—
9
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRESENT:
Mr- Justice Ijmar Atta Bandial
Mr. Justice Sajjad Ali Shah
Mr. Justice Munib Akhtar
)
Civil Appeal No. 24-K of 2019.
Against the order dated 19-10-2018 passed by the
High Court of Sindh at Karachi in FA No. 15 of 2018)
Pak Leather Crafts Limited and others.
Appellants
Versus
Al-Barka Bank Pakistan Limited. 
... Respondent
For the Appellant (s) 
Mr. Hassan Khurshid l-'ashmi, ASC.
For the Respondent(s) 
r Mr. Ghulam Mohiuddin Qureshi, ASO.
Date of Hearing 
18032021
!p4g !!M
Said All Shah. J. The appellants have impugned the
judgirent of the Sindh High Court, "hereby their appeai under Section 22
of Ihe Financial Institutions (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance. 2001, was
dismissed after having been found barred by rime.
2. The admitted position as emerges from the record appears to
he that the appellants applied for certified copy of the decree after 5 days of
its preparation and consumed 23 days in filing appeai after obtaining the
certified copy which makes in ah 28 days and the lime for filing appeal
prescribed under the Ordinance, 2301 admittedly is 30 days. The only
point therefon,, in the instant appeal is as to whethcr the time of 38 days
consumed by the appellants in paymeru of fee/cost for the cerUlied copies
after it was estimated could he excluded under Section 12(5) of the
Limitation Act. The High Court came to the conclusion that such tirnt
CA 244. f2(119 
2
cannot be termed as time requisite for obtaining copy of judgment or decree
and, therefore, could not be excluded under Section 12 of Limitation Act,
3. 
Leave was granted by this Court on 29.5.2019 inter alia, to
"consider whether the scope and effect of the decisions of this Court relied
upon in the impugned judgment (Fateh Muhammad and others vs. Malik
Qadir Bakhsh, 1975 SCMR 257 and Mst. Jarnila Khatoorz and another vs.
Mst. Tajunnisa and others, PLD 1984 Sc 208) have (as concluded by the
learned Division Bench) been left unaffected notwithstanding the addition of
the aforementioned subsection (5) to s.12, and also to consider whether (also
as held) the facts and circumstances of the present case came within the
scope of the judgment of this Court reported as Mian Muhammad Sabir vs.
Malik Muhammad Sadiq through legal heirs and others PLD 2008 SC 577".
4. Learned ASC for the appellants has contended that the rule
128 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (Appellate side) and Rule 324 of the
Sindh Civil Court Rules, which require the deposit of cost before the
certified copies are prepared, are not applicable to the Banking Court and,
therefore, there was no requirement to first deposit the cost. When inquired
as to whether the certified copies of judgment and decree or order in the
Banking Court are issued free of cost, the learned counsel fairly conceded
that such copies are always issued on payment of cost in advance but
submitted that the period consumed by an applicant in depositing the
required cost would be excluded under the provisions of sub-Section 5 of
Section 12 of the Limitation Act. It was next contended that in accordance
with the provision of sub-Section 5, the period of limitation stops upon
filing of an application for certified copy and then starts once the notice for
delivery of certified copy of the judgment in terms of section 12(5) of the Act
is received. In this very perspective, learned counsel extended his
arguments by submitting that since the Banking Court has no system of
chits or receipts to intimate the date on which certified copy is to he
tA24-Ko12019 
3
collected, therefore, notice in that respect was necessary. It was lastly
contended that the case law relied upon to support the impugned judgment
pre-date the amendment in Section 12 by introducing sub-Section 5 and,
therefore, the dicta laid in judgments relied upon by the respondent are not
applicable to the case in hand.
5.
On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent
supported the judgment by contending that the exclusion of time as
envisaged under Section 12 consumed in obtaining the certified copies of
judgment and decree by employing the words "time requisite" means the
time consumed by the Court for preparing the certified copy and does not
cover the time which is consumed by a litigant. It was next contended that
cost was estimated on the very day when the application for certified copy
of judgment and decree was made and the appellant consumed 38 days in
payment of costs which could not be excluded for computing the limitation.
In support of his contentions, reliance has been placed on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Fateh Malik vs. Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 SCMR
157) Jamila Khatoon us. Tai-un-Nissa (PLD 1984 SC 2081 and Mkzn
Mohammad Sabir Vs. Malik Muhammad Sadig throu gh his legal heirs &
others (PLD 2008 Supreme Court 577).
6.
