IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
Present: 
 
Mr. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
 
Civil Petitions No.1885 and 2259 of 2017 
Against the judgment dated 30.3.2017 passed 
by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in WPs 
No.832-P & 843-P of 2017.    
  
Olas Khan    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in CP 1885/17)  
 
Chairman, NAB thr. Its Chairman and others  
 
 
(in CP 2259/17)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Petitioner(s) 
VERSUS 
Chairman, NAB thr. Its Chairman and others  
 
 
(in CP 1885/17) 
Sahibzada Alamgir  
 
 
 
 
 
 
(in CP 2259/17) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Respondent(s) 
 
For the Petitioner(s): 
 
Syed Mudassar Ameer, ASC 
 
(in CP 1885/17) 
 
For the Petitioner(s): 
 
Mr. Inamul-Haq, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB 
 
(in CP 2259/17)  
 
 
Mr. Arshad Qayyum, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB  
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Junaid Iqbal, IO  
 
For the Respondent(s):   
Mr. Inamul-Haq, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB 
(in CP 1885/17)  
 
 
Mr. Arshad Qayyum, Spl. Prosecutor, NAB  
 
 
 
 
 
Junaid Iqbal, IO 
 
For the Respondent(s):  
Mr. Shumail Butt, ASC    
(in CP 2259/17)  
 
 
Date of Hearing:  
 
03.08.2017 
 
ORDER 
 
Mushir Alam, J.-  Through this common judgment we intend 
to decide CPLA No.1885 of 2017 by the petitioner Olas Khan, challenging 
judgment dated 30.3.2017 passed by the learned Bench of the Peshawar 
High Court, in Writ Petition No.832-P of 2017, declining bail to him in 
NAB Reference and through the same judgment conceded bail to 
Saibzada Alamgir, facing trial under same NAB Reference under section 
497 Cr. P.C, which exercise of Jurisdiction under code of Criminal 
Procedure has been impugned and cancellation of bail is sought by the 
Chairman NAB through CPLA No.2259 of 2017. 
2. 
 
Learned Special Prosecutor, NAB has with vehemence 
questioned the Jurisdiction of High Court to concede bail to a person 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
2 
accused of an offence under section 9 (a) of the NAB Ordinance, 1999. 
According to him section 9(b) of the Ordinance ibid, is non-obstinate 
provision and all offences under the NAO, 1999, are made non-bailable 
and general provisions regulating pre-arrest or post-arrest bail or release 
of person from detention, suspension of sentence, in terms of Section 
426, 491, 497, 498, and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 
1908 have been excluded in application. To support his contentions he 
placed reliance on large number of cases from different High Courts and 
of this Court reported as Mrs.Shahida Faisal and others versus 
Federation of Pakistan and others (2001 SCMR 294) and Anwer Saifuallh 
Khan versus The State and three others (2001 SCMR 1040), wherein it 
has been held that jurisdiction of both the Accountability Court as well 
as the High Court is ousted in terms of Section 9(b) of the Ordinance, 
ibid in the matter of bail to a person facing reference under the National 
Accountability Bureau Ordinance, (NAO, 1999). Though in both the cited 
cases, it was held that jurisdiction to concede bail under Article 199 of 
the Constitution would be available. In the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah 
and others versus General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan 
and others (PLD 2000 SC 869) in paragraph 7 of the operative part at 
page 1222 it was also observed that “validity of the National 
Accountability Ordinance will be examined separately in appropriate 
proceedings at appropriate stage”.  
3. 
 
Challenge to the jurisdiction of High Court to concede bail to 
persons facing reference for charged under the NAO, 1999 is not novel; 
and has been agitated time and again since very inception of the NAO, 
1999. Section 9 (b) ibid; prior to amendment read as follows:- 
“All offences under this Order shall be non-bailable and 
notwithstanding anything contained in sections *(426, 
491), 497, 498 and 561-A or any other provision of the 
Code or any other law for the time being in force no Court, 
including High Court shall have jurisdiction to grant bail to 
any person accused of any offence under this Order.” 
(*Inserted by Ordinance IV/2000 dated 3.2.2000).  
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
3 
 
4. 
 
