IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN  
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT:  
 
 
Mr. Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, CJ  
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Tariq Parvez  
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Ghulam Rabbani  
 
 
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO.468, 471-474, 632-633, 852-859, 883-892, 899-
901, 950 & 974 OF 2010  
 
 
(On appeal from the judgment dated 22.12.2009 passed 
by the High Court of Sindh at Hyderabad in C.P. No.D-707 
of 2009; judgment dated 29.10.2009 passed by the 
Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in W.P. No. 2140 of 2006, 
144 & 398 of 2007, 1938 of 2008 and 2190 of 2009; 
judgment dated 16.03.2010 in C.P.No.D-297 & 299 of 
2008; judgment dated 05.05.2010 passed by the Lahore 
High Court, Multan Bench in W.P. No. 4811, 5325, 5425, 
5728 & 5798 of 2006, 551 of 2007 and 6143, 6691 & 9257 
of 2009; judgment dated 03.06.2010 passed by the High 
Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No.D-750 & 751 of 2006, 
1695 & 1696 of 2008, 98, 298, 300, 682, 1950 & 1951 of 
2009; 
judgment 
dated 
15.06.2010 
passed 
by 
the 
Peshawar High Court in W.P. No. 339 of 2006; order dated 
14.06.2010 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in 
W.P. No. 21202 of 2009; and judgment dated 17.06.2010 
passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in ICA No. 
219 of 2009)  
 
CIVIL APPEALS NO. 468, 471-474, 632-633, 852-859, 899-901, 
950 & 974 of 2010 
 
Pakistan Telecommunication Co. Ltd. through its Chairman  
 
    …  APPELLANT   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VERSUS  
 
Iqbal Nasir & 2 others   
 
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 468/2010]  
 
Fazal Karim & 17 others  
 
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 471/2010]  
 
Naseer Khan & 4 others  
 
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 472/2010]  
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
2 
 
Muhammad Adnan Pasha & 3 others   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 473/2010]  
 
Muhammad Idrees & another  
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 474/2010]  
 
Shakeel Ahmed & another 
 
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 632/2010]  
 
Syed Ahsan Ali  & another 
 
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 633/2010]  
 
Hafiz Muhammad Hussain & 21 others    
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 852/2010]  
 
Hafiz Muhammad Hussain 
 
 
 
    … RESPONDENT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 853/2010]  
 
Muhammad Naveed Alam & another 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 854/2010]  
 
Abdul Ghaffar & 5 others  
 
  
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 855/2010]  
 
Hafiz Muhammad Hussain 
 
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 856/2010]  
 
Muhammad Ikhlaq & 2 others   
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 857/2010]  
 
Iram Zahra & another  
 
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 858/2010]  
 
Iram Zahra & 3 others  
 
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 859/2010]  
 
 
Imtiaz Ali & 39 others    
  
 
 
   … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 899/2010]  
 
Qadeer Ahmed & 3 others 
 
   
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 900/2010]  
 
Abid Hussain & another  
 
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 901/2010] 
  
Murad Ali Khan & 4 others    
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 950/2010]  
 
Irfan Bashir & 23 others   
 
 
 
    … RESPONDENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 974/2010]  
C.A. No. 883 of 2010 
 
Manzoor Ali & 25 others   
 
 
 
    … APPELLANTS  
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
VERSUS 
 
Federation of Pakistan through Secretary 
Ministry of Information & Technology &  
Telecommunication, Islamabad & 3 others  
  … 
RESPONDENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
C.A. No. 884 to 892 of 2010 
Muhammad Arif Joya   
 
 
 
… 
APPELLANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 884/2010]  
 
Allah Rakhio & another   
 
 
 
… 
APPELLANTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 885/2010]  
 
Abdul Ghafoor & another  
 
 
 
… 
APPELLANTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 886/2010]  
 
Ghulam Shabbir   
 
 
 
 
… 
APPELLANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 887/2010]  
 
Shah Muhammad Rajpur 
 
 
 
… 
APPELLANT  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 888/2010]  
 
Syed Muhammad Ally Raza & another 
 
… 
APPELLANTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 889/2010]  
 
Mukhtiar Ahmed & 6 others   
 
 
… 
APPELLANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 890/2010]  
 
Naimat Ullah & 3 others  
 
 
 
… 
APPELLANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 891/2010]  
 
Muhammad Rafique & 4 others  
 
 
… 
APPELLANTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[CA 892/2010]  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
VERSUS 
 
General Manager & others  
 
 
  
  … 
RESPONDENTS 
 
 
For the appellants:  
 
Mr. Muhammad Munir Piracha, ASC  
(in CAs 468,471-474, 632, 
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh, AOR, 
633, 853-859, 899-901,  
with Ms. Zahida Awan, GM (Legal) 
950 & 974/2010)  
  
Syed Yamin Shah, Manager (HR) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the appellants: 
 
Raja M. Ibrahim Satti, Sr. ASC  
(in CA. 852/2010) 
 
  
 
For the appellants:  
 
Mr. Nazir Ahmed Bhutta, ASC  
(in CAs 883-892/2010)  
Mr. Mehmood A. Sheikh. AOR  
 
 
For respondents : 
 
Mr. Muhammad Rafique Rajwana, ASC 
(in CAs.852-859/2010)  
Mr. M.S. Khattak, AOR 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
4 
 
For respondents : 
 
Mr. Ejaz Faroze, ASC 
(in CAs.882-892 /2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For respondents : 
 
Mir Afzal Malik, ASC 
(in CA.899/2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For respondents : 
 
Mr. M.A. Ghani, ASC 
(in CA.900 /2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For respondents : 
 
Malik Qamar Afzal, ASC 
(in CAs.471 & 950/2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For Telecom       : 
 
Mr. Ishtiaq Haider, ASC 
Foundation  
: 
 
(in CAs.472-474 & 950/2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondents 
: 
 
M/s Iqbal Nazir, Naqi Butt, Izhar-ud-Din 
(in-person)  
 
 
Syed Ahsan Ali, Shakeel Ahmed, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M. Adnan Pasha  
 
Dates of hearing:  
 
4, 22, 24, 29 & 30.11.2010  
.-.-. 
 
