IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE UMAR ATA BANDIAL 
MR. JUSTICE FAISAL ARAB 
MR. JUSTICE SAJJAD ALI SHAH 
 
 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018  
(On 
appeal 
against 
the 
judgment 
dated 
26.04.2018 passed by the Islamabad High Court, 
Islamabad in Writ Petition No. 2907/2017) 
 
 
Khawaja Muhammad Asif 
… Petitioner 
VERSUS 
 
Muhammad Usman Dar and others 
… Respondents 
 
 
For the Petitioner:  
Mr. Munir A. Malik, Sr. ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Rashdeen Nawaz Kasuri, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Zahid F. Ebrahim, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Assisted by: 
 
 
 
 
Ch. Najam-ul-Hassan, Advocate 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Ahmed Nawaz Chaudhry, AOR 
 
For the Respondent (1): Mr. Sikandar Bashir Mohmand, ASC 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Tariq Aziz, AOR 
 
 
For the Respondent (2): N.R. 
 
For the Respondent (3): Mr. Waqar Chaudhry, DPA (Litigation) 
 
 
Dates of Hearing: 
07.05.2018, 21.05.2018, 31.05.2018 & 
01.06.2018 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
 
 
 
FAISAL ARAB, J.- The petitioner has impugned the 
decision of the Islamabad High Court dated 26.04.2018 rendered 
in a constitution petition in which respondent No.1 succeeded in 
obtaining a writ in the nature of quo warranto against the 
petitioner, who was a member of the National Assembly and 
holding the portfolio of foreign minister. The case of respondent 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
2
No.1 before the High Court was that the petitioner whilst holding 
public offices in Pakistan continued to serve a UAE based company 
called the International Mechanical & Electrical Company LLC as 
its fulltime employee. It was submitted that the petitioner held the 
portfolio of federal minister for Water & Power from 08.06.2013 to 
28.07.2017 and foreign minister from 04.08.2017 to 26.04.2018 
and hence not only violated the oath of his office and the rule of 
conflict of interest but also failed to disclose his monthly salary 
derived from such employment in the statement of assets and 
liabilities filed under the provisions of Sections 12 (2) (f) and 42A of 
the Representation of the Peoples Act, 1976, now repealed (RoPA for 
short) and thus stood disqualified to be member of the National 
Assembly.  
 
 
2. 
 
Disqualification of the petitioner was also sought on 
the ground that no income tax on salary derived from employment 
with the UAE Company was paid, which was his obligation under 
Section 102 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001. Yet another 
ground on the basis of which disqualification was sought that the 
petitioner failed to declare a sum of AED 5,000/- in his statement 
of assets and liabilities which were lying deposited in his account 
bearing No. 6201853775 maintained with National Bank of Abu 
Dhabi, UAE on the date when he filed his nomination paper. 
 
 
3. 
 
In the impugned judgment the reasons that mainly 
prevailed with the learned High Court in disqualifying the 
petitioner under Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution were; that the 
petitioner’s employment with a UAE based company at the time 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
3
when he was a member of the federal cabinet has given rise to 
serious questions of conflict of interest; that the source of income 
from foreign employment and the salary derived therefrom was not 
appropriately disclosed by the petitioner in his nomination paper 
as only ‘business’ was declared to be his source of income; that the 
petitioner did not pay income tax on the foreign salary under 
Section 102 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 and; that the 
petitioner failed to declare a sum of AED 5,000/- that were lying 
deposited in his account No. 6201853775 maintained with 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi in a UAE bank. Aggrieved by this 
decision of the High Court, the petitioner has filed the present 
petition.  
 
 
4. 
 
Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the High 
Court erred in not considering the fact that the entire controversy 
was put at rest in the election petition which ought not to have been 
set at naught in a fresh round of litigation initiated through a quo 
warranto proceedings on account of the bar contained in Article 225 
of the Constitution. On merits of the case he submitted that the 
petitioner was justified in describing his occupation as business, 
which was his dominant source of income; that the petitioner had 
disclosed his monthly salary settled under the foreign employment 
contract in the tax return filed with the nomination papers and as 
no cash was left in hand from such salary in the form of savings, all 
being already spent, after stating the salary to be AED 9,000/- the 
figure ‘0’ was written in the tax return, hence it cannot be said that 
income from salary was concealed and; that non-disclosure of a 
sum of AED 5,000/- lying deposited in petitioner’s UAE bank 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
4
account No. 6201853775 was only an honest omission. He 
submitted that in the presence of these facts, there was no basis for 
the High Court to conclude that the petitioner fell short in fulfilling 
the condition of honesty as envisaged in Article 62 (1) (f) of the 
Constitution, particularly when there were no allegations of 
embezzlement, bribery or misappropriation of public property was 
made against him in the writ petition.  
 
