IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
PRESENT:  
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
MR. JUSTICE MUNIB AKHTAR  
MR. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI 
 
  
CRIMINAL 
APPEAL 
NO.528 
OF 
2019 IN JAIL PETITION NO. 327 
OF 2018 
(Against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore dated 14.01.2015 passed in Capital 
Sentence Reference No. 10/2011, Criminal Appeal 
No.69-ATA/2011 and Criminal Appeal No.86-
ATA/2011) 
 
Muhammad Hanif 
 
 
 
… 
Appellant(s) 
Versus 
The State  
 
 
 
… 
Respondent(s) 
 
For the Appellant(s)  
: 
Sardar Shahbaz Khosa, ASC 
Ch. Akhtar Ali,  AOR 
 
 
 
For the (State)  
: 
Ch. M. Sarwar Sidhu, Addl. PG 
 
 
 
Date of Hearing 
: 
29.09.2020 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J:-  Criminal appeal, by leave 
of the Court, is directed against the impugned judgment of learned 
Division Bench of Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, dated 14.01.2015 
passed in Capital Sentence Reference No.10/2011, Criminal Appeal 
No.69-ATA/2011 and Criminal Appeal No.86-ATA/2011 whereby the 
conviction of the appellant under section 302(b), 324, 186, 353, PPC read 
with section 7 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 awarded by the Special Judge, 
Anti-Terrorism Court, Dera Ghazi Khan vide judgment dated 08.08.2011 
was upheld but his sentence of death under section 302(b) PPC and 
under section 7 Anti-Terrorism Act,1997 was  converted into imprisonment 
for life. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The compensation 
awarded by the learned trial court and sentence in default thereof was 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
2 
 
ordered to be maintained. The benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. was also 
extended to the appellant. 
2. 
 
As per prosecution story contained in the FIR   No. 157/2009 
dated 12.06.2009, offences under section 302, 324, 353, 186, 34 PPC 
read with section 7 Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, registered with police station 
Civil Lines, D.G. Khan (Exh.PA) lodged at the instance of one Mushtaq 
Ahmad Shah (PW-5) is that on 12.06.2009 at about 9.30 a.m. the 
complainant came to visit his brother Iqbal Shah No. 916/HC at Sessions 
Court who was posted there,  where he was assigned the duty of checking 
persons entering into the court premises. In the meantime, Rao Naveed 
alongwith Muhammad Hanif previously known to complainant came there 
on a motorcycle bearing registration 6938/DGK being driven by Rao 
Naveed Advocate while appellant was on back seat. Soon they tried to 
enter court premises without checking, Iqbal Shah 916/HC estopped them 
for personal search, in the meantime Muhammad Hanif after de-boarding 
from the motorcycle, picked out 30 bore pistol from right folder of his 
shalwar, fired upon Iqbal Shah (Head Constable) but it missed. The other 
police official Muhammad Mohsin 411/C who was sitting in a nearly 
rampart retaliated by fire shot towards the assailant which missed too. 
Rao Naveed decamped towards north whereas Muhammad Hanif 
(appellant) ran towards south while resorting to firing. Muhammad Akram 
SI, Muhammad Tariq HC, Zulqarnain Shah 840/C, Muhammad Mohsin 
411/C and Iqbal Shah (HC) chased him. Iqbal Shah being ahead of 
others, was likely to apprehend Muhammad Hanif who took a turn and 
made a fire shot at Iqbal Shah which landed on left side of his chest who 
fell down on the ground. Muhammad Hanif ran towards Arts Council 
followed by other police officials. Iqbal Shah was taken to hospital in 
injured condition through ambulance and was medically examined by Dr. 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
3 
 
Majeed Ullah Buzdar at 09:55 AM. but he succumbed to injuries in the 
hospital.  
3. 
 
After registration of the aforesaid case, the investigation was 
conducted by Muhammad Zafar SI who after the conclusion of the 
investigation found them involved in the crime hence they were challaned 
while placing their names in column No.3 of the report under Section 173 
Cr.P.C. On receipt of challan, the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, 
Dera Ghazi Khan formally charge sheeted the appellant and his co-
accused vide order dated 06.01.2020 to which they pleaded not guilty and 
claimed trial. Prosecution in order to substantiate its case produced as 
many as 11 witnesses. The appellant was examined under Section 342, 
Cr.P.C, however, he opted not to appear in his defence, as his own 
witness in terms of Section 340(2), Cr.PC to disprove the allegations 
levelled against him, he even did not produce any defence evidence. 
4. 
 
