IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
Present: 
Mr. Justice Ijaz Ahmed Chaudhry 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Sardar Tariq Masood 
 
 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
Against 
judgment 
dated 
28.05.2015 
of 
Lahore High Court, Lahore, passed in Intra 
Court Appeal No.67 of 2015. 
 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority  
Appellant(s) 
VERSUS 
Faisalabad Electric Supply Company Limited  
Respondent(s) 
 
For the Appellant(s) 
: 
Mr. Munawar-us-Salam, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Syed Rafaqat H. Shah, AOR 
 
For the Respondent(s) : 
 Mir Afzal Malik, ASC 
 
 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR 
 
Date of Hearing  
: 
08.12.2015 
 
JUDGMENT  
 
 
 
Mushir Alam, J-. Through this appeal by leave of 
the Court, the Appellant-National Electric Power Regulatory 
Authority (NEPRA) has impugned the Judgment dated 
28.05.2015, passed by a learned Division Bench of Lahore 
High Court, Lahore in ICA No.67 of 2015, also reported as 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority v. Faisalabad 
Electric Supply Co. Ltd (PLD 2015 Lahore 661), whereby 
Judgment dated 15.12.2014 passed by a learned Single 
Judge in Writ Petition No.28681 of 2014 was maintained 
setting aside the order dated 16.6.2014 made on a ‘Motion for 
Leave to Review’ by three members Authority of NEPRA, as 
against total strength of five members and the Appeal was 
dismissed on the ground inter alia  that “it is clear from 
perusal of the Rule 16(6) of the NEPRA (Tariff Standards 
Procedure) Rules, 1998 that the law mandates for hearing of a 
Motion for Leave to review to be heard by the “full strength of 
the Authority”. 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
2
2. 
 
Brief facts of the case appear to be that the 
NEPRA, appellant herein, is an Authority, constituted under 
Section 3 of the Regulation of Generation, Transmission and 
Distribution of Electric Power Act, 1997, responsible for 
determining of tariffs and other terms and conditions for the 
supply of electricity 
by generation, transmission and 
distribution companies. It also confers jurisdiction for 
determination of the process and procedures for reviewing 
tariff and recommending tariff adjustment. The Authority is 
comprised of a Chairman to be appointed by the Federal 
Government and four members, one from each Province, to be 
appointed by the Federal Government after considering the 
recommendations of the respective Provincial Governments. 
Vice Chairman of the Authority is appointed from amongst 
the members for a period of one year by rotation. Sub Section 
(6) of Section 3 of the Act provides that no act or proceeding 
of the Authority shall be invalid by reason only for the 
existence of a vacancy in, or defect in, the constitution of the 
Authority. Section 5 ibid provides that meetings of the 
Authority shall be presided over by the Chairman or, in his 
absence, the Vice-Chairman. Three members shall constitute 
a quorum for meetings of the Authority requiring a decision 
by the Authority. Decision of the Authority is by majority of 
its members present, and in case of a tie, the person 
presiding the meeting has a casting vote. Section 6 mandates 
that all orders, determinations and decisions of the Authority 
are in writing and shall identify the determination of the 
Chairman and each member. 
 
3. 
 
The Respondent-FESCO, under Rule 3(1) of the 
NEPRA 
Tariff 
Standards 
and 
Procedure 
Rules, 
1998, 
(hereinafter referred to as NEPRA Rules, 1998) filed a Petition 
for the determination of Consumer Tariff for the Financial 
Year 2013-14 dated 28.06.2013. The matter was heard and 
decided by a three members Authority on 6.2.2014.  
Respondent being not satisfied, filed a “Motion for Leave to 
Review, as provided under sub rule (6) of Rule 16 of the 
NEPRA Rules, 1998.  Review motion was admitted for hearing 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
3
and after hearing the Respondents-FESCO, Order on Review 
Motion was rendered on 16.6.2014 by the Vice Chairman 
(Sindh), and two members one from Balochistan and other 
from Punjab.  
 
