IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
Mr. Justice Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ 
Mr. Justice Mushir Alam 
Mr. Justice Manzoor Ahmad Malik 
Mr. Justice Sardar Tariq Masood 
Mr. Justice Ijaz Ul Ahsan 
Mr. Justice Mazhar Alam Khan Miankhel 
Mr. Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah 
 
 
Criminal Appeals No. 95 and 96 of 2019, Civil Appeal No. 10-L 
of 2017 and Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2013 
(Against the judgments dated 05.12.2007, 27.04.2017, 22.11.2016 & 
24.09.2012 passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore in Criminal Appeals No. 
397-J of 2006, 587-J of 2014 & 342-J of 2011 and Capital Sentence Reference 
No. 1-T of 2006 & 40-T of 2014 and Writ Petition No. 15608 of 2016) 
 
 
Ghulam Hussain  
 
(in Cr. A. 95 of 2019) 
Muhammad Azeem, etc.  
(in Cr. A. 96 of 2019) 
Tanvir 
 
 
 
(in C. A. 10-L of 2017) 
 
Sikandar Hayat  
 
(in Cr. A. 63 of 2013) 
 
…Appellants 
 
 
 
 
 
versus 
 
The State, etc. 
 
 
(in Cr. A. 95 of 2019) 
The State, etc. 
 
 
(in Cr. A. 96 of 2019) 
Prosecutor-General, etc.  
(in C. A.10-L of 2017) 
The State, etc. 
 
 
(in Cr. A. 63 of 2013) 
 
 
 
 
…Respondents 
 
 
In attendance: 
Mr. Shahid Azeem, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Javed Iqbal Raja, ASC 
Mr. Burhan Moazam Malik, ASC 
Mian Pervaiz Hussain, ASC 
Syed Tayyab Mehmood Jaffari, ASC 
Mr. 
Muhammad 
Ishtiaq 
Ahmed 
Raja, ASC 
Raja Abdul Ghafoor, AOR 
Malik Ghulam Mustafa Kandwal, 
ASC 
Mr. Kamran Murtaza, ASC 
Mr. Abid Hussain Saqi, ASC 
Mr. Muhammad Sadiq Baloch, ASC 
Ch. Munir Sadiq, ASC 
Mr. Zulfiqar Khalid Maluka, ASC 
 
 
 
 
 
Mr. Khadim H. Sandhu, ASC 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
2
On Court’s Notice: 
Mr. 
Sajid 
Ilyas 
Bhatti, 
Deputy 
Attorney-General of Pakistan 
 
Mr. 
Tariq 
Mehmood 
Jehangiri, 
Advocate-General, Islamabad 
 
Mr. 
Ahmed 
Awais, 
Advocate-
General, Punjab 
 
Ch. 
Faisal 
Farid, 
Additional 
Advocate-General, Punjab 
 
Mr. Ahmed Raza Gillani, Additional 
Prosecutor-General, Punjab  
 
Barrister Shabbir Hussain Shah, 
Additional Advocate-General, Sindh 
 
Mr. 
Salim 
Akhtar, 
Additional 
Prosecutor-General, Sindh 
 
Mr. 
Zahid 
Yousaf 
Qureshi, 
Additional 
Advocate-General, 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
 
Syed Baqar Shah, State Counsel, 
Balochistan 
 
Mr. Ayaz Khan Swati, Additional 
Advocate-General, Balochistan 
 
Date of hearing: 
 
 
02.04.2019 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ.:  
The 
meanings, 
scope 
and import of the term ‘terrorism’ defined in section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act 1997, as amended from time to time, have been a 
subject of controversy in this Court for some time and different 
Honourable Benches of varying strength deciding different cases 
have differed with each other in the past and have understood and 
interpreted the said term differently. It is in this backdrop that the 
present Larger Bench has been constituted so as to put an end to 
that controversy. 
 
2. 
The facts of the present appeals giving rise to the issue at 
hand are summed up as follows: 
 
Ghulam Hussain v The State  
(Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019) 
After a regular trial Ghulam Hussain appellant was convicted by 
the trial court on two counts of the charge under section 302(b), 
PPC for killing two minors and was sentenced to death on each 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
3
count. He was also convicted on two counts of the charge under 
section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and was sentenced to 
death on each such count. His appeal filed before the High Court 
was dismissed and all his convictions and sentences recorded by 
the trial court were upheld and confirmed. Leave to appeal was 
granted by this Court in order the reappraise the evidence and also 
to consider as to whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 were applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case or 
not.  
 
Muhammad Azeem and 3 others v The State  
(Criminal Appeal No. 96 of 2019) 
The appellants were convicted by the trial court for offences under 
section 302(b), PPC and section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 and were sentenced to death each for committing the said 
offences besides having been convicted and sentenced for some 
other offences. The appellants filed a joint appeal before the High 
Court which was dismissed and all their convictions and sentences 
were upheld and maintained except their sentences of death on 
two counts of the charge which sentences of death were reduced by 
the High Court to imprisonment for life each on each of the 
relevant counts of the charge. Leave to appeal was granted by this 
Court in order to reappraise the evidence and also to consider as to 
whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were 
attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case or not.  
 
Tanvir v Prosecutor General Punjab, Lahore, etc.  
(Civil Appeal No. 10-L of 2017) 
In this case the investigating agency had deleted section 7 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 from the FIR and the Anti-Terrorism 
Court-II, Lahore had refused to treat the case as one of terrorism. 
A writ petition filed in that regard before the High Court succeeded 
and the case was ordered to be transferred to the Anti-Terrorism 
Court for trial. Leave to appeal was granted by this Court to 
determine as to whether the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 were attracted to the case or not.  
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
4
 
Sikandar Hayat v The State  
(Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2013) 
The appellant was convicted by the trial court for an offence under 
section 302(b), PPC read with section 149, PPC and was sentenced 
to imprisonment for life besides having been convicted and 
sentenced for an offence under section 148, PPC read with section 
149, PPC. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by the High Court 
and leave to appeal was granted by this Court in order to 
reappraise the evidence.  
 
3. 
Before making an attempt to understand as to what the term 
‘terrorism’ defined in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
denotes it may be advantageous to recapitulate how different acts, 
events, episodes and phenomena have from time to time been 
perceived or understood in different parts of the world as terrorism 
and distinct from ordinary and usual crimes howsoever heinous in 
nature.   
 
4. 
History is full of instances where likeminded groups of 
people have resorted to violence as a tool for achieving political, 
ideological and religious ends. Jewish sects Zealots and Sicarii (or 
Sicarris), using small daggers called sicae hidden in their cloaks to 
stab people in crowds and then melting away in the throng, 
attacking the Roman occupiers of Judea and their allies in public 
places between 2 B.C. and 70 A.D.; the Assassins of Persia and 
Syria, Muslims belonging to the Ismaili sect who were called the 
Assassins because they were given hashish (hashishin) before 
being launched for terrorist acts, killing their targets and 
threatening the governments of several states between the 11th and 
13th centuries; suicidal attacks carried out by different groups 
against the colonial rule in India, Indonesia and Philippines in the 
18th and 19th centuries; Russian anarchists attacking members 
and supporters of the Tsarist regime with explosives at the end of 
the 19th century; Japanese Kamikaze pilots launching suicide 
attacks against American ships in the Pacific ocean during World 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
5
War II, particularly in the Battle of Okinawa in April 1945 wherein 
some 2,000 Kamikaze pilots rammed fully fuelled planes into more 
than 300 ships killing about 5,000 Americans and about 2000 
Kamikaze; Hizbullah supporters launching devastating attacks 
against the American and French forces in Lebanon in the year 
1983; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) using hundreds 
of suicide bombers and killing thousands of people including 
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the year 1991 and Sri 
Lankan President Premadasa in the year 1993; and the Marxist-
Nationalist Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) carrying out many 
suicide attacks in Turkey against a range of targets during the end 
of the last century and beginning of the current century have all 
been universally perceived and acknowledged as terrorists 
indulging in acts of terrorism.   
 
