IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, HCJ 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE MAQBOOL BAQAR 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
 
CIVIL PETITIONS NO.569-K AND 570-K/2016 
(Against the judgment dated 13.06.2016 of the High 
Court of Sindh, Karachi passed in ITRA No.190/2012, 
Constitutional Petition No.D-2302/2011) 
 
 
Commissioner Inland Revenue  
 
 
 In C.P. 569-K/2016 
FBR through Commissioner Inland Revenue  
 In C.P. 570-K/2016 
 
…Petitioner(s) 
VERSUS 
M/s ICI Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 In C.P. 569-K/2016 
M/s ICI Pakistan  
 
 
 
 
 In C.P. 570-K/2016 
 
…Respondent(s) 
 
For the petitioner(s): 
Mr. Muhammad Sarfaraz Metlo, ASC  
 
 
For the respondent(s): 
 
Dr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, ASC  
Mr. Mahmood A. Sheikh, AOR 
 
 
Date of hearing: 
13.03.2017 
… 
ORDER 
 
 
MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ.- The respondent company 
filed its tax returns for the year 2001-02 and the assessment was 
finalized under Section 62 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 1979 (the 
Ordinance, 1979) by an order dated 29.05.2002. On 30.12.2004, the 
Department issued a notice under Section 122(5A) of the Income 
Tax Ordinance, 2001 (the Ordinance, 2001) to the respondent seeking 
to amend the assessment order dated 29.5.2002. The respondent 
replied to this subsequent notice on 8.3.2005. However the 
Department took no further action upon the notice dated 
30.12.2004 which was subsequently withdrawn. Finally, on 
07.05.2007, a notice under Section 122(5A) of the Ordinance, 2001 
was issued by the Department stating therein that the date of de-
merger was not properly appreciated by the assessing officer and 
CPs 569-K,570-K/16 
-: 2 :-
thus the assessment order passed on 29.05.2002 is erroneous and 
prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue. This notice was 
challenged 
by 
the 
respondents 
through 
Writ 
Petition 
No.1094/2007 and during the pendency thereof, an assessment 
order was passed pursuant to the notice dated 07.05.2007. This 
writ petition was allowed by the Division Bench of the learned High 
Court of Sindh on 30.05.2007 setting aside the notice dated 
07.05.2007 and the assessment order passed pursuant thereto. 
Civil Appeal No.1598/2007 initiated by the Department was 
dismissed by this Court vide order dated 29.10.2009 by relying 
upon the judgment reported as Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. 
Eli Lilly Pakistan (Pvt) Ltd. (2009 SCMR 1279). There was a lull 
for a considerable period when on 20.06.2011 the Department 
issued another notice to the respondents under Section 66 read 
with Section 66-A of the Ordinance, 1979 intending to amend the 
notice dated 29.5.2002. Aggrieved of this notice, the respondent 
filed Constitutional Petition No.2302/2011 before the learned High 
Court of Sindh which, by considering the law laid down in the 
judgments reported as Honda Shahrah-e-Faisal Association of 
Persons, Karachi Vs. Regional Commissioner of Income Tax, 
Karachi 
(2005 
PTD 
1316), 
Eli 
Lilly’s 
case 
(supra) 
and 
Commissioner Income Tax Vs. Islamic Investment Bank (2016 
SCMR 816), came to the conclusion that the period of limitation 
provided under Sections 66 and 66-A of the Ordinance, 1979 is 
four years and that the notice issued by the petitioners on 
20.06.2011 is beyond such period.  
2. 
 
Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the 
said notice was in fact issued under Section 65 of the Ordinance, 
CPs 569-K,570-K/16 
-: 3 :-
1979 and by relying upon Eli Lilly’s case (supra) it is argued that 
the period of limitation has been provided in Section 65 of the 
Ordinance, 1979 which is five years and the notice issued on 
07.05.2007 is within that period. Suffice it to say that after 
considering the notice dated 07.05.2007 purportedly issued under 
the provisions of Section 122(5A) of the Ordinance, 2001, we find 
that it is akin to the notice/proceedings which the Department 
would initiate in terms of Sections 66 and 66-A of the Ordinance, 
1979 as the said notice was issued on the ground that the 
assessment order dated 29.05.2002 was erroneous and prejudicial 
to the interest of the Revenue, the period of limitation for which is 
four years. We are not persuaded to hold that the notice was 
issued under Section 65 of the repealed law as the notice dated 
07.05.2007 was not issued on the basis of some definite 
information. Even this is not envisaged by the clear language of the 
notice itself. Besides, as mentioned earlier this notice was set aside 
by the learned High Court of Sindh vide order dated 30.05.2007 
which order kept intact by this Court. It is to be noted that after 
the judgment in Eli Lilly’s case (supra), a fresh notice was issued on 
20.06.2011 which was challenged by way of a constitution petition 
before the learned High Court of Sindh and this was set aside vide 
impugned judgment as being issued far beyond the period of 
limitation. The judgment in Eli Lilly’s case (supra) has neither 
provided a new cause of action to the petitioner to issue a notice 
afresh nor has it in any way extended the period of limitation 
originally prescribed for such a notice. We do not find there to be 
any error in such finding warranting any interference. Resultantly, 
CPs 569-K,570-K/16 
-: 4 :-
the view set out by the learned High Court is absolutely in 
accordance with law. Dismissed accordingly.  
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
ISLAMABAD. 
13th March, 2017. 
Approved for reporting 
Mudassar/ 