The learned trial court after conclusion of trial found that 
prosecution has succeeded to prove accusation against the appellant, 
hence convicted the appellant under section 302(b) PPC and sentenced to 
death with payment of compensation of Rs.1,00,000/- to the legal heirs of 
Muhammad Iqbal Shah deceased under section 544-A Cr.PC or in default 
whereof to further undergo S.I. for six months. The appellant was also 
convicted under section 324 PPC and sentenced to 10 years R.I. He was 
also convicted under section 186 PPC and sentenced to three months. He 
was convicted under section 353 PPC and sentenced to two years. The 
appellant was further convicted under section 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 and sentenced to death with payment of compensation of 
Rs.2,00,000/- to the legal heirs of Muhammad Iqbal Shah u/s 544-A Cr.PC 
or in default whereof to further undergo S.I. for six months. Benefit of 
section 382-B Cr.P.C. was extended to the appellant. The co-accused of 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
4 
 
the appellant was acquitted of the charge by extending him benefit of 
doubt. 
5. 
 
The appellant being aggrieved by the judgment of the 
learned trial court dated 08.08.2011 filed Criminal Appeal No.69-ATA/2011 
before the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench whereas the learned trial 
court forwarded Capital Sentence Reference No.10/2011 for confirmation 
of the sentences of death inflicted upon the appellant whereas the 
complainant filed Criminal Appeal No.86-ATA/2011 against the acquittal of 
co-accused Rao Naveed. The learned Division Bench of High Court vide 
judgment dated 14.01.2015 dismissed the Criminal Appeal No.69-
ATA/2011 filed by the appellant and that of complainant, however, 
maintained convictions under section 302(b), 324, 186, 353, PPC read 
with section 7(a) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 awarded by the learned trial 
court but converted the sentence of death to imprisonment for life u/s 
302(b) PPC and section 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act. The compensation 
awarded by the learned trial court and sentence in default thereof was 
maintained. The benefit of section 382-B Cr.P.C. was also given to the 
appellant. The sentences were also ordered to run concurrently. 
6. 
 
Leave to appeal was granted by this Court vide order dated 
28.10.2019 mainly on the ground that according to the record, the inter-se 
distance between the assailant and the deceased was 35 feet whereas 
the postmortem report clearly reflects that there was blackening around 
the injuries which do not commensurate with distance mentioned in site 
plan as per allegation levelled against the petitioner in the crime report. 
Further that there is contradiction qua the number of injuries sustained by 
the deceased. 
7. 
 
At the very outset, learned counsel for the appellant states 
that both the courts below have not taken into consideration the evidence 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
5 
 
available on the record and the same has not been appreciated according 
to the established principles of “appreciation of evidence” enunciated by 
the superior courts from time to time. He argued that the presence of the 
prosecution witnesses of ocular account at the spot at the relevant time is 
doubtful, the complainant himself is a police officer, his presence at the 
spot do not inspire confidence. Contends that there are glaring 
discrepancies found in the statements of prosecution witnesses of the 
ocular account. Further contends that the inter-se distance disclosed in 
the site plan clearly contradict the ocular account. Contends that 
blackening is found around the injuries which suggests that the assailant 
has fired from a close range. Contends that though the petitioner was 
taken into custody soon after the occurrence but the fact remains that he 
was taken into custody from Arts Council which is at fairly long distance 
from the place of occurrence. Contends that the provision of section 7 of 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are not attracted in this case as occurrence has 
taken place outside the premises of the court and as such the trial in court 
established under Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was beyond its jurisdiction, 
hence, the conviction and sentence inflicted u/s 7 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 is not sustainable in the eye of law. The learned counsel further 
contends that co-accused of the appellant was acquitted of the charge and 
as such it has created a dent in the prosecution case, therefore, the 
petitioner is also entitled for the same relief while extending him benefit of 
doubt. 
8. 
 
