grant him back benefits whereafter he 
approached the High Court in constitution petition which was 
allowed inter alia on the ground that there was no evidence on 
record that he was gainfully employed and merely because he had 
invested some money in defense certificates does not disentitle him 
to back benefits. 
Gist of the Arguments: 
12. 
In support of Civil Appeal No. 39/2010 learned 
counsel for the appellants Mr. Khalid Javed, ASC submitted that 
the learned High Court of Sindh has failed to appreciate that the 
service of the respondent was neither regulated by any law nor 
statutory rules of service and the petition under Article 199 of the 
Constitution was not maintainable; that the learned High Court 
has failed to consider that the termination order dated 9.9.2008 of 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
13
the respondent was a ‘termination simplicitor’ and there being no 
stigma 
attached 
the 
petition 
for 
reinstatement 
was 
not 
maintainable; that the learned Court fell in error in not 
appreciating that the Ordinance, 2000, did not provide substantive 
rights to employees but only laid down procedure for taking action 
against them for any act or omission which may fall within the 
mischief of law and that the service of the respondent was being 
regulated by regulations which were non-statutory and therefore, 
the Constitution petition was not maintainable. 
13. 
In support of the submissions made, learned counsel 
relied on Pakistan International Airline Corporation Vs. Tanweer-
ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676 (relevant paras 19, 23  25), 
Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd Vs. Iqbal Nasir (PLD 2011 SC 
132), R.T.H. Janjua Vs. National Shipping Corporation (PLD 1974 
SC 146), Secretary, East Pakistan Industrial Development 
Corporation Vs. Md. Serajul Haque (1970 SCMR 398), Pakistan 
International Airlines Corporation Vs. Shahabuddin and others 
(1993 PLC (CS) 1), Raziuddin Vs. PIA Corporation (PLD 1992 SC 
531), Muhammad Yusuf Shah Vs. Pakistan International Airlines 
Corporation (PLD 1981 SC 224), Shafaullah Vs. Saif ur Rehman 
(PLD 1991 SC 1106), Pakistan Red Crescent Society Vs. Nazir 
Gillani (PLD 2005 SC 806).  
14. 
Learned counsel for the appellants in all the remaining 
appeals adopted the arguments of learned counsel for the 
appellant in Civil Appeal No. 39/2010.  
15. 
Learned counsel for the respondents in Civil Appeal 
Nos. 188-K/2011 and 83-K/2011 M/s Muhammad Humayun, ASC 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
14
and Muhammad Aqil Awan, Sr. ASC defended the impugned 
judgments of the learned High Court as according to them the 
Constitution petitions were maintainable because the Ordinance, 
2000 had an overriding effect and any violation thereof was 
amenable to writ jurisdiction of the High Court. They added that 
after promulgation of Ordinance 2000, there was a statutory 
intervention and the respondents who were aggrieved of the 
violation of the said statute could invoke the jurisdiction of the 
High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution.  
16. 
In support of the submissions made, learned counsel 
relied on I.G. HQ Frontier Corpos and others Vs. Ghulam Hussain 
etc (2004 PLC (CS) 1187 at page 1199), Daud Shah and another 
Vs. Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and others 
(2007 PLC (CS) 281 at page 284-F para), Federation of Pakistan Vs. 
Syed Ibrahim Shah and others (2007 PLC (CS) 1288 at 1290(b)), 
Tanveer Hussain Vs. Divisional Superintendent (PLJ 2006 SC 1092 
at 1095-A para 5-6), Azizullah Memon Vs. Province of Sindh (2007 
SCMR 229 at 231), Evacuee Trust Property Board Vs Muhammad 
Nawaz (1993 SCMR 1275 at 1277), Muhammad Zubair Ikram Vs. 
Aithison College, Lahore through its Principal (NLR 2000 Civil 519 
at 530), Aitchison College Vs. Muhammad Zubair (PLD 2002 SC 
326 at 341), Managing Director, Ittehad Chemical Vs. Musthaq 
Ahmed (NLR 1997 Service 119), Pakistan International Airlines Vs. 
Nasir Jamal Malik (2001 SCMR 934 at 943 and 944-F), Principal 
Cadet College, Kohat Vs. Muhammad Shoab (PLD 1984 SC 170 at 
176-B), 
Muhammad 
Ashraf 
Vs. 
Director 
General, 
Multan 
Development Authority etc (2000 PLC (CS) 796 at 801-C), 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
15
Muhammd Dawood Vs. Federation of Pakistan and others (2007 
PLC (CS) 1046), Civil Aviation Authority Vs. Javed Ahmed (2009 
SCMR 956) and (2010 PLC (CS) 1360 at 1375).  
17. 
Leave was granted by this Court (In Civil Appeal No. 
1162 of 2012) against the judgment of the High Court in following 
terms:- 
4. We have heard the learned Advocate Supreme 
Court for the petitioner and learned Deputy 
Attorney-General, the latter relied upon the 
judgment in the case of Civil Aviation Authority v. 
Javed Ahmad (2009 SCMR 956) and stated that 
in such like cases when a person has been 
dismissed under the Ordinance of 2000, he can 
invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court as he 
cannot be left without any remedy. He relied 
upon following paragraph from the judgment in 
the case of Javed Ahmed (supra):-- 
 
"8. Needless to mention here that FBR 
through Circular No.7 dated l9th July, 
2008 
clarified 
that 
scheme 
is 
applicable 
to 
all 
undisclosed 
assets/income which somehow or the 
other could not be disclosed and 
remained unexplained and that cases 
are 
pending 
in 
appeal 
or 
raised/detected by the department 
would be dealt under normal law and 
not 
under 
specific 
provisions 
of 
scheme. The second deviation took 
place when the FBR issued Circular 
No.8 of 2008 whereby the scheme was 
restricted so as to exclude pending 
cases before the department, appellate 
authority or any Court, thus, the state 
of law was changed. We are of the 
view that amendment brought through 
the referred circular is of substantive 
nature thereby restricting the scope of 
the original scheme and the state of 
law stood changed from the said date 
effecting the right and liabilities of 
those who have acted upon the 
scheme in good faith under its original 
scope. Therefore, Circular No.8 of 2008 
cannot 
apply 
retrospectively 
and 
show-cause notices stand vacated. 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
16
 
5. It is pertinent to mention here that besides the 
above judgment, in another case i.e. Hyderabad 
Electric Supply Company v. Mushtaq Ali Brohi 
(2010 PSC 1392), this Court has held that as the 
services of the respondent were not governed by 
the statutory rules, therefore, the High Court had 
no jurisdiction to entertain the petition under 
Article 199 of the Constitution. It may not be out 
of context to note that in another case reported as 
Executive  Council  Allama  Iqbal  Open  
University  v.  M. Tufail Hashmi (2010 SCMR 
1484), this Court in its paragraph No.9 observed 
as under:-- 
 
9. The principle perceived from the 
above judgments is that the employees 
of those organizations, which are 
discharging functions in connection 
with the affairs of Federation, can 
approach the learned High Court 
under Article 199 of the Constitution 
but subject to the condition if their 
services 
are 
protected 
under 
the 
statutory rules." 
 
