IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial 
Mr. Justice Qazi Muhammad Amin Ahmed 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO. 977 & 978 OF 
2018 AND C.M.A. NO. 3658/2019 
IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 978/2018 
(Against judgment dated 26.02.2018   passed by 
the Islamabad High Court Islamabad in F.A.O. 
No.42/2016) 
 
M/o Information Technology  
and Telecommunications, Islamabad  
(in C.A. No.977/2018) 
 
The Pakistan Telecommunications Authority, 
Islamabad  
(in C.A. No.978/2018 & C.M.A. 3658/2019  
inC.A.978/2018) 
 
 
…Appellant(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
Versus 
 
CM Pak (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad & another  
(in C.A. 977/2018) 
 
CM Pak (Pvt) Ltd. Islamabad  
(in C.A. 978/2018) 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the Appellant/: 
Mr. Sajid Ilyas Bhatti, Addl. A.G.P. 
Applicant(s) 
M. Ayub, Ministry of I.T. 
 
(in C.A. 977/2018)  
 
Mr. Munawar Iqbal Duggal, ASC 
 
Sajjad Latif, D.G. (Law) PTA  
 
M. Khurram Siddiqui,  
 
Director Law, PTA 
 
M. Kashif, A.D. PTA 
 
(in C.A. 978/2018) 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
Mian Shafaqat Jan, ASC 
 
M. Sharif Janjuah, AOR 
 
(in all cases) 
 
Mr. Rashid Hanif, ASC 
 
(in C.M.A. 3658/2019) 
 
Date of hearing: 
22.04.2020. 
 
. . . . . . . . 
 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
2
ORDER 
 
 
 
Umar Ata Bandial, J. The impugned judgment dated 
26.02.2018 was passed by the learned High Court in a first appeal 
bearing No. FAO 42 of 2016 filed by the respondent telecom 
licensee under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) 
Act, 1996 (“Act”). The respondent licensee had challenged the 
suspensory direction dated 28.03.2016 issued by the appellant 
Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (“PTA”). However, the 
impugned judgment struck down the policy directive dated 
26.12.2009 published by the Ministry of Information Technology 
(I.T. & Telecom Division) under Section 8(2)(c) of the Act. The 
impugned judgment held that the said policy directive failed to 
meet the criteria and conditions laid down in Section 54(2) and (3) 
of the Act.  
2.  
 
Pursuant to this impugned policy directive dated 
26.12.2009, PTA from time to time had issued directions whereby 
cellular services provided by telecom licensees were ordered to be 
suspended in specified areas for limited time on grounds of 
national security. To illustrate this point, certain suspensory 
directions issued by PTA are given below. Email dated 22.03.2016: 
“all  Mobile and Wireless (2G/3G/4G/LTE/ 
CDMA/WiMax) Voice & Data Services would 
remain blocked in 20 kilometer radius around 
Multi Purpose Ground, Islamabad to avoid any 
untoward incident during Joint Services Pakistan 
Day Parade at Multi Purpose Ground”  
 
Email dated 21.10.2015: 
“the closure timing for closing of Mobile and 
Wireless 
Services 
(2G/3G/4G/ 
LTE/CDMA/WiMax Voice & Data Services) in 
district/cities/areas forwarded vide trailing emails 
is:  from 0630 Hours to 2000 Hours on 24th 
October 2015 (10 Muharram ul Haram). It is 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
3
pertinent to highlight that the area of Karachi is 
all five districts.”  
 
3.  
 
It is common ground that the events that invite such 
directions are invariably related to national security or public 
safety. What is disputed by the respondent licensee who 
succeeded before the learned High Court is the extent of such 
restrictions in terms of time, space and type of services that are 
blocked. Specifically, the respondent licensee had challenged the 
suspensory directions dated 28.03.2016. The first direction was 
sent at 12.27 am:  
“It is requested to block all cellular mobile 
(2G/3G/4G/LTE) Voice & Data services in 10km 
radius around D-Chowk, Red Zone, Islamabad to 
avoid any untoward incident by 0030 hrs on 
March 28 2016 and control spill over sites as well. 
The services would remain blocked till further 
notice.”  
 
This was followed by a further direction at 06.24 am:  
“Is requested to restore mobile services by 0700 
hrs on March 28, 2016 and confirm through 
return email.”  
 
There is agreement between the parties that national security or 
public safety priorities should justify the imposition of such 
restrictions and directions. However, the respondent licensee 
contends that the Federal Government ought to have settled 
procedures and benchmarks to regulate its discretion. This is 
urged because the respondent has a right to do business and the 
sudden curtailment of its rights has negative implications.  
4.  
 
