IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
  
 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE ANWAR ZAHEER JAMALI, CJ 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE SH. AZMAT SAEED 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE KHILJI ARIF HUSSAIN 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.384 OF 2014 
(On appeal from order dated 7.2.2014, 
passed 
by 
the 
Election 
Tribunal, 
Quetta-1, in E.P.No.01/2013) 
 
 
Muhammad Khan 
 
… Appellant (s) 
Versus 
Obaidullah Jan Babat and others 
 
… Respondent (s) 
 
 
For the Appellant (s) 
: Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC a/w 
Barrister Sajeel Sheryar, Advocate 
Ch. Hasan Murtaza Mann, Advocate 
Miss Sundas Hurain, Advocate 
 
  
For the Respondent (s) 
: Mr. Tariq Mehmood, Sr. ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
 
  
Date of Hearing 
: 20 and 26.01.2016 
  
 
 
JUDGMENT  
 
 
  
 
SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.- This Civil Appeal under 
Section 67(3) of the Representation of People Act, 1976 (ROPA) 
is directed against the Order dated 07.02.2014, whereby an 
Election Petition bearing No.1 of 2013, filed by the present 
Appellant, was dismissed.  
CA.384/2014. 
2 
2. 
 
Brief facts necessary for adjudication of the lis at 
hand are that the General Elections were scheduled for the 11th 
of May, 2013, including for the Provisional Assembly of the 
Province of Balochistan. The Appellant and the present 
Respondents filed their respective Nomination Papers to 
contest the Elections from Constituency PB-16 Loralai-II. It 
appears from the record that the Appellant filed two separate 
Nomination Papers to contest the said Elections, however, both 
were rejected by the Returning Officer vide Order dated 
07.04.2013, holding the Appellant disqualified to contest the 
said Elections. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed two Appeals i.e. 
Election Appeals No.21 and 25 of 2013 before the learned 
Election Tribunal, which failed to find favour and were 
dismissed vide Order dated 17.04.2013. The said Order dated 
17.04.2013, was challenged through Constitutional Petitions 
No.286 and 287 of 2013 before the learned High Court of 
Balochistan, which too were dismissed vide Order dated 
19.04.2013. 
3. 
 
The Appellant challenged the above-said Order 
dated 19.04.2013 of the learned High Court of Balochistan by 
invoking the appellate jurisdiction of this Court through two 
CA.384/2014. 
3 
separate Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal No.520 and 521 of 
2013.  
4. 
 
The aforesaid two Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal 
came up for hearing before this Court on 25.04.2013 when 
CPLA No.521 of 2013 was not pressed and was disposed of; 
and leave to appeal was granted in CPLA No.520 of 2013. The 
said CPLA No.520 was accompanied by a Civil Misc. 
Application bearing No.2348 of 2013, seeking interim relief 
thereupon, the following Order was passed: 
 
“Notice for a date during next month. Meanwhile 
operation of the impugned judgment shall remain 
suspended.” 
 
5. 
 
In the above backdrop, the Appellant was permitted 
to contest the elections along with the Respondents and after 
the poll Respondent No.1 was declared and notified as a 
Returned Candidate while the Appellant was runner up. 
6. 
 
The Civil Appeal No.444 of 2013 arising out of Civil 
Petition for Leave to Appeal No.520 of 2013 wherein leave to 
appeal has been granted vide Order dated 25.04.2013 referred 
to above, came up for hearing before this Court on 06.11.2013. 
7. 
 
In the meanwhile, the Appellant had already 
challenged the elections of Respondent No.1 through an 
CA.384/2014. 
4 
Election Petition under Section 52 of the ROPA, which was 
pending adjudication before the learned Election Tribunal. On 
20.12.2013, Respondent No.1 filed an application seeking 
dismissal of the Election Petition filed by the Appellant, inter 
alia, contending that the said Election Petition was not 
maintainable as the Appellant had no locus standi to maintain 
such Election Petition as he (the Appellant) was not a “validly 
nominated candidate” for the purposes of Section 52 of ROPA. 
The said contentions found favour with the learned Election 
Tribunal and the Election Petition filed by the Appellant was 
dismissed vide Order impugned dated 07.02.2014.  
8. 
 
It is contended by Mr. Muhammad Akram Shaikh, 
learned Sr. ASC that the Appellant was not disqualified from 
contesting the elections as no Court of competent jurisdiction 
had returned a finding against the Appellant, in this behalf, 
hence his Nomination Papers could not have been legally 
rejected. In the above backdrop, after the illegal rejection of the 
two Nomination Papers filed by the Appellant, the matter was 
agitated right up to this Court by filing Civil Petitions for Leave 
to Appeal No.520 and 521 of 2013. The Appellant, it is 
contended, had filed one Nomination Paper to contest the 
CA.384/2014. 
5 
Elections as an Independent Candidate while the other 
Nomination Paper had been filed as a Candidate of a Political 
Party. Since the Appellant decided to contest the Elections on 
the ticket of a Political Party, the Civil Petition for Leave to 
Appeal arising from the Order rejecting the said Nomination 
Paper was not pressed. However, leave was granted in the Civil 
Petition pertaining to the matter of rejection of the Nomination 
Paper of the Appellant filed as a Candidate of a Political Party. 
Interim relief was granted by this Court to the Appellant to 
contest the Elections. The afore-said is evident from the Order 
of this Court dated 25.04.2013. Pursuant to the said Order, the 
Appellant contested the Elections. After the Elections had been 
held the Appellant withdrew the pending proceedings before 
this Court without prejudice to his rights as is apparent from 
the Order dated 06.11.2013, hence, by operation of law, the 
Appellant was clothed with the locus standi to file an Election 
Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 1976 and such Election 
Petition could not be summarily rejected by the learned 
Election Tribunal vide Order impugned, which is, therefore, not 
sustainable in law.  
CA.384/2014. 
6 
9. 
 