6. As far as the jurisdiction of the Tribunal under 
Article 212 of the Constitution is concerned, it 
was opined that the Tribunal would have 
jurisdiction under Article 212 of the Constitution 
for redressal of grievance of those employees 
whose terms and conditions are governed under 
the statutory rules. Admittedly, terms and 
conditions of the respondent in the present case 
have not been settled under the Constitutional 
provision referred to hereinbefore, therefore, inter 
alia, the question for consideration would be as to 
whether, if a person being employee of a 
corporation like Steel Mills has been proceeded 
against under the provisions of Ordinance of 
2000, would he have no remedy to challenge 
such order. 
7. Leave to appeal is granted, inter alia, to 
examine the above questions and to resolve the 
divergent opinions in the judgments noted 
hereinabove. Office is directed to put up a note for 
the purpose of constituting larger Bench to set at 
naught these discrepancies in the judgments 
noted above.” 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
17
18. 
Having considered the submissions made by learned 
counsel for the parties and having gone through the precedent 
case law cited at the bar as also the conflict of opinion reflected in 
the leave granting order, the questions which crop up for 
consideration broadly would be as follows:- 
(i) 
Whether the appellants are persons discharging 
functions in connection with affairs of Federation or a 
Province within the meaning of clause (5) of Article 199 
of the Constitution and amenable to writ jurisdiction of 
the High Court? and 
(ii) 
Whether the respondent-employees being ‘person in 
corporation service’ within the meaning of section 2(c) 
of 
the 
Removal 
from 
Service 
(Special 
Powers) 
Ordinance, 2000 and having been deprived of their 
right to appeal by a judgment of this Court in Mubeen 
us Islam’s case (PLD 2006 SC 602), could invoke 
Article 199 of the Constitution against the order of the 
departmental authority in view of the law laid down by 
this Court in Civil Aviation Authority through Director 
General v. Javed Ahmad and another (2009 SCMR 
956) or their remedy is a claim of damages as held in 
Pakistan 
International 
Airline 
Corporation 
Vs. 
Tanweer-ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676), Executive 
Council, Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad 
through Chairman and another v. M. Tufail Hashmi 
(2010 SCMR 1484), Hyderabad 
Electric Supply 
Company v. Mushtaq Ali Brohi (2010 PSC 1392) and 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
18
Civil Aviation Authority through Director General v. 
Javed Ahmad (2009 SCMR 956)? 
Questions of Law and Opinion of the Court: 
 
Question No.1: 
Whether the appellants are persons discharging 
functions in connection with affairs of Federation 
or a Province within the meaning of clause (5) of 
Article 199 of the Constitution and amenable to 
writ jurisdiction of the High Court? 
 
 
19. 
To better appreciate the question mooted above, it 
would be of relevance to give a brief overview of the law, structure 
and functions of the statutory bodies/corporations/authorities 
(appellants). 
(i) 
Pakistan Steel Mills 
 
Pakistan Steel Mills is admittedly a public sector 
project. It was established in July 1968 under the Companies Act, 
1913 as a private limited company. It is not denied that the 
Federal Government makes appointments in the top management 
of the Mills and plays a pivotal role in its policy making. Though it 
is not a statutory body, but its employees are “persons in 
corporation service” within the scope of section 2(c) of the 
Ordinance, 2000. Admittedly, their disciplinary matters were being 
regulated by a statutory regime (the Ordinance 2000) and they had 
sought enforcement of the said regime/statutory intervention when 
the said regime was in the field by invoking Article 199(1)(a)(ii) of 
the Constitution as they had been deprived of their right to appeal. 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
19
(ii) 
Port Qasim Authority: 
 
Port Qasim Authority is a statutory body created 
under the Ports Qasim Authority Act, 1973. A bare reading of 
various provisions of this Act would indicate that in its 
management and functions the Federal Government has effective 
control. The Government by notification in the Official Gazette 
defines the limits of the Port Qasim Authority (Section 3); the 
management of the Authority is carried out by the Board 
comprising of at least three and not more than seven members 
including the Chairman to be appointed by the Federal 
Government (Section 6); the Board is guided on policy mattes by 
directions issued by the Federal Government from time to time 
[(Section 5(2)]; the remuneration and conditions of service of the 
Chairman and Members of the Board are determined by the 
Federal Government (section 7); all schemes under the Act are to 
be prepared in such manner and form as the Federal Government 
may specify (section 12); the Authority is mandated to frame scale 
of tolls, dues, rates and charges, annual or other, to be paid by the 
owners of vessels. Such scales are to be published in the Official 
Gazette after approval by the Federal Government [Section 12 (3) 
(4)]; the Federal Government has the power to exempt any goods or 
class of goods from operation of the charging section (Section 
20(3); the Authority has the power to acquire land within the 
Board Area (Section 34); the Chairman, members, officers and 
servants of the Authority when acting under the Act are deemed to 
be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan 
Penal Code (Section 52).  
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
20
 
Thus the composition and functions as given in 
various provisions of the Statute to which reference has been made 
above indicate that: first the Federal Government has an overriding 
role in the appointment of the Chairman and members of the 
Board, in policy making and even in charging provisions and with 
regard to powers of land acquisition. Second the functions and 
powers it exercise have some elements of public authority. The 
Authority therefore can be classified as a ‘person’ performing 
functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation within 
the meanings of Article 199(1)(a)(ii) read with Article 199(5) of the 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. 
iii) 
S.M.E. Bank: 
 
S.M.E. Bank is established under the Regional 
Development Finance Corporation and Small Business Finance 
Corporation (Amalgamation and Conversion) Ordinance, 2001 
(Ordinance LVI of 2001). Its employees would come within the 
purview of the Ordinance 2000, section 2(c) of which defines 
‘person in corporation service’ as “every person in the employment 
of a corporation, corporate body, authority, statutory body or other 
organization or institutions set up, established, owned, managed or 
controlled by the Federal Government, or by or under any law for the 
time being in force or a body or organization in which the Federal 
Government has a controlling share or interest and includes the 
Chairman and the Managing Director, and the holder of any other 
office therein.” It was on account of the above mandate of law that 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
21
admittedly its respondent-employees were proceeded against this 
Ordinance. 
iv) 
Defence Housing Authority, Karachi: 
 
The 
Defence 
Housing 
Authority 
Karachi 
was 
established under the Pakistan Defence Officers Housing Authority 
Order, 
1980 
(promulgated 
on 
9th of 
August 
1980). 
The 
management and authority vests in the Governing Body which 
comprises 
of 
the 
Secretary-General, 
Ministry 
of 
Defence, 
Government of Pakistan, who would be its Chairman and the other 
members/officers include (a) Vice Chiefs of Staff of the three 
Services or one Principal Staff Officer from each of the three 
Services to be nominated by the respective Chiefs of Staff; (b) the 
President; (c) the Director, Military Lands and Cantonments; and 
(d) the Administrator [(Section 5 (1)]. For day to day working, an 
Executive Board of the Authority comprises of Corps Commander 
who would be its President and other members include: (a) a 
serving Naval Officer not below the rank of a Commodore posted at 
Karachi, to be nominated by the Chief of the Naval Staff; (b) a 
serving Air Force officer not below the rank of an Air Commodore 
posted at Karachi, to be nominated by the Chief of the Air Staff; (c) 
a serving Army Officer not below the rank of a Brigadier posted at 
Karachi, to be nominated by the Chief of the Army Staff; (d) the 
Administrator; and (e) co-opted members, to be appointed by the 
Executive Board for a period not exceeding two years at a time, 
provided that such co-opted members shall not have any right of 
vote. [(Section 5(2)]. The Executive Board of the Authority has the 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
22
power to acquire land under the law, undertake any work in 
pursuance of any scheme or project; no master plan, planning or 
development scheme can be prepared by any local body or agency 
for the specified area without prior consultation with, and approval 
of, the Executive Board (Section 9). The Authority through the 
Executive Board has the power to raise funds for the purpose of its 
working capital in a manner the Board may think proper, through 
loans or levy of any charges which may be prescribed by it under 
the Rules (Section 10). The Administrator functions in accordance 
with the policy laid down by the Governing Body (Section 11). All 
schemes/projects/works carried out by the Authority are deemed 
under the law to be schemes for public purposes (section 12). The 
employees of the Authority are deemed to be public servants within 
the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code (Section 16). 
The Governing Body has the power to make Rules by notification in 
the Official Gazette for carrying out the purposes of the 
Order/Statute. (Section 22). The Executive Board has the power to 
make Regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of the Order 
and the rules as it may consider necessary or expedient for the 
administration and management of the affairs of the Authority. 
(Section 23).  
 