 
5. 
 
In rebuttal, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 
argued that by declaring his occupation to be business, the 
petitioner concealed the fact that he also derived income from salary 
under a written employment contract executed with the UAE based 
company; that he took employment with UAE based company while 
holding the portfolios of Defence and Finance Minister, which raised 
the question of conflict of interest; that no income tax was paid on 
his foreign salary income under the laws of Pakistan. Lastly it was 
argued that the petitioner also failed to list AED 5,000/- as one of 
his assets which were admittedly lying deposited in his bank 
account maintained with the National Bank of Abu Dhabi at the 
time of filing his nomination paper and hence failed to demonstrate 
himself as an honest person in terms of Article 62 (1) (f) of the 
Constitution.  
 
 
6. 
 
Before we proceed to examine the merits of the case, we 
find it appropriate to first discuss the scope of Article 62 (1) (f) of the 
Constitution in matters that relate to failure of an elected member of 
the National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly to declare his assets 
in his nomination paper.  
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
5
 
7. 
 
The provisions of election laws are designed to facilitate 
the general public to know what assets the contesting candidates 
own and what liabilities they owe before they are elected and what 
variation has taken place in their assets and liabilities on a year on 
year basis after being elected. Hence the election laws require every 
contesting candidate to file his or her statement of assets and 
liabilities and when elected was required to declare his assets and 
liabilities every year with the Election Commission. In this manner 
the net-worth of all elected members is maintained on the records of 
the Election Commission which is useful in noticing changes that 
may have occurred in their assets and liabilities after entering upon 
their office. In case an asset not declared by an elected member 
comes to light, his details of assets and liabilities would help in 
ascertaining whether concealment was intended to cover some 
wrongdoing. The whole purpose behind seeking details of assets 
and liabilities under the election laws is to discourage persons 
from contesting elections for a seat in the Parliament or a 
Provincial Assembly who have concealed assets acquired through 
some wrongdoing. Simultaneously it also aims at those members 
as well who hitherto may have held untainted record, be 
discouraged 
from 
indulging 
in 
corruption 
and 
financial 
wrongdoings after entering upon their office. Hence whoever 
contests an election for a seat in the Parliament or a Provincial 
Assembly, is mandatorily required by law to be forthright in 
declaring all his assets which he owns and all liabilities he owes. 
Before RoPA was repealed and replaced by the Election Act, 2017 it 
was applicable to the all candidates who contested the 2013 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
6
elections. Under Section 12 (2) (f) of RoPA where an asset owned by 
a contesting candidate was not declared at the time of filing of the 
nomination paper for any reason and such non-disclosure was 
timely brought to the notice of the Returning Officer, he had the 
power to reject the nomination paper under Section 14 (3) (c) of 
RoPA. Such rejection was avoidable under proviso (ii) of Section 14 
(3) (c) of RoPA which states that the Returning Officer shall not 
reject a nomination paper where the defect was remedied 
forthwith. In case the defect was not remedied and the nomination 
paper was rejected, even then, in terms of the proviso (i) to Section 
14 (3) of RoPA, such candidate was still competent to contest the 
election if he had filed another nomination paper either in the same 
constituency or in another constituency that fulfilled all the 
requirement of Section 12 (2) (f) of RoPA. In case he has not chosen 
to contest elections from any other constituency, he still remained 
eligible to contest any future election and the earlier rejection of his 
nomination paper would not be an obstacle merely on account of 
non-compliance with the requirements of Section 12 (2) (f) of RoPA. 
So where an omission to declare an asset had been pointed out by 
any rival candidate to the Returning Officer at the appropriate 
stage of the election process, it would at best result in rejection of 
the nomination paper. Where the objection to seek such rejection 
has failed before the Returning Officer or before the Election 
Tribunal constituted to hear Election Appeals before the elections 
or the time to throw such challenge has gone by, the stage to 
challenge the candidature of a contesting candidate at pre-polling 
stage comes to an end. After the elections, the rival candidate may 
choose to file an election petition before the Election Tribunal to 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
7
challenge the candidature of an elected member for non-compliance 
with the provisions of elections laws. When the above stated stages 
of challenge under the election laws are over, the belated 
awakening of the rival candidate to point out any omission with 
regard to non-declaration of an asset would be hit by the bar 
contained in Article 225 of the Constitution. However, there is 
exception to this rule of finality, which we shall now proceed to 
discuss.  
 
