IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.540-L OF 2009 
(Against the judgment dated 8.9.2004 of 
the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in 
C.R.No.727/2003) 
 
 
Meraj Din and another 
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
 
Muhammad Sharif and another 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the appellant(s): 
Ch. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Sr. ASC 
 
 
For the respondent(s): 
Mr. Abdul Wahid Chaudhry, ASC 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
06.12.2016 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.- The sole legal question involved 
in this appeal, with the leave of the Court, is whether the period of 
limitation for filing a suit for pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-
emption Act, 1913 (the Pre-emption Act) is one year from the date of 
execution of the sale deed or from the date of its registration? 
2. 
 
The relevant facts in this regard are that the respondents 
purchased the suit property vide sale deed executed in their favour 
on 8.5.1975 but registered on 26.5.1975. The appellants brought a 
suit for pre-emption on 25.5.1976 which was resisted by the 
respondents, inter alia, on the ground that it was barred by time and 
therefore issue No.4 was framed to decide if it was so. The learned 
Trial Court decreed the suit on merits and also resolved the issue of 
limitation in favour of the pre-emptors which judgment was upheld in 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 2 :- 
appeal. However, the learned High Court in its revisional jurisdiction 
overturned the findings on the issue of limitation and concluded that 
the suit was barred by time, holding that the period of limitation 
started from 8.5.1975, the date of execution and not from 26.5.1975, 
the date of registration. In this regard the provisions of Section 47 of 
the Registration Act, 1908 (Registration Act) and the judgment of this 
Court reported as Naseer Ahmed and another Vs. Asghar Ali (1992 
SCMR 2300) were relied upon. The learned High Court did not dilate 
upon any other issue. 
 
Leave was granted on 29.6.2009 to consider the proposition 
ibid by making reference to Section 47 of the Registration Act and 
Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act. 
3. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellants argued that with 
regard to pre-emption suits, two provisions of law are relevant for the 
purposes of limitation. The first is Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 
1908 (Limitation Act) which clearly prescribes a limitation period of one 
year for a pre-emption suit in cases where the sale is effected through 
a registered deed, from the date of its registration. The second is 
Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act which is a residual provision for 
suits that do not fall within the purview of the Article ibid. He argued 
that following the procedure set out in Sections 59 and 60 of the 
Registration Act an instrument is registered when the competent 
authority certifies and endorses the same: and it is only then that the 
document takes effect and serves as a notice to those who have a 
right to pre-empt. Further, Section 47 of the Registration Act is not 
relevant for the purposes of Article 10 of the Limitation Act, because 
it (Section 47) only applies to the parties to the transaction itself (or any 
person claiming through them or any other person who has some right or interest in the 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 3 :- 
property which is effected on account of the registered document) and it (Section 47) 
would not abridge the period of limitation of a pre-emptor, which 
would only commence from the date he is put to notice of the sale. In 
this regard he highlighted the object and purpose of a registered sale 
deed which, according to him, is to put the prospective pre-emptor to 
notice that the sale has taken place in order that the pre-emptor may 
exercise his right(s) under the law. The putative pre-emptor would be 
deemed to have been put to notice only once the document had been 
registered even though such documents may be registered a week, 
month or more (but less than four months) after the date of execution (note:- a 
document has to be presented for registration within four months of its execution according 
to Section 23 of the Registration Act). In support of his arguments, learned 
counsel relied upon the judgments reported as Ghulam Mustafa Vs. 
Dilawar and others (1984 CLC 401), Ch. Shafaat Mahmood Vs. 
Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue, Punjab, Lahore and 2 
others (2001 CLC 751) and Fazal Din Vs. Abdul Hamid and 
another (PLD 1967 Lahore 378). Whilst relying upon the judgment 
reported as Qazi Muhammad Daud and another Vs. Muhammad 
Ayub and others (1985 SCMR 1966), learned counsel argued that 
even though it was not the case of the respondents, yet mere 
reference in the sale deed that possession of the pre-empted property 
had been delivered would have no relevance, rather it had to be 
proved independently that possession was so delivered. Reliance was 
also placed on Muhammad Sarwar Vs. Feroze Khan and another 
(PLD 1951 Lahore 169). 
4. 
 