In Civil Appeal Nos. 1150 and 228-K of 2010, 
respondents were employees of Pakistan International Airlines 
Corporation. In Civil Appeal No. 117-K of 2010, respondents were 
employees of Housing Building Finance Corporation. In Civil 
Appeal No. 142-K of 2009, respondents were employees of N.E.D. 
University. In Civil Appeal No. 188-K of 2011, respondents were 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
23
employees of Pakistan State Oil. All these employees were 
proceeded against under the Ordinance, 2000 and were awarded 
various penalties. The learned High Court decided the question of 
jurisdiction holding that writ was maintainable as the appellants 
were “persons” within the meaning of Article 199(5) of the 
Constitution and further that respondent-employees had no 
alternate remedy as their right of appeal under section 10 of the 
Ordinance had been declared to be ultra vires of the Constitution. 
20. 
While dilating on this question whether the appellants-
organizations are “persons” within the meanings of Article 
199(1)(a)(ii) read with Article 199(5) of the Constitution, the 
expanded 
functions 
of 
the 
Federation 
or 
a 
Province 
in 
contemporary age have to be kept in view. An important dimension 
of the modern welfare State is that the role of the State and its 
various institutions has increased manifold. The government is 
regulator and dispenser of special services. It has the power to 
create jobs, issue licenses, fix quotas, grant mining rights or lease 
of estate, sign contracts and provide variety of utility services to 
the people. Such entrepreneurial activities at times are carried out 
through companies created under the Statute or under the 
Companies 
Ordinance. 
The 
functions 
these 
companies 
/ 
institutions perform have elements of public authority. A public 
authority is a body which has public or statutory duties to perform 
and which performs those duties and carries out its transactions 
for the benefit of the public and not for private gain or profit. Such 
an authority, however is not precluded from making a profit for the 
public benefit. The Courts have generally applied what has been 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
24
classified as a “function test” to consider whether a statutory body 
is a ‘person’ within the meaning of Article 199 of the Constitution. 
In Salahuddin v. Frontier Sugar Mills & Distillery Ltd (PLD 1975 
SC 244), the Court laid down similar test to assess whether a body 
or authority is a person within the meaning of Article 199 of the 
Constitution and observed:- 
“The primary test must always be whether the 
functions entrusted to the organization or person 
concerned are indeed functions of the State 
involving some exercise of sovereign or public 
power; whether the control of the organization 
vests in a substantial manner in the hands of 
Government; and whether the bulk of the funds is 
provided by the State. If these conditions are 
fulfilled, then the person, including a body politic 
or body corporate, may indeed be regarded as a 
person performing functions in connection with 
the affairs of the Federation or a Province; 
otherwise not.” 
 
 
21. 
The afore-referred view was further affirmed in 
Aitchison College, Lahore through Principal v. Muhammad Zubair 
(PLD 2002 SC 326), and while not interfering with the judgment of 
the Lahore High Court whereby the latter court had held that the 
said college was amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court 
under Article 199 of the Constitution, this Court laid down as 
follows:- 
“Applying the above test on the facts of instant 
cases, we feel no hesitation in drawing inference 
that the Board of Governors, Aitchison College, 
Lahore headed by the Governor of the Province as 
its President along with other officers i.e. 
Secretaries Education, Finance and General 
Officer 
Commanding 
as 
well 
as 
unofficial 
Members are involved in providing education 
which is one of the responsibility of the State and 
by taking over its management and control the 
Board, exercises sovereign powers as well as 
public powers being a statutory functionary of 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
25
Government who in order to provide it full 
legal/Constitutional protection had brought it into 
the folds of its Education Department by 
amending the Provincial Rules of Business as 
back as in 1994 and even if for sake of 
arguments if it is presumed that no financial aid 
is being provided to the College from the 
Provincial Public exchequer, even then, the 
College remains in dominating control of the 
Provincial 
Government 
through 
Board 
of 
Governors. Therefore, the above test stands fully 
satisfied and we are persuaded to hold that 
organization of the Aitchison College, Lahore falls 
within the definition of a person.” 
 
22. 
In Pakistan International Airlines v. Tanweer-ur-
Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676), reiterating the earlier view, the Court 
laid down a similar three pronged test: 
(i) 
whether 
the 
functions 
entrusted 
to 
the 
organization or person concerned are indeed 
functions of the State involving some exercise 
of sovereign or public power; 
 
(ii) 
whether the control of the organization vests in 
a substantial manner in the hands of 
Government; and 
 
(iii) 
whether the bulk of funds is provided by the 
State. 
 
 
23. 
A comparative study of constitutional law on issues 
under consideration would be instructive. In Sukh Dev Singh and 
others v. Beghatram Sardar Singh Raghwamshi and another (AIR 
1975 SC 1331), the questions mooted before the Court were inter 
alia whether action of a statutory corporation in derogation to its 
Rules could be annulled in writ jurisdiction and whether the Rules 
framed by the corporation under the Statute were statutory. The 
Court held as follows:- 
"33. ……….A regulation framed under a statute 
applies uniform treatment to every one or to all 
members of same group or class.. The' Oil and 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
26
Natural Gas Commission, the Life Insurance 
Corporation and Industrial Finance corporation 
are all required by the statute to frame 
regulations, inter alia, for the purpose of the 
duties and conduct and conditions of service of 
officers and other employees. These regulations 
impose obligation on the statutory authorities. 
The statutory authorities cannot deviate from the 
conditions of service. Any deviation will be 
enforced by legal sanction of declaration by 
Courts to invalidate actions in violation of rules 
and regulations under statute is to ensure regular 
conduct with a distinctive attitude to that conduct 
as a standard. The regulations in the cases under 
consideration give the employees a statutory 
status and impose restriction on the employer 
and the employee with no option. to vary the 
conditions. An ordinary individual in a case of 
master and servant contractual relationship 
enforces breach of contractual terms. The remedy 
in such contractual .relationship of master and 
servant is damages because personal service is 
not capable of enforcement. In cases of statutory 
bodies, there is no personal element whatsoever 
because of the impersonal character of statutory 
bodies. In the case of statutory bodies it has 
been' said that the element of public employment 
or service and the support of statute require 
observance of rules and regulations. Failure to 
observe requirements by statutory bodies is 
enforced by Courts by declaring dismissal in 
violation of rules and regulations to be valid. This 
Court has repeatedly observed that whenever a 
man's rights are affected by decision taken under 
statutory powers, the Court would presume the 
existence of a duty to observe the rules of natural 
justice and compliance with rules and regulations 
imposed by statute. " 
 
 
24. 
Somewhat similar view was taken by this Court in The 
Evacuee Trust Property Board and another v. Muhammad Nawaz 
(1983 SCMR 1275) and the judgment of this Court in C.P.S.L.A. 
No. 645/74 titled as Chairman Evacuee Trust Property Board 
Lahore, etc., v. Noor Elahi and C.P.L.S.A. No. 646/74, titled as 
Chairman 
Evacuee 
Trust 
Property 
Board 
Lahore, 
etc 
v. 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
27
Muhammad Ramzan, upholding the judgment of the High Court 
was followed with approval. This Court held:- 
"It appears from the order passed by the learned 
Chief Justice of the High Court on the two 
Constitution Petitions that the Board at its 6th 
Meeting held in May 1969, passed the following 
resolution :‑‑ 
 
"Agreed. Central Government Rules would apply 
to the Board's employees for all intents and 
purposes." 
 
Under paragraph 43 of the scheme the Board is 
authorized to make rules to carry out the; 
purposes of the scheme framed under section 
16‑A(i) of the Displaced Persons (Compensation 
and Rehabilitation) Act 1958, and under section 
14(2) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) 
Act 1958. Paragraph 16 of the Scheme provides 
that no employee of the Board shall be dismissed 
or otherwise punished except in accordance with 
the rules framed by the Board and approved by 
the Central Government. In our opinion the 
aforesaid resolution amounted to making of the 
rules by the Board.” 
 
It was not disputed before the learned Chief 
Justice that till such time the Board framed its 
own rules, the employees were governed by the 
Efficiency and Discipline Rules 1960, framed by 
the Central Government. 
 
Admittedly these rules were not followed in the 
cases of the two respondents and, therefore, no 
fault can be found with the impugned orders of 
the learned Chief Justice. Both the petitions are 
accordingly dismissed." 
 