 
8. 
 
It may so happen that an undeclared asset of an 
elected member that stands in his own name or in the name of his 
spouse or dependent children or any of his business entities gets 
discovered after the time to challenge an election under the 
election law has expired and had it been declared it would have 
exposed his dishonesty qua such an asset. The right time to call in 
question such concealment would obviously arise when such a fact 
becomes known, therefore, no cutoff period can be fixed or legal 
bar can be imposed to seek a declaration of dishonesty with regard 
to such an asset that remained concealed from the records of the 
Election Commission. We may clarify here that this declaration of 
dishonesty cannot be sought from the Returning Officer at the time 
of raising objections to a  nomination as his scope of work is only 
to scrutinize the nomination papers in a summary manner within 
two to three days and at the most reject a nomination for non-
compliance with the requirement of making requisite declarations 
but not to pass a judicial verdict on the issue of honesty of a 
contesting candidate in terms of Article 62 (1) (f) of the 
Constitution. Thus upon finding a nomination paper to be 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
8
noncompliant with the election law all that a Returning Officer can 
do is to reject a nomination paper without attributing any sort of 
dishonesty to the contesting candidate. It is only when a contesting 
candidate has already been declared disqualified under Article 62 
(1) (f) of the Constitution by a competent court of law that the 
Returning Officer can reject his nomination paper straight away on 
that basis. Hence where an undeclared asset that had remained 
concealed from the records of the Election Commission comes to 
light and some dishonest act is associated with such an asset then 
the court of competent jurisdiction would scrutinize the issue of 
disqualification within the ambit of Article 62 (1) (f) of the 
Constitution. If the outcome of the scrutiny is that a declaration of 
dishonesty is to be made then the court would make such a 
declaration or it may in the first instance choose to put the 
investigative machinery of the state into motion. Based on the 
material coming on the record the test of honesty would be applied 
and in case the elected member is found dishonest he would be 
disqualified for life.  
 
 
9. 
 
While considering a case of dishonesty in judicial 
proceedings what should not be lost sight of is that on account of 
inadvertence or honest omission on the part of a contesting 
candidate a legitimately acquired asset is not declared. This may 
happen as an honest person may perceive something to be right 
about which he may be wrong and such perception cannot 
necessarily render him dishonest though the omission would 
invariably result in rejection of his nomination paper had such a 
fact is pointed out to the Returning Officer at the time of scrutiny 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
9
of nomination papers or in proceedings available under the election 
laws. There are many conceivable instances where an omission to 
declare an asset on the face of it cannot be regarded as dishonest 
concealment. For example, where an inherited property is not 
declared on account of mistake of fact or an asset acquired from a 
legitimate source of income is not listed in the nomination paper. 
Suchlike omissions at best could be categorized as bad judgment or 
negligence but certainly not dishonesty. As mentioned earlier even 
the proviso to Section 14 (3) (d) of RoPA envisaged that rejection of 
a nomination paper on account of failure to meet the requirements 
of Section 12 of RoPA would not prevent a candidate to contest 
election on the basis of another validly filed nomination paper. 
Hence mere omission to list an asset cannot be labeled as 
dishonesty unless some wrongdoing is associated with its 
acquisition or retention which is duly established in judicial 
proceedings. In our view attributing dishonesty to every omission to 
disclose an asset and disqualify a member for life could never have 
been the intention of the parliament while incorporating Article 62 
(1) (f) in the Constitution. All nondisclosures of assets cannot be 
looked at with the same eye. In our view no set formula can be 
fixed with regard to every omission to list an asset in the 
nomination paper and make a declaration of dishonesty and 
impose the penalty of lifetime disqualification. In a judgment from 
the foreign jurisdiction in the case of Aguilar vs. Office of 
Ombudsman decided on 26.02.2014 by the Supreme Court of 
Philippines (G.R. 197307) it was held that dishonesty is not simply 
bad judgment or negligence but is a question of intention. There has 
to exist an element of bad intention with regard to an undeclared 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
10
asset before it is described as dishonest. Unless dishonesty is 
established in appropriate judicial proceedings, Article 62 (1) (f) of 
the Constitution cannot be invoked to disqualify an elected member 
for life.  
 