 
J U D G M E N T  
 
 
 
Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, CJ –. These appeals, by 
leave of this Court, are directed against the judgments passed on 
different dates by the High Court of Sindh at Hyderabad & Karachi, 
Peshawar High Court at Peshawar & D.I. Khan and Lahore High Court 
at Multan & Lahore in Constitution/Writ Petitions filed by the 
respondents/employees 
of 
the 
appellant 
company 
“Pakistan 
Telecommunication Co. Ltd.”, hereinafter referred to as the PTCL, 
against the termination of their service, and/or denial of the benefit of 
voluntary separation scheme introduced by the appellant.  
2. 
 
The facts in C.A. No. 468 of 2010, arising out of judgment 
dated 22.12.2009 passed by the High Court of Sindh at Hyderabad in 
C.P. No.D-707 of 2009 are that the PTCL introduced a scheme for its 
employees known as “Voluntary Separation Scheme” (hereinafter 
referred to as “VSS”), whereby, apart from other benefits which an 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
5 
employee was entitled to get, he was also entitled to receive early 
retirement benefits provided he had rendered a minimum of 20 years 
of service. The petitioners in the said petition [respondents herein] 
applied for the benefit of VSS, but were denied the same on the 
ground that they did not possess the requisite qualifying length of 
service. They wrote a letter to a learned Judge of the High Court of 
Sindh, Circuit Bench, Hyderabad which was converted into a 
Constitution Petition and notices were issued to the concerned 
authorities. The claim of the said respondents was that they had 
completed 20 years of service from the date of their appointment, but 
they were wrongly denied the benefit of VSS. On the other hand, the 
stance of the PTCL was that the respondents/petitioners were 
appointed on 14.12.1981 & 24.03.1983 respectively, they passed their 
recruitment examination on 03.08.1987 and completed their training 
on 30.10.1988 & 02.04.1990 respectively, therefore, their service 
could only be considered from the date of successful completion of 
training, and not from the date of their initial appointment. In rebuttal, 
the respondents referred to the case of one Mrs. Rubina Khadim, 
Telephone Operator who was granted similar benefits on the basis of 
date of her appointment and not with reference to the date of 
completion of training, and submitted that the act of the PTCL was a 
clear case of discrimination, which warranted interference by the High 
Court in the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction. The learned 
Division Bench of the High Court allowed the Constitution Petition and 
directed the PTCL to extend the benefit of VSS to the respondents as 
well. Following the view thus taken, another learned Division Bench of 
the said High Court at Hyderabad, vide a common judgment dated 
16.03.2010 passed in Constitution Petitions No. D-297 & D-299 of 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
6 
2008 granted relief to the petitioners therein and the PTCL was 
directed to pay to them the balance amount and monthly pension as 
claimed by them.   
3. 
 
Aggrieved 
by 
the 
said 
judgment/order, 
the 
PTCL 
approached this Court by means of Civil Petitions No. 516, 1185 & 
1186 of 2010 wherein leave was granted vide separate orders dated 
08.07.2010 and 19.07.2010 to consider, inter alia, the contentions 
that writ in the matter could not be issued to the PTCL as it was not 
performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Government, 
and even if it was assumed to be performing such functions, still the 
subject matter of the impugned judgment was not connected with the 
affairs of the Government, and further whether the rules framed by 
the PTCL were statutory or not.  
4. 
 
Civil Appeal No. 901 of 2010 arises out of the judgment 
dated 17.06.2010 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in 
ICA No. 219 of 2009, filed by the appellant-employee of the PTCL, 
Multan Region, who had opted for VSS wherein the cut off date was 
mentioned as 26.05.2008 but he could not be relieved from service 
due to some unavoidable reasons and continued till 04.06.2008, 
therefore, he claimed the pay and benefits up-till 04.06.2008, which 
were declined by the PTCL authorities. He then approached the Lahore 
High Court, Multan Bench through Writ Petition No. 4690 of 2008, 
which was dismissed vide order dated 08.07.2009. Aggrieved by the 
said order, the respondent challenged the same in ICA No. 219 of 
2009, which was allowed by the Division Bench vide order dated 
17.06.2010 and the remuneration for the period over and above the 
cut off date was ordered to be paid to him.  
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
7 
5. 
 
This Court, vide orders dated 21.09.2010 and 28.09.2010 
passed in Civil Petitions No. 1569, 1622-1626, 1742 & 1780 of 2010, 
and 1678, 1679 & 1694 of 2010 respectively, filed against the above 
judgments, granted leave to appeal to the PTCL in terms of leave 
granted in Civil Petitions No. 516 of 2010 and 1185 of 2010.  
6. 
 
