IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN  
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
PRESENT:  
MR. JUSTICE MUSHIR ALAM 
MR. JUSTICE YAHYA AFRIDI 
MR. JUSTICE QAZI MUHAMMAD AMIN AHMAD 
 
 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
Against the judgment dated 11.10. 2019 passed 
by Islamabad High Court, Islamabad in W.P. No. 
2948 of 2018  
 
 
 
 
Nadia Naz 
…Petitioner(s) 
                                        VERSUS 
The President of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
President House, Islamabad & others 
…Respondent(s) 
 
 
For the Petitioner(s): 
In person a/w Nadeem A. Sh, ASC (as 
probono) 
 
 
For Respondent No.6: 
 
 
For Respondent No.11: 
Mr. Agha Muhammad Ali, ASC 
Mr. M. Sharif Janjua, AOR 
 
Mr. M. Nazeer Jawad, ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
22.9.2020 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
MUSHIR ALAM, J.- The facts leading to the instant petition are that 
the petitioner was appointed on temporary basis as Resource Person 
(Camera Department) at PTV on 04.09.2007. She filed a complaint 
alleging 
workplace 
harassment 
under 
the 
“Protection 
against 
Harassment of Women at Workplace Act, 2010” (‘the Act, 2010’) before 
the Federal Ombudsman for Protection against Harassment of Women 
at Workplace against current respondents No 4 & 5 on 08.03.2016. 
The record shows that during the pendency of complaint before the 
Federal 
Ombudsman, 
the 
petitioner 
was 
proceeded 
against 
departmentally, charge-sheeted, show-caused, and consequently 
terminated 
from 
service 
w.e.f. 
13.05.2017 
vide 
order 
dated 
17.05.2016. It may be noted that the Petitioner took no exception to 
her termination before any forum which, therefore, attained finality. 
However, the petitioner continued pouring various applications before 
the Federal Ombudsman, including actions taken against her for 
disciplinary proceedings.   
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
2
 
2. 
 
The learned Federal Ombudsman, vide order dated 
16.10.2017, not only took cognizance of disciplinary proceedings 
against the Petitioner, but treated action and proceedings in the 
departmental enquiry as harassment, as detailed in paragraph 24 of 
the order, and also condemned the Respondents No. 4 and 5, namely 
Saeed Ather who was Controller Administration and Personnel, and 
Abdul Rashid who held the post of Controller. Respondents No.4 and 5 
were ordered to be proceeded against and “the penalty of withholding 
of promotion be imposed on them for a period of two years under 
Section 4(4)(i)(b) of Act of 2010”. The said respondents were further 
burdened with fine of Rs.100,000/- which was to be paid to the 
Petitioner. The departmental disciplinary proceedings against the 
Petitioner were set-aside and she was reinstated into service. In 
paragraph 26 of the order, the Ministry of information was directed to 
investigate on the Department of Administration and Personnel to root 
out the cause of this perpetual harassment against the Appellant and 
take appropriate action against the conspirators including and besides 
respondents in the matter. 
 
3. 
 
The Ministry of Information, Broadcasting and National 
Heritage, created an inter-departmental inquiry commission, which 
observed in its inquiry report dated 05.07.2017 that ‘no incident of 
harassment had taken place’. 
 
4. 
 
The Federal Ombudsman’s Order dated 16.10.2017 was 
successfully challenged by the affectees’ respondents before the 
President of Pakistan. The Petitioner also made as many as seven (7) 
Complaints before the President of Pakistan. All the Representations 
by the affectees-Respondents and Complaints filed by the petitioner 
were heard, the record was examined, and the case was decided 
together.  
 
5. 
 
