IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(REVIEW JURISDICTION) 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA 
MR. JUSTICE EJAZ AFZAL KHAN 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED 
MR. JUSTICE SH. AZMAT SAEED 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 297 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016   
(Against the judgment dated 28.07.2017 passed by this Court in Constitution 
Petitions No. 29 & 30 of 2016 and 03 of 2017).  
 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi. 
 
 
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
AND 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 298 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 30 OF 2016   
 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 299 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 03 OF 2017   
 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Siraj ul Haq and others. 
 
 
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 303 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016   
 
Senator Muhammad Ishaq Dar. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 308 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016   
 
Maryam Nawaz Sharif and others. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 309 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016   
 
Maryam Nawaz Sharif and others. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
2
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 310 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 29 OF 2016   
 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Imran Ahmed Khan Niazi and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 311 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 30 OF 2016   
 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CIVIL REVIEW PETITION NO. 312 OF 2017 IN CONST. PETITION NO. 03 OF 2017   
 
Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif. 
 
 
                …Petitioner(s) 
Versus 
Siraj ul Haq and others. 
 
 
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
AND 
CMA. NO. 6114 OF 2017 IN CONSTITUTION PETITION NO. 30 OF 2016.   
 
Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed. 
 
 
 
                …Applicant(s) 
Versus 
Federation of Pakistan and others.  
 
 
      …Respondent(s) 
 
 
 
 
………………………………………… 
 
For the petitioner(s):  
Khawaja Harris Ahmed, Sr. ASC.  
 
 
 
 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. 
 
 
 
 
(in CRPs. 297-299 & 310-312/2017) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Shahid Hamid, Sr. ASC. 
 
 
 
 
Dr. Tariq Hassan, ASC. 
 
 
 
 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR. 
 
 
 
 
(in CRP.303/17). 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Salman Akram Raja, ASC. 
 
 
 
 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR.  
 
 
 
 
(in CRPs.308-309/2017). 
 
For the respondent(s): 
N.R.  
 
On Court’s call : 
 
Mr. Waqas Qadeer Dar, P. G. Accountability.  
 
For the applicant : 
 
In person (in CMA.6114/2017). 
 
 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
 
12th to 15th September, 2017. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-.-. 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
3
 
 
 
J U D G M E N T 
 
 
 
EJAZ AFZAL KHAN, J.- These review petitions have arisen out of 
the judgment dated 28.07.2017 of this Court whereby Constitution Petitions 
No. 29, 30 of 2016 and 03 of 2017 have been disposed of in the terms as 
under:-  
“FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT 
 
The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) shall within six weeks from 
the date of this judgment prepare and file before the Accountability 
Court, Rawalpindi/Islamabad, the following References, on the basis of 
the material collected and referred to by the Joint Investigating Team 
(JIT) in its report and such other material as may be available with the 
Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) and NAB having any nexus with 
assets mentioned below or which may subsequently become available 
including material that may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal 
Assistance requests sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions:-  
 
a) 
Reference against Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, (respondents 
No. 1), Maryam Nawaz Sharif (Maryam Safdar), (Respondent No. 6), 
Hussain Nawaz Sharif (Respondent No. 7), Hassan Nawaz Sharif 
(Respondent No. 8) and Capt. (Retd). Muhammad Safdar (Respondent 
No. 9) relating to the Avenfield properties (Flats No. 16, 16-A, 17 and 
17-A Avenfield House, Park Lane, London, United Kingdom). In 
preparing and filing this Reference, the NAB shall also consider the 
material already collected during the course of investigations conducted 
earlier, as indicated in the detailed judgments; 
 
b) 
Reference against respondents No. 1, 7 and 8 regarding Azizia 
Steel Company and Hill Metal Establishment, as indicated in the main 
judgment; 
 
c) 
Reference against respondents No. 1, 7 and 8 regarding the 
Companies mentioned in paragraph 9 of the judgment unanimously 
rendered by Mr. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed 
and Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan; 
 
d) 
Reference against respondent No. 10 for possessing assets and 
funds beyond his known sources of income, as discussed in paragraph 9 
of the judgment unanimous rendered by Mr. Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mr. 
Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed and Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan; 
 
e) 
NAB shall also include in the proceedings all other persons 
including Sheikh Saeed, Musa Ghani, Kashif Masood Qazi, Javaid Kiyani 
and Saeed Ahmed, who have any direct or indirect nexus or connection 
with the actions of respondents No. 1, 6, 7, 8 and 10 leading to 
acquisition of assets and funds beyond their known sources of income; 
 
f) 
NAB may file supplementary Reference(s) if and when any other 
asset, which is not prima facie reasonably accounted for, is discovered;  
 
g)   
The Accountability Court shall proceed with and decide the 
aforesaid References within a period of six months from the date of 
filing such References; and  
 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
4
h) 
In case the Accountability Court finds any deed, document or 
affidavit filed by or on behalf of the respondent(s) or any other 
person(s) to be fake, false, forged or fabricated, it shall take appropriate 
action against the concerned person in accordance with law. 
 
 
2. 
It is hereby declared that having failed to disclose his un-
withdrawn receivables constituting assets from Capital FZE Jebel Ali, 
UAE in his nomination papers filed for the General Elections held in 
2013 in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of the Representation of the People 
Act, 1976 (ROPA), and having furnished a false declaration under 
solemn affirmation respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif is 
not honest in terms of Section 99(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 and therefore he 
is disqualified to be a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament). 
 
3. 
The Election Commission of Pakistan shall issue a notification 
disqualifying respondent No. 1 Mian Muhammad Nawaz Sharif from 
being a Member of the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) with immediate 
effect, whereafter he shall cease to be the Prime Minister of Pakistan; 
 
4. 
The President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan is required to 
take all necessary steps under the Constitution to ensure continuation 
of the democratic process.   
 
5. 
The Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan is requested to nominate 
an Hon’ble Judge of this Court to supervise and monitor implementation 
of this judgment in letter and spirit and oversee the proceedings 
conducted by NAB and the Accountability Court in the above mentioned 
matters.  
 