In the alternative, it is further contended by the 
learned counsel for the Appellant that in Section 2 of ROPA, 
1976, the various terms employed in the said Statute have been 
defined. Such words and expressions defined in the said 
provision include “candidate”, “validly nominated candidate”, 
“contesting candidate” and “returned candidate”. Such 
expressions 
have 
been 
defined 
in 
the 
Statutes 
in 
contradistinction to each other. In Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, a 
“candidate” can file an Election Petition, and the expression 
“candidate” has been defined in Section 2 sub section (iv) as 
“means a person proposed as a candidate for, or seeking 
election as a member”. The learned counsel also referred to 
Section 2 sub section (xxvi) of ROPA, 1976, wherein “validly 
nominated candidate” has been defined to “mean a candidate 
whose nomination has been accepted”. Thus, even if it is 
presumed that the Appellant was not a “validly nominated 
candidate” in as much as his Nomination Papers were legally 
rejected, he the Appellant, in law could file an Election Petition 
in terms of Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, as it is a settled law that 
the words and expressions used in a Statute or any provision 
thereof must necessarily be interpreted inconformity with the 
CA.384/2014. 
7 
definitions given in the Interpretation Clause of such Statute. It 
is added, had the intention of the law been to limit the scope of 
Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, to the Election Petitions being filed 
only by validly nominated candidates or by the contesting 
candidates, it is such expression, which would had been 
employed in the said provision (Section 52 of ROPA, 1976). 
Therefore, the learned Election Tribunal has misconstrued, 
misinterpreted and misapplied the law by way of the 
impugned judgment, which is consequently not tenable in law 
and liable to be set aside.  
10. 
 
The learned counsel further contended that the 
entire election process was tainted and both, the Appellant as 
well as the Contesting Respondents had expressed their 
dissatisfaction and separately sought verification of the thumb 
impressions on the counterfoils of the Ballot Papers through 
National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). The 
learned counsel also pointed out that the number of rejected 
votes (900) exceeded the votes separating the Appellant from 
the Contesting Respondents in terms of notified result thereby 
denuding such result of credibility and authenticity. It was 
urged that the impugned judgment be set aside and the 
CA.384/2014. 
8 
Election Petition filed by the Appellant be decided on merits. In 
support of his contentions, the learned counsel relied upon the 
judgments, reported as (1) Raja Aftab Ahmad Khan v. 
Muhammad Ajmal and another (PLD 2010 SC 1066), (2) 
Muhammad Rizwan Gill v. Nadia Aziz and others (PLD 2010 
SC 828), (3) Election Commission of Pakistan through its 
Secretary v. Javaid Hashmi and others (PLD 1989 SC 396), (4) 
Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional District & Sessions 
Judge/Returning Officer, N.A. 158, Naushero Feroze and 
others (1994 SCMR 1299), (5)  Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. 
Muhammad Altaf Hussain and others (1986 SCMR 1736) and 
(6) Naeem Hussain Chattha v. Tawakkal Ullah and another 
(1997 CLC 192). 
11. 
 
The learned Sr. ASC for the Contesting Respondents 
controverted the contentions raised on behalf of the Appellant 
by contending that pursuant to the General Elections held in 
2008, it was discovered that the Appellant had utilized fake and 
fraudulent 
educational 
testimonials 
and 
the 
Election 
Commission of Pakistan (ECP) concluded that the Appellant 
was disqualified and directed the initiation of criminal 
proceedings 
against 
him. 
In 
view 
of 
the 
afore-said 
CA.384/2014. 
9 
determination of the ECP, both the Nomination Papers filed by 
the Appellant for the Elections of 2013 were rejected on the 
ground that the Appellant was disqualified from contesting the 
Elections. The Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of this Court 
through two separate Civil Petitions for Leave to Appeal i.e. 
CPLA No.520 and 521 of 2013. One of such Petition was 
withdrawn as is evident from the Order of this Court dated 
25.04.2013. Thus, the Order of the Returning Officer holding the 
Appellant to be disqualified and rejecting his Nomination 
Papers in this behalf attained finality. Therefore, it was 
contended, both in fact and in law, the Appellant was 
disqualified from contesting the Elections in question held on 
the 11th of May, 2013. Furthermore, with reference to the Civil 
Petition for Leave to Appeal which was not withdrawn by the 
Appellant and interim Order was passed merely suspending 
the operation of the judgment impugned therein i.e. the 
judgment passed by the learned High Court, dismissing the 
Constitutional Petition filed by the Appellant. The legal 
consequence of such suspension would at best result in the 
revival of the Order of the Returning Officer rejecting the 
Nomination Papers of the Appellant. Thus, despite the Order of 
CA.384/2014. 
10 
this Court dated 25.04.2013, purportedly granting interim relief, 
the Appellant was not entitled to contest the Elections and the 
ECP misconstrued the said Order by allowing the Appellant to 
participate in the electoral process. Consequently, the very 
candidature of the Appellant was non-est in the eye of law 
who, therefore, had no locus standi to file an Election Petition in 
terms of Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, as has been correctly held by 
the learned Election Tribunal by way of the impugned 
judgment. After the Elections were held and Respondent No.1 
was declared and notified as a Returned Candidate, the 
Appellant withdrew his Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal 
without prejudice only to the matter pending before the ECP 
pertaining to the Elections of 2008, as is apparent from the 
Order dated 06.11.2013. As a consequence of such withdrawal, 
there can be no manner of doubt that the question of 
disqualification of the Appellant and rejection of his 
Nomination Papers became a past and closed transaction. 
Furthermore, had the Appellant wished to achieve the locus 
standi to file an Election Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 
1976, he should have pressed the Civil Petition for Leave to 
Appeal before this Court and sought its adjudication on merits. 
CA.384/2014. 
11 
On account of the aforesaid withdrawal, the Appellant it was 
contended lost not only the nascent status to file an Election 
Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, but was also estopped 
in law from doing so and such Election Petition filed by the 
Appellant was not maintainable and rightly dismissed.  
12. 
 