The President of Pakistan, on examining the record came 
to a conclusion that in consideration of the fact that the decision of 
learned Federal Ombudsman is exceptional in the eyes of law and 
required to be set-aside by the appellate forum holding  that  
“Undoubtedly, the issue of the complainant revolves around the 
component of discipline/administrative issue in service matter and not 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
3
covered under sexual harassment as mentioned in the particular 
definition of sexual harassment provided by the Protection against 
Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010, elaborated supra.” 
and “Thus the complainant could not able to prove the allegations of 
sexual harassment before the appellate forum beyond any shadow of 
doubt.” Consequently, representations filed by the Respondents were 
accepted, while the representation of the complainant was set-aside. 
However, the complainant was left with option to “avail the remedy for 
redressal of her grievance in service/administrative matter before the 
competent forum under the law, if so desired”. 
 
6. 
 
The petitioner challenged the order of the President dated 
05.01.2018 before the learned Islamabad High Court which upheld the 
order of the President vide judgment dated 11.10.2019 impugned 
before this Court through the instant petition.   
 
7. 
 
The learned Bench of the Islamabad High Court, placing 
reliance on the case of “Shahina Masood etc. vs. Federal Ombudsman 
Secretariat for Protection of against Harassment at Workplace etc” 
rendered in Writ Petition No. 1665-2019, (since reported as reported 
as 2020 PLC (CS) 186), wherein it was held that “when the definition 
of a particular expression has been given in a statute then its ordinary 
meaning becomes irrelevant nor, can it be considered”. The cited 
judgment, taking into consideration the definition of harassment as 
expounded in the case, examined the merits of the case in hand and 
came to a conclusion that no case for harassment, within the 
contemplation of section 2(h) of the Act, 2010 was made out. It was 
further held that the learned Federal Ombudsman had no jurisdiction 
to order re-instatement of the complainant. The Order of the President 
was accordingly maintained through judgment impugned before us.     
 
8.   
 
Learned counsel for the petitioner, appeared as probono 
counsel, along with the petitioner, contended that she was subjected 
to workplace harassment by her colleagues/respondents and when she 
filed a complaint before the Federal Ombudsman under the Act 2010, 
she was dragged into unnecessary disciplinary proceedings and 
departmental inquiries. It was further urged that instead of taking 
action against the harassers and the delinquent officers, she was 
victimized; the departmental proceedings were drawn against her and 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
4
she was terminated from services vide order dated 17.05.2016 illegally 
and unjustifiably. The learned counsel for the petitioner supported the 
order of the Federal Ombudsman’s dated 16.10.2017 to be just and 
argued that she was rightly reinstated into service. He further argued 
that the Federal Ombudsman was justified to direct penal action 
against the respondents on cogent reasons. It was contended that the 
impugned judgment dated 26.07.2019 of the Islamabad High Court, 
upholding the order of the President and dismissing the writ petition of 
the petitioner, is not tenable under the law, facts, and circumstances 
of the case due to which it needs to be set aside and the order of the 
Federal Ombudsman to be restored. 
 
9.  
 
Learned counsels for the respondents supported the 
impugned decision of the President of Pakistan and judgment of the 
High Court, by contending that only when an act of harassment, as 
defined in the Act of 2010, is established against the accused that the 
Federal Ombudsman has authority and jurisdiction either to impose 
minor and/or major penalties, as prescribed under Section 4 (4) of the 
Act, 2010 and not otherwise. It was argued that the Federal 
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to attend or entertain complaints 
against disciplinary and departmental proceedings not relatable to 
harassment of the kind cognizable under the Act, of 2010 and pass 
any order to reinstate the petitioner into service under the provisions 
of the Act of 2010. Learned counsel placed reliance on a recent 
judgment of the Islamabad High Court, in the case titled Shahina 
Masood (supra), as relied in the impugned judgement. It was also 
argued that against the termination of service, despite the observation 
of the President in its order, the petitioner has till yet not challenged 
her termination, which has since attained finality.  
 
10. 
 
We have heard the arguments and perused the record 
through the able assistance of the petitioner and the learned counsels 
for the parties. The learned bench of Islamabad High Court drew the 
distinction between harassment in a generic sense and harassment as 
an act made actionable under section 2 (h) of the Act, 2010. The 
learned bench of the Islamabad High Court referred to paragraphs No. 
6 to 10 of the judgment rendered by another bench in earlier case of 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
5
Shahina Masood1 (supra) to arrive at a conclusion that no case for 
interference in the order of the President is made out. 
 
