IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa 
Mr. Justice Amir Hani Muslim 
 
 
Criminal 
Appeal 
No. 
140 
of 
2005 
& 
Criminal 
Miscellaneous Applications No. 629 of 2010, 141 of 
2005, 228 to 233 of 2004, Civil Petition No. 205 of 2006 
& Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 393 of 2007, Civil 
Appeals No. 91 and 609 of 2006 & Civil Miscellaneous 
Application No. 2710 of 2013, Civil Appeal No. 1189 of 
2008, Criminal Appeal No. 1-Q of 2010, Civil Appeal No. 
1324 of 2007, Criminal Appeals No. 274 to 279 of 2006, 
Criminal Petitions No. 78-L & 79-L of 2004, Civil 
Petitions No. 1355-L, 1188-L, 1363-L and 1013-L of 
2010, Civil Petitions No. 1749, 1548 of 2009, 226-L of 
2010, 1936-L of 2011, 1145-L, 1326-L, 2534-L of 2009, 
629-L of 2008, Criminal Original Petition No. 31 of 2007 
in Civil Appeal No. 1324 of 2007, Civil Petition No. 318 
of 2008, Civil Appeal No. 483-L, 484-L of 2009, Criminal 
Appeals No. 101, 102 of 2005, 86 of 2003 & Criminal 
Petitions No. 96 and 97 of 2003  
 
 
Abdul Aziz Memon 
 
 
(Crl.A. 140/05) 
Mst. Farida Abdul Aziz  
 
(Crl.A. 141/05) 
The State through NAB 
 
(Crl.As. 228 to 233/04, C.P. 1548/09) 
The State through PG NAB 
(C.A. 91/06, C.P. 318/08, Cr.As. 96 & 
97/03) 
The State through Chairman  
(Crl.As. 274-276/06, C.P.1936-L/11) 
NAB 
Sohail Akhtar, etc. 
 
 
(C.P. 250/06) 
Shahbaz-ud-Din Ch. etc. 
 
(C.A. 609/05) 
Mst. Farzana Shaheen  
 
(C.A. 1189/08) 
Muzaffar Hussain, etc. 
 
(Crl.A. 1-Q/10) 
Nadeem Majeed  
 
 
(C.A.1324/07) 
Muhammad Asif Sehgal 
 
(Crl.As. 277 to 279/06) 
Mohib Fabrics Limited  
 
(Crl.Ps. 78 & 79-L/04) 
Mazhar Wakil Malik 
 
 
(C.P. 1355-L/10) 
Brig. Retd Zaheerullah 
 
(C.Ps. 1188-L/10, 1145-L/09) 
Munir Ahmad Virk 
 
 
(C.P. 1363-L/10) 
Dr. Ayesha Tahir, etc.  
 
(C.P. 1013-L/2010) 
Mehran Bibi, etc.  
 
 
(C.P. 1749/09) 
Anjuman Mutasareen Double  
(C.P. 226-L/05) 
Shah 
Mohammad Yaseen 
 
 
(C.P. 1326-L/09) 
Mohammad Amin Bhatti 
 
(C.P. 2534-L/09) 
Muhammad Ashraf 
 
 
(C.P. 629-L/08) 
Nadeem Majeed  
 
 
(Crl.O.P. 31/07) 
M. Anees-ur-Rehman Butt, etc. 
(C.As. 483 & 484-L/09) 
Ch. Aamir Sher Ali 
 
 
(Crl.As. 101 & 102/05) 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
2 
Haji Kabir Khan  
 
 
(Crl.A. 86/03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            … Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
versus 
  
The State 
(Crl.As. 140-141/05, 277 to 
279/06, Crl.Ps. 78 & 79-L/04, 
Crl.As. 101 to 102/05 & 
86/03) 
Nasim-ur-Rehman 
 
 
(Crl.A. 228/04) 
Anwar-ur-Rehman 
 
 
(Crl.A. 229/04) 
Masood-ur-Rehman 
 
 
(Crl.A. 230/04) 
Mujeeb-ur-Rehman 
 
 
(Crl.A. 231/04) 
Faisal Saleem 
 
 
 
(Crl.A. 232/04) 
Asad Saleem 
 
 
 
(Crl.A. 233/04) 
Chairman NAB, etc. 
 
 
(C.Ps. 250/06, 1355-L, 1188-L,   
1363-L, 
1013-L/2010, 
1145-
L/09, 629-L/08) 
Naseem-ur-Rehman, etc. 
 
(C.A. 91/06) 
The State, etc. 
(C.A. 609/05, Crl. A. 1-Q/10, 
C.A. 1324/07, Crl.O.P. 31/07) 
Federation of Pakistan through 
(C.A.1189/08, C.P. 1749/09) 
Secretary, Interior, etc. 
Brig (R) Karar Ali Agha 
 
(C.P. 1548/09) 
Government of Pakistan, etc. 
(C.P. 226-L/2010) 
Dr. Abdul Basit  
 
 
(C.P. 1936-L/11) 
DG NAB, Lahore, etc.  
 
(C.Ps. 1326-L/09, 2534-L/09) 
M. Kamran Khan, etc.   
 
(C.P. 318/08) 
Rashid Ahmad Yaqoob, etc.  
(C.As. 483 & 484-L/09) 
Haji Kabir Khan, etc.  
 
(Crl.Ps. 96-97/03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             …Respondent(s) 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005 & Criminal Miscellaneous 
Application No. 629 of 2010 and Civil Appeal No. 141 of 2005 
 
For the appellant(s) 
: Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Afzal Siddiqui, ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
 
For the respondent  
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
Crl. As. 228 to 233/2004 
For the appellant(s) 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
For the respondent(s) : Raja Muhammad Bashir, Sr. ASC 
 
C. P. 205/2006 & CMA No.393/07 
For the petitioner 
: Mr. Afzal Siddiqui, ASC 
Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, ASC 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
3 
For respondent No.1 
 
 
For respondent No.3 
 
 
: 
 
 
: 
Raja M. Ibrahim Satti, Sr. ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
Nemo 
 
C. A. No. 91/2006 
For the appellant 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
For respondent No.1  : Nemo. 
 
C. A. No. 609/2006 & CMA 2710/13 
For the appellant 
: Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Mehr Khan Malik, AOR 
 
For respondent No.1 
 
 
For Complainant  
: 
 
 
: 
Raja M. Ibrahim Satti, Sr. ASC 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR a/w 
 
Syed M. Iqtidar Haider (in person) 
 
C. A. 1189/2008  
For the appellant 
: Mr. M. Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Naseer-ud-Din Khan, ASC 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
 
For respondent No.1  : Nemo. 
 
Crl. A. No.1-Q/2010  
For the appellant 
: Nemo. 
 
For the respondent  
: Mr. K. K. Agha, PG (NAB) 
 
C. A. No.1324/07 
For the appellant 
: Mr. Kamran Murtaza, ASC 
 
For respondent No.1 
 
 
 
Respondent No. 7  
: 
 
 
: 
Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
Mr. M. S. Khattak, AOR 
Mr. Ali Shafi (in person) 
 
Crl. A. No. 274 & 276/2006 
For the appellant(s) 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
For the respondent  
: Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, Sr. ASC 
 
Crl. A. No. 277 to 279/2006 & Crl. Ps.78 & 79-L/2004 
and C. P. 1335-L/2010 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
4 
For the appellant(s) 
: Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, Sr. ASC 
 
For the respondent  
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
Cr. P. 79-L/2004 
 
For the petitioner 
: Nemo 
 
For the respondent  
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB) 
 
C. P. 1188/2010 
For the petitioner        :    Nemo 
For the respondent      :    N.R. 
 
C. Ps. No. 1363-L & 1013/2010 
For the petitioner 
: Nemo. 
 
For the respondent  
: N.R. 
 
C. P. No. 1749/2009 
For the petitioner 
: Mr. M. Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Naseer-ud-Din Khan, ASC 
 
For the respondent  
: N. R. 
 
C. P. 1548/2009 
For the petitioner 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB) 
 
For the respondent  
: Nemo. 
 
 
C. P. No. 226-L/2011 
For the petitioner 
: Dr. A. Basit, Sr. ASC 
 
For the respondent  
: N.R. 
  
 
C. P. No. 1936-L/2011 
For the petitioner 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
For the respondent  
: In person 
 
C. Ps. No. 1145-L, 1326-L/2009 & 2534-L/2009 
For the petitioner(s) 
: Nemo. 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
5 
 
For the respondent(s) : N.R. 
 
C. P. No. 629-L/2008 
For the petitioner 
: Nemo. 
 
For the respondent  
: N.R.  
 
C. P. No. 318/2008 
For the petitioner 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
For the respondent  
: Nemo. 
 
C. A. 483 & 484-L/2009 
For the appellant 
: Appellant No. 2 in person 
 
For respondent No.1 
 
Official respondents  
: 
 
: 
Nemo. 
 
Nemo. 
 
Crl. As. No. 101 & 102/2005 
For the appellant(s) 
: Mr. M. Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC 
Mr. Naseer-ud-Din Khan, ASC 
 
For the 
respondent(s)  
: Mr. K. K. Agha, PG (NAB) 
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Dy. PG (NAB) 
 
Crl. A. No. 86/2003 
For the appellant 
: Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, Sr. ASC 
 
For the respondent  
: Mr. K. K. Agha, PG (NAB) 
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Dy. PG (NAB) 
 
Crl. Ps. No.96 & 97/2003 
For the petitioner(s) 
: Mr. K. K. Agha, Prosecutor-General, NAB  
Mr. Fauzi Zafar, Additional Prosecutor-
General, NAB 
 
For the respondent  
 
: Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, Sr. ASC. 
 
Dates of hearing        :    21.05.2013 & 22.05.2013 
 
JUDGMENT  
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.: There 
are 
two 
features 
common to all these appeals and petitions for leave to appeal and 
they are, firstly, the persons affected have been proceeded against 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
6 
under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and, secondly, 
such persons claim not to be holders of any public office during 
the period relevant to the offences regarding which they have been 
proceeded against. These two common features in these appeals 
and petitions have given rise to a common question as to whether 
the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are 
applicable to a person who is not holder of a public office or not. 
Thus, before taking up these appeals and petitions for decision in 
terms of their individual factual and legal merits we have decided 
to resolve and answer the said common question in the first 
instance and have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for 
the parties regarding the said issue. 
 
2. 
Mr. Abid Hassan Minto, Sr. ASC appearing for the appellants 
in some of the appeals has submitted that a close examination of 
the provisions of section 9(a) of the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 shows that three categories of persons can be 
proceeded against by the National Accountability Bureau for the 
offences mentioned in that section and they are: 
(a) 
a person who is holder of a public office,  
(b) 
a person who aids and abets or conspires with 
holder of a public office, and 
(c) 
any other person who may not be holder of a 
public office and may have nothing to do with 
holder of a public office. 
He has taken us through different provisions of section 9(a)(i) to 
9(a)(xii) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 pointing 
out which provision relates to which of the categories of persons 
mentioned above. While Mr. Minto was making his submissions 
Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Sr. ASC interjected and maintained that there is 
also a fourth category of persons who have held a public office at 
some point of time and they are proceeded against for an offence 
under section 9(a) allegedly committed before and during the 
period of holding the public office and he has maintained that such 
persons cannot be proceeded against for an offence allegedly 
committed during the period when they were not holding any 
public office. Mr. Minto has acknowledged that there indeed exist 
some provisions of section 9(a) of the National Accountability 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
7 
Ordinance, 1999 whereunder any private person who may not be 
holder of a public office himself and who may have nothing to do 
with any holder of a public office may independently be proceeded 
against by the National Accountability Bureau if the offence 
committed by him affects the public at large. 
 