In terms of Section 9 (b) of NAO, 1999 as reproduced above 
all offences under the NAO, 1999 are non-bailable and general provisions 
regulating suspension of sentence, order in the nature of habeas corpus, 
pre-arrest and or post-arrest bail in exercise of power under Sections 
426, 491, 497, 498, and 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 
1908 have been excluded in application. Both the cases of Mrs.Shahida 
Faisal (Supra) and Anwer Saifuallh Khan (Supra) relied upon by the 
learned Special Prosecutor, NAB are based on the exposition of un-
amended section 9(b) of NAO, 1999 as reproduced above and the 
judgments in the cited cases were penned down on 10.7.2000 and 
21.2.2001 respectively and prior to  judgment rendered by a four 
member Bench of this Court in the celebrated judgment rendered on 
24.4.2001 in the case of  Khan Asfandyar Wali and others versus 
Federation of Pakistan through Cabinet Division Islamabad and others 
(PLD 2001 Supreme Court 607), when this Court had the occasion to 
examine the vires of various provisions including section 9(b) of NAO, 
1999. In paragraph 197 at page 885 of the cited judgment, principle 
laiddown in the case of Syed Zafar Ali Shah (PLD 2000 Supreme Court 869), was 
reiterated that the “the power of Superior Courts under Article 199 of the 
Constitution remaining available to their full extent, notwithstanding 
anything contained in any legislative instruction enacted by the Chief 
Executive Whereas, section 9(b) of the NAB Ordinance purports to deny all 
Courts, including the High Court the jurisdiction under section 426, 
491,497, 498 and 561-A of Code of Criminal Procedure or any other law 
for the time being in force to grant bail to any person accused on an offence 
under the NAB Ordinance. It is well settled that the Superior Courts have 
the power to grant bail under Article 199 of the Constitution, independent 
of any statutory source of jurisdiction such as section 497 of the Criminal 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
4 
Procedure Code, section 9(b) of the NAB Ordinance to that extent is ultra 
vires the Constitution. Accordingly, the same be amended accordingly.”   
5. 
 
Consequent upon judgment rendered in the case of Khan 
Asfandyar Wali (PLD 2001 SC-607 @ 885), through Ordinance No. XXXV of 2001 
dated 10.8.2001 (PLJ 2001 Federal Statute 403), in Section 9(b) ibid; 
after the words “no Court” words, “Including High Court” were omitted. 
The amended provision, now read as follows:- 
“All offences under the Order shall be non-bailable and 
notwithstanding any thing contained in sections 426,491, 
497, 498 and 561A or any other provision of the Code or 
any other law for the time being in force no Court,** shall 
have jurisdiction to grant bail to any person accused of 
any offence under this Order.” (**Including High Court” omitted) 
 
6. 
 
It may be observed, that merely omission of words “including 
High Court” in section 9(b) of the NAO, 1999 did not effect the legal 
implication; nor made any impact on overall scheme of the provision 
regulating either pre-arrest or post-arrest bail; offences under the NAO, 
1999 remained non bailable and a person accused of an offence there 
under, in view of non obstinate language used in section 9(b) ibid; 
remedies available to general Courts of criminal jurisdiction under 
“sections 426, 491, 497, 498 and 561-A or any other provision of the Code 
or any other law for the time being in force” remained beyond the pale of 
NAO, 1999.   
7. 
 
NAO, 1999 is a special statute, hybrid in nature, it is fusion 
of criminal liability and civil obligations, enacted with an aim to take 
effective measures for detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy 
trial of cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, misuse or abuse of 
power, and misappropriation of property and recovery of the same from 
the beneficiary or those found to have misappropriated such property 
and restoration of the same to the rightful owner thereof. It create special 
genre of offences and wrongs. 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
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8. 
 
