IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
 
   (Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
 
Present: 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali, CJ 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Sh. Azmat Saeed 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 532 OF 2015 
(On appeal from the judgment/order dated 12.05.2015 passed by learned  
Election Tribunal, Multan in Election Petition No.44/2013-ECP & 5/2013-ETM)  
 
Rai Hassan Nawaz   
 
 
… 
… 
Appellant. 
 
 
 
 
Versus 
Haji Muhammad Ayub  & others  
… 
… 
Respondents.  
 
 
For the appellant   
: 
Mr. Uzair Karamat Bhandari, ASC.  
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. M.A. Sheikh, AOR.  
 
For respondent No.1 
: 
Sardar Muhammad Aslam, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Mughees Aslam Malik, ASC.  
 
 
 
 
 
Ch. Akhtar Ali, AOR.  
Date of hearing  
 
: 
25.05.2016. 
 
 
 
 
JUDGMENT: 
 
UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J. – This direct appeal is filed under 
Section 67(3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 
(“ROPA”) against the judgment dated 12.05.2015 of the learned 
Election Tribunal, Multan whereby the election of the appellant as 
returned candidate from the National Assembly constituency  
NA-162 Sahiwal-III was declared void for his failure to possess the 
qualities specified in Article 62(1)(f) of the Constitution of Islamic 
C.A.532/2015 
2
Republic of Pakistan and for the commission of corrupt practice 
falling within the mischief of Section 78(3)(d) of the ROPA. 
2. 
 
As grounds to unseat the appellant the impugned 
judgment of the learned Election Tribunal gives several adverse 
findings of facts against the appellant. However, after hearing the 
learned counsel for the parties and upon a reading of the impugned 
judgment we notice that the appellant’s false statement or incorrect 
declaration about his assets in his nomination papers constitute the 
essential basis of the learned Election Tribunal’s findings. Section 
78(3)(d) of the ROPA provides the underlying substantive law in 
this respect: 
“78. Corrupt practice.–- A person is guilty of corrupt practice if he -- 
(1) 
… 
(2) 
… 
(3)  
makes or publishes a false statement or submits 
false or incorrect declaration in any particular 
material --  
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) … 
(d) in respect of his educational qualifications, 
assets and liabilities, or any liability with regard to 
payment of loans or adherence to party affiliation 
specified in sub-section (2) of section 12.  
 
 
4) 
…”       (emphasis supplied). 
Section 12(2) of the ROPA which is mentioned in the above said 
provision imposes a duty of disclosure on every contesting 
candidate in the following terms: 
“12. Nomination for election.– 
(1) 
... 
(2)  
Every nomination shall be made by a separate nomination paper 
in the prescribed form which shall be signed both by the proposer 
and the seconder and shall, on solemn affirmation made and 
signed by the candidate, accompany 
C.A.532/2015 
3
(a)  
a declaration that he has consented to the nomination and 
that he fulfils the qualifications specified in Article 62 and 
is not subject to any of the disqualifications specified in 
Article 63 or any other law for the time being in force for 
being elected as a member; 
(b)  
[Omitted]. 
(c)  
a declaration that no loan for an amount of two million 
rupees or more, obtained from any bank, financial 
institution, cooperative society or corporate body in his 
own name or in the name of his spouse or any of his 
dependents, or any business concern mainly owned by 
him or the aforesaid, stands unpaid for more than one year 
from the due date, or has got such loan written off; 
(d)  
a declaration that he, his spouse or any of his dependents 
or a business concern mainly owned by him or the 
aforesaid, is not in default in payment of government dues 
or utility charges, including telephone, electricity, gas and 
water charges of an amount in excess of ten thousand 
rupees, for over six months, at the time of filing of 
nomination papers; 
(e)  
a statement specifying his educational qualifications, 
occupation, National Identity Card number and National 
Tax Number, if any, alongwith attested copies thereof; and 
(f)  
a statement of his assets and liabilities and those of his 
spouse and dependents on the prescribed form as on the 
preceding thirtieth day of June;” 
 
The attack upon the impugned judgment by the appellant before us 
centers on the validity of the finding about the concealment of assets 
by the appellant in his nomination papers and the jurisdictional 
competence of the learned Election Tribunal to entertain the election 
petition in the form that it was filed.  
3. 
 