Civil Appeals No. 899 & 900 of 2010 arise out of judgment 
dated 15.06.2010 passed by a Division Bench of the Peshawar High 
Court in Writ Petition No. 339 of 2006 and order dated 14.06.2010 
passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in 
Writ Petition No. 21202 of 2009 respectively, filed by the petitioners-
employees of the PTCL, Peshawar and Lahore Regions seeking a 
declaration that they were employees of the PTCL from the date of 
appointment and entitled to the same wages as were being paid to 
other regular employees of PTCL, and the termination orders made by 
the PTCL or by the Foundation were void, as also a direction to the 
PTCL to take them on its strength from the date of appointment and to 
pay them salary. By the impugned judgment and order, the relief 
prayed for was granted by the respective High Courts, against which 
leave was granted by this Court vide order dated 28.09.2010 passed in 
Civil Petitions No. 1678 & 1679 of 2010.  
7. 
 
Another set of appeals, namely, Civil Appeals No. 471, 
472, 473, 474 & 950 of 2010 arises out of the consolidated judgment 
dated 29.10.2010 passed by the Peshawar High Court in Writ Petitions 
No. 2140 of 2006, 144 & 398 of 2007, 1934 of 2008 and 2190 of 2009 
filed by the petitioners-employees of the PTCL, Peshawar Region 
against the termination of their services due to the termination of 
contract by the PTCL with the Telecom Foundation regarding hiring of 
services of skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled manpower in that region. 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
8 
It was pleaded that the impugned orders of termination of services 
were patently mala fide as neither their jobs were abolished nor any 
charge existed against them, which were also discriminatory and 
deprived them of the equal treatment before, and equal protection of 
law, inasmuch as various other similarly placed employees were made 
permanent and were continuing in service. A learned Division Bench of 
the Peshawar High Court, following the law laid down by this Court in 
the judgment reported as PTCL v. Muhammad Zahid (2010 SCMR 
253), on a parity of reasoning, allowed the writ petitions and declared 
the impugned orders to be without jurisdiction, without lawful 
authority and of no legal effect, besides being discriminatory and 
ordered the petitioners to be restored on their respective posts with all 
back benefits due to them under the contract agreement except the 
monthly salary as they had not practically worked on their posts.   
8. 
 
This Court, vide order dated 05.07.2010 passed in Civil 
Petitions No. 2581, 2582, 398 and 612 of 2010 filed against the above 
judgment, granted leave to appeal to the PTCL to consider, inter alia, 
the contention that there was no statutory right in favour of the 
respondents-employees to continue in service despite retrenchment, 
which aspect was not adverted to by the learned High Court.  
9. 
 
The next set of appeals, namely, Civil Appeals No. 852 to 
859 & 974 of 2010 arises out of the consolidated judgment dated 
05.05.2010 passed by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench in Writ 
Petitions No. 4811, 5325, 5425, 5728 & 5798 of 2006, 551 of 2007 
and 6143, 6691 & 9257 of 2009, all filed by the petitioners-employees 
of the PTCL, Multan Region against the termination of their services. It 
was pleaded that in the light of the judgment of this Court reported as 
Muhammad Zahid (supra), the petitioners were entitled to the same 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
9 
relief, i.e. the regularization of their appointment and grant of same 
wages as were being paid to the other regular employees of the PTCL. 
In pursuance of the interim orders passed by the High Court, the 
petitioners continued to perform their duties. A learned Single Judge of 
the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, in the light of the precedent 
case of Muhammad Zahid (supra) allowed the writ petitions and 
granted the relief prayed for.  
10. 
 
Yet another set of appeals, namely, Civil Appeals No. 883 
to 892 of 2010 arises out of the consolidated judgment dated 
03.06.2010 passed by the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, in Constitution 
Petitions No. C.P. No.D-750 & 751 of 2006, 1695 & 1696 of 2008 and 
98, 298, 300, 682, 1950 & 1951 of 2009, all filed by the petitioners-
employees of the PTCL, Karachi Region against the termination of their 
services. A learned Division Bench, in the light of the law laid down by 
this Court in the cases of Muhammad Zahid (supra) and PIAC v. 
Tanweer-ur-Rehman (PLD 2010 SC 676) held that though PTCL was a 
person amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 
199(5) of the Constitution, but since PTCL did not have statutory rules, 
the writ petitions of the employees of PTCL were not maintainable, 
therefore, the same were dismissed and the petitioners were allowed 
to seek such remedies as were available to them under the law. Leave 
against the aforesaid judgment was granted by this Court vide order 
dated 28.09.2010 passed in Civil Petitions No. 1589 to 1598 of 2010.  
11. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Munir Piracha, ASC, learned counsel for 
the appellant PTCL contended that the PTCL was not a person 
performing functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation 
within the meaning of Article 199(5) of the Constitution, inasmuch as 
the Federal Government, on 12.04.2006, entered into an agreement 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
10 
with Etisalat International Pakistan LLC, hereinafter referred to as “the 
EIP” whereby 1,326,000,000 shares of the PTCL were transferred to 
the EIP, therefore, the management of the company vested in the EIP. 
He 
argued 
that 
the 
PTCL 
had 
succeeded 
the 
Pakistan 
Telecommunication Corporation, hereinafter referred to as “the PTC”, 
which was governed by section 6 of the Pakistan Telecommunication 
Corporation Act, 1991 [hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1991], 
therefore, only such functions of the Corporation, which were 
performed in pursuance of section 6 ibid, could be said to be functions 
in connection with the affairs of the Federation. The matters dealing 
with the officers and servants of the PTCL, which vested in the EIP, 
were not the functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation. 
The learned counsel maintained that the law laid down in Muhammad 
Zahid’s case, which was rendered at a time when the controlling share 
of the concern vested, not with the EIP, but with the Federal 
Government was required to be revisited/clarified in view of the fact 
that the controlling shares had subsequently been vested with the EIP.      
12. 
 
