SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Gulzar Ahmed 
Mr. Justice Qazi Faez Isa 
Mr. Justice Yahya Afridi 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1189 OF 2014 
[on appeal against the Judgment dated 19.03.2014 passed by the Lahore High 
Court, Lahore, in W.P.No.21698 of 2011] 
 
 
Habib Bank Limited 
…Appellant(s) 
Versus 
Gulzar Khan & others 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the Appellant(s) 
: Mr. Faisal Mehmood Ghani, ASC 
 
  
For the Respondent(s) 
: Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, ASC 
 
  
Date of Hearing 
: 11.04.2019 
 
  
 
  
JUDGMENT 
GULZAR AHMED, J.— This appeal is by leave of the Court dated 
10.09.2014.  Brief facts of the matter are that respondent No.1 
(the respondent), who was working as an Officer Grade-II (OG-II) 
and Manager HBL, Sharifabad Branch, District Jhang, allegedly 
mishandled the bank funds.  Show-cause notice was issued to the 
respondent, who filed its reply.  Thereafter, a regular inquiry was 
conducted against the respondent in which he was found guilty of 
the commission of said offence.  Second show-cause notice dated 
20.11.2006 was issued to the respondent and thereafter vide letter 
dated 26.06.2007, a major penalty of compulsory retirement from 
service was imposed on him.  The respondent then filed Grievance 
Petition in Punjab Labour Court No.5, Sargodha Camp at Jhang, 
praying for his reinstatement with all back benefits.  The appellant 
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contested the said Grievance Petition of the respondent by filing its 
written statement in which one of the objections taken was about 
the maintainability of the Grievance Petition on the basis that he 
was not a ‘workman’ for that he was employed as OG-II and 
Manager of the branch.  The Labour Court, after full trial, vide its 
order dated 23.02.2009 allowed Grievance Petition filed by the 
respondent.  On appeal, the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (the 
Tribunal), after hearing both parties, allowed the appeal vide 
judgment dated 08.07.2011, by setting aside the order of the 
Labour Court.  The respondent, however, challenged judgment of 
the Tribunal by filing Writ Petition No.21698 of 2011 before the 
Lahore High Court, Lahore.  Such Writ Petition of the respondent 
was dismissed in limine vide order dated 30.09.2011 passed by the 
learned Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, Lahore.  The 
respondent approached this Court by filing Civil Petition No.1965-L 
of 2011, wherein order dated 20.12.2012 was passed remanding 
the Writ Petition to the High Court for decision afresh.  Pursuant to 
the remand order, the learned Judge in Chamber of the Lahore 
High Court, Lahore, passed the impugned order dated 19.03.2014 
and while allowing the Writ Petition of the respondent the matter 
was remanded to the Tribunal for decision of the controversy on 
merits.   
2. 
 
Mr. Faisal Mehmood Ghani, learned ASC for the 
appellant, at the outset, has contended that the Tribunal in its 
judgment has considered all relevant evidence as well as the case 
law and thereafter concluded that the respondent was not a 
‘workman’ and thus the order of the Labour Court was set-aside.  
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He further contended that the High Court, in the impugned 
judgment, has dealt with the question of respondent being a 
‘workman’ or not, and has given a finding that he is a ‘workman’.  
He next contended that the evidence, on record, amply 
demonstrated that the respondent, who was employed as OG-II 
and Manager of the branch was not a ‘workman’ and thus the 
Labour Court could not have exercised jurisdiction of entertaining 
his Grievance Petition.  He contended that the High Court, by way 
of impugned judgment, had misread the evidence available on 
record so also the legal position pronounced by this Court and 
have thus reached the conclusion that the respondent is a 
‘workman’, which is not sustainable by law. 
3. 
 
Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, learned ASC, on the other 
hand, has contended that by the impugned judgment the High 
Court has merely remanded the matter to the Tribunal and thus 
the remand order could not have been challenged by the appellant.  
He conceded that the High Court while remanding the matter, by 
the impugned judgment, has given a specific finding that the 
respondent is a ‘workman’ and thus his Grievance Petition before 
the Labour Court was maintainable and the matter was remanded 
only for decision on merits by the Tribunal.  Learned ASC further 
contended that the evidence on record so also the legal position 
amply established that the respondent was a ‘workman’ and in this 
regard supported the impugned judgment of the High Court. 
4. 
 