We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties
and have perused the case law cited at bar.
7.
The main point which requires our consideration is as to
whether the time consumed by a litigant in payment of cost of the certified
copy could be excluded under the newly added sub section (5) of section 12
of the Limitation Act while computing the period of limitation. OR, in other
words upon filing of application for the grant of certified copies of the
judgment, decree or order, the time would stop, leaving upon the Court to
repare the certified copies at its own expenses and then issue intimation
CA 24-K of2O9
4
notice to the litigant to collect so that the period of limitation could
commence
8. 
In the instant case the admitted facts are that judgment was
announced by the Banking Court on 28.11.2017 whereas the decree was
prepared on 30.11.2017. The application for certified copies of judgment
and decree was made by the appellant on 05.12.20 17 and on the same day
the copyist estimated the fee for certified copies. The appellant admittedly
paid the fee for the certified copies on 13.01.2018 i.e. after 38 days, the
copies were made ready on 15.01.2018 and were received on the same date
and thereafter the appeal ultimately was filed before the High Court on
7.2.2018. The appellants or their counsel did not file any Affidavit at any
stage explaining the time consumed in payment of fee/cost for making
copies or obtaining the same; on the contrary it is claimed that the period
of limitation stops from the day the application for certified copies was
made, and would commence from the day the notice, intimating that
certified copy was ready for delivery is served would be time requisite as
there was no requirement and/or rule requiring payment of cost/fee of
copies. Though the submission made by the counsel contradict his own
stance of depositing cost/fee for certified copies well before commencement
of preparation of copies, despite the same, we would examine as to whether
there was any requirement of payment cost/fee for obtaining certified
copies of judgment, decree or order etc., and further that if the copies were
to be issued on payment of fee then the time consumed in payment of such
fee would fall within the ambit of time requisite as envisaged under section
12 of the Act. In order to understand the legislative intent we need to first
examine the original text of Section 12 and the manner in which it was
interpreted and then the purpose behind legislative intervention to add up
Section 12 by introducing sub-Section 5 thereto. The original text of Section
12 ofthe Limitation Act read as follows:
C k 24-K of 2019 
5
"12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) In
computing the period of limitation prescribed for any suit,
appeal or application, the day from which such period is to
be reckoned shall be excluded.
(2) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an
appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application
for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment
complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed
from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.
(3) Where a decree is appealed from or sought to be
reviewed, the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the
judgment on which it is founded shall also be excluded.
(4) In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an
application to set aside an award, the time requisite for
obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded."
9. A bare perusal of the pre-amended Section 12 of the Act reveals
that it details the manner in which period of limitation prescribed for any
suit, appeal or application, is to be reckoned. It provides for the exclusion of
certain time period for obtaining the certified copies by prescribing it as
"Lime requisite" for obtaining a copy of the order appealed. However, the
provision of Section 12 of the Limitation Act providing exclusion of "time
requisite" are applicable only after the application for certified copies is
submitted, and the consistent view of this Court has been that the "time
requisite" includes only that period of time which is taken up in drawing up
the judgment, decree or order by the official of the Court in preparing and
issuing the same, and does not include the period of time consumed by the
litigant. The reason being that these provisions were always interpreted
keeping in view the rules in the field for obtaining certified copies of decree
or order such as rule 128 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules as well as rule
324 of the Sindh Civil Court Rules which provided that "the preparation of
copies not commenced until prescribed fee deposited". A similar provision is
found in "Rules & Orders of the Lahore High Court Court; volume V Chapter
(-14-Koi2OI9 
6
5, Part B(6)(v) which provides that every application for attested copy will be
entertained subject to deposit of cost in advance. It appears that these rules
were adopted by rest of the High Courts except Sindh, which as stated, had
its own rules. Likewise, rule 133 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules as well as
rule 329 of the Sindh Civil Court Rules provide for the manner in which
copies were to be certified and were to contain the endorsement of following
particulars:-
"(I) the date of application for copy;
(2)
the date of estimate offee;
(3)
the date of deposit of estimate fee & the day of supply of
stamps;
(4)
the date of certification by Chief Ministerial Officer; and
(5)
the date of delivery of the copy.
The case-law developed on the pre-amendment Section 12 throughout
would reflect that the period prescribed for filing of appeal or the other
prescribed proceedings would not stop, merely upon filing of application for
the certified copies unless the fee/cost for the certified copies was paid.
However, the time consumed by the office of the Court, for assessment of
cost/fee would be excluded while computing the period of limitation.