4. 
 
This order dated 16.6.2014 by the Authority, was 
challenged by the Respondent-FESCO. Contentious issue was 
the competence of the Authority to decide “Motion for leave to 
Review”, on the ground that the order has been passed by 
three members of the Authority, while Rule 16 (6) of the 
NEPRA Rules, 1998 requires that the Motion for Leave to 
Review was to be determined by “full strength of Authority”. A 
learned Single Judge in Chambers in the High Court quoted 
Rule 16 ibid which reads as follows:- 
“16. Decisions, etc., by the Authority. — (1) All orders, 
determinations and decisions of the Authority shall be 
taken in writing. 
(2).. 
(3)… 
(4)… 
(5)…  
 (6) Within ten days of service of a final order, 
determination or decision of the Authority, a party may 
file a motion for leave for review by the full strength of 
the Authority of such final order, determination or 
decision, as the case be. 
(7) A motion for leave for review shall specify the 
grounds on which review is sought by the party. Parties 
to the proceedings shall be afforded a reasonable 
opportunity, orally or in writing as deemed fit by the 
Authority, to respond to a motion for leave for review. 
(8) The Authority shall act upon a motion for leave for 
review within ten days of receipts of such motion unless 
it gives notice to the parties, in writing that a longer 
period of time will be required and specifies the 
additional length of time necessary to consider the 
motion.  
(9) The Authority may refuse leave for review if it 
considers that the review would not result in the 
withdrawal 
or 
modification 
of 
the 
final 
order, 
determination or decision.  
(10) The Authority may grant leave for review on such 
conditions as deemed appropriate by the Authority 
including, without limitation, the conditions pertaining to 
any limits on time or additional evidence proposed to be 
presented in review.” 
 
 
 
In paras 5 & 6 of the Judgment, dated 
15.12.2014, it was held as under:- 
“5. 
It is clear from a perusal of the Rule 16(6) that 
the law mandates for the hearing of a Motion for Leave 
to Review to be heard by the ‘full strength’ of the 
Authority. The term ‘full strength’ of the Authority does 
not present a complicated issue of construction of 
statute. It simply means that the said proceedings shall 
be taken and decided by all the members of the 
Authority sitting together and deciding such review. 
There is no cavil with the proposition that in the instant 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
4
case the law does not even refer to a quorum but 
without equivocation requires the hearing by the ‘full 
strength’ of the Authority. It is settled as a basic canon 
of interpretation that if the intent of the legislature can 
be clearly gleaned then it must be given effect to 
without demur. In this case, there can be no two 
opinions on the requirement of the law and the meaning 
of the term ‘full strength’. A dictionary meaning given to 
the term shall suffice. In Oxford Advanced Learner’s 
Dictionary, 8th Edition, it is described thus: 
 
‘5[usually before noun] complete; with 
nothing missing’ 
 
and strength as: 
 
‘10 [uncountable] the number of people in a 
group, a team or an organization’. 
 
6. 
There also seems to be a purpose for laying it as 
a condition that the Motion for Leave to Review be heard 
by the full strength of the Authority. And that seems to 
be that such a review is in the nature of an appeal and, 
therefore, the hearing should be by a complete strength 
of members sitting and deciding the review. This will 
lend due process to the entire procedure.” 
 
5. 
 
The writ petition was accepted. The Appellant-
NEPRA challenged the judgment of the learned Single Bench 
through ICA No.67 of 2015 and a learned Division Bench, 
vide judgment dated 28.05.2015, concurred with the above 
judgment of Single Bench and in paragraphs 12 TO 14 
thereof and it was held as follow:- 
“12. 
The term full strength under Rule 16(6) of the 
Tariff Rules is not the available strength but the 
statutory strength as provided under Section 3 of the 
Act i.e., five Members including a Chairman because 
under the said Rule, the Authority discharges one of its 
essential functions. Rule 16(6) simply reiterates this 
principle that the Authority has to act with full strength 
in matters which fall within the core essential functions 
of 
the 
Authority 
and 
where 
delegation 
is 
not 
permissible. It is important to highlight that it is not only 
at the time of hearing a motion for leave for review that 
the Authority must have full strength, but the full 
strength of the Authority must be there when the tariff 
is to be determined by the Authority or while performing 
the other functions issued under Section 12 of the Act. 
 