3. 
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh, Sr. ASC appearing for the 
appellants/petitioner in some of the appeals and a petition has 
argued that holder of a public office is a trustee and for dealing 
with the offence of corruption committed by such a person 
different laws have been framed in this country from time to time. 
He has argued that if a private person is also covered by such laws 
then an uncertainty is to creep in as to whether in a given case 
such private person ought to be tried under the normal laws of the 
land or under the special law generally meant for holders of public 
offices and in matters of penal laws any uncertainty is to be 
avoided. He has referred in this respect to the cases of Jamat-i-
Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, Secretary-General 
v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Law, Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs (PLD 2000 SC 111), In the matter of: 
Reference No. 2 of 2005 by the President of Pakistan (PLD 2005 SC 
873) and Jibendra Kishore Achharyya Chowdhry and 58 others v. 
The Province of East Pakistan and Secretary, Finance and Revenue 
(Revenue) Department, Government of East Pakistan (PLD 1957 SC 
(Pak.) 9). He has gone on to contend that any law which allows the 
authorities to pick and choose at their whims as to which person is 
to be proceeded against under which law is bad law. He has 
maintained that a law which is capable of discriminatory 
applicability is violative of the Fundamental Right guaranteed by 
Article 25 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
1973. Mr. Sheikh has referred in this regard to the cases of Inamur 
Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and others (1992 SCMR 563), Sh. 
Liaquat Hussain and others v. Federation of Pakistan through 
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, Islamabad and 
others (PLD 1999 SC 504) and Rauf Bakhsh Kadri v. The State 
and others (2003 MLD 777).  
 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
8 
4. 
Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, Sr. ASC appearing for some of the parties 
to these matters has contended that the words “any other person” 
appearing in different parts of section 9(a) of the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ought to be read as any person 
who has benefitted from a person holding a public office because 
beneficiaries from the offences committed by holders of public 
offices are covered by different provisions of section 9(a) and he has 
referred in this respect to the cases of Mir Munawar Ali Talpur v. 
State through Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Islamabad and 2 
others (PLD 2003 SC 46) and Vijant Kumar and 4 others v. State 
through Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, Islamabad and  others 
(PLD 2003 SC 56). He has maintained that the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is a very harsh and stringent law 
as there is no provision therein for bail, it allows freezing of 
properties, the sentences provided therein are high and excessive, 
remissions are not available to convicts, a conviction also entails 
disqualifications and transfer of property is not allowed even to 
those facing an investigation or trial and, therefore, such a law is 
to be interpreted quite strictly and beneficially towards a citizen.  
 
5. 
Mr. Wasim Sajjad, Sr. ASC appearing for the appellant in 
one of the appeals has argued that the accountability laws 
introduced in the country from time to time were meant to apply 
mainly to holders of public offices and the purpose invariably was 
to curb the menace of public sector corruption. According to him a 
“Holder of Public Office” has been defined in section 5(l) of the 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 quite elaborately and the 
words “holder of a public office or any other person” appearing in 
section 9(a) of the said Ordinance are to be treated as ejusdem 
generis. By referring to the Black’s Law Dictionary and 2nd Edition 
of Mr. S. M. Zafar’s book ‘Understanding Statutes’ he has 
elaborated that it is an established principle of interpretation of 
statutes that where general words follow an enumeration of 
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, 
such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, 
but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the 
same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. He has 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
9 
gone on to submit that if the intention of the legislature was to 
include every person within the scope of section 9(a) of the 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 then there was no need to 
refer to holder of a public office specifically in that section. Mr. 
Wasim Sajjad has also referred to Article 4 of the Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 to maintain that every 
citizen has an inalienable right to enjoy the protection of law and if 
the ordinary law of the land covers the allegations leveled against a 
private person then subjecting him to a harsher special law 
adversely affects his constitutional right under Article 4. He has 
also drawn our attention towards the National Accountability 
Bureau Ordinance, 1999 as introduced originally (published in 
PLD 2000 Central Statutes 57) and has pointed out that the 
originally introduced provisions of section 9(a)(i) to 9(a)(vii) were 
relevant only to holders of public offices and any other person who 
aided such holder of public office or who was a beneficiary of the 
corruption of such holder of public office. According to him 
subsequent widening of the net through amendments introduced 
in the main Ordinance was not in consonance with the spirit and 
scope of the original law. He has lastly pointed out that that the 
High Court of Sindh in the case of Abdul Aziz Memon v. The State 
(2003 YLR 617), the Lahore High Court in the case of Ch. Zulfiqar 
Ali v. Chairman, NAB and others (PLD 2003 Lahore 593) and the 
Peshawar High Court in the case of Haji Kabir Khan v. The State 
(2003 YLR 1607) have rendered divergent views regarding 
interpretation of the words “any other person” appearing in section 
9(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and, thus, 
there is a pressing need that the said words may be interpreted by 
this Court so that the prevalent ambiguity in that regard may be 
brought to an end.    
 
6. 
Mr. Sardar Muhammad Ghazi, Mr. Kamran Murtaza, Raja 
Bashir Ahmad and Dr. A. Basit, Sr. ASCs appearing in some of the 
appeals and petitions have adopted the arguments advanced by 
Mr. Muhammad Akram Sheikh and Mr. Wasim Sajjad and have 
maintained that a private person not holding a public office, other 
than a private person aiding or abetting or conspiring with holder 
of a public office or a beneficiary from holder of a public office, 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
10
cannot be proceeded against under the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999. Written synopses of their arguments have also 
been submitted before us by some of the learned counsel 
mentioned above. No other learned counsel has addressed 
arguments or submitted written synopsis in support of the 
submissions noted above. 
 
7. 
As against the arguments and submissions noted above Mr. 
K. K. Agha, the learned Prosecutor-General Accountability 
appearing for the National Accountability Bureau, has taken us 
through the legislative history of this country and the laws 
introduced from time to time concerning accountability of holders 
of public offices. He has particularly highlighted how different laws 
were amended or new laws were enacted extending the jurisdiction 
of the agencies established for curbing corruption not only in high 
public places but also in the public at large. According to him the 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 is a hybrid law in its 
present form and the same is now applicable not just to holder of a 
public office or a person aiding or abetting or conspiring with 
holder of a public office but also to any other person who is neither 
holder of a public office himself nor has anything to do with holder 
of a public office. He has extensively compared the provisions of 
the erstwhile Ehtesab Act, 1997 with the provisions of the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 to show how through the latter 
legislation the net has deliberately been spread wider even to cover 
large-scale corruption in the private sector and in the public at 
large. He has also extensively read out many portions of the 
judgment handed down by this Court in the case of Khan 
Asfandyar Wali and others v. Federation of Pakistan through 
Cabinet Division, Islamabad and others (PLD 2001 SC 607) to 
maintain that this Court has already recognized the enlarged scope 
of the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 
and that the question being debated before the Court already 
stands answered by this Court in that judgment. Referring to the 
judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Justice Khurshid 
Anwar Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another 
(PLD 2010 SC 483) he has submitted that while interpreting the 
words in a statute the ordinary meanings of the words are to be 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
11
the preferred option unless the context requires otherwise and, 
thus, the words “any other person” appearing in section 9(a) of the 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 ought to be understood to 
mean any other person not necessarily connected with holder of a 
public office. Mr. Agha has emphasised that different High Courts 
in the country have understood and applied the said words 
differently and, thus, this Court may clarify the correct legal 
position in this regard. As regards the submission made by some of 
the learned counsel mentioned above regarding the power of the 
Chairman, National Accountability Bureau to pick and choose 
cases for their handling under the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 
1999 
he 
has 
maintained 
that 
the 
National 
Accountability Bureau has a safe mechanism for deciding as to 
which case is to be handled by it and the decision of the Bureau in 
that regard is subject to judicial scrutiny, as held by the High 
Court of Sindh in the case of Rauf Bakhsh Kadri v. The State 
and others (2003 MLD 777). He has gone on to submit that this 
aspect of the jurisdiction of the National Accountability has already 
been examined by this Court in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali 
(supra) on the touchstone of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution and no violation of the Constitution had been 
found by this Court in that regard.   
 
8. 
Raja Muhammad Ibrahim Satti, Sr. ASC appearing for the 
respondents in an appeal and a petition has also traced the 
legislative history qua accountability in this country and has 
referred in this respect to the case of Federation of Pakistan and 
others v. M. Nawaz Khokhar and others (PLD 2000 SC 26). He has 
also made a reference to the case of Chaudhary Aamir Ali v. The 
State (2002 YLR 1902) wherein a view identical to that in the case 
of Ch. Zulfiqar Ali v. Chairman, NAB and others (PLD 2003 Lahore 
593) had been taken by the Lahore High Court on the issue being 
considered by this Court. 
 
9. 
After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and the 
learned Prosecutor-General Accountability and after going the 
relevant laws and provisions and attending to the precedent cases 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
12
cited before us we have found that the stance that a person can be 
proceeded against under the National Accountability Ordinance, 
1999 only if he is holder of a public office is clearly misconceived. 
It may be true that the accountability laws in this country 
introduced till the Ehtesab Act, 1997 were mainly directed against 
holders of public offices and persons aiding and abetting or 
conspiring with holders of public offices but at the same time it is 
equally true that, in the words of Mr. K. K. Agha, the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 had brought about a “sea change” 
by expanding the jurisdiction of the National Accountability 
Bureau far beyond holders of public offices and by covering 
corruption of high scale even in the public at large. For a proper 
understanding of this change a look at the legislative history in 
this field may be in order and fortunately the same has already 
been summed up by this Court in the case of Federation of 
Pakistan and others v. M. Nawaz Khokhar and others (PLD 2000 SC 
26) as follows: 
“Before we proceed to consider the above contentions of 
the learned counsel for the patties, it may be stated here that 
transparent, even-handed and across the board accountability of 
holders of all public offices, is the essence of Islamic polity and a 
democratic set-up. Presence of accountability process in a system 
of governance not only deter those who hold sway over the 
populace from misusing and abusing the power and authority 
entrusted to them but it also ensures principles of good 
governance. It would be pertinent at this stage to briefly refer to 
the legislative history of accountability laws in Pakistan. 
Soon after the establishment of State of' Pakistan, Public 
and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act, 1949 (PRODA) 
was passed by the Legislature which became effective from 15th 
August, 1947. This Act provided for debarring from public life for 
a suitable period of persons judicially found guilty of misconduct 
in any public office. It remained enforced until 21st September, 
1954 when it was repealed by Public and Representative Offices 
(Disqualification) (Repeal) Act, 1954. After the repeal of PRODA, 
there was no special law on the statute book dealing with the 
accountability of holders of public offices between the period from 
21st September, 1954 to 6th August, 1959. On 7th August, 1958 
while the country was under the Martial Law, Elective Bodies 
(Disqualification) Order, 1959 (President's Order No.13 of 1959) 
(EBDO) was promulgated which remained enforced only until 
31st December, 1960 (EBDO provided for disqualifications of 
certain categories of persons from being a member or a candidate 
for the membership of any elective body until 31st December, 
1966. EBDO was amended by P.O. No.7 of 1960 dated 10-2-1960; 
P.O. 9 of 1960 dated 5-3-1960; P.O. 27 of 1960 dated 28-11-1960 
and P.O. 29 of 1960 dated 27-11-1960. On 7th January, 1963, 
Elective 
Bodies 
Disqualification 
(Removal 
and 
Remission) 
Ordinance, 1963 was promulgated which authorised the 
President to reduce the period of disqualification of a person 
disqualified under EBDO. Once again, after expiry of EBDO on 
31st December, 1960, no special law existed on the subject of 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
13
accountability of holders of public offices until 8th of January, 
1977. On 9th January, 1977, Holders of Representative Offices 
(Prevention of Misconduct) Act IV of 1976 and Parliament and 
Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification from Membership) Act V of 
1976 were passed which provided for trial of offences of 
misconduct of holders of public offices before a Bench of the High 
Court consisting of not less than two Judges. On 13th November, 
1977 
Holders 
of 
Representative 
Offices 
(Punishment 
for 
Misconduct) Order (President's Post Proclamation) Order No.16 of 
1977 (P.P.P.0.16) and Parliament and Provincial Assemblies 
(Disqualification 
for 
Membership) 
Order 
(President's 
Post 
Proclamation Order 17 of 1977 (P.P.P.O. 17) were promulgated. 
P.P.P.Os. 16 and 17 of 1977, however, did not repeal Holders of 
Representative Offices (Prevention of Misconduct) Act, 1976 and 
Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for 
Membership) Act, 1976 with the result from 13-11-1977 onwards 
we had on the Statute Books Act IV of 1976, Act V of 1976, 
P.P.P.0.16 of 1977 and P.P.P.O. 17 of 1977, all dealing with 
punishment for misconduct and disqualification of the holders of 
public offices. Holders of Representative Offices (Prevention of 
Misconduct) Act, 1976 and Parliament and Provincial Assemblies 
(Disqualification for Membership) Act, 1976 were finally repealed 
by Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Disqualification for 
Membership) (Amendment) Act, 1991 which was assented to by 
the President on 28-4-1991. P.P.P.O. 16 of 1977 was amended 
through P.P.P.O. 5 of 1978 dated 17-1-1978 and President's 
Order I of 1981. Similarly, P.P.P.O. 17 was also amended by 
Ordinance IX of 1990 dated 15-10-1990 and Act V11 of 1991 
dated 28-4-1991.  
On 18th November, 1996, Ehtesab Ordinance CXI of 1996 
was promulgated which repealed P.P.P.O. 16 and P.P.P.O. 17 of 
1977. Ordinance CXI was amended by Ordinance CXXIII of 1996, 
Ordinance V11 of 1997 and Ordinance XI of 1997. Ordinance CXI 
amended as aforesaid was repealed and replaced by Ordinance 
XX of 1997. Ordinance XX was repealed by Act IX of 1997. Act IX 
of 1997 was amended through Ordinance II of 1998 on 4th 
February, 1998 but this Ordinance stood repealed on 3rd June, 
1998 as it was not passed by the Parliament. 
From the legislative history mentioned above, two 
conclusions clearly emerge. Firstly, the necessary for special 
legislation relating to accountability of holders of public offices 
has been recognised both by the Civilian as well as Military 
Governments. Secondly, except for two brief interludes, the 
special laws relating to accountability of holders of public offices 
remained in the field from 15th August, 1947 till today. 
At this stage, we may also mention that at least on two 
previous occasions, the justification for imposition of Martial Law 
and deviation from the Constitutional Rule in the country was 
sought to be justified on the plane of rampant corruption of the 
politicians. It is also not without significance that four previous 
elected Civilian Governments were also dismissed before 
completion of their tenure under the Constitution on allegations 
of corruption besides other allegations. In this backdrop, when 
the second Benazir Bhutto's elected Government was dismissed 
under Article 58(2)(b) of the Constitution in November, 1996, 
there was a public outcry for a severe accountability of the 
holders of public offices. The caretaker set-up which carne into 
existence as a result of dismissal of elected Government of 
Benazir Bhutto, therefore. promulgated Ehtesab Ordinance CXI of 
1996, which was later amended through Ordinance CXXIII, 
Ordinance VII and Ordinance XI, before it was repealed and 
replaced by Ordinance XX of 1997. Nawaz Sharif's Government 
which came into power as a result of general elections in the 
country held in February, 1997 promulgated the Act which 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
14
repealed Ordinance XX of 1997. In the light of the preceding 
discussion, we now proceed to consider the above contentions of 
the parties.” 
The “sea change” regarding spreading the net wider and enlarging 
the scope of the accountability law referred to by Mr. K. K. Agha in 
his submissions with reference to the Ehtesab Act, 1997 and the 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 already stands noticed 
and recognized by this Court in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali 
(supra) as it was observed by this Court in that case as under: 
“106. Mr. Minto submitted that while examining the vires of this 
law, the following provisions may be given deeper consideration: 
 