6. 
This Court commends and appreciates the hard work and 
efforts made by Members of the JIT and their support and ancillary staff 
in preparing and filing a comprehensive and detailed Report as per our 
orders. Their tenure of service shall be safeguarded and protected and 
no adverse action of any nature including transfer and posting shall be 
taken against them without informing the monitoring Judge of this 
Court nominated by the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Pakistan.  
 
7. 
We also record our appreciation for the valuable assistance 
provided to us by Mr. Naeem Bokhari, ASC; Mr. Makhdoom Ali Khan, Sr. 
ASC., Mr. Shahid Hamid, Sr. ASC, Khawaja Harris Ahmed, Sr. ASC; Mr. 
Salman Akram Raja, ASC; Dr. Tariq Hassan, ASC; Mr. Taufiq Asif, ASC; 
Sheikh Rasheed Ahmed, petitioner in person, Mr. Ashtar Ausaf Ali, 
Attorney-General for Pakistan; Mr. Waqar Rana; Additional Attorney- 
General for Pakistan, Mr. Waqas Qadeer Dar, Prosecutor-General, NAB 
and Mr. Akbar Tarar, Acting Prosecutor-General, NAB and their 
respective teams.  
 
8. 
These petitions are thus disposed of in the terms mentioned 
above.”  
 
 
2. 
 
Learned Sr. ASC appearing on behalf of the petitioner in CRPs. 
No. 297 to 299 and 310 to 312 of 2017 contended that the five-member bench 
was not properly constituted after the submission of the report of the JIT as 
two of its members (Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa and Mr. Justice Gulzar 
Ahmed) having given their final verdicts on 20.04.2017 became functus officio. 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
5
Their judgments, the learned Sr. ASC added, could not be treated as part of the 
majority judgments written by Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat 
Saeed and Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan, therefore, it would be the latter that would 
prevail and hold the field and that it is in view of this anomaly that two sets of 
review petitions, one before the five-member bench and the other before the 
three-member bench have been filed. The learned Sr. ASC next contended that 
unwithdrawn salary could never constitute an asset even if entitlement of the 
petitioner thereto stemmed from a written agreement, the more so, when he 
on account of an understanding between him and his son opted not to receive 
it. The learned Sr. ASC next contended that salary as defined in Section 12(2) of 
the Income Ordinance, 2001 means an amount received by an employee from 
any employment, therefore, it cannot be extended to cover unwithdrawn 
salary. The learned Sr. ASC further contended that even if it is assumed, that 
the unwithdrawn salary constitutes an asset, omission to disclose it, involving 
violation of Sections 12 and 13 of the Representation of the People Act, calls 
for the rejection of the nomination papers or at worst removal of the petitioner 
from the public office he held, therefore, his disqualification in terms of 
Sections 99(1)(f) of ROPA and 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the Islamic 
Republic of Pakistan is unwarranted. Such disqualification, the learned Sr. ASC 
maintained, is all the more unwarranted when the petitioner has not been 
given a fair chance to vindicate his position. Much greater care, the learned 
ASC maintained, has to be exercised in upholding the order disqualifying the 
petitioner in terms of Sections 99(1)(f) of ROPA and 62(1)(f) when no appeal 
lies against it. The learned Sr. ASC went on to argue that where an omission to 
disclose assets in the circumstances of the case appears to be unintentional, it 
would be rather presumptive to impute dishonest intention to him. To support 
his contention, the learned Sr. ASC placed reliance on the cases of Muhammad 
Saeed and 4 others. Vs. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan, (2) Mehr 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
6
Muhammad Arif Khan, (3) Ghulam Haider and (4) West Pakistan Government 
and others  (PLD 1957 S.C. (Pak.) 91), Khan Muhammad Yusuf Khan Khattak. 
Vs. S. M. Ayub and 2 others  (PLD 1973 SC 160), Syed Saeed Hassan. Vs. Pyar 
Ali and 7 others  (PLD 1976 SC 6), Muhammad Siddique Baloch. Vs. Jehangir 
Khan Tareen and others  (PLD 2016 SC 97), Rai Hassan Nawaz. Vs. Haji 
Muhammad Ayub and others  (PLD 2017 SC 70) and Sheikh Muhammad 
Akram. Vs. Abdul Ghafoor and 19 others  (2016 SCMR 733). The learned Sr. 
ASC next contended that the directions given by this Court to the NAB to file 
References against respondents in Constitution Petition No. 29 of 2016 are on 
the face of the record per incuriam as they amount to assuming the functions 
of the Chairman NAB and the Judge Accountability Court which is not only 
against the law but also repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution. 
Assumption or exercise of such powers, the learned Sr. ASC maintained, is also 
repugnant to the principle of tricotomy of powers which is an unchangeable 
feature of the Constitution. Another direction to the NAB, the learned Sr. ASC 
contended, to file References on the basis of the material collected and 
referred to by the JIT and such other material as may be available with the FIA 
and NAB or the one which may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal 
Assistance requests sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions is an encroachment 
on the authority of the NAB and violation of Article 175(2) of the Constitution. 
Learned ASC went on to argue that the direction to the NAB to file 
supplementary reference if and when any other asset, which is not reasonably 
accounted for, is discovered has also been issued without jurisdiction as no 
provision of the Constitution including Article 187 empowers this Court to issue 
a direction of this nature. This direction, the learned Sr. ASC added, implies 
unambiguous approval of the material collected by the JIT whose probative 
worth is yet to be established. He next contended that the direction to the Trial 
Court to decide the References within six months from the date of filing them 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
7
also tends to prejudice the fair trial of the petitioners. Power to superintend 
the proceedings of the Accountability Court, the learned Sr. ASC maintained, 
has not been conferred on the Supreme Court, therefore, nomination of one of 
the Judges of this Court to superintend them is also violative of Article 
175(2)(3) of the Constitution. The petitioner, the learned Sr. ASC contended, 
could not be disqualified in terms of Section 99(1)(f) of ROPA and Article 
62(1)(f) of the Constitution for non disclosure of his unwithdrawn income from 
Capital FZE in his nomination papers for the 2013 General Elections when it was 
not specifically averred in any of the Constitution Petitions. The learned Sr. ASC 
next contended that where the material collected by the JIT is not worthy of 
reliance and the report submitted by it is full of infirmities, commendation of 
JIT and its report reflected in the concluding part of the judgment under review 
would tend to prejudice the case of the petitioner, therefore, it needs to be 
qualified. The learned Sr. ASC lastly contended that the word ‘judgments’ used 
in sub-para (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 of the Order of the Court dated 28th July, 
2017 requires clarification whether it refers to the minority or the majority 
judgments lest it misleads the National Accountability Bureau or the 
Accountability Court.  
3. 
 