We have considered the submissions of learned ASC 
for the parties and have also gone through the record with their 
assistance.    The foremost question is as to whether jurisdiction 
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was available to the Labour Court to adjudicate and decide the 
matter and once it is established that the Labour Court had the 
jurisdiction, then the Labour Appeal before the Tribunal, as a 
consequence, would be maintainable and decided on its own 
merits.  The history of this case shows that the Labour Court has 
already dealt with the matter at full length and passed its order.  
Thereafter, the matter has been dealt with by the Tribunal, the 
High Court and then by this Court, when it was remanded to the 
High Court to decide the Writ Petition filed by the respondent 
afresh.  In our view, where this Court, while remanding the matter 
to the High Court, has directed to decide the matter afresh, 
perhaps such direction of this Court did not provide enough room 
to the High Court to further remand the matter to the Tribunal for 
deciding the same on merits.  In our view, in terms of the order 
passed by this Court, the High Court ought to have decided the 
case afresh not only on the point of jurisdiction but also on merits.  
Be that as it may, as the High Court has decided only the question 
of jurisdiction of the Labour Court by determining the respondent 
to be a ‘workman’, so we are mainly concerned with this question, 
which has been elaborately argued by the learned ASC appearing 
for the parties.  So far as the evidence available on record is 
concerned, we have noted that the respondent has recorded his 
evidence as PW-1 before the Labour Court where he admitted that 
on 01.07.2005 he was promoted as OG-II by the appellant and that 
he worked as Manager of Sharifabad branch of the appellant-bank 
for one year and three months.  He also admitted that he was 
drawing a salary of Rs.18,324/- plus other allowances, as 
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admissible to him.  He further admitted, in his evidence, that his 
duty included issuing of drafts, issuing of cheques, opening of 
accounts, closing of cash with signature of second officer, 
depositing of cash in the strong room and locking the same.  Such 
admission by the respondent, in his evidence, amply demonstrated 
that the nature of work being performed by the respondent as OG-
II and Manager of the branch was not of a clerical nature and did 
not fall within the ambit of term ‘workman’ as defined in the 
Industrial 
and 
Commercial 
Employment 
(Standing 
Orders) 
Ordinance, 1968 so also under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 
2002.  It is not necessary for us to give here the definition of the 
term ‘workman’ in these two laws for that besides the evidence 
available on record, the legal aspect is also clinched by various 
judgments pronounced by this Court in relation to the bank 
employees, who were employed as OG-II and Manager of the 
branch.  We may note that though the respondent did not have 
Power of Attorney with him, he was still Manager of the branch 
and all affairs of the branch were under his management and 
control, even the entire cash and record of the bank relating to the 
branch as well as all communications of the branch were also 
under his supervision, upon which he was required to take 
decisions as to how the same has to be dealt with in the best 
interest of the appellant-bank.  The term ‘Manager’ even otherwise 
is defined in the Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, as follows: 
“A person who administers or supervises the affairs of a 
business, office, or other organization” 
 
5. 
 
Learned ASC for the appellant has cited a number of 
cases on the point as to whether the respondent being OG-II and 
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Manager of the branch could be considered as a ‘workman’ and in 
this regard has referred to the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. 
Punjab Labour court No.5, Faisalabad & 2 others [1993 SCMR 672], 
where this Court dealt with the case of OG-II of the National Bank 
of Pakistan, who had filed Grievance Petition before the Labour 
Court.  The bank has taken an objection that OG-II was not a 
‘workman’ as he was predominantly performing managerial and 
administrative work.  This Court dealt with the issue as follows: 
“11. 
… … Admittedly, respondent No.3 was drawing, 
according to his own showing, salary of Rs.1,150 per month.  
He was an officer of Grade-II and, therefore, if he was 
employed at the relevant time in a supervisory capacity not 
necessarily mainly in a managerial or administrative 
capacity, he would fall within the first category of clause (b) 
referred to hereinabove.  It is a well-settled proposition of law 
that a person who approaches a Court on the basis of 
averment that he is a workman within the definition of 
clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the IRO, the burden of proof lies 
on him and not on the employer.  In the present case as 
pointed out hereinabove, the Labour Court has not examined 
the above question, but the Tribunal relied upon the 
statement of respondent No.3 in his examination-in-chief to 
the effect that “I was Second Officer in the branch when I 
was dismissed.  I was not Manager at the relevant time.  My 
job was of clerical nature. I was not entrusted with 
managerial or supervisory job.”   The Tribunal was also 
influenced by the factum that no cross-examination was 
directed in this regard.  In our view, simpliciter statement of 
respondent No.3 that “I was not performing supervisory job”, 
but at the same time, admitting the factum that he was 
Grade-II Officer, was not sufficient for discharging the above 
burden of proof.  The Tribunal as well as the learned Judge 
in chamber wrongly placed burden of proof on the appellant 
by holding that they had failed to produce the evidence to 
show the duties of respondent No.3.  In our view, it was for 
respondent No.3 to have stated what were the duties of a 
Grade-II Officer.  It is also incorrect to conclude that the 
appellant had not directed any cross-examination on the 
above question.  In the cross-examination, it was suggested 
that respondent No.3 was performing the duties of Manager, 
which suggestion was denied by him.” 
 