The Authority has other administrative Powers and 
functions listed under Section 7 of the Act. These 
administrative functions and its decisions are taken in 
the meetings of the Authority. Section 5 deals with this 
administrative character of the Authority and its 
secretarial provision, regulating the procedures for 
holding a meeting. These meetings and the decisions 
taken thereunder have no co-relation with the core and 
essential quasi-judicial powers and functions of the 
Authority e.g., the determination of tariff or deciding the 
motion for leave to review. Hence, the argument that if 
the quorum is complete the Authority can call a meeting 
and determine tariff, is hopelessly misconceived as it 
incorrectly 
mixes 
two 
different 
functions 
of 
the 
Authority. Section 5 deals with administrative meetings 
and is a secretarial provision with no nexus with the 
determination of tariff which is a quasi-judicial function 
of the Authority. 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
5
 
Learned counsel for the Appellant has relied on Section 
3(6) of the Act to argue that decisions of the Authority 
cannot be declared to be void if only three Members 
have made the determination of tariff or have decided 
the motion for leave to review: Section 3 (6) provides: 
 
No act or proceeding of the Authority shall be 
invalid by reason only of the existence of a 
vacancy in, or defect in, the constitution of 
the Authority. 
 
This is an operational provision which applies once the 
Authority has been duly constituted in terms of Section 
3 and its composition is complete. The reference to the 
terms “vacancy” and “defect” pertain to absence of the 
member or a procedural defect or irregularity in the 
membership. Both these disqualifications assume that 
the Authority has been fully constituted. Section 3(6) 
addresses a temporary problem and, therefore, protects 
the acts or proceedings of the Authority to allow smooth 
operability of the Authority. There could be a situation 
where a duly appointed member refused to attend the 
proceedings of the Authority for tariff determination or 
some irregularity in the appointment of any member 
who is part of these proceedings. The purpose of Section 
3(6) is to ensure that such hiccups do not derail the 
Authority or its decisions. In the case of determination 
of tariff, while full strength is mandatory, there could be 
a situation where the Member is genuinely not able to 
attend the meeting or his appointment suffers from any 
irregularity making it difficult for him to attend, in such 
a situation, which should be duly recorded in the 
minutes of the proceedings, the Authority can proceed 
and determine the tariff or decide the motion for leave 
for review. This exception is few and far between but in 
the present case, Section 3(6) has no relevance as the 
Authority was not properly and lawfully constituted to 
begin with, as the Chairman and one other Member had 
not been appointed. Section 3(6) does not empower the 
Authority to proceed without proper constitution in terms 
of Section 3 of the Act. Any such interpretation can lead 
to absurd results, as the Chairman or a few Members, 
under the garb of Section 3(6) can proceed on their own 
and continue to determine tariff for the longest time. In 
such an eventuality, the Federal Government will have 
no incentive of obligation to appoint Members under the 
Act or complete the constitution of the Authority. Any 
such interpretation is also violative of the fundamental 
rights and the Constitutional vision as discussed 
above.”    
  
 
6. 
 