 Learned Sr. ASC appearing on behalf of petitioner in CRP. No. 
303 of 2017 contended that where rise in the assets of the petitioner has been 
explained by the relevant documents including the returns filed by him, 
issuance of the direction to the NAB to file a Reference against him does not 
appear to be well founded. He next contended that where nothing significant 
appeared against the petitioner during the proceedings of the Constitution 
Petitions, the JIT could not have collected any material against him nor could 
this Court direct the NAB to file a Reference against him on the basis of the 
material so collected, therefore, the direction to file the Reference merits a 
second thought.  
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
8
4. 
 
Learned ASC appearing on behalf of the petitioner in CRPs. No. 
308 and 309 of 2017 contended that when no material has come on the record 
to show any nexus between respondent No. 10 in C. P. No. 29 of 2016 and the 
Avenfield Apartments, the direction to the NAB to file a Reference against him 
is not sustainable. The learned ASC next contended that observations in the 
judgment under review commending the JIT and its report, also need to be 
diluted lest they are accepted by the NAB and the Accountability Court as being 
unquestionable.  
5. 
 
We have carefully gone through the record and considered the 
submissions of the learned Sr. ASCs and ASC for the parties.  
6. 
 
The first argument of the learned Sr. ASC for the petitioner in 
CRPs. No. 297 to 299 and 310 to 312 of 2017 is that the five-member bench 
was not properly constituted after the submission of the report of the JIT as 
two of its members (Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa and Mr. Justice Gulzar 
Ahmed) having given their final verdicts on 20.04.2017 became functus officio 
and that their judgments could not be treated as a part of the majority 
judgments written by Justice Ejaz Afzal Khan, Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed and 
Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan, therefore, it would be the latter that would prevail 
and hold the field and that it is in view of this anomaly that two sets of review 
petitions one before the five-member bench and the other before the three-
member bench have been filed. It was mainly because of this argument that 
these petitions, in the first instance, were listed before a three-member bench 
but on the request of the learned Sr. ASC for the petitioner they were listed 
before a five-member bench. But when during the hearing before the five-
member Bench it was pointed out that the three-member bench judgment has 
to prevail and hold the field, if maintained and that the objection being 
academic would not have much effect, the learned Sr. ASCs and ASC for the 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
9
petitioners opted not to press the review petitions filed before the three-
member bench which were disposed of accordingly.  
7. 
 
Next comes the question whether unwithdrawn salaries could 
constitute an asset when entitlement of the petitioner thereto stemmed from a 
written agreement. We while dealing with this aspect held as under :-  
“13. 
The next question emerging for the consideration of this Court 
is whether respondent No. 1 as a Chairman of the Board of Capital FZE is 
entitled to salaries and whether the salaries if not withdrawn being 
receivable as such constitute assets which require disclosure in terms of 
Section 12(2) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 and 
whether his failure to disclose them would entail his disqualification? 
The word asset has not been defined in the Representation of the 
People Act, 1976, (“ROPA”), therefore, its ordinary meaning has to be 
considered for the purposes of this case. The word asset as defined in 
Black’s Law Dictionary means and contemplates “an asset can be (i) 
something physical such as cash, machinery, inventory, land and 
building (ii) an enforceable claim against others such as accounts 
receivable (iii) rights such as copyright, patent trademark etc (iv) an 
assumption such as goodwill”. The definition of the word receivable as 
used in the above mentioned definition as given in the Black’s Law 
Dictionary is also relevant which means and contemplates “any 
collectible whether or not it is currently due. That which is due and 
owing a person or company. In book keeping, the name of an account 
which reflects a debt due. Accounts receivable as a claim against a 
debtor usually arising from sales or services rendered”. The word 
‘receivable’ also has similar ring and connotation according to Business 
Dictionary which reads as under:-  
 
“Accounting term for amount due from a customer, employee, supplier 
(as a rebate or refund) or any other party. Receivables are classified as 
accounts receivable, notes receivable etc and represent an asset of the 
 firm”. 
The definitions reproduced above leave no doubt that a salary not 
withdrawn would nevertheless be receivable and as such would 
constitute an asset for all legal and practical purposes. When it is an 
asset for all legal and practical purposes, it was required to be disclosed 
by respondent No. 1 in his nomination papers in terms of Section 12(2) 
of the ROPA. When we confronted, the learned Sr. ASC for respondent 
No. 1, whether the said respondent has ever acquired work permit 
(Iqama) in Dubai, remained Chairman of the Board of Capital FZE and 
was entitled to salary as such, his reply was in the affirmative with the 
only addition that respondent No. 1 never withdrew any salary. This 
admission was reiterated in more categorical terms in the written 
arguments filed by the learned Sr. ASC for respondent No. 1 in the 
 words as under:-  
“So far as the designation of Respondent No. 1 as Chairman of the Board 
is concerned, this was only a ceremonial office acquired in 2007 when 
the respondent No. 1 was in exile, and had nothing to do with the 
running of the Company or supervising its affairs. Similarly, the 
respondent No. 1 did not withdraw the salary of AED 10,000. Thus, the 
salary shown in the Employment Contract in effect never constituted an 
“asset” for the respondent No. 1.” 
 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
10
It has not been denied that respondent No. 1 being Chairman of the 
Board of Capital FZE was entitled to salary, therefore, the statement 
that he did not withdraw the salary would not prevent the un-
withdrawn salary from being receivable, hence an asset. When the un-
withdrawn salary as being receivable is an asset it was required to be 
disclosed by respondent No. 1 in his nomination papers for the Elections 
of 2013 in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of the ROPA. Where respondent No. 
1 did not disclose his aforesaid assets, it would amount to furnishing a 
false declaration on solemn affirmation in violation of the law 
mentioned above, therefore, he is not honest in terms of Section 
99(1)(f) of the ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan.”     
 