5. 
There are also many other instances in history where some 
individual acts or collective activity were, and are, perceived and 
accepted as terrorism and not just commission of normal, though 
heinous, offences. In the year 1881 anarchists killed the Russian 
Tsar Alexander II and 21 bystanders; in the year 1901 anarchists 
killed the US President McKinley as well as King Humbert I of Italy; 
World War I started in the year 1914 when anarchists killed 
Archduke Ferdinand of Austria; the British Raj referred to Bhagat 
Singh, Chandrasekhar Azad and many other Indian freedom 
fighters as terrorists; guerrilla fighters from Mao Zedong to Ho Chi 
Minh and Fidel Castro killed civilians during their revolutionary 
campaigns and they too were called terrorists until they 
triumphed; after World War II some Jewish groups in Palestine, i.e. 
Haganah, Irgun and Stern Gang fought for the creation of a Jewish 
state, bombing hotels and installations and killing civilians and the 
British, who then governed Palestine, called those Jewish groups 
terrorists and many of those terrorists including Moshe Dayan, 
Yitzhak Rabin, Menachem Begin and Ariel Sharon later became 
leaders of the independent state of Israel and, ironically, those 
former terrorists then derided terrorism, applying this label to the 
Arabs, including Yasser Arafat, fighting for the very same 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
6
nationhood that the Jews had fought for earlier; in Germany in the 
years 1968 to 1992 the Baader-Meinhoff Gang killed dozens, 
including the head of Treuhand, the German privatization agency; 
in Italy the Red Brigades kidnapped and killed Aldo Moro, a former 
prime minister, and the Japanese Red Army was an Asian version 
of that; Japan was also the home of Aum Shinrikyo, a Buddhist 
cult that tried to kill thousands in the Tokyo metro system using 
nerve gas in the year 1995; in Europe the Irish Republican Army 
has 
been 
a 
Catholic 
terrorist 
organization 
for 
almost 
a 
century; Spain and France face a terrorist challenge from ETA and 
the Basque terrorist organization; Lord's Salvation Army in 
Uganda and Boko Haram in Nigeria are universally acknowledged 
as terrorist outfits; the Afghan freedom fighters were called the 
Mujahideen (holy warriors) by the West when they were fighting 
the Soviet occupying forces but they are now branded as terrorists 
when they are fighting to oust the American occupying forces; the 
Muslim freedom fighters in the Indian occupied Kashmir, the Sikhs 
led and inspired by Bhindranwale in Punjab, the United Liberation 
Front and Bodo of Assam, militant groups in Tripura, Christian 
Mizos mounting an insurrection for decades, Christian Nagas 
waging a freedom struggle and the Maoist groups operating in no 
less than 150 out of India 's 600 districts are all termed by India as 
terrorists; and the savagery perpetrated by Talibans of different 
shades in Afghanistan and Pakistan for the last many decades is 
generally accepted and treated as acts of terrorism.  
 
6. 
The historical context of terrorism given above shows that at 
different times in history terrorism has been resorted to for 
achieving different political, ideological or religious objectives. 
There are many explanatory theories about terrorism in modern 
times but the one advanced by David C. Rapoport, Professor 
Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, in the year 2004 (published in his journal Terrorism and 
Political Violence) has received wide acceptance. The theory 
propounded by him is known as the ‘waves of terrorism’ theory and 
according to him modern terrorism can be divided into four waves 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
7
which are Anarchists (1880s-1920s), Anti-Colonial (1920s-1960s), 
Left Wing (1960s-1990s) and Religious (1990 to date). He 
maintains that each wave came and died out and that these waves 
have at times overlapped also. The common factor in all those 
waves is that all the relevant acts of violence were and are 
universally recognized as terrorism because the unlawful use of 
violence was and is meant to achieve political, ideological or 
religious goals. By now the international community understands 
quite well that terrorism is a species quite distinct from all other 
usual and private crimes howsoever heinous or gruesomely 
executed. 
 
7. 
In his book 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (published by 
Random House LLC, New York in 2018) the author Yuval Noah 
Harari has come up with a very interesting, and quite apt, analysis 
of how terrorists operate and succeed in their objectives. The 
following part of his analysis is quite enlightening:  
 
“Though the challenges are unprecedented, and though the 
disagreements are intense, humankind can rise to the occasion if 
we keep our fears under control and be a bit more humble about 
our views. 
 
Terrorists are masters of mind control...terrorism is a military 
strategy that hopes to change the political situation by spreading 
fear rather than by causing material damage. 
 
In this respect, terrorists resemble a fly that tries to destroy a 
china shop. The fly is so weak that it cannot move even a single 
tea-cup. So how does a fly destroy a china shop? It finds a bull, 
gets inside its ear, and starts buzzing. The bull goes wild with fear 
and anger, and destroys the china shop. This is what happened 
after 9/11, as Islamic fundamentalists incited the American bull 
to destroy the Middle Eastern china shop. Now they flourish in 
the wreckage. And there is no shortage of short-tempered bulls in 
the world. 
 
Terrorism is a very unattractive military strategy, because it 
leaves all the important decisions in the hands of the enemy. 
Terrorists are so weak that they cannot wage war so they opt 
instead to produce a theatrical spectacle that they hope will 
provoke the enemy and cause him to overreact. By killing a 
handful of people the terrorists cause millions to fear for their 
lives.  
 
Terrorists don't think like army generals. Instead, they think like 
theatre producers. Because we intuitively understand that 
terrorism is theatre, we judge it by its emotional rather than 
material impact.  
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
8
Terrorists undertake an impossible mission: to change the 
political balance of power through violence, despite having no 
army.  
 
Every now and then a state loses its temper and reacts far too 
forcefully and publicly, thus playing into the hands of the 
terrorists. The legitimacy of the modern state is based on its 
promise to keep the public sphere free of political violence. 
Consequently, sporadic acts of political violence that kill a few 
dozen people are seen as a deadly threat to the legitimacy and 
even survival of the state. A small coin in a big empty jar makes a 
lot of noise. 
 
The theatre of terror generates visceral fear of anarchy, making 
people feel as if the social order is about to collapse. The state is 
driven to respond to the theatre of terror with its own theatre of 
security. So instead of acting quietly and efficiently, the state 
unleashes a mighty storm, which not infrequently fulfills the 
terrorists' most cherished dreams.  
 
How then should the state deal with terrorism? A successful 
counter-terrorism struggle should be conducted on three fronts: 
First, governments should focus on clandestine actions against 
the terrorist networks. Second, the media should keep things in 
perspective and avoid hysteria. The theatre of terror cannot 
succeed without publicity. The third front is the imagination of 
each and every one of us. The success or failure of terrorism 
therefore depends on us. If we allow our imagination to be 
captured by the terrorists and then we overreact to our own fears, 
terrorism will succeed. If we free our imagination from the 
terrorists and then we react in a balanced and cool way, terrorism 
will fail.” 
 
This analysis also confirms that terrorists operate on a level 
different from that on which ordinary criminals operate, their 
operations and tactics are different and the offence of terrorism is 
more concerned with the object and design behind an action than 
with the action itself. 
 
8. 
Since the year 1974 different laws have been introduced in 
our country in order to deal with the menace of terrorist activities 
and terrorism and the first serious attempt to understand the 
nature and scope of such an offence was made by a Division Bench 
of the Lahore High Court, Lahore in the case of Basharat Ali v 
Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Gujranwala and two others 
(PLD 2004 Lahore 199). In that case the history of terrorism was 
traced, different definitions of ‘terrorism’ adopted in the laws of 
different countries were mentioned, all the precedent cases 
available on the subject till then in Pakistan and India were 
referred to and all the relevant issues were exhaustively discussed. 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
9
As all the ensuing discussion in the judicial and legal circles that 
followed that decision generally revolved around the judgment 
rendered in that case, therefore, some parts of that judgment are 
being reproduced here in extenso: 
 
“4. 
Terror and terrorism are concepts quite distinct from each 
other and the quintessence of the two notions is not difficult to 
distil. Terror as a manifestation of fright, dread, fear or insecurity 
is a consequential effect created by an act that may not 
necessarily be motivated to create such an effect whereas 
terrorism is an activity designed to create such an effect of terror. 
The critical difference between the two is the design and purpose 
understood in the criminal jurisprudence as mens rea. In the case 
of terror the act, or the actus reus, is not motivated to create fear 
and insecurity in the society at large but the same is actuated 
with a desire to commit a private crime against targeted 
individuals, etc. and the fear and insecurity created by the act in 
the society at large is only an unintended consequence or a fall 
out thereof whereas in the case of terrorism the main purpose is 
creation of fear and insecurity in the society at large and the 
actual victims are, by and large, not the real targets. Every crime, 
no matter what its magnitude or extent, creates some sort of fear 
and insecurity in some section of the society but every felony or 
misdemeanor cannot be branded or termed as terrorism. As 
against that an act of terrorism designed to create fear and 
insecurity in the society at large may or may not succeed in 
achieving the desired effect but nonetheless it can be accepted as 
nothing but terrorism because of the object or purpose behind 
such act. Thus, the real test to determine whether a particular act 
is terrorism or not is the motivation, object, design or purpose 
behind the act and not the consequential effect created by such 
act. In this context terrorism has to be understood as a species 
different and apart from terror, horror, shock, fear, insecurity, 
panic or disgust created by an ordinary crime. The history of 
recent terrorism in the world and an insight into how the world 
has understood and tried to define the same may be of significant 
help and of critical importance in appreciating the true meanings 
and import of the term ‘terrorism’. 
 
5. 
The history of terrorism as it is known today has 
essentially a political tone and background. ------- 
    
6. 
The question of a definition of terrorism has haunted the 
debate among States for decades. -------  
 
7. 
The discussion made above shows, and shows quite 
clearly, that out of the various facets of the world view about 
terrorism one factor is constant and that is that in order to 
qualify as terrorism an act must be designed to achieve a political 
and a larger objective and the same is not primarily directed 
against the actual victims themselves who are treated merely as 
‘collateral damage’. It is also quite evident that the extent of the 
actual damage caused or injuries inflicted by the act is not the 
determinative factor in this regard.  
 
8. 
Like its counterparts in rest of the world Pakistan has also 
been groping for the last many decades to find a suitable and 
appropriate definition of terrorism. Eversince the introduction of 
anti-terrorism laws in our country our legislature has constantly 
been in search of an apt definition of terrorism and in the process 
different laws have been enacted from time to time and different 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
10
definitions of terrorism have been introduced at different 
occasions. In such definitions emphasis has been placed upon 
different aspects at different times. Although Suppression of 
Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1974, Special Courts for 
Speedy Trials Ordinance, 1987, Terrorist Affected Areas (Special 
Courts) Ordinance, 1990, Special Courts for Speedy Trials 
Ordinance, 1991, Special Courts for Speedy Trials Act, 1992 and 
many other laws were also enacted in this regard from time to 
time yet for the purposes of the present judgment we intend to 
focus mainly on the two major enactments in this field, i.e. the 
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 and 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.   
 
