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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN
(Appellate Jurisdiction)
PRBSBNT:
Mr. Justice Ijaz ul Ahsan
Mr. Justice Syed Hasan Azhar Rizvi
Mr. Justice Irfan Saadat Khan
Civil Petitions No.890-K to 909-K/2023
(Against the Order dated 14.03.2023 passed by High Court of Sindh, Karachi
in C.P Nos. 5389, 5245,5004, 6120, 47, 361, 529, 530, 583, 5069,56891 60289
7470, 7668, 7771/2021 and 241, 242, 474, 966/2023)
Collector of Customs & another
(in all cases)
VERSUS
M/s. Young Tech Private Limited & another
Club Mobile.(Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s Bellco Trading Co.(Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s Young Tech. (Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s. Young Tech Private Limited & another
M/s. A.S. Telecom (Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s.G' Five Mobile (Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s. A.S. Telecom (Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s Young Tech (Pvt) Ltd. & another
M/s.SSH Telecom SMC (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. Inovi Teleco (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. SSH Telecom SMC (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. A.S. Telecom (Private) Limited & another
M/s. Young Tech (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. G' Five Mobile (Pvt) Limited &; another
M/s. Young Tech (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. G' Five Mobile (Pvt) Limited & another
M/s. Young Tech (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. Young Tech (Private) Ltd. & another
M/s. A.S. Telecom (Private) Ltd. & another
Dr. Farhat Zafar, ASC
(in all cases)
9/w
Ms. UIne Kalsoom, D.C. Law East
Karachi
Mr.Nabeel Siraj, D.C Custom
(both vIa video link, Karachi)
22. 11.2023
For the Petitioner(s) :
Fa, ReSeQv\ debt(S) ,
Date of Hearing:
ORDER
Ijaz ul Ahsan, J .- Leave to appeal is sought against the order dated
14.03.2023 of the High Court of Sindh, Karachi in C.P. No.D-5389
of 2022 etc. Through the impugned order a number of
constitutional petitions filed by the respondents were allowed and it 
. . . Petitioner(s)
(in CP 890-K/ 23)
(in CP 89 1-K/23)
(in CP 892-K/23)
(in CP 893-K/23)
(in CP 894-K/23)
(in CP 895-K/23)
(in CP 896-K/23)
(in CP 897-K/23)
(in CP 898-K/23)
(in CP 899-K/ 23)
(in CP 900-K/23)
(in CP 901-K/ 23)
(in CP 902-K/23)
(in CP 903-K/23)
(in CP 904-K/23)
(in CP 905-K/23)
(in CP 906-K/ 23)
(in CP 907-K/23)
(in CP 908-K/23)
(in CP 909-K/23)
. . . Respondent(s)
Civil Petitions No.890-K 2023 etc.
2
was held that the demand for mobile handset levy on phones other
than smart phones was unlawful and without jurisdiction.
2. 
Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the
respondents had imported mobile phones and were aggrieved by
the imposition of mobile handset levy under section 10 of the
Finance Act, 2018 (“Act”) on mobile phones that were admittedly
not smart phones. Section 10 of the Act imposed mobile handset
levy on smart phones in the following terms:
“10. 
Mobile handset levy-–(1) There shall be levied a Mobile
handset levy, at the rates specified in column (3) of the Table
below, on smart phones of different categories as specified in
column (2) of the said Table, namely:
TABLE
Sr. No
Category of smart phone
Rate of levy
set 
in
ru
(3)
(1)
Where Import value of handset (including
duties
taxes)
and
does
exceed
not
Rs. 10,000
Where Import value of handset (including
duties and taxes) exceeds Rs. 10,000 but
does not exceed Rs.40,000
Where Import value of handset (including
duties and taxes) exceeds Rs.40,000 but
does not exceed Rs.8 C),000
Where Import value of handset (including
duties and taxes) exceeds Rs.40,000 but
does not exceed Rs.80,000
1000
3000
5000
Section 10 of the Act was supported 
by a table which gave
categories of smart phones and the rates of levy per set. It was also
stated that the Federal Board of Revenue shall collect the levy on
mobile handsets in the prescribed mmlner.
3. 
It appears that subsequently in the Finance Act, 2022,
the table of section IO was amended and the amended table
replaced the words “category of smmt phone” with the words
“Mobile Phones having C&F Value (US Dollars)”. The case of the
respondents was that mobile handset levy was imposed only on 
smart phones and since the imported ,,n,ig„m,nt, 
admitt,dIy did 
Civil Petitions No.890-K 2023 etc.
3
not fall under that category, recovery of the levy was unlawful. The
stance of the department was that by changing the table, it had
been conferred the power to recover the said levy not only on the
smart phones but also on the ordinary phone which did not fall in
the category of smart phones. It was, however, stated before the
High Court that the respondents had made a representation which
had been referred to the Federal Board of Revenue. However, in the
representation sent by the Collector, with which he appears to have
agreed, it was clearly stated as follows:
“The colectorate is of view that contention of the importers’
merits consideration as originally in Finance Act, 2018, the
handset levy was meant for Smart phones only and now the
same is being also charged on low cost feature mobile
phones imported in CKD/SKD condition. Accordingly, the
above referred representation of the importer may be
referred to the Finance Division for clarification 
as to
whether the said levy is applicable on both Smart and
Feature phones or Smart phones only.”
4.
The High Court came to the conclusion that without
amending the charging section, and merely by amending the table,
the levy could not be recovered. The reference to the table was to
the extent of the rates which were to be specified and in view of the
fact that the charging section, namely, section 10 of the Act
remained unaltered, by a mere substitution of column in the
heading of the table, the charging section itself could not and did
not stand altered or amended.
5. 
The learned counsel for the petitioners has argued that
the intention of the legislature was clear that the phones other than
smart phones were also subjected to the levy and such intention
was reflected in th, tabl,. Th, mW,n,nt ha, n.t app,al,d t. u, in
view of the fact that the right to recover any levy rests in the 
Civil Petitions No.890-K 2023 etc
BP
4
charging section and not in the table that specifies the rates at
which such charge is to be recovered. The power to recover a levy is
anchored in the charging section and the table is merely meant to
prescribe the rates at which such levy is to be recovered on various
goods/items. Unless the charging section confers a power to
recover a levy on an article or class of goods, mere mention of a
different class, types or category of goods clearly goes beyond the
scope of the charging section. This, in our opinion, cannot be done.
A schedule/table is merely a supplement of the charging section
and cannot go beyond it and create a new and altogether different
levy on a different class of goods not mentioned or contemplated by
the charging section. We have gone through the order of the High
Court which has examined the original section as well as the
amendments made therein and recorded conclusions which are
duly supported by settled law on the subject. We find no error, legal
or jurisdictional in the impugned order of the High Court which is
in-line with settled principles of law on interpretation 
of fiscal
statutes and tax laws.
6. 
Consequently, we do not find any merit in these
petitions. The same are accordingly dismissed.
refused.
appeal
ISLAMABAD
22.11.2023
Naseer
For Reno
TO
Fu