  
We held in the paragraph reproduced above that the unwithdrawn 
salary of the petitioner is an asset. Petitioner’s entitlement to salary stems 
from a written employment contract. Salary in this case, it may be noted, is not 
salary of the future which was yet to accrue. It was salary of the past six and a 
half years which had already accrued and accumulated. There is nothing in oral 
or written form, from July 2006 to January 2013 as could stop the accrual and 
accumulation of salary or prevent it from becoming an asset. There is also 
nothing in oral or written form in between July 2006 to January 2013 as could 
stop the withdrawal of the salary thus accrued and accumulated. Therefore, 
the argument that the salary even if agreed upon under the employment 
contract, would not be an asset if not withdrawn is not correct.  
8. 
 
Now let us examine what stance the petitioner has taken with 
regard to the salary in the written arguments and the memorandum of the 
review petition. His stance is that “when respondent No. 8 in CP. No. 29 of 
2016 showed his decision to wind up the company in January 2013 the 
petitioner categorically stated that he did not intend to nor would claim any 
salary from the company”. The words reproduced above would unmistakably 
show that the salary thus accrued and accumulated till January 2013 was all 
along the asset of the petitioner; that the power to withdraw or waive it lay 
exclusively with the petitioner and that he instead of withdrawing it waived it 
in favour of the company. Granted, it ceased to be an asset of the petitioner 
from January 2013 but it remained an asset till then and the more so on 30th 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
11
June, 2012 which is the crucial date in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of ROPA. Where 
the salary has already accrued and accumulated from July 2006 to January 
2013 and there is absolutely nothing in oral or written form in between the said 
dates as could stop its withdrawal, it was an asset out and out. It was thus 
required to be disclosed in the nomination papers of the petitioner for the 
2013 General Election. The expression ‘asset’ as defined in Black’s Law 
Dictionary has rightly been relied upon when it has not been defined in the 
ROPA and the Constitution. The expression salary as defined by Section 12(2) of 
the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 would be just irrelevant for the purposes of 
this case when the salary having already accrued and accumulated could be 
withdrawn at any stage without any hindrance before January, 2013.  Even if 
we ignore the definition of the expression “asset” as given in Black’s Law 
Dictionary for a while, the very admission of the petitioner that he waived the 
salary so accrued and accumulated in January, 2013 in favour of the company 
speaks for itself. Had there been no admission we would not have stepped in as 
we did not step in when the document issued by Mossack Fonseca showing 
respondent No. 6 in C. P. No. 29 of 2016 as the beneficial owner of the 
Avenfield apartments, was disputed by her. We also did not step in when many 
other documents disclosing several other assets purportedly owned by the 
children of the petitioner were disputed as is evident from paragraph 16 of the 
judgment dated 20.04.2017 which reads as under:-  
“16. 
The second question in the seriatim is whether respondent No. 1 
or any of his dependents or benamidars owns, possesses or has acquired 
any assets or pecuniary resources disproportionate to his known means 
of income? The learned ASCs for the petitioners in their efforts to 
persuade us to answer this question in affirmative referred to a number 
of documents showing the establishment of Gulf Steel Mill at Dubai, its 
sale, establishment of Azizia Steel Mill at Jeddah, its sale and 
incorporation of Nescol Limited and Neilson Enterprises Limited in British 
Virgin Islands. Under the veil of the aforesaid companies, respondent 
No. 1 has been alleged to have acquired flats No. 16, 16-A, 17 and 17-A 
at Avenfield House Park Lane London. The personal information form 
dated 14.10.2011 purportedly issued by Minerva Trust and Corporate 
Services Limited shows respondent No. 6 as the beneficial owner of the 
flats. This document has been purportedly signed by the said 
respondent, but she disputed its genuineness and even her signatures 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
12
thereon. Another document showing respondent No. 6 as the beneficial 
owner of the flats is the alleged correspondence between Mr. Errol 
George, Director FIA, British Virgin Islands and Money Laundering 
Reporting Officer of Mossack Fonseca & Co. (B.V.I.) Limited. A photocopy 
of an extract from the clients register of Director, Minerva Trust and 
Corporate Services Limited, according to the learned ASC for the 
petitioner, is yet another document proving respondent No. 6 as the 
beneficial owner of the flats. In any case, the questions how did Gulf 
Steel Mill come into being; what led to its sale; where did go its sale 
proceeds; how did they reach Jeddah, Qatar and the U.K.; whether 
respondents No. 6, 7 and 8 in view of their tender ages had the means in 
the early nineties to purchase the flats; whether sudden appearance of 
letters of Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jaber Al-Thani is a myth or a reality; how 
bearer shares crystallized into the flats; how did Hill Metal 
Establishment come into existence; where did the money for Flagship 
Investment Limited and where did its Working Capital Fund come from 
and where did the huge sums running into millions gifted by respondent 
No. 7 to respondent No. 1 drop in from clamor for answers to be found  
by the investigation agency and then by the Accountability Court 
established under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance.”   
 
 
It is also evident from paragraph 9 of the judgment dated 28.07.2017 
which reads as under:-  
“9. 
A careful examination of the material so far collected 
reveals that a prima facie triable case under Section 9, 10 and 
15 of the Ordinance is made out against respondents No. 1, 6, 7 
and 8 vis-à-vis the following assets:- 
 
 
“(i) 
Flagship Investments Limited. 
 