The relevant facts of the case in relation to the allegation 
of false or incorrect statement of assets by the appellant under 
Section 12(2) of the ROPA are that in his nomination papers  
(Exb.P-70) he describes his sole vocation to be agriculture. To 
comply with the duty cast by Section 12(2) of the ROPA, he attached 
a statement of his assets and liabilities along with his nomination 
C.A.532/2015 
4
papers. This includes a detail of the agricultural land owned by him 
in different revenue estates of District Sahiwal and District Vehari. 
However, this detailed account fails to mention land measuring 39 
Kanals 19 Marlas situate in Qasba Chichawatni, Tehsil Chichawatni, 
District Sahiwal. The extract from the Jamabandi of 1997-98 and  
2009-10 for the said piece of land shows its ownership to vest in the 
appellant. These extracts are exhibited on the record of the learned 
Election Tribunal as Exb.P-26/1 and Exb.P-32 (available at pages 561 
& 566 of the appeal file).  
4. 
 
In his statement recorded as RW-2 by the learned 
Election Tribunal, the appellant has stated that the said land belongs 
to Rai Cotton Factory (Pvt.) Ltd., a company that is owned by his 
family. Nevertheless, the appellant admits that in the revenue record 
the ownership of 22 Kanals of the said land are recorded in his name 
and the rest in names of his family members. Also that there is no 
mutation of transfer of ownership of the said land in favour of Rai 
Cotton Factory (Pvt.) Ltd. He accepts that although the land is 
described as agricultural land, however, it has been put to 
commercial and residential use by construction of buildings thereon. 
These comprise, inter alia, 22 shops that have been rented out to 
tenants including seven banks. The buildings also include 25 
quarters and one Petrol/CNG pump depicted in the aks shajra 
(Exb.P-31) of the said land (available at page 564 of the appeal file). 
The appellant admits that the rent agreements of all the properties 
C.A.532/2015 
5
are made in his name and he receives a total annual rent of Rs.3.778 
million from the properties located in the said Qasba Chichawatni 
land. He conceded that neither the said land nor any of its 
superstructures that accommodate banks, shops, quarters and 
Petrol/CNG pump are mentioned in the statement of assets made 
and filed by the appellant with his nomination papers (Exb.P-70). It 
is clear that the appellant has in his own statement as RW-2 before 
the learned Tribunal admitted and accepted that in his nomination 
papers he did not disclose the Qasba Chichawatni properties 
belonging to him. His justification is fanciful; being based on a 
misplaced presumption that the said land and properties somehow 
belong to the Rai Cotton Factory (Pvt.) Ltd. because the income 
derived from these properties is statedly declared in the income tax 
return of the said company.  
5. 
 
The explanation given by the appellant was rightly 
rejected by the learned Election Tribunal as being futile and 
meaningless. When the recorded owner of the Qasba Chichawatni 
properties is the appellant then merely by the declaration of its 
rental and other income in the income tax return filed by a family 
company cannot make that company the owner of such properties. 
Accordingly, the said arrangement does not discharge the obligation 
of the appellant to make a full and truthful disclosure of the Qasba 
Chichawatni properties in the declaration of his assets made in his 
nomination papers. Consequently, to our minds, the finding of 
C.A.532/2015 
6
concealment of assets given by the Election Tribunal against the 
appellant is fully warranted on the merits and record of the case.  
6. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to demolish 
that finding on the basis of law declared by different High Courts in 
Illahi Bux Soomro   vs.   Aijaz Hussain Jakhrani (2004 CLC 1060), 
Umar Ayub Khan   vs.  Returning Officer, NA-19 (2003 MLD 222) 
and Ghazanfar Ali   vs.  Noor Muhammad (PLD 2011 Lahore 11). 
These judgments treat a plausible explanation given by a contesting 
candidate for non-disclosure of assets in his nomination papers to be 
an exonerating factor. It is held that an element of deliberation by 
such candidate should be the cause of incomplete or non-disclosure 
of his assets or liabilities. We agree that a trifling error induced by 
reliance placed upon information furnished by a government 
functionary would not fall within the pale of Section 78(3)(d) of the 
ROPA. Rather this Section constitutes a false statement or incorrect 
declaration made by a contesting candidate in respect of a ‘material’ 
particular, inter alia, about his assets and liabilities, to be a corrupt 
practice. Indeed an error or omission that is neither intentional nor 
pertains to a material particular in relation to the assets or liabilities 
of a contesting candidate would not constitute a corrupt practice. In 
the present case, the facts are, however, different. Several valuable 
urban properties yielding income running into millions of rupees 
have under a conscious tax scheme, affirmed and defended by the 
appellant before the learned Election Tribunal, been parked in the 
C.A.532/2015 
7
income tax return of a family company.  With rights of ownership 
thereof including title, control and profits being vested in and 
enjoyed by the appellant, the conditions of a plausible explanation 
here are altogether absent.  
7. 
 
