IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR 
MR. JUSTICE MANZOOR AHMAD MALIK 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.222-L OF 2016 
(Against the judgment dated 10.6.2015 of 
the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in 
W.P.No.3925/2015) 
 
 
Mian Umar Ikram-ul-Haque 
 
…Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Dr. Shahida Hasnain and another 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the appellant(s): 
Mr. Qamar Zaman Qureshi, ASC 
 
 
For respondent No.1: 
Mr. Riasat Ali Chaudhry, ASC 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
15.09.2016 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.- This appeal with the leave of 
the court dated 6.9.2016 involves a simple yet important question of 
law i.e. whether an order under Section 24 of the Punjab Rented 
Premises Act, 2009 (the Act) can be passed against a respondent of an 
eviction application when he has denied the relationship of tenancy, 
leave to contest has been granted pursuant to a leave application and 
an issue to that effect has also been framed by the learned Rent 
Tribunal. 
2. 
 
The brief facts in the context of the aforesaid question 
are that respondent No.1 (respondent) filed an eviction application 
against the appellant under the Act asserting that the latter is a 
tenant who failed to pay rent to the former according to the terms 
and conditions of the lease agreement dated 1.1.2012 entered into 
between the two parties. The application also states that such lease 
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agreement was not registered with the Rent Registrar therefore the 
amount of 10% rent is being deposited as fine. The rate of rent was 
claimed as Rs.40,000/- per month. The appellant filed an application 
for leave to contest in which he specifically and unequivocally denied 
the relationship of tenancy and clearly set out a defence that he was 
in occupation of the property pursuant to an agreement to sell dated 
1.2.2012 between the parties in terms whereof the appellant paid an 
amount of Rs.41,00,000/- at the time of execution [out of the total 
consideration of Rs.61,00,000/-] and took possession; the balance 
amount was/is payable at the time of the execution of the sale deed. 
It was further averred that the appellant had already filed a suit on 
3.10.2012 for the performance of the agreement to sell whereas the 
eviction application had been moved on 3.12.2014. It was 
categorically stated that the lease agreement dated 1.1.2012 was/is a 
fake and forged document. The learned Rent Tribunal vide order 
dated 3.12.2014 granted leave to the appellant and in view of the 
defence taken, framed a sole issue i.e. whether the relationship of 
landlord and tenant exists between the parties, if so its effect. 
However the learned Rent Tribunal observed that since the 
relationship of landlord and tenant was yet to be determined, 
therefore no order as to interim rent could be made. The respondent 
did not challenge this order of the learned Rent Tribunal but instead 
moved an application under Section 24 of the Act with the prayer 
that an order for the deposit of past and future rent due be passed by 
the Tribunal in terms of the section ibid. The application was 
dismissed by the learned Rent Tribunal vide order dated 2.1.2015 on 
the ground that since the respondent had denied the relationship of 
landlord and tenant, the order for the deposit of rent under Section 
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24 ibid cannot be made till such relationship is established. 
Aggrieved, the respondent challenged both the orders dated 
3.12.2014 and 2.1.2015 by filing a constitutional petition before the 
learned High Court (in which the appellant was proceeded against ex-parte and the 
impugned order is ex-parte order) to the extent that no direction was given for 
deposit of rent.. The learned High Court, while allowing this petition, 
held as under:- 
 
“The tenor of section 24 of the Act does not 
make a distinction between the cases where the 
relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted 
and in those cases where the said relationship 
is denied. The mandate of section 24 is clear. 
When an application for leave to contest is 
granted, it falls upon the Rent Controller to 
make an order for the deposit of rent due from 
the tenant and continue to deposit the same in 
accordance with the tenancy agreement. This 
proposition is bolstered by the terms of 
subsection (2) of section 24 of the Act which 
lays down that if there is no dispute as to the 
amount of rent due, then the Rent Tribunal 
shall tentatively determine the dispute and pass 
the order for the deposit of rent in terms of 
subsection (1) of section 24 of the Act. The  
term “rent due” has a wide sweep and would 
include a dispute of the nature where the 
relationship 
of 
landlord 
and 
tenant 
is 
denied…” 
 
It was further held that:- 
 
“A common thread which runs through the Act 
is to discourage and ward off unscrupulous and 
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irrational defenses on the part of tenants. If the 
deposit of payment of interim rent was made 
dependent upon the denial or acceptance of the 
relationship of landlord and tenant then the 
spirit which permeates the Act would be 
rendered nugatory…A combined reading of 
sections 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Act, 2009 brings 
forth ineluctably the sea-change which runs 
through the length and breadth of the Act, 
2009…The jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal is only 
triggered when the conditions laid down in the 
Act, 2009 are found to exist…It is clear from a 
reading of the provisions of section 10 
reproduced above that an agreement to sell or 
any other agreement entered into between the 
landlord and tenant shall not affect the 
relationship of landlord and tenant. 
 