9. 
The first major piece of legislation introduced in Pakistan 
specifically in the context of terrorism was the Suppression of 
Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 ------- It is of critical 
importance to point out here that although the word terrorism 
had been used in the Preamble of the said Act yet the same had 
not been defined in the Act at all and the Schedule of that Act 
created an impression that the word terrorism was to be 
understood in the context of any offence of serious and grave 
nature. 
 
10. 
The Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was a major step forward in 
Pakistan’s quest for dealing with the menace of terrorism and its 
Preamble provided as follows: 
 
“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the 
prevention of terrorism, sectarian violence and for 
speedy trial of heinous offences and for matters 
connected therewith and incidental thereto.” 
 
Section 12 of the Act conferred jurisdiction to try the scheduled 
offences exclusively upon the Special Courts constituted under 
the said Act. Section 6 of that Act defined a ‘terrorist act’ in the 
following terms: 
 
“Whoever, to strike terror in the people, or any 
section of the people, or to alienate any section of 
the people or to adversely affect harmony among 
different sections of the people, does any act or 
thing by using bombs, dynamite or other explosive 
or inflammable substances, or fire-arms, or other 
lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or 
chemicals or other substances of a hazardous 
nature in such a manner as to cause, or to be 
likely to cause the death of, or injury to, any 
person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, 
property or disruption of any supplies of services 
essential to the life of the community or displays 
fire-arms, or threatens with the use of force public 
servants in order to prevent them from discharging 
their lawful duties commits a terrorist act.” 
 
Section 7 of the Act specified various punishments for the 
terrorist acts mentioned in section 6, section 8 defined an offence 
regarding stirring up sectarian hatred and section 9 of the said 
Act provided for punishment for the offence under section 8. The 
Schedule of the said Act read as follows: 
 
“1. 
Any offence punishable under this Act. 
 
2. 
Any offence punishable under any of the 
following sections of the Pakistan Penal Code (Act 
XLV of 1860), namely:- 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
11
 
(a) 
section 302, -- 
(i) 
if 
committed 
with 
a 
cannon, 
grenade, bomb, rocket or a light or heavy 
automatic weapon; 
(ii) 
if the victim is a member of police, 
armed forces or civil armed forces or is a 
public servant; 
(iii) 
if there is more than one victim; or 
(iv) 
the victim was subjected to cruelty, 
brutality, torture or burning; and 
 
(b) 
offences under sections 295-A, 298-A, 364, 
364-A, 365, 365-A, 392 to 402 of the 
Pakistan Penal Code (Act No. XLV of 1860). 
 
3. 
An offence punishable under sub-section 
(4) of 
section 
10 of 
the Offence 
of 
Zina 
(Enforcement 
of 
Hudood) 
Ordinance, 
1979 
(Ordinance No. VII of 1979). 
 
4. 
Any attempt or conspiracy to commit or any 
abetment of any of the aforesaid offences.” 
 
The core and essence or the pith and substance of a ‘terrorist act’ 
defined by this Act was striking terror in the people or any section 
of the people or alienating any section of the people or adversely 
affecting harmony among different sections of the people. The 
emphasis appeared to be on the gravity of the offence and its 
effect upon the general populace rather than on the actual 
motivation behind the act. 
 
11. 
The above mentioned definition of a ‘terrorist act’ 
contained in section 6 was subsequently amended through the 
Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Ordinance, 1999 (Ordinance 
No. XIII of 1999) and the new definition read as follows: 
 
“A person is said to commit a terrorist act if he – 
 
(a) 
in order to, or if the effect of his actions will 
be to, strike terror or create a sense of fear and 
insecurity in the people, or any section of the 
people, does any act or thing by using bombs, 
dynamite or other explosive or inflammable 
substances, or such fire-arms or other lethal 
weapons as may be notified, or poisons or noxious 
gases or chemicals, in such a manner as to cause, 
or be likely to cause, the death of, or injury to, any 
person or persons, or damage to, or destruction of, 
property on a large scale, or a widespread 
disruption of supplies of services essential to the 
life of the community, or threatens with the use of 
force public servants in order to prevent them from 
discharging their lawful duties; or 
 
(b) 
commits a scheduled offence, the effect of 
which will be, or be likely to be, to strike terror, or 
create a sense of fear and insecurity in the people, 
or any section of the people or to adversely affect 
harmony among different sections of the people; or 
 
(c) 
commits an act of gang rape, child 
molestation, or robbery coupled with rape as 
specified in the Schedule to this Act; or 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
12
(d) 
commits an act of civil commotion as 
specified in section 7-A.”  
     
 
Through this amendment the focus on the effect of the action was 
extended to a potential or likely effect besides the actual effect of 
the action and the focal point still remained the effect of the 
action rather than the incentive or inspiration behind the same.  
 
12. 
It is of vital importance to mention here that while 
providing in the amended section 6 that “in order to, or if the 
effect of his actions will be to, strike terror or create a sense of 
fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people, 
does any act or thing ---” the legislature never specified the 
motivation for that “act or thing” on the part of the perpetrator 
which propelled or prompted him to commit a terrorist act. Thus, 
the actus reus was itself considered to be determinative if the 
same was intended to create fear and insecurity, etc. in the public 
at large, had the effect of creating such fear and insecurity, etc. or 
had a potential for creating such fear and insecurity, etc. 
According to this definition what was of paramount consideration 
was the effect of the act, whether actual, intended or potential, 
and not the design or the purpose behind that act. It was in that 
context that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan had 
interpreted the provisions of section 6 of this Act in many cases, 
to be discussed later on in this judgment, and had held that an 
act was to be considered a terrorist act if its effect, whether 
actual, intended or potential, was to create fear and insecurity, 
etc. in the society at large.    
 
13. 
On August 15, 2001 the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was 
drastically amended through the Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) 
Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance No. XXXIX of 2001). Through the 
amending Ordinance the Schedule of the Act containing various 
offences to be tried under the said Act was done away with and 
the term ‘terrorist act’ with its definition contained in section 6 of 
the Act was substituted and replaced by the term ‘terrorism’ with 
the following definition thereof: 
 
“(1) 
In this Act “terrorism” means the use or 
threat of action where: 
 
(a) 
the action falls within the meaning of sub-
section (2), and 
 
(b) 
the use or threat is designed to coerce and 
intimidate or overawe the Government or 
the public or a section of the public or 
community or sect or create a sense of fear 
or insecurity in society; or 
 
(c) 
the use or threat is made for the purpose of 
advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic 
cause. 
 
(2) 
An “action” shall fall within the meaning of 
sub-section (1), if it: 
 
(a) 
involves the doing of anything that causes 
death; 
 
(b) 
involves grievous violence against a person 
or grievous bodily injury or harm to a 
person; 
 
(c) 
involves grievous damage to property; 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
13
 
(d) 
involves the doing of anything that is likely 
to cause death or endangers a person’s life; 
 
(e) 
involves kidnapping for ransom, hostage-
taking or hijacking; 
 
(f) 
incites hatred and contempt on religious, 
sectarian or ethnic basis to stir up violence 
or cause internal disturbance; 
 
(g) 
involves stoning, brick-batting or any other 
form of mischief to spread panic; 
 
(h) 
involves firing on religious congregations, 
mosques, imambargahs, churches, temples 
and all other places of worship, or random 
firing to spread panic, or involves any 
forcible takeover of mosques or other places 
of worship; 
 
(i) 
creates a serious risk to safety of the public 
or a section of the public, or is designed to 
frighten the general public and thereby 
prevent them from coming out and carrying 
on their lawful trade and daily business, 
and disrupts civic life; 
 
(j) 
involves the burning of vehicles or any 
other serious form of arson; 
 
(k) 
involves extortion of money (“bhatta”) or 
property; 
 
(l) 
is designed to seriously interfere with or 
seriously disrupt a communications system 
or public utility service; 
 
(m) 
involves serious coercion or intimidation of 
a public servant in order to force him to 
discharge or to refrain from discharging his 
lawful duties; or  
 
(n) 
involves serious violence against a member 
of the police force, armed forces, civil armed 
forces, or a public servant. 
 
(3) 
The use or threat of use of any action 
falling within sub-section (2), which involves the 
use of fire-arms, explosives or any other weapon, is 
terrorism, whether or not sub-section 1(c) is 
satisfied.   
 
(4) 
In this section “action” includes any act 
done for the benefit of a proscribed organization. 
 
(5) 
In this Act, terrorism includes any act done 
for the benefit of a proscribed organization. 
 
(6) 
A person who commits an offence under 
this section or any other provision of this Act, shall 
be guilty of an act of terrorism. 
 
(7) 
In this Act, a “terrorist” means: 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
14
(a) 
a person who has committed an offence of 
terrorism under this Act, and is or has been 
concerned in the commission, preparation 
or instigation of acts of terrorism; 
 
(b) 
a person who is or has been, whether 
before or after the coming into force of this 
Act, 
concerned 
in 
the 
commission, 
preparation 
or 
instigation 
of 
acts 
of 
terrorism, shall also be included in the 
meaning given in clause (a) above.” 
 