An honest and truthful declaration of assets and 
liabilities by a returned candidate in his nomination papers 
furnishes a benchmark for reviewing his integrity and probity in the 
discharge of his duties and functions as an elected legislator. His 
statement of assets and liabilities alongwith other financial 
disclosures contemplated by Section 12(2) of the ROPA provide the 
Election Commission of Pakistan and the general public with a 
picture of both his wealth and income. Such disclosures are crucial 
for demonstrating the legitimacy and bona fides of the accrual and 
the accumulation of economic resources by such a candidate. In 
other words, the said disclosures show the returns received from his 
economic activities and can indicate if these activities may be tainted 
with illegality, corruption or misuse of office and authority. This 
important aspect of the financial disclosures by a contesting 
candidate has been noticed by this Court in Muhammad Yousaf 
Kaselia   vs.   Peer Ghulam (PLD 2016 SC 689).  
8. 
 
We, therefore, observe that any plausible explanation 
that exonerates, inter alia, mis-declaration of assets and liabilities by 
a contesting candidate should be confined to unintended and minor 
errors that do not confer any tangible benefit or advantage upon an 
C.A.532/2015 
8
elected or contesting candidate. Where assets, liabilities, earnings 
and income of an elected or contesting candidate are camouflaged or 
concealed by resort to different legal devices including benami, 
trustee, nominee, etc. arrangements for constituting holders of title, 
it would be appropriate for a learned Election Tribunal to probe 
whether the beneficial interest in such assets or income resides in the 
elected or contesting candidate in order to ascertain if his false or 
incorrect statement of declaration under Section 12(2) of the ROPA is 
intentional or otherwise. This view finds support from the statutory 
aim and purpose of requiring all contesting candidates to file their 
statements and declarations as envisaged in Section 12(2) of the 
ROPA. Clearly there is a public interest object behind the statutory 
prescription for obtaining the said statements and declaration. It is 
to ensure integrity and probity of contesting candidates and 
therefore all legislators. The said purpose and object comes across 
clearly in Muhammad Yousaf Kaselia   vs.   Peer Ghulam (PLD 
2016 SC 689): 
“5. 
It is of utmost importance, that a contesting candidate 
must disclose the assets that he owns and the liabilities that he 
owes in his nomination form. The disclosure of liabilities is more 
important that disclosure of assets. It is important for the reason 
that while holding public office, in case the liability incurred 
prior to the election is liquidated, he could be called upon to 
explain the source from which the liability was liquidated; that 
is, whether the same was liquidated from his personal sources of 
income or that he had misused the authority of the public office 
in any manner that contributed to the liquidation of the liability. 
C.A.532/2015 
9
Therefore, non-disclosure of any liability is to be met with penal 
action in the same manner as non-disclosure of any asset.  …” 
It is for that reason that in a number of recent judgments, this Court 
has treated inaccurate disclosure of proprietary and financial 
resources to be fatal to the election of a returned candidate. In 
Muhammad Ahmad Chatta   vs.  Iftikhar Ahmad Cheema (2016 
SCMR 763), the failure by a returned candidate to disclose a 
presumed inactive bank account and in Shamuna Badshah 
Qaisarani   vs.  Muhammad Dawood (2016 SCMR 1420) the 
omission by a lady returned candidate to disclose her agricultural 
land claimed to be transferred to her brothers without evidence of 
the mutation were held to annul their elections.  
9. 
 