 
11.      
Two main questions that call for resolution in instant 
case, have attracted our attention are; 
 
1) Whether the actionable “harassment”, as 
defined in section 2(h) of the Act, 2010, is of 
restricted 
application 
or 
applies 
to 
all 
manifestations of harassment.  
   
2)  Whether the Federal Ombudsman has the 
jurisdiction and/or authority to reinstate the 
petitioner into service under the provisions of the 
“Protection Against Harassment of Women at 
Workplace Act, 2010”?  
 
12.    
The title and the preamble of “Protection Against 
Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act, 2010” hold out assurance 
to provide a legal regime for the “protection of women against 
harassment at workplace”. When the Act, 2010 is examined as a 
whole, it does not live up to expectation as title and preamble of the 
Act suggest. In its present form, surprisingly the harassment against 
which a woman is provided an assurance of protection is just another 
piece of cosmetic legislation; it is blinkered in its application. The Act, 
2010 caters to grievance of the complainant [section 2(e)], may it be 
‘men’ or ‘women’, against the act of misdemeanor defined as 
‘harassment’ [under section 2(h)] on the part of an ‘accused’ [section 
2(a)], who may either be an ‘employee’ or ‘employer’ of an organization, 
against whom a ‘complaint’ to the ‘Ombudsman’ [under section 8] or to 
the ‘Inquiry Committee’ [under section 4] is made.  
 
13. 
 
Harassment, in all forms and manifestations, may it be 
based on race, gender, religion, disability, sexual orientation, age-
related, an arrangement of quid pro quo, and/or sexual harassment etc2 
affects and violates the dignity of a person3, as guaranteed under the 
                                       
12020 PLC CS) 186 
2 Equality Act 2010, Chapter 2, Section 4, each of the characteristics as noted herein 
are classified as protected characteristic and elaborately dealt with in UK Act. 
3 Article 14 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
6
Constitution of Pakistan, 1973. Even though anyone may be subject to 
sexual harassment, in a culture and society like Pakistan, women are 
the distressing majority of victims. Harassment in any society or 
organization is a testament to regressive behavior that creates an 
intimidating, 
hostile, 
degrading, 
humiliating, 
and 
offensive 
environment which has a devastating effect on any society or 
organization by adversely affecting its overall performance and 
development. The Act, 2010, rather than addressing issue of 
harassment in all its manifestation, as noted above, in a holistic 
manner, is a myopic piece of legislation that focused only on a minute 
faction of harassment4. The Act, 2010 confines or limits its application 
to sexualized forms, including orientation of unwanted or unwelcome 
behavior, or conduct displayed by an accused person towards a victim 
in any organization. It may be observed that insulting modesty or 
causing sexual harassment at work place or public place etc. has been 
criminalized under Section 509 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860, 
which is punishable for a term which may extend to three years, or 
with fine up to five hundred thousand rupees, or both w.e.f. 
02.02.2010. 
 
14. 
 
Attending to first formulation, it is of extreme importance 
to unravel the issue of explaining what does the term ‘harassment’ 
mean that has been made actionable wrong under the Act, 2010. 
Section 2(h) of the Act, 2010 clearly defines the term “harassment” as 
follows;  
 
“(h) 
harassment” 
means 
any 
unwelcome 
sexual advance, request for sexual favors or 
other verbal or written communication or 
physical conduct of a sexual nature or 
sexually 
demeaning 
attitudes, 
causing 
interference with work performance or creating 
an intimidating, hostile or offensive work 
environment, or the attempt to punish the 
complainant for refusal to comply to such a 
request or is made a condition for employment.” 
 
15. 
 