 
10. 
 
Where a matter with regard to an undisclosed asset is 
taken to court, it would not form the opinion that it is a case of 
dishonest concealment without first calling upon the elected 
member to explain the source from which such an asset was 
acquired. Where no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming and the 
undeclared asset also does not commensurate with the elected 
member’s known sources of income, it would give rise to the 
presumption that unlawful means may have been applied with 
regard to such an asset. It is the credibility of the explanation that 
would be the determining factor as to whether nondisclosure of an 
asset carries with it the element of dishonesty or not. The test of 
honesty with regard to non-disclosure of assets and liabilities is to 
be applied in that context only and certainly not in a case where a 
clean asset has not been declared on account of bad judgment or 
inadvertent omission. In the impugned judgment, the learned High 
Court itself was conscious of the fact that where there is a case of 
non-disclosure of an asset the same ipso facto does not render a 
person to be dishonest. In this regard, a judgment of this Court 
cited by respondent No. 1’s counsel in the case of Rai Hassan 
Nawaz Vs. Haji Muhammad Ayub (PLD 2017 SC 70) was referred 
where it was held as follows:- 
 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
11
“8.         We, therefore, observe that any plausible explanation 
that exonerates, inter alia, mis-declaration of assets and 
liabilities by a contesting candidate should be confined to 
unintended and minor errors that do not confer any tangible 
benefit or advantage upon an elected or contesting candidate. 
Where assets, liabilities, earnings and income of an elected or 
contesting candidate are camouflaged or concealed by resort 
to different legal devices including benami, trustee, nominee, 
etc. arrangements for constituting holders of title, it would be 
appropriate for a learned Election Tribunal to probe whether 
the beneficial interest in such assets or income resides in the 
elected or contesting candidate in order to ascertain if his 
false or incorrect statement of declaration under Section 12(2) 
of the ROPA is intentional or otherwise. This view finds 
support from the statutory aim and purpose of requiring all 
contesting candidates to file their statements and declarations 
as envisaged in Section 12(2) of the ROPA. Clearly there is a 
public interest object behind the statutory prescription for 
obtaining the said statements and declaration. It is to ensure 
integrity and probity of contesting candidates and therefore all 
legislators.   
 
 
11. 
 
The 
above 
discussed 
essential 
element 
of 
disqualification with regard to non-declaration of an asset within 
the ambit of Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution has also been 
recognized in a recent judgment of this Court in the case of 
Muhammad Hanif Abbasi Vs. Imran Khan Niazi (PLD 2018 SC 
189) wherein in paragraphs 100 and 103 holding as under:- 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
12
 
 
“100.     In the passage referred above, the Court is 
addressing an undisclosed asset, existence whereof is 
expressly admitted through the coffers of an entity whose 
financial dealings were already doubted and formed part of 
the network of persons and entities allegedly holding 
disproportionate assets attributed to the erstwhile Prime 
Minister, his dependents and benamidars. It cannot, therefore, 
be contented that dishonesty is attributed in the said 
judgment without reference to any alleged design, intention, 
scheme, background or impropriety. Consequently, to our 
minds the larger Bench has not expunged the requirement of 
establishing the "dishonesty" of conduct of an aspirant or 
incumbent member of a Constitutional Legislature in order for 
the disqualification under Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution 
and Section 99 (f) of the ROPA to be attracted. Each and every 
word in the Constitution bears a meaning and place, which 
must be given effect because redundancy cannot be assigned 
to the Constitution. Accordingly, in earlier judgments by this 
Court in the matter of "dishonest conduct," violation of 
constitutional norms required by Article 62 (1) (f) in its phrase 
"honest and ameen" have been deduced with caution and 
care……….. 
 