The impugned directions dated 28.03.2016 under the 
policy directive dated 26.12.2009 were not impeached by the 
respondent licensee before PTA but were straightaway challenged 
before the High Court in an appeal filed under Section 7(1) of the 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
4
Act. However, it appears that at the hearing the respondent 
licensee’s challenge shifted to the policy directive. There is nothing 
on record to indicate that the respondent licensee expressed its 
grievance before the Federal Government or its concerned 
agencies about the said directive dated 26.12.2009 in the seven 
years that elapsed before the filing of its appeal. Be that as it may, 
the impugned judgment considered the provisions of the Act and 
concluded that Section 54(3) of the Act which authorises the 
suspension of services of telecom licensees is not attracted to the 
facts of the case. That the policy directive issued under Section 
8(2)(c) of the Act is controlled by Section 54(3) ibid and therefore, 
the policy directive dated 26.12.2009 issued under the Act by the 
Government is ultra vires.  
5. 
 
It would be useful at this stage to reproduce the 
relevant provisions of the Act: 
“8. Power of the Federal Government to issue 
policy directives.- (1)… 
 
(2) The matters on which the Federal Government 
may issue policy directives shall be— 
 
(a)… 
(aa)… 
(b)… 
(c) requirements of national security and of 
relationships between Pakistan and the 
Government of any other country or 
territory outside Pakistan and other States 
or territories outside Pakistan.” 
 
(2A)… 
(3)… 
 
“54. National Security.-- (1) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in any law for the time being 
in force, in the interest of national security or in 
the apprehension of any offence, the Federal 
Government may authorise any person or persons 
to intercept calls and messages or to trace calls 
through any telecommunication system. 
 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
5
(2) During a war or hostilities against Pakistan by 
foreign power of internal aggression or for the 
defence or security of Pakistan, the Federal 
Government shall have preference and priority in 
telecommunication systems over any licensee. 
 
(3) Upon proclamation of emergency by the 
President, the Federal Government may suspend 
or modify all or any order or licences made or 
issued under this Act or cause suspension of 
operation, functions or services of any licensee for 
such time as it may deem necessary; 
 
   Provided that the Federal Government may 
compensate any licensee whose facilities or 
services are affected by any action under this sub-
section.” 
 
Having carefully perused the foregoing provisions of the Act, we 
are of the view that both sections cater to different circumstances. 
Section 54(3) confers powers on the Federal Government to modify 
or suspend all or any orders or licences in a situation where an 
Emergency is imposed by the President under Article 232 of the 
Constitution. On the other hand, Section 8(2)(c) empowers PTA to 
take steps pertaining to matters of national security, diplomatic 
protocols and State functions. The purpose of the two sections is 
distinct. Section 54(3) is reactive and defensive in nature, coming 
into the field when on account of grave circumstances in the 
country or its provinces a Proclamation of Emergency is issued by 
the President potentially involving suspension of Fundamental 
Rights and the Provincial Government(s). Conversely, Section 
8(2)(c) contemplates pre-emptive action as it allows for the 
disruption of services before any perceived threat in a specified 
area materialises. Further, under Section 54(3) cellular services 
may according to the terms of the Emergency be disrupted for a 
lengthy period of time over an extensive area. In contrast, 
disruption of services under Section 8(2)(c) is likely to be event 
specific and localised, in effect applying only for a temporary 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
6
period of time across a limited area.  Clearly then, both sections 
operate in separate spheres and situations with no conflict 
between them nor any primacy being given to one over the other.  
6.  
 
As far as the policy directive dated 26.12.2009 is 
concerned, it has been issued by the Federal Government in 
exercise of its power under Section 8(2)(c) of the Act. 
Consequently, the said directive is a piece of delegated legislation. 
The purpose of such an executive instrument has been set out by 
this Court in Muhammad Amin Muhammad Bashir Limited Vs. 
Government of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 630) at para-7:  
Para 7:… “[delegated legislation is] intended to 
enforce the law, not override it. [It] can fill in 
details but not vary the underlying statutory 
principles.”  
 