On the other hand, learned Law Officer appearing on behalf 
of the State vehemently opposed the contentions raised by the learned 
counsel for the appellant. It has been argued by learned Law Officer that 
in fact it is a case of highhandedness; the police official was done to death 
in a brutal manner while he was in uniform and performing his duties in 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
6 
 
official capacity. Further contends that conduct of the appellant is reckless; 
he has acted in a brutal manner twice; in the earlier phase he fired at 
police official which missed but when he was given hot pursuit by the 
police officials and he was likely to be arrested by the deceased, he fired 
at him on the most vital part resulting into instantaneous death. Further 
contends that the appellant was apprehended at the spot; the recovery of 
pistol from his possession further lend support to the prosecution version. 
Contends that the report of Forensic Science Agency is positive. All these 
facts clearly reflect that the petitioner was sole perpetrator of the 
occurrence; he has taken law into his own hands while committing the 
murder of a police official in uniform within the court premises. Finally 
argued that Anti-Terrorism Court being a special court was fully justified to 
entertain and take cognizance of such like offences being scheduled 
offence. Finally argued that prosecution has proved its case to hilt.  
9. 
 
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant, 
learned Additional Prosecutor General and perused the record with their 
able assistance. 
 
 
A close scrutiny of the record made it abundantly clear that 
the instant occurrence has taken place in the broad daylight whereas both 
the accused nominated in the crime report were previously known to the 
prosecution witnesses. The inter-se distance between the place of 
occurrence and police station is hardly 1 ½ miles. Undeniably, the incident 
has taken place in two phases, first in the court premises and the other 
when the police officials retaliated in the same coin, as a consequent both 
the accused tried to make their escape but in different directions. The 
police officials gave a chase to the accused persons and finally when Iqbal 
Shah 916/HC was likely to apprehend the appellant, he took a turn and 
fire upon him which pierced through the left side of his chest, resultantly 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
7 
 
he expired in hospital, however, the other police officials continued their 
chase and finally the appellant was taken into custody from the Arts 
Council where he had taken rescue. The pivotal questions which require 
determination by this Court are (i) jurisdiction assumed by court 
constituted under Anti-Terrorism Act (ii) the series of incident qua the 
occurrence relates to one and the same transaction (iii) contradiction in 
the inter-se distance between appellant and deceased and if any its legal 
consequences (iv) conviction and sentence under Anti-Terrorism Act. 
10. 
 
For the determination of the aforesaid questions raised, it 
seems imperative to capsulate brief history of law emerged relating to 
terrorism. Our homeland is perhaps one of the country most affected by 
terrorism in the world. It began experiencing terrorism on a sustained 
basis in 1990 primarily in the form of sectarian killings. Thereafter the 
wave of terrorist activities further intensified upon a larger canvas. Now 
the target of terrorism was State functionaries, holding key positions, and 
every notable entity from every walk of life including law enforcing 
agencies. Use of explosive, sophisticated weapons, bomb blasting, target 
killing, abduction for ransom, extortion to generate funds for terrorist 
activities were very common features of crime oriented outlaws to disrupt 
the peace of society and create a sense of insecurity in public at large. 
Due to rise in terrorist activities, national economy had incurred huge loss 
estimated to be in billions of dollars. This situation forced the State 
functionaries to adopt extraordinary measure to preserve the authority of 
the State. The consensus has prevailed amongst the Government 
functionaries to deal with the law breakers with iron hands. Consequently, 
the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act of 1975 was 
promulgated with special emphasis qua:- 
 (i). 
No adjournment in the court proceedings.  
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
8 
 
(ii) 
Continuation of court proceedings even if the accused 
absconds, and 
(iii) 
Salutary principle burdened to prove guilt upon prosecution 
was reversed and accused was to prove his innocence. 
 