Section 5 (a)  wherein ‘accused’ has  been extensively defined; 
 
Section 5 (m) defines ‘holder of public office’, which has been 
gathered from all the previous statutes on the subject and 
thus the scope and purview of the process of accountability has 
been enlarged; 
 
Clause (iv) of section 5 (m) has brought all persons in the 
service of Pakistan within the purview of accountability, 
inasmuch as even the serving officers of the Armed Forces, 
who are employed in organizations other than the Armed 
Forces, have been included; 
 
Likewise in clause (vi) (ibid), all those persons have been 
included who have served in, resigned, retired, discharged or 
dismissed from the Armed Forces and thus only a limited 
class of persons employed in the Armed Forces, who are 
within the discipline of the Force concerned, have been 
excluded with a view to maintaining integrity in the institution 
inasmuch as public trial in such cases would not be in the 
interest of the Institution. Even otherwise, such persons are 
amenable to the discipline of the Force concerned: 
 
The word ‘person’ used in various provisions of this law is 
wide enough to cover any person and thus no body is 
being spared and across the board accountability is being 
conducted throughout the length and breadth of the 
country with no discrimination whatsoever, inasmuch as 
there is no political bias, no provincial bias.   
 
The impugned law is applicable to the politicians, 
bureaucrats and other persons, it is vast in its application 
and the exceptions are very exceptional and very limited; 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
157. 
The case of the Federation/respondents is that the NAB 
Ordinance does not suffer from any legal infirmity inasmuch as: 
-- 
It is a valid piece of legislation made and promulgated by 
the competent authority under the Chief Executive’s Order No. IX 
of 1999 dated 15.11.1999, as amended from time to time; 
-- 
The legislation has been duly acted upon and is being 
administered throughout the country inasmuch as numerous 
Accountability Courts have been established and Judges have 
been appointed to such courts in consultation with the Chief 
Justice of Pakistan. This ensures the independence of the courts 
and the judiciary in general. All these Courts are presided over by 
serving and retired District & Sessions Judges, who are under the 
direct supervisory control of the Chief Justices of the respective 
High Courts of the four Provinces; 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
15
-- 
The NAB Ordinance is a special law falling in the series 
seeking to combat the evil of high level corruption. For the first 
time, through the NAB Ordinance, members of hitherto an 
untouchable class of influential and powerful persons, not 
merely restricted to holders of public offices, but also 
including bankers, businessmen, industrialists, bureaucrats 
and other persons, who are involved in corruption and 
corrupt practices as defined in the NAB Ordinance, fall within 
the purview of accountability in an effective and coherent 
manner; 
The NAB Ordinance seeks to:  
(i) 
re-define 
certain 
offences 
and 
re-prescribe 
their 
punishments;  
(ii) provide for Special Courts and procedure for trial of specified 
offences;  
(iii) provide for special agency for pre-trial investigation/inquiry, 
namely, the National Accountability Bureau; 
-- 
One of the objectives of the NAB Ordinance is the retrieval 
of the looted public money. It also provides for ‘plea bargaining’, 
which appears for the first time in such a law in Pakistan and in 
consequence 1064.600 million rupees have been recovered during 
a short span; 
-- 
Up to 2.4.2001, 759 authorized investigations have been 
undertaken by the NAB out of which 143 have been completed 
while 586 are in progress and 30 have been closed or suspended.  
Similarly out of 261 filed in the Accountability Courts, 120 have 
been decided with 73 convictions and 16 acquittals. 46 ‘plea 
bargaining’ cases were concluded while 13 were rejected.  Only 36 
accused are in NAB custody for interrogation, 156 are in the 
judicial lock-ups, 56 have been released and 69 are at large; 
-- 
The NAB Ordinance was framed keeping in mind Articles 
175, 202 and 203 of the Constitution and the principles laid 
down in Mehram Ali’s case (supra); 
-- 
It does not create a new offence with retrospective effect, 
but an offence, which is in the nature of continuation of ‘wilful 
default’ after coming into force of the NAB Ordinance; 
-- 
Section 5(r) does not negate the freedom of trade, business 
and profession as contemplated in Article 18 of the Constitution.  
It merely seeks to penalize deliberate evaders of due payments to 
financial institutions. Prosecution of genuine cases where there 
are no deliberate and wilful evasions is abandoned within the 
contemplation of the NAB Ordinance;  
-- 
Section 5 (r), no doubt, is a constitutional deviation in 
view of the provisions of Article 12(2) of the Constitution, but on 
the ground of state survival and having regard to the objectives of 
the Chief Executive coupled with the law declared in the case of 
Syed Zafar Ali Shah (supra), no objection can be taken to section 
5 (r), particularly when adequate safeguards have been provided 
by making appropriate amendments in the Ordinance; 
-- 
Conciliation Committee has been established and no 
proceedings against the loan defaulters can be initiated by the 
NAB without the recommendation of the Governor, State Bank of 
Pakistan.  However, section 25-A requires to be further suitably 
amended so as to empower the Court of competent jurisdiction to 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
16
decide as to whether or not accept the agreement/conciliation 
reached between the parties; 
-- 
The NAB Ordinance does not contravene the provisions of 
Articles 23/24 of the Constitution, in that, freezing of property of 
the accused persons (ill-gotten properties) is merely an 
interlocutory measure; 
-- 
The vires of the NAB Ordinance cannot be tested on the 
touchstone of the Fundamental Rights, which stood suspended 
by the Proclamation of Emergency of 28th May 1998, which has 
been upheld by this Court in Syed Zafar Ali Shah’s case (supra); 
-- 
The burden of proof on accused is not an alien concept in 
jurisprudence. There are number of existing laws, which place the 
burden of proof on the accused and/or require an accused to 
rebut a statutory presumption. Such a course is not violative of 
the equality clause(s) of the Constitution; 
-- 
The choice of Court to which a reference is sent for 
trial is a matter of procedure and no body has a vested right 
to demand that his case be tried by a particular Court/Bench; 
-- 
The power conferred on Chairman NAB is not 
uncontrolled and his discretion is to be exercised judiciously 
having regard to the provisions of section 24A of the General 
Clauses Act, 1897, which require reasons to be recorded in 
writing for a deviation while passing any discretionary order;   
-- 
The provisions of the Ordinance are in conformity with the 
established principles of procedure for criminal proceedings; 
-- 
The nature of investigation and inquiry under the NAB 
Ordinance is of special kind, which entails inquiry and 
investigation into such offences, and in most cases requires 
tedious efforts including careful perusal of voluminous records of 
companies/banks, which cannot be completed overnight and 
therefore the period of 90 days for custody has been prescribed; 
-- 
The period of remand of 90 days is not violative of Article 
10(2) of the Constitution, in that, section 24 (d) requires 
production of the accused before an Accountability Court within 
24 hours of the arrest;   
-- 
Section 23 of the Ordinance, insofar as it prohibits transfer 
of any right, title, interest or creation of charge on property after 
Chairman NAB has initiated investigation into the offences under 
the NAB Ordinance, is an interlocutory measure, in that, it is not 
desirable that persons accused of such offences should frustrate 
the objects of law by creating third party rights in respect of 
illegally acquired property thereby creating hurdle in the objects of 
law; 
-- 
Power vesting in Chairman NAB under section 24 (a) of 
the NAB Ordinance to order arrest of the accused if not already 
arrested 
at 
any 
stage 
of 
the 
investigation, 
is 
neither 
discriminatory nor violative of Article 25 of the Constitution, in 
that, similar powers are conferred upon police officers under 
section 54 Cr.P.C.; 
-- 
As to the case of voluntary return, i.e. ‘plea bargaining’ 
under section 25, the provision stands amended by virtue of 
Amendment Ordinance No. XXIV of 2000 and now, by virtue of 
section 25 (a) (ii), after cognizance of the offence has been taken 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
17
by the Court or the trial has commenced, Chairman NAB may 
release the accused only with the approval of the Court; 
-- 
There is no restraint on freedom of contract, in that the 
powers earlier vesting in Chairman NAB under section 25 (e) & (g) 
have now been vested in the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan by 
virtue of the Amendment Ordinance No. XXIV of 2000, thus 
clause  (g) of section 25 does not suffer from excessive delegation; 
-- 
Section 32 (d) of the NAB Ordinance is subject to the 
Constitution and does not purport to oust the constitutional 
jurisdiction of the Courts; 
-- 
The Civil Servants Act, 1973 continues to apply to civil 
servants, who are deputed to or posted in the NAB.  Those, who 
are appointed directly, are distinct and separate category and 
class of persons and therefore no violation of Article 25 of the 
Constitution is caused; 
-- 
The mere fact that the Ehtesab Act, 1997 was competently 
and validly made and its vires were upheld by this Court does not 
curb the power of the Legislature to make a new law on the same 
subject; 
-- 
The NAB Ordinance is neither discriminatory nor un-Islamic 
and in any case, its vires cannot be examined on the touchstone of 
Article 2A of the Constitution; 
-- 
The method of appointment in respect of Chairman NAB is 
contained in section 6 (b) (I) and for other officers in section 28 
ibid. Provisions relating to transfer of cases qua the provincial 
courts within the territories of a Province and from one Province 
to another Province, do not suffer from excessive delegation; 
-- 
As regards special treatment to be meted out to women 
accused, the provisions of section 167 Cr.P.C. are applicable and 
the same have not been ousted;” 
(italics and bold letters have been supplied for emphasis) 
The above mentioned stands taken by the Federation of Pakistan 
had been accepted by this Court in the said case and the National 
Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999 (as the said Ordinance 
was titled at that time) had been declared by this Court to be a 
constitutionally valid piece of legislation. It had been observed and 
held by this Court as follows: 
“201. For the last several years there has been tremendous 
increase in allegations of massive corruption against divergent 
strata of the society. The necessity for creating the offence of 
`wilful default' arose because in the past the prosecution agency 
and other government agencies had not properly carried out their 
public duty to investigate the offences disclosed due to the alleged 
involvement of several persons holding high offices in the 
executive, public offices, etc. Indifferent/casual attitude of the 
concerned agencies to conduct and proceed with the investigation 
is understandable. This is, indeed, a grave situation. Supreme 
Court can take judicial notice of the fact that great loss of public 
revenue owing to enormous corruption and failure to recover the 
looted money through huge bank loan defaults pose a serious 
threat to economic life, financial stability, credit and security of 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
18
Pakistan including the unity and integrity of the nation. These are 
the circumstances in which the vires of the Ordinance are to be 
judged, which was promulgated for an expeditious and thorough 
probe into corruption and corrupt practices and holding 
accountable those accused of such practices, which had already 
been delayed for several decades. The validity of the impugned 
Ordinance is also to be judged keeping in view the extraordinary 
circumstances prevailing in the country and the adverse impact 
of lacking probity in the public life leading to highest degree of 
corruption. Such a situation has also adversely affected the 
foreign investment and funding from the International Monetary 
Fund as well as the World Bank who have warned that future aid 
to Pakistan shall be subject to the requisite steps being taken to 
eradicate corruption. If the pervading corruption in the society is 
permitted to continue unchecked it would lead to economic 
disaster. 
202. 
It was on 12th October, 1999, that the situation prevailing 
in the country in the sphere of economic debacle was recognised. 
The factors leading to the above situation on the ground, included 
the acts and omissions of persons who were the Members of 
the National and Provincial Assemblies, the Senate, the Civil 
Services, in business and/or working for gain in other 
disciplines in the country. 
203. 
In Syed Zafar Ali Shah and others v. General Pervez 
Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan and others (PLD 2000 SC 
869) Supreme Court took notice of the pleadings of the parties, 
and after considering the adverse effects of the inaction etc. of all 
concerned to collect the looted wealth of the country from those 
who were responsible therefor, it was observed that the action 
taken on 12-10-1999 was justifiable and that the speeches of the 
Chief' Executive dated 13-10-1999 and 17-10-1999 correctly spelt 
out the plan/scheme to be adhered to by him for the purposes of 
making recovery thereof: It was held that Chief Executive of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan is entitled, inter alia, to perform all 
such acts and promulgate all legislative measures as would 
establish or lead to the establishment of the declared objectives of 
the Chief Executive as spelt out in his speeches referred above. 
The Chief Executive in his speech dated 17-10-1999 clearly 
stated: 
 "Revival of economy is critical. Our economy is in 
deep trouble and revolutionary steps are needed to 
put it back on track. The Pakistani people were 
subjected to betrayal of their trust. Their hard-
earned money was frozen or taxed in violation of 
State commitment. We need to restore this trust.” 
………………………………… 
"The process of accountability is being directed 
especially towards those guilty of plundering 
and looting the national wealth and tax 
evaders. It is also directed towards loan 
defaulters and those who have had their loans 
rescheduled 
or 
condoned. 
The 
process 
of 
accountability will be transparent for the public to 
see. My advice to the guilty is to return voluntarily 
national wealth, bank loans and pay their taxes 
before the hand of law forces them to do so with 
penalty. As a last chance I urge all defaulters to 
come forth and settle their debts within a period of 
four weeks, after which their names will be 
published and the law will take its due course. 
They owe this to Pakistan and I expect their spirit 
of patriotism to guide them." 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
19
It was in the above backdrop that the Ordinance was 
promulgated and amendments made therein, subsequently. The 
plea that a person entering into contractual obligations before 