However, filing of application was treated as complete for the purposes of
excluding time when it was entertained after payment of cost/ fee. The case-
law on pre-amended Section 12 revolved upon the interpretation of the
keyword in that section i.e. "time requisite" and the consistent view of this
Court was that the time consumed by the office of the court in preparing
copies and/or at times failure on their part to intimate that the copies were
made ready or that the fee was estimated, was held to be 'time requisite",
and was accordingly excluded while computing the period of limitation but
not the time consumed by a litigant on account of his negligence or default.
10. The term "time requisite" was first considered by the Privy
Council almost hundred years ago in the case of Jell Dhot, N. Surtu Vs. T. S.
Chettuar (AIR 1928 PC 123) to the following effect:-
CA 24K ol 2019
The word requisite is strong word; it may be regarded as
meaning something more than the word required It means
'properly required, and it throws upon the pleader or
counsel for the appellant the necessity of showing that no
part of the delay beyond the prescribed period is due to his
default. But for that time which is taken up by his
opponent in drawing up the decree or by the officials of the
Court in preparing and issuing the two documents, he is
not responsible".
11. Likewise, in the case of West Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation Vs. Aziz Qureshi (PLD 1973 Supreme Court 222), the view taken
by Lahore High Court in the case of Gui Mohammad Vs. Allah Ditta (PLD
1960 Lahore 443) was affirmed by this Court by holding:-
"In the case under report it has been held that the "time
requisite 'for obtaining copies which can be excluded under
section 12, Limitation Act, is the time which is taken
between the date of application and the date when the
copies are ready, but it can be further extended if further
delay takes place by reason of the carelessness of the
office in giving wrong Information to the applicant as to the
date on which the copies would be ready, or in giving no
information at all".
12. In the case of Fateh Muhammad and others VaiialikD_241r
Bakhsh (1975 SCMR 157), the term time requisite" was elaborated in the
following terms:-
'It is well settled that the time requisite for obtaining copy
of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation
Act, 1908 means only the interval between the date of
application for supply of copy and the date when it is
ready for delivery. Even during this interval, due diligence
on the part of the litigant is required by law, and no delay.
unless such as was caused by circumstance over which
he had no control and which he could not by due diligence
be avoided, can form part of time requisite for obtaining
the copy- The time between the date on which the copy is
-- 
I
- CA 24-K of 2(119 
8
ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant
chooses to take delivery thereof is not a portion of the time
requisite for obtaining a copy"
13.
In the case of Mst. Jarnila Khatoon and another Vs. Mst.
Taiunnisa & others (PLD 1984 Supreme Court 208), again the term "time
requisite" came for consideration before this Court and after observing that
the appellant in order to claim exclusion of time under Section 12 of the
Limitation Act must act with reasonable promptitude and diligence in order
to satisfy the Court that the time which he claims to be excluded was
properly required in obtaining copies, it was held:-
"In failing to deposit the stamps and wasting 37 days,
without any sufficient cause the appellant was clearly to
blame and the time thus spent cannot be held to be "time
requisite" for obtaining copies."
14.
In the case of Ahmed Nawaz Vs. Muhammad Aijub (PLD 1988
Supreme Court 258), the petitioner in the stated case was relying on West
Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation Karachi Vs. Aziz Qureshi (1973
SCMR 555) by claiming that the time between the date when the copy is
ready and the date when it was delivered, should have been excluded as of
a right being "time requisite" for obtaining the copy, and this Court while
relying on its own judgment in the case of Fateh Muhammad (supra) held
that under the existing law, (Section 12 of the Limitation Act) the period, as
in dispute in this case, could not be excluded as of a right, however, in a
given case, the delay could be condoned only on furnishing of sufficient
explanation in that behalf. In this background to eliminate uncertainty and
difficulty faced by the litigants regarding the period spent between the date
when the copy is ready for delivery and the date for obtaining delivery a
legislative intervention was proposed and consequently in 1991 sub section
(5) was introduced in Section 12 of the Limitation Act, which reads as
follows: -
CA 24-K of 2010 
19
"For the purposes of subsections (2), (3) and (4), the time
requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence,
order, judgment or award shall be deemed to be the time
intervening between the day on which an application for
the copy is made and the day actually intimated to the
applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for
delivery".
15. Before we proceed to examine the effect of afore-stated deeming
provision, we would like to examine the cases decided by this Court after
the introduction of sub-Section 5 to Section 12 of the Act through a
deeming provision. The first judgment in time was in the case Nooruddin vs.