 
25. 
The Court further candidly held, “Even otherwise it is 
well‑settled that where statutory rules govern the service conditions 
of an employee, then the pleasure of the master stands surrendered 
to the extent the matter is covered by the relevant rules”. 
26. 
Whether a company or authority is an instrumentality 
of the State has also been subject of debate in constitutional 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
28
jurisprudence of India. The Indian Supreme Court in Ramana v. 
I.A. Authority of India (AIR 1979 SC 1628) adverting to the factors 
which make a corporation or authority an instrumentality of the 
State held:- 
“It will thus be seen that there are several factors 
which may have to be considered in determining 
whether 
a 
corporation 
is 
an 
agency 
or 
instrumentality of Government. We have referred 
to some of these factors and they may be 
summarized as under: Whether there is any 
financial assistance given by the State, and if so, 
what is the magnitude of such assistance 
whether there is any other form of assistance, 
given by the State, and if so, whether it is of the 
usual kind or it is extraordinary, whether there is 
any control of the management and policies of the 
corporation by the State and what is the nature 
and 
extent 
of 
such 
control, 
whether 
the 
corporation enjoys State conferred or State 
protected monopoly status and whether the 
functions carried out by the corporation are public 
functions 
closely 
related 
to 
Governmental 
functions. This particularization relevant factors 
is, however, not exhaustive and by its very 
nature it cannot be because with increasing 
assumption of new tasks, growing complexities of 
management 
and 
administration 
and 
the 
necessity of continuing adjustment in relations 
between the corporation and Government calling 
for flexibility, adaptability and innovative skills, it 
is 
not 
possible 
to 
make 
an 
exhaustive 
enumeration of the tests which would invariably 
and in all cases provide an unfailing answer to 
the question whether a corporation is Government 
instrumentality 
or 
agency. 
Moreover, 
even 
amongst these factors which we have described, 
no one single factor will yield a satisfactory 
answer to the question and the Court will have to 
consider the cumulative effect of these various 
factors and arrive at its decision on the basis of a 
particularized 
inquiry 
into 
the 
facts 
and 
circumstances of each case. ‘The dispositive 
question in any State action case’, as pointed out 
by Dougles, J., in Jackson v. Matropolitan Edison 
Co. (1974) 419 US 345 (supra) is not whether any 
single fact or relationship presents a sufficient 
degree of State involvement, but rather whether 
the aggregate of all relevant factors compels a 
finding of State responsibility. It is not enough to 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
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29
examine seiatim each of the factors upon which a 
corporation is claimed to be an instrumentality or 
agency of Government and to dismiss each 
individually as being insufficient to support a 
finding to that effect. It is the aggregate or 
cumulative effect of all the relevant factors that is 
controlling.” 
 
 
27. 
Keeping in view the Statutes which established and 
the functions of the appellants’ authorities, and having considered 
in the light of “function test”, we hold and declare that these are 
statutory bodies, performing some of the functions which are 
functions of the Federation/State and through the exercise of 
public power, these bodies create public employments. These 
bodies are therefore “persons” within the meanings of Article 
199(1)(a)(ii) read with Article 199(5) of the Constitution. If their 
actions or orders passed are violative of the Statute creating those 
bodies or of Rules/Regulations framed under the Statute, the same 
could be interfered with by the High Court under Article 199 of the 
Constitution. 
Question No.2: 
Whether the respondent-employees being ‘person 
in corporation service’ within the meaning of 
section 2(c) of the Removal from Service (Special 
Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and having been 
deprived of their right to appeal by a judgment of 
this Court in Mubeen us Islam’s case (PLD 2006 
SC 602), could invoke Article 199 of the 
Constitution against the order of the departmental 
authority in view of the law laid down by this 
Court in Civil Aviation Authority through Director 
General v. Javed Ahmad and another (2009 
SCMR 956) or their remedy is a claim of damages 
as 
held 
in 
Pakistan 
International 
Airline 
Corporation Vs. Tanweer-ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 
SC 676), Executive Council, Allama Iqbal Open 
University, Islamabad through Chairman and 
another v. M. Tufail Hashmi (2010 SCMR 1484), 
Hyderabad Electric Supply Company v. Mushtaq 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
30
Ali Brohi (2010 PSC 1392) and Civil Aviation 
Authority through Director General v. Javed 
Ahmad (2009 SCMR 956)? 
 
 
28. 
For a better appreciation of the question framed, it 
would be pertinent to comprehend the ambit and scope of the 
Ordinance 2000 and its various provisions. It has not been 
disputed before this Court that the appellants are statutory bodies 
within the meaning of section 2 of the Ordinance and that is why 
all the respondent-employees were proceeded against under the 
said law except those of NED University and regarding that the 
High Court of Sindh vide the impugned judgment had observed 
that those employees too ought to have been dealt with under the 
said Ordinance. To discern that the Ordinance 2000 has an 
overriding effect a reference to certain provisions at this stage 
would be in order. Section 1(4) of the Ordinance 2000 stipulates 
that “it shall apply to persons in Government service and corporation 
service.” The expression “person in corporation service” has been 
defined in section 2(c) which reads as under:- 
“2. Definitions.---  
---- 
(a)----- 
(aa) 
------ 
 
(b)------ 
(c)'person in corporation service' means 
every person in the employment of a 
corporation, 
corporate 
body, 
authority, 
statutory body or other organization or 
institutions set up, established, owned, 
managed or controlled by the Federal 
Government, or by or under any law for the 
time being in force or a body or organization 
in which the Federal Government has a 
controlling share or interest and includes 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
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the Chairman and the Managing Director, 
and the holder of any other office therein. 
 
 
 
(d) ----- ” 
29. 
The right of appeal given under section 10 of the 
Ordinance (before the Service Tribunal) was held to be ultra vires in 
view of the law laid down in Mubeen-us-Salam’s case (PLD 2006 SC 
602). To further buttress its overriding effect, Section 12 of the 
Ordinance 2000 provided:- 
“Proceedings 
under 
this 
Ordinance. 
- 
All 
proceedings initiated on the commencement of 
this Ordinance in respect of matters and persons 
in service provided for in this Ordinance shall be 
governed by the provisions of this Ordinance and 
rules made thereunder. 
Provided that the Federal Government may, by 
notification in the official Gazette, exempt any 
class or classes of employees of a Corporation, a 
corporate body, authority, statutory body or other 
organization or institution set up, established, 
owned, managed or controlling share or interest 
from the provisions of this Ordinance and such 
class 
or 
classes 
of 
employees 
shall, 
notwithstanding 
anything 
contained 
in 
this 
Ordinance, be proceeded against and dealt with 
under the laws and rules applicable to such 
employees before the commencement of this 
Ordinance.” 
 
 
30. 
This Ordinance was promulgated on 27th of May 2000 
and remained in force till its repeal on 6th of March, 2010. 
31. 
The 
expression 
‘person 
in 
corporation 
service’ 
appearing in section 2(c) of the Ordinance 2000 is fairly 
comprehensive and indicates that the legislative intent was that 
every person in the service of a corporation, a corporate body, 
authority, statutory body or other organization or institution which 
is established, owned and managed or controlled by the Federal 
Government or under any law for the time being in force in which 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
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32
the Federal Government has a controlling share shall be treated as 
a “person in corporation service”. Section 12 mandates that 
proceedings in service matters against the employees of such 
statutory bodies/organizations shall be governed by the provisions 
of the Ordinance 2000. However, it carries a rider i.e. unless, “the 
Federal Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, 
exempt any class or classes of employees of a Corporation, a 
corporate body, authority” as defined in section 2(c) from the 
provisions of this Ordinance and the said notification further 
provides that those employees would, “be proceeded against and 
dealt with under the laws and rules applicable to such employees 
before the commencement of this Ordinance”. It has never been the 
case of the appellant-organizations before this Court that the 
Federal Government had in this regard issued any notification in 
the Official Gazette exempting the respondent-employees from the 
provisions of Ordinance 2000. Hence the matters of their service 
discipline had to be dealt with under the said Ordinance.  
32. 
Before we proceed to discuss the issue raised, a brief 
reference to the precedent case law in writ jurisdiction with regard 
to the employees of statutory bodies generally would be relevant. 
33. 
The actions of statutory bodies in service matters have 
been subject of judicial scrutiny in all jurisdictions. In some cases, 
Courts have interfered in exercise of the power of judicial review on 
a variety of grounds, while in others they have refrained invoking 
the principle of Master and Servant. There is need to discern the 
principles which have weighed with the Courts in varied situations. 
In Maloch Vs. Aberdeen Corporation (1971) 1 W.L.R. 1578 Lord 
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33
Wilberforce, in speaking about the anomaly created by judicial 
decision in the area of contractual and statutory employments 
narrowed down the parameters of ‘pure master and servant cases’ 
in observing:- 
 
“A comparative list of situations in which 
persons have been held entitled or not entitled to 
a hearing or to observation of rules of natural 
justice, according to the master and servant test, 
looks illogical and even bizarre. A specialist 
surgeon was denied protection which is given to a 
hospital doctor; a University professor, as a 
servant has been denied the right to be heard, a 
dock labourer and an undergraduate have been 
granted it; examples can be multiplied. One may 
accept that if there are relationships in which all 
requirements of the observance of rules of natural 
justice are excluded (and I do not wish to assume 
that this is inevitably so), these must be confined 
to what have been called “pure master and 
servant cases”, which I take to mean cases in 
which there is no element of public employment or 
service, no support by statue, nothing in the 
nature of an office or a status which is capable of 
protection. If any of these elements exist, then, in 
my opinion, whatever the terminology used, and 
even though in some inter parties aspects the 
relationship may be called that of master and 
servant, there may be essential procedural 
requirements to be observed, and failure to 
observe them may result in a dismissal being 
declared to be void.  (Emphasis is supplied) 
 
 
I think that employment under public 
corporation of the nature under consideration 
here is public employment and therefore the 
employee should have the protection which 
appertains to public employment.”  
 