the promulgation of the impugned Ordinance cannot be made to 
suffer for his alleged failure to clear his said indebtedness under 
the impugned Ordinance and that too as an offence, loses all 
significance in the light of the above circumstances. It is not the 
case of any one that they have been willing to account for the ill-
gotten wealth and that it was not their inaction which has placed 
them in the predicament in which they find themselves today. The 
sources of amassing wealth by the specific individuals and 
juristic persons being what they are, they should not expect any 
lenient view in the cases, against them provided the action taken 
against them is not contrary to a valid piece of law. More so, when 
the efforts on behalf of Bureau in putting them under notice of 
30-days in terms of section 5(r) of the impugned Ordinance also 
fell on deaf ears. Viewed in this perspective, the transformation 
of the alleged civil action flowing out of the contractual 
obligations, into an "offence" under the impugned Ordinance, 
does not suffer from any flaw whatsoever. 
--------------------------------------------- 
208. 
Yet another factor, which is to be taken into consideration 
while judging the validity of the impugned Ordinance would be 
that one of the grounds on which validation and legitimacy was 
accorded to the present regime as stated in the case of Zafar Ali 
Shah (supra) was that the representatives of the people, who were 
responsible for running the affairs of the State were themselves 
accused of massive corruption and corrupt practices in the public 
as well as private spheres and were benefiting therefrom. They 
were resisting the establishment of good governance. There was a 
general perception that corruption was being practised by 
diversified strata including politicians, parliamentarians, 
public officials and ordinary citizens and there was no political 
and economic stability in the country. The bank loan defaults 
were rampant, in that, as per report of the Governor, State Bank 
of Pakistan, Rs. 356 billion were payable by the bank defaulters 
upto 
12.10.1999. 
There 
being 
no 
accountability 
and 
transparency, economic stability in the country was highly 
precarious and there was an overall economic slowdown as GDP 
growth during the past three years had hardly kept pace with the 
growth of population and that Pakistan has a debt burden which 
equals the country’s entire national income.” 
(bold letters have been supplied for emphasis) 
We have also found Mr. K. K. Agha to be quite justified in 
maintaining that the stand of the Federation of Pakistan that the 
provisions of the said Ordinance are applicable not just to holders 
of public offices and to persons who aid and abet or conspire with 
holders of public offices but also to any other person who may not 
be holder of any public office or connected with holder of a public 
office in any manner had been accepted by this Court in the said 
case. The issue raised before us through the present appeals and 
petitions, thus, already stands resolved by this Court in the above 
mentioned case.   
 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
20
10. 
We have observed that on different occasions different High 
Courts in the country have made an effort to understand and 
interpret the words “any other person” appearing in section 9(a) of 
the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and some times they 
have reached conclusions which are divergent and at variance. On 
01.02.2001 a learned Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court 
held in the case of Haji Kabir Khan v. The State (2003 YLR 1607) as 
follows: 
“12. 
Haji Kabir Khan remained a member of the Parliament 
from 1993 to 1999. Apart from this, he had not held public office 
in any other period. Though there is a controversy regarding the 
dates on which some of the properties were acquired but the 
admitted position is that the list of the properties for which Haji 
Kabir Khan was charged, and which were found by the trial Court 
to be the assets of Haji Kabir Khan, included properties acquired 
by him prior to the year 1993. The question thus arose as 
whether such properties would fall within the scope of NAB 
Ordinance and the accused prosecuted for them. The argument of 
the defence was that since the properties were acquired before 
Haji Kabir Khan held a public office, he could not be tried for 
these acquisitions under the Ordinance. The learned Prosecutor 
however submitted that as the Ordinance has come into force 
from 1-1-1985, all properties acquired by the appellant since that 
date shall be treated as the appellant's assets for the purpose of 
the offence under section 9(a)(v) of the Ordinance.  
13. 
The charge framed in this case stated that the accused 
was being tried for “the properties acquired during the period 
1988 to 1999, which included his tenure as holder of public office 
at National Assembly". Thus, the trial of the accused was also for 
the assets acquired by him during the period of five years in 
which he did not hold any public office. The learned Prosecutor 
relied upon the definition of "holder of public office" given in 
section 5(1)(ii) of the Ordinance which not only includes a person 
who is, but who has been, a member of Parliament. By this 
definition the present as well as past member of Parliament have 
been termed as holders of public office. Though past members of 
Parliament can be tried under the Ordinance, the definition by no 
means can be stretched retrospectively so as to make an accused 
accountable for acts done by him prior to his becoming a member 
of Parliament. Again by section 2 the Ordinance has been given 
retrospective effect from 1-1-1985. By this retrospectively no 
doubt persons who have held public office since the commencing 
date of the Ordinance can be tried thereunder. It does not 
however mean that the holder of public office can be tried under 
the Ordinance for acts, though committed after 1-1-1985, but 
during the period when he did not hold any public office. To hold 
otherwise would be going against the very object of the Ordinance 
as stated in the preamble, that is, "to provide for effective 
measures for the detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy 
disposal of cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, 
misuse/abuse of power, misappropriation of property, kick-
backs, commissions and for matters connected and ancillary or 
incidental thereto". The corruption, corrupt practices and misuse 
of power obviously must relate to the periods during which a 
person is in a position as a holder of public office to misuse this 
office for private gains. If wealth is acquired by illegal means at a 
time when the accused did not hold a public office, it may 
constitute an offence under some other law but not under the 
NAB Ordinance.  
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
21
14. 
The principle laid down in the unreported judgment of this 
Court in Syed Zahir Shah v. The State (Ehtesab Appeal No.5 of 
2000, decided on 2-1-2001) is not relevant for resolving the 
present controversy. In that case the question was, whether the 
appellant, who was a civil servant, could be charged and tried for 
properties and assets acquired by him prior to 1-1-1985, the date 
on which the NAB Ordinance came into force. The question was 
answered in the positive and it was held that the appellant could 
be made accountable under the Ordinance for accumulation of 
wealth illegally prior to the commencing date during his tenure as 
civil servant. The question before the Court there was not whether 
the appellant could be tried for properties or assets acquired by 
him before he was inducted in the civil services but whether he 
could be tried for assets acquired by him prior to 1-1-1985, but 
during his holding of public office.  
15. 
We therefore hold that Haji Kabir Khan could not have 
been tried for properties or assets acquired by him before he was 
elected member of Parliament. Such properties were therefore 
wrongfully included in the charge framed by the trial Court. The, 
charge was therefore defective.” 
Subsequently on 08.06.2002 a learned Division Bench of the 
Lahore High Court had held in the case of Chaudhary Aamir Ali v. 
The State (2002 YLR 1902) as under: 
“9. 
There is weight in the submission made by the learned 
Law Officer that not only holder of a public office but also "any 
other person" can be tried for the offence of corruption and 
corrupt practices under section 9 of the Ordinance. This is clear 
from the plain reading of section 9 of the Ordinance. Therefore, 
the prosecution need not establish any nexus with the exercise of 
powers by the appellant as Mayor of the Corporation and 
acquisition of the disputed properties by him. He can be tried in 
his position as an ordinary person and be held guilty of the 
offence of corruption and corrupt practices. -------” 
Later on a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh had 
attended to this issue in the case of Abdul Aziz Memon v. The State 
(2003 YLR 617) and in its judgment dated 06.11.2002 it had 
concluded as follows: 
“A perusal of the first para. of preamble shows that it 
envisages setting-up of National Accountability Bureau so as to 
eradicate corruption and corrupt practices and to hold 
accountable all those persons accused of such practices and 
matter ancillary thereto. In this para. the purpose of setting-up of 
National Accountability Bureau has been given very vividly which 
is to "hold accountable all those persons accused of such 
practices and matters ancillary thereto". Thus, the purpose of 
setting up of National Accountability Bureau is not confined to 
eradication of corruption committed by the holders of public 
offices only but to hold accountable to all those persons who are 
found involved in corruption. Again in section 4 of the NAB 
Ordinance, dealing with the application of said Ordinance, it is 
provided that, "it extends to whole of Pakistan and shall apply to 
all persons in Pakistan". Again it is stated by the Legislature in 
very clear and unambiguous terms that the NAB Ordinance 
extends to all persons in Pakistan. Thus, no section or group of 
persons or individuals has been excluded from the applicability of 
the NAB Ordinance. Section 5 of the NAB Ordinance contains the 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
22
definitions in clause (a) of section 5, the term "accused" has been 
defined to include a person in respect of whom there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that he is or has been involved in 
the commission of any offence triable under the Ordinance. Here 
again the term "accused" is not confined to the holder of public 
office only. In clause (c) of section 5, the expression "assets" has 
been defined to mean any property owned, controlled by or 
belonging to any accused whether directly or indirectly or held 
benami in the name of his spouse or relatives or associates, 
whether within or outside Pakistan, for which they cannot 
reasonably account for, or for which they account prove payment 
of full and lawful consideration". In this definition also the 
properties owned, controlled by or belonging to any accused, his 
spouse or relatives or the associates are required to be reasonably 
accounted for and the burden of giving reasonable account and to 
prove the payment of full and lawful consideration is on all those 
persons and the accountability is not restricted to the holder of 
public office only. Here it is pertinent to note that the terms 
"assets" has been defined with the expression "means" while the 
expression "accused" has been defend with the word "include". 
Thus, the definition of the term "assets" is conclusive while the 
definition of term "accused" is inclusive and thus, the definition of 
term "accused" is wider in its import. In clause (d) of section 5, 
the expression "associates" has been defined. In this definition 
any individual who is or has been managing the affairs or keeping 
accounts of the accused has been included. An association of 
persons, body of individuals, partnership firms and private 
limited companies are also included in which such a person is or 
has been a member, partner or director or which have been 
promoted, floated, established or run by the same group of 
persons. It also includes any Trustee of a private Trust or any 
person who ostensibly holds or is in possession of any property of 
an accused on his behalf for the benefit and enjoyment of the 
accused. Clause (m) of section 5, contains the definition of holder 
of public office. 
Mr. Khalid Anwar learned counsel for the appellants, has 
conceded that the appellant Abdul Aziz Memon was holder of 
public office as an MNA in between the years 1993 and 1996, 
therefore, no discussion is required in respect of this definition. 
Clause (r) of section 5 contains the definition of willful default and 
a bare reading of this provision shows that this particular 
provision is applicable to the persons other than holders of public 
offices as well. Clause (n) of section 5 contains the definition of 
offence. According to this definition the offence for the purpose of 
NAB Ordinance means offence of corruption and corrupt practices 
as defined in the NAB Ordinance and includes the offences as 
specified in the Schedule to the NAB Ordinance. This provision is 
to be read with section 9 of the NAB Ordinance, which defines the 
expression "corruption and corrupt practices". Various acts and 
omissions have been enumerated in paras. (i) to (ix). It provides 
that, a holder of public office, or any other person (emphasis 
provided by us), is said to commit or to have committed the 
offence of corruption and corrupt practices, if the acts and 
omissions specified in paras. (i) to (ix) of clause (a) of section 9 are 
committed. It includes para. 5, which is relevant in this case. If 
the opening sentence of section 9(a) of the NAB Ordinance is read 
with para. (v) it reads as follows:-- 
"A holder of public office, or any other person, is 
said to commit or to have committed the offence of 
corruption and corrupt practices, if he or any of his 
dependents or Benamidars owns, possesses, or has 
acquired right or title in any movable or immovable 
property or pecuniary resources disproportionate 
to his known sources of income, which he cannot 
reasonably account for." 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
23
The word 'he' used in para. 5 above, is a reference to holder of 
public office as well as any other person. Thus, the act specified 
in section 9(a)(v) is not confined to holder of public office only but 
is extended to any other person as well. Section 20 of the N.A.B. 
Ordinance, is also pertinent in this behalf. For the sake of 
convenience, the section 20 of NAB Ordinance is reproduced 
below:--  
"20. Reporting of suspicious financial transactions. 
---(a)  Notwithstanding anything contained in any 
law for the time being in force, it shall be the duty 
of all banks and financial institutions to take 
prompt and immediate notice of all unusual or 
large transactions in an account, which have no 
apparently genuine, economic or lawful purpose 
and upon bona fide professional judgment of the 
Bank 
or 
financial 
institution, 
that 
such 
transactions could constitute or be related to illegal 
or illicit activities, corruption or corrupt practices, 
the manager or director of such Bank or financial 
institution shall report all such transactions to the 
Chairman, NAB forthwith by the quickest possible 
mode of communication to be confirmed in 
writing.  
 