The learned counsel for the Respondents drew the 
attention of the Court to the various provisions of ROPA, 1976, 
in an effort to establish that during the electoral process a 
person seeking to contest the Elections attains various legal 
status separately and distinctly referred to in the various 
provisions of the law. A person who is proposed is referred to 
as a “candidate”, if Nomination Papers filed are accepted he 
attains the status of a “validly nominated candidate”, and if 
such validly nominated candidate does not withdraw or retire 
from elections, such person is referred to as a “contesting 
candidate”. During the poll and thereafter, the only persons 
recognized by law and available in the field are “Contesting 
Candidates” while the others i.e. persons whose Nomination 
Papers have been rejected or have been withdrawn or who have 
retired from the Elections disappear from the scene and it is 
only such Contesting Candidates who can challenge the 
CA.384/2014. 
12 
Elections by filing an Election Petition under Section 52 of 
ROPA, 1976, as has been held by way of the impugned 
judgment. It was added that all expressions defined in Section 2 
of ROPA, 1976, when employed in the succeeding provisions 
can only be assigned the meaning given in Section 2 of ROPA, 
1976, if there is nothing repugnant to the context in which such 
expressions are used in the other provisions of ROPA, 1976. 
Therefore, the expression “candidate” when used in Section 52 
of ROPA, 1976, means a Contesting Candidate and not a 
Candidate whose Nomination Papers have been rejected and as 
a consequence thereof, has exited from the electoral process. To 
interpret Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, as is being canvassed by the 
learned counsel for the Appellant, it is contended, would 
offend against the scheme of the law and may also result in 
absurdity. The learned counsel further contended that each 
provision of law must be given a purposive rather than a literal 
interpretation as is the settled law and when examined 
purposively Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, offers only one 
interpretation i.e. that the Election Petition can only be filed by 
a Contesting Candidate.  
CA.384/2014. 
13 
13. 
 
The learned counsel further contended that this 
Court had already held that a person whose Nomination 
Papers have been rejected, has no remedy before an Election 
Tribunal, after the Elections.  Furthermore, if the intention of 
the law had been to permit persons other than the Contesting 
Candidates to file Election Petitions after the Elections, express 
words, in this behalf, would have been employed as has been 
done in the Indian Representation of People Act, 1951. 
Consequently, the judgment of the learned Election Tribunal is 
in accordance with the law and should not be interfered with. 
In support of his contentions, the learned counsel referred to 
various treaties on Interpretation of Statutes and relied upon 
the judgments, reported as (1) Jaffar Khan v. Chief Election 
Commissioner, Pakistan and others [PLD 1965 (W.P.) Peshawar 
245], (2) Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional District & Sessions 
Judge/Returning Officer, N.A. 158, Naushero Feroze and 
others (1994 SCMR 1299), (3) Raja Abdul Qayyum v. Ch. Latif 
Akbar, Advocate and 2 others (1994 CLC 2041), (4) Harbhajan 
Singh v. Press Council of India and others (AIR 2002 SC 1351), 
(5) Charan Lal Sahu v. Shri Fakruddin Ali Ahmed and others 
(AIR 1975 SC 1288), (6) Amin Lal v. Hunna Mal (AIR 1965 SC 
CA.384/2014. 
14 
1243) and (7) Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan (AIR 
1957 SC 907).  
14. 
 
Heard. Available record perused. 
15. 
 
The real matter in issue which goes to the heart of 
the controversy involved in the instant case is regarding the 
person who can file and maintain an Election Petition under 
Section 52 (1) of ROPA, 1976, which reads as follows: 
 
“No election shall be called in question except 
by an election petition made by a candidate 
for that election (hereinafter in this Chapter 
referred to as the petitioner) 
 
 
 
 
        (emphasis supplied) 
The expression “candidate” has been defined in Section 2 sub 
section (iv) as follows: 
 
“means a person proposed as a candidate for, 
or seeking election as a member;” 
 
The said Section 2 also defines the expression “contesting 
candidate” in sub section (viii) in the following terms: 
 
“means a validly nominated candidate who 
has not withdrawn his candidature;” 
  
A “validly nominated candidate” is defined in Section 2 sub 
section (xxvi) as follows: 
 
“means a candidate whose nomination has 
been accepted;” 
 
CA.384/2014. 
15 
A “returned candidate” has been defined in Section 2 sub 
section (xxi) as follows: 
 
“means a candidate who has been declared 
elected as a member under this Act;” 
  
16. 
 
In pith and substance, it is the case of the Appellant 
that in terms of Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, an Election can be 
called into question by a candidate. The expression “candidate” 
has been defined by Section 2 sub section (iv), reproduced 
hereinabove and an expression defined in a statute must be 
given only the said meaning. Had the intention of the 
Legislature been to the contrary any of the other defined terms 
i.e. “validly nominated candidate” or “contesting candidate” 
would have been employed in Section 52 of ROPA, 1976. 
17. 
 
It may be noticed that the definitions enumerated in 
the various clauses of Section 2 of ROPA, 1976, are prefaced 
with the rider “In this Act unless there is anything repugnant in 
the subject or context”.  
18. 
 
With regard to construing the true import and effect 
of an Interpretation Clause in a Statutory Instrument, the Privy 
Council in its judgment, reported as Indian Immigration Trust 
Board of Natal v. Govindasamy (AIR 1920 Privy Council 114) 
held as follows: 
CA.384/2014. 
16 
 
“Now, when the interpretation clause in a 
statute says that such and such an expression 
shall include so and so, a Court in construing 
a statute is bound to give effect to the 
direction unless it can be shown that the 
context of the particular passage where the 
expression is used shows clearly that the 
meaning is not in this place to be given effect 
to, or unless there can be alleged some general 
reasons of weight why the interpretation 
clause is to be denied its application. …” 
 
In the judgment of this Court, reported as The Bank of 
Bahawalpur Ltd. through its Manager v. The Chief Settlement 
& Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore and others (PLD 1977 
SC 164), in the minority view of Muhammad Afzal Cheema, J. 
by relying upon the aforesaid judgment of the Privy Council, it 
was observed as follows: 
 
“Although normally an expression if defined 
in a Statute has to be given the same meanings 
wherever it occurs therein, yet there is ample 
authority for the principle of interpretation 
that a definition of a term in a Statute is 
merely declaratory in nature and should not 
be unnecessarily inflicted where it does not fit 
in with the subject and context and might lead 
to anomalies and absurd results. Further 
strength is lent to this justifiable invocation of 
the 
above 
principle 
by 
the 
express 
qualification or exception with which section 
2 was prefaced, namely, “unless there is 
something repugnant in the subject or 
context”. From this, it is abundantly clear that 
the definition of "house" or of "possession" 
like any other definitions contained in section 
2 would apply only where it is in consonance 
and fits in with the subject and the context 
and not otherwise. The repugnancy is only 
CA.384/2014. 
17 
too obvious and incapable of resolution on 
any other reasonable hypothesis. …” 
 
Subsequently, in a later judgment, the aforesaid minority view 
was endorsed and followed by this Court in the case, reported 
as Iftikhar Ahmad and others v. President, National Bank of 
Pakistan and others (PLD 1988 SC 53) in the following terms: 
  
“10. It is difficult to subscribe to the view 
taken by the learned Judges in the High 
Courts. No doubt, the award given by the 
Wage Commission is not included in the 
definition of the term 'award' as given in 
section 2(ii) of the Ordinance, but then as the 
governing clause of section 2 itself states the 
definitions given therein are to be read subject 
to anything repugnant in the context in which 
the defined terms occur. Apart from that, as 
held by this Court in Bank of Bahawalpur v. 
Chief 
Settlement 
and 
Rehabilitation 
Commissioner PLD 1977 S C 164 that 
although normally an expression if defined in 
a Statute has to be given the same meaning 
wherever it occurs therein, yet there is ample 
authority for the principle of interpretation, 
that a definition of a term in a Statute is 
merely declaratory in nature and should not 
be unnecessarily inflicted where it does not fit 
in with the subject or context. …” 
 
19. 
 