34. 
In Viteralli v. Saton (359 US 535 Second Series 1012), 
the American Supreme Court speaking through Judge Frankfurter 
held that the authority is bound to follow the procedure prescribed 
in law: 
“An executive agency must be rigorously held to 
the standards by which it professes its action to 
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34
be judged……Accordingly, if dismissal from 
employment is based on a defined procedure, 
even though generous beyond the requirements 
that bind such agency, that procedure must be 
scrupulously observed……This judicially evolved 
rule 
of 
administrative 
law 
is 
now 
firmly 
established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that 
takes the procedural sword shall perish with the 
sword.” 
 
 
35. 
In Sukhdev Singh, Oil & Natural  Gas Commission, 
Life Insurance Corporation, 
Industrial Finance Corporation 
Employees Associations Vs. Bhagat Ram, Association of Clause II 
Officers, Shyam Lal, Industrial Finance Corporation (AIR 1975 SC 
1331), the questions before the Indian Supreme Court were 
whether an order for removal from service contrary to regulations 
framed under the Oil and Natural Gas Commission Act, 1959; the 
Industrial Finance Corporation Act, 1948; and the Life Insurance 
Corporation Act, 1956 would enable the employees to a declaration 
against the statutory corporation of continuance in service or 
would only give rise to a claim for damages. Second whether an 
employee of a statutory corporation is entitled to claim protection 
of Articles 14 and 16 against the Corporation. The Court by 
majority held as follows:- 
 
“60. The Oil and Natural Gas Commission is 
owned by the Government. It is a statutory body 
and not a company. The Commission has the 
exclusive privilege of extracting petroleum. The 
management is by the Government. It can be 
dissolved only by the Government.  
 
 
 
…………………………………………….. 
 
 
67. 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that 
rules and regulations framed by the Oil and 
Natural 
Gas 
Commission, 
Life 
Insurance 
Corporation 
and 
the 
Industrial 
Finance 
Corporation have the force of law. The employees 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
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35
of these statutory bodies have a statutory status 
and they are entitled to declaration of being in 
employment  when their dismissal or removal is in 
contravention of statutory provisions. By way of 
abundant caution we state that these employees 
are not servants of the Union or the State. These 
statutory bodies are “authorities” within the 
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.” 
 
 
36. 
In Lt. Col. Shujaddin Ahmad v. Oil & Gas Development 
Corporation (1971 SCMR 566), the question mooted was whether 
the Oil & Gas Development Corporation was a government 
department and, if so, whether its employees could challenge the 
order of departmental authority before the High Court under 
Article 199 of the Constitution. The Court while reiterating that 
relationship between the Corporation and its employees in the said 
case was that of master and servant dismissed the petition and 
held as follows:- 
“The consistent view of this Court  therefore has 
been that the employees of such statutory 
Corporations do not acquire the status of 
Government servants nor are the guarantees 
given by the Constitution applicable in their case. 
The High Court was, therefore, in our view, right 
in vacating the order of interim injunction, for 
according to the law of Master and Servant, a 
contract of service cannot be specifically enforced. 
It follows, therefore, that no temporary injunction 
can either be granted in such case. This petition 
is, accordingly dismissed.” 
 
This view was further affirmed in Raziuddin v. Chairman, Pakistan 
International Airlines Corporation (PLD 1992 SC 531), and while 
dismissing the appeal of the employees whose services had been 
terminated by the respondent, this Court held as follows:- 
“Even if we are to agree with Mr. Niaz Ahmad 
Khan's above submission, we cannot hold that 
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section 10(2) of the Act is violative of any 
fundamental 
rights 
guaranteed 
by 
the 
Constitution, keeping in view the factum that to 
the absence of statutory provisions for regulating 
the relationship of a statutory Corporation and its 
employees, the relationship is that of Master and 
Servant. We may also observe that subsections 
(2), (3) and (4) of section 10 of the Act have been 
omitted by the Pakistan International Airlines 
Corporation (Amendment) Act,. 1989 (Act No.V11 
of 1989), gazetted on 2-11-1989, and therefore, 
the above subsection (2) of section 10 is no longer 
on the statute.” 
 
37. 
The above rule of master and servant, it may however, 
be noted, was departed in situations where relationship between a 
corporation and its employees was regulated by statutory 
provisions and violation of such provisions was complained of. 
Thus in Evacuee Trust Property Board v. Muhammad Nawaz (1983 
SCMR 1275), the Court upheld the judgment of the High Court by 
holding that, “Where statutory rules governed the service conditions 
of an employee, then the pleasure of the master stands surrendered 
to the extent the matter was covered by the relevant rules.”  
38. 
The afore-referred view was followed in Anwar Hussain 
v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan (PLD 1984 SC 194) 
wherein this Court laid down as follows:- 
“The test of the employer/employee relation is the 
right of the employer to exercise control of the 
details and method of performing the work. It 
follows that if the relationship is the result of a 
contract freely entered into by the contracting 
parties then the principle of Master and Servant 
will apply. The principle, however, will not apply 
if some law or statutory rule intervenes and 
places fetters upon the freedom of the parties in 
the matter of the terms of the contract. It is on this 
principle that a civil servant for whom there are 
constitutional safeguards, is not governed by the 
principle of Master and Servant; for he is 
possessed 
of 
a 
legal 
character 
for 
the 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
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37
enforcement of which he can bring an action. 
Even where the employee is not a civil servant 
but there are statutory safeguards governing his 
relationship with the employer and placing 
restrictions on the freedom of the parties to act, 
the general law of Master and Servant will not 
apply. In such cases the employer would be 
bound to follow the procedure provided for in the 
statute or the statutory rules before terminating 
the service of the employee and in the absence of 
conformity to such procedure, the termination of 
service would not be clothed with validity and the 
employee will be entitled to an action for his 
reinstatement:" (Emphasis is supplied) 
 
39. 
In Principal, Cadet College, Kohat and another v. 
Mohammad Shoab Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170), this Court 
reiterated the above principle and held as follows: 
“It is, therefore, evident that where the conditions 
of service of an employee of a statutory body are 
governed 
by 
statutory 
rules, 
any 
action 
prejudicial taken against him in derogation or in 
violation of the said rules can be set aside by a 
writ petition. However, where his terms and 
conditions are not governed by statutory rules but 
only by regulations, instructions or directions, 
which the institution or body, in which he is 
employed, has issued for its internal use, any 
violation thereof will not, normally, be enforced 
through a writ petition." . 
 
40. 
The above principle was reiterated in following cases:- 
(1) 
Nisar Ahmad v. The Director, Chiltan 
Ghee Mills 1987 SCMR 1836. 
 
(2) 
National Bank of Pakistan v. Manzoorul 
Hasan 1989 SCMR 832. 
 
(3) 
Sindh 
Road 
Transport 
Corporation 
through , its Chairman v. Muhammad Ali 
G. Khokhar 1990 SCMR 1404. 
 
(4) 
Karachi 
Development 
Authority 
and 
another v Wali Ahmad Khan and others 
1991 SCMR 2434. 
 