The courts established under the law of Suppression of Terrorist Activities 
remained in field for a considerable time but it could not deliver according 
to the expectations, as during proceedings before the courts of law many 
flaws surfaced before the superior courts, therefore, Suppression of 
Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act of 1975 was substituted by 
“Special Courts for Speedy Trial Ordinance 1987” The said legislation was 
introduced with different approach in which right of one appeal was 
withdrawn while the only appeal arising out of the judgment of trial court 
was to be heard by a Bench comprising of two Judges of respective High 
Courts whereas it was to presided over by a Judge of the Supreme Court. 
The courts established under the legislation could not continue for long 
hence, the framer of law introduced another act “Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997”. The preamble of the said legislation was more exhaustive, 
cyclopaedic and potent while the other provisions of the act, were framed 
to provide legal cover to all judicial norms relating to administration of 
criminal justice. The said legislation had already undergone judicial review 
since its inception by this Court in two cases reported as (PLD 1998 SC 
1445” Mehram Ali and others vs Federation of Pakistan and others” and 
(PLD 2001 SC 607) “Khan Asfandyar Wali and others Vs Federation of 
Pakistan through Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others”. In the aforesaid 
judgments all those provisions which were found inconsistent to any 
provision of the “constitution” and established principle of “due process” 
were struck down, hence, the said legislation is in field to deal with such 
like cases in more judicious form. The paramount object of said legislation 
is spelled out from bare reading of “preamble” of the act which is 
reproduced as under:-.  
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
9 
 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
(Act No.XXVII of 1997) 
 
An Act to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for 
speedy trial of heinous offences; 
 
It was duly published in Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary Part I, August 
20, 1997 in the following terms: - 
 
No.F.9(39)/97-Legis.—The following Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) 
received the assent of the President on 16th August, 1997, is hereby 
published for general information: - 
 
WHEREAS it is expedient to provide for the prevention of terrorism, 
sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters 
connected therewith and incidental thereto; 
 
The preamble of The Anti-Terrorism Act has broadly classified jurisdiction 
to entertain cases relating to (i) terrorism, (ii) sectarian violence and for 
speedy trial of (iii) heinous offences and for matters connected therewith 
and incidental thereto. Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 has 
defined and categorized cases falling within the definition of terrorism. For 
the purpose of the case in hand, the provision of sections 
6(1)(2)(a)(m)(n)(3) are relevant to the facts and circumstance. 
6. Terrorism.-(1) In this Act, “terrorism” means the use or threat of action 
where:-  
 (2) An “action” shall fall within the meaning of sub-section (1), if it:-  
(a) involves the doing of anything that causes death;  
(m) involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public servant in order to 
force him to discharge or to refrain from discharging his lawful duties;  
(n) involves serious violence against a member of the police force, armed 
forces, civil armed forces, or a public servant;  
(3) The use or threat of use of any action falling within sub-section (2), 
which involves the use of firearms, explosive or any other weapon is 
terrorism, whether or not sub-section 1(c) is satisfied.  
  
The punishment of the aforesaid provisions is provided u/s 7 of Anti-
Terrorism Act. Similarly, the 3rd Schedule relating to cognizable offences  
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
10 
 
under the act are also notified, classifying the nature of offences attracting 
the provision of section 6 punishable u/s 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, the 
same is mentioned below: -  
THE THIRD SCHEDULE 
(Scheduled Offences) 
[See section 2(t)] 
 
1. Any act of terrorism within the meaning of this Act including those 
offences which may be added or amended in accordance with the 
provisions of section 34 of this Act.  
2. ……………….. 
3. ………………..  
[4. ………………..  
(i) ………………..  
(ii) ……………….. 
(iii) firing or use of explosive by any device, including bomb blast in the 
court premises.] 
[(iv) ……………….. 
(v) ……………….. 
 
Provision of Section 34 of the act authorized to amend, modify, add or 
omit any part of the schedule notified by the Government, as a 
consequent the schedule was reframed vide Notification No.SO(Judl-
I)10(I-36(I)/2010 dated 5th September, 2012.  
While scanning the aforesaid provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act and the 
schedule appended, the offence committed by the petitioner, it is 
abundantly clear that a court established under the Anti-Terrorism Act was 
fully competent to entertain and take cognizance of the offence, therefore, 
the court constituted under the act was fully competent to proceed with the 
matter in view of the facts of the instant case narrated above. 
11. 
 