It was contended by learned ASC that the Original 
order was passed by the Authority comprised of two members 
and a Vice Chairman, and order on Motion for Leave to 
Review was also heard and decided by same set of members 
and a Vice Chairman. It was vehemently argued that in terms 
of Section 5(2) of the Act, 1997 three member quorum is 
provided for the decision by the Authority which is a statutory 
requirement of the Act of 1997. It was urged that the Rules 
providing otherwise are to be read in conformity with the 
provisions of parent law and not in derogation thereto. It was 
urged that the learned Division Bench of the High Court has 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
6
taken a very strict view of sub rule (6) of Rule 16 of the 
NEPRA Rules, 1998 providing for the review by the “full 
strength of the Authority” should have been read in 
conjunction with Section 3(6) of the Act, 1997 whereby the 
Act, 1997 expressly provides and save the proceedings of the 
authority in event of the vacancy in, or defect in, constitution 
of the authority and in terms of Section 5(2) of the Act, 1997, 
which provides quorum of three members for decision of 
NEPRA. It was, therefore, argued with vehemence that Rule 
16(6) of the NEPRA, 1998 not governs the Act, but it is vice 
versa, as power to Review was conferred on Authority under 
Clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 of the Act, 1997 
through an Amendment in Act of 2011. In support of his 
contentions, he has placed reliance on Managing Director, 
SSGC Ltd v. Ghulam Abbas (PLD 2003 SC 724 @ 751); 
Reference No.1 of 2012 (PLD 2013 SC 279 @ 329 and 330); 
Muhammad Ashraf Tiwana v. Pakistan (2013 SCMR 1159 @ 
1192); and Pakistan v. Aryan Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt) 
Ltd (2003 SCMR 370 @ 388). 
 
7. 
 
It was further urged that decisions of the 
Authority are merely recommendatory and under Section 31 
of the Act, 1997 it is upto the Federal Government to decide 
as it is or may require the Authority to reconsider its 
determination, 
and 
after 
such 
exercise 
within 
the 
contemplation of sub-section (4) of Section 31 of the Act, it is 
published in the Official Gazette. It was stated at bar that the 
Federal Government has accepted the determination on 
01/11/2014, and further revision in tariff was made on 
10.6.2015 to which the Respondent-FESCO has taken no 
exception. 
 
8. 
 
Learned ASC for the Respondent-FESCO heavily 
relied upon sub-rule (6) of Rule 16 of the NEPRA Rules, 1998, 
reproduced hereinabove. According to him, for the purpose of 
Leave to Motion in Review per sub Rule (6) has to be 
determined by the full strength that is to say all five 
members. According to him, said sub-rule (6) ibid must 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
7
receive literal interpretation otherwise it would amount to 
violating the spirit of the law. In support of his contention, he 
relies on Sindh High Court Bar Association v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 2009 Supreme Court 879). 
 
9. 
 
We have heard the arguments of learned counsel 
for the parties and perused the record. Leave to Appeal was 
granted on 06.11.2015 in the following terms:- 
 
“Inter alia contends that under Section 5(2) of 
the NEPRA Act any decision in respect of the functions 
under the NEPRA Act can be taken by the petitioner in a 
duly convened meeting wherein minimum of three 
members of the petitioner are present; that Section 5(4) 
of the Act specifically mandates that the decision shall 
be taken by the majority of its present members; that 
the Act do not create a distinction or imposes a 
restriction for the purposes of tariff determination to be 
undertaken by the full statutory strength of the 
petitioner and that the above aspects of the matter have 
not been taken into consideration by the learned High 
Court.  
 
2. 
Having heard learned counsel for the petitioner 
at some length, leave is granted in this petition inter alia 
to consider the issues raised. Since a short point is 
involved, office is directed to fix the main appeal on 
26.11.2015.” 
 
10. 
 
Entire 
controversy 
revolves 
round 
the 
interpretation of sub-rule (6) of Rule 16 ibid; which runs as 
follows:- 
“(6) Within ten days of service of a final order, 
determination or decision of the Authority, a party may 
file a motion for leave for review by the full strength of 
the Authority of such final order, determination or 
decision, as the case be.” 
 