The matter again came up for consideration before 
this Court in the case reported as Syed Muhammad Haider 
Zaidi and others v. Abdul Hafeez and others (1991 SCMR 1699), 
wherein it was held as follows: 
  
“18. We may observe that a definition clause 
in a statute is of a declaratory nature though 
CA.384/2014. 
18 
normally the definitions provided for in the 
definition clauses are to be read into the 
provisions of the Act while interpreting the 
defined terms/words, but if the contents of 
the provisions of the Act indicate otherwise, 
the definition clause cannot override a main 
provision of the statute. In the present case, 
section 2 makes it explicit by providing that 
“unless there is anything repugnant in the 
subject or context”.” 
 
In the aforesaid judgment, the following extracts from various 
Treaties or Interpretation Statutes were quoted with approval: 
“Craies on Statute Law Seventh Edition: 
 
  
It is a sound rule of construction, said Cleasby 
B. in Courtauld v. Legh, (1869) L.R. 4 Ex. 126, 
130. Lewise v. Cattle (1938) 2 K.B. 454, 457. R. 
v. Belfast JJ. (1947) N.I. 191) "to give the same 
meaning to the same words occurring in 
different parts of an Act of Parliament". The 
presumption that the same words are used in 
the same meaning is however very slight and 
it is proper, "if sufficient reasons can be 
assigned, to construe a word in one part of an 
Act in a different sense from that which it 
bears in another part of an Act. (Per Turner 
L.J. in Re National Savings Bank (1866) L.R. 1 
Ch. App. 547, 550). For instance, if, as Fry L.J. 
said in Re Moody and Yates' Contract, (1885) 
30 Ch. D. 344, 349) "a word is used 
inaccurately in one section of a statute, it must 
not 
be 
assumed 
to 
have 
been 
used 
inaccurately when it occurs in another section 
of the same statute". And, in fact, a word may 
be used in two different senses in the same 
section of an Act. (Maddox v. Storer (1963) 1 
Q.B. 451). "It is obvious", said North J. in Re 
Smith, Green v. Smith, (1883) 24 Ch. D. 672, 
678) "that the word `property' is used in 
section 54 of the repealed Bankruptcy Act, 
1869 in two totally different senses". The 
CA.384/2014. 
19 
Court said, in Doe d. Angell v. Angell (1846) 9 
Q.B. 328). "Considerable difficulty arises in the 
construction of the Real Property Limitation 
Act, 1833 by reason of the word `rent' being 
used in two different senses throughout viz. 
in the sense of a rent charged upon land, and 
of rent reserved under a lease". Similarly, in R. 
v. Allen (1872) 1 C.C.R. 367, 374) the Court 
held, as to the word "marry" in section 57 of 
the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 
(which enacts that "whosoever, being married, 
shall marry any other person during the life of 
the former husband or wife………shall be 
guilty of felony") that "it is at once self-evident 
that the proposition that the same effect must 
be given to the term `marry' in both parts of 
the sentence cannot possibly hold good.”  
 
“Crawford on Interpretation of Laws 1940 
Edition 
 
Strictly 
speaking, 
construction 
and 
interpretation are not the same (U.S. v. 
Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (U.S.) 76, 5 L. Ed. 37), 
although the two terms are often used 
interchangeably (U.S. v. Keitzel, 211 U.S. 370, 
53 L. Ed. 320, 29 S.Ct.123). Construction 
however, to be technically correct, is the 
drawing of conclusions with respect to 
subjects that are beyond the direct expression 
of the text, from elements known and given in 
the text (U.S. v. Farenholt, 206 U.S. 226, 51 
L.Ed. 1036, 27 S. Ct.123; People v. Comrs. of 
Taxes, 95 N.Y. 554), while interpretation is the 
process of discovering the true meaning of the 
language used (Bloomer v. Todd, 3 Wash. T. 
599, 19 Pac. 135, 1 L.R.A. 111). Thus, the Court 
will resort to interpretation when it endeavors 
to ascertain the meaning of a word found in a 
statute, which when considered with the other 
words in the statute, may reveal a meaning 
different from that is apparent when the word 
is considered abstractly or when given its 
usual 
meaning 
(Anderson 
v. 
City 
of 
Hattiesburg, 131 Miss. Miss. 216, 94 So. 163). 
CA.384/2014. 
20 
But when the Court goes beyond the language 
of the statute and seeks the assistance of 
extrinsic aids in order to determine whether a 
given case falls within the statute, it resorts to 
construction (Union Trust Co. v. McGinty, 212 
Mass. 205, 98 N.E. 679). The process to be 
used in any given case will depend upon the 
nature of the problem presented. And, as is 
apparent, both processes may be used in 
seeking the legislative intent in a given 
statute. If the legislative intent is not clear 
after the completion of interpretation, then the 
Court will proceed to subject the statute to 
construction (2 Williston, contracts (1920) 
1160-1161).” 
 