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41. 
In Karachi Development Authority v. Wali Ahmed 
Khan (1991 SCMR 2434), this Court did not interfere in the 
judgment of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution 
whereby the petitions were allowed because the action of the 
authority was tainted with malice notwithstanding the non-
statutory nature of Regulations under which the employee was 
being governed.  
42. 
In Mrs. Anisa Rehman v. PIAC and another (1994 
SCMR 2232), the scope of judicial review was further enlarged 
despite Regulations being non-statutory and violation of principles 
of natural justice was held to be a valid ground to invoke writ 
jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. In the said case, 
the employee was aggrieved of an order of demotion passed without 
hearing him and the said right of hearing was not being claimed by 
him through statutory provision. This Court nevertheless held that 
the principles of natural justice were part of law and the order of 
the authority was struck down. 
43. 
In 
Walayat 
Ali 
Mir 
v. 
Pakistan 
Intl. 
Airlines 
Corporation through its Chairman (1995 SCMR 650), the Court 
held that the Corporation was bound by its Regulations though 
those may be non-statutory and struck down the order of the 
authority which was violative of those Regulations. It also laid 
down parameters of exercise of this discretionary jurisdiction. 
44. 
In Housing Building Finance Corporation through 
Managing Director, Karachi and another v. Inayatullah Shaikh 
(1999 SCMR 311), this Court while reiterating the earlier view that 
the Corporation may terminate the service of an employee under 
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Regulation 11 simplicitor qualified it with a proviso; provided it acts 
in good faith and in the interest of Corporation. Though the 
principle of ‘Master and Servant’, was reaffirmed, yet the Court did 
not interfere with the judgment of the High Court whereby the writ 
petition had been allowed and the employee of the House Building 
Finance Corporation was reinstated since the order of the 
competent authority terminating the service of the employee had 
not been placed before the High Court. 
45. 
In Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) v. 
Nasir Jamal Malik (2001 SCMR 934), the PIA had challenged the 
judgment of the Service Tribunal wherein it had allowed 
respondents-employees’ appeal and directed their reinstatement as 
their services had been terminated without assigning any reason 
but it was left to the organization to proceed against them in 
accordance with law. This Court upheld the judgment of the 
Service Tribunal and reiterated the law laid down in Mrs. Anisa 
Rehman v. PIAC (1994 SCMR 2232) to the effect that the 
employees of PIAC were governed by the principle of “Master and 
Servant” but put a rider that “the employer who itself has framed 
Rules as well as the Regulations for its domestic purposes is bound 
to strictly follow/adhere them because deviation therefrom is bound 
to violate settled principles of justice including the one enshrined in 
the maxim Audi alteram partem i.e. no one is to be condemned 
unheard.” 
46. 
The violation of principles of natural justice in 
disciplinary proceedings has been found to be valid ground for 
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judicial review in U.K. as well. In a very instructive Article1 titled 
‘Judicial Review of Dismissal from Employment: Coherence or 
Confusion?’ by Bernadette A. Walsh, with reference to plethora of 
case law, the author stated that:- 
“In the context of dismissal from employment, the 
major significance of the grounds of judicial 
review is that they enable a dismissed employee 
to challenge his dismissal on the grounds that the 
decision to dismiss him was taken in disregard of 
procedural requirements, including the rules of 
natural justice, or that it was so unreasonable 
that no reasonable body could have taken it2. By 
contrast, in an ordinary action for wrongful 
dismissal, the traditional view was that the 
employee was confined to arguing that there had 
been a breach of the terms of his contract 
pertaining 
to 
notice3. 
Ridge 
v. 
Baldwin4 
established that an office-holder was entitled to 
challenge his dismissal on the additional ground 
that there had been a breach of the rules of 
natural justice. Ridge itself concerned an action 
begun by writ, but there was no argument in the 
case as to the appropriate procedure for seeking 
relief.” 
 
 
47. 
In Azizullah Memon v. Province of Sindh (2007 SCMR 
229), this Court annulled the order of the departmental authority 
because notwithstanding the overriding effect of the Removal from 
Service (Special Powers) Ordinance (Sindh Ordinance IX) of 2004, 
the said civil servant had not been dealt with under the said 
Ordinance. The Court observed as follows:- 
“In the presence of express and specific language 
employed 
in 
the 
Ordinance 
neither 
the 
departmental 
authorities 
nor 
the 
Tribunal 
                                     
1 Appeared in Public Law (1989) 131. 
2 In C.S.S.U. v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374, Lord Diplock 
described the latter ground as “irrationality”. However, in R. v. Devon County 
Council, ex parte G. [1988] 3 W.L.R. 49, Lord Donaldson M.R. stated that he 
preferred the term “unreasonable” to that of “irrational”, because the latter term 
is widely interpreted as casting doubt on mental capacity. 
3 See, e.g. the discussion in Smith and Wood, Industrial Law (1986, 3rd ed.), 
199-218. 
4 [1964] A.C. 40. 
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41
bothered to notice that after the date of 
promulgation of the Ordinance all disciplinary 
proceedings should have been initiated under 
Ordinance rather than the old Rules enforced in 
1973. This Court has already ruled in a number 
of judgments that this Ordinance has the 
overriding effect over all other laws on the subject 
except in case of proceedings, which were 
already pending before promulgation of the 
Ordinance. Since the impugned action was 
initiated and taken to its logical conclusion under 
a misconception of law and under a wrong law, it 
has vitiated the entire proceedings including the 
final order, which cannot be sustained under the 
law. The proceedings as well as final order is, 
therefore, liable to be set aside.” 
 
 
48. 
In Muhammad Dawood and others v. Federation of 
Pakistan and others (2007 PLC (C.S.)1046), the High Court of 
Sindh was seized of the cases of employees of statutory/corporate 
bodies (including the Civil Aviation Authority, etc.) who had been 
proceeded against under the Ordinance, 2000 and their appeals 
before the Service Tribunal were abated which obliged them to 
challenge the order of the departmental authority in writ 
jurisdiction. The Court allowed those petitions and speaking 
through its Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Sabihuddin Ahmed held as 
follows:- 
“From the above somewhat detailed discussion, 
we have arrived at the following conclusions:- 
 
(i) 
Irrespective of an employee of a State 
controlled corporation not being a civil 
servant 
the 
corporation 
themselves 
continue 
to 
remain 
amenable 
to 
the 
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 
of the Constitution. 
 
(ii) 
The 
rule 
of 
master 
and 
servant 
is 
inapplicable to cases where there is 
violation of statutory provisions or of any 
other law. 
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The expression “violation of law” would not be 
confined merely to violation of any specific 
provision of a statute but the expression “law”, as 
observed by Hamoodur Rehman, J., (as his 
Lordship then was) in Government of West 
Pakistan v. Begum Agha Abdul Karim Sorish 
Kashmiri PLD 1969 SC 14 at page 31 and ought 
to be considered in its generic sense as connoting 
all that is treated as law in this country including 
even the judicial principles laid down from time to 
time by the superior Courts. It means according to 
the 
accepted norms of legal process and 
postulates a strict performance of all the functions 
and duties laid down by law. It may, for instance, 
include the principles of natural justice, the public 
duty to act fairly and honestly and absence of 
mala fides in fact and law. In all such cases the 
Court would be competent to grant relief of 
reinstatement.” 
 