As could be seen from the definition of harassment as 
reproduced 
above, 
any 
misdemeanor, 
behavior, 
or 
conduct 
unbecoming of an employee, or employer at the workplace towards a 
fellow employee or employer, in any organization, may it be generically 
classifiable harassment, is not actionable per-se under the Act, 2010, 
                                       
4 Section 2(h) of the Act, 2010 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
7
unless such behavior or conduct is shown to be inherently 
demonstrable of its ‘sexual’ nature. Any other demeaning attitude, 
behavior, or conduct which may amount to harassment in the generic 
sense of the word, as it is ordinarily understood, howsoever grave and 
devastating it may be on the victim, is not made actionable within the 
contemplation of actionable definition of “harassment” under section 2 
(h) of the Act, 2010. Giving such restricted meaning to “actionable” 
harassment, by the legislature in its wisdom, impinges the very object 
and purpose for which the Act, 2010 was promulgated. The impact of 
harassment, as generically understood, and how restrictive its 
application has been made is very well articulated and thrashed out in 
paragraph 10 of the judgment rendered by the Islamabad High Court 
in the case of Shahida Masood5 (supra) which needs no further 
elaboration.  
 
16. 
 
The Act, 2010 above has specifically been legislated to 
protect not only working women but men as well only against 
“harassment having sexual nature” at the workplace and, therefore, 
any conduct amounting to harassment of any other kind and nature, 
as noted in paragraph 13 above, despite howsoever distasteful and 
injurious, is not made cognizable before the Federal Ombudsman. The 
meaning of the term ‘harassment’ as given in Section 2 (h) of the Act, 
2010 cannot be stretched to other conduct being not of sexual 
orientation. Apparently, the reason for limiting the actionable offence 
of ‘harassment’ could possibly be for the reason it may have a serious 
impact on all those involved, which includes both the potential 
‘harasser’, the potential victims, and the responsibility for avoiding 
instances of harassment on workplace regulators. Such an approach 
is not unique to Pakistan and is in fact similarly followed in India. The 
Indian Supreme Court formulated the guideline known as Vishaka 
Guidelines6 which made it mandatory for institutions across the 
country to put in place measures to prevent and redress sexual 
harassment at the workplace. The Vishakha Guidelines laid the 
foundation for the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace 
(Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013.  
 
                                       
5 2020 PLC (CS) 186 @193   
6 Vishaka Guidelines formulated after the seminal decision in Vishaka v State of 
Rajasthan by the Supreme Court of India, concerning the gangrape of Bhanwari 
Devi, a Dalit women, in 1992. 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
8
“Section 2 (n) of the Act 2013 reads as follows: 
(n) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of 
the following unwelcome acts or behavior 
(whether directly or by implication) namely: 
 
(i) physical contact and advances; or 
(ii) a demand or request for sexual favours; or 
(iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or 
(iv) showing pornography; or 
(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-
verbal conduct of sexual nature; ” 
 
17. 
 
The Vishaka Guidelines are regarded as the regulatory 
framework for dealing with sexual harassment against women at 
workplace in India. The focus under the Guidelines is on the reported 
conduct being sexual in nature and not otherwise. Likewise, under the 
Act, 2010, s.11 makes it obligatory on the part of employer to 
incorporate a ‘Code of Conduct for Protection against Harassment of 
Women at the Work Place’ as a part of management policy. It is 
appended to the Schedule to the Act, 2010, after recapitulating 
definition of Harassment as given in section 2(h) ibid, the explanation 
given under Clause (ii) of the Code of Conduct for Protection against 
Harassment of Women at Workplace is reproduced as follows: 
 
“Explanation: 
There are three significant manifestations of 
harassment in the work environment:  
 
a) Abuse of Authority: A demand by a person 
in authority, such as a supervisor, for sexual 
favors in order for the complainant to keep 
or obtain certain job benefits, be it a wage 
increase, a promotion, training opportunity, 
a transfer or the job itself. 
 