“Maxwell On The Interpretation of Statutes 
Twelfth Edition 
 
  
The words of a statute, when there is doubt 
about their meaning, are to be understood in 
the sense in which they best harmonise with 
the subject of the enactment (Towerfield 
(Owners) v. Workington Harbour and Dock 
Board (1949) P. 10. per Scott and Asquith L. 
JJ., and Freed v. D.P.P. (1969) 2 W.L.R. 390). 
Their meanings found not so much in a 
strictly grammatical or etymological propriety 
of language, nor even in its popular use, as in 
the subject, or in the occasion on which they 
are used, and the object to be attained (Per 
cur., R. V. Hall (1822) 1 B. & C. 123). 
Grammatically, words may cover a case but 
whenever a statute or document is to be 
construed it must be construed not according 
to the mere ordinary general meaning of the 
words, but according to the ordinary meaning 
of the words as applied to the subject-matter 
with regard to which they are used, unless 
there is something which renders it necessary 
to read them in a sense which is not their 
ordinary sense in the English language as so 
applied (Lion Mutual Marine Insurance 
Association V. Tucker (1883) 12 Q.B.D. 176, 
per Brett M.R.).” 
CA.384/2014. 
21 
 
In the case, reported as Syed Mukhtar Hussain Shah v. Mst. 
Saba Imtiaz and others (PLD 2011 SC 260), it was held as 
follows: 
  
 
“It is settled law that definition clause or 
a section in a statute is meant generally to 
declare what certain words or expressions 
used in that statute shall mean, the obvious 
object of such a clause is to avoid the necessity 
of frequent repetition in describing all the 
subject 
matter 
to 
which 
the 
word 
or 
expression so defined is intended to apply. 
…” 
 
The Supreme Court of India in the judgment, reported as 
Commissioner of Sales Tax, Gujarat v. M/s. Union Medical 
Agency (AIR 1981 SC 1) expressed a similar view, which reads 
as under: 
“14. It is a well settled principle that when a 
word or phrase has been defined in the 
interpretation 
clause, 
prima 
facie 
that 
definition governs whenever that word or 
phrase is used in the body of the statute. But 
where the context makes the definition clause 
inapplicable, a defined word when used in the 
body of the statute may have to be given a 
meaning different from that contained in the 
interpretation clause; all definitions given in 
an 
interpretation 
clause 
are, 
therefore, 
normally 
enacted 
subject 
to 
the 
usual 
qualification-'unless 
there 
is 
anything 
repugnant in the subject or context', or 'unless 
the context otherwise requires'. Even in the 
absence of an express qualification to that 
effect such a qualification is always implied.” 
 
CA.384/2014. 
22 
“18. There is no dispute with the proposition 
that the meaning of a word or expression 
defined may have to be departed from on 
account of the subject or context in which the 
word had been used and that will be giving 
effect to the opening sentence in definition 
section, namely 'unless the context otherwise 
requires'. In view of this qualification, the 
Court has not only to look at the words but 
also to look at the context, the collocation and 
the object of such words relating to such 
matter and interpret the meaning intended to 
be conveyed by the use of the words in a 
particular section. But where there is no 
obscurity in the language of the section, there 
is no scope for the application of the rule ex 
visceribus actus. …”  
 
A perusal of the aforesaid reveals that the words and 
expressions used in a Statute are ordinarily to be interpreted in 
accordance with their normal dictionary meaning and the same 
words used in different Sections of the same Statute usually 
carry the same meaning. Words and expressions may be 
defined in the Interpretation Clause of Statutes. Such 
definitions are declaratory in nature and are incorporated to 
avoid repetitiveness. Normally, such words and expressions 
occurring in the main provisions of the Statute carry the same 
meaning, as are available in the definition. However, both the 
aforesaid general principles are subject to the overriding 
condition that the said words and expressions must always be 
construed with reference to the context they are used in the 
CA.384/2014. 
23 
Statutes the subject of provisions wherein they are used and 
examined with reference to the scheme of the Statute and the 
intent and purpose to be achieved thereof. The possibility that 
such words and expressions may have a different meaning in 
individual Sections of the Statute cannot be entirely ruled out as 
the meaning of such words and expressions must be construed 
subject to the context in which they are employed in the specific 
provision. Usually, definition clauses in the Statutory 
Instruments are scribed subject to the rider that the words and 
expressions so defined will carry the meaning ascribed to them 
where the context and the subject so permit. Where the defined 
meaning being employed results in an obvious anomaly or 
absurdity, it is not permissible to mechanically and mindlessly 
inflict such meaning regardless of repugnancy to the context or 
the subject, to the words or expressions in the provision sought 
to be interpreted.  
20. 
 
In the instant case, it is canvassed on behalf of the 
Contesting Respondent that if the expression “candidate” as 
used in Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, reproduced hereinabove, if 
given the meaning as defined in Section 2 sub section (iv), it 
would result in an anomaly and absurdity and also run 
CA.384/2014. 
24 
contrary to the scheme of ROPA, 1976. It is the veracity of such 
argument, which needs to be examined.  
  
Section 12 of ROPA, 1976, deals with filing of the 
Nomination Papers for election and confers a right on any 
Elector of the Constituency to propose or second the name of 
any duly qualified person in this behalf. The Nomination 
Papers also require the signatures of such a person who is 
referred to in the said provision as a “Candidate”. A person so 
proposed is in fact a “candidate” as defined by Section 2 sub 
section (iv) of ROPA, 1976. The Nomination Papers so filed are 
subjected to scrutiny in terms of Section 14 of ROPA, 1976. A 
candidate whose Nomination Papers are accepted is referred to 
as a “validly nominated candidate” whose name is published in 
a prescribed manner (Sections 15 and 26). Such validly 
nominated candidate may subject to law withdraw from the 
elections under Section 16 or retire therefrom under Section 17 
of ROPA, 1976. Such validly nominated candidate who has 
neither withdrawn nor retired from the Elections is the 
Contesting Candidate as defined by Section 2 sub section (viii) 
of ROPA, 1976. The names of such Contesting Candidates are 
published in terms of Section 21 (b) of ROPA, 1976. It is the 
CA.384/2014. 
25 
names and symbols of the Contesting Candidates alone which 
are published on the Ballot Papers.  
21. 
 