(b) 
Whoever fails to supply the information in 
accordance with subsection (a) shall be punishable 
with rigorous imprisonment, which may extend to 
5 years, or with fine, or with both.  
 
(c) 
Where there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the assets of a person or any part 
thereof were acquired through corruption or 
corrupt practices, and there was no other likely 
source of acquiring such assets or part thereof, it 
shall be presumed, unless proved to the contrary 
by the accused person, that such assets or part 
thereof were acquired, generated or obtained 
through corruption and corrupt practices." 
A perusal of the above section shows that it starts with the 
non obstante clause and is comprehensive so as to include every 
bank account without any exception. It is not confined to the 
bank accounts of the holders of public offices only. It enjoins 
upon the Manager of Bank or Director of a financial institution 
about all the transactions by any account holder constituting or 
relating to illegal or illicit activities, corruption or corrupt 
practices. Clause (c) of section 20 also speaks of an assets of 'a 
person' acquired through corruption or corrupt practices and 
provides that if no other likely source of acquiring such assets or 
part thereof is furnished there shall be a presumption unless 
proved to the contrary by the accused persons that such assets or 
part thereof are acquired/generated through corruption and 
corrupt practices. Thus, the provisions contained in section 20 of 
the NAB Ordinance are also leading to the conclusion that the 
scope and applicability of the NAB Ordinance is not confined to 
the holders of public offices only.  
Consequent to the above discussion, we are persuaded to 
agree with the contention of Mr. S. M. Zafar, that the scope of 
NAB Ordinance is wider in terms and is applicable to all citizens 
of Pakistan and all persons including the holders of public offices. 
The result is that, the appellants are accountable for acquiring 
the assets from the year 1985 till the year 1996, the period for 
which they were tried.” 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
24
Still later a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court 
decided the case of Ch. Zulfiqar Ali v. Chairman, NAB and others 
(PLD 2003 Lahore 593) on 12.05.2003 and after a detailed analysis 
of the relevant statutory provisions and the precedent cases 
available till then it held as under:  
“11.  
The questions which have cropped up for consideration in 
these petitions are as under:-- 
(i) 
------------------------------------ 
(ii) 
Whether a 'person' other than holder of a public office can 
be tried under the NAB Ordinance for any act which falls within 
the mischief of the said Ordinance? 
(iii) 
Can the holder of a public office being tried for an act 
committed when he held the said office, be tried alongwith the 
afore-referred act for an offence relatable to a period when he did 
not hold the office? 
(iv) 
------------------------------------ 
Reply to Question (ii).--Whether A "PERSON" other than holder of 
a public office can be tried under the NAB Ordinance for any act 
which falls within the mischief of the said Ordinance? 
13.  
This is the foundational question so far as the ambit and 
scope of the law under which the petitioners are being tried, is 
concerned. To appreciate the import of the expression "a holder of 
a public office or any other person (section 9) it is essential to 
examine the context in which it has been used i.e. the Pre-amble 
of the enactment, its various provisions and the mischief it 
sought to remedy. The preamble of the National Accountability 
Bureau Ordinance XVIII of 1999 declared the objective of the 
enactment as under:-- 
"An Ordinance to provide for the setting up of a 
National Accountability Bureau so as to eradicate 
corruption 
and 
corrupt 
practices 
and 
hold 
accountable all those persons accused of such 
practices and matters ancillary. 
Whereas it is expedient and necessary to provide 
for 
effective 
measures 
for 
the 
detection, 
investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of 
cases 
involving 
corruption, 
corrupt 
practices 
misuse 
or 
abuse 
of 
power 
or 
authority, 
misappropriation of property, taking of kickbacks, 
commissions and for matters connected and 
ancillary or incidental thereto. 
And whereas there is an emergent need for the 
recovery of outstanding amounts from those 
persons who have committed default in the 
repayment 
of 
amounts 
to 
Banks, 
Financial 
Institutions, Governmental agencies and other 
agencies. 
And whereas there is a grave and urgent need for 
the recovery of State money and other assets from 
those persons who have misappropriated or 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
25
removed such money or assets through corruption, 
corrupt 
practices 
and 
misuse 
of 
power 
or 
authority. 
And whereas there is an urgent need to educate 
the society about the causes and effects of 
corruption and corrupt practices and to implement 
policies and procedure for the prevention of 
corruption in the society. 
And whereas there is an increased international 
awareness that nations should co-operate in 
combating corruption and seek, obtain or give 
mutual legal assistance in matters concerning 
corruption and for matter connected, ancillary or 
incidental thereto." 
 Section 4 of the Ordinance provides:-- 
"It extends to the whole of Pakistan and shall apply 
to all persons in Pakistan, all citizens of Pakistan 
and persons who are or have been in the service of 
Pakistan wherever they may be, including areas 
which are part of Federally and Provincially 
Administered Tribal Areas". (Underlining is our).  
Section 5(a) defines the accused in the following:-- 
"Accused" shall include a person in respect of 
whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that 
he is or has been involved in the commission of 
any offence triable under this Ordinance or is 
subject of an investigation or inquiry by the 
National Accountability Bureau, or any other 
agency authorized by the National Accountability 
Bureau in this regard under this Ordinance." 
(Underlining is ours). 
Section 5(o) stipulates as under:-- 
" 'Person' unless the context otherwise so requires, 
includes in the case of a company or a body 
corporate, 
the 
sponsors, 
Chairman, 
Chief 
Executive, Managing Director, elected Directors, by 
whatever name called, and guarantors of the 
company or body corporate or anyone exercising 
direction or control of the affairs of such company 
or corporate body, and in the case of any firm, 
partnership or sole proprietorship, the partners, 
proprietor or any person having any interest in the 
said firm, partnership or proprietorship concern or 
direction or control thereof" 
Section 9 further spells out the scope of the enactment, those 
who can be tried and lists the offences. It stipulates as under:-- 
"9. 
Corruption and corrupt practices.--(a) A 
holder of a public office, or any other person, is 
said to commit or to have committed the offence of 
corruption and corrupt practices-- 
(i) 
if he accepts or obtains from any person or 
offers any gratification directly or indirectly, other 
than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward 
such as is specified in section 161 of the Pakistan 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
26
Penal Code 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) for doing or for 
bearing to do any official act, or for showing or for 
bearing to show, in the exercise his official 
functions, favour or disfavour to any person, or for 
rendering or attempting to render any service or 
disservice to any person; or 
(ii) 
if he accepts or obtains or offers any 
valuable thing without consideration, or for a 
consideration which he knows to be inadequate, 
from any person whom he knows to have been, or 
likely to be, concerned in any proceedings or 
business transacted or about to be transacted by 
him, or having connection with his official 
functions or from any person whom he knows to be 
interested in or related to the person so concerned; 
or 
(iii) 
if 
he 
dishonestly 
or 
fraudulently 
misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own 
use, or for the use of any other person, any 
property entrusted to him, or under his control, or 
wilfully allows any other person so to do; or 
(iv)  
if he by corrupt, dishonest, or illegal means, 
obtains or seeks to obtain for himself, or for his 
spouse or dependents or any other person, any 
property, valuable thing, or pecuniary advantage; 
or 
(v)  
if 
he 
or 
any of 
his 
dependents 
or 
Benamidars owns, possesses, or has acquired right 
or title in any assets or holds irrevocable power of 
attorney in respect of any assets or pecuniary 
resources disproportionate to his known source of 
income, which he cannot reasonably account for or 
maintained his standard of living beyond that 
which is commensurate with his source of income; 
or 
(vi) 
if he misuses his authority so as to gain 
any benefit or favour for himself or any other 
person, or renders or attempts to render or wilfully 
fails to exercise his authority to prevent the grant, 
or rendition of any undue benefit or favour which 
he could have prevented by exercising his 
authority; or 
(vii) 
if he issued any directive, policy, or any 
S.R.O. (Statutory Regulatory Order) or any other 
order which grants or attempts to grant any undue 
concession or benefit in any taxation matter or law 
or otherwise so as to benefit himself or any relative 
or associate or a benamidar or any other person; or 
(viii) 
if he commits an offence of wilful default; or 
(ix) 
if he commits the offence of cheating as 
defined in section 415 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 
1860 (Act XLV of 1860), and thereby dishonestly 
induces members of the public at large to deliver 
any property including money or valuable security 
to any person; or 
(x) 
if he commits the offence of criminal breach 
of trust as defined in section 405 of the Pakistan 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
27
Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 1860) with regard to 
any property including money or valuable security 
entrusted to him by members of the public at 
large; 
(xi) 
if he, in his capacity as a banker, 
merchant, 
factor, 
broker, 
attorney 
or 
agent 
commits any breach of trust as provided in section 
409 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (Act XLV of 
1860) in respect of property entrusted to him or 
over which he has dominion; and if he aids, 
assists, abets, attempts or acts in capacity with a 
person or a holder of public office accused of an 
offence as provided in clauses (i) to (xi).  
(b) 
All offences under this Ordinance shall be 
non-bailable 
and, 
notwithstanding 
anything 
contained in section 426, 491, 497, 498 and 561-A 
or any other provision of the Code, or any other 
law for the time being in force no Court shall have 
jurisdiction to grant bail to any person accused of 
any offence under this Ordinance. 
(c) 
If after completing the investigation of an 
offence against holder of public office or any other 
person, the Chairman is satisfied that no prima 
facie case is made out against him and the case 
may be closed, the Chairman NAB shall refer the 
matter to a Court for approval and for the release 
of the accused, if in custody."  
In the ordinary use, the word "or" is disjunctive that marks an 
alternative which generally corresponds to the word "either" 
(Crawford's Interpretation of Laws). The word "person" has been 
used in the general sense and includes every person. It is one of 
the fundamental rules of Construction that the general words 
should be given a general construction unless the statute in some 
manner reveals that the legislative intent was otherwise. We have 
not been able to find any contrary intent after going through 
various provisions of Ordinance referred to in the preceding 