Pakistan (2000 SCMR 354). In this case though the provisions of sub-
Section 5 were examined but no findings thereon were recorded as the
controversy was the announcement of judgment during vacation without
notice to the parties and the commencement of limitation from the date of
knowledge of the judgment intended to be challenged or otherwise.
Thereafter another two-Member Bench of this Court in the case of Shuiahat
Hussain us. Muhammad Habib (2003 SCMR 176) accepted the contention
that notice as required under Section 12(5) of the Limitation Act for
collecting the copies was not received and in case the time was calculated
from the day of certifying copy, the petition was well within time. The
relevant portion from the judgment reads as under:-
"According to learned counsel, the office of the Copyist
Branch had not issued notice to petitioner for collecting the
certified copy of the judgment for a particular date in terms
of section 12(5) of the Limitation Act and if the time is
calculated from, the date of certifying the copy i.e. 11th
December, 2001, then the petition is within time which was
bmitted on 121h January, 2002.
in view of above position, we are of the optfliOfl that the
petition is within time".
CA 24-K of 2019 
10
16. However, no reasons whatsoever for accepting such
contentions were laid down. Thereafter this Court in the case of iftikhar AU
vs. Abdul Rashid (2003 SCMR 1560) had the opportunity of examining the
provision of sub-Section 5, on an argument that according to Section 12(5)
of the Limitation Act, the time spent for obtaining certified copy would
extend to the date when the certified copy of the judgment was delivered. A
three-Member Bench of this Court was of the view that the intimation of the
day when the copy is made ready is to be stated by the applicant by
producing a chit issued by the copying agency. The observations in para 4
are to the following effect but again the observations were without
examining the effect of the deeming clause:-
"4. Learned counsel for the petitioner when questioned has
no answer as in the said application, it was not disclosed
as to the date which was indicated to the petitioner on the
chit issued by the Copying Agency to obtain certified copy
because that would have been the determining factor,
because originally in routine on the Chit, date is indicated
by the Copying Agency on which date the applicant is
required to inquire from the Copying Agency about the
readiness of the copy. If the same was not ready on the
said date, then the question would have arisen whether
further notice should be given to the petitioner or not,
therefore, in our view even if the reasons given by the
learned Judge of the High Court that section 5 of the
Limitation Act was not applicable are ignored and the
arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is
considered, the same has no factual basis as no pleading
was made as observed above as to the date which was
given to the petitioner originally to procure copy from the
Copying Agency"
17. Finally the last judgment which came to our notice on the
question of limitation was again of a three-Member Bench of this Court in
the case of Muhammad Sabir vs. Muhammad Sad ip (PLD 2008 SC 577)
CA 24-K of 2019 
ii
wherein this Court refused to accept the proposition as is propounded
today and held that to claim the benefit of newly introduced sub-Section 5,
the applicant has to discharge his burden by producing the chit issued by
the copying agency mentioning the date on which certified copy will be
made ready. The relevant portion of the observations reads as follows:-
"This Court in a case reported as Fate/i Muhammad and
others vs. Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 SCMR 157) has held
that the time "requisite" for obtaining copy of order within
the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908,
means only the interval between the date of application for
supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery
and that the time between the date on which the copy was
ready for delivery, and the date on which the applicant
chooses to take delivery thereof is not a portion of time
"requisite" for obtaining a copy. Even section 12(5) of the
Limitation Act is of no help to the appellant as he failed to
produce the chit/receipt issued by the copying agency
showing the date for preparation of certified copy,
inasmuch as, no such date has been indicated in the
application for condonation of delay. Had the appellant
produced a chit issued by the copying agency and the copy
was not ready on the date indicated in the chit, then the
appellant could have taken shelter under section 12(5) of
the Limitation Act.
18. A study of post amendment case law shows that the effect,
purpose and limits of the newly added sub-Section 5 through a deeming
provision was never examined, consequently, this brings us to the core
issue of examining the newly added sub-Section. A bare reading of sub-
Section 5 reflects that this legislative intervention has been made through
a deeming provision, a legal fiction, to treat the intervening time between
the day of making an application for the certified copy and the day actually
intimated to the applicant by which the copy will be made ready for
delivery to be the time requisite for obtaining the required copies, however,
CA 14.K 0r2w9 
12
this provision cannot be read in isolation by employing literal meaning to
it. The principles to interpret deeming provisions in a statute have been
settled by this Court in its various pronouncements while interpreting
deeming provisions in a statute by holding that the Court is bound to
ascertain the limits, purpose and object for which the legislature has
created the fiction by adopting deeming provision. In the case of Mehreen
Zaibun Nisa vs. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC 397),
the effect of deeming clauses was summarized as under:-
(i)
"V/hen a statute contemplates that a state of affairs
should be deemed to have existed, it clearly proceeds
on the assumption that in fact it did not exist at the
relevant time but by a legal fiction we are to assume
as if it did exist.