Controverting the above, learned counsel for the 
respondents stated that in paragraph No.2 of the plaint, the 
appellants (plaintiffs) mentioned in categorical terms that the sale was 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 4 :- 
effected on 8.5.1975 and thus their cause of action would be based 
on the said date, therefore the period of limitation would commence 
from the date of execution of the sale deed; it was never the case of 
the appellants that the period of limitation would commence from the 
date of registration i.e. 26.5.1975, therefore the appellants cannot go 
beyond the scope of their own pleadings. He also argued that 
possession of the property was delivered to the respondents even 
prior to the date of execution and this is so mentioned in the sale 
deed, thus the period of limitation would begin from the date of 
delivery of possession and not from either execution of the sale deed 
(Article 10 of the Limitation Act) or registration thereof. He strenuously relied 
upon Section 47 of the Pre-emption Act to submit that the operation 
of a registered document (such as a sale deed) would take effect from the 
date of execution and not the date of registration, and the latter 
would have no nexus to the starting point of limitation for a pre-
emption suit. He relied upon the judgments reported as Muhammad 
Ali Vs. Muhammad Irshad etc. (PLJ 2002 Lahore 743), Naseer 
Ahmed’s case (supra) (1992 SCMR 2300), Muhammad Hayat Vs. 
Mst. Surraya Begum and another (1981 CLC 293), Muhammad 
Sharif Vs. Muhammad Safdar etc. (NLR 1994 Civil 688), Sher 
Muhammad Vs. Rajada and another (1981 Law Notes (S.C.) 859), 
Allah Yar and another Vs. Raja and another (1989 SCMR 802) and 
Hakim Muhammad Buta and another Vs. Habib Ahmad and 
others (PLD 1985 SC 153). 
5. 
 
Heard. To resolve the proposition at hand, it is expedient 
to reproduce the relevant provisions of law. Article 10 of the 
Limitation Act reads as under:- 
 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 5 :- 
Description of suit 
Period of 
limitation 
Time 
from 
which 
period beings to run 
10. To enforce a 
right of pre-emption 
whether the right is 
founded on law, or 
general usage, or 
on special contract 
One year 
When the purchaser 
tah25kes, 
under 
the 
sale 
sought 
to 
be 
impeached, 
physical 
possession 
of 
the 
whole of the property 
sold, or, where the 
subject of the sale does 
not admit of physical 
possession, when the 
instrument of sale is 
registered. [emphasis 
supplied] 
 
Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act reads as under:- 
 
“30. Limitation.—In any case not provided for by 
Article 10 of the Second Schedule of the Limitation 
Act, 1908, the period of limitation in a suit to enforce a 
right of pre-emption under the provisions of this Act 
shall, notwithstanding anything in the Article 120 of 
the said Schedule, be one year-- 
(1) 
in the case of a sale of agricultural land or of 
village immovable property; 
 
from the date of the attestation (if any) of the 
sale by a Revenue Officer having jurisdiction in the 
register of mutations maintained under the Punjab 
Land Revenue Act, 1887; or 
 
from the date on which the vendee takes under 
the sale physical possession of any part of such land or 
property; 
 
whichever date shall be the earlier; 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 6 :- 
(2) 
in the case of a foreclosure of the right to 
redeem 
village 
immovable 
property 
or 
urban 
immovable property; 
 
from the date on which the title of the 
mortgagee to the property becomes absolute; 
(3) 
in the case of a sale of urban immovable 
property;  
 
from the date on which the vendee takes under 
the sale physical possession of any part of the 
property.” 
 
Sections 47, 59 and 60 of the Registration Act are as follows:- 
 
“47. 
Time 
from 
which 
registered 
document 
operates.— A registered document shall operate from 
the time from which it would have commenced to 
operate if no registration thereof had been required or 
made, and not from the time of its registration. 
 
59. 
Endorsements to be dated and signed by 
registering officer. The registering officer shall affix 
the date and his signature to all endorsements made 
under sections 52 and 58, relating to the same 
document and made in his presence on the same day. 
 
60. 
Certificate of registration.-(1) After such of the 
provisions of sections 34, 35, 58 and 59 as apply to 
any document presented for registration have been 
complied with, the registering officer shall endorse 
thereon a certificate containing the word “registered”, 
together with the number and page of the book in 
which the document has been copied. 
 
(2)  Such certificate shall be signed, sealed and dated 
by the registering officer, and shall then be admissible 
for the purpose of proving that the document has been 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
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duly registered in manner provided by this Act, and 
that the facts mentioned in the endorsements referred 
to in section 59 have occurred as therein mentioned.” 
 