There is no denial that the occurrence has taken place in two 
phases. During the course of investigation, it was found correct, hence, 
the same was incorporated in report u/s 173 Cr.P.C. The learned trial 
court while framing the charge against the appellant has also proceeded in 
the same manner. Firstly, he charged u/s 324/353/186 PPC read with 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
11 
 
section 7 of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 while the second limb the charge 
relates to offence u/s 302/34 PPC read with section 7 of Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997. The charge sheet framed by the learned trial court fully 
endorsed the investigation carried out by the investigating officer of the 
local police. Although the petitioner has committed the crime at two 
different places commencing from the court premises and finally when he 
reached in front of Rana Abdul Sittar Tea-stall which is at distance of 1 ½ 
kilometers it would be presumed one and the same transaction as per the 
spirit of law. As the act of the petitioner was in continuation till its 
conclusion and this aspect is fully covered by provision of section 235 
Cr.P.C. which is reproduced as under: - 
“235. Trial for more than one offence.  
(1) If, in one series of acts so connected together as to form the same 
transaction, more offences than one are committed by the same person, 
he may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, every such offence. 
 
(2) Offence falling within two definitions. If the acts alleged constitute an 
offence falling within two or more separate definitions of any law in force 
for the time being by which offences are defined or punished, the person 
accused of them may be charged with, and tried at one trial for, each of 
such offences. 
 
(3) Acts constituting one offence, but constituting when combined a 
different offence. If several acts, of which one or more than one would by 
itself or themselves constitute an offence, constitute when combined a 
different offence, the person accused of them may be charged with, and 
tried at one trial for, the offence constituted by such acts when combined, 
and for any offence constituted by anyone, or more, of such acts. 
 
(4) Nothing contained in this section shall affect the Pakistan Penal Code, 
Section 71”. 
 
Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that the occurrence has 
taken place away from the court premises has no force, the same is 
repelled.  
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
12 
 
12. 
 
Leave to appeal was granted by this Court vide order dated 
28.10.2019 mainly on two grounds:- 
(a) Inter-se distance between assailant and deceased. 
(b) Variation in number of injuries sustained by the deceased. 
Bare reading of the FIR reflects the entire situation qua the act of the 
appellant. 
ﺐﺟ ﺎﻧار رﺎﺘﺴﻟاﺪﺒﻋ ﭨﯽ لﺎﭩﺳ ﮯﮐ ﮯﻨﻣﺎﺳ ﮯﭽﻨﮩﭘ ﻮﺗ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ لﺎﺒﻗا هﺎﺷ مرداﺮﺑ ﮯﮔآ ﺎﮭﺗ روا ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻨﺣﯿﻒ ﻮﮐ 
ﮯﻧﺮﭩﮑﭘ ﻻاو ﮨﯽ ﺎﮭﺗ ہﮐ ﺪﻤﺤﻣ ﻨﺣﯿﻒ ﮯﻧ ﭘﯿﮯﮭﭽ ﮍﻣ ﺮﮐ ﻞﭩﺴﭘ ﮯﺳ ﺳﯿﺎھﺪ ﺮﺋﺎﻓ ﮐﯿﺎ ﻮﺟ لﺎﺒﻗا هﺎﺷ مرداﺮﺑ ﻮﮐ 
ﮯﻨﻣﺎﺳ ﺋﺎﺑﯿﮟ ﺗﺎﮭﭼﯽ ﺮﭘ ﺎﮕﻟ۔ 
 
During the trial proceedings, the prosecution witnesses of the ocular 
account PW-2 Muhammad Akram SI and PW-5 Mushtaq Ahmad Shah 
(complainant) had reiterated the contents mentioned in the crime report. 
Both of the witnesses of the ocular account are unanimous on the salient 
features of the prosecution version qua the time, mode and manner of the 
occurrence. Both witnesses were found trustworthy, reliable, independent 
and straightforward by the two courts below. The evidence of prosecution 
witnesses of the ocular account if found reliable, the same is sufficient to 
record conviction without any other corroborative piece of evidence. The 
contention raised by learned counsel that the ocular account is 
contradicted by the site plan qua the inter-se distance between the 
appellant and the victim, the law established by the superior courts is 
unanimous on this point. It is established that the statement of prosecution 
witnesses of the ocular account if contradictory to site plan it would have 
precedent over the distance mentioned in the site plan. Even otherwise, 
site plan is not a substantive piece of evidence having no legal sanctity. 
The purpose behind the preparation of site plan is to explain or give a 
glimpse of the occurrence in black and white enabling the concerned to 
appreciate the facts of the case in a more rational way. During the course 
of proceedings before the learned trial court, Dr. Majeed Ullah Buzdar 
appeared as PW.3. He has concurred the statement of prosecution 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
13 
 