 
 
In order to examine the purport of the above rule, 
it would be advantageous to keep in sight the relevant 
provisions of the Act, 1997 that is to say Sections 3 to 6 of the 
Act, 1997 which read as follows;  
“3. Establishment of the Authority. (1) As soon as 
may be, but not later than thirty days after the 
commencement of this Act, the Federal Government 
shall, by notification in the official Gazette, establish a 
National Electric Power Regulatory Authority consisting 
of a Chairman to be appointed by the Federal 
Government and four members, one from each Province, 
to be appointed by the Federal Government after 
considering the recommendations of the respective 
Provincial Governments.  
(2) There shall be a Vice-Chairman of the Authority, 
appointed from amongst the members for a period of 
one year, by rotation, in the following order, namely: (i) 
the member representing the Province of Baluchistan; (ii) 
the member representing the Province of North-West 
Frontier; (iii) the member representing the Province of 
the Punjab; and (iv) the member representing the 
Province of Sind.  
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
8
(3) [The Chairman shall be an eminent professional of 
known integrity and competence with at least twenty 
years 
of 
related 
experience 
in 
law, 
business, 
engineering, finance, accounting, economics, or the 
power industry].   
(4) Every member shall be a professional of known 
integrity and competence with at least fifteen years of 
related experience in law, business, engineering, 
finance, accounting, economics or the [power] business.  
(5) The Chairman and a member shall, unless he 
resigns or is removed from office earlier as hereinafter 
provided, hold office for a term of four years and shall 
be eligible for reappointment for similar term: Provided 
that a Chairman or a member shall not be appointed 
under sub-section (1) if he has attained the age of sixty-
five years.  
(6) No act or proceeding of the Authority shall be invalid 
by reason only of the existence of a vacancy in, or 
defect in, the constitution of the Authority.  
(7) The principal office of the Authority shall be in 
Islamabad and it may set up offices at such place or 
places as it may deem appropriate.  
4. Resignation and removal of Chairman, etc. (1) 
The Chairman, or a member may, by writing under his 
hand, resign from his office.  
(2) The Chairman or a member may be removed by the 
Federal Government from his office if, on an inquiry by 
the Federal Public Service Commission, he is found 
incapable of performing the functions of his office by 
reason of mental or physical incapacity or has been 
found guilty of misconduct.  
5. Meetings of the Authority, etc. (1) The meetings of 
the Authority shall be presided over by the Chairman 
or, in his absence, the Vice-Chairman.  
(2) Three members shall constitute a quorum for 
meetings of the Authority requiring a decision by the 
Authority.  
(3) The members shall have reasonable notice of the 
time and place of the meeting and the matters on which 
a decision by the Authority shall be taken in such 
meeting.  
(4) Decision of the Authority shall be taken by the 
majority of its members present, and in case of a tie, the 
person presiding the meeting shall have a casting vote.  
6. 
Decisions 
of 
the 
Authority. 
All 
orders, 
determinations and decisions of the Authority shall be 
taken in writing and shall identify the determination of 
the Chairman and each member.” 
  
11. 
 
NEPRA Rules, 1998 are framed by the Authority 
under Section 46 of the Act, 1997 with the approval of the 
Federal Government. Rules and or Regulations are the 
progeny or off spring of a Statute and are to be strictly in 
conformity with the provisions of the Statute where under 
same are framed. It is settled proposition of law that the rules 
framed under a Statute are to remain within the precinct of 
the Statute itself and cannot transgress the limits and 
parameters of the parent Statute itself. All efforts are to be 
made to interpret the rules so as to bring it in conformity and 
without injuring the intent and spirit of the Statute, where it 
is not possible then the rules in as much as it is injuring the 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
9
very intent and spirit which must yield to the Statute. This 
view finds support from a case reported as Ziauddin v. Punjab 
Local Government (1985 SCMR 365 @ 368), wherein it was 
held as under:- 
 
“Rules framed under the statute could not go 
beyond and over reach the statute itself. To make 
implementation 
of 
statutory 
provision 
consistent 
harmonious 
directory 
effect 
must 
be 
given 
to 
requirement of Rule”. 
 
12. 
 