Amended provision of section 9(b) ibid; came up for 
consideration of this Court in the case of Muhammad Saeed Mehdi versus 
The State and 2 others (2002 SCMR 282) and at page 289, view 
expressed by the full Bench of the Lahore High Court in the case of 
Anwer Saifullah v. The State and four others (PLD 2000 Lahore 564) “that the 
High Court had jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution to grant 
bail to a person accused of an offence under NAB Ordinance in appropriate 
cases in that the bar of jurisdiction there under being in the nature of 
legislative enactment could not take away the jurisdiction of the High 
Court under Article 199 of the Constitution” was approved. In another case 
reported as Ch. Zufiqar Ali versus The State (PLD 2002 Supreme Court 
546) in the concluding part of paragraph 8 at page 552 it was held “After 
the amendment, the jurisdiction of the Accountability Court for grant of bail 
remained ousted, whereas after the omission of words “including the High 
Court” the High Court has jurisdiction to grant bail in NAB cases under 
Article 199 of the Constitution as held in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali” 
which view was also affirmed in the case of Abdul Aziz Khan Niazi versus 
The State through Chairman, NAB, Islamabad (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 
668) in paragraph 7 at page 675, it was held that “the refusal of bail by 
the High Court in its constitutional jurisdiction merely for the reason that 
the concept of discretion for grant of bail under Article 199 of the 
Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is different to that of 
under section 497/498 Cr.P.C is not proper. The discretion of High Court 
under the Constitution and under ordinary law in bail matter is based 
almost on same principle.”  This view was followed in the case of Haji 
Ghulam Ali versus The State through A.G., N.W.F.P., Peshawar (2003 
SCMR 597); wherein, this Court had the occasion to analyze the legal 
implications of section 9(b) of the NAB Ordinance, 1999 as amended, at 
page 602 of the cited judgment it was held “We may point out that the use 
of word “notwithstanding” in the said section would still exclude the 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
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applicability of section 497 Cr.P.C in the cases under NAB Ordinance, 
1999. However, as held in above said Judgment (Ch. Zulfiqar Ali supra) the power 
of High Court for grant of bail in writ jurisdiction would be available and 
an accused of an offence under NAB Ordinance, 1999 is at liberty to take 
any ground for grant of bail on the basis of which bail can be granted 
under section 497, Cr.P.C. The conclusion is that even after amendment in 
section 9(b) of NAB Ordinance, 1999 the legal position regarding the 
maintainability of a bail application under section 497, Cr.P.C in a case 
under the said Ordinance was not changed”  at page 604 it was further 
affirmed that “In amended section 9(b) of NAB Ordinance, 1999, except the 
omission of words “High Court” no change was made, therefore, the legal 
position regarding maintainability of bail application under section 497 
Cr.P.C before the High Court in the case under the NAB Ordinance, 1999 
would remain as such and an accused of such an offence cannot maintain 
a bail application before the High Court under section 497, Cr.P.C.” In the 
case of Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and another 
versus Asif Baig Muhammad and others (2004 SCMR 91), this Court 
declined to interfere in bail granting order passed by the High Court in 
exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, 1973. 
9. 
 
The view expressed by this Court in the case of  Anwer 
Saifullah Khan (Supra) was successively followed and resonates in the 
cases of  Ch. Zulfiqar  Ali (PLD 2002 SC 546), Muhammad Saeed Mehdi (2002 
SCMR 282), Muhammad Jehangir Badar versus The State and others (PLD 
2003 Supreme Court 525), Abdul Aziz Khan Niazi versus The State 
through Chairman, NAB, Islamabad (PLD 2003 Supreme Court 668), 
Chairman, National Accountability Bureau, Islamabad and another versus 
Asif Baig Muhammad and others (2004 SCMR 91 @ 93), National 
Accountability Bureau versus Khalid Masood and another (2005 SCMR 
1291) and recently in the case of Himesh Khan versus National 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
7 
Accountability (NAB) Bureau, Lahore and others (2015 SCMR 1092, 
paragraph 7 & 8 @ 1095) and so also in  un-reported judgment  dated 
26.8.2016 titled as Chairman NAB versus Bakht Zameen & another (in 
CP No.1542 of 2016), in all such cases bail was considered under 
Article 199 and or Article 184 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 
respectively and not under section 497 Cr.P.C. 
10. 
 