Mr. Muhammad Ibrahim Satti, learned Sr. ASC, also 
appeared on behalf of the PTCL and submitted that in absence of 
statutory rules, the employees of the PTCL were governed by the 
principle of “Master and Servant” and the writ petitions were not 
competent and the learned High Courts wrongly assumed jurisdiction 
under Article 199 of the Constitution. He contended that the terms and 
conditions of service of employees of the PTCL were governed by the 
contracts of service, according to which they were temporary 
employees/daily wagers, therefore, they could not claim permanent 
appointments against the provisions of the contracts, which provided, 
inter alia, that the employees would not have any right of permanent 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
11 
induction in service. The learned counsel submitted that Muhammad 
Zahid’s case was wrongly relied upon by the learned High Courts in the 
instant case, inasmuch as this Court has clarified/modified the 
judgment in the said case in the subsequent judgment to the effect 
that the employees who were not governed by statutory rules were 
debarred to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 
of the Constitution. To substantiate his argument, he referred to 
Executive Council Allama Iqbal Open University v. M. Tufail Hashmi 
(2010 SCMR 1484), which laid down that the employees of only such 
organizations were entitled to invoke constitutional jurisdiction of the 
High Court, which were performing functions in connection with the 
affairs of the Federation and whose services were governed by 
statutory rules.   
13. 
 
Mr. M.A. Ghani, ASC for the respondents-employees in 
C.A. No. 900/2010 argued that the respondents were workmen as 
defined in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 
1969, section 2 (xxx) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002 and 
clause (g) of Order 1 of the Schedule to the W.P. (Standing Orders) 
Ordinance, 1968, the role of Telecom Foundation was only of 
employment exchange and they were the employees of the PTCL from 
the date of appointment, regular after 183 days of service and entitled 
to same wages as were being paid to regular employees of the PTCL as 
held in Masood v. PIAC [2001 PLC (CS) 41], which formed the basis of 
Muhammad Zahid’s case (supra). The learned counsel submitted that 
Masood’s case (supra) was also relied upon in Ikram Bari v. National 
Bank (2005 SCMR 100). In the latter case, the Bank had terminated 
the services of daily wages employees on the ground that although the 
employees were appointed by the Bank, yet their salaries were being 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
12 
paid by the borrowers/loanees. However, the termination orders were 
set aside by this Court, inter alia, holding as under: -  
(1) 
The fact that the wages of the employees were debited to 
the borrower’s account would make no difference since for 
all practical purposes and legal consequences they were 
placed under the administrative control of the Bank;  
(2) 
Islamic welfare state is under an obligation to establish a 
society, which is free from exploitation wherein social and 
economic justice is guaranteed as envisaged by Article 2A 
of the Constitution; and  
(3) 
Under Article 38 of the Constitution, State is obliged to 
secure the well being of the people by raising their 
standards of living and by ensuring equitable adjustment 
of rights between employer and employees while Article 3 
requires the State to ensure elimination of all forms of 
exploitation, therefore, the approach of the Bank that 
temporary Godown staff and daily wages employees 
should be continued to be governed on disgraceful terms 
and conditions of service for indefinite period could not be 
countenanced.    
 
According to the learned counsel, the other case, which lay at the 
foundation of Muhammad Zahid’s case was Muhammad Asam v. PTCL 
[1997 PLC (CS) 1131] wherein it was laid down that whoever 
completed 183 days including artificial breaks shall be permanent 
workman. The claim of the PTCL was that the Foundation was the 
employer whereas the claim of the employees was that as they worked 
for, at the premises, and under the administrative control, of the PTCL, 
therefore, they were the employees of the PTCL. The question as to 
who was the employer, whether PTCL or the Foundation could not be 
agitated before the Labour Court where a worker could just file a 
grievance petition against the employer, therefore, the claim and the 
conduct of the PTCL being in violation of the definition of workman, 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
13 
such a question could only be settled in writ jurisdiction of the High 
Court. The impugned termination orders were void, therefore, the 
same were rightly challenged before the High Court in its writ 
jurisdiction. Reference was made to Nazir Ahmed Panhwar v. Govt. of 
Sindh [2009 PLC (CS) 161] and Municipal Committee, Arifwala v. 
Muhammad Ramzan (2005 SCMR 1721) for the proposition that in case 
of violation of the principles of natural justice, writ petition was 
competent even in a case involving contractual obligation, and to the 
case of Sharifan Begum v. Abdul Aziz (PLD 1975 SC 475) for the 
proposition that in case of violation of Article 25 of the Constitution, 
resort could only be made to the remedy provided by the Constitution.   
14. 
 
The learned counsel also submitted that the liability 
imposed upon the employer under the Industrial & Commercial 
Employment Standing Order of confirming the employees after 183 
days’ service including artificial breaks could not be defeated by 
contract as held by this Court in Pakistan International Airlines v. 
Sindh Labour Court No.5 (PLD 1980 SC 323) and Ikram Bari (supra).   
15. 
 