The use of the word “or” in the 3rd column of Article 10 of the 
Limitation Act is significant. It essentially bifurcates the said article 
into two parts: (i) where the purchaser takes physical possession of 
the property or (ii) where the instrument of sale has been registered. 
We would like to mention that this bifurcation of Article 10 of the 
Limitation Act has been recognized by the learned High Courts in 
Muhammad Sarwar’s case (supra) and Fazal Din’s case (supra) which, 
in our opinion, is the correct view. The object of either delivery of 
possession to the vendee or registration of the sale deed is to put the 
prospective pre-emptor to notice of the sale in order for him to 
exercise his right within the prescribed period of limitation. The first 
part of Article 10 of the Limitation Act deals with cases where the sale 
has taken place and possession of the sold property has been 
delivered to the vendee pursuant thereto. No doubt in such a 
situation the period of limitation would start from the date of delivery 
of physical possession; but in order to successfully defend a suit for 
pre-emption falling in this category on the point of limitation (if it is 
beyond one year from the date of delivery of possession) the defendant-vendee 
would be obliged to prove that physical possession was delivered 
prior to the date of execution of the registered sale deed. Why is it so? 
The obvious object behind this is that the prospective pre-emptor 
must have notice that the sale has taken place and possession of the 
property has been delivered or that there is a change of possession. 
This factum of possession, in the wisdom of the law, is thus 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 8 :- 
considered to be adequate notice of sale of the property, enabling the 
pre-emptor to file a suit. Positive evidence has to be led by the vendee 
where the date of delivery of physical possession is different from the 
date of registration of the sale deed. Mere mention of delivery of 
possession in the sale instrument will not be a positive proof of the 
fact, which has to be independently established by the vendee when 
his defence of limitation is founded upon this fact. In the judgments 
reported as Qazi Muhammad Daud’s case (supra) and the judgments 
reported as Khushi Muhammad Vs. Abdul Shakoor (1987 SCMR 
1473) and Muhammad Abid and 2 others Vs. Nisar Ahmed (2000 
SCMR 780) this Court has held that a mere recital in the sale deed of 
delivery of possession is not by itself effective proof of such delivery. 
In those cases where possession has not been delivered and/or 
the sale deed has been executed but not registered as yet, obviously a 
pre-emptor would have no notice that sale had taken place, thereby 
enabling him to exercise his right. In those cases the first part of 
Article 10 of the Limitation Act would have no application, rather the 
case(s) would fall within the second part thereof beginning from the 
word OR “where the subject of the sale does not admit of physical possession, 
when the instrument of sale is registered.”  It is instructive to remember that 
a document required to be registered can be presented to the 
registrar within four months from the date of its execution as per 
Section 23 of the Registration Act. Thus for example, if a document is 
executed on 1.1.2000 and is presented for registration on the last 
date of the four months allowed for the presentation thereof and it 
takes a further one month to be registered according to the law, in 
this manner about five months may be lost and yet the pre-emptor 
would have no notice of the sale; the right of the prospective pre-
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 9 :- 
emptor to file a suit within a period of one year cannot thus be 
curtailed by excluding this whole period from the calculation which is 
what would happen if we took the date of execution of the sale deed 
to be the starting point for purposes of limitation; further the 
provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act cannot be read into 
the clear language of Article 10 of the Limitation Act which 
specifically mandates “when the instrument of sale is registered” meaning 
thereby that limitation begins to run from the date of the registration. 
6. 
 
Before expressing our opinion on the true import, 
meaning and effect of the afore-quoted expression of Article 10 of the 
Limitation Act, we would like to briefly deal with Section 30 of the 
Pre-emption Act. The Limitation Act has provided a period of 
limitation for every suit and if the limitation is not prescribed by any 
particular provision, then the residuary Article 120 is applicable. 
However, a special law can also prescribe the period of limitation for 
particular types of suits which could be instituted under such law. A 
bare reading of Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act, particularly the 
phrase “In any case not provided for by Article 10 of the Second Schedule of the 
Limitation Act, 1908”, makes it clear that this section acknowledges the 
application of the period of limitation for the class of cases falling 
within Article 10 of the Limitation Act, meaning thereby that for all 
those suits which fall within the purview of Article 10 ibid, Section 30 
supra would not apply. In this regard a three member bench of this 
Court has held in the judgment reported as Chaudhry Khan Vs. 
Major Khan Alam (PLD 2009 SC 399) that:- 
 
“Article 10 of the First Schedule of Limitation Act, 
1908 provides for a limitation period of one year to 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
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enforce a right of pre-emption commencing from the 
date when the purchaser takes, under the sale, sought 
to be impeached, physical possession of the whole of 
the property sold, or, where the subject of the sale 
does not admit to physical possession, when the 
instrument of sale is registered. Section 30 of the 
Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 also takes care of 
limitation period in a case not provided for by 
Article 10 of the Limitation Act. It provides a period 
of limitation of one year for instituting a suit for pre-
emption from the date on which a vendee takes 
under the sale physical possession of any part of 
such land or property whichever is earlier. Now the 
question arises as to terminus a quo for a limitation 
period. In the present case, the registered sale-deed 
was executed and registered on 21-2-1978 as 
required by section 54 of the Transfer of Property 
Act, 1882. Therefore, the period of limitation would 
be computed from the date of registration of the 
sale-deed as the physical possession of the suit 
property under the sale could not take place earlier 
thereto. The delivery of possession even if earlier 
made pursuant to an agreement to sell would not 
serve the purpose for non-suiting a pre-emptor on 
that ground.” 
 