(ii)
Where a statute says that you must imagine the state
of affairs) it does not say that having done so you
must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when
it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of
affairs.
(iii)
At the same time, it cannot be denied that the Court
has to determine the limits within which and the
purposes for which the Legislature has created the
fiction,
(iv)
When a statute enacts that something shall be deemed
to have been done which in fact and in truth was not
done, the Court is entitled and bound to ascertain for
what purposes and between what persons the
statutory fiction is to be resorted to".
19. 
This principle was again reiterated by this Court in the case of
Begum B.H. Sued vs. Mst. Afzal Jehan (PLD 1980 Sc 29) by holding that
the Court has to determine the limits within which and purpose for which
the legislature has created a fiction". Likewise in the case of Muhammad
Mubeen-us-Salam vs. Federation of Pakistan (PD 2006 SC 602), this Court
while taking note from "Understanding Statutes" by S.M. Zafar, observed:-
CA 24-K 4209 
13
alt is important to note that two important concepts have
been introduced by the learned author in the construction of
the provision creating a statutory fiction, namely; 'statutory
fiction should be carried to its logical conclusion as held in
Muhammad Y asin vs. Sheikh Ghulam Murtaza and another
(PLD 1988 Sc 163) but the fiction cannot be extended beyond
the language of the section by which it is created or by
importing another fiction', therefore, to find out a solution, it
has been observed that 'principle of harmonization shall be
attracted' and ultimately it was held that 'the impact of
deeming clause could be curtailed if it produces a disgraceful
result".
20. Keeping in mind the principles of interpreting a deeming
provision, we need to determine the limits within which and the purpose for
which the legislature has created this fiction. It appears that the legislature,
by introducing subsection (5) to Section 12 of the Act has eliminated the
controversy regarding the term "time requisite" and for the first time has
defined the term by laying down that the "time requisite" for obtaining a
certified copy of the decree, order or such other prescribed proceedings,
would be deemed to be the time intervening between the day on which an
application for certified copy is made and the day actually intimated to the
applicant to be the day on which the certified copy is ready for delivery. The
interpretation proposed by the learned ASC for the appellants that mere
filing of an application would be suffice to stop the period of limitation
would not only be against the spirit and purpose for which the legislature
has created the fiction, but would also be against the purpose and object
for which the legislative intervention was suggested by this Court. Besides,
this interpretation would not only render the scheme of law behind the
limitation Act as redundant but at the mercy of the litigant. Admittedly, the
application for certified copies referred to is not entertained and/or
processed till the prescribed fee/cost is paid and in case such
interpretation is accepted that mere filing of application would stop the
CA 24-K At 2019 
14
period of limitation then by not paying the prescribed fee/cost one could
prolong the period of limitation as has happened in the instant case, which
would be against the intention and purpose of the legislation. This
interpretation not only appears to be against the reasons and object of the
law of limitation but would substantially frustrate it. The law of Limitation
seeks to prescribe the time limit for invoking remedies in order to curtail
period of suspense and uncertainty and ensure peace of mind to the
parties, and such interpretation would be against the very purpose of the
statute as it would prolong the period of uncertainty and suspense.