When the electoral process reaches a stage where the 
names of the Contesting Candidates are finalized and their 
names and symbols published on the Ballot Papers, all 
candidates whose Nomination Papers were rejected and such 
order of rejection has attained finality as well as such validly 
nominated candidates who have either withdrawn or retired in 
accordance with law, for all intents and purposes cease to have 
any further relevance in the subsequent process of the conduct 
of the Elections. Yet, in the provisions that follow which pertain 
to the electoral process, even prior to the stage of the resolution 
of the electoral disputes there is repeated reference to the 
expression “candidate”. If the said expression is interpreted in a 
manner as canvassed by the learned counsel for the Appellant, 
it would result in an obvious anomaly bordering on absurdity 
rendering such provisions meaningless, as is obvious from the 
following: 
  
(a) In Section 22 (1) a “candidate” may appoint an 
election agent and the name and details of such 
appointment are to be transmitted to the Returning 
Officer (Section 22 sub section 3). However, when 
CA.384/2014. 
26 
the aforesaid provision is examined in juxtaposition 
with Section 23 (1), it appears that a “contesting 
candidate or his election agent” may appoint polling 
agents for each polling station. Thus, if the definition 
of the expression “candidate” as given in Section 2 
sub section (iv) is pressed into service while 
interpreting Section 22, it would result in an obvious 
anomaly that while a candidate whose Nomination 
Papers have been rejected may appoint an Election 
Agent but cannot appoint any Polling Agent. Even 
otherwise, the appointment of election agents by 
such candidates would be an exercise in futility.  
 
  
(b) 
Similarly, in sub section 2 of Section 23, the 
provision pertaining to revoking the authority of 
polling 
agent, 
the 
expression 
“candidate” 
is 
employed. Such candidate cannot be anyone other 
than a Contesting Candidate as only a contesting 
candidate can appoint an election agent. Thus, by 
interpreting 
the 
expression 
“candidate” 
with 
reference to the context wherein it is employed the 
only possible conclusion that can be drawn is that 
such candidate is in fact the Contesting Candidate 
and not the candidate as defined by Section 2 sub 
section (iv) i.e. a candidate whose Nomination 
Papers may have been rejected.  
  
  
(c) 
In Section 30 (4) (c), it is stated that the empty 
Ballot Boxes would be shown to the “candidates or 
CA.384/2014. 
27 
their election agents or polling agents” as may be 
present. The expression “candidate” used in the said 
provision obviously refers to a Contesting Candidate 
as only such Contesting Candidate would have 
polling agents in view of Section 23. Giving the term 
“candidate” the meaning as set forth in Section 2 sub 
section (iv) would render the said provision 
meaningless.  
 
  
(d) 
Section 35 sub section (1) pertaining to 
challenge of electors, it is provided that a “candidate 
or his polling agent” can raise such objection. The 
expression “candidate” in the said provision 
obviously means a Contesting Candidate as only 
such Contesting Candidate can appoint a polling 
agent. The expression as defined in Section 2 sub 
section (iv) if pressed into service would result in a 
legal impossibility. Hence, in order to attribute any 
meaning to the said provision, the term “candidate” 
must be interpreted with reference to the context in 
which it is employed.  
 
  
(e) 
In Section 38 sub section (11) the Presiding 
Officer is required to provide a certified copy of the 
statement of the count and a ballot paper account to 
the “candidates, their election agents or polling 
agents” as may be present. Here again the 
expression 
“candidate” 
obviously 
means 
a 
Contesting Candidate, as such Contesting Candidate 
CA.384/2014. 
28 
alone can appoint polling agents. The aforesaid 
becomes even more obvious in view of sub section 
(13) of the said provision which provides that upon 
each statement and packet prepared under sub 
section (12), the signatures of the Contesting 
Candidates or their election agents or polling agents 
could be obtained. Yet again, the expression 
“candidate” must necessarily be interpreted with 
reference to the context and subject in accordance 
with the scheme of the law rather than the meaning 
enumerated in the Interpretation Clause i.e. Section 2 
sub section (iv). 
 
  
(f) 
In Section 40, yet again reference is made to a 
candidate and their election agents obviously it 
refers to the Contesting Candidates only as they 
alone can have election agents.  
 
  
(g) 
In Section 41, the term “candidate” is employed 
while referring to drawing of lots in case of the 
equality of votes. Obviously, such candidate means a 
Contesting Candidate, as there is no question of 
equality of votes between the Contesting Candidates 
and a candidate whose Nomination Papers were 
rejected and his name and symbol was not present 
on the Ballot Paper. Thus, the definition of 
“candidate” as given in Section 2 sub section (iv) of 
the expression candidate is inapplicable to Section 
41.   
CA.384/2014. 
29 
 
  
(h) 
In Chapter VI, which is pertaining to election 
expenses, in Sections 48 and 49 (1), the expression 
candidate is employed, yet in Section 49 (2) with 
regard to the amount of election expenses, the term 
“Contesting Candidate” is mentioned. Subsequently, 
in sub section (3) yet again, the term “candidate” is 
used with regard to receipts of election expenses. 
However, by virtue of sub section (1) of Section 50, 
the Contesting Candidates are required to file the 
return of election expenses. It is evident that the 
expression “candidate” in Sections 48 and 49 implies 
a Contesting Candidate only. If the definition of the 
term “candidate” as used in Section 2 sub section (iv) 
is pressed into service an obvious anomaly would 
result as a candidate whose Nomination Papers are 
rejected would be required to maintain accounts of 
election expenses and receipts thereof without any 
legal necessity of filing the same.  
 
An overview of the aforesaid provisions of law leaves little 
room for doubt that the expression “candidate” does not in all 
events and in each and every provision carry the meaning that 
attributed to it in Section 2 sub section (iv) of ROPA, 1976 and 
must necessarily be interpreted with reference to the context in 
which it is employed in each and every provision so as to avoid 
an anomaly or absurdity. The expression “candidate” must be 
CA.384/2014. 
30 
construed after contextualizing the same with regard to the 
subject of the provision, as is not only the settled rule of 
construction but also the mandate of the opening lines of 
Section 2 itself. The legal premises of the contentions of the 
learned counsel for the Appellant to the contrary are not only in 
conflict with the time honoured rules for interpretation but also 
would result in obvious anomaly and render various provisions 
meaningless, as is apparent from the examples cited above. It 
also appears to be the scheme of the law that by and large in the 
absence of clear and unequivocal statement to the contrary, in 
the provisions pertaining to the electoral process subsequent to 
the publication of the list of the Contesting Candidates and 
printing of their names and symbols on the Ballot Papers, the 
expression “candidate” occurring in any such provision would 
tend to mean a Contesting Candidate and not a Candidate, 
whose Nomination Papers have been rejected.  
22. 
 
The provisions of Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, which 
pertain to the real matter in controversy involved in the instant 
case, must necessarily be interpreted in the above backdrop.  
23. 
 