To the same effect are observations made in Iftikhar Ahmad 
Khan Bar v. Chief Election Commissioner Islamabad and 
others (PLD 2010 SC 817). 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
13
103.     The insistence by learned counsel for the petitioner 
that any error or omission in the declaration of assets by a 
candidate for election or a legislator incurs his disqualification 
under Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution posits a wide 
proposition of law. If at all, this may have limited relevance 
where the context involves corruption or money laundering in 
state office, misappropriation of public property or public 
funds, accumulation of assets beyond known means or abuse 
of public office or authority for private gain. These allegations 
are not germane to the present case. There is no involvement 
here of public property or funds, abuse of public office and 
authority, 
corruption 
or 
breach 
of 
fiduciary 
duty. 
Consequently, the argument of the learned counsel for the 
petitioner on this score fails. 
 
 
12. 
 
Making differentiations and distinctions are the tools 
that 
are 
always 
applied 
in 
judicial 
proceedings 
in 
the 
determination of the penalties and punishments, therefore, the 
notion of proportionality and making distinctions cannot be lost 
sight of while considering an omission to declare an asset. 
Intervention through a writ in the nature of quo warranto in 
financial matters against an elected member can only be justified 
when non-disclosure of an asset is meant to conceal a 
wrongdoing. As law does not envisage that every rejection of 
nomination paper on account of non-disclosure of an asset would 
lead to disqualification under Article 62 (1) (f) of the Constitution 
therefore unless some wrongdoings associated with an undeclared 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
14
asset is established the outcome of the case would not culminate 
into disqualification for life.  
 
 
13. 
 
Having discussed the circumstances in which Article 62 
(1) (f) of the Constitution can be invoked in the matters relating to 
declaration of assets, we shall proceed to examine the first ground 
of attack with regard to the petitioner’s employment contract 
executed with a UAE based company that required him to serve as 
a fulltime employee in UAE on monthly salary basis.   
 
 
14. 
 
Before the High Court both the petitioner’s counsel 
and the UAE Company which expressed its stand by filing a 
certificate, had maintained that the petitioner was not required to 
be physically present in UAE to serve the company. It was stated 
that he was to render advice on phone only. The learned High 
Court however in its decision treated the petitioner as a fulltime 
employee who served the company with his physical presence in 
UAE. In this background, what needs to be examined is whether the 
petitioner actually went to UAE to serve the company or rendered 
advice on phone or was the employment contract intended to 
whiten black money. From the amalgam of these divergent 
situations truth needs to be spotted. 
 
  
15. 
 
It is highly inappropriate for a parliamentarian or 
member of a provincial assembly, who holds a position in the 
cabinet, to take a fulltime job in a foreign country where in terms 
of the written contract he is committed to work six days a week, 
however at the same time it seems highly improbable that a person 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
15
holding such a position would actually be rendering his services as 
a fulltime employee elsewhere. Had it been true, it would have 
certainly become headline news in this day and age where such 
kind of information does not remain hidden from the media for 
long. It would have also been a case of frequent absence of the 
petitioner from Pakistan at the expense of his official duties. On 
the basis of the contents of the contract of employment the status 
of the petitioner was though shown to be of a fulltime employee of 
the UAE Company but in actuality the petitioner is not shown to 
have gone to UAE to work for the company in such capacity. He 
retained his presence in Pakistan as a member of the federal 
cabinet. Even if the petitioner had rendered legal advice on phone, 
the respondent has failed to demonstrate that the petitioner or any 
of his family members own any  shares in the foreign company 
which has financial dealings with the federation of Pakistan and 
their 
competing 
financial 
interests 
have 
undermined 
the 
impartiality of the petitioner by leaking any information to the said 
company or unduly benefited it in any manner that falls within the 
ambit of conflict of interest. It has also not been established that 
the petitioner by using his official position was instrumental in 
extracting some undue benefit from the Federal Government in 
favour of the UAE Company.  
 