Considering the recorded evidence of the appellant’s 
conscious knowledge of his recorded ownership of the Qasba 
Chichawatni properties, his learned counsel has forcefully argued 
his jurisdictional challenge to the impugned judgment. It transpires 
that the person who verified the election petition and annexures 
thereto at the time of its filing in the year 2013 did not actually 
possess a Notary Public/ Oath Commissioner’s licence. Actually his 
licence had been terminated by the Lahore High Court in the year 
2005 but he continued to deceive the public and allegedly also the 
respondent, election petitioner.   
10. 
 
This fact was highlighted by the appellant on 12.08.2013 
through an application under Section 63 of the ROPA calling for the 
dismissal of the respondent’s election petition for its failure to 
C.A.532/2015 
10
comply with the mandatory requirement of Section 55(3) of the 
ROPA. This provision, inter alia, envisages that every election 
petition and annexure thereto shall be signed by the petitioner and 
verified in the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 
1908 for the verification of pleadings. Section 63 of the ROPA 
mandates that a petition, which fails to, inter alia, comply with the 
requirements of Section 55 shall be dismissed. Since the attestation 
and verification done by a charlatan has no legal sanctity, therefore, 
the fatal defect in the election petition filed by the respondent is 
apparent on the face of the record.  
11. 
 
Upon learning about the foregoing defect of non-
verification of the contents of his election petition, the respondent on 
27.03.2014 filed an application seeking permission for the re-
verification of its contents. On 24.04.2014, the learned Election 
Tribunal dismissed the appellant’s application under Section 63 of 
the ROPA and permitted the respondent to re-verify the relevant 
pages of and the documents attached to his election petition. Section 
52(2) of the ROPA prescribes a limitation period of 45 days for filing 
an election petition duly compliant with the mandatory procedural 
requirements. However, both the filing date of application seeking 
re-verification of the election petition and the date of the enabling 
order passed thereon occurred long after the expiry of the prescribed 
limitation period. The learned Election Tribunal, however, held that 
fraud 
was 
committed 
by 
the 
fake 
Notary 
Public/Oath 
C.A.532/2015 
11
Commissioner and, without citing any authority, concluded that in 
such a case limitation did not run. 
12. 
 
Learned counsel for the appellant has strenuously 
argued that the amendments made in an election petition beyond 
the prescribed period of limitation are illegal and void. He has relied 
upon the cases of Umar Aslam  vs.  Sumera Malik (PLD 2007 SC 
362), Zia ur Rehman   vs.  Ahmed Hussain (2014 SCMR 1015) and 
Hina Manzoor   vs.  Ibrar Ahmed (PLD 2015 SC 396).  
13. 
 
We find that the law referred by the learned counsel for 
the appellant is clear and emphatic in making the bar of limitation in 
the given facts of the case to be inflexible. The exception of fraud 
vitiating the most solemn proceedings invoked by the learned 
Election Tribunal cannot arrest the limitation from running 
altogether. In such cases convincing evidence of fraud combined 
with evidence of timely reaction from the date of knowledge of such 
fraud must be established by the affected election petitioner. Here 
the application by the respondent for re-verification of the election 
petition was filed on 27.03.2014 more than seven months after 
receipt of notice of the defect on 12.08.2013. On the other hand, the 
prescribed limitation period under Section 52(2) of the ROPA for 
filing an election petition and therefore an amendment thereto is 45 
days. From the record we do not find convincing proof either of 
commission of fraud against the respondent or of the sufficient 
cause inducing the delay by him. We consider the application by the 
C.A.532/2015 
12
respondent for amendment through re-verification of the election 
petition to be time barred and liable to dismissal as held in the cases 
of Umar Aslam (PLD 2007 SC 362) and Zia ur Rehman (2014 SCMR 
1015).     
14. 
 