Mr. Nazir Ahmed Bhutta, ASC for the appellants in C.A. No. 
883 to 892 of 2010 submitted that the appellants-employees were 
actually appointed in Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department in 
the year 1992, the predecessor of the PTC. They were imparted 
prescribed departmental training/courses, which they successfully 
completed. On promulgation of the Act of 1991, they were transferred 
to the PTC on the same terms and conditions as they were entitled in 
the T&T Department as its employees in the light of the provisions of 
section 9 of the Act of 1991 and subsequently on promulgation of the 
Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-organization) Act, 1996 [hereinafter 
referred to as the Act of 1996], the terms and conditions of the 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
14 
transferred employees were protected under section 35(2) and section 
36(1) & (2) of the latter Act. However, suddenly the appellants and 
their other colleagues were terminated from service. Such termination 
orders were challenged by some of the employees before the Federal 
Service Tribunal, which were set aside and the employees reinstated in 
service with back benefits vide judgment reported as Ch. Muhammad 
Ashraf v. State Life Insurance [2002 PLC (CS) 948]. The benefit of said 
judgment was extended to another lot of employees who had not 
challenged their termination at the initial stage in the light of the law 
laid down in Hameed Akhtar Niazi v. Secretary, Establishment Division 
Government of Pakistan (1996 SCMR 1185). Similarly, the High Court 
of Sindh at Hyderabad vide order dated 28.04.2004 passed in 
Constitution Petition No. D-283 of 2003 allowed the request of some 
employees directing the respondents to give equal treatment to the 
petitioners. The said order was upheld by the Supreme Court vide 
order dated 26.09.2005 passed in CPLA No. 471-K of 2004. The 
appellants-employees 
were 
denied 
such 
benefit 
and 
were 
discriminated, therefore, they approached the High Court by means of 
Constitution 
Petition, 
which 
was 
dismissed 
by 
the impugned 
consolidated 
judgment 
dated 
03.06.2010. 
The 
said 
impugned 
judgment was in conflict with the judgment dated 04.04.2003 passed 
by the said High Court in C.P. D-2301 and 2410 of 2001, order dated 
16.05.2005, which had already been implemented by the PTCL 
Management, judgment of that High Court reported as 2007 PLC (CS) 
174, reinstatement of employees by the PTCL vide orders dated 
20.11.2001 and 06.08.2002, and judgment of the Lahore High Court 
passed in W.P. No. 1444 of 2001 against which appeal was dismissed 
by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Zahid’s case.    
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
15 
16. 
 
The employees-respondents in C.A. No. 468 of 2010 
submitted that six Teleprinter Operators of defunct Central Telegraph 
Office, Hyderabad, Sindh, namely, Allah Bux, Muhammad Akram, 
Ateequddin, Iqbal Nasir, Muhammad Naqi Butt and Izharuddin Alvi had 
given their option under VSS and were retired, out of whom first three 
were granted pensionary benefits whereas the latter three, i.e., 
respondents No. 1 to 3 in C.A. No. 468 of 2010, were deprived of the 
pensionary benefits by ignoring the intervening period between 
appointment and training, though they were appointed after qualifying 
the recruitment examination, had been regularized by the competent 
authority from the date of ad hoc appointment, had put in continuous 
service of 26, 24 and 24 years respectively, were senior to their above 
mentioned colleagues who were granted the similar benefit, and were 
qualified to avail the pensionary benefits under the said scheme, 
having served for more than 20 years. One Mrs. Rubina Khadim was 
also extended the benefit of VSS counting her service from the date of 
appointment as against the date of completion of training. They relied 
upon Muhammad Zahid’s case and prayed for equal treatment.  
17. 
 
 Malik M. Rafique Rajwana, ASC for the respondents No. 1 
to 20 in C.A. No. 852 of 2010 raised a preliminary objection that the 
appeal was not maintainable as the appellant had failed to avail the 
remedy of intra-Court appeal before a Division Bench of the High Court 
as provided in section 3(2) of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 and 
the judgment reported as PIAC v. Samina Masood (PLD 2005 SC 831). 
He further submitted that the judgment dated 05.05.2010 was not 
being implemented by the appellants, therefore, the respondents filed 
contempt petitions in which General Manager PTCL, Islamabad 
appeared and made a statement that in case no stay order had been 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
16 
granted by the Supreme Court, they would be implementing the 
judgment dated 23.09.2010. Consequently, they issued letters of 
implementation/appointment in BPS and the respondents accordingly 
had joined the PTCL and were posted in different units and were 
performing their respective duties. Therefore, the appeal had become 
infructuous.  
18. 
 
The learned counsel further submitted that W.P. No. 5122 
of 2004 was disposed of by the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench after 
the PTCL had given the assurance/undertaking in the following terms:-  
“Learned counsel for the respondent, with reference to the 
comments 
filed 
by 
the 
respondents, 
states 
that 
apprehension expressed in the writ petition are rather 
unfounded, inasmuch as the respondents are taking steps 
to adjust all the daily wages employees, however, number 
of employees is large and process initiated will take some 
time. He, however, ensures that no steps will be taken 
discriminatory regarding the petitioners.  
 
2. 
In view of the said statement of the learned counsel 
for the respondents, grievances stand redressed at the 
moment and the writ petition is accordingly disposed of.”  
 
Subsequently, in W.P. No. 5325 filed before the same High Court, the 
following order was passed: -  
“Learned counsel contends that the petitioners are old 
employees and their cases were being actively considered 
for regularization and in fact an assurance had been given 
to this Court as well earlier in W.P. No. 5122 of 2004. The 
contention is that in the garb of the impugned letter 
(Annex-M), in fact services of the petitioners were sought 
to be terminated and they were not being allowed to work. 
Subject to notice for an early date, no interference with 
the performance of the duties of the petitioners.”  
 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
17 
The learned counsel submitted that the PTCL having accepted the 
version of the respondents could not be permitted to blow hot and cold 
in the same breath and to violate their own undertaking, which had 
also been implemented. He stated that the PTCL had framed 
policy/criteria for adjustment/regularization of the daily wages 
employees converted to Telecom Foundation, namely, age not more 
than 50 years on 30.06.2005; minimum one month pay drawn as daily 
wages employee before conversion to Telecom Foundation; and daily 
wages employees who had entered PTCL up to 31.12.2001. The said 
policy was duly pleaded by the PTCL in W.P. No. 5325 of 2006 and 
W.P. No. 6143 of 2009 stating therein that the entire exercise 
regarding regularization of the said employees was being done in good 
faith to accommodate the left over daily wages employees. 
19. 
 