Contention of the learned Special Prosecutor, NAB that 
jurisdiction pertaining to grant of bail by the High Court is concurrent 
jurisdiction with the trial Court, therefore, ouster of jurisdiction of the 
Accountability Court ousts the jurisdiction of the High Court, has not 
impressed us. Accountability Court has no jurisdiction to grant either 
pre-arrest and or post-arrest bail, as provisions of Cr.P.C regulating 
grant or otherwise pre-arrest and or post-arrest bail in cases under NAO, 
1999 in view of non-obstinate provisions of section 9(b) of NAO, 1999 are 
inapplicable. However, position as regards High Court and this Court is 
altogether different, superior Courts extract jurisdiction under Article 
199 and 184 respectively of the Constitution, 1973 to consider and grant 
bail or otherwise, in cases under NAO, 1999 and not under section 9(b) 
and or 17(c) the NAO, 1999, which jurisdiction, neither can be taken 
away nor, made subservient through sub-ordinate legislation. Contention 
of the learned Special Prosecutor NAB is correct to the extent that the 
assumption of jurisdiction by the Peshawar High Court to concede bail 
under section 497 Cr.P.C to the Respondent Sahibzada Alamgir (in CPLA 
2259 of 2017), is not available. However, in view of the stated legal position, 
such objections retreats merely of form bereft of any substance. Exercise 
of jurisdiction by the High Court to concede bail in instant case cannot 
be set at naught merely because such jurisdiction was erroneously 
assumed under section 497 Cr. P.C, though admittedly jurisdiction to 
concede bail or otherwise was very much vested in the High Court under 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
8 
Article 199 of the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, and such assumption 
of jurisdiction in the given facts and circumstance can always be 
considered under Article 199 of the Constitution, 1973. It is now settled 
position in law that merely citing or relying on wrong provision of law to 
assume jurisdiction over a lis is of no consequence, provided the Court 
other wise has jurisdiction under the Constitution, statue or any other 
provision of law to pass order as has happened in the instant case. For 
reference one may see Mst.Safia Bibi versus Mst.Aisha Bibi (1982 SCMR 
494), Jane Margrete William versus Abdul Hamid Mian (1994 SCMR 
1555), Rauf B Kadir versus State Bank of Pakistan and another (PLD 
2002 Supreme Court 1111).  
11. 
 
While assuming jurisdiction under section 497 Cr.P.C 
learned bench of the High Court, was influenced and has misconstrued 
section 17 of the NAO, 1999 which makes the provisions of Cr.P.C 
including procedure for session trial (per chapter XX-A of the Cr.P.C)  
applicable, unless otherwise, provided in the NAO, 1999 itself.  Section 
17 (c) ibid; librated the Accountability Court from the procedural and 
technical trapping of Criminal Procedure Code, giving it authority not 
only to “dispense with any provision of the Code” and at the same time 
empowered it “to follow such procedure as it may deemed fit in 
circumstances of case.” [17(c) ibid;]  However, freedom to “follow such 
procedure as it may deemed fit” does not empower the Accountability 
Court or for that matter the High Court to assume jurisdiction and or 
invoke provisions of Cr.P.C, which are specifically excluded by virtue of 
section 9(b) ibid; from application in cases triable under NAO, 1999 in 
ostensible exercise of power under section 17(c) ibid; of the NAO, 1999. 
Such enabling power of the Accountability Court were conditioned by 
this Court in the case of Khan Asfandyar Wali (PLD 2001 SC 607@ 926), “not 
exercise its discretion arbitrarily but on sound judicial principles by 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
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assigning valid reasons.,”  such exercise of discretion was also held to be 
“Justiciable in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of Superior Court”.  
Excluding the words “including High Court” from Section 9 (b) ibid; as 
noted above has not brought about any change on overall scheme of the 
provision regulating matters under the exclusionary provisions of Code of 
Criminal Procedure mentioned therein including Sections 497 and 498 
Cr.P.C regulating pre-arrest and post-arrest bail. 
12. 
 
Judgment in the case of Muhammad Saeed Mehdi (2002 SCMR 
282) was not appreciate by the learned bench of the High Court in its true 
perspective. In the judgment it was specifically observed that the  “High 
Court has jurisdiction to grant bail in NAB cases under Article 199 of the 
Constitution” relevant part of paragraph 8 of cited judgment is 
reproduced in preceding paragraph 8 above and, perhaps attention of the 
learned bench was also not drawn to the cases of Haji Ghulam Ali, supra. 
(2003 SCMR 597) @ 602), Himesh Khan versus National Accountability Bureau (2015 
SCMR 1092 @ 1095)  In view of the forgoing discussion, conclusion of the 
learned Bench of the Peshawar High Court; as contained in paragraphs 
12 to 15 of the impugned judgment to the effect that High Court by 
virtue of section 17 (c) ibid; can import and or exercise power contained 
in Sections 491, 496, 497, 498, 561-A Cr.P.C, is not correct exposition of 
law, to such an extent impugned order cannot be sustained.; 
 
Now adverting to the merit of the respective Petitions.  
 