After examining the case law on the point, this Court ultimately 
reached at the following conclusion: 
“15. 
… … The question, whether a person is a workman 
within the purview of clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the IRO, 
can be determined not on the basis of the designation of his 
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post, but on the basis of the duties which he was performing.  
In the present case, we have already held that burden of 
proof that respondent No.3 was a workman, was on him, 
which he failed to discharge.” 
 
Further, in the case of National Bank of Pakistan & another v. 
Anwar Shah & others [2015 SCMR 434], this Court was confronted 
with the question as to whether OG-I, OG-II and OG-III were 
workmen and could become members of the employee’s union and 
participate in such union election process, and observed as 
follows: 
“8. 
… … The 'worker' and the 'workman' defined in the 
Act mean person not falling within the definition of 'employer' 
who is employed as a supervisor or as an apprentice but 
does not include a person who is employed mainly in 
managerial or administrative capacity. On the other hand, 
the 'employer' as defined in the Act includes a person who is 
proprietor, director, manager, secretary, agent or officer or 
person concerned with the management of the affairs of the 
establishment. The term 'officer' is specifically mentioned in 
the definition of term 'employer'. However, as has been noted 
from the case-law cited by the learned counsel for the 
parties, the Courts have not considered the designation of a 
person to be a factor determining his status of employment in 
an establishment to be that of an officer or a workman rather 
the Court has always considered the nature of duties and 
functions of a person to be the factor which will determine 
his status as to whether he is a workman or not. In this 
respect, we may refer to the case of National Bank of 
Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No.5, Faisalabad (1993 
SCMR 672), which was a case relating to an Officer Grade-I1 
of NBP against whom disciplinary action was taken. He 
approached the Labour Court for redressal of his grievance 
claiming himself to be a workman. The matter came up to 
this Court and it was held that the designation per se is not 
determinative of a person being a workman rather the nature 
of duties and function determine his status and the burden is 
on him to establish that he is a workman. As the Officer 
Grade-II failed to discharge his burden, he was held not to be 
a 'workman' and his grievance petition was dismissed. The 
ratio of this case and also of the other cases that have been 
relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties is that the 
person who approaches a Labour Court for redressal of his 
grievance claiming himself to be a workman and such status 
of workman being denied by the employer, it becomes a 
bounden duty of a person who approaches the Labour forum 
to demonstrate through evidence that his nature of duties 
and functions were that of a workman and not that of a 
managerial or administrative capacity and that he was not 
an employer. Unless such categoric evidence is led by him, 
he will not be considered to be a workman and his grievance 
petition will not be maintainable before the Labour forum. It, 
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therefore, implies that the officer cannot be assumed to be 
workmen nor such can be declared on mere asking. The 
argument that officers Grade-I to III are performing 
supervisory function in itself means that this has to be 
established by evidence. In this view of the matter, on a 
solitary claim of the union no blanket declaration can be 
given that the Officers Grade-I to III in the establishment of 
NBP are workmen.” 
 