(ii) 
Hartstone Properties Limited; 
 
(iii) 
Que Holdings Limited; 
 
(iv) 
Quint Eaton Place 2 Limited; 
(v) 
Quint Saloane Limited (formerly Quint Eaton Place Limited). 
(vi) 
Quaint Limited; 
(vii) 
Flagship Securities Limited; 
(viii) 
Quint Gloucester Place Limited; 
(ix) 
Quint Paddington Limited (formerly Rivates Estates Limited); 
(x) 
Flagship Developments Limited; 
(xi) 
Alanna Services Limited (BVI); 
(xii) 
Lankin SA (BVI); 
(xiii) 
Chadron Inc; 
(xiv) 
Ansbacher Inc; 
(xv) 
Coomber Inc; and  
(xvi) 
Capital FZE (Dubai).” 
 
But we could not have shut our eyes when an asset of the petitioner arising out 
of IQAMA (work permit) having surfaced during the investigation of the case 
and admitted by him to be his in no uncertain terms, was not found to have 
been disclosed in his nomination papers in terms of Section 12(2)(f) of ROPA. 
Nor could have we let him get away with it simply because he happened to be 
the Prime Minister of the country. Much higher level of integrity is expected of 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
13
the holder of the highest elected office of the country. But to our dismay and 
disappointment the petitioner has not been fair and forthright in answering 
any of the queries made during the course of hearing. He never came forth 
with the whole truth. He tried to fool the people inside and outside the 
Parliament. He even tried to fool the Court without realizing that “you can fool 
all the people for some of the time, some of the people all the time but you 
cannot fool all the people all the time”. Refuge in evasive, equivocal and non 
committal reply does not help always. If fortune has throned, crowned and 
sceptered him to rule the country, his conduct should be above board and 
impeccable. Whatever he does or says must be res ipsa loquitur. (Thing speaks 
for itself). Resignation rather than prevarication in ambiguous terms is more 
honourable exit if and when anything secretly carried under the sanctimonious 
gown of leadership drops and gets sighted. Since the Prime Minister of the 
country is thought to be the ethos personified of the nation he represents at 
national and international level, denying an asset established or defending a 
trust deed written in 2006 in a font becoming commercial in 2007 is below his 
dignity and decorum of the office he holds. An Urdu verse may perhaps explain 
the feeling of a follower about the leader which reads:- 
 
ﺎﭩُﻟ ںﻮﯿﮐ  ہﻠﻓﺎﻗ  ہﮐ  ﺎﺘﺑ  ہﯾ  ﺮﮐ  تﺎﺑ  ہﻧ  ﯽﮐ  ﺮھدُا  ﺮھدا 
ﮯﮨ لاﻮﺳ ﺎﮐ یﺮﺒﮨر یﺮﯿﺗ ﮟﯿﮩﻧ ہﻠﮔ ﮯﺳ ںﻮﻧﺰﮨار ﮯﮭﺠﻣ 
       
 
9.  
The argument that even if it is assumed that unwithdrawn salary 
constitutes an asset, omission to disclose it involving a violation of Sections 12 
and 13 of the Representation of Peoples Act calls for the rejection of 
nomination papers or at its worst, removal of the petitioner from the public 
office and not his disqualification in terms of Section 99(1)(f) of the ROPA and 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution is devoid of force when the petitioner 
deliberately concealed his assets and willfully and dishonestly made a false 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
14
declaration on solemn affirmation in his nomination papers. It is not something 
to be looked at with a casual eye and outlook. It is not only a legal duty but a 
qualifying test for the candidates who in the later days preside over the destiny 
of the people. This duty has to be performed without a taint of 
misrepresentation. This test has to be qualified without resorting to unfair 
means. Any concession at this stage or any leniency to the candidates or the 
person elected would be a prelude to a catastrophe in politics, which has 
already had enough of it. Since it is already touching the extreme, extreme 
measures have to be taken. The culture of passing the candidates by granting 
grace marks has not delivered the goods. It has rather corrupted the people 
and corrupted the system. This aspect of the case has been beautifully 
highlighted in the case of Rai Hassan Nawaz. Vs. Haji Muhammad Ayub and 
others  (PLD 2017 SC 170) by holding as under:-  
“7. 
An honest and truthful declaration of assets and liabilities by a 
returned candidate in his nomination papers furnishes a benchmark for 
reviewing his integrity and probity in the discharge of his duties and 
functions as an elected legislator. His statement of assets and liabilities 
alongwith other financial disclosures contemplated by Section 12(2) of 
the ROPA provide the Election Commission of Pakistan and the general 
public with a picture of both his wealth and income. Such disclosures are 
crucial for demonstrating the legitimacy and bonafides of the accrual 
and the accumulation of economic resources by such a candidate. In 
other words, the said disclosures show the returns received from his 
economic activities and can indicate if these activities may be tainted 
with illegality, corruption or misuse of office and authority. This 
important aspect of the financial disclosures by a contesting candidate 
has been noticed by this Court in Muhammad Yousaf Kaselia v. Peer 
Ghulam  (PLD 2016 SC 689)”.   
 
10. 
 
The argument that the petitioner could not be disqualified under 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution without recording evidence, in a proceeding 
under Article 184(3) of the Constitution also runs counter to the settled law of 
the land as this Court in the case of Syed Mahmood Akhtar Naqvi v. 
Federation of Pakistan (2012 PLD SC 1089) while exercising jurisdiction under 
Article 184(3) of the Constitution proceeded to disqualify the person elected, 
who despite being disqualified in terms of Article 63(1)(c) of the Constitution 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
15
made a false declaration on solemn affirmation in his nomination papers to the 
contrary. The relevant paragraphs read as under :-  
 “we have no option but to hold that at the time of submitting their 
nomination papers they were disqualified and ineligible to file the same 
and apparently have made false statements while submitting their 
nomination papers’ 
 
‘From the facts noted herein-above, what appears is that respondent 
was holding citizenship of a foreign state, made statement on oath that 
he is qualified under Article 62(1)(c) of the Constitution and not 
disqualified under Article 63(1) of the Constitution apparently made a 
false statement.’ 
 