In any case, there is no discord between the parties that the present 
case squarely falls within ambit of Article 10 of the Limitation Act and 
that Section 30 of the Pre-emption Act is not attracted thereto. 
Regardless of the fact that the counsel for the parties have not raised 
such issue, our candid opinion is that Section 30 ibid is not 
applicable to the present case. 
7. 
 
Reverting to the proposition in hand, in the context of 
Article 10 of the Limitation Act, a plain reading of the said article 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
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establishes that the period of limitation for the cases falling in the 
second part of the said article will be one year from when the sale 
instrument is registered and not the date of execution. This was also 
the view of the learned High Courts in Ch. Shafaat Mahmood’s case 
(supra) and the judgment reported as Chaudhry Muhammad Yusuf 
Vs. Ghulam Muhammad and 3 others (2000 YLR 2178). For the 
purposes of this second part of Article 10 of the Limitation Act, 
delivery of possession is not relevant. It may be pertinent to mention 
here that in the present case it is not even the defence of the 
vendees/respondents that they had taken over possession of the suit 
property either prior to the date of the execution of the sale deed or 
on the date of execution of the sale deed or even during the period 
between the date of execution and registration. Their defence 
primarily has been that because the sale deed was executed on 
8.5.1975, resultantly, registration of the deed on 26.5.1975 is not 
relevant. Seemingly this was on the basis of the provisions of Section 
47 of the Registration Act, which stipulate that a registered sale deed 
shall take effect from the date of execution. This is also the view 
which has prevailed with the learned High Court in its impugned 
judgment whilst relying upon Naseer Ahmed’s case (supra). The 
question of limitation was not in issue in the said case, rather the 
vendee in that case built up his defence on the basis of a purchase 
made vide document executed on 8.9.1974 and registered on 
10.9.1974 in his favour, thus he claimed that being an owner in the 
estate w.e.f. 8.9.1974, the sale having been made in his favour on 
such date could not be pre-empted. It is in this context that this 
Court held as under:- 
 
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 12 :- 
“There is no controversy that the sale-deed in respect 
of this land was executed in appellants' favour on 
8-9-1974 i.e. a day before the institution of the suit. It 
was presented for registration on 9-9-1974, but 
registered on 10-9-1974. In the opinion of the High 
Court, as the document was registered after the 
institution of the suit, the transaction was of no avail to 
the appellants. The view taken by the High Court is 
untenable. Section 47 of the Registration Act seemingly 
escaped notice of the learned Judges of the High 
Court, which provides that a document registered on a 
date subsequent to the date of its execution operates 
from the date of the execution. Obviously, therefore, 
the title to the land had passed on to the appellants on 
8-9-1974, and they could justifiably bank on it to 
oppose the suit filed by the respondent.” 
 
Section 47 of the Registration Act, which provides that a document 
registered on a date subsequent to the date of its execution would 
operate from the date of execution and not registration, was referred 
to in the context of passing of title of the property unto the vendee for 
the purposes of resisting the suit for pre-emption, having become the 
owner of the property prior to the institution of the suit. Hence, 
reliance upon such case by the learned counsel for the respondents 
and by the learned High Court in its impugned judgment is 
misplaced. 
 
Besides, Section 47 of the Registration Act applies inter se the 
parties to a transaction, anyone claiming through them or anyone 
who has some right or interest in the property on account of the 
registered document. The said section has no relevance to the rights 
of persons who are not a party to such document therefore it would 
not operate to curtail the period of limitation available to a pre-
Civil Appeal No.540-L of 2009 
-: 13 :- 
emptor under Article 10 of the Limitation Act, for the purposes of 
which limitation would begin from the date he is put to the notice of 
the sale. This was also the view of the learned High Court in Ch. 
Shafaat Mahmood’s case (supra) which to our mind is correct. 
8. 
 
 In light of the above, the instant appeal is allowed and 
the impugned judgment is set aside. 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 5.1.2017 at Islamabad 
Approved For Reporting 
Waqas Naseer/* 