Moreover, in the case of Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. and others 
v. Muhammad Shahid Mumtaz and another [2011 SCMR 1475] = 
[2009 PLC 281] this Court has dealt with the issue as follows: 
“7. 
In the light of the above definition, we need to examine 
as to whether the respondent was a workman or not.  Before 
discussing the factual aspects of the question, we may point 
out that both the Courts erred in placing burden on the Bank 
to provide that the respondent was not a workman.  This 
Court has already held in the case of National Bank of 
Pakistan v. Punjab Labour Court No.5 (supra) that a person, 
who approaches a Court on the basis of averment that he is 
a workman, the burden of proof lies on him and not on the 
employer. The respondent, was a Manager at the relevant 
time of the Khakwani Cloth Market Branch of the appellant-
Bank. This was his second posting as Manager as he has 
earlier posted in the same capacity in Khiali Gate Branch, 
MCB, Gujranwala. The power of attorney was executed by 
the Bank in his favour on 20th August, 1996, four years prior 
to the present incident. This power of attorney was given to 
him on his first posting as Manager. It was duly notarized by 
a Notary Public and signed by the President of the Bank and 
attested by two Vice-Presidents of the Bank. There is no 
reason to doubt its authenticity and we are unable to 
understand as to how the trial Court had ruled out of 
consider the power simply on the ground that there was no 
evidence to show that the same was ever delivered to the 
respondent. In view of its notarization and execution by the 
most responsible official of the Bank, in the absence of any 
convincing evidence to the contrary, it is unbelievable that 
the same would have been fabricated only to counter the 
respondent's claim of being the workman. We have also 
noticed that this aspect was not discussed by the learned 
Judge in Chambers in the High Court. 
8. 
The powers conferred on the respondent by the power 
of attorney are material for fixing his status in the context as 
to whether or not he was a workman.  For this purpose, all 
the powers conferred are relevant but the most significant 
ones are the following:-- 
 
(2) 
To engage, employee, control and dismiss 
Clerks, Servants and others whether engaged by the said 
Attorney or by the Bank or otherwise. 
 
(4) 
To settle and adjust all average and other 
losses and claims under Policies of Insurance of All kinds 
and all other accounts and reckonings whatsoever and to 
compromise and compound all debts and claims whatsoever 
claimable by the Bank and to submit to Arbitration all 
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differences and disputes whatsoever. 
 
(6) 
To take on lease or other tenancy any land, 
houses, buildings for the purposes of officers or premises 
suitably for carrying on the said business or any of them and 
to build, alter and furnish any office, house or premises. 
 
(8) 
To make, sign, seal, execute, deliver and 
endorse all receipts, deeds, redemption of mortgage deeds, 
conveyance, transfers and instruments. 
 
(12) 
To draw, accept, endorse, sign and negotiate 
all Bills of Exchange, Dividend Warrants and any orders for 
payment of money in which the Bank is or may be interested 
or concerned and to which its endorsement or signature may 
be necessary or requisite. 
 
(17) 
AND GENERALLY to do all such acts, deeds 
and things not specifically mentioned hereinabove but which 
are necessary or expedient to carry on and manage the 
business of the Bank and all such other acts which are 
incidental to the promotion of Banking business.” 
 
9. The above powers, particularly the one of hire and fire in 
para 2, sufficiently demonstrates the nature of his duties 
and functions as managerial and supervisory and not 
clerical in nature, as claimed by him.” 
 
Again, in the case of Javaid Hussain Naqi v. Member Board of 
Directors, MCB and others [2009 PLC 260], this Court was 
confronted with the question as to whether the Branch Manager 
of the Bank could fall within the term ‘workman’ as defined 
under the labour laws.  Such question was dealt with by this 
Court as follows:- 
“3. The present petitioner also is a Branch Manager of 
Muslim 
Commercial 
Bank, 
performing 
the 
duties 
of 
managerial and supervisory nature. It is not in the last 
Branch alone but, according to para. No.3 of his grievance 
petition (pp.65), he has all along been working as Branch 
Manager at different stations since November, 1979. Learned 
High Court was, therefore, justified in holding, in the light of 
the above referred judgment of this Court, that the petitioner 
was not a "workman"' and hence the Labour Court lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain his petition under section 25-A of the 
Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. 
4. The arguments of the learned counsel that the branch in 
which the petitioner was last posted, was a small branch, is 
altogether out of context. The size of a branch has no nexus 
with the nature of duties of the Manager, which always 
remain of managerial and supervisory nature. It would be 
ridiculous to observe that the Manager of a large branch 
would not be a "workman" and that of a small branch would 
be. There being no force in the petition, it is hereby dismissed 
and leave to appeal refused.” 
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6. 
 