Section 
52 
(1) 
of 
ROPA, 
1976, 
reproduced 
hereinabove, is couched in negative terms and enjoins that no 
CA.384/2014. 
31 
election can be called into question except through an Election 
Petition filed by a “candidate for the election” (referred to as 
the Petitioner in Chapter VII). It needs to be ascertained 
whether the expression “candidate” as occurring in Section 
52(1) of ROPA, 1976, would include a candidate whose 
Nomination Papers have been rejected or has otherwise 
withdrawn or retired from the election. In this behalf, reference 
may be made to Section 54 of ROPA, 1976, which reads as 
follows: 
  
“54. Parties to the petition.- The petitioner 
shall join as respondents to his election 
petition – 
 
  
 
 
(a) 
all contesting candidates; and 
 
  
(b) 
any other candidate against 
whom any allegation of any corrupt 
or illegal practice is made and shall 
serve personally or by registered post 
on each such respondent a copy of the 
petition.” 
 
A perusal of the aforesaid provision makes it clear and obvious 
that only Contesting Candidates are per se necessary and proper 
parties to an Election Petition. Other candidates can only be 
impleaded, if there are allegations of corrupt or illegal practices 
against them. It is difficult to accept that a candidate whose 
Nomination Papers have been rejected and against whom there 
CA.384/2014. 
32 
are no allegations of corrupt or illegal practices and who is 
neither a necessary nor a proper party to the proceedings can 
maintain an Election Petition. Section 66 of ROPA, 1976, in the 
same Chapter i.e. Chapter VII, makes reference to the 
expression “candidate”. The said provision for ease of reference 
is reproduced herein-below: 
  
“66. Recrimination where seat is claimed.- 
(1) Where in an election petition a declaration 
is claimed that a candidate other than the 
returned candidate has been duly elected, the 
returned candidate or any other party may 
produce evidence to prove that the election of 
such other candidate would have been 
declared void had he been the returned 
candidate and had a petition been presented 
calling his election in question: 
 
  
 
Provided that the returned candidate or 
such other party as aforesaid shall not be 
entitled to give such evidence unless he or it 
has, within the fourteen days next following 
the commencement of the trial, given notice to 
the tribunal of his intention so to do and has 
also deposited the security referred to in 
section 52. 
 
  
(2) 
Every notice referred to in sub-section 
(1) shall be accompanied by a statement of the 
case, and all the provisions relating to the 
contents, verification, trial and procedure of 
an election petition, or to the security deposit 
in respect of an election petition, shall apply 
to such a statement as if it were an election 
petition.” 
  
24. 
 
Yet again, the expression “candidate” would imply a 
Contesting Candidate, as only such Contesting Candidate can 
CA.384/2014. 
33 
be declared as a duly elected candidate, as it is a legal 
impossibility for a candidate whose Nomination Papers have 
been rejected to be declared an elected candidate by the learned 
Election Tribunal.  
25. 
 
The orders that can possibly be passed by an 
Election Tribunal are enumerated in Section 67 sub section (1) 
(c) of ROPA, 1976, which reads as follows: 
  
“67. Decision of the Tribunal.- (1) The 
Tribunal may, upon the conclusion of the trial 
of an election petition, make an order- 
 
  
 
 
(a) 
…………………………….……..  
 
  
 
 
(b) 
……………………………….…..  
 
  
(c) 
declaring the election of the 
returned candidate to be void and 
the petitioner or any other contesting 
candidate to have been duly elected;”  
 
Reference may also be made to Section 69 of ROPA, 1976, which 
reads as under: 
  
“69. Ground for declaring a person other 
than a returned candidate elected.- The 
Tribunal shall declare the election of the 
returned candidate to be void and the 
petitioner or any other contesting candidate to 
have been duly elected, if it is so claimed by 
the petitioner or any of the respondents and 
the Tribunal is satisfied that the petitioner or 
such other contesting candidate was entitled 
to be declared elected.” 
  
CA.384/2014. 
34 
In the aforesaid two provisions reproduced hereinabove, which 
are part of Chapter VII of ROPA, 1976, the expression 
“petitioner or any other contesting candidate” and the 
expression “petitioner or such other contesting candidate” have 
been employed. The expression “such” in legal parlance has a 
peculiar and well settled connotation : 
In West’s Legal Dictionary 2010 Edition 
 
Such: Of that type, kindred, corresponding, 
similar, of that sort, of that kind, comparable, 
suchlike, analogous, twin, allied, matching. 
 
In Words and Phrases Permanent Edition 
 
Such: The word ‘such’ is defined as of the sort 
or degree previously indicated or contextually 
implied. People v. Heslen, Cal., 163 P.2d 21, 
30. 
 
Word ‘Such’ means of this or that kind, 
character or measure: of the sort or degree 
previously indicated or contextually implied. 
Campbell v. Mueller, CCA Ohio, 159 F.2d 803, 
806. 
 
‘Such’ is defined by Webster as “having the 
particular quality or character specified …”. 
State v. Estep, 71 P. 857, 859, 66 Kan. 416. 
 
Word ‘Such’ means … of the same kind or 
class as something mentioned … People ex 
rel. Miller v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 29 N.E.2d 
604, 607, 374 I11. 376. 
 
Black’s Law Dictionary Fifth Edition 
Such: Of that kind, having particular quality 
or character specified. Identical with, being 
CA.384/2014. 
35 
the same as what has been mentioned. Alike, 
similar, of the like kind. 
  
 
  
 
 
 
(emphasis supplied) 
 
26.   
When examined in the above context, there can be 
no manner of doubt that the expression “petitioner” as used in 
Sections 66 and 69 of Chapter VII of ROPA, means a person 
having identical attributes and characteristics of a contesting 
candidate and therefore, means a validly nominated candidate, 
who has neither withdrawn nor retired from the election 
process. The said provisions pertaining to the relief, which may 
be granted to a petitioner under Section 52 of ROPA, where 
such expression “petitioner” has been defined to mean a 
candidate. The intention of the Legislature appears to be clear 
and unambiguous that the expressions “Candidate“ and 
“Petitioner” are used in Chapter VII including Section 52 
thereof is limited to “a contesting candidate” and does not 
include a candidate whose Nomination Papers have been 
rejected. 
27. 
 