49. 
While affirming the afore-mentioned judgment of the 
High Court of Sindh, this Court considered the effect of the 
Ordinance 2000 qua the jurisdiction of the High Court under 
Article 199 of the Constitution for the first time in Civil Aviation 
Authority through Director General v. Javed Ahmad (2009 SCMR 
956). The Court observed as under:- 
““The 
learned 
High 
Court 
was 
fully 
empowered to consider whether the action 
complained of is in accordance with the 
Removal 
from 
Service 
(Special 
Powers) 
Ordinance, 2000. Therefore, the violation of 
law falls within the parameters of the 
constitutional jurisdiction and the petition 
was 
properly 
entertainable 
regarding 
punishment of compulsory retirement 
to 
Javed Ahmed. The right of individual by 
change of law cannot be closed as past 
transaction and the constitutional petition 
remains alive to agitate the rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution. The departmental 
action 
on 
the 
statement 
of 
allegations 
contained 
23 
allegations 
which 
include 
additional allegations, was passed on malice 
and pre-determined desire to get rid of Javed 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
43
Ahmed. After abatement of his service appeal, 
there was no remedy available under the law 
in view of Mubeen-us-Salam's case and the 
petition 
before 
the 
High 
Court 
was 
maintainable” 
 
 
50. 
The principles of law which can be deduced from the 
foregoing survey of the precedent case law can be summarized as 
under:- 
(i) 
Violation of Service Rules or Regulations framed 
by the Statutory bodies under the powers 
derived from Statutes in absence of any 
adequate or efficacious remedy can be enforced 
through writ jurisdiction. 
(ii) 
Where conditions of service of employees of a 
statutory 
body 
are 
not 
regulated 
by 
Rules/Regulations framed under the Statute but 
only Rules or Instructions issued for its internal 
use, any violation thereof cannot normally be 
enforced through writ jurisdiction and they 
would be governed by the principle of ‘Master 
and Servant’. 
(iii) 
In all the public employments created by the 
Statutory bodies and governed by the Statutory 
Rules/Regulations 
and 
unless 
those 
appointments 
are 
purely 
contractual, 
the 
principles of natural justice cannot be dispensed 
with in disciplinary proceedings.  
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
44
(iv) 
Where the action of a statutory authority in a 
service matter is in disregard of the procedural 
requirements and is violative of the principles of 
natural justice, it can be interfered with in writ 
jurisdiction.  
(v) 
That the Removal from Service (Special Powers) 
Ordinance, 2000 has an overriding effect and 
after its promulgation (27th of May, 2000), all the 
disciplinary 
proceedings 
which 
had 
been 
initiated under the said Ordinance and any 
order passed or action taken in disregard to the 
said law would be amenable to writ jurisdiction 
of the High Court under Article 199 of the 
Constitution. 
 
51. 
This brings us to the precedent case law of this Court 
which reflects the conflict of opinion with regard to remedies 
available to an employee of a statutory body. As we examine the 
law, it may be kept in view that prior to Mubeen-us-Salam’s case 
(PLD 2006 SC 602), there were two remedies available to the 
employees of the statutory corporations: (i) section 2A of the 
Service Tribunals Act; and (ii) under section 10 of the Ordinance, 
2000. Section 2A of the Service Tribunals Act, was declared ultra 
vires of the Constitution and the appeals pending before the 
Tribunal abated. The effect of section 10 of the Ordinance 2000, 
however, was not considered by the Court in the said judgment. As 
discussed in para 49 above, the effect of deprivation of right to 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
45
appeal granted under section 10 of the Ordinance, 2000 with 
reference to remedy under Article 199 of the Constitution was 
considered for the first time in Civil Aviation Authority v. Javed 
Ahmad supra. In the said case, the facts were that an employee 
of Civil Aviation Authority was proceeded against under the 
Ordinance 2000 and awarded major penalty of compulsory 
retirement. He filed appeal before the Service Tribunal which was 
directed to have abated by order of the Service Tribunal on account 
of the judgment of this Court in Mubeen-us-Salam’s case (PLD 
2006 SC 602). He along with several employees similarly placed 
challenged the order of departmental authorities before the High 
Court of Sindh. The petitions were allowed only on question of 
jurisdiction by a Full Bench of which one of us (Sarmad Jalal 
Osmany, J.) was a member and it was held that those petitions 
under Article 199 of the Constitution were competent and were 
directed to be listed before appropriate Benches of High Court of 
Sindh for hearing on merit [Muhammad Dawood and others Supra 
(2007 PLC (C.S.)1046)]. The Court allowed those petitions in terms 
as referred to in para 48 above. The said judgment was upheld in 
Civil Aviation Authority supra (2009 SCMR 956). 
52. 
In Executive Council, Allama Iqbal Open University, 
Islamabad through Chairman and another v. M. Tufail Hashmi 
(2010 SCMR 1484) wherein a contra opinion was rendered, this 
Court was seized of several appeals filed by the employees of 
statutory bodies against the judgment of the Federal Service 
Tribunal. The question mooted in those appeals inter alia was 
whether the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain and 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
46
decide appeals in view of the law laid down in Muhammad 
Mubeen-us-Salam v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2006 SC 62) and 
Muhammad Idrees v. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan 
(PLD 2007 SC 681). The question of jurisdiction of the High Court 
under Article 199 of the Constitution was not considered. The 
Court 
relying 
on 
these 
two 
judgments 
and 
Pakistan 
Telecommunication Company Ltd. V. Muhammad Zahid (2010 
SCMR 253) held as under:- 
“10. Now coming towards the definition of a 
person in 'corporation service' or a person in 
'government service', as defined in section 2(c) 
and (d) of the RSO, 2000. Such persons can 
be subjected to the RSO, 2000 but keeping in 
view the definition of the 'civil servant' under 
the Civil Servant Act, 1973 as well as the 
dictum laid down in Muhammad Mubeen-us-
Salam's case (ibid), only those employees can 
approach the Service Tribunal, who fall within 
the definition of civil servant', holding posts in 
connection with the affairs of the Federation. 
As far as 
the remaining categories of 
employees, including the contractual ones; 
are concerned, if they are aggrieved of any 
adverse action, the Service Tribunal is not the 
appropriate forum for redressal of their 
grievance, in view of above conclusion, 
because it is a forum constituted under Article 
212 of the Constitution for the redressal of 
grievance of those employees, whose terms 
and conditions are settled under Article 
212(1)(a) of the Constitution. Similarly, any 
action taken against such persons shall not 
be questionable before the Service Tribunal as 
it is not meant to provide a forum to the 
employees, whose services are governed by 
non-statutory rules or who do not fall within 
the definition of a person in 'government 
service' as defined in section 2(d) of the RSO, 
2000. Admittedly, in the present case the 
employees of AIOU, SME Bank and Pakistan 
Steel Mill, who approached the Service 
Tribunal for redressal of their grievance, were 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
47
not enjoying the protection of statutory rules, 
therefore, 
the 
Service 
Tribunal 
had 
no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such matters 
and they will be governed by the principle of 
Master and Servant.” 
 
 
53. 
In Pakistan International Airlines Corporation PLD 2010 
SC 676 supra, (taking a contra view) the Court distinguished the 
case of Anisa Rehman v. PIAC (1994 SCMR 2232) by relying on the 
case of Justice Khurshid Anwar Bhinder (Supra). In the latter case, 
the petitioners who were Judges of the High Court had filed review 
applications against the judgment of this Court in Sindh High 
Court Bar Association v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2009 SC 879) 
wherein the appointment of the then Chief Justice of Pakistan and 
the entire consultative process leading to their appointments had 
been found to be unconstitutional and non est. The grievance of 
the review petitioners was that they had been condemned unheard. 
The Court while dismissing their review applications came to the 
conclusion that there can be exceptions to the principle of natural 
justice that no one should be condemned unheard. The Court 
observed as follows: 
“42.………Principle of audi alteram partem, at the 
same time, could not be treated to be of universal 
nature because before invoking/applying the said 
principle one had to specify that the person 
against whom action was contemplated to be 
taken prima facie had a vested right to defend the 
action and in those cases where the claimant had 
no basis or entitlement in his favour he would not 
be entitled to protection of the principles of 
natural justice. "(Nazir Ahmad Panhwar v. 
Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary 
Sindh 2009 PLC (C.S.) 161, Abdul Haque Indhar 
and others v. Province of Sindh through Secretary 
Forest, Fisheries and Livestock Department, 
Karachi and 3 others 2000 SCMR 907 and Abdul 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
48
Waheed and another v. Secretary, Ministry of 
Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth Affairs, 
Islamabad and another 2002 SCMR 769). It has 
been elucidated in the detailed reasoning of the 
judgment of 31.7.2009 how the order passed by 
a seven Member Bench of this Court has been 
flagrantly violated. Besides that the applicants 
had no vested right to be heard and furthermore 
they have acted illegally and in violation of the 
order of seven Member Bench for obtaining illegal 
gains and benefits which cannot be ignored while 
examining the principle of `audi alteram Partem'. 
 