 
16. 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines conflict of interest as ‘a 
real or seeming incompatibility between ones private interest and 
one’s public or fiduciary duties’. To serve personal interest means 
to give ‘preferential treatment’ by using one’s official privileges or 
misusing confidential information to benefit someone else or one’s 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
16
own interests. There are numerous examples that come to mind 
which can reflect the essence of a conflict of interest situations 
such as the prospect of personally gaining financial benefits 
subject to an approval of a project, introducing policy that are 
friendly to one’s private interests or lobbying to approve a friend’s 
tender or application just to help his interests. In the present case 
there is absolutely no allegation that the petitioner received some 
lucrative opportunity in exchange for conferring benefits or sharing 
confidential information thereby abusing his public office. The 
respondent has absolutely failed to point out any decision which 
the petitioner had taken in discharge of his official duties that was 
likely to result in any financial or other material benefits for 
himself or his family or friends or any decision he took that had 
influenced him in the performance of his official duties. Thus no 
case of conflict of interest is made out.   
 
 
17. 
 
For whatever its worth, as the execution of the 
employment contract with the UAE Company is an undeniable 
reality, the petitioner was required to declare the salary settled 
thereunder. Failure to do so would have resulted in taking the risk 
of rejection of his nomination paper on account of concealment of 
one of his sources of income. The petitioner’s counsel submitted 
that as the salary received from the UAE Company for rendering 
legal advice on phone had already been spent by the petitioner, 
therefore while the monthly salary was disclosed in the tax return 
filed with the nomination papers, nothing was left in hand as 
savings from the salary to be declared as an asset hence the figure 
‘0’ was written in the relevant column of the tax return after 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
17
recoding the monthly salary settled under the foreign contract. 
Many people involved in politics make their living by taking 
employment with private persons or private companies. When they 
contest elections they are required under election laws to declare 
their sources of income, the assets they hold and the liabilities they 
owe. Where a person deriving income from salary has already spent 
it then all that is required to be disclosed is the source from which 
he derives his salary, not the entire quantum of salary that he 
received as it no more exists in his hand in the form of an asset. 
Hence, the occasion to declare salary as an asset arises only when 
at the stage of filing nomination papers it has either accrued but the 
employee at his own instance has not collected from the employer, 
who keeps it in trust for the employee or where the salary has been 
received but after spending some of it, part of it still exists as his 
savings in the form of cash-in-hand or cash-in-bank. So the salary 
that has not been collected at the option of the employee or the 
savings from the salary that exists in the hands of the employee at 
the time of contesting elections needs to be declared as an asset in 
the nomination paper. It seems that without looking at these 
aspects, respondent No.1 raised the issue of non-declaration of 
salary income by merely reading the contents of the written 
employment contract and the learned High Court went with such 
reading, though the learned High Court has clearly acknowledged 
in the impugned judgment that the salary under the foreign 
employment contract has been declared in the tax return that was 
filed with the nomination paper. The learned judge of the High 
Court however erroneously defined such disclosure to be ‘vague 
and obscure’ and went on to declare the petitioner dishonest. 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
18
Petitioner’s declaration of foreign salary as one of his sources of 
income under the foreign employment contract exists on the 
record, so it can’t be said that it is case of non-declaration of a 
source of income. 
 
 
18. 
 
One can speculate that the employment contract was 
intended to create a fake source of income in order to convert black 
money into white. In the present case, however, allegations such as 
embezzlement, bribery or misappropriation of public funds or 
property has not been attributed to the petitioner which only would 
have served as a basis to scrutinize the matter in that context as 
well. Even otherwise there was no need for the petitioner to show 
‘0’ receipt against the foreign salary declared in his tax return filed 
with the nomination paper, as declaring substantial savings out of 
salary income under the foreign employment contract would have 
served the purpose of whitening any black money which the 
petitioner may have been holding. In the present case no savings 
from foreign salary have been shown to have existed in the hands 
of the petitioner when he filed his nomination paper. As already 
discussed, only where salary has been earned but not yet collected 
from the employer or where any part of it has not yet been spent 
and exists in the form of savings was required to be declared. In 
the present case, no part of salary earned but not yet collected 
from the employer or any part of unspent salary was demonstrated 
to have existed in order to make out a case of concealment. In the 
circumstances the explanation given by the petitioner’s counsel 
that no part of the salary settled under the foreign employment 
contract was in the hands of the petitioner at the time of filing of 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
19
nomination paper cannot be brushed aside. In the case of Rai 
Hassan Nawaz supra, it has been held that there is a public 
interest behind the statutory prescription for obtaining the 
statements of assets and liabilities so that integrity and probity is 
maintained by the contesting candidates. It was further held that 
where an asset is not disclosed and where no plausible explanation 
is forthcoming only then an elected member is to be unseated. In 
the present case the respondent No.1 has failed to rebut the 
explanation of the petitioner and failed to point out that salary 
proceeds or any part of it, whether in cash or kind or in the form of 
receivables existed at the time of filing of the nomination papers 
which remained undeclared. Thus no case of concealment of an 
asset is made out. 
 