b) Creating a Hostile Environment: Any 
unwelcome sexual advance, request for 
sexual favors or other verbal or physical 
conduct of a sexual nature, which interferes 
with an individual’s work performance or 
creates an intimidating, hostile, abusive or 
offensive work environment. The typical 
“hostile environment” claim, in general 
requires the finding of a pattern of offensive 
conduct, however, in cases where the 
harassment is particularly severe, such as 
cases involving physical contact, a single 
offensive incident will constitute a violation.  
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
9
 
c) Retaliation: The refusal to grant a sexual 
favor can result in retaliation, which may 
include limiting the employee’s options for 
future promotions or training, distorting the 
evaluation reports generating gossip against 
the employee or other ways of limiting 
access to his/her rights. Such behavior is 
also a part of the harassment.” 
 
18. 
 
The Explanations, as reproduced above, reiterate and leave 
no room for doubt that the harassment made actionable under the 
Act, 2010 is confined to the manifestation of harassment that is 
inherently demonstrable of sexual orientation as defined in section 2(h) 
read with Explanations, as reproduced above, which is part of the 
Schedule of the Act, 2010.7   
 
19. 
 
Contrastingly, 
in 
the 
United 
Kingdom, 
workplace 
harassment is approached in a refreshingly objective manner. It is 
more in line with the definition of ‘harassment’ as explained in the 
Oxford dictionary as: 
“The act of annoying or worrying somebody by 
putting pressure on them or saying or doing 
unpleasant things to them.”  
 
20. 
 
Any kind of harassment based on the protected 
characteristics as noted in para 13 above and defined under section 4 
of the UK Equality Act, 2010 is made actionable. Additionally, 
‘harassment’ by itself, is simply defined as:8 
  
“1) A person (A) harasses another (B) if— 
(a) A engages in unwanted conduct related to a relevant 
protected characteristic, and 
(b) the conduct has the purpose or effect of— 
(i) violating B's dignity, or 
(ii) creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or 
offensive environment for B.”  
 
21.   
While our version of the legislation to protect women at 
workplaces against harassment is titled as ‘The Protection against 
Harassment of Women at the Workplace Act 2010’, however, when the 
                                       
7 Section 2(c) and section 11 of the Act, 2010 
8 (UK) Equality Act 2010, Chapter 2, Section 26  
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
10
scheme of the enactment is carefully examined, its contents and 
application has been restricted to harassment of a purely of sexual 
orientation and nature. It must be noted that under the Pakistani 
legislation on the subject, not only in the Preamble but also in the title 
of the Act, the term ‘harassment’ is used and not ‘sexual harassment’, 
but contrarily to the apparent intent, the meaning of the term 
‘harassment’ has been explicitly given a restrictive meaning under 
clause (h) of Section 2 of the Act, 2010. Meanwhile, other acts of 
harassment, as noted in para 13 above, cannot be taken cognizance by 
the Ombudsman, in view of the limitation of authority and 
jurisdiction, to punish the harassment of the kind defined under the 
Act, 2010 and in a manner as provided under section 4 ibid.9 To our 
great regret, all such acts of harassment that fall beyond the pale of 
restricted definition of actionable harassment under section 2(h) ibid; 
can neither be made cognizable or punishable by the Inquiry 
Committee and/or the Ombudsman, in view of the fetters  placed 
under Article 12 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973.10 The act, 
demeanor, behavior, and/or conduct that has been made cognizable is 
of limited application and, has been nailed down in the definition 
clause of section 2 (h) of the Act, 2010 and not as generically reflected 
either from Preamble or the title of the Act, 2010. The aggrieved person 
under the provisions of the Act, 2010 has the responsibility to prove 
that the perpetrator truly had an accompanying sexual intention or 
overture with his act, demeanor, behavior, and/or conduct. Since the 
Act, 2010 itself limits the protection it offers to the harassment having 
sexual orientation, the Court is shackled to interpret it in line with its 
express charging clause (h) of section 2 of the Act, 2010. Any other 
interpretation advanced by this Court to enlarge the scope of the 
charging section will violate the rights guaranteed under Article 12 of 
Constitution. There is no cavil to the proposition that the sexual 
conduct is cognizable under the provisions of the Act, 2010, however, 
as held by the President in its order, and as upheld through impugned 
judgment of the Islamabad High Court, the petitioner has failed to 
establish that the conduct on the part of respondents 4 & 5 actually 
amounted to sexual harassment within the contemplation of Act, 2010.  
 