14. 
The resume of our legislative developments in the field of 
terrorism shows that with different laws and definitions of 
terrorist act or terrorism the emphasis has been shifting from one 
criterion to another including the gravity of the act, lethal nature 
of the weapon used, plurality of culprits, number of victims, 
impact created by the act and effect of fear and insecurity 
brought about or likely to be created in the society by the action. 
The last definition of a ‘terrorist act’ contained in section 6 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 squarely focused on the effect of fear 
and insecurity intended to be created by the act or actually 
created by the act or the act having the potential of creating such 
an effect of fear and insecurity in the society. It, however, appears 
that subsequently the legislature did not feel convinced of the 
aptness or correctness of that definition and resultantly the 
erstwhile definition of a ‘terrorist act’ contained in section 6 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was repealed and a totally fresh and 
new definition of ‘terrorism’ was introduced through an amended 
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and this was 
accomplished 
through 
the 
Anti-Terrorism 
(Amendment) 
Ordinance, 2001 (Ordinance No. XXXIX of 2001) promulgated on 
15.08.2001. The legislature had probably realized by then that an 
effect of an act may not always be a correct indicator of the 
nature of such an act as every crime, especially of violence 
against person or property, does create some sense of fear and 
insecurity in some section of the society and a definition of 
terrorism based upon the magnitude or potential of an effect 
created or intended to be created or having a potential of creating 
would necessarily require a premature, speculative and imaginary 
quantification of the effect so as to determine the nature of the 
act in order to decide about the jurisdiction of a criminal court to 
try such an act. That surely was an unsure test and the result of 
such a premature, speculative and presumptive test could vary 
from court to court and from Judge to Judge reminding a legal 
scholar of the Star Chamber and the early days of a Court of 
Equity in England where equity was said to vary with the size of 
the Chancellor’s foot. The new definition of ‘terrorism’ introduced 
through the amended section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as 
it stands today appears to be the most comprehensive and the 
clearest definition of ‘terrorism’ introduced in our legal system 
thus far. It appears that in its quest for an apt and appropriate 
definition of terrorism and after stumbling through various 
approaches in that regard the legislature in our country has 
finally hit upon a definition of terrorism which is not only closest 
to its real meaning but the same is also in accord with the 
international perceptions about the same. The earlier emphasis 
on the speculative effect of the act has now given way to a clearly 
defined mens rea and actus reus. The amended section 6(1)(b) 
now specifies the ‘design’ and section 6(1)(c) earmarks the 
‘purpose’ which should be the motivation for the act and the actus 
reus has been clearly mentioned in section 6(2)(a) to (n) and now 
it is only when the actus reus specified in section 6(2) is 
accompanied by the requisite mens rea provided for in section 
6(1)(b) or (c) that an action can be termed as ‘terrorism’. Thus, it 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
15
is no longer the fear or insecurity actually created or intended to 
be created or likely to be created which would determine whether 
the action qualifies to be termed as terrorism or not but it is now 
the intent and motivation behind the action which would be 
determinative of the issue irrespective of the fact whether any fear 
and insecurity was actually created or not. After this amendment 
in section 6 an action can now be termed as terrorism if the use 
or threat of that action “is designed to coerce and intimidate or 
overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public 
or community or sect” or if such action is designed to “create a 
sense of fear or insecurity in society” or the use or threat is made 
for the purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause. 
Now creating fear or insecurity in the society is not by itself 
terrorism unless the motive itself is to create fear or insecurity in 
the society and not when fear or insecurity is just a byproduct, a 
fall out or an unintended consequence of a private crime. In the 
last definition the focus was on the action and its result whereas 
in the present definition the emphasis appears to be on the 
motivation and objective and not on the result. Through this 
amendment the legislature seems to have finally appreciated that 
mere shock, horror, dread or disgust created or likely to be 
created in the society does not transform a private crime into 
terrorism but terrorism as an ‘ism’ is a totally different concept 
which denotes commission of a crime with the object and purpose 
of destabilizing the society or government with a view to achieve 
objectives which are political in the extended sense of the word. 
This approach appears to be in harmony with the emerging 
international perception about terrorism according to which, as 
referred to above, “the aim of the activity is always political, i.e. 
the goal is to attain political objectives like changing the regime, 
changing the people in power, changing social or economic 
policies, etc. In the absence of a political aim, the activity in quest 
will not be defined as terrorism. A violent activity against civilians 
that has no political aim is, at most, an act of criminal 
delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to 
terrorism. Some scholars tend to add ideological or religious aims 
to the list of political aims.” This metamorphosis in the anti-
terrorism law in our country has brought about a sea change in 
the whole concept as we have understood it in the past and it is, 
therefore, of paramount importance for all concerned to 
understand this conceptual modification and transformation in 
its true perspective. In view of this conceptual transformation 
even the interpretations of a ‘terrorist act’ or ‘terrorism’ rendered 
by our courts in the past on the basis of the earlier law may, it is 
observed 
with 
great 
respect, 
require 
revisiting 
and 
reinterpretation so as to be in line with the newly introduced 
definition and concept of terrorism. 
 
15. 
Adverting to the case-law on the subject we may 
straightaway observe with profound respect that, barring a few 
exceptions, the judgments rendered on the subject thus far by the 
Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan appear to be heavily 
influenced by the erstwhile definition of a ‘terrorist act’ contained 
in the original Act and even the new definition of ‘terrorism’ 
contained in the amended Act has, by and large, been looked at 
with the same mindset. For instance in the case of -------  
 
16. 
One cannot help noticing that all the cases referred to in 
the last paragraph pertained to offences committed for private 
purposes with no motivation to destabilize the society at large but 
they were all adjudged to be cases of terrorist acts or terrorism on 
the basis of a presumptive and speculative quantification of the 
effect that the relevant actions could have created in the society. 
In all such cases, it is observed with great deference, the change 
brought about by the new definition of ‘terrorism’ with its 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
16
resultant shifting of focus from the effect of the action to the 
design or purpose behind the action had not been noticed and all 
those cases had been decided on the basis and on the yardstick of 
the principles provided for by the earlier definition of a ‘terrorist 
act’. In the above mentioned cases the gravity of the offence with 
its resultant actual, intended or potential effect on the people at 
large was considered as the measure for determining whether the 
act constituted terrorism or not. We can appreciate that the 
mindset inherited by us in the background of the Summary 
Military Courts, Speedy Trial Courts and Special Courts for 
Suppression of Terrorist Activities, which were different courts 
constituted at different stages in the past for separate and special 
handling of offences of grave nature, may take some time to be 
dispelled and it may take us a while to appreciate and realize that 
an act of ‘terrorism’ is not just a grave offence but it is a class and 
species apart and this class or species has to be understood in its 
true and correct perception and perspective otherwise every 
serious offence may be found by one Judge or the other to involve 
terrorism depending upon a subjective assessment of the 
potential of the act to create some sense of fear or insecurity in 
some section of the society. Such an approach, it may be 
observed with great veneration, may not be wholesome as it may 
ultimately result in every case of a serious offence landing in a 
Special Court and thereby rendering the ordinary courts 
substantially redundant. It ought not to be lost sight of that the 
legislature’s repeal of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities 
(Special Courts) Act, 1975, doing away with the Schedule of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and also its retraction from the ‘effect’ 
through the fresh definition of ‘terrorism’ cannot be without any 
significance or purpose. That drastic change of the definition 
manifestly indicated a change of meanings and of focus and such 
a change has to be given its proper effect. After all if the newly 
introduced term ‘terrorism’ is still to be interpreted in the same 
manner as the erstwhile term ‘terrorist act’ then there was hardly 
any occasion or need for the legislature to amend the definition 
and to bring about any change in the existing law in that regard. 
The legacy and interpretations pertaining to the Suppression of 
Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 and of the original 
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 have now to be 
shrugged off so as to correctly understand the new definition of 
‘terrorism’ introduced through the latest amendment in the latter 
Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan had itself declared in 
the above mentioned case of Mumtaz Ali Khan Rajban and another 
v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2001 SC 169) that the 
subject matters of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special 
Courts) Act, 1975 and the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were 
“different” and their respective applicability was “governed by 
different criteria”.   
 