If the expression “candidate” as used in Section 52 of 
ROPA, 1976, is interpreted to include a person whose 
Nomination Papers though filed were rejected and such person 
is permitted or held entitled in law to maintain an Election 
CA.384/2014. 
36 
Petition in terms thereof but to what end? It has been noticed 
that the illegal rejection of the Nomination Papers is not a 
ground available under Chapter VII of ROPA, 1976, for grant of 
any relief. With reference to the aforesaid, this Court has 
already held that the candidate whose Nomination Papers are 
rejected, even illegally cannot seek any relief through an 
Election Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 1976, or other 
provisions of Chapter VII thereof. Reference, in this behalf, may 
be made to the judgment of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi v. Additional 
District & Sessions Judge/Returning Officer, N.A. 158, 
Naushero Feroze and others (1994 SCMR 1299). The relevant 
portion of the said judgment is reproduced hereunder: 
  
 
“It may also be pertinent to mention 
that subsection (1) of section 68 of the Act 
gives the grounds on which the election of a 
returned candidate can be declared as void. 
The above subsection (1) of section 68 reads as 
follows:-- 
 
  
“68. Ground for declaring election of 
returned candidate void.—(1) The Tribunal 
shall declare the election of the returned 
candidate to be void if it is satisfied that— 
 
  
(a) 
the nomination of the returned 
candidate was invalid; or 
 
  
(b) 
the returned candidate was 
not, on the nomination day, qualified 
for, or was disqualified from, being 
elected as a member; or 
 
CA.384/2014. 
37 
  
(c) 
the election of the returned 
candidate has been procured or 
induced by any corrupt or illegal 
practice; or 
 
  
(d) 
a corrupt or illegal practice has 
been committed by the returned 
candidate or his election agent or by 
any 
other 
person 
with 
the 
connivance of the candidate or his 
election agent.” 
 
  
20. 
It may be noticed that the above 
grounds do not admit the filing of a petition 
by a candidate whose nomination papers 
were illegally rejected and who could not 
participate in the elections on that account. 
…” 
 
  
 
 
 
(emphasis supplied) 
 
28. 
 
It appears to have been held in clear and 
unequivocal terms by this Court in the above quoted judgment 
that a candidate whose Nomination Papers have been rejected 
cannot maintain an Election Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 
1976. 
29. 
 
The 
compulsion 
to 
interpret 
the 
expression 
“candidate” in terms of Chapter VII with reference to the 
context in which it has been employed and the subject to which 
the provisions pertain is overwhelming. If the petitioner for 
purposes of the said Chapter i.e. Chapter VII of ROPA, 1976, 
were to include a candidate whose Nomination Papers have 
been rejected, the result would be anomalous and lead to 
CA.384/2014. 
38 
unexpected and unforeseen situations rendering the provisions 
meaningless. There appears to be little doubt that only a validly 
nominated candidate who has neither withdrawn nor retired 
from the Elections i.e. a Contesting Candidate can file or 
maintain an Election Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 1976.  
30. 
 
Adverting now to the facts of the instant case, it 
appears from the record that in the General Elections held in 
2008, the Appellant was elected as a Member of the Provincial 
Assembly of the Province of Balochistan. Subsequently, the 
educational testimonials of the Appellant were scrutinized and 
the ECP, in this behalf, came to a prima facie conclusion that the 
Appellant had become a Member of the Provincial Assembly by 
employing illegal and unfair means in as much as the 
educational testimonials appended by the Appellant with his 
Nomination Papers while contesting the Elections in 2008 were 
fake and fictitious. Criminal proceedings, in this behalf, were 
directed to be initiated against the Appellant. When the 
Appellant submitted his Nomination Papers to contest the 
General Elections held on 11th of May, 2013, his Nomination 
Papers were rejected on the ground that he had filed fake and 
fictitious educational testimonials while contesting the General 
CA.384/2014. 
39 
Elections of 2008. Findings to this effect were returned by the 
ECP after an inquiry, hence, the Appellant was held to be 
disqualified in view of Article 63 of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Such Order of rejection was 
challenged unsuccessfully by the Appellant before the learned 
Election Tribunal as well as the learned High Court of 
Balochistan and eventually, the matter reached this Court 
wherein some interim relief was granted with reference to one 
of the rejected Nomination Papers filed by the Appellant. The 
Appellant appears to have been permitted to contest the 
Elections on the strength of the said interim Order. The Civil 
Appeal No.444 of 2013 arising out of Civil Petition for Leave to 
Appeal No.520 of 2013 wherein leave to appeal has been 
granted vide Order dated 25.04.2013 referred to above, came up 
for hearing before this Court on 06.11.2013, when the following 
Order was passed: 
 
 
“It has been informed by the learned 
counsel for the appellant that the appellant 
has 
already 
approached 
the 
Election 
Commission for redressal of his grievance, 
against the result of election held in the year 
2008, therefore, in such view of the matter 
instant appeal be disposed of with the 
observation that no prejudice shall be caused 
to the cases of either party pending before the 
concerned forum. 
 
CA.384/2014. 
40 
 
 
Dispose of accordingly.” 
 
31. 
 
A perusal of the afore-said Order reveals that the 
withdrawal was without prejudice to the proceedings pending 
before the ECP pertaining to the Elections of 2008 and not with 
regard to the Elections of 2013. Even without examining and 
adjudicating upon the contentions of the learned counsel of 
Respondent No.1 with regard to the fact that Civil Petition for 
Leave to Appeal No.521 of 2013 pertaining to the rejection of 
one set of Nomination Papers had been withdrawn on 
25.04.2013 and the interim relief granted did not permit the 
Appellant to contest the Elections, there can be no manner of 
doubt that on account of the withdrawal the aforesaid Order of 
the Returning Officer, rejecting the Nomination Papers of the 
Appellant for the General Elections of 2013, was not set aside 
and attained finality. Consequently, the Appellant neither has 
the status nor the locus standi of the Contesting Candidate, 
hence, was not in law a “petitioner” entitled to challenge the 
Elections in an Election Petition under Section 52 of ROPA, 
1976, or seek any relief under any other provision of Chapter 
VII of ROPA, 1976. The conclusions drawn by the learned 
Election Tribunal, in this behalf, by way of the impugned 
CA.384/2014. 
41 
judgment appear to be in accordance with law and no ground 
warranting interference therewith is available to the Appellant.  
32. 
 
Consequently, this Civil Appeal, being without merit 
is dismissed with no order as to cost. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
 
 
 
      Judge 
 
 
 
‘APPROVED FOR REPORTING’ 
 
      Judge 
Mahtab H. Sheikh/* 
 
 
 
Announced on 02.03.2016 at Islamabad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