In reaching its decision, the learned High Court relied heavily upon a 
judgment of this Court reported as Rana Abdul Hameed Talib Vs. 
Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (PLD 2013 SC 775).  
3. 
 
Leave has been granted to consider whether an order 
under Section 24 of the Act can be passed where the relationship of 
tenancy has been denied and the effect of Section 10 of the Act upon 
such denial. Although the legislative history of rent laws in Pakistan 
has been discussed in detail in Rana Abdul Hameed Talib’s case 
(supra), nevertheless we find it expedient to briefly reiterate the same 
for the sake of completeness before deciding the proposition in hand. 
Initially disputes inter se landlords and tenants relating to leases and 
tenancies were dealt with under the general law of the land i.e. 
Transfer of Property Act, 1872 (excluding leases of agricultural properties, dealt 
with by the revenue courts) and the same were adjudicated by the courts of 
general jurisdiction (see Section 9 CPC). The West Pakistan Rent 
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Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (Ordinance) a special law was enacted for 
the purposes of resolution of such disputes between landlords and 
tenants within the purview of the provisions mentioned therein, 
particularly Section 13 of the Ordinance which provided the grounds 
upon which a tenant may be evicted by the landlord. The definitions 
of landlord and tenant were specifically provided and it is clear that 
jurisdiction under this special law was endowed in three ways. The 
first was jurisdiction upon the subject matter i.e. the property was to 
be urban immovable property – residential or non-residential, or 
rented land etc. The second was jurisdiction upon the parties i.e. 
there was to be a relationship of tenancy, in other words the dispute 
must be between the landlord and tenant as defined in the law. The 
third 
was 
territorial 
jurisdiction. 
Therefore 
if 
any 
of 
the 
aforementioned requirements were not met, the Rent Controller 
would have no jurisdiction over the matter before him. With respect 
to the second type of jurisdiction: if the respondent in a rent matter 
denied the relationship of tenancy, a question of jurisdictional fact 
would arise. The doctrine of jurisdictional fact connotes that the 
jurisdiction of an adjudication forum is dependent upon the 
ascertainment and determination of certain facts. In this behalf, N.S. 
Bindra in the Interpretation of Statutes Seventh Edition, 1984, p.229, 
has defined "Court's jurisdiction to determine the jurisdictional fact", 
as follows:- 
“Court's jurisdiction to determine jurisdictional 
facts. It is well settled that a Tribunal can 
investigate into the facts relating to the exercise of 
its jurisdiction when that jurisdictional fact itself is 
in dispute. Where a Tribunal is invested with 
jurisdiction to determine a particular question, it is 
competent to determine the existence of the facts 
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collateral to the actual matter which the Tribunal 
has to try. This power to decide collateral facts is 
the foundation for the exercise of its jurisdiction.” 
 
In Halsbury's Laws of England, it has been stated; 
 
“Where the jurisdiction of a tribunal is dependent 
on the existence of a particular state of affairs, that 
state of affairs may be described as preliminary to, 
or collateral to the merits of, the issue. If, at the 
inception of an inquiry by an inferior tribunal, a 
challenge is made to its jurisdiction, the tribunal 
has to make up its mind whether to act or not and 
can give a ruling on the preliminary or collateral 
issue; but that ruling is not conclusive”. 
 
The jurisdictional fact in this context would be whether the 
relationship of landlord and tenant existed between the parties. If the 
Rent Controller positively ascertained such a relationship through 
factual enquiry, he would assume jurisdiction, otherwise the petition 
had to fail because the Rent Controller in that situation would not 
have any jurisdiction over the parties and consequently the matter 
before him. Section 13(6) of the erstwhile Ordinance was similar to 
Section 24 of the Act, where the Rent Controller was obliged to make 
an order directing the tenant to pay all the past rent due and the 
future rent that would become due: however this direction could only 
be to a tenant and not a respondent of an eviction petition. There is 
a conspicuous distinction between the two which needs to be 
appreciated. The expression of law is that such direction be made to 
a tenant, which expression (i.e. tenant) cannot be read or substituted 
for the respondent of an eviction petition. ‘Tenant’ was defined in 
Section 2(i) of the Ordinance, therefore an order under Section 13(6) 
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could only be passed against a person who fell within the definition of 
‘tenant’ as provided in the Ordinance.  
4. 
 