In another case reported as Pakistan v. Aryan 
Petro Chemical Industries (Pvt) Ltd (2003 SCMR 370) in 
paragraph 11 of the judgment, it was held that “This is a 
settled principle that a statutory rule cannot enlarge the scope 
of the section under which it is framed and if a rule goes 
beyond what the section completes, the rule must yield to the 
statute. The authority of executive to make rules and 
regulations in order to effectuate the intention and policy of the 
Legislature, must be exercised within the limits of mandate 
given to the rule making authority and the rules framed under 
an enactment must be consistent with the provisions of said 
enactment. The rules framed under a statute if are inconsistent 
with the provisions of the statue and defeat the intention of 
Legislature expressed in the main statute, same shall be 
invalid”. 
 
13. 
 
In somewhat similar situation, in a case reported 
as Isa Ammal v. Rama Kudumban (AIR 1953 Madras 129), 
where the Petitioner applied for the issuance of a writ of 
certiorari to quash the proceedings and the decision of the 
Estates Abolition Tribunal at Madurai dated 22nd May 1950 in 
Revenue Appeal No.54 of 1950, on the ground inter alia that 
only two members of the Tribunal heard and disposed of the 
appeal filed by the petitioner under Section 9(4) of Madras Act 
XXVI of 1948 when the Tribunal as constituted by the 
Government was consisted of three members. The Settlement 
Officer Ramnad, acting under Section 9 of Madras Act XXVI of 
1948 held an enquiry and declared the village not to be an 
inam estate as defined in Section 2 (7) of the said Act. Against 
his decision there was an appeal to the Estates Abolition 
Tribunal at Madurai by a ryot of the village. Two members of 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
10
the Tribunal set, heard and reversed the decision of the 
Settlement Officer and declared the village to be an inam 
estate. The Tribunal under Section 2 (14) of Madras Act XXVI 
of 1943 is constituted and in terms of Section 8 (2) each 
Tribunal shall consist of three members; one of them (who 
shall be its chairman) shall be a District Judge or an officer 
eligible to be appointed as a District Judge, another shall be a 
Subordinate Judge or an officer eligible to be appointed as a 
Subordinate Judge, and the third shall be a Revenue 
Divisional Officer or an officer eligible to be appointed as a 
Revenue Divisional Officer. In terms of Section 9 (4) (a) any 
person deeming himself aggrieved by a decision of the 
settlement Officer under Sub-section (3) may appeal to the 
Tribunal, whereupon the Tribunal hears the Appeal and gives 
decision [Section 9 (4) (b)]. Besides the jurisdiction to decide 
appeals from the decision of the Settlement Officer under 
Section 9, the Tribunal is also entrusted with several 
important duties and for carrying them out, large powers 
have been conferred on the Tribunals. Section 67 empowers 
the Government to make rules to carry out the purposes of 
the Act, and in particular rule 1 as regards the Tribunal 
provided, inter alia that “Not less than two members shall be 
necessary to constitute a sitting of a Tribunal”.  In rule 2 it 
was provided that any matter before it, shall be decided 
according to the opinion of the majority of the members. If 
any matter has been heard by only two of the members and 
the members are divided in opinion as to the decision to be 
given, the matter shall be referred to the third member and 
decided according to the opinion which along with his 
constitutes the opinion of the majority, in rule 3 it was 
provided that when the Chairman of a Tribunal is ill or absent 
for any other reason the Second Judicial Member of the 
Tribunal shall act as the Chairman." Argument raised before 
the Court was that said rules, in so far as they purport to 
authorise two members of a Tribunal to sit and dispose of 
matters arising for the decision of the Tribunal are invalid as 
being ultra vires to the provisions of the Act. The Madras High 
Court on examining the provision of the Act and the Rules as 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
11
quoted above held that “on a plain reading of the language of 
the material sections this contention must prevail. Under 
Section 9 (4) (b) it is the "Tribunal" which must hear and give its 
decision in an appeal preferred to it under Section 9 (4) (a). The 
Tribunal, according to the definition, means a Tribunal 
constituted under Section 8 and under Section 8 (2) it is 
expressly provided that each Tribunal shall consist of three 
members. When the substantive provision in the Act clearly 
lays down that the Tribunal shall consist of three members it is 
not open for the Government to provide by a rule that a 
Tribunal may consist of less than three members”. 
 