 
Civil Petition No.1885 of 2017 
13. 
  
Petitioner Olas Khan in CPLA 1885 of 2017 was declined bail 
by the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in Writ Petition No.832-P of 2017 
vide impugned judgment dated 30.03.2017.  
14. 
 
Petitioner was Director General on Farm Water Management, 
Department and Provincial Project Director for the Project of “Water 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
10 
Conservation and Productivity Enhancement through High Efficiency 
(Pressurized) Irrigation System”. Allegation against the present petitioner 
has been highlighted in the investigation report dated 19.01.2017 
available at page 37 (in CPLA 2259/2017), his role is highlighted in 
paragraph No.10 (1-6) thereof. It is specifically mentioned that he has 
issued various work orders for the implementation of the scheme without 
insuring the 20% farmers’ share which is in utter disregard to the 
Implementation Plan given in PC-1 and he has even released the funds 
for dropped scheme causing colossal loss to the national exchequer. It 
was further noted that on physical verification that out of 182 schemes 
only six schemes are functional and rest of 176 schemes are non-
functional resulting in waste of national resources. Learned bench of the 
High Court on the strength of available record declining bail vide 
impugned order reasoning is contained in paragraphs 17-19 thereof; 
which are reproduced as follows:- 
 
“17. 
The record reveals that the accused/petitioner had 
advanced 20% mobilization amount even to those companies, 
persons, whose works were dropped and even the schemes were 
not found feasible. 
18. 
It is also depicted and palpable on available record that 
many schemes for which more than 80% amount had released 
were not existed on grounds but those were commissioned and 
funds were released with active connivance of the Project director. 
19. 
As it is settled principle of law, that deep appreciation of 
facts, while disposing of bail petition or constitutional petition, in 
matter of detention, is not requirement of law, but prima facie 
from the inquiry against the petitioner Olas Khan, sufficient and 
reasonable documentary proof is available which makes out a 
case, in term of Section 9 of the NAB Ordinance, 1999 against 
him so he does not deserve any concession of bail at this stage. 
So his petition for release on bail in the instant matter is declined 
and the WP No.843-P/2017 filed by him, is dismissed 
accordingly.” 
 
15. 
 
Learned ASC for the petitioner that after the 18th 
Constitutional Amendment in July, 2011 the subject project devolved 
unto respective Provinces, in instant case Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and 
that the Petitioner also retired from service in the year 2013 and since 
July 2011. He is no more associated or responsible for alleged corruption 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
11 
and or corrupt practice. He laid much emphasis on the judgment passed 
by the Peshawar High Court in Writ Petition 1208-P of 2014 dated 
29.11.2016 wherein, the High Court directed payment of outstanding 
amount for the work done of the verified and completed schemes.   
16. 
 
It was therefore, urged that the Petitioner is not responsible. 
And the present exercise is uncalled. He further relies on the reports so 
submitted pursuant to the directions of the Peshawar High Court in the 
referred petition supports the petitioner’s claim. He also relied upon 
report of the representative of NESPAK and HESCON (page 178 to 180 of 
CPLA 1885/17) per direction of the High Court, in the referred Writ 
Petition to seek exoneration from any corrupt practice as alleged. 
Learned ASC further referred to letter dated 22.05.2013 (at page 170), 
and argued that adjustment of 20% being farmer share was not 
deposited for the reason that instead of cash the farmers who were the 
beneficiary of the project contributed in form of labour as approved by 
the competent authority, which fact has been certified by the Secretary, 
Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Agriculture and Live Stock & 
Coop: Department, Peshawar. It was contended by the learned ASC for 
the Petitioner that it is a fit case to enlarge the Petitioner on bail. 
17. 
 
Learned Special Prosecutor NAB controverted the stance 
adopted by the petitioner. He has drawn our attention to the various 
portions of the Project PC-1, documents of the subject project to show 
that it was petitioner’s responsibility to ensure its due compliance being 
the Director General, as well Project Director on Farm Water 
Management, Department. He has placed on record various work orders 
and the copies of the cheques issued to the contractors without due 
complaisance of all the requirements and in abdication of his authority 
as detailed in the PC-1, filed through CMA No.5314 of 2014. He has also 
drawn our attention to various monitoring letters addressed to the 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
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petitioner to ensure that his “report” reflect true progress of work, quality 
of material delivered at site and quality of work mentioned” and he was 
directed to address the deficiency as noted in the monitoring reports, 
which were not paid any heed. As regards the reliance on the proceeding 
in the High Court by certain contractors, it was urged that such 
proceedings did not relate to the conduct of the petitioner nor relate to 
the corruption and corrupt practice committed by persons associated 
with the monitoring and or execution of the project, therefore of no 
relevance, It was contended by the Special Prosecutor NAB that the 
report of the representatives of NESPAK and HEISCON, was also 
examined by the successors of the petitioner vide letter dated 09.12.2013 
(page 181 of the paper book))  and it was noted that same is based on 
discrepant contents.   
18. 
 