   
19. 
 
Disqualification has also been sought on the ground 
that income tax on the foreign salary income under the 
employment contract with the UAE based company has not been 
paid by the petitioner. In this regard the learned High Court held 
that Section 102 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 provides that 
any foreign salary received by a resident individual shall be exempt 
from tax only when the individual has paid income tax in the 
country where it was earned and nothing was placed on record to 
show compliance with this legal requirement. Keeping aside for a 
moment our doubts with regard to the real object behind executing 
the employment contract, we would proceed to examine the 
question of non-payment of income tax purely on the legal plain. 
Section 12 (2) (d) of RoPA required every contesting candidate to 
make a declaration that they or their spouses or any of their 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
20
dependents or the business entities mainly owned by them are not 
in default in payment of any government dues or utility charges in 
excess of ten thousand rupees for over a period of six months at 
the time of filing the nomination papers. In our view, such default 
can only be established had it been shown that a bill or a recovery 
or demand notice or an assessment order was issued by an 
authority that is competent to recover government dues yet the 
same has remained unpaid. However, that is not the case in the 
present proceedings. Hence in absence of any such demand from 
the 
concerned 
government 
department, 
the 
court 
in 
the 
proceedings in the nature of quo warranto cannot take upon itself 
the obligation to make assessment of tax on its own which only the 
income tax department is competent to do under the law. In 
absence of a tax demand from the tax department, the learned 
High Court ought not to have assumed the role of determining 
petitioner’s tax liability after being quite conscious of the fact that 
it cannot assume such a role when it observed in the impugned 
judgment “We are not concerned with violations of the tax laws”. 
Hence no case for disqualification is made out on this ground as 
well. 
 
 
20. 
 
Petitioner’s disqualification has also been sought on 
the ground that he had AED 5,000/- in his account bearing 
No.6201853775 maintained with National Bank of Abu Dhabi, 
UAE which he failed to disclose in his nomination paper filed at the 
time of contesting 2013 general elections. He explained the 
omission by stating that it happened due to oversight. This bank 
account was however disclosed in the statement of assets and 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
21
liabilities filed in the year 2015 as required under Section 42A of 
RoPA. A complete bank statement of the said account is on the 
record which reflects that the petitioner opened his account on 
17.04.2010 with a sum of AED 5,000/- and five years later closed 
it on 07.07.2015. In the interregnum, the bank had only been 
debiting bank charges periodically which brought down the original 
deposit amount from AED 5,000/- to AED 4,715/-. This balance 
amount was finally withdrawn from the account when it was 
closed. So right from the day the bank account was opened and till 
its closure, no business was transacted in the said account which 
substantiates the plea taken by the petitioner that non-disclosure 
was an innocent omission and not intended to conceal some 
wrongdoing. We are not oblivious of the fact that a bank account 
may reflect certain transactions of substantial value which have 
already taken place and scrutiny of such transactions may lead to 
disclosure of illegal financial dealings regardless of the meager 
amount lying deposited. However, that is not the case here as 
other than making a deposit of AED 5,000/- no transaction has 
taken place in the said account which throughout its life remained 
dormant. Hence the petitioner cannot be labeled dishonest for 
omitting to declare such a small amount under Article 62 (1) (f) of 
the Constitution.  
 
 
21. 
 
In the present case neither a case of conflict of interest 
is made out nor has any wrongdoing associated with any asset 
belonging to the petitioner has been established in order to 
warrant interference in proceedings in the nature of quo warranto. 
 
CIVIL PETITION NO. 1616 OF 2018 
22
 
22. 
 
Above are the reasons for our short order dated 
01.06.2018 whereby we converted this petition into appeal and 
allowed it after reaching the conclusion that the decision of the 
leaned High Court in disqualifying the petitioner under Article 62 
(1) (f) of the Constitution is not sustainable in law and thus no 
case for issuance of a writ in the nature of quo warranto was made 
out.  
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
Islamabad, the 
19th of October, 2018 
Approved for Reporting 
Khurram 