17. 
We understand, and we observe so with all the respect at 
our command, that in the above mentioned cases the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of Pakistan had, wittingly or otherwise, detracted 
or moved away from the principle of nexus so painstakingly 
carved out by itself in the case of Mehram Ali and others v. 
Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 1998 SC 1445). -------  
 
18. 
It may be advantageous to mention here that the 
definition of ‘terrorism’ introduced in Pakistan in 2001 through 
the latest amendment in the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 proceeds 
on lines somewhat similar, if not identical, to the corresponding 
definitions contained in the relevant laws of Northern Ireland, 
United Kingdom, United States of America, Australia and India. 
Section 58 of the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 
1996 defined terrorism in the following words: ------- Section 1 of 
the United Kingdom’s Terrorism Act, 2000 reads as follows: ------- 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
17
Section 802 of the Uniting and Strengthening America Act by 
Providing Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism 
(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 of the United States of America 
defines “domestic terrorism” as follows: ------- In Australia Section 
5 of the Terrorism (Emergency Powers) Act, 2003 defines a 
‘terrorist act’ in the following words: ------- In India the Terrorist 
and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (Act No. 28 of 
1987) defined a ‘terrorist act’ in sections 3(1) thereof as follows: --
----- The Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 
was subsequently repealed in India and was substituted by the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (Act No. 15 of 2002) and 
section 3 of the said Act provides as follows: -------  
 
19. 
The similarities, nay resemblances, in the definitions of a 
‘terrorist act’ or ‘terrorism’ enacted in Northern Ireland, United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Australia, India and Pakistan 
are too striking to be merely coincidental and, therefore, in the 
lager interests of global harmony and communion their 
interpretations ought also not be different. ------- In the case of 
Niranjan Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate v. Jitendra Bhimraj 
Bijja and others (AIR 1990 SC 1962) ------- This, to us, appears to 
be an approach which is not only in complete harmony with the 
change of focus brought about by the new definition of ‘terrorism’ 
through the amended section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 in 
Pakistan but is also in perfect accord with the global perceptions 
about the true nature of terrorism according to which the 
determinative factor is the design or purpose behind the act and 
not the presumptive effect created by the act upon those who 
were not even the targets of the private act. ------- the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of India had reiterated in the case of Niranjan 
Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja and 
others (AIR 1990 SC 1962) that: ------- In the subsequent case of 
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab ((1994) 3 Supreme Court Cases 
569) the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India reproduced the above 
mentioned passages from the judgments in the cases of Niranjan 
Singh Karam Singh Punjabi, Advocate v. Jitendra Bhimraj Bijja and 
others (AIR 1990 SC 1962) and Usmanbhai Dawoodbhai Memon v. 
State of Gujrat ((1988) 2 SCC 271) and commented upon them 
with approval and reiteration. The later case of Hitendra Vishnu 
Thakur and others v. State of Maharashtra and others (AIR 1994 
SC 2623) can truly be described as a milestone in the context of 
identifying the true meanings of terrorism and the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of India had observed in its judgment in that case 
as follows: ------- A similar approach was adopted by the Hon’ble 
Supreme Court of Pakistan in 1998 in the above mentioned case 
of Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 
(PLD 1998 SC 1445) by carving out the principle of nexus with 
the objects of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. However, it appears 
that in the last few years the said principle has either been side 
tracked or placed on the back burner in our country and the law 
is not only being stretched in a different direction but the same is 
also often being misapplied and misused by the police and the 
subordinate courts. An appropriate and correct restatement of the 
relevant law for its proper application is, therefore, not only 
necessary but also a crying need so that the relevant law may be 
saved from being derailed from its real objectives.   
 
20. 
By way of summing up we may observe that, keeping in 
view the latest definition of ‘terrorism’ contained in section 6 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, mere gravity or brutal nature of an 
offence does not provide a valid yardstick for branding the same 
as terrorism. In order to qualify as terrorism the motivation 
behind the offence has to be political in the extended sense of the 
word and, as provided in the United Kingdom law, “the use or 
threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
18
or ideological cause” and the act has to be designed to destabilize 
the society at large. The history of crimes in the human society is 
replete with macabre, gruesome and horrifying offences shocking 
the society at large yet such crimes were never treated or 
accepted as terrorism because the motivation was personal and 
private. As against that even an unsuccessful attempt at sabotage 
of public supplies or services has readily been accepted as 
terrorism because the purpose behind the act is to destabilize the 
society at large. Even a petty theft in a house in a street is likely 
to create a sense of insecurity in the people living in that street, a 
rape of a young girl is bound to send jitters in every family having 
young girls living in the relevant locality, a murder in the vicinity 
surely creates a grave sense of fear in the inhabitants of the area, 
a bloodbath in furtherance of an on-going feud shocks the society 
as a whole, a massive fraud in a bank may send shockwaves 
throughout the banking and financial sectors and an offence 
committed against a member of any profession may render the 
other members of that profession feeling vulnerable and insecure. 
But all such offences are ordinary crimes distinguishable from 
terrorism because for the former the motivation is personal and 
private whereas for the latter the purpose has to be to destabilize 
the society at large. In this backdrop a premature, speculative, 
presumptive and imaginary quantification of the effect of an 
action so as to determine the nature of the act as terrorism or not 
appears to be an unsure and subjective test and it would be safer 
and consistent to revert to the principle of nexus carved out by 
the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan which is not only now a 
statutory requirement but the same is also consistent with the 
first major enunciation of the relevant law by our Supreme Court 
and that too by a Bench larger than any other Bench deciding 
any of the other cases mentioned above.  
 
21. 
------- 
 
22. 
Judged on the basis of the requirements of the amended 
provisions of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and 
examined on the touchstone of the principle of nexus propounded 
by the largest Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in 
the case of Mehram Ali and others v. Federation of Pakistan and 
others (PLD 1998 SC 1445), reiterated by an equally large Bench 
of it in the case of Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar 
Hassan, Secretary-General v. Federation of Pakistan through 
Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (PLD 2000 SC 
111) and applied by it in the case of Ch. Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed 
Iqbal and 7 others (PLD 2001 SC 521) the case in hand, despite 
the brutality displayed by the culprits and the consequent horror, 
shock, fear and insecurity likely to be created by the savagery 
perpetrated by the offenders, has not appeared to us to be a case 
of terrorism as the motive for the alleged offences was nothing but 
personal enmity and private vendetta and the motivation on the 
part of the accused party was not to overawe or intimidate the 
government, etc. or to destabilize the society at large or to 
advance any sectarian cause, etc.. The intention of the accused 
party did not depict or manifest any ‘design’ or ‘purpose’ as 
contemplated by the provisions of section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 and, thus, the actus reus attributed to it was 
not accompanied by the necessary mens rea so as to brand its 
actions as terrorism triable exclusively by a Special Court 
constituted under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The stand taken 
before us by the learned Assistant Advocate-General appearing 
for the State also proceeds on the same lines and it is for these 
very reasons that the State has chosen not to oppose this 
petition. This writ petition is, therefore, allowed, the impugned 
order passed by the learned Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, 
Gujranwala on 04.10.2003 is declared to be without lawful 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
19
authority and of no legal effect and the same is set aside, the 
application filed by the petitioner before the said court under 
section 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is accepted and the 
petitioner’s case is declared to be triable by a court of ordinary 
jurisdiction. 
The 
learned 
Judge, 
Anti-Terrorism 
Court-II, 
Gujranwala is directed to transmit the record of the petitioner’s 
case to the learned District & Sessions Judge, Gujranwala 
forthwith for further proceedings in the matter. There shall be no 
order as to costs.” 
 
The said judgment passed by the Lahore High Court, Lahore 
(authored by one of us, Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, CJ, in his capacity 
as a Judge of that Court at that time) was initially set aside by this 
Court in the case of Mirza Shaukat Baig and others v Shahid Jamil 
and others (PLD 2005 SC 530) but subsequently in the cases of 
Bashir Ahmed v M. Siddique (PLD 2009 SC 11), Ahmad Jan v 
Nasrullah and others (2012 SCMR 59) and Farooq Ahmed v State 
and another (PLJ 2017 SC 408) it was not only referred to with 
approval and relied upon by this Court but it was also held to be 
laying down correct law regarding the scope and meanings of 
‘terrorism’ as defined in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
 
9. 
Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 has been amended 
from time to time and in its present shape it provides as follows: 
 
6.  
Terrorism. – (1) 
In this Act, “terrorism” means the 
use or threat of action where: 
 
(a)  
the action falls within the meaning of subsection (2), and 
 
(b) 
the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or 
overawe the Government or the public or a section of the 
public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or 
insecurity in society; or 
 
(c) 
the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a 
religious, sectarian or ethnic cause or intimidating and 
terrorizing the public, social sectors, media persons, 
business community or attacking the civilians, including 
damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson, or by 
any other means, government officials, installations, 
security forces or law enforcement agencies: 
 
Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to a 
democratic and religious rally or a peaceful demonstration in 
accordance with law. 
 
(2)  
An “action” shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), 
if it: 
 
(a) 
involves the doing of anything that causes death; 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
20
(b) 
involves grievous violence against a person or grievous 
bodily injury or harm to a person; 
 
(c) 
involves 
grievous 
damage 
to 
property 
including 
government 
premises, 
official 
installations, 
schools, 
hospitals, offices or any other public place or private 
property including damaging property by ransacking, 
looting or arson or by any other means; 
 
(d) 
involves the doing of anything that is likely to cause death 
or endangers a person's life; 
 
(e) 
involves 
kidnapping 
for 
ransom, 
hostage-taking 
or 
hijacking; 
 
(ee)  
involves use of explosive by any device including bomb  
blast or having any explosive substance without any 
lawful justification or having been unlawfully concerned 
with such explosive; 
 
(f) 
incites hatred and contempt on religious, sectarian, or 
ethnic basis to stir up violence or cause internal 
disturbance; 
 
(g) 
involves taking the law in own hand, award of any 
punishment by an organization, individual or group 
whatsoever, not recognized by the law, with a view to 
coerce, intimidate or terrorize public, individuals, groups, 
communities, 
government 
officials 
and 
institutions, 
including law enforcement agencies beyond the purview of 
the law of the land; 
 
(h) 
involves firing on religious congregations, mosques, 
imambargahs, churches, temples and all other places of 
worship, or random firing to spread panic, or involves any 
forcible takeover of mosques or other places of worship; 
 
(i) 
creates a serious risk to safety of the public or a section of 
the public, or is designed to frighten the general public 
and thereby prevent them from coming out and carrying 
on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts 
civic life; 
 
(j) 
involves the burning of vehicles or any other serious form 
of arson; 
 
(k) 
involves extortion of money (“bhatta”) or property;  
 
(l) 
is designed to seriously interfere with or seriously disrupt 
a communication system or public utility service; 
 
(m) 
involves serious coercion or intimidation of a public 
servant in order to force him to discharge or to refrain 
from discharging his lawful duties; 
 
(n) 
involves serious violence against member of the police 
force, armed forces, civil armed forces, or a public servant; 
 
(o) 
involves in acts as part of armed resistance by groups or 
individuals against law enforcements agencies; or  
 
(p) 
involves in dissemination, preaching ideas, teachings and 
beliefs as per own interpretation on FM stations or 
through any other means of communication without 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
21
explicit approval of the government or its concerned 
departments. 
 