Be that as it may, notwithstanding the bar of limitation 
it must be observed that the matter does not end here. By the 
incorporation of Section 76A in the ROPA, the Legislature has 
invested an extra-ordinary jurisdiction in the Election Tribunal, inter 
alia, in matters pertaining to financial statements, declarations and 
disclosures made by returned candidates in their nomination forms. 
The said provision is reproduced hereunder: 
76A. Additional powers of Election Tribunal.-(1) If an Election 
Tribunal, on the basis of any material coming to its knowledge 
from any source or information laid before it, is of the opinion that 
a returned candidate was a defaulter of loan, taxes, government 
dues or utility charges, or has submitted a false or incorrect 
declaration regarding payment of loans, taxes, government dues or 
utility charges, or has submitted a false or incorrect statement of 
assets and liabilities of his own, his spouse or his dependents 
under section 12, it may, on its own motion or otherwise, call upon 
such candidate to show cause why his election should not be 
declared void and, if it is satisfied that such candidate is a 
defaulter or has submitted false or incorrect declaration or 
statement, as aforesaid, it may, without prejudice to any order that 
may be, or has been made on an election petition, or any other 
punishment, penalty or liability which such candidate may have 
incurred under this Act or under any other law for the time being 
in force, make an order - 
 
      (a)  declaring the election of the returned candidate to  
 
 
be void; and 
 
      (b) declaring any other contesting candidate to have  
 
 
been duly elected. 
 
C.A.532/2015 
13
(2)  
If on examining the material or information referred to in 
sub-section (1), an Election Tribunal finds that there appear 
reasonable grounds for believing that a returned candidate is a 
defaulter or has submitted a false or incorrect declaration referred 
to in sub-section (1) it may, pending decision of the motion under 
subsection (1), direct that the result of the returned candidate shall 
not be published in the official Gazette. 
(3)  
No order under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be 
made unless the returned candidate is provided an opportunity of 
being heard. (emphasis supplied) 
 
It is clear from a plain reading of Section 76A of the ROPA that the 
power conferred on the Election Tribunal is exercisable on its own 
motion on the basis of material brought to its knowledge from any 
source. The Election Tribunal is therefore vested with a suo moto 
power to scrutinize, inter alia, false or incorrect statements made by a 
returned candidate in respect of his own assets and liabilities and 
those of his spouse or his dependents. These attributes dispense 
with any locus standi requirement for the informant, excludes any 
constraint of a prescribed limitation period, empowers the Election 
Tribunal to adopt a summary procedure initiated from a show cause 
notice. Section 76A ibid does not envisage opposing parties in its 
proceedings which are therefore not adversarial in nature. It is also 
clear that to obtain its satisfaction an Election Tribunal can summon 
requisite evidence on its own motion.  
15. 
 
The object of Section 76A ibid is clearly meant to 
promote 
public 
interest 
by 
ensuring 
that 
elected 
public 
representatives have untainted financial credentials of integrity,  
probity and good faith. The Election Tribunal can summon evidence 
C.A.532/2015 
14
on a matter in issue to the point of its satisfaction as to whether the 
allegation under scrutiny is justified or not. In this background the 
power vested by Section 76A ibid in an Election Tribunal is therefore 
inquisitorial rather than adversarial in nature. This principle finds 
recognition in Watan Party  vs.   Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2011 
SC 997) as under: 
“49. 
The proceedings, which are initiated as public interest 
litigation in civil or criminal matters cannot be treated as 
adversarial because of the definition of nature of the proceedings 
where without contest between the parties a final finding has to 
be recorded, as it has so been held in the case of Tobacco Board v. 
Tahir Raza (2007 SCMR 97). In this judgment, matter relating to 
maintainability of writ of quo warranto was considered and it 
was held that such writ is to inquire from a person the authority 
of law under which he purports to hold public office and it is 
primarily inquisitorial and not adversarial, for the reason that a 
relater need not be a person aggrieved; such exercise can be done 
suo motu, even if attention of High Court is not drawn by the 
parties concerned. The same principle has been followed by the 
Court in Ch. Muneer Ahmad vs. Malik Nawab Sher (PLD 2010 
Lahore 625).”  
 