paragraphs. A close examination of section 9, reproduced above 
would show that with reference to subject-matter there are three 
kinds of offences. Those kinds are as under:--  
(i) 
Offences which are holder of public office 
specific; 
(ii)  
offences which are committed by the holder 
of a public office along with any other person and 
in which the latter are also liable, 
(iii)  
offences committed by person who do not 
hold any public office. 
14. 
The arguments of the petitioner's learned counsel that the 
"person" used in section 9, only refers to a person who abets, the 
offence with a holder of public office, is not tenable as the offence 
of abetment has been separately dealt with in clause (xii) of 
section 9. 
 15. 
Even in section 10 of the NAB Ordinance which relates to 
punishments, "the holder of public office" and "person" have been 
separately described. It reads as under:--  
10. 
Punishment 
for 
corruption 
and 
corrupt 
practices: 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
28
(a)  
A holder of public office or any other person 
who commits the offence of corruption and corrupt 
practices shall be punishable with rigorous 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 
years and with fine and such of the assets and 
pecuniary resources of such holder of public office 
or person, as are found to be disproportionate to 
the known sources of his income or which are 
acquired by money obtained through corruption 
and corrupt practices whether in his name or in 
the name of any of his dependents, or benamidars 
shall be forfeited to the appropriate Government or 
the concerned bank or financial institution as the 
case may be. (Underlining is ours). 
Similarly, the legislative intent of making it applicable to all 
persons is clear from a reading of section 20 of the Ordinance. 
16. 
Precisely, this question came up for consideration before a 
learned Division Bench of this Court in an unreported Ehtesab 
Criminal Appeal No.753 of 2001 (Ch. Amir Sher Ali v. The State) 
and it was held as under:-- 
"There is weight in the submission made by the 
learned Law Officer that not only holder of a public 
office but also "any other person" can be tried for 
the offence of corruption and corrupt practices 
under section 9 of the Ordinance. This is clear 
from the plain reading of section 9 of the 
Ordinance. Therefore, the prosecution need not 
establish any nexus with the exercise or powers by 
the appellants as Mayor of the Corporation and 
acquisition of the disputed properties by him. He 
can be tried in his position as an ordinary person 
and be held guilty of the offence of corruption and 
corrupt practices." 
A Division Bench, of Sindh High Court Karachi in an unreported 
Ehtesab Appeal No.58 of 2002 (Abdul Aziz Memon v. The State) 
held as under:-- 
"Thus the purpose of setting up of National 
Accountability 
Bureau 
is 
not 
confined 
to 
eradication of corruption committed by the holders 
of public offices only but to hold accountable to all 
those 
persons 
who 
are 
found 
involved 
in 
corruption. Again in section 4 of the NAB 
Ordinance, dealing with the application of said 
Ordinance, it is provided that, it extends to whole 
of Pakistan and shall apply to all persons in 
Pakistan. Again it is stated by the legislature in 
very clear and unambiguous terms that the NAB 
Ordinance extends to all persons in Pakistan. 
Thus, no section or group of persons or individuals 
have been excluded from the applicability of the 
NAB Ordinance."  
In an unreported judgment of the Peshawar High Court in 
Ehtesab Criminal Appeal No.5 of 2001 (Haji Kabeer Khan v. The 
State) copy of which was placed before us, a contrary view has 
been taken. The operative part of the judgments is para 13 
wherein the learned Bench held as under:-- 
"... ....Though past member of Parliament can be 
tried under the Ordinance, the definition by no 
means can be stretched retrospectively so as to 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
29
make an accused accountable for acts done by him 
prior to his becoming a member of Parliament. 
Again by section 2 the Ordinance has been given 
retrospective 
effect 
from 
1-1-1985. 
By 
this 
retrospectively no doubt persons who have held 
public office since the commencing date of the 
Ordinance can be tried thereunder. It does not 
however mean that the holder of public office can 
be tried under the Ordinance for acts, though 
committed after 1-1-1985, but during the period 
when he did not hold any public office. To hold 
otherwise would be going against the very subject 
of the Ordinance as stated in the Preamble that is, 
to provide for effective measures for the detection, 
investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of 
cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, 
misuse/abuse 
of 
power, 
misappropriation 
of 
property, kickbacks, commissions and for matters 
connected and ancillary or incidental thereto. The 
corruption, corrupt practices and misuse of power 
obviously must relate to the periods during which 
a person is in a position as a holder of public office 
to misuse his office for private gains. If wealth is 
acquired by illegal means at a time when the 
accused did not hold a public office, it may 
constitute an offence under some other law but not 
under the NAB Ordinance." 
Having held so, the case was remanded to the trial Court for a re-
trial in terms of the observations made. This judgment was 
challenged before the august Supreme Court in Criminal Petitions 
Nos. 54, 55, and 96 of 2002. The august Supreme Court allowed 
the appeal in terms of an agreement between learned counsel for 
the appellant and the NAB. The operative part of the order reads 
as under:-- 
"Grievance as canvassed by both the learned 
counsel for the petitioner Mr. Abid Hasan Minto, 
Advocate 
Supreme 
Court 
as 
well 
as 
Mr. 
Muhammad Afzal Siddiqui, Advocate Supreme 
Court for NAB was that sufficient material existed 
before the High Court to resolve the controversy 
instead of remanding the case to the trial Court. 
The contention raised by both the learned counsel 
has force, because we feel that no ground existed 
for re-trial, inasmuch as, inadmissible evidence 
could have been bifurcated from the admissible 
evidence, and thus the High Court itself ought to 
have decided the question of guilt or innocence of 
the petitioner in the light of admissible evidence. 
Accordingly, we convert these petitions into appeal 
and allow the same with direction that High Court 
shall decide the appeal on the basis of admissible 
evidence with regard to properties, which the 
petitioner had allegedly procured after 1993." 
17. 
We are bound by the law declared by the august Supreme 
Court. However, it is a settled principle of law that a judgment 
rendered on concession given by a counsel is not a law declared. 
The Supreme Court of India was called upon to decide a similar 
issue in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur (AIR 
1989 Supreme Court 38) and it held as under:-- 
"It is axiomatic that when a direction or order is 
made by consent of the parties, the Court does not 
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties nor lay 
down any principle. Quotability as 'Law' applies to 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
30
the principle of a case, its ratio decidendi. The only 
thing in a Judge's decision binding as an authority 
upon a subsequent Judges is the principle upon 
which the case was decided. Statements which are 
not 
the 
part 
of 
the 
ratio 
decidendi 
are 
distinguished 
as 
obiter 
dicta 
and 
are 
not 
authoritative. The task of finding the principle is 
fraught 
with 
difficulty 
because 
without 
an 
investigation into the facts, it could not be 
assumed whether a similar direction must or ought 
to be made as a measure of social justice. 
Precedents sub silentio and without argument are 
of no moment. This rule has ever since been 
followed. One of the chief reasons for the doctrine 
of precedent is that a matter that has once been 
fully argued and decided should not be allowed to 
be re-opened. The weight accorded to dicta varies 
with the type of dictum. Mere casual expressions 
carry no weight at all. Not every passing expression 
of a Judge, however eminent, can be treated as an 
ex cathedra statement, having the weight of 
authority."  
As reflected in the operative part of the judgment of the Hon'ble 
Supreme Court reproduced in the earlier part of this para, 
learned counsel for the NAB had conceded for remanding the 
case. That judgment, therefore, cannot be classified as declaring a 
law. The judgment of the Peshawar High Court, therefore, shall 
have to be examined on its own merit. With utmost humility and 
respect for the Court, we have not been able to persuade 
ourselves to agree with the view expressed therein for following 
reasons:--  
(i) The Court was persuaded to render the 
judgment solely with reference to a portion of the 
preamble. It did not appreciate that the expression 
'corruption, 
corrupt 
practices' 
used 
in 
the 
preamble stand defined and exemplified in section 
9 of the NAB Ordinance and it includes criminal 
acts which may be committed by any other person 
as well;  
(ii) 
the learned Court did not take note of the 
fact that the word 'person' (section 9) has been 
used in the general sense and it includes every 
person; 
(iii) 
the import of section 3, 4, 5, 10, and 20 of 
the NAB Ordinance escaped the attention of the 
Court. The legislative intent and the meaning of 
the word 'person' could not have been appreciated 
without a careful glance at these provisions. 
Reply to Question No. (iii).---Can the holder of a public office 
being tried for an act committed when he held the said office, be 
tried alongwith the afore-referred act for an offence relatable to a 
period when he did not hold the office? 
18. 
In view of answer to Question No. 2 above we hold that the 
holder of a public office can be tried alongwith an offence which 
may have been committed when he was not holder of a public 
office as there is no bar in any law and an ordinary person can be 
tried under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999.” 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
31
We note that the case of Haji Kabir Khan v. The State (2003 YLR 
1607) decided by the Peshawar High Court was the only case 
which struck a note different from that of the Lahore High Court 
and the High Court of Sindh but we further note that the said 
judgment of the Peshawar High Court had been set aside by this 
Court through appeals arising out of Criminal Petitions No. 54, 55 
and 96 of 2002 and the matter was remanded to the Peshawar 
High Court with consent of the parties for deciding the convict’s 
appeal afresh on the merits of the case. After setting aside of that 
judgment of the Peshawar High Court by this Court what remains 
in the field is complete harmony on the issue as far as the Lahore 
High Court and the High Court of Sindh are concerned. 
 
11. 
As has been noticed above, the Lahore High Court and the 
High Court of Sindh agree that the words “any other person” 
appearing in section 9(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 
1999 show that any person not holding any public office and not 
aiding and abetting or conspiring with any holder of a public office 
can also be proceeded against under the said Ordinance and this 
Court has also made observations to that effect in the judgments 
referred to earlier on. The reasons for handing down such an 
interpretation 
of 
those 
words 
appearing 
in 
the 
National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are not difficult to explain or 
understand and although some reasons for holding so have 
already been recorded in the afore-referred judgments of the 
Lahore High Court and the High Court of Sindh in some detail, 
which reasons we endorse, yet we may also briefly allude to some 
other reasons in support of the same conclusion so that the issue 
in this respect is clinched and the controversy is set at rest. 
 