The 
learned 
counsel 
vehemently 
argued 
that 
the 
respondents were being discriminated in violation of the provisions of 
Articles 2A, 4 and 25 of the Constitution, as against the other 
operators performing services permanently with the PTCL or having 
been regularized in due course as operators etc., in the International 
Gateway Exchange performing similar functions. The learned counsel 
submitted that the respondents employed on daily wages were not 
regularized despite having rendered service for a period of more than 
two years as contract employees renewed from time to time while 
various other daily wages employees who were junior to them 
described in ground (b) of W.P. No. 6143 of 2009 allowed vide order 
dated 05.05.2010, the subject-matter of C.A. No. 852 of 2010, were 
regularized. He submitted that the contention of the appellants that 
the respondents being the employees of the Telecom Foundation, 
which is an industrial establishment were workmen as defined under 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
18 
the IRO and the W.P. Industrial and Commercial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 was held not relevant in 
Muhammad Zahid’s case for the purpose of redressal of grievance of 
the respondent-employees pertaining to discrimination, which could 
hardly be dealt with under the labour laws.  
20. 
 
The learned counsel further submitted that the question of 
invoking of jurisdiction of High Court under Article 199 of the 
Constitution by the employees of the PTCL was dealt with at great 
length in Muhammad Zahid’s case wherein the entire legislative history 
beginning with Telegraph Act, 1885 up to the Act of 1996 and the 
relevant case law on the subject were minutely examined and the 
controversy was set at rest once for all, by inter alia, holding as 
under:-  
(1) 
The Telecommunication undisputedly is the subject which 
pertains to one of the important affairs of the Federation 
dischargeable now through the PTCL; hence such entity 
involved in the same exercise of the sovereign powers, 
essentially falls within the context of ‘person’ as defined in 
clause (5) of the Article 199 of the Constitution, therefore, 
for the above reasons the grievance of the private 
respondents was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the 
High Court. 
(2) 
The claim of the appellants that the private respondents 
are the employees of the Foundation which is an ‘industrial 
establishment’ and are ‘workmen’ as defined in the 
relevant provisions of the I.R.O., 2002 and as given in the 
West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment 
(Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 in view of the above 
discussion, relating to the issuance of the writ by the High 
Court, seems to us not relevant to be dilated upon nor for 
the redressal of their grievance made in the writ petition 
which 
substantially 
pertains 
to 
the 
contention 
of 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
19 
discrimination, can hardly be dealt with under the Labour 
Laws. Undisputedly, the crux of the case of the private 
respondents has been that they are being discriminated as 
against 
the 
other 
Operators 
performing 
service 
permanently with the PTCL or having been regularized in 
due course as Operators in the International Gateway 
Exchange performing similar functions in the Exchange 
apparently amounts to have been grossly violated as 
against the guaranteed rights under Articles 2A, 4, and 25 
of the Constitution by depriving them of their emoluments 
besides all other service benefits etc., described in 
paragraph No.2 of the writ petition being paid to other 
Operators performing service in the said Exchange and 
similarly placed and, therefore, discriminatory treatment 
has been meted out to the writ petitioners employed on 
daily wages and not regularized despite having rendered 
service for a period of more than 2 years as contract 
employees renewed from time to time mentioned in Para. 
No.16 (supra), therefore, the impugned judgment is 
unexceptionable irrespective of the status of the private 
respondents be that of a ‘worker’ or a ‘civil servant’ or the 
‘contact employee’ having no nexus to the maintainability 
of the writ petition on the ground of discrimination meted 
out to them. 
 21.  
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and 
have gone through the impugned judgments as also the case-law cited 
at the bar in support of the respective contentions.  
22. 
 
The question whether the PTCL was a ‘person’ performing 
functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation within the 
contemplation of Article 199(5) of the Constitution was first dilated 
upon by this Court at great length in Muhammad Zahid’s case in which 
the plethora of case law was gone into and it was held that the 
employees of the erstwhile T&T Department transferred to the 
Corporation [PTC] under the relevant provisions of the Act of 1991 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
20 
and later on succeeded by the PTCL, discharging their functions and 
duties in the International Gateway Exchange as Operators were 
inducted permanently or regularized subsequently under the rules 
necessarily related to one of the affairs of the Federation within the 
purview of provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution; hence 
similar duties and functions in the International Gateway Exchange 
being discharged by the private respondents as Operators could not 
be distinguished to say that the same did not relate to the affairs of 
the Federation though conferred upon the Corporation [PTC], and 
finally 
upon 
the 
PTCL. 
It 
was 
further 
held 
that 
the 
Telecommunication undisputedly was the subject which pertained to 
one of the important affairs of the Federation dischargeable now 
through the PTCL; hence such entity involved in the same exercise of 
the sovereign powers, essentially fell within the connotations of the 
word `person' as defined in clause (5) of the Article 199 of the 
Constitution; accordingly, the grievance of the private respondents 
was amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. However, it 
was observed that the status of the private respondents, be that of a 
‘worker’ or a ‘civil servant’ or a ‘contact employee’ had no nexus to the 
maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of discrimination 
meted out to them.  
23. 
 