witnesses as he observed blackening over the injuries which can be 
caused only from close contact, hence, the contents of FIR, statement of 
prosecution witnesses of ocular account corroborated by the medical 
evidence leaves nothing, contrary to challenge the intrinsic value of the 
prosecution version, hence, it has established the prosecution case 
beyond reasonable doubt. Reliance is placed upon PLD 1976 SC 234 (Taj 
Muhammad Vs, Muhammad Yusuf and 2 others) and 1998 SCMR 1823 
(Sardar Khan and 03 others Vs, The State). The observation made in 
1998 SCMR 1823 is as under: - 
“The site plans are, however, prepared only to explain or to 
appreciate the evidence on record in the case. Site plan by 
itself is not a substantive piece of evidence so that it could 
contradict the ocular account in the case.” 
 
13. 
 
We have noticed that contradiction in number of injuries 
observed by doctor is mainstay of criticism by the learned counsel for the 
appellant. This aspect was also noted by this Court while granting leave in 
this case. This Court has already resolved this issue while delivering 
exhaustive judgments on the subject. Primarily the ocular account is 
always considered as principle evidence. The litmus test to evaluate the 
veracity of the prosecution witnesses of ocular account depends being 
independent, reliable, trustworthy and confidence inspiring. The evidence 
of the expert is only confirmative in nature. If there is contradiction in 
between the ocular account and medical evidence qua the number of 
injuries, the rule of thumb is that the preference would be given to the 
ocular account as the statement of prosecution witnesses of ocular 
account is always placed at a higher pedestal as compare to the medical 
evidence. The rationale behind such strict construction of the rule of 
thumb is that firstly, expert evidence is confirmatory in nature based upon 
opinion of an expert which can be influenced by so many factors (i) lack of 
expertise (ii) lack of knowledge (iii) defective technique (iv) variation in 
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
14 
 
observation (v) lack of coordination with subordinate staff and possibility of 
obliging concession extended in favour of either of the party due to 
extraneous consideration. Reliance is placed upon 2002 SCMR 1568 
(Amrood Khan Vs, The State), 1992 SCMR 2037 (Manzoor and others Vs, 
The State), 1990 SCMR 1272 (Muhammad Younas and another Vs, The 
State), NLR 2005 (Criminal) SC 501 (Shafqat Ali etc vs, The Stae), PLD 
1976 SC 53 (Yaqoob Shah Vs, The State) and PLD 1993 SC 895 
(Muhammad Hanif Vs, The State). The observation made in 1990 SCMR 
1272 is as under: - 
“--- Doctor’s evidence --- There is no principle of law that in 
each and every case doctor’s evidence must have 
preference over direct evidence – If witnesses have seen the 
incident and have implicated the accused and their 
statements have been accepted by Court, then any conflict 
with the evidence of Expert does not detract the evidentiary 
value of the eye-witnesses – [Evidence].[p.1274]-D ” 
 
14. 
 
Another unrebutted aspect in this case is that the appellant 
was apprehended at the spot by the police officials soon after the 
occurrence leaving no ambiguity qua the involvement of the petitioner in 
the aforesaid crime. The weapon of offence recovered from the petitioner 
was transmitted to the office of Forensic Science Laboratory without any 
delay in its dispatch. The report of Forensic Science Laboratory further 
confirmed that the empties recovered from the spot are matched with the 
weapon recovered from the appellant which is positive in nature. All these 
aspects further strengthen the prosecution case in its totality. Another 
aspect of this case which is being observed by this Court that the crime 
rate has at the verge of rise on day-to-day basis. The law breakers are 
adamants to take the law into their own hands such element, destroying 
the very fabric of the society must be dealt with iron hand. The instant 
occurrence is glaring example of the same and as such, no leniency can 
be extended to such like criminals.   
Criminal Appeal No.528/19 in JP No.327/18 
Muhammad Hanif vs, The State 
15 
 
15. 
 
In view of the above facts and circumstances, we do not find 
any merit in this appeal, hence, dismissed accordingly. 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
Islamabad 
Announced on 05.09.2023 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge  
 
Approved for reporting. 
“Athar” 