(3)  
The use or threat of any action falling within sub-section 
(2) which involves the use of firearms, explosive or any other 
weapon is terrorism, whether or not sub-section (1) (c) is satisfied.  
 
(4)  
In this section ‘action” includes an act or a series of acts. 
 
(5)  
In this Act, terrorism includes any act done for the benefit 
of a proscribed organisation.  
 
(6)  
A person who commits an offence under this section or 
any other provision of this Act, shall be guilty of an act of 
terrorism.  
 
(7)  
In this Act, a “terrorist” means:- 
 
(a) 
an individual who has committed an offence of terrorism 
under this Act, and is or has been concerned in the 
commission, 
preparation, 
facilitation, 
funding 
or 
instigation of acts of terrorism; 
 
(b) 
an individual who is or has been, whether before or after 
the coming into force of this Act, concerned in the 
commission, 
preparation, 
facilitation, 
funding 
or 
instigation of acts of terrorism, shall be included in the 
meaning given in clause (a) above. 
 
On the basis of the said definition of ‘terrorism’ and the precedent 
cases available on the subject all the learned counsel for all the 
parties as well as all the learned law officers, except the learned 
Attorney-General for Pakistan, have argued before us in unison 
that an act of terrorism is not to be confused with an ordinary 
crime committed in the background of a personal enmity or private 
vendetta and gravity of an offence, shocking nature of the violence 
committed or mere fear and insecurity generated or likely to be 
generated by commission of a brutal, gruesome or heinous act are 
not to be treated as the yardsticks for determining whether an 
action is to be labeled as terrorism or not and only that action is to 
be accepted as terrorism which action falls within the purview of 
subsection (2) of section 6 and such action is committed with a 
‘design’ or ‘purpose’ specified in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) 
of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The learned Attorney-
General for Pakistan has, however, submitted his written 
submissions and through the same he has maintained that “all 
“actions” that fall within the contemplation of sub-section (3) of 
section 6 would have to be registered as an act of terror, within the 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
22
meaning of terrorism. However punishments contemplated by Sec 
7 would be awarded, subject to subsequent evidence being led, 
that, the ‘actions’ where weapons are used and has caused 
fear/terror etc., it would be termed as ‘terrorism’, as defined in 
section 6(1), (2) & (3), else, the person could be acquitted to the 
extent of the charge of terrorism. In other cases not involving the 
contemplation of sub-section (3) of section 6, the FIR cannot be 
lodged under the provisions of ATA, however, where during 
investigation and available evidence, any of the provision of sub-
section (2) of section 6 comes to surface, Anti-terrorism Act can be 
included.” The main thrust of the stand taken by the learned 
Attorney-General is that in terms of subsection (3) of section 6 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 use or threat of use of firearms, 
explosive or any other weapon for all the actions mentioned in 
subsection (2) of section 6 of that Act ipso facto constitutes 
terrorism and an FIR can be registered on that basis in respect of 
the offence of terrorism but conviction for committing the offence of 
terrorism can be recorded at the end of the trial only if the alleged 
action is proved through evidence to have been taken with the 
‘design’ or ‘purpose’ specified in clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) 
of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. According to the 
learned Attorney-General subsections (1), (2) and (3) of section 6 of 
the said Act are to be read in conjunction and for determining 
whether an action constitutes terrorism or not it is the action with 
its actual or likely consequences which is relevant and not the 
intention behind the action which remains hidden in the mind of 
the perpetrator of the action. However, in the same written 
submissions the learned Attorney-General has also observed that 
“terrorism as a concept is not ‘ordinary’ in even the way that 
intention, guilt and dishonesty are. Nor is it a term belonging to 
some science; its natural home is in polemical, ideological, and 
propagandist contexts or, less alarmingly, highly political ones.” 
The learned Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab has added that 
the provisions of subsection (3) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 are quite problematic as they do not piece well with the 
remaining provisions of the said section as far as the matter of 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
23
defining terrorism is concerned. According to him if the provisions 
of subsection (3) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, as 
they are worded, are to be given effect then almost every offence in 
commission of which firearms, explosive or any other weapon is 
used or threatened to be used would constitute terrorism and such 
an approach would obliterate any distinction between the peculiar 
offence of terrorism and most of the run of the mill offences 
committed in the society in routine.          
 
10. 
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some 
length and have attended to the relevant statutory provisions and 
all the precedent cases available on the subject so far. As the 
opinion of this Court has remained divided on the issue as to what 
constitutes terrorism in the context of section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997, therefore, it is imperative to examine and 
scrutinize all the precedent cases available on either side of the 
divide with care. In the following cases this Court has held that the 
actions specified in subsection (2) of section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 are to constitute the offence of terrorism only 
if such actions are accompanied by the ‘design’ or ‘purpose’ 
specified in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the 
said Act and it has consistently been maintained in these cases 
that an act of terrorism is not to be confused with the usual and 
run of the mill crimes committed in the background of any 
personal enmity or private vendetta and also that gravity of an 
offence, shocking nature of the violence committed or mere fear 
and insecurity generated or likely to be generated by commission of 
a brutal, gruesome or heinous offence are not to be treated as the 
determining factors for deciding whether an action is to be labeled 
and accepted as terrorism or not.     
 
Mehram Ali and others v Federation of Pakistan and others  
(PLD 1998 SC 1445) 
 
“However, it may be observed that the offences mentioned in the 
Schedule should have nexus with the object of the Act and the 
offences covered by sections 6, 7 and 8 thereof. It may be stated 
that section 6 defines terrorist acts, section 7 provides 
punishment for such acts, and section 8 prohibits acts intended 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
24
or likely to stir up sectarian hatred mentioned in clauses (a) to (d) 
thereof. If an offence included in the Schedule has no nexus with 
the above sections, in that event notification including such an 
offence to that extent will be ultra vires. ------- It will suffice to 
observe that if a Government servant or any other employee of the 
Government functionaries is murdered because he belongs to the 
above service and that there was no enmity or plausible reason 
for commission of the above offence, such a killing is an act of 
terrorism within the ambit of the Act and can lawfully be included 
in the Schedule, but if the murder is committed solely on account 
of personal enmity, such murder will have no nexus with the 
above provisions of the Act and will not be triable under the Act.”  
 
Jamat-i-Islami Pakistan through Syed Munawar Hassan, 
Secretary-General 
v 
Federation 
of 
Pakistan 
through 
Secretary, Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs  
(PLD 2000 SC 111)  
 
“------- to make an act punishable under the Act, it must be 
shown that the act bears nexus to sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Act.”  
 
Ch. Bashir Ahmad v Naveed Iqbal and 7 others  
(PLD 2001 SC 521)  
 
“A person would commit a terrorist act if in order to, or if the 
effect of his actions will be “to strike terror or create a sense of 
fear and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people ---”. 
In the instant case as the facts of the case reveal, the alleged 
sprinkling of the spirit on the person of the victim was within the 
boundary walls of the appellant’s house. It was not in public and, 
therefore, the element of striking terror or creating sense of fear 
and insecurity in the people, or any section of the people is not 
made discernible in the F.I.R. and for that matter on the record of 
the case as a whole. Similarly the perusal of the Schedule to the 
Act also indicates that the element of striking terror or creation of 
sense of fear and insecurity in the people or any section of the 
people by doing an act or thing by using bombs, dynamite or 
other explosive or inflammable substances etc. is a sine qua non 
for the attraction of the provisions of section 6 of and the 
Schedule to the Act -------. In the instant case no doubt the 
offence committed was certainly most heinous in nature but it 
does not mean that it does qualify to be a terrorist act within the 
contemplation of section 6 or the Schedule to the Act.”  
 
Muhammad Mushtaq v Muhammad Ashiq and others  
(PLD 2002 SC 841) 
 
“It would thus appear that ordinary crimes are not to be dealt 
with under the Act. A physical harm to the victim is not the sole 
criterion to determine the question of terrorism.”  
 