It may also be added here that as rightly held by a learned 
Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in the judgment impugned in 
C.A. No. 883 of 2010 that the Federal Government had first sold 12% 
shares through public subscription and then it sold 26% [all of B class 
shares] to the EIP and the remaining 62% shares of PTCL were still 
owned by the Federal Government and as long as the Government 
owned majority shares in said entity either in its own name, or 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
21 
whether wholly or partially in the name of any other organization or 
entity controlled by the Government, PTCL was and should continue to 
be amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of 
the Constitution. In this view of the matter, the argument that the 
PTCL was not a person within the meaning of Article 199(5) of the 
Constitution is not tenable.  
24.   
However, this Court, in the case of Principal Cadet Collage 
Kohat v. Mohammad Shoaib Qureshi (PLD 1984 SC 170), while dealing 
with the question, as to whether in absence of any breach of statutory 
provision the employees of a corporation can maintain an action for 
reinstatement, held that where the conditions of service of an 
employee of a statutory body were governed by statutory rules, any 
action prejudicial taken against him in derogation or in violation of the 
said rules could be set aside by a writ petition; however, where his 
terms and conditions were not governed by statutory rules but only by 
regulations, instructions or directions, which the institution or body, in 
which he was employed, had issued for its internal use, any violation 
thereof would not, normally, be enforced through a writ petition. 
Recently, this Court in Tanweer-ur-Rehman’s case (supra), while 
dealing with the issue of invoking of jurisdiction of the High Court 
under Article 199 of the Constitution by the employees of the PIAC, 
held that although the appellant-Corporation was performing functions 
in connection with the affairs of the Federation, but since the services 
of the respondent-employees were governed by the contracts 
executed by them with the employer, and not by the statutory rules 
framed under section 30 of the Pakistan International Airlines 
Corporation Act, 1956 with the prior approval of the Federal 
Government, therefore, they would be governed by the principle of 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
22 
‘Master and Servant’. On the question whether in absence of any 
breach of statutory provision, the employees of appellant-Corporation 
could maintain an action for reinstatement etc., it was observed that 
the said question needed no further discussion in view of the fact that 
this Court was not of the opinion that if a Corporation was performing 
its functions in connection with the affairs of the Federation, the 
aggrieved persons could approach the High Court by invoking its 
constitutional jurisdiction. But as far as the cases of the employees 
regarding their individual grievances were concerned, it was held that 
they were to be decided on their own merits, namely, if any adverse 
action was taken by the employer in violation of the statutory rules, 
only then such action would be amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 
Therefore, in absence of statutory rules, the principle of ‘Master and 
Servant’ would be applicable and such employees would be entitled to 
seek remedy permissible before the Court of competent jurisdiction. 
Similarly, in M.Tufail Hashmi (supra), after discussing the aforesaid 
two judgments in detail, it was held that the employees of those 
organizations, which were performing functions in connection with the 
affairs of Federation, were eligible to approach the High Court 
under Article 199 of the Constitution if their services were governed 
by statutory rules. It was further held that since the employees of 
AIOU, SME Bank and Pakistan Steel Mills, who approached the Service 
Tribunal for redressal of their grievances, were not enjoying the 
protection of statutory rules, therefore, the Service Tribunal had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon such matters and they would be 
governed by the principle of ‘Master and Servant’.  
25. 
 
The learned counsel for the respondents though placed on 
record a copy of the Pakistan Telecommunication Corporation Service 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
23 
Regulations, 1996 framed under section 20 of the Act of 1991, but 
failed to show whether the said Regulations were duly notified in the 
official gazette. However, even if such Regulations were duly made, 
they were not holding the field after the repeal of the Act of 1991 
under which the said Regulations were made. Further, as per 
Regulation 1.02 thereof, the said Regulations would not apply to a 
person employed on contract or on work-charged basis or who is paid 
from contingencies. They would be governed by the principle of 
‘Master and Servant’.  Applying the principles of law enunciated in the 
above cited judgments to the case in hand, in absence of statutory 
rules, writ petitions filed by the employees of the PTCL were not 
maintainable.  
26.   
The argument of the learned counsel that the respondents 
were the employees of the PTCL from the date of appointment, regular 
after 183 days of service and entitled to same wages as were being 
paid to regular employees of the PTCL is untenable. It may be 
observed that as provided in clause (g) of Order 1 of the Schedule to 
the W.P. (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, a contract worker is a 
workman who works on contract basis for a specific period of 
remuneration to be calculated on piece rate basis, while clause (b) of 
Order 1 of the Schedule to the W.P. (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 
1968, provides that a ‘permanent’ workman is a workman who has 
been engaged on work of permanent basis likely to last more than 
nine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of 
three months in the same or another occupation in the industrial or 
commercial establishment, including breaks due to sickness, accident, 
leave, lock-out, strike (not being an illegal lock-out or strike) or 
involuntary closure of the establishment, and includes a badli who has 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
24 
been employed for a continuous period of three months or for one 
hundred and eighty-three days during any period of twelve 
consecutive months. In this view of the matter, an aggrieved person 
falling within the definition of workman would be well within his rights 
to seek remedy at the appropriate forum as provided in Order 12 of 
the Schedule referred to above. However, as held in PIAC v. Sindh 
Labour Court No.5 (PLD 1980 SC 323), the respondents had been 
employed, not on permanent basis, but on contract and would be 
governed by the provisions of the contract of service. The nature of 
employment of the respondents can be easily understood from a 
perusal of a contract of service entered by Muhammad Idrees Khan, 
respondent No. 1 in C.A. No. 474 of 2010 with the Telecom 
Foundation, which, inter alia, provides as under: -  
“TELECOM FOUNDATION 
 