21. It is also very important to note that the computation of period
of limitation prescribed by Section 12 mainly deals with appeals,
application for leave to appeal, application for review judgment and
application to set-aside an Award and these proceedings have the minimum
time period prescribed in the Limitation Act which ranges between 15 to 90
days excluding the time consumed for obtaining the certified copies. In case
the interpretation proposed by the learned ASC for the appellants is
accepted then one would file an application for certified copy and by not
paying the cost could prolong the restricted period of limitation which
would frustrate the very purpose by which the legislature has curtailed the
period of suspense and uncertainty for the litigants to ensure their peace of
mind. Coming back to the limits and the purpose for which the legislature
has created this fiction by introducing sub-Section 5 to Section 12 of the
Act. Admittedly, this legislative intervention of adding sub-Section 5 to
Section 12 was proposed by this Court in the case of Ahmed Now (supra)
and this Court before proposing the legislative intervention had examined
the case law and to eliminate uncertainty and difficulty faced by the
litigants regarding the period spent between the date when the copy is
readyfor delivery and the date of obtaining the delivery of copy. A minute
examination of pre-amendment case law would reflect that the dispute was
N
CA24.Ko12019 
15
mostly with regard to non intimation or wrong intimation of date on which
the copy was ready for delivery. In the cases of Gui Muhammad us. Allah
Ditta (PLD 1960 Lah. 443), West Pakistan Industrial Development
Corporation of Pakistan us. Aziz Qureshi (PLD 1973 SC 222), Saleh
Muhammad and others vs. Malik Qadir Bakhsh (1975 SCMR 157) and
Ahmed Jvawaz vs. Muhammad Auub (PLD 1988 Supreme Court 258) (which
led to proposing legislative intervention). In all these cases, the dispute was
the period between the date on which copy was made ready and the date on
which it was delivered.
22.
In the circumstances subscribing to the proposed view that
filing of application would stop the period of limitation appears to be
against the spirit and purpose of the proposed amendment and is bound to
bring disgraceful results unless all the rules requiring payment of cost/fee
for the certified copies in advance are suitably amended/ repealed and
provisions for supply of free certified copies are introduced. Consequently,
we are of the view that filing of application pre-supposes the payment of
cost for obtaining certified copies. In the instant case, since the appellants
have consumed almost 38 days in payment of cost/fee for the certified
copies and there appears to be no explanation on record to show that this
non-payment could be attributed to the office in estimating the cost/fee for
preparing the certified copies, therefore, cannot be excluded while
computing the period of limitation.
23.
Coming to the second submission that the limitation to
commence from the date intimated through notice on which date the copy
was ready for delivery. A perusal of sub-Section 5 shows that it provides
commencement of period of limitation from the day actually intimated to
the applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery. The
proposition propounded by the ASC that the intimation notice shall be
issuedonce the copy is made ready and on receipt of such intimation the
CA 24-K of2019 
16
period of limitation would commence, in our opinion, from the very reading
of sub-Section 5 appears to be ill-founded. A careful reading of sub-Section
5 shows that the intimation of the day on which the copy will be ready for
delivery by the very language adopted by sub-Section 5 appears to be an
intimation of a future date, a date expected by the office by which it would
be in a position to make the copy ready for delivery. It does not envisage a
notice after the certified copy is ready for delivery. In our opinion, it is a
date intimated to the applicant after he has effectively made the application
for the certified copies i.e. upon payment of cost/fee to be a date
acknowledging receipt of cost/fee and providing a date on which copy
would be ready for delivery. It also cast a duty upon the applicant that
while making the payment of cost/fee for certified copy to obtain a receipt
containing a date when the certified copies will be ready for delivery to
eliminate once for all the pre-amendrnent dispute of non-intimation of date
on which the certified copies are ready for delivery. Since the burden to
demonstrate that the copies were not ready on the day intimated to the
applicant to be the day on which the copy will be ready for delivery is upon
the applicant, therefore, in case of non delivery of certified copy on the date
intimated to the applicant then in order to eliminate the controversy and to
discharge his burden the applicant should accordingly take a fresh date so
that the dispute of applicant having different date and the copy containing
different date of "copy ready for delivery" comes to an end.
24. Coming to the last contention regarding the non-applicability of
Sindh Civil Court Rules or Sindh Chief Court Rules and/or no requirement
under any statute for payment of cost in Banking Courts, suffice it to
observe that Financial Institution (Recovery of Finances) Ordinance, 2001
does not envisage providing of certified copies free of cost/fee, unlike other
atutes/rules relating to criminal administration of justice or service
related matters and unless the statute/rules itself provides for supply of
CA 24-K (112019 
17
t
copies of orders, judgments, decree etc. free of cost/fee, it has to be
obtained by the applicant on payment of cost. Even otherwise, the practice
and procedure adopted by the Banking Courts since its inception in respect
of issuance of certified copy is the same as adopted by the Civil Courts or
the High Court and even the applicant himself has fairly conceded that
such procedure is being adopted since the inception of the Banking Court
and the appellant itself has obtained copy of the judgment/decree upon
payment of cost, therefore, the submission is without any force.
25. In the circumstances, this appeal, for our own reasons as
recorded above, is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
 
Islamabad,
nnounced on t--2 ao-1
 A.Reirnmn
st Approved for Reporting.