                                       
9 Limitation is place on all Courts to exercise jurisdiction as may be conferred by 
constitution or by law see Article 175 (2) of the Constitution, 1973. 
10 Article 12 (1) No Law shall authorize the punishment of a person (a) for an act or 
omission that was not punishable by law at the time of act or omission; or (b)…. 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
11
22. 
 
Now, attending to second formulation as to the authority 
and jurisdiction of the Federal Ombudsman to grant relief to the 
complainant, it is the prerogative of the complainant, having 
encountered hostile act of misdemeanor, behavior, or conduct as 
defined under the Act, 2010 as ‘harassment’ either to make complaint 
against an accused person, who may be an employer or even an 
employee to, the Inquiry Committee, constituted under section 3 of the 
Act, 2010 or to the Ombudsman under Section 10 of the Act, 2010.  
The procedure and powers of the Inquiry Committee are provided for 
in section 4 and 5 of the Act, 2010 respectively. The Inquiry 
Committee on conclusion of the Inquiry may ‘recommend appropriate 
penalty against the accused within the meaning of sub-section (4) of 
section 411 to the Competent Authority’.12 However, where the Inquiry 
Committee finds the allegations in the complaint leveled against the 
accused to be false and made with malafide, they may recommend the 
complaint to the Ombudsman for appropriate action against the 
Complainant. Unsurprisingly, given the draconian structure of the 
law, no remedy under the Act, 2010 is provided to the complainant, 
against whom action may be recommended by the Inquiry Committee 
for action making false and malafide complaint. The remedy of appeal 
against the decision of Competent Authority is provided before the 
Federal Ombudsman in terms of section 6 (1) and (2) both to the 
accused who is inflicted penalty and to the Complainant who is 
aggrieved by any decision of the Competent Authority.     
 
23. 
 
In case the complaint against actionable harassment is 
made directly to the Ombudsman, the procedure to carry out inquiry 
into complaint and the powers of the Ombudsman are given under 
Sections 8 and 10 respectively. None of the provisions of the Act, 2010 
empowers the Federal Ombudsman to reinstate an aggrieved person 
back into service. Therefore, the decision of the President, as 
maintained through impugned judgment of the Islamabad High Court, 
reversing and setting aside the order and direction of the Federal 
Ombudsman to reinstate the petitioner is unexceptionable and calls 
for no interference. It may be observed that the scheme of the Act, the 
Federal Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to enquire into and give 
findings as regard to the disciplinary proceeding against an     
                                       
11 Sub Section (2) of section 5 of the Act, 2010 
12 Under sub section (4) of section 4 of the Act, 2010 
CIVIL PETITION NO.4570 OF 2019  
 
12
employee of the Organization, as disciplinary matter fell beyond the 
realm of the authority and jurisdiction of Federal Ombudsman under 
the Act, of 2010, and departmental proceeding and action taken 
thereunder may be agitated before the appropriate forum, may it be 
civil Court under its plenary jurisdiction, Writ Jurisdiction and or 
appropriate Service Tribunal depending on legal status of employee 
and employer as the case may be. 
 
24. 
 
In view of the foregoing discussion, and under the facts 
and circumstances of the case, the order of the President as 
maintained through impugned judgment of the learned Islamabad 
High Court, is well reasoned, calls for no interference. Instant Petition 
is therefore dismissed. The research carried out by Syeda Saima 
Shabbir, Sr.R.O of the court in the instant matter is highly appreciated 
and acknowledged.                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
 
ANNOUNCED on_5.07.2021_at Islamabad.      Judge                                              
 
 
                                                                    “Approved for reporting” 
 
 