From this examination of the erstwhile Ordinance it is 
clear that where the relationship of tenancy was denied by the 
respondent of the eviction petition the Rent Controller would be 
exceeding his jurisdiction and acting in violation of the clear 
provisions of law in directing such respondent to deposit the rent 
due. This question pertaining to the earlier law came before the 
superior courts in a number of cases and it has been categorically 
held that in a situation where the relationship of tenancy was denied, 
the Rent Controller could not pass an order for payment of rent due 
under Section 13(6) of the Ordinance. In this respect the judgments 
which are germane are Muhammad Ismail Vs. Israr Ahmad [PLD 
1961 (W.P.) Lahore 601],Mst. Karam Bibi Vs. Mir Muhammad 
Hassan and others [PLD 1962 (W.P.) Quetta 67], Akhtar Ali Pervez 
Vs. Altaf ur Rehman [PLD 1963 (W.P.) Lahore 390], Habibullah Vs. 
Bawa Vasdevgir Chelo Shambhugir (PLD 1968 Kar 869), Mst. 
Khurshid Vs. Haji Abdul Hadi and 4 others(PLD 1979 Quetta 39), 
Mst. Rashida Begum Vs. Mazhar Iqbal (1983 CLC 380), Abdul 
Wahid Vs. Bashir Ahmad and others(1986 CLC 829), Muhammad 
Siddique Vs. Fazal Hussain Qureshi and 2 others (PLD 1996 Lah 
252), Mst. ah Razia Begum and another Vs. Senior Civil Judge 
(Rent Controller), Charsadda and 2 others (PLD 1996 Pesh 8), 
Tariq Ali Sheikh Vs. Rent Controller (Khalid Nawaz), Lahore and 
another (1998 CLC 460), Sh. Muhammad Siddiq Vs. Khurram 
Gulraiz and 2 others (1998 MLD 624), Ghulam Rasool Vs. Mian 
Khurshid Ahmed (2000 SCMR 632),Khalid Saeed and others Vs. 
Nadeem Ahmad Khan (2003 CLC 1614), Irfanullah Shah Vs. 
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Wahabullah and another (2003 YLR 1195), Qazi Muhammad 
Hayat and others Vs. Dad Muhammad and others (PLD 2003 SC 
231), Babu Din Vs. Civil Judge/Rent Controller, Multan and 6 
others (2006 CLC 926), Aziz Ahmed Mughal Vs. Rent Controller 
and others (2006 CLC 1381), Irshad Ahmad Khan Vs. Rent 
Controller and 2 others (2006 CLC 1860), Ashiq Hussain and 
another Vs. Jamia Masjid Hanfia Ghausia through President (PLD 
2007 Lah 283) and Muhammad Wakil Khan Vs. Additional 
District Judge, Lahore and 3 others (2007 CLC 1151). 
5. 
 
The Ordinance was repealed by the Punjab Rented 
Premises Ordinance, 2007 which finally culminated into the Act. 
Again, in this special law (the Act) the jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal 
is restricted to disputes which are covered by the Act in terms of 
subject matter, parties and territorial jurisdiction. Subject matter 
jurisdiction includes non-agricultural residential or non-residential 
buildings or rented land whereas in terms of territorial jurisdiction it 
is the same as the extent of the jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal 
under the previous law. With respect to parties, as was the case 
under the earlier law, the Rent Tribunal would only assume 
jurisdiction over a matter once the jurisdictional threshold is crossed 
by establishing that the matter involves a landlord and tenant. 
‘Tenant’ has been defined 
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termination of his tenancy for the 
purpose of a proceeding under this Act; 
(ii) 
Legal heirs of a tenant in the event of 
death of the tenant who continue to be 
in occupation of the premises; and 
(iii) 
A sub-tenant who is in possession of the 
premises or part thereof with the 
written consent of the landlord…” 
 
Section 24 of the Act reads as under: 
 
“24. 
Payment of rent and other dues for 
pending proceedings.—(1) 
If 
an 
eviction 
application is filed, the Rent Tribunal, while 
granting leave to contest, shall direct the 
tenant to deposit the rent due from him within a 
specified time, and continue to deposit the same 
in accordance with the tenancy agreement or 
as may be directed by the Rent Tribunal till the 
final order. 
(Emphasis supplied) 
 
(2) 
If there is a dispute as to the amount of 
rent due or rate of rent, the Rent Tribunal shall 
tentatively determine the dispute and pass the 
order for deposit of the rent in terms of Sub-
section (1). 
 