We have heard the arguments and perused the record with 
the assistance of learned ASC for the Petitioner and Special Prosecutor 
NAB.  At the very outset it may be observed that original project period 
was five years effective July, 2007 to July, 2011. As claimed by the 
Petitioner subject project, devolved on the Province of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa, in July, 2011 and that the Petitioner retired in the year 
2013, fact remains that the corruption and or corrupt practice, of which 
the Petitioner is accused of pertains to a period prior to devolution of the 
Project on the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and or prior to his retirement. We 
have noted that PC-1, all the work orders, cheques, monitoring reports 
etc. placed on record through CMAs 5314 of 2017 and CMA 5383 of 
2017, were all signed and issued by the Petitioner pertains to the 
Petitioner during his tenure as the Project Director.  As regard the 
proceeding in Writ Petition 2197 of 2012 and orders passed thereon 
dated 22.06.2016 before the Peshawar High Court is concerned, as 
rightly pointed out by the learned  Special Prosecutor NAB, same were 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
13 
not in relation to the conduct of the Petitioner, therefore, have no bearing 
on the investigation, and or proceedings under the NAO, 1999. The, 
report of the representative of NESPAK and HEISCON, (pages 178-180), 
also has no bearing on the allegations and charged against the Petitioner. 
The report does not exonerate the Petitioner, on the contrary it highlights 
certain deficiencies, in the performance of project, as also noted by the 
successor to the Petitioner in his letter dated 9.12.2013 (page 181) less 
commented better it is as it may prejudice case of either side.  
19. 
 
In view of the foregoing, we are not persuaded by the learned 
ASC for the Petitioner, to take any exception to the view taken by the 
Peshawar High Court declining bail to the Petitioner which is accordingly 
declined, (one may refer to the cases cited as The State versus Haji 
Kabeer Khan (PLD 2005 Supreme Court 364) and Haji Ghulam Ali 
versus The State through A.G., N.W.F.P. Peshawar and another (2003 
SCMR 597). It appears that entire record of the subject Project has been 
collected; it would not take much time to produce the same and complete 
the trial preferably within a period of four months.        
Civil Petition No. 2259 of 2017 
20. 
 
Now adverting to the case of Saibzada Alamgir-Respondent (in 
CPLA 2259 of 2017), bail was conceded to him by the Peshawar High Court, in 
consideration of reasoning set down in Paragraph No.20 of the impugned 
judgment inter alia on the ground “As the inquiry is already completed 
against the accused, where he had (been) charged only for connivance and 
no any direct allegation had  (been) brought by the NAB, therefore, keeping 
in view his position and kind of duties, assigned to  him as Deputy 
Director, for the Northern region, he deserves to be released on bail”.  
21. 
 
We have considered the grounds seeking cancellation of bail 
of Saibzada Alamgir-Respondent and noted that cancellation is sought 
essentially on the jurisdictional ground and on merit it was not contested 
Civil Petitions No.1885  & 2259 of 2017 
 
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seriously. Jurisdictional grounds have been elaborately dealt with in 
preceding paragraph. We have gone through the impugned judgment, it 
is well reasoned. Consideration for cancellation of bail, are altogether 
different and distinct from consideration for the grant of bail, one may 
see National Accountability Bureau versus Khalid Masood and another 
(2005 SCMR 1291). 
22. 
 
Learned Special Prosecutor, NAB was not able to show any 
extraordinary or exceptional circumstances that may warrant recall of 
the order of the grant of bail by the High Court. Accordingly, the Civil 
Petition No.2259 of 2017 is dismissed and leave declined.   
 
Judge 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
ISLAMABAD 
Announced by me in open Court 
on__23rd October______,2017.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Judge 
approved for reporting 