14. 
 
It is to be noted that composition of the 
“Authority”, the Quorum, required to attend and make 
decisions both administrative and or quasi judicial, as is 
required to be taken by any regulatory Authority, within the 
contemplation of Section 3 of the Act of 1997, is with great 
deal of flexibility from the strict rules of rigidity. Important 
nature of functions and duties of the Authority, that is 
required to take administrative and quasi judicial functions 
and duties, with promptitude desired informality and 
flexibility in its composition so that the working of the 
Authority may not be stifled and or strangulated in the rigors 
of strict norms of its composition and effect its performance of 
functions and duties. Section 5(1) thereof provides that 
meeting of the authority shall be presided over by the 
chairman or, in absence, the Vice chairman.  And Section 5(2) 
ibid provides in clear terms that three members shall 
constitute a quorum for meetings of the Authority requiring 
decisions by the Authority. In order to dispel any doubt as to 
the effect and or merit of any act and or proceedings by the 
Authority, legislature has taken due care of eventuality in 
case where there happens to be any vacancy in, or defect in, 
the constitution of the Authority. Subsection (6) of Section 3 
provides legal cover and any such act or proceedings could 
not be invalidated on such count. Object of sub-section (6) of 
section 3 ibid, is to keep the authority functional in all 
respects in performance of its all functions irrespective of any 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
12
vacancy but subject to maintaining minimum strength of 
quorum as three. There is no dispute that at the time when 
the original decision was rendered on 6.2.2014 and even at 
the time when the decision dated 16.6.2014 on Motion for 
Leave to Review was handed down, the Authority was 
comprised of two Members and a vice Chairman, that met the 
minimum requirement of three members quorum set down in 
terms of Section 5 (2) of the Act, 2007. 
15. 
 
The Authority that has been conferred power 
under clause (g) of sub-section (2) of Section 7 to “review its 
order, decision, or determination”. Power to Review was 
conferred on the authority as noted above under the 
Regulation of Generation, Transmission and Distribution of 
Electric Power (Amendment) Act, 2011 and Rules were framed 
on 23 December 1998. Therefore, rules providing any other, 
strength of members for exercising its authority may it be 
executive, administrative and or quasi judicial, different than 
what is set down in the parent Statute itself, unless of course, 
such is permissible and provided for under the Act itself, 
must yield to the present Statute.   
16. 
 
Every provision of the Act, 1997 is to be read 
harmoniously and rules are to be read keeping in sight the 
parameters of the parent statute. Therefore, rule 16(6) of the 
Rules 1998 requires order, determination on motion for leave 
for review is to be made by “full strength”, within the 
contemplation of Rule 16(6) ibid means strength as set down 
in the Statute itself, that is minimum of three members 
within the contemplation of section 5 (2) of the Act, 1997. Act 
of 2007 does not admit of any classification of Authority viz. 
statutory strength and or full strength, and none should be 
created when the parent Statute does not permit so. One 
must not lose sight of the fact that rules are subservient to 
the Statute. Rules must be interpreted in a manner that it 
remains within the confine of the Statute itself and any 
interpretation that may outstretch the rules to take it out of 
pale of Statute should be avoided. 
Civil Appeal No.1149 of 2015 
13
17. 
 
In view of the above discussion, we have no 
hesitation in holding that decision by as many members as 
were present not below quorum as required under Section 5(2) 
of the Act, 1997 is the “the full strength” of the Authority 
within the preview of the Rule 16(6) of the Rules, 1998. The 
decision of the Authority dated 6.2.2014 was therefore, well 
within the competence 
of the 
Authority. Accordingly, 
impugned Judgment dated 28.5.2015 passed by a learned 
Division Bench of the High Court in ICA No.67/2015 
maintaining the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 
15.12.2014 is set aside. Resultantly, the appeal is allowed. 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
ISLAMABAD, THE 
8th of December, 2015 
ZR/* 
 
 