(3) 
In case the tenant has not paid a utility 
bill, the Rent Tribunal shall direct the tenant to 
pay the utility bill. 
 
(4) 
If a tenant fails to comply with a 
direction or order of the Rent Tribunal, the 
Rent Tribunal shall forthwith pass the final 
order.” 
 
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Through the impugned judgment the learned High Court has tried to 
resolve the question at hand by dwelling upon the larger scheme of 
the new rent laws by trying to decipher the latent intent of the 
legislature, which in our view was completely unnecessary because 
the answer to the question is quite patent. A plain reading of Section 
24 of the Act reproduced hereinabove makes it clear that a direction 
is not to be issued to the respondent of an eviction application but to 
a tenant. The use of the word ‘tenant’ as opposed to ‘respondent’ 
speaks to the legislative intent. This usage appears to be conscious 
and deliberate, because elsewhere in the Act where the parties to a lis 
are meant to be referred to without identifying their legal characters, 
the words ‘applicant’ and ‘respondent’ are used instead of ‘landlord’ 
and ‘tenant’ (see Sections 19, 21 and 22 etc.). Where there is a specific 
intention to do so and the attending context requires that the parties 
be referred to by their legal status, the legislature has used the words 
‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ (see Sections 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 20, 24 etc.). It is 
a settled canon of statutory interpretation that where a statute uses a 
particular word(s), the presumption is that such word(s) is illustrative 
of the legislative intent unless there are very cogent reasons to 
displace the same and in our view, there are no such reasons that 
justify interpreting Section 24 of the Act in a way that defeats its 
express meaning. Therefore, it follows that where the relationship of 
landlord and tenant is denied, the Rent Tribunal would lack 
jurisdiction, on account of the doctrine of jurisdictional fact, to pass 
an order for payment of rent due under Section 24 of the Act until 
and unless the Tribunal positively ascertains the relationship of 
tenancy and establishes that the respondent to the eviction 
application is in fact a ‘tenant’ in terms of Section 2(l) of the Act. As 
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regards the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that 
where there is a contumacious denial by the respondent of an 
eviction application the Rent Tribunal should pass an order for 
payment of rent due, suffice it to say that contumacious denial of the 
relationship of tenancy would form the basis for declining relief to the 
respondent. Where the denial, prima facie, appears to be tainted and 
contumacious, the Rent Controller would refrain from granting leave 
to the respondent as a matter of right and course, in a perfunctory 
manner. Instead, when the Rent Tribunal, without framing an issue, 
concludes that the denial is contumacious in nature, it may refuse to 
grant leave and allow the eviction application. Whilst so doing, the 
Tribunal can simultaneously pass an order under Section 24 of the 
Act finally determining the rent due from the tenant and direct that 
the same be deposited/paid. However, where once leave has been 
granted and the Tribunal has first to decide the question of its own 
jurisdiction, then in that eventuality, on account of the clear 
provisions of Section 24 ibid read with the definition of the word 
‘tenant’ appearing in the Act, the Rent Tribunal is precluded from 
passing an order without first determining the jurisdictional fact. 
Once the relationship of tenancy has been denied the jurisdiction of 
the Rent Tribunal has essentially been called into question and needs 
to be resolved before the Tribunal can proceed to pass an order for 
payment of rent due. It needs to be appreciated that the there is a 
distinction between an issue as to the very authority to adjudicate 
and those issues which may arise as between the parties. The Rent 
Controller must first establish relationship of landlord and tenant. 
Objections “to” proceedings must be distinguished from objections 
“in” the proceedings. Issue of jurisdiction may be raised by a party 
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but it only concerns the court and the party over whom it is asked to 
assume jurisdiction.1To hold otherwise would be to defeat the express 
intention of the statute, which is that an order for payment of rent 
due should only be passed against a tenant, and not merely a 
respondent of an eviction application. The relationship of landlord 
and tenant is an essential question which has a direct effect upon the 
assumption and exercise of the jurisdiction of the Rent Tribunal, 
which (question) must necessarily be positively ascertained before 
passing an order for payment of rent due under Section 24 of the Act. 
The judgment of the High Court reported as Farrukh Nadeem Vs. 
Muhammad Ahmad Khan and another (2009 MLD 955) relied 
upon by the learned counsel for the respondent to the effect that 
where there is a contumacious denial an order under Section 13(6) of 
the Ordinance can be passed is bad law which cannot be sustained, 
thus this judgment is set aside. It may however be mentioned here 
that where default in the payment of rent is set out as a ground in 
the eviction application, the relationship of tenancy is denied by the 
respondent, leave is granted to the respondent of the case, an issue 
in this context is framed, evidence is led by the parties, and the Rent 
Tribunal comes to the conclusion that such relationship exists, the 
Tribunal by applying the principles of estoppel and the rule of 
forfeiture of tenancy shall straightaway pass an order of eviction 
against the respondent/tenant and shall also pass the final order 
regarding the amount of rent due to the landlord which the 
respondent (adjudged as a tenant) is obliged to pay, and such order shall 
be executable against the tenant, besides the execution of the 
                                       