12. 
None of the learned counsel appearing before us has 
challenged the constitutionality and legal validity of the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999, and rightly so, as the same 
already stands accepted and established through the judgment of 
this Court handed down in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali 
(supra). It also cannot be denied that there is a marked difference 
between the Ehtesab Act, 1997 and the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 vis-à-vis the canvas and the scope of their 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
32
applicability and Mr. K. K. Agha is spot on when he maintains that 
a necessity of enacting a new piece of legislation arises only where 
the old law is found incapable of catering for a totally new 
approach because otherwise an amendment of the old law can 
serve the purpose. The Preamble to the Ehtesab Act, 1997 
manifested that the said law had been enacted only “for 
eradication of corruption and corrupt practices from the public 
offices” whereas the Preamble to the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 does not even mention “public offices” and 
instead it states the objects to be achieved as to eradicate 
corruption and corrupt practices and hold accountable all those 
persons accused of such practices; to provide for effective 
measures for the detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy 
disposal of cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, misuse or 
abuse of power or authority, misappropriation of property, taking 
of kickbacks,  commissions; recovery of outstanding amounts from 
those persons who have committed default in the repayment of 
amounts to banks, financial institutions, governmental agencies 
and other agencies; recovery of state money and other assets from 
those persons who have misappropriated or removed such money 
or assets through corruption, corrupt practices and misuse of 
power or authority; to seek, obtain or give mutual legal assistance 
internationally in matters concerning corruption; and to educate 
the society about the causes and effects of corruption and corrupt 
practices and to implement policies and procedures for the 
prevention of corruption in the society. It is but obvious that the 
scope of applicability of the National Accountability Ordinance, 
1999 is much larger than the scope envisioned in the Ehtesab Act, 
1997 and, thus, it would be naïve to examine the former through 
the narrow prism of the latter. The stated object of the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999 was to rid the whole society of the 
menace of corruption and that is why section 33C of the said 
Ordinance had provided as follows: 
 
“33C. Measures for the prevention of Corruption and Corrupt 
practices.  The Chairman NAB, shall form time to time as he 
deems fit, constitute committees comprising officers of  the NAB  
or other persons or organization from the private or public sectors 
to -- 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
33
(a) 
educate and advise public authorities, holders of public 
office and the community at large on measures to combat 
corruption and corrupt practices; 
 
(b) 
develop, arrange, supervise, participate in or conduct 
educational programmes or media campaigns, and generally to 
disseminate information on the detrimental effects of corruption 
and corrupt practices and the importance of maintaining the 
integrity of public administration; 
 
(c) 
examine the laws in force, and also rules and regulations 
relating to the practice and procedure of various ministries, 
departments 
of 
the 
Federal 
Government 
or 
Provincial 
Government, statutory or other public corporations or bodies and 
the conduct of holders of public office and to recommend 
amendments in such laws, rules or regulations, as the case may 
be, in order to eliminate corruption and corrupt practices; 
 
(d) 
instruct, advise and assist any statutory or other public 
corporation or bodies or upon request, any organization in the 
private and public sector on measures for the reduction and 
elimination of corruption and corrupt practices; and  
 
(e) 
monitor the implementation of the instruction and advice 
as aforesaid and to assess and evaluate success or otherwise of 
such instructions and advice on the reduction and elimination of 
corruption and corrupt practices.” 
   
According to section 1(2) of the Ehtesab Act, 1997 the said Act was 
applicable only to “holders of public offices” whereas by virtue of 
section 4 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 the said 
Ordinance applies to “all persons in Pakistan, all citizens of 
Pakistan and persons who are or have been in the service of 
Pakistan”. It is, thus, quite clear that the Ordinance of 1999 is not 
restricted in its applicability to “holders of public offices” only and 
the all-encompassing sway of the same covers all Pakistani citizens 
wherever they may be and even persons of other nationalities 
available, operating or transacting within Pakistan and it is in this 
context that the words “any other person” appearing in section 9(a) 
of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 must be 
understood. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “person” as “a 
human being” and that is why section 5(n) of that Ordinance 
clarifies that the word “person” used in the Ordinance includes the 
relevant persons of a company or a body corporate. Inclusion of a 
company or a body corporate in the definition of the word “person” 
is also an unmistakable indication that the said Ordinance was not 
restricted in its applicability to holders of public offices only. Apart 
from that section 3 of the Ehtesab Act, 1997 showed that the 
offence of corruption and corrupt practices triable under that Act 
was relatable only to holder of a public office whereas the 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
34
provisions of section 9(a)(i) to 9(a)(xii) of the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 show quite evidently that “any other person” not 
holding any public office and not aiding or abetting or conspiring 
with holder of a public office may also be tried independently for 
the offence of corruption and corrupt practices. The provisions of 
section 9(a)(viii), (ix), (x), (xi) and (xii) particularly make the 
intention of the legislature quite clear in this respect. It may be 
advantageous to reproduce sections 9(a)(xi) and 9(a)(xii) here which 
read as under: 
 
“(xi) 
if he, in his capacity as a banker, merchant, factor, 
broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust as 
provided in Section 409 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 (ACT 
XLV of 1860) in respect of property entrusted to him or over 
which he has domination; and 
 
(xii) 
if he aids, assists, abets, attempts or acts in conspiracy 
with a person or a holder of public office accused of an offence as 
provided in clauses (i) to (xi).” 
 
(underlining has been supplied for emphasis) 
         
If we were to accept the contention that the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999, and particularly section 9(a) thereof, is 
applicable only to holder of a public office and a person aiding and 
abetting or conspiring with holder of a public office then the 
provisions of sections 9(a)(xi) and 9(a)(xii) reproduced above would 
be rendered partially or wholly redundant. It is trite that 
redundancy cannot or ought not to be attributed to the legislature. 
 
13. 
The discussion made above leads us to an irresistible 
conclusion that the principle of ejusdem generis pressed by Mr. 
Wasim Sajjad does not apply to the words “any other person” 
appearing in section 9(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 
1999 and that the words “A holder of a public office, or any other 
person,” used in that section are disjunctive as they refer to 
different classes of persons. In the context of the scheme and scope 
of that Ordinance the words “any other person” are to be given 
their ordinary meanings and are simply to be accepted as referring 
to any other person, nothing more and nothing less. On the 
subject of interpretation of such words appearing in a statute we 
may usefully refer to the following passages of the judgment 
rendered by this Court in the case of Justice Khurshid Anwar 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
35
Bhinder and others v. Federation of Pakistan and another (PLD 
2010 SC 483): 
“A fundamental principle of constitutional construction has 
always been to give effect to the intent of the framers of the 
organic law and of the people adopting it. The pole star in the 
construction of a Constitution is the intention of its makers 
and adopters. When the language of the statute is not only 
plain but admits of but one meaning, the task of interpretation 
can hardly be said to arise. It is not allowable to interpret what 
has no need of interpretation. Such language best declares, 
without more, the intention of the lawgivers, and is decisive of 
it. The rule of construction is "to intend the Legislature to have 
meant what they have actually expressed". It matters not, in 
such a case, what the consequences may be. Therefore if the 
meaning of the language used in a statute is unambiguous and 
is in accord with justice and convenience, the courts cannot 
busy themselves with supposed intentions, however admirable 
the same may be, because, in that event they would be 
travelling beyond their province and legislating for themselves. 
But if the context of the provision itself shows that the 
meaning intended was somewhat less than the words plainly 
seem to mean then the court must interpret that language in 
accordance with the indication of the intention of the 
legislature so plainly given. The first and primary rule of 
construction is that the intention of the Legislature must be 
found in the words used by the Legislature itself. If the words 
used are capable of one construction only then it would not be 
open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction 
on the ground that such hypothetical construction is more 
consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act. The 
essence of law lies in its spirit, not in its letter, for the letter is 
significant only as being the external manifestation of the 
intention that underlies it. Nevertheless in all ordinary cases 
the courts must be content to accept the litera legis as the 
exclusive and conclusive evidence of the sententia legis. They 
must, in general, take it absolutely for granted that the 
Legislature has said what it meant, and meant what it has 
said. Its scriptumest is the first principle of interpretation. 
Judges are not at liberty to add to or take from or modify the 
letter of the law simply because they have reason to believe 
that the true sententia legis is not completely or correctly 
expressed by it. That is to say, in all ordinary cases 
grammatical interpretation is the sole form allowable. It is no 
doubt true that the felt necessities of the times must, in the 
last analysis, affect every judicial determination, for the law 
embodies the story of a nation's development through the 
centuries and it cannot be dealt with as if it contains only 
axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics. A Judge 
cannot stand aloof on chill and distant heights. The great tides 
and currents which engulf the rest of men, do not turn aside in 
their course and pass the Judge by. But at the same time, the 
Judge must remember that his primary function is to interpret 
the law and to record what the law is. He cannot allow his zeal, 
say, for social or agrarian reform, to overrun his true function. 
He does not run a race with the Legislature for social or 
agrarian reform. His task is a more limited task; his ambition a 
more 
limited 
ambition. 
Of 
course in 
this 
process 
of 
interpretation he enjoys a large measure of latitude inherent in 
the very nature of judicial process. In the skeleton provided by 
the Legislature, he pours life and blood and creates an 
organism which is best suited to meet the needs of society and 
in this sense he makes and moulds the law in a creative effort. 
But he is tied by the basic structure provided by the 
Legislature which he cannot alter and to appeal to the spirit of 
the times or to the spirit of social or agrarian reforms or for the 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
36
matter of that any other reform for the purpose of twisting the 
language of the Legislature is certainly a function which he 
must refuse to perform. 
  