‘All members of the parliament/provincial assemblies noted above had 
made false declaration before the ECP while filing their nomination 
papers and as such appear to be guilty of corrupt practices in terms of 
Section 78 of ROPA, 1976, therefore, the ECP is directed to institute legal 
proceedings against them under section 82 of the Act read with Sections 
193, 196, 197, 198 and 199 PPC in accordance with law.’ 
 
‘As regards the case of Senator A. Rehman Malik, it may be noted that 
at the time of filing of nomination papers for election to the senate in 
the year 2008, he had made a false declaration to the effect that he was 
not subject to any of the disqualifications specified in Article 63 of the 
Constitution or any other law for the time being in force for being 
elected as a member of the parliament/provincial assembly, therefore, 
reference will be required to be made to the chairman senate under 
Article 63(2) in view of the provisions  of section 99(1)(f) of the Act of 
1976, which lays down that a person shall not be qualified from being 
elected or chosen as a member of an Assembly unless he is sagacious, 
righteous and non-profligate and honest and ameen. Mr. A. Rehman 
Malik, in view of the false declaration filed by him at the time of 
contesting the election to the senate held in the year 2008, wherein he 
was elected, cannot be considered sagacious, righteous honest and 
ameen within the contemplation of Section 99(1)(f).’   
 
In the case of Sadiq Ali Memon. Vs. Returning Officer, NA-237, Thatta-I and 
others (2013 SCMR 1246) this Court without recording any evidence, 
disqualified the candidate who filed a declaration to the effect that he fulfills 
qualification specified in Article 62 of the Constitution and is not subject to any 
disqualification specified in Article 63 of the Constitution by holding as under:-  
 
“In the present case, admittedly the petitioner has while filing 
nomination papers for contesting By-Elections of PS-84, Thatta-1, in 
2010, filed a declaration to the effect that he fulfills qualifications 
specified in Article 62 of the Constitution and is not subject to any 
disqualification specified in Article 63 of the Constitution. This 
declaration was made by the petitioner despite the fact that he was 
holding dual nationality i.e. of Pakistan and of Canada and in terms of 
Article 63(1)(c) of the constitution on acquiring the citizenship of a 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
16
foreign state, he was disqualified from being elected or chosen as a 
member of majlis e shoora or the provincial assembly’ 
 
‘Keeping in view the above state of law, it becomes apparent that while 
petitioner has filed a declaration, which on its face was a false and 
untrue declaration which will bring in to application the provisions of 
Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution that he is not a sagacious, righteous, 
non-profligate and honest and ameen.” 
 
In the case of Mian Najeeb ud din Owasi. Vs. Amir Yar Waran  (PLD 2013 SC 
482), this Court disqualified a candidate who made a false declaration in the 
nomination papers in the column meant for academic qualification, by holding 
as under:-  
“yet if a candidate has made a declaration in the column meant for 
academic qualification and declared himself to be a graduate, but 
subsequently, it is found that he was not a graduate then he would be 
equally liable to face the consequences of Articles 62 & 63 of the 
Constitution or the other relevant provisions of the PPC. It is further to 
be observed that once there is a disqualification, it is always a 
disqualification; therefore while making a declaration in the nomination 
papers, a candidate must provide, a crystal clear statement about his 
credentials and antecedents. There is no scope of making or proving 
information, which is not correct, because he is one of the persons 
whom the electorate of a constituency, which may be having a strength 
of 50 thousand, are going to elect their representative. Therefore, 
whatever he possesses in terms of academic qualification, bank credits 
and taxes etc. he shall have to declare each and every thing required for 
the qualification to contest the election. ‘ 
 
‘Once a person has filed a declaration under his signatures declaring 
that he fulfills the conditions of Articles 62 & 63 of the constitution and 
he undertakes that the statement is incorrect the ECP shall de-notify him 
for such representation, retrospectively.’ 
 
11. 
 
The argument that the omission to disclose assets could possibly 
be unintentional in the circumstances of the case would have been tenable had 
the petitioner been a novice or a new entrant in business and politics. But 
where he has been neck deep in business and politics ever since early 80s’ it is 
unbelievable that he did not understand the simple principle of accounting that 
his accrued and accumulated salary of six and a half years was his asset and 
liability of the company he was an employee of. Even otherwise, this argument 
cannot be given much weight when it has not been pleaded by the petitioner 
that the omission to mention the asset was accidental, inadvertent or 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
17
unintentional. The argument that such disqualification is all the more 
unwarranted when the petitioner has not been given a fair chance to vindicate 
his position does not appear to be correct when we not only gave him a fair 
chance to vindicate his position before this Court, heard him at length for 
almost two days but also accepted whatever he stated about work permit, his 
employment contract with Capital FZE Jabal Ali, his position as the Chairman of 
the Board and his entitlement to salary which according to him was not 
withdrawn. The mere fact that we did not agree with the petitioner when he 
stated that his unwithdrawn salary is not an asset would not amount to denial 
of a fair chance to vindicate his position. The argument that much greater care 
has to be exercised in upholding the order disqualifying the petitioner in terms 
of Section 99(1)(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution when no 
appeal lies against it is more of an apprehension as we being conscious of our 
duties have dealt with this case with much greater care and circumspection in 
the judgment under review and while hearing and deciding this petition for 
review. The judgments rendered in the cases of Muhammad Saeed and 4 
others. Vs. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan, (2) Mehr Muhammad 
Arif Khan, (3) Ghulam Haider and (4) West Pakistan Government and others, 
Khan Muhammad Yusuf Khan Khattak. Vs. S. M. Ayub and 2 others , Syed 
Saeed Hassan. Vs. Pyar Ali and 7 others, Muhammad Siddique Baloch. Vs. 
Jehangir Khan Tareen and others, Rai Hassan Nawaz. Vs. Haji Muhammad 
Ayub and others and Sheikh Muhammad Akram. Vs. Abdul Ghafoor and 19 
others (supra) cited at the bar by the learned Sr. ASC for the petitioner being 
distinguishable on facts and law are not applicable to the case at hand.  
12. 
 