The aforesaid rule has been reiterated in Riaz-ul-Haq   vs.  
Federation of Pakistan (PLD 2013 SC 501) with reference to suo 
moto matters involving public interest.  
16. 
 
Indeed, honesty, integrity, probity and bona fide 
dealings of a returned candidate are matters of public interest 
because these standards of rectitude and propriety are made the 
touchstones in the constitutional qualifications of legislators laid 
down in Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of 
C.A.532/2015 
15
Pakistan. In the present case, the delay in obtaining verification of 
the election petition and its annexures by the respondent becomes 
immaterial because the allegation under scrutiny is covered by 
Section 76A of the ROPA. As already noted above, for triggering the 
remedy under Section 76A of the ROPA there is no requirement of 
an election petition to be filed let alone for its contents to be verified. 
The learned counsel for the appellant was invited to comment upon 
as to why proceedings undertaken by the learned Election Tribunal 
in relation to the allegation of false and incorrect statement by the 
appellant of his assets and liabilities should not be treated as having 
been conducted under Section 76A of the ROPA. He pointed out that 
the learned Election Tribunal had not done so. That is 
inconsequential; appellate proceedings are a continuation of the 
original proceedings. Sitting in appeal we can and do order so. 
Thereafter learned counsel has but merely emphasized that the 
disclosure of the property of the appellant in the income tax return 
of Rai Cotton Factory (Pvt) Ltd. constituted a plausible defence and 
in this behalf he referred the case law from the learned High Court 
that has already been mentioned above.  
17. 
 
We consider that said plea taken by the learned counsel 
for the appellant acknowledges that the proceedings of the learned 
Election Tribunal against the appellant complied the requirements of 
due process; indeed the appellant was provided a right of written 
and oral defence, of cross-examining the election petitioner’s 
C.A.532/2015 
16
witnesses and of producing his own documentary as well as oral 
evidence on the matter in issue. These safeguards are the requisities 
of a regular trial and were adopted by the learned Election Tribunal. 
The show cause notice procedure envisaged by Section 76A ibid is 
more than sufficiently satisfied by the same. Therefore, the only 
conclusion that can be drawn from arguments rendered by the 
learned counsel for the appellant is that the property owned by the 
appellant from which he regularly derives substantial income is 
disclosed and declared with his knowledge in the income tax returns 
of a private limited company owned by the appellant and his family. 
This plea is totally irrelevant, facile and meritless to rebut the 
allegation under Section 78(3) ROPA regarding the false statement 
with respect to the concealment of ownership of urban commercial 
property by the appellant. Further more, it is apparent that the 
disguised ownership of the said properties is aimed at avoiding the 
personal scrutiny and accountability of the appellant under the 
Income Tax Ordinance, 2001.  At the level of income derived by the 
appellant that process also requires the disclosure of wealth of an 
assessee and a reconciliation of his total means and total 
expenditures. The statement of assets and liabilities made by the 
appellant in his nomination papers is, therefore, intentional and not 
a bona fide or an innocuous omission made without design or 
purpose. It does not exonerate the appellant. 
C.A.532/2015 
17
18. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any defect in 
the findings given by the learned Election Tribunal in its judgment 
dated 12.05.2015 against the appellant and therefore, affirm the 
declarations made therein in relation to the person and the election 
of the appellant from the National Assembly constituency NA-162 
Sahiwal-III. Consequently, this appeal is dismissed with no order as 
to costs.   
19. 
 
Herein above are the reasons of our short order of even 
date which reads as under:  
“We have heard arguments of the learned ASCs. For the 
reasons to be recorded separately, this appeal is dismissed.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Chief Justice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Judge 
Islamabad, 
25.05.2016. 
Irshad Hussain /* 
 
 
 
APPROVED FOR REPORTING.  