The words of a statute must, prima facie, be given their 
ordinary 
meaning. 
Court 
must 
not 
shrink 
from 
an 
interpretation which will reverse the previous law; for the 
purpose of a large part of our statute law is to make lawful that 
which would not be lawful without the statute, or, conversely, 
to prohibit results which would otherwise follow. Judges are 
not called upon to apply their opinions of sound policy so as to 
modify the plain meaning of statutory words but where, in 
construing general words the meaning of which is not entirely 
plain there are adequate reasons for doubting whether the 
Legislature could have been intending so wide an interpretation 
as would disregard fundamental principles, then Court may be 
justified in adopting a narrower construction. At the same time, 
if the choice is between two interpretations the narrower of 
which would fail to achieve the manifest purpose of the 
legislation, court should avoid a construction which would 
reduce the legislation to futility and should rather accept the 
bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would 
legislate only for the purpose of bringing about an effective 
result.”   
14. 
Adverting to the argument that the provisions of the National 
Accountability Bureau allow the Chairman, National Accountability 
Bureau to pick and choose cases to be proceeded with under the 
National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and such power to pick 
and choose is discriminatory besides being capable of abuse we 
may observe that during the course of his arguments Mr. K. K. 
Agha, the learned Prosecutor-General Accountability, has informed 
us that the National Accountability Bureau has framed and it 
follows a considered policy guiding the Bureau as to which kind of 
cases of private sector are to be picked up for proceeding with 
under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and which 
kind of such cases are to be left to be proceeded with under the 
ordinary and normal laws of the land. He has also informed us 
that the National Accountability Bureau follows a mechanism of 
assessment and scrutiny of all such cases even during their 
inquiry and investigation and finally the Chairman of the Bureau, 
a person of highest caliber, experience and accomplishment as is 
evident from the qualifications of that office mentioned in section 
6(ba) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999, applies his 
mind to the matter before filing a Reference before an 
Accountability Court. He has also pointed out that the Bureau’s 
and the Chairman’s decisions in such regards are justiciable before 
the superior judiciary. He has, thus, maintained that intelligible 
differentia exists in this respect and sufficient safeguards against 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
37
mistakes and abuse are in place and, therefore, the assertion 
regarding discrimination does not hold water. It has also been 
pointed out by him that this aspect of the matter has already been 
attended to by the High Court of Sindh in the case of Rauf 
Bakhsh Kadri v. The State and others (2003 MLD 777) and a 
learned Division Bench of the said Court had observed in that case 
as under: 
“12. 
Against this background learned counsel argued that the 
unbridled discretion conferred upon the Chairman N.A.B. or an 
officer authorized by him to refer a matter involving commission 
of substantially the same offence which was triable by a Special 
Judge under the 1958 Act or the power to seek transfer of a 
pending case to an Accountability Court under section 16-A was 
ultra vires the fundamental right of equality and equal protection 
of laws guaranteed by Article 25 of the Constitution. In support to 
his contention learned counsel placed reliance inter alia upon two 
well known pronouncements of the Honourable Supreme Court in 
Waris Meah v. State (PLD 1957 SC 157) and Inamur Rehman v. 
Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 563). 
13. 
In Waris Meah's case, the validity of certain provisions of 
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act providing three different 
modes of trial and punishment for offence under the Act were 
called in question. The law enabled the Central Government or 
the State Bank to proceed against a person accused of an offence 
under the Act either before a Sessions Court or a Magistrate 
under section 23, or before an Adjudicating Officer under section 
23-A or before a Special Tribunal under section 23-B. Different 
procedures for trial of offence before different fora and different 
extent of punishments which could be imposed were laid down. 
Muhammad Munir, C.J, speaking for the Full Court held that, in 
the absence of any statutory guidelines to make a classification of 
persons required to be tried before a particular forum the 
provisions conferring such arbitrarily discretion to apply any of 
the three modes of trial upon any person without any 
classification was ex facie discriminatory and violative of Article 
5(1) of the 1956 Constitution (which is in pari materia with Article 
25 of the 1973 Constitution). 
14. 
In the subsequent case of Inam-ur-Rehman Alvi v. 
Federation of Pakistan (1992 SCMR 563) the provisions of M.L.R. 
104 stipulated that any person having any claim against a person 
repatriating foreign exchange could seek redress through an 
authorized officer was called in question. Their Lordships 
speaking through Zafar Hussain Mirza, J., held that, a provision 
denying the right to defend through judicial procedure in a Court 
to a person having repatriated foreign exchange against any claim 
which may have no nexus with the repatriation of foreign 
exchange could not satisfy the test of reasonable classification 
and therefore, the provision was hit by Article 25 of the 
Constitution.  
15. 
In support of his contention Mr. Khalid Anwar also 
referred to the following observations of Ajmal Mian, CJ, in the 
recent case of Liaqat Hussain v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1999 
SC 504) decided by nine members Bench of the Honourable 
Supreme Court: 
"As regards the violation of Article 25 of the 
Constitution, 
it 
may 
be 
observed 
that 
the 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
38
contention 
of 
the 
learned 
counsel 
for 
the 
petitioners was that the impugned Ordinance 
contravenes the above Article, inasmuch as it gives 
discretion to the Federal Government to pick and 
choose cases which may be referred to the Military 
Courts. On the other hand, the learned Attorney-
General has urged that the offences triable under 
the impugned Ordinance are those which are 
mentioned in section 6 and the Schedule to the 
impugned Ordinance and that this Court has 
already held in more than one case that different 
laws can be enacted for different sexes, persons of 
different age group, persons having different 
financial standards and persons accused of 
heinous crimes. No doubt, that this Court inter 
alia in the case of I. A. Sherwani v. Government of 
Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041) has held so, which 
has been reiterated in the case of Mehram Ali and 
others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 
1998 SC 1445) (supra). However, in the present 
case the basic question is as to the vires of the 
impugned Ordinance on the ground of providing 
parallel judicial system, but at the same time the 
impugned Ordinance is also violative of Article 25 
of the Constitution, inasmuch as it gives discretion 
to the Federal Government under section 3 thereof 
to pick and choose cases for referring to the 
Military Courts as has been held by this Court in 
the case of Brig. (Retd.) F. B. Ali (supra). There is 
no mandatory provision providing that all the 
offences mentioned in section 6 and the Schedule 
shall be triable by the Military Courts convened 
under section 3 of the impugned Ordinance."  
16. 
Learned counsel candidly conceded that different laws 
could be enacted for different classes of people but it was well-
settled that the classification must be rational and bear a 
reasonable nexus with the object of the legislation. He argued 
that possibly Ehtesab Act, 1997 could not be questioned on this 
score as its provisions were made applicable only to Government 
servants in BS-18 or above. The Ordinance in question however, 
did not create any classification or lay down any guideline but 
only enables the Chairman, N.A.B. to exercise absolute arbitrary 
discretion in filing a reference against any person triable under 
the 1958 Act or to apply for transfer of a pending case from a 
Special Court under to an Accountability Court. Conferment of 
such discretion according to Mr. Khalid Anwar was plainly 
violative of Article 25 of the Constitution in view of the 
abovementioned weighty pronouncements of the Honourable 
Supreme Court. 
-------------------------------------------- 
30. 
For the foregoing reasons we are inclined to hold that the 
qualifications laid down in clause (ix) will also have to be read in 
the other clauses of section 9(a). In other words the discretion of 
the Chairman, N.A.B. or an officer authorized by him to file a 
reference before the Accountability Court is not absolute or 
arbitrary. Such reference could be filed only when the Chairman 
or the Authorized Officer is satisfied that the amount involved is 
of large magnitude and resort to the facility of pre-bargaining to 
the accused would be in the national interest. In the absence of 
such satisfaction a case could only be triable under the ordinary 
law. 
31. 
As regards the new offences created by the Ordinance we 
are constrained to observe that strictly speaking, it is not possible 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
39
for us to declare them ultra vires the Constitution. Nevertheless, 
it is expected that the Chairman, N.A.B. will keep in view the 
spirit of the law in accordance with the guidelines referred to in 
para. 29 and file references only when the amounts involved are 
large enough and it is worthwhile in the public interest and same 
mens rea on the part of the defaulter is involved. 
32. 
Since filing of a reference is essentially the function of the 
Chairman, N.A.B (though it may be amenable to judicial review in 
proper cases) and since he in view of the experience of the 
Institution is in a better position to determine whether the 
amount involved in these cases could be classified as large or 
otherwise. We would remand these matters to the Chairman, 
N.A.B. to re-examine these cases from the above stand-point. In 
case he is satisfied that the amounts involved are large enough to 
justify proceedings under the Ordinance, they may continue 
before the Accountability Courts. In case he is not so satisfied the 
cases may be transferred to the appropriate Courts and such 
Courts may proceed with them from the stage they had reached 
without recalling witnesses. A definite decision is expected to be 
taken within one month from today and till such time the interim 
order passed earlier will continue. The petitions stand disposed of 
in the above terms.” 
We may add that the offence of cheating mentioned in section 
9(a)(ix) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and the 
offence of criminal breach of trust referred to in section 9(a)(x) of 
that Ordinance can be dealt with under the said Ordinance only if 
such offences affect “the public at large”, as stipulated therein, 
and, thus, a reasonable classification exists in those provisions so 
as to ward off a criticism based upon discrimination. The question 
as to whether an alleged cheating or criminal breach of trust 
affects the public at large or not is a question which is initially to 
be determined by the National Accountability Bureau and its 
Chairman and subsequently such determination may, in an 
appropriate case, be amenable to judicial review. Apart from that 
the 
constitutional 
validity 
of 
the 
National 
Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 and all its provisions has already been judicially 
determined by this Court in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali 
(supra) and, therefore, there is hardly any occasion for us to re-
examine the same at this stage. 
 
15. 
In the end we may also advert to the submissions made 
before us regarding the provisions of the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 being very stringent, harsh and oppressive in the 
matters of transfer/withdrawal of cases, bail, remissions, freezing 
of property, transfer of property, presumption of guilt, higher 
sentences and disqualifications, etc. We note that all such aspects 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
40
of the said Ordinance had also been taken due notice of by this 
Court in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali (supra) and 
constitutional validity of such provisions was affirmed. It may be 
pertinent to mention here that in the judgment delivered in that 
case this Court had prepared a detailed chart showing that the 
above mentioned stringent provisions were identical or similar to 
many such provisions already existing in many other statutes 
which included the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997, the 
Establishment of Office of Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 
2000, the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, the Banks (Nationalization) 
Act, 1974, the Offences in respect of Banks (Special Courts) 
Ordinance, 1984, the Anti-Narcotics Force Act, 1997, the 
Conciliation Courts Ordinance, 1961, the Criminal Procedure 
Code, 1898 and the Employment of Children Act, 1991. This Court 
had also found that such provisions of the National Accountability 
Ordinance, 1999 were quite justified in view of the gravity of the 
menace of rampant corruption the said Ordinance was meant to 
tackle. Dealing with such stringent provisions of the Control of 
Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 and their interpretation one of us 
(Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.) had observed as a Judge of the Lahore 
High Court in the case of Nazar Hussain v. The State (2002 
P.Cr.L.J. 440) as under: 
“7. 
The learned counsel for the petitioner is quite right in 
pointing out that in the cases of Ghani-ur-Rehman v. The State 
1996 PCr.LJ 347, Muhammad Afzal v. The State 1998 PCr.LJ 955 
and Naveed Ahmad Khan v. The State 1999 PCr.LJ 63 it had been 
held that if the allegation levelled against an accused person 
attracts the provisions of section 9(b) of the Control of Narcotic 
Substances Act, 1997 as well as the provisions of Articles 3 and 4 
of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 then in such a 
case of two penal provisions attracted to the same allegation 
against an accused person that penal provision is to be applied 
which carries a lesser punishment or attracts lesser rigours of the 
law, i.e. Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) 
Order, 1979. However, we have noticed in this context that in all 
the abovementioned cases the provisions of section 76 of the 
Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 had not been brought to 
the notice of the Honourable Judges deciding those cases. Section 
76 of the said Act of 1997 provides for giving an overriding effect 
to the provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 
over anything contained in any other law for the time being in 
force. The provisions of section 74 of the said Act may also be 
advantageously referred to in this context. The overriding effect of 
section 76 of the Act of 1997 was clearly noticed and expressly 
referred to in the case of Khalil-ur-Rehman. v. The State 1998 
PCr.LJ 1625 for brushing aside an argument that the case of the 
accused person in that case may be considered to be one under 
Articles 3 and 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 
1979 and not to be that under section 9 of the Control of Narcotic 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
41
Substances Act, 1997 for the purposes of the said accused 
person’s bail. We respectfully subscribe to the view expressed in 
this regard in this precedent case. 
-------------------------------------------- 
11. 
We are conscious that some of the views expressed by us 
above and some of the interpretations advanced by us vis-a-vis 
different provisions of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 
1997 may appear to some to be somewhat harsh or stringent but 
we maintain that the same are in consonance with the spirit of 
the said law. The said law is not an ordinary law as the menace 
that it purports to curb is not commonplace and the criminals 
who indulge in it are not of the normal type. The mischief sought 
to be suppressed by this law is not just a crime against a human 
being but a crime against the humanity and, therefore, a 
response to the same has to be aggressive and punitive rather 
than benign and curative. It may be true that an individual 
subjected to the rigours of this law may sometimes suffer 
disproportionately but the greater good of the society emerging 
from stringent application of this law may make this approach 
worth its while.” 
The perils of corruption in a society are far greater than the 
hazards of narcotics and, thus, the observations made above in the 
context of the Control of Narcotic Substances Act, 1997 are 
attracted with a greater force in the context of the National 
Accountability Ordinance, 1999. It may not be forgotten that by 
virtue of section 3 of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 
the provisions of the said Ordinance are to have an overriding 
effect over any other law for the time being in force. 
 
16. 
For what has been discussed above we hold and declare that 
the provisions of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are 
applicable even to a person who is not holder of a public office and 
also to a person who has not aided, assisted, abetted, attempted or 
acted in conspiracy with holder of a public office and the words 
“any other person” appearing in section 9(a) of the said Ordinance 
are to be understood and applied accordingly. For removal of any 
doubt or ambiguity it is clarified that a stand alone private person 
can be proceeded against under the said Ordinance if the other 
conditions mentioned in that Ordinance in that respect are 
satisfied. 
 
17. 
After settling the common legal controversy in the above 
mentioned regard we direct the Office of this Court to fix the titled 
appeals and petitions for hearing before appropriate Benches of the 
Criminal Appeal No. 140 of 2005, etc. 
42
Court for their decision on the basis of their individual factual and 
legal merits.   
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
Judge 
 
 
Announced in open Court at Islamabad on 07.06.2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Approved for reporting. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