The argument that the directions given by this Court to NAB to 
file References against respondents are per incurium on the face of the record 
as they amount to assuming the functions of the Chairman NAB and the judge 
of the Accountability Court which is not only against the law but also repugnant 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
18
to the provisions of the Constitution ensuring trichotomy of powers is not 
correct when both of them have been left on their own to proceed in 
accordance with law. What necessitated the issuance of these directions to the 
NAB has already been dealt with in paragraph 19 of the judgment dated 20th 
April, 2017 authored by one of us (Ejaz Afzal Khan, J) which deserves a look and 
reads as under:-  
“19. 
Yes, the officers at the peak of NAB and FIA may not cast their 
prying eyes on the misdeeds and lay their arresting hands on the 
shoulders of the elites on account of their being amenable to the 
influence of the latter or because of their being beholden to the persons 
calling the shots in the matters of their appointment posting and 
transfer. But it does not mean that this Court should exercise a 
jurisdiction not conferred on it and act in derogation of the provisions of 
the Constitution and the law regulating trichotomy of power and 
conferment of jurisdiction on the courts of law. Any deviation from the 
recognized course would be a recipe for chaos. Having seen a deviation 
of such type, tomorrow, an Accountability Court could exercise 
jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution and a trigger happy 
investigation officer while investigating the case could do away with the 
life of an accused if convinced that the latter is guilty of a heinous crime 
and that his trial in the Court of competent jurisdiction might result in 
delay or denial of justice. Courts of law decide the cases on the basis of 
the facts admitted or established on the record. Surmises and 
speculations have no place in the administration of justice. Any 
departure from such course, however well-intentioned it may be, would 
be a precursor of doom and disaster for the society. It as such would not 
be a solution to the problem nor would it be a step forward. It would 
indeed be a giant stride nay a long leap backward. The solution lies not 
in bypassing but in activating the institutions by having recourse to 
Article 190 of the Constitution. Political excitement, political adventure 
or even popular sentiments real or contrived may drive any or many to 
an aberrant course but we have to go by the law and the book. Let us 
stay and act within the parameters of the Constitution and the law as 
they stand, till the time they are changed or altered through an 
amendment therein.”  
 
13. 
 
The argument that another direction to the NAB to file 
References on the basis of the material collected and referred to by the JIT and 
such other material which may be available to the FIA and NAB or the one 
which may come before it pursuant to the Mutual Legal Assistance Requests 
sent by the JIT to different jurisdictions is an encroachment on the authority of 
the NAB and violation of Article 175 (2) of the Constitution, could have been 
given some weight had there been no institutional capture, seizure and 
subjugation of all the important institutions of the State including NAB, SECP, 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
19
FBR, State Bank of Pakistan, National Bank of Pakistan and Intelligence Bureau 
through the cronies and collaborators of the person at the peak as has been 
evidenced during the course of hearing. We thus with our eyes open and minds 
awake would not let everything go into the hands of the cronies and 
collaborators for being taken to a dead end. Once things have been 
streamlined, they have to be taken to their logical conclusion. The argument 
that the direction to the NAB to file supplementary references if and when any 
other asset, which is not reasonably accounted for, is discovered has also been 
issued without jurisdiction as no provision of the Constitution including Article 
187 empowers this Court to issue a direction of this nature is also devoid of 
force as this Court under Article 184(3) of the Constitution has the power to 
issue a direction if and when a person performing functions in connection with 
the affairs of the federation does not do what he is required by law to do. 
Supplementary References have to be filed if and when anything receivable in 
evidence pursuant to MLA requests sent by JIT to various jurisdictions are 
received. Else the leads revealed by Volume X and the outcome of the MLAs 
requests in respect of huge sums which have prima facie been dealt with by 
and on behalf of the petitioner, his sons and daughter through Montmarte 
Holdings S.A., L.Z. Nominees B.V.I., Fidex Registrar B.V.I., Berryvale Limited 
B.V.I. & E.M.S.I. (S.A.) in Luxemburg, Shamrock Consulting Corporation and 
Ansbacher A.G. acting through Hans Rodulf Wegmuller and Urs Specker in 
Switzerland would be thrown over board.  
14. 
 