 
54. 
The afore-referred justification for dispensing with the 
principle of natural justice was understandable as there was 
already in the field a conclusive finding by this Court (Sindh High 
Court Bar Association’s case PLD 2009 SC 879 supra) qua the 
nature of the consultative process which culminated in the 
appointment of those Judges. But in the instant cases, there was 
no prior conclusive finding by this Court qua the merits of 
respondents’ cases in disciplinary proceedings and also with 
regard to the effect of statutory intervention of the Ordinance, 
2000. In Hyderabad Electric Supply Co. v. Mushtaq Ali Brohi (2010 
PSC 1392), an employee of Hyderabad Electric Supply Co., had 
challenged the award of major penalty of dismissal from service 
under the Ordinance, 2000 in writ jurisdiction which was allowed. 
This Court set aside the said judgment holding that since the 
service regulations were non-statutory, writ was not competent. In 
this case as well, it was not appreciated that though the 
Rules/Regulations may be non-statutory but there was statutory 
intervention in the shape of the Ordinance and the employees had 
to be dealt with under the said law.  
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
49
55. 
In an attempt to resolve a conflict of judicial opinion, 
this Court must keep in mind: first the purpose of law the Court is 
called upon to interpret; second that law is a living organism which 
adapts to societal change and sometimes change in law precedes 
the former; third the ambit of court’s jurisdiction and its 
limitations as defined in the Constitution; fourth the Court must 
be consistent i.e. in similar situations/cases, the judicial opinion 
will be similar; fifth though the Supreme Court is not bound by the 
principle of stare decisis, but the departure from the precedent 
should be well reasoned, proper and in accordance with the 
established principles of law. A Judge’s role is to interpret the law 
and to correct its mistakes. The twin role of a developer in law and 
an earnest interpreter of legislation, though challenging, is in 
accord with the role the Supreme Court has in the constitutional 
scheme as also consistent with society’s perceptions of the role of 
judiciary in a liberal democracy. In the context of the case in hand, 
the mandate of two constitutional provisions should be kept in 
mind i.e. Article 4 and Article 10A which read as follows:- 
“4. (1) to enjoy the protection of law and to be 
treated in accordance with law is the inalienable 
right of every citizen wherever he may be, and of 
every other person for the time being within 
Pakistan. 
(2) In particular--- 
(a) 
no action detrimental to the life, liberty, 
body, reputation or property of any person 
shall be taken except in accordance with 
law. 
 
(b) 
No person shall be prevented from or be 
hindered in doing that which is not 
prohibited by law; and 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
50
(c) 
No person shall be compelled to do that 
which the law does not require him to do. 
 
10A. For the determination of his civil rights and 
obligations or in any criminal charge against him 
a person shall be entitled to a fair trial and due 
process.” 
 
 
56. 
The legislative intent in the promulgation of Ordinance 
2000, inter alia, was that “persons in corporation service” in their 
service matters should be dealt with in accordance with the 
provisions of the said law and to ensure a fair deal/trial it was inter 
alia provided in the Ordinance that unless specifically so exempted 
by a reasoned order, the competent authority shall hold a regular 
enquiry against an employee accused of misconduct and that he 
shall have a right of appeal (Section 10 of the Ordinance). 
57. 
The right of appeal is a substantive right. The 
respondents were deprived of the said right not by any legislative 
amendment but by a judicial opinion and that too on the analogy 
of the law laid down in Mubeen us Islam’s case (PLD 2006 SC 602) 
and Muhammad Idrees’s case (PLD 2007 SC 68). In both these 
cases, the effect of the Ordinance 2000 and that it was a statutory 
intervention was not a moot point. It is well established that an 
appeal is continuation of trial. Would it be a fair trial if an accused 
is shorn off his right of appeal? Would the deprivation of right of 
appeal not amount to judicial sanctification of all the orders 
passed by the departmental authorities awarding various penalties 
to the employees and would it not be violative of the fundamental 
right to a “fair trial and due process” as ordained in Article 10A of 
the Constitution? Could the respondent-employees not invoke 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
51
Article 199 of the Constitution to seek due compliance of the 
Ordinance 2000 for ensuring fair trial and due process? If the 
constitutional scheme and the purpose of law are kept in view, the 
answer to all these queries has to be in the affirmative and the 
constitutional 
petitions 
filed 
by 
the 
respondents 
seeking 
enforcement of their said right would be maintainable.  
58. 
The High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction under 
Article 199 of the Constitution can pass an appropriate order 
“declaring that any act done or proceeding taken within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Court by a person performing functions 
in connection with the affairs of the Federation, a Province or a local 
authority has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of 
no legal effect.” [(Article 199(1)(a)(ii)] The grievance of the 
respondent-employees in most of the cases was that the order of 
the departmental authority was violative of the Ordinance, 2000 
and of no legal effect (as they were proceeded against under the 
said law) while in other cases it was that they had not been dealt 
with under the said law despite its overriding effect, the High Court 
had jurisdiction to interfere and allow the petitions.  
59. 
For what has been discussed above, the cases of this 
Court reported as (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation PLD 
2010 SC 676, Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University 2010 
SCMR 1484  and Hyderabad Electric Supply Co. 2010 PSC 1392 
Supra), we observe with respect, did not declare or enunciate any 
principle of law but were rendered in their own peculiar facts and 
circumstances and may not be treated as precedent on the issue 
we are seized of, because:- 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
52
(i) 
The issue before this Court in Executive Council 
Allama Iqbal Open University supra was only 
whether the Service Tribunal had jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal in view of the law laid down in 
Mubeen-us-Salam’s case supra and whether the 
writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the 
Constitution could be invoked in the event of 
violation of Ordinance, 2000. 
(ii) 
In all the above cases, the point that irrespective 
of the Rules/Regulations being non-statutory 
the promulgation of Ordinance 2000 was a 
statutory intervention and any violation thereof 
would be amenable to writ jurisdiction was not 
considered. In Hyderabad Electric Supply Co. 
2010 PSC 1392 Supra, there was no allegation 
that there was any violation of any provision of 
the Ordinance 2000 and enforcement of Service 
Rules was sought which were found to be non-
statutory.  
(iii) 
Neither the mandate of Articles 4 and 10A of the 
Constitution nor the law laid down in Civil 
Aviation Authority through Director General v. 
Javed Ahmad (2009 SCMR 956) and Azizullah 
Memon v. Province of Sindh (2007 SCMR 229) 
was considered in those cases. 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
53
60. 
It was not disputed before this Court by appellants’ 
learned counsel that the respondent-employees were “persons in 
corporation service” within the meaning of section 2(c) of the 
Ordinance 2000 and except in the case of N.E.D. University, they 
were proceeded against under the said law. This was a statutory 
intervention and the employees had to be dealt with under the said 
law. Their disciplinary matters were being regulated by something 
higher than statutory rules i.e. the law i.e. Ordinance, 2000. Their 
right of appeal (under section 10) had been held to be ultra vires of 
the Constitution by this Court as they did not fall within the ambit 
of the Civil Servants Act, 1973, [(in Mubeen us Islam’s case (PLD 
2006 SC 602) and Muhammad Idrees’s case (PLD 2007 SC 68)]. 
They 
could 
in 
these 
circumstances 
invoke 
constitutional 
jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to seek 
enforcement of their right guaranteed under Article 4 of the 
Constitution which inter alia mandates that every citizen shall be 
dealt with in accordance with law. The judgment of this Court in 
Civil Aviation Authority (2009 SCMR 956) supra is more in 
consonance with the law laid down by this Court and the 
principles deduced therefrom as given in Para 50 above. 
61. 
These are the detailed reasons for our short order 
dated 2.5.2013 which is reproduced hereinbelow:- 
“For the reasons to be recorded later in the 
detailed judgment we are of the view that 
Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 
2000 had overriding effect and any violation or 
non-compliance of the said statute was amenable 
to writ jurisdiction. The impugned judgments 
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 39/2010, 1150/2010, 1162/2010, 142-K/2009, 177-
K/2010, 178-K/2010, 228-K/2010, 57-K/2011, 63-K/2011, 65-K/2011, 66-
K/2011, 83-K/2011, 91-K/2011, 135-K/2011, 136-K/2011, 137-K/2011, 188-
K/2011, 232-K/2011, 75-K/2012 AND 82-K/2012  
54
rendered by the High Court on that score are not 
open 
to 
exception. 
In 
the 
afore-referred 
circumstances all these appeals are dismissed.” 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Islamabad, the 
2nd of May, 2013 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING 
Khurram Anees/- 