Fazal Dad v Col. (Rtd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik and others  
(PLD 2007 SC 571)  
 
“In case the aforesaid provisions and contents of F.I.R. are put in 
a juxta position then section 6 of the said ordinance is not 
attracted. It is a settled law that preamble is always key to 
interpret the statute. The very object to promulgate the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 was to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian 
violence and other heinous offences as defined in section 6 of the 
Act and their speedy trial to bring the offence within the ambit of 
the act, it is essential to examine that the said offence should 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
25
have nexus with the object of the act and offences covered by its 
relevant provisions such as section 6. It is a settled law that 
provisions of law must be read as a whole in order to determine 
its true nature, import and scope -------. It is abundantly clear 
that in case the provisions of act be read as a whole with the 
offence which creates a sense of fear or insecurity in society, 
causes of death or endangers a person's life commits an act of 
vehicle snatching or lifting, damage to or disturbance of, State or 
private property failing to create panic charging bhatta or 
criminal trespasser (Illegal qabza). As mentioned above, the 
ingredients of aforementioned offences have no nexus while 
reading the aforesaid provisions along with the contents of the 
impugned F.I.R. It is pertinent to mention here that nothing was 
on record to show that occurrence created terror, panic or sense 
of insecurity among people by securing possession of the land in 
question by the respondent. The word illegal Qabza must be read 
with the previous words used by the legislature in clause (d) of 
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 on well-known principle 
that statutory provisions ought not to be construed in isolation 
and courts always to lean towards reasonable interpretation of 
statute. The learned High Court was justified to examine the 
scope of terrorism at the time of deciding the constitutional 
petition with regard to the transfer of case from special court to 
ordinarily court on the well known maxim that legislative intent 
as a guide to interpretation of statute should be gathered 
primarily from words used in statute. The case in hand did not 
qualify to be a terrorist act within the contemplation of section 6 
or schedule of Anti-Terrorism Act and the learned High Court was 
justified to transfer the case to the ordinary court. It is settled law 
that promulgation of special law by itself is not sufficient to 
supersede provisions of law contained in Cr.P.C. In case, the 
offence has no nexus with the parameters of special law, then 
general law will apply. The judgment of the learned High Court is 
in consonance with the law laid down by this court in various 
pronouncements. See Mehram Ali's case PLD 1998 SC 1445 and 
Jamat-e-Islami Pakistan's case PLD 2000 SC 111.”  
 
Mohabbat Ali and another v State and another  
(2007 SCMR 142)  
 
“In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within 
the ambit of section 6 of the Act, it would be essential to have a 
glance over the allegations made in the F.I.R., record of the case 
and surrounding circumstances. It is also necessary to examine 
that the ingredients of alleged offence has any nexus with the 
object of the case as contemplated under sections 6, 7 and 8 
thereof. Whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the 
motivation, object, design or purpose behind the said Act is to be 
seen. It is also to be seen as to whether the said Act has created a 
sense of fear and insecurity in the public or any section of the 
public or community or in any sect. Examining the case in hand 
on the above touchstone, it is manifest on the face of it that the 
alleged offence took place because of previous enmity and private 
vendetta. The incident admittedly took place inside the fields of 
sugarcane and Banana cultivated in jungle about 14/15 miles 
away from the main road. Motive as defined in the F.I.R. is also to 
be given a specific attention which indicates that there was a 
personal enmity between the parties over the land and murder 
case of Haries of complainant.”  
 
“From the entire resume, it is manifest on record that intention of 
the petitioner was not at all to create sense of insecurity or in 
destabilize the public-at-large or to advance any sectarian cause. 
Thus, we are of the view that the design or purpose of the offence 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
26
as contemplated by the provisions of section 6 of the Act is not 
attracted. Reference can be made to the case of this Court 
reported as Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed Iqbal PLD 2001 SC 521 
whereby sprinkling of spirit on the person of victim was made 
within the boundary walls of the house of appellant which was 
not a public place and accordingly the element of a striking terror 
or creating sense of fear and insecurity in the people or any 
section of the people was found missing, therefore, the order of 
transferring the case to the Court of learned Sessions Judge 
passed by the High Court was upheld.”  
 
Tariq Mahmood v State  
(2008 SCMR 1631)  
 
“In our opinion, the case of the respondent accused, who have 
clean past, rests on a lower pedestal than that on terrorists and 
sectarian criminals who killed innocent persons either to weaken 
the State or to cause damage to the parties of the rival sect. The 
terrorist or the sectarian killers do not have any personal grudge 
or motive against the innocent victims. The instant case is clearly 
distinguishable as admittedly a feud existed between the parties 
over a piece of land prior to the occurrence.”  
 
Muhammad Yaqoob and others v The State and others  
(2009 SCMR 527) 
 
“Though learned counsel for the appellants has not specifically 
challenged convictions of the appellants under section 7 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and occurrence in the case allegedly 
took place in Samoote Bazaar, opposite U.B.L. Branch, wherein 
three persons were done to death and another sustained grievous 
injuries yet, in the absence of any stipulation in the F.I.R. to the 
effect that the incident had struck terror or panic in the public 
and in the absence of any evidence to the effect that the incident 
had created sense of fear or insecurity in the public or any 
section of public or community or any sect, it could not have been 
contended that section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was 
attracted in the instant case. It would be pertinent to mention 
here that in order to bring a particular act within the ambit of 
section 7, it is to be seen as to whether the said act had created 
sense of fear or insecurity in public or in any section of public or 
community or any sect, or the occurrence was simply the result of 
previous enmity or personal vendetta. 
 
Since in the instant case it has been established that motive 
behind the incident was previously strained relations between the 
parties and an iota of evidence has not been brought on record to 
show that object was not to kill the deceased but also to strike 
terror or create sense of fear or insecurity in the general public or 
community or any sect thereof, therefore, in our view section 7 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act was not attracted. In the case of Tariq 
Mahmood v. The State 2008 SCMR 1631, the occurrence had 
allegedly taken place in a Bazaar which was heavily populated 
and it was claimed that due to firing there was stampede in the 
traversers yet, since it was found that there was no evidence that 
the act of respondents/accused struck terror amongst the masses 
and the place of occurrence was not a busy populated area rather 
it took place on a service road, therefore, the provisions of Anti- 
Terrorism Act were not attracted. In the case of Muhammad 
Idrees and others v. The State 2008 SCMR 1544, occurrence took 
place on the bank of canal. It was not established on record that 
the act done by the accused persons had created sense of fear or 
insecurity in public, therefore, it was held that section 7 of the 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
27
Anti-Terrorism Act was not attracted. In the case of Mohabbat Ali 
v. the State 2007 SCMR 142, the alleged incident took place 
because of previous enmity and private vendetta inside the fields 
of sugarcane and banana, about 14/15 miles away from main 
road, it was held that intention of the accused was not at all to 
create sense of fear or insecurity or to destabilize public at large 
or to advance any sectarian cause and design or purpose of 
offence as contemplated by provisions of section 6 of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 was not attracted. In the case of Fazal Dad v. 
Col. (Retd.) Ghulam Muhammad Malik PLD 2007 SC 571, since 
nothing was brought on record to show that the occurrence 
created terror, panic or sense of insecurity among people by 
securing possession land in question by the accused persons, 
therefore, the case did not qualify to be a terrorist act within the 
contemplation of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act or its 
schedule. Convictions and sentences recorded against the 
appellants under section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, are, 
therefore, set aside.”  
 
Bashir Ahmed v M. Siddique  
(PLD 2009 SC 11)  
 
“In order to determine as to whether an offence would fall within 
the ambit of section 6 of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997, it would 
be essential to have a glance over the allegations made in the 
F.I.R, record of the case and surrounding circumstances. It is 
also necessary to examine that the ingredients of alleged offence 
have any nexus with the object of the case as contemplated under 
sections 6, 7 and 8 thereof. Whether a particular act is an act of 
terrorism or not, the motivation, object, design or purpose behind 
the said act is to be seen. It is also to be seen as to whether the 
said act has created a sense of fear and insecurity in the public or 
any section of the public or community or in any sect. Examining 
the case in hand on the above touchstone, it is manifest on the 
face of it that the alleged offence took place because of previous 
enmity and private vendetta. A perusal of the record would reveal, 
that occurrence has taken place in front of the `haveli' of the 
respondents, situated in village ‘Fatoowala’. The motive for the 
occurrence is enmity inter-se the parties on account of some 
previous murders. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion 
that since motive was enmity inter-se the parties, the application 
of section 7 of the Act, which primarily requires the spread of 
sense of insecurity and fear in the common mind is lacking in the 
present case. The occurrence neither reflects any act of terrorism 
nor it was a sectarian matter instead the murders in question 
were committed owing to previous enmity between the two 
groups. The present case, as observed above, does not fulfil the 
requirements laid down in the judgment titled as "Basharat Ali v. 
Special Judge Anti-terrorism Court-II, Gujranwala (PLD 2004 
Lah.199), wherein it was held that fear or insecurity must not be 
a by-product, fall out or unintended consequence of a private 
crime. As such, creation of fear and insecurity in the society is 
not itself terrorism unless the same is coupled with the motive. 
The gist of the citation is that act of terrorism desires to be 
determined from the yardstick and scale of motive and object, 
instead of its result or after effect. From the facts of case, the 
definition of terrorism is not attracted as the said offence has 
neither created any threat to coerce or intimidate or overawe the 
Government or the public or a section of the public or community 
or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society. Reference 
in this regard can be made on Ch. Bashir Ahmad v. Naveed Iqbal 
and 7 others (PLD 2001 SC 521), Muhammad Mushtaq v. 
Muhammad Ashiq and other (PLD 2002 SC 841) and Basharat Ali 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
28
v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, Gujranwala (PLD 2004 
Lah. 199).”  
 