The policy directive dated 26.12.2009 sets out the purpose, 
causes and parameters of suspensory action by PTA. It gives law 
enforcement authorities the power to forward written requests to 
PTA specifying the cellular services to be closed, the time and 
duration of closure and the specific area where such closure is to 
be implemented in case of significant threat of “hostilities against 
Pakistan by a foreign power” or “internal aggression by 
terrorists/groups.” It is obvious that these events are significant 
for public safety and national security. However, their limited and 
transient occurrence cannot justify the imposition of an 
Emergency 
under 
the 
Constitution 
which 
can 
continue 
uninterrupted for 60 days without sanction of the two Houses 
[Article 232(7) of the Constitution]. Therefore, there is nothing in 
the policy directive dated 26.12.2009 which contravenes any 
substantive provision of Section 54 of the Act. Instead, it 
complements and strengthens the purpose of the Act by attending 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
7
to national security situations that fall outside the ambit of 
Section 54(3).  
7.  
 
Consequently, the only question arising before us for 
determination is whether PTA has exercised its power under the 
policy directive dated 26.12.2009 reasonably, fairly, justly and for 
the advancement of the purposes of the Act [ref: Section 24-A(1) of 
the General Clauses Act, 1897 (“1897 Act”)]. This test has been 
reiterated by this Court in the Muhammad Amin case (supra). 
Reasonableness and fairness are criteria that bear nexus with the 
factual matrix of a grievance and with the object of the law. In the 
present case, the factual background for the impugned exercise of 
such power vide PTA’s email dated 28.03.2016 has not been 
examined by the learned High Court. In our considered view, in a 
country where there is sectarian tension during the Ashoora in 
Moharram the Zuljinah procession ought to be protected from 
attacks and turmoil. This is attempted by PTA’s email dated 
21.10.2015 which is necessary to ensure the religious freedom 
guaranteed to the citizens under Article 20 of the Constitution. 
Equally, the Pakistan Day Parade by the Armed Forces is an 
annual national event where apart from the Armed Forces 
personnel, the highest State and foreign dignitaries are assembled 
to view the military parade. This again is an event which deserves 
security protection. Indeed, PTA’s email dated 22.03.2016 seeks to 
ensure that. Similarly, the impugned directions of 28.03.2016 
were issued during the protest which marked the Chehlum of 
Mumtaz Qadri. This protest had involved severe damage to public 
property (Danish Hussain, ‘D-Chowk Protestors End Sit-In After 
Successful Talks’ The Express Tribune (Islamabad, 31 March 
2016)). Therefore to curtail further escalation of damage/violence 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
8
there was a legitimate need to suspend cellular services.  These 
protective measures are taken on the request of law enforcement 
authorities in view of past experience of terrorist activities at 
similar events. If such events caused the issuance of the 
impugned directions then the same would be in the public 
interest, reasonable, fair, consistent with the object of the law and 
therefore valid. Accordingly, the exercise of power by PTA under 
the policy directive dated 26.12.2009 ought to be evaluated in the 
light of the threat that is anticipated.  
8.  
 
To our minds, the power of PTA under the policy 
directive dated 26.12.2009 does not conflict with Section 54(3) of 
the Act which operates in a different field. In fact, it is regulated 
by Section 8(2)(c) of the Act read with Section 24-A(1) of the 1897 
Act and the law laid down by this Court controlling the exercise of 
delegated authority. Apart from the aforesaid parameters, it is not 
within the province of a Superior Court to strike down or interfere 
with decisions taken by Federal Government bodies pursuant to 
the policy directive dated 26.12.2009.  
9. 
 
Accordingly, for the reason that the impugned 
judgment has failed to examine the impugned suspensory 
directions dated 28.03.2016 in the context of the power conferred 
on PTA, we consider that the impugned judgment has arrived at a 
hasty and incorrect conclusion. The learned High Court has 
construed Section 8(2)(c) to be subservient to Section 54(3) of the 
Act. In reaching this decision, the learned High Court has misread 
the Act, specifically the provisions of Section 54, all of which serve 
an express purpose/function. Whilst these purposes/functions 
may incidentally be effectuated by the exercise of power under 
Section 8(2)(c) of the Act but this does not lead to the conclusion 
 Civil Appeal Nos.977 & 978 of 2018 and C.M.A. No.3658/2019 in C.A. No.978/2018 
9
that Section 54 ibid controls the exercise of such power. 
Consequently, the impugned judgment is set aside. If the 
respondent telecom licensee had any grievance regarding the 
manner in which the power under Section 8(2)(c) of the Act was 
exercised by PTA it should have taken up the matter in the first 
instance with the Federal Government. Therefore, its recourse to a 
Court of law straightaway was pre-mature and vexatious. The 
appeals are accordingly allowed.  
C.M.A. No.3658 of 2019: Disposed of.  
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
Islamabad, the 
22th April, 2020 
Approved for reporting 
Ghulam Raza/Meher LC 