On the other hand, learned ASC for the respondent 
has refereed to the case of Mahmood Hussain Larik and others v. 
Muslim Commercial Bank Limited [2009 SCMR 857].  This case was 
heard by a three-member bench of this Court where two of the 
members who were in majority, inter alia, dealt with the question 
as to whether OG-III in the bank could be considered as a 
‘workman’ or not and came to the conclusion that such officers, in 
view of the nature of work performed by them were not ‘workman’.  
However, his lordship Sabihuddin Ahmed, J., one of the members 
of the said bench gave his dissenting note.  Learned ASC for the 
respondent has relied upon this dissenting note to support his 
case.  Reliance of the learned ASC for the respondent on the 
dissenting note against the majority view, cannot give a foundation 
to this Court to base its decision in considering as to what was the 
decision of this Court in the case, the Court will always consider 
the majority view that prevailed in the case and not the dissenting 
note given by one of the judges of the bench.  This is well 
established law and it is unnecessary to cite any precedent for it. 
7. 
 
The very evidence which the respondent recorded 
before the Labour Court, as read by us, did not refer to any 
function of the respondent that could be considered to be mainly of 
manual or clerical nature rather the functions which he performed 
and also stated in his evidence were of OG-II and Manager of the 
branch and those were mainly of managerial and supervisory 
nature and under no circumstance could they be considered to be 
that of a ‘workman’ more particularly, when the respondent in his 
evidence has stated that he was issuing drafts and cheques, 
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opening of accounts, closing of cash with signature of second 
officer, depositing of cash in strong room and locking the same are 
the those which need independent application of mind and making 
of decisions for that the drafts and cheques are not issued in 
routine when they are also to be signed.  Similarly, opening of 
bank accounts, depositing of cash in the strong room and locking 
the same are the functions which are mainly of the Manager and 
not that of a ‘workman’. Further, during arguments, provision of 
Section 9 of the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) 
Ordinance, 2001, was also referred to, which provides as follows: 
“9(1) Where a customer or financial institution commits a 
default in fulfilment of any obligation with regard to any 
finance, the financial institution or, as the case may be, the 
customer, may institute a suit in the Banking Court by 
presenting a plaint which shall be verified on oath, in the 
case of a financial institution by the Branch Manager or such 
other officer of the financial institution as may be duly 
authorized in this behalf by power of attorney or otherwise”. 
 
This provision shows that the branch Manager of the bank is 
competent to file a suit on behalf of the bank and the person, who 
is authorized by law to file a suit on behalf of a bank in the Court 
of law could not be considered to be a ‘workman’.  In this regard, 
reference may further be made to the provision of Rule 1 Order 
XXIX CPC, which is as follows: 
“Subscription and verification of pleading: In suits by or 
against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and 
verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary or by 
any director or other principal officer of the corporation who 
is able to depose to the facts of the case.” 
 
8. 
 
The cumulative effect of the evidence available on 
record, judgments of this Court referred to above, the provision of 
the Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001 
and Rule 1 Order XXIX CPC amply establish that the respondent, 
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as an officer OG-II and Manager of the branch, was not a 
‘workman’.  Thus, the Labour Court did not have jurisdiction to 
entertain his Grievance Petition, which on this very ground was 
liable to be dismissed.  Having come to conclusion that the Labour 
Court did not have jurisdiction in the matter, thus, the Tribunal 
also lacked jurisdiction to deal with the matter and, therefore, the 
very exercise of remanding the case to the Tribunal for deciding the 
same on merits will be a futile exercise. 
9. 
 
For all the above reasons, we are of the considered 
view that the impugned judgment was not in consonance with the 
evidence available on record, the law pronounced by this Court 
and other legal provisions cited above, thus the same is not 
sustainable.  Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the 
impugned judgment dated 19.03.2014 passed by the High Court is 
set-aside. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
Bench-II 
ISLAMABAD 
11.04.2019 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING 
JUDGE 
 
*Hashmi* 
JUDGE 
 
 
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In the very evidence which the respondent recorded before the 
Labour Court, as read by us, did not at all refer to the work that he 
actually performed in that Bank as OG-II and Manager of the 
branch was predominantly of manual or clerical nature, which is 
the requirement under the law for holding a person to be as 
‘workman’ rather as noted above, the function that he has 
admitted to be performing as OG-II and branch Manager 
predominantly shows that he was performing work that of an 
officer and manager which under no circumstance to be considered 
to that of a ‘workman’. 