1Akhtar Ali Pervez Vs. Altafur Rehman (PLD 1963 (WP) Lah 390), Full Bench, J Manzur Qadir. 
 
 
C.A.222-L of 2016 
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eviction. However where grounds envisaged by Section 15 of the Act 
other than default are raised in an eviction application, obviously the 
Rent Tribunal after deciding the issue of relationship of tenancy and 
finding in favour of the landlord may frame further issues on merits 
and at that point of time pass an order under Section 24 ibid. 
6. 
 
We now advert to the question regarding the validity of 
the agreement to sell in terms of Section 10 of the Act which (section) 
reads as follows:- 
 
“Effect of other agreement.—An agreement to 
sell or any other agreement entered into 
between the landlord and the tenant, after the 
execution of a tenancy agreement, in respect of 
premises and for a matter other than a matter 
provided under the tenancy agreement, shall 
not affect the relationship or landlord and 
tenant, unless the tenancy is revoked through a 
written agreement entered before the Rent 
Registrar in accordance with the provisions of 
section 5.” 
 
Section 10 of the Act provides that an agreement to sell entered into 
between a landlord and tenant, after the execution of a tenancy 
agreement, shall not affect the relationship of landlord and tenant 
unless the tenancy is revoked in accordance with the Act. In the 
instant matter the case of the appellant (respondent in the eviction petition) is 
that he was in occupation of the premises by virtue of an agreement 
to sell entered into with the respondent, and not because he was a 
tenant who subsequently entered into an agreement to sell with the 
respondent. It is his stance that the agreement to sell had nothing to 
do with any tenancy whatsoever, and therefore Section 10 had no 
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bearing on his case. We are inclined to agree with this argument. 
Again, the use of the words ‘landlord’ and ‘tenant’ in Section 10 ibid 
presupposes the existence of the relationship of tenancy between the 
parties. Therefore the agreements to sell that Section 10 refers to are, 
by ineluctable conclusion, the ones entered into between existing 
landlords and tenants subsequent to their tenancy agreement and 
during the subsistence thereof. This is entirely different from those 
cases where there is/was no relationship of landlord and tenant from 
the very beginning, as is allegedly the case in the instant matter. 
Therefore, the judgment reported as Haji Muhammad Saeed Vs. 
Additional District Judge (2012 MLD 108) relied upon by the 
learned counsel for the respondent is distinguishable, pertaining to 
the former category of cases where existing landlord and tenant 
subsequently enter into an agreement to sell. This vital distinction 
has eluded the attention of the learned High Court while passing the 
impugned judgment. 
7. 
 
In light of the above, we answer the question identified in 
the first paragraph of the opinion in the negative, in that an order 
under Section 24 of the Act cannot be passed against a respondent of 
an eviction application where the relationship of landlord and tenant 
has been denied. The learned High Court has clearly erred in holding 
that the Rent Tribunal is obliged to pass an order for payment of rent 
due under Section 24 ibid notwithstanding the fact that the 
relationship of tenancy had been denied. Therefore, this appeal is 
accepted and the impugned judgment of the learned High Court is set 
aside. Before parting it may be observed that the counsel for the 
respondent has apprised us that in compliance with the impugned 
judgment the appellant has deposited a certain amount with the Rent 
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Tribunal in response the appellant’s counsel states that his client 
shall not withdraw such amount, which shall be subject to the final 
decision of the case. We also direct that the suit for specific 
performance filed by the respondent against the appellant and the 
eviction petition be tried by the same court, therefore, either of the 
parties may apply to the District Judge Lahore for the transfer of 
either of the cases to one court. Such court should decide both the 
matters within four months of the transfer of the case under 
intimation to the Assistant Registrar (Lahore) of this Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced in open Court 
on 10.10.2016 at Lahore 
Approved For Reporting 
Waqas Naseer/* 
 
 
JUDGE 