The argument that this direction implies unambiguous approval 
of the material collected by the JIT whose probative worth is yet to be 
established is also misconceived as none of our observations projects any such 
impression. The trial court in any case would be at liberty to appraise evidence 
including the material collected by the JIT according to the principles of the law 
of evidence without being influenced by any of our observations. Even 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
20
otherwise, all the observations made in the judgment, being tentative, would 
not bind nor would restrain the trial court from drawing its own conclusions 
from the evidence recorded before it in accordance with the principles and 
provisions of the law of evidence. The argument that the direction to the trial 
court for deciding the References within 6 months from the date of filing them 
also tends to prejudice the fair trial of the petitioner is also misconceived as the 
purpose behind such direction is not to prejudice the trial but to ensure 
expeditious conclusion of the case which more often than not has been 
extended even in the past by this Court, if the trial was delayed by any hardship 
or anything imponderable. The argument that the power to superintend the 
proceedings of the Accountability Court has not been conferred on the 
Supreme Court, therefore nomination of one of the judges of this Court to 
superintend them would be violative of Article 175(2) and (3) of the 
Constitution is also misconceived as this practice has been in vogue since long 
and the purpose behind it is to guard against intrusion of casualness in the 
proceedings before the trial court. Such practice, by no stretch of imagination, 
implies that the monitoring Judge would in any way influence or interfere with 
decision-making process of the Trial Court. It being completely innocuous to 
either of the parties would not tend to harm any. Its continuance, therefore, 
need not be objected to. The argument that the petitioner could not be 
disqualified in terms of section 99(1)(f) of ROPA and Article 62(1)(f) of the 
Constitution for non-disclosure of his unwithdrawn income from Capital FZE in 
his nomination papers for the 2013 General Elections when it was not 
specifically averred in any of the Constitution Petitions would not entail much 
when the proceedings before this Court under Article 184(3) of the 
Constitution being inquisitorial in nature cannot debar the Court from taking 
cognizance of a matter which is too obvious to be lost sight of. It was in view of 
this essential fact of the case that one of us (Ijaz ul Ahsan, J.) adverted to it in 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
21
paragraphs 87, 89 and 90(iii) of the judgment rendered on the 20th April 2017 
in the words as under: 
“87.  It is also an admitted position that Respondent No.8 set up a 
company under the name and style of Flagship Investments Limited 
which received substantial sums of money in the year 2001 when 
the said Respondent had no source of income. Over the course of 
the next few years, a number of other companies were set up/taken 
over by Respondent No.8 allegedly for the purpose of his real estate 
business. The sources from which the said companies/businesses 
were funded are also shrouded in mystery. There is yet another 
company under the name and style of Capital FZE, Dubai 
presumably registered under the laws of UAE. Funds also appear to 
have been routed through the said company from time to time by / 
and on behalf of Respondent No.7. The real ownership and business 
of the said company is unclear from the record which needs to be 
explained. No effort has been made on the part of the Respondents 
to answer the questions on the afore-noted matters. 
 
89. Regrettably, most material questions have remained 
unanswered or answered insufficiently by Respondent No.1 and his 
children. I am also constrained to hold that I am not satisfied with 
the explanation offered by Respondent No.1 (Mian Muhammad 
Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan) and his children 
regarding the mode and manner in which the said properties came 
in their possession and what were the sources of funds utilized for 
acquisition of the same. Further, the source(s) of funding for Azizia 
Steel Mills and Hill Metals Establishment in Saudi Arabia, Flagship 
Investments Limited and a number of other companies set up/taken 
over by Respondent No.8 also need to be established. In addition 
the affairs of Capital FZE, Dubai which also appears to be owned by 
Respondent No.7 need an inquiry. The aforesaid investigation and 
inquiry under normal circumstances should have been conducted by 
NAB. However, it has become quite obvious to us during these 
proceedings, that Chairman NAB is too partial and partisan to be 
solely entrusted with such an important and sensitive investigation 
involving the Prime Minister of Pakistan and his family. Further 
owing to the nature and scope of investigation a broader pool of 
investigative expertise is required which may not be available with 
NAB. 
 
90. In the afore-noted circumstances, I would order as follows:- 
 
(iii) Evidence shall also be collected by the JIT regarding source(s) of 
funding of Capital FZE, Dubai; its business activities and role in 
transfer of funds to different entities owned or controlled by 
Respondents No.7 & 8”. 
  
15. 
 
It thus cannot be said that the petitioner was taken by surprise 
in an inquisitorial proceeding when the facts entailing his disqualification as 
mentioned above have not been disputed. The argument that where material 
collected by the JIT is not worthy of reliance and the report submitted by it is 
full of infirmities commendation of JIT and its report reflected in the concluding 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
22
parts of the judgments under review would tend to prejudice the case of the 
petitioner, therefore, it needs to be qualified is again based on 
misunderstanding when the commendation or any other observation being 
tentative would not restrict the trial court to discard it if and when any infirmity 
therein became palpable on the record.  
16. 
 
The argument of the learned Sr. ASC for the petitioner in CRP 
No. 313 of 2017 that where the rise in assets of the petitioner has been 
explained by the relevant documents including the returns filed by him, 
issuance of a direction to the NAB authorities to file a Reference against him 
does not appear to be well-founded need not be commented upon at this stage 
as it would tend to prejudice the case of the petitioner before the 
Accountability Court. The argument that where nothing significant turned 
against the petitioner, the JIT could not have collected any material against him 
nor could this Court direct the NAB to file a Reference does not appear to be 
correct when the entire case is considered in its totality.  
17. 
 
The argument of the learned ASC in the CRP No. 308 and 309 of 
2017 that when no material has come on the record to show any nexus 
between respondent No. 10 in C.P. No. 29 of 2016 and the Avenfield 
apartments, the direction to the NAB authorities to file a Reference against him 
is not sustainable is not correct when he is the spouse of respondent No. 6 in 
the Civil Petition No. 29 of 2016 who prima facie happens to be the beneficial 
owner of the Avenfield apartments. The argument that the observations in the 
judgments commending the JIT and its reports also need to be diluted lest they 
are accepted by the NAB and the Accountability Court as being unquestionable 
has already been attended to above. 
18. 
 
The long and short of what has been said above is that no error 
much less patent on the face of the judgment under review has been pointed 
out as could call for any change or modification therein except the observations 
CRP. NOS. 297 TO 299, 303, 308 TO 312 OF 2017. 
23
mentioned above. These are the detailed reasons of our short order dated 
15.09.2017 dismissing the review petitions.    
       I agree and have added a very  
       brief note of my own.  
 
 
(ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA) 
JUDGE 
 
 
(EJAZ AFZAL KHAN) 
JUDGE 
 
 
(GULZAR AHMED) 
JUDGE 
 
 
(SH. AZMAT SAEED) 
JUDGE 
 
 
(IJAZ UL AHSAN) 
 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J.- No ground has been taken in these 
review petitions nor any argument has been advanced at the bar questioning 
anything observed or concluded by me in my separate opinion recorded in the 
main case. The other Hon’ble members of the Bench have not felt persuaded to 
review their opinions already recorded. These review petitions are, therefore, 
dismissed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(JUDGE) 
 
ISLAMABAD. 
15.09.2017. 
M. Azhar Malik 
‘Approved for Reporting’ 
 