SHORT TERM CONTRACT 
Mr. Muhammad Idrees Khan s/o Haji Chamnay Khan is hereby 
contracted in Telecom Foundation as Cable Guard with effect from 
_______ at the rate of Rs.153/- per day (Rs.4600/- per month). He is 
directed to report to A.E. O.F.C. (PTCL) Peshawar for further 
deployment as and where required by them on the following terms and 
conditions: -  
 
1. 
PERIOD OF CONTRACT 
Service shall be on contract for a period of Eighty Nine 
(89) days.  
 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
9. 
TERMINATION OF CONTRACT  
This contract shall be liable to termination any time 
without notice even on account of ______ political 
activities, trade unions and due to misconduct and 
unsatisfactory service. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Manager (M&T) 
 
 
 
 
 
    Telecom Foundation 
 
I, Muhammad Idrees Khan s/o Chamnay Khan resident of 
Village Bab-e-Jadeed P.O. Taru Jabba Tehsil & District Nowshera, have 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
25 
carefully read the above instructions and agree to the terms and 
conditions for the employment as Cable Guard on contract basis.”  
   
All the employees having entered into contracts of service on the same 
or similar terms and conditions have no vested right to seek 
regularization of their employment, which is discretionary with the 
master. The master is well within his rights to retain or dispense with 
the services of an employee on the basis of satisfactory or otherwise 
performance. The contract employees have no right to invoke writ 
jurisdiction, particularly in the instant case where their services have 
been terminated on completion of period of contract. Since they fall 
within the definition of workman, they would be entitled to one 
month’s notice or salary in lieu thereof, as permissible to them under 
the rule of master and servant.  
27. 
 
As to the contention of Mr. Qamar Afzal, ASC that the 
respondent-employees had been discriminated in terms of Article 25 of 
the Constitution, suffice it to say that in the light of the law laid down 
in I.A. Sharwani v. Government of Pakistan (1991 SCMR 1041), 
reasonable classification is permissible. The private respondents in 
Muhammad Zahid’s case were already in service whereas the private 
respondents herein were working with the PTCL either on contract or 
on daily wages basis, therefore, the rule of ‘Master and Servant’ would 
be applicable. In this view of the matter, Article 25 is not attracted in 
the present case.   
28. 
 
The cases of Engineer Naraindas v. Federation of Pakistan 
(2002 SCMR 82) and Ikram Bari v. National Bank of Pakistan through 
President (2005 SCMR 100) stand on a different factual matrix, 
inasmuch as the services of temporary employees (godown staff, daily 
wagers, etc.) were terminated whereas in the instant case the 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
26 
employees were working with the PTCL under contracts of service. 
Even otherwise, the said case had arisen out of a judgment of the 
Federal Service Tribunal.  
29. 
 
As to the case of the employees seeking the benefit of 
VSS, no relief could be granted to them by the High Court in view of 
the non-maintainability of their writ petitions on the ground that their 
services were not governed by any statutory rules and even the VSS 
was not offered under, or in terms of, any statutory provisions.  
30. 
 
In the light of the above, the case of Muhammad Zahid in 
which relief was granted on the ground of discrimination irrespective of 
the status of the employees, be that of a worker, or a civil servant or a 
contract employee could not be relied upon in the instant case.  
31. 
 
As regards the objection regarding non-filing of Intra-Court 
Appeals before filing the petitions for leave to appeal in the instant 
cases taken by the learned counsel for the respondents-employees, 
suffice it to say that though a similar view was taken in some of the 
cases, namely, Imtiaz Ali Malik v. Mst. Surrya Begun (1979 SCMR 22), 
Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. Samina Masood (PLD 
2005 SC 831) and Accountant General for Pakistan (Revenue) 
through Auditor-General v. Zia Mohy-ud-Din (PLD 2008 SC 164), but 
in a number of cases, such as, Mst. Shohrat Bano v. Ismail Dada 
Adam Soomar (1968 SCMR 574), Punjab Employees Social Security 
Institution Lahore and others v. Manzoor Hussain Khan (1992 SCMR 
441), Province of Punjab through Secretary Excise and Taxation, 
Government of Punjab v. Sargodha Textile Mills Ltd., Sargodha (PLD 
2005 SC 988) and Commissioner of Income Tax v. Messrs Media 
Network (PLD 2006 SC 787), this Court has held that requiring of filing 
ICA is a rule of practice for regulating the exercise of discretion which 
C.A. 468 of 2010 etc. 
 
 
27 
does not oust or abridge the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court 
and in certain exceptional circumstances this Court can entertain 
petitions, or as the case may be, direct appeals even where the 
remedy of ICA under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1973 
has not been availed by a party. We may observe that in the first 
instance no such objection was taken at any earlier stage of the 
proceedings. Further, some of the appellants-employees have also 
directly approached this Court against the impugned judgments 
passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court. Therefore, it 
would not be appropriate to examine the question at this stage, in 
view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases.  
32. 
 
As far as the non-implementation of the order is 
concerned, it may be observed that if an order is bad or cannot be 
implemented, it would make no difference.  
33. 
 
Writ petitions, which are the subject matter of Civil 
Appeals No. 883 to 892 of 2010 also suffered from laches, hence the 
same were not maintainable on that score as well.   
34. 
 
As a result of the above discussion, the appeals filed by 
the PTCL are allowed and the judgments/orders impugned therein are 
set-aside while the appeals filed by the employees are dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Announced on ____ day of December, 2010  
At Islamabad.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING  
 