Ahmad Jan v Nasrullah and others  
(2012 SCMR 59)  
 
“In Bashir Ahmed v. State (PLD 2009 SC 11) by considering the 
law laid down in Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism 
Court-II (PLD 2004 Lahore 199), a judgment authored by one of 
us (Asif Saeed Khan Khosa, J), Bashir Ahmed v. Naveed Iqbal and 
others (PLD 2001 SC 521) and Muhammad Mushtaq v. 
Muhammad Ashiq and others (PLD 2002 SC 841), the case in 
question was held not to be triable by a Special Court established 
under the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 because “The motive for the 
occurrence is enmity inter se the parties on account of some 
previous murders. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion 
that since motive was enmity inter se the parties, the application of 
section 7 of the Act, which primarily requires the spread of sense of 
insecurity and fear in the common mind is lacking in the present 
case. The occurrence neither reflects any act of terrorism nor it was 
a sectarian matter instead the murders in question were committed 
owing to previous enmity between the two groups.””  
 
Malik Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri v The State and others  
(PLD 2016 SC 17)  
 
“The next question to be considered is as to whether by 
committing the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer, the then Governor 
of the Province of the Punjab, the appellant had also committed 
the offence of 'terrorism' as defined by section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 or not which offence is punishable under 
section 7(a) of the said Act. A plain reading of section 6 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 shows that while defining 'terrorism' the 
said section bifurcates the same into two parts, the mens rea for 
the offence falling in section 6(1)(b) or (c) and the actus reus of the 
offence falling in section 6(2) of the Act and in order to attract the 
definition of terrorism in a given case the requisite mens rea and 
actus reus must coincide and coexist. The provisions of section 
6(5), (6) and (7) of the Act also indicate that there may be some 
other actions of a person which may also be declared or 
recognized as acts of terrorism by some other provisions of the 
same Act. Restricting ourselves to the provisions of section 6 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 for the present purposes we note 
that in a case where the action involves the doing of anything that 
causes death [section 6(2)(a)] and such causing of death is 
designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the Government or 
the public or a section of the public or community or sect or 
create a sense of fear or insecurity in society [section 6(1)(b)] or 
such causing of death is for the purpose of advancing a religious, 
sectarian or ethnic cause [section 6(1)(c)] there the causing of 
death of the victim is to be accepted and treated as terrorism 
triable exclusively by an Anti-Terrorism Court. As far as the case 
in hand is concerned the action of Malik Muhammad Mumtaz 
Qadri appellant involved firing at Mr. Salman Taseer and thereby 
causing his death and, thus, his actus reus fell within the ambit 
of section 6(2)(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. As regards the 
appellant's mens rea he had himself stated in his statement 
recorded by the trial court under section 342, Cr.P.C. that the 
murder of Mr. Salman Taseer committed by him was "a lesson for 
all the apostates, as finally they have to meet the same fate". That 
statement of the appellant clearly established that he not only 
wanted to punish Mr. Salman Taseer privately for the perceived or 
imagined blasphemy committed by him but the appellant also 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
29
wanted to send a message or teach a lesson to all others in the 
society at large who dared to follow Mr. Salman Taseer's suit. In 
this view of the matter the causing of death of Mr. Salman Taseer 
by the appellant was surely designed to intimidate or overawe the 
public or a section of the public or to create a sense of fear or 
insecurity in the society so as to attract the requisite mens rea 
contemplated by section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
Apart from that it cannot be seriously contested that the 
appellant had committed the murder of Mr. Salman Taseer for the 
purpose of advancing a religious cause and, thus, even the mens 
rea contemplated by section 6(1)(c) of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 
1997 stood fully attracted to the case of the appellant. In these 
circumstances we have entertained no manner of doubt that the 
action of the appellant and the intention, design or purpose 
behind such action fully attracted the definition of terrorism 
contained in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and, 
therefore, he was correctly and justifiably punished by the trial 
court under section 7(a) of the said Act for committing the offence 
of terrorism. In paragraph No. 44 of the impugned judgment the 
Islamabad High Court, Islamabad had set aside the appellant's  
conviction and sentence recorded by the trial court under section 
7(a) of the Anti- Terrorism Act, 1997 on the sole ground that 
sufficient evidence had not been brought on the record by the 
prosecution to establish that the murder committed by the 
appellant had in fact created any sense of fear or insecurity in the 
society. We have found such an approach adopted by the 
Islamabad High Court, Islamabad vis-a-vis the offence of 
terrorism to be utterly misconceived. The provisions of section 
6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 quite clearly contemplate 
creation of a sense of fear or insecurity in the society as a design  
behind the action and it is immaterial whether that design was 
actually fulfilled or not and any sense of fear or insecurity was in 
fact created in the society as a result of the action or not. It is the 
specified action accompanied by the requisite intention, design or 
purpose which constitutes the offence of terrorism under section 
6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 and the actual fallout of the 
action has nothing to do with determination of the nature of 
offence. In this view of the matter we find ourselves in agreement 
with the learned Advocate-General, Islamabad that Malik 
Muhammad Mumtaz Qadri appellant's acquittal by the Islamabad 
High Court, Islamabad from the charge under section 7(a) of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 is liable to be set aside and 
consequently his conviction for the said offence recorded by the 
trial court needs to be restored.”  
 
Khuda-e-Noor v The State  
(PLD 2016 SC 195)  
 
“The crucial question involved in this appeal is as to whether the 
learned Sessions Judge, Mastung was justified in holding that the 
case in hand was one of honour killing and, thus, it was a case of 
"terrorism" attracting the exclusive jurisdiction of an Anti-
Terrorism Court or not. It also needs to be examined as to 
whether the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta was justified in 
declaring in the case of Gul Muhammad (supra) that by virtue of 
the provisions of section 6(2)(g) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 all 
cases of honour killing are to be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court. 
We have minutely gone through the said judgment passed by the 
High Court of Balochistan, Quetta and have found that for 
holding that all cases of honour killing attracted the definition of 
"terrorism" the High Court had only relied upon the provisions of 
section 
6(2)(g) 
of 
the 
Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 
1997 
without 
appreciating that by virtue of the provisions of section 6 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 any action falling within any of the 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
30
categories of cases mentioned in subsection (2) of section 6 of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 could not be accepted or termed as 
"terrorism" unless the said action was accompanied by a "design" 
or "purpose" specified in section 6(1)(b) or (c) of the said Act. If the 
interpretation of section 6(2)(g) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
advanced by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta in the said 
judgment were to be accepted as correct then all cases of a 
person taking the law in his own hands are to be declared or 
accepted as cases of terrorism but that surely was not the 
intention of the legislature. The provisions of section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 which define "terrorism" clearly show that 
the said section is divided into two main parts, i.e. the first part 
contained in section 6(1)(b) and (c) of the said Act dealing with the 
mens rea mentioning the "design" or the "purpose" behind an 
action and the second part falling in section 6(2) of the said Act 
specifying the actions which, if coupled with the mens rea 
mentioned above, would constitute the offence of "terrorism". This  
scheme of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 had 
unfortunately not been considered by the High Court of 
Balochistan, Quetta while rendering the judgment mentioned 
above and, thus, we have every reason to declare that the said 
judgment passed by the High Court of Balochistan, Quetta had 
not laid down the law correctly and had in fact misconceived the 
legal position contemplated by section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997.”  
 
“The case in hand was a case of a private motive set up in the FIR 
and during the trial the motive set up in the FIR was changed by 
the prosecution and an element of honour killing was introduced 
but even that did not change the character of the offence which 
was nothing but a private offence committed in the privacy of a 
home with no design or purpose contemplated by section 6(1)(b) 
or (c) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. We have thus, entertained 
no manner of doubt that the allegations leveled against the 
appellant and his co-accused in the present criminal case did not 
attract the jurisdiction of an Anti-Terrorism Court, the learned 
Sessions Judge, Mastung was not justified in transferring the 
case to an Anti-Terrorism Court and the High Court was also not 
legally correct in dismissing the appellant's revision petition.”   
 
Sagheer Ahmed v The State and others  
(2016 SCMR 1754)  
 
“High Court in the impugned judgment has observed as 
 
follows: 
 
"10.  
The averments of FIR are silent regarding 
the financial status and source of income of the 
complainant against which accused have been 
demanding Bhatta. Complainant has also not 
disclosed the specific dates, times and places of 
demanding Bhatta by accused persons nor any 
such 
evidence 
was 
produced 
before 
the 
Investigating Officer to prima facie establish such 
allegations. In absence of any tangible material, 
mere allegations of demanding Bhatta do not 
attract section 6(2)(k) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, 
in the present case nor said section was mentioned 
in the FIR and Challan. Perusal of Challan reflects 
that Investigating Officer had made a request to 
the Anti-Terrorism Court for return of FIR and 
other 
documents 
so 
that 
Challan 
may 
be 
submitted before the ordinary Court of law as no 
case under the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
31
1997 was made out, but his request was declined 
by the Anti-Terrorism Court vide order dated 
09.06.2014, and cognizance was taken by the 
Court. 
 
11.  
Cumulative effect of the averments of FIR, 
surrounding circumstances and other material 
available on record have replicated that offence 
having been committed on account of previous old 
enmity with a definite motive. The alleged offence 
occurred at Faiz Wah bridge, which is not situated 
in 
any 
populated 
area, 
consequently, 
the 
allegations of aerial firing have not appeared to us 
to be a case of terrorism as the motive for the 
alleged offence was nothing but personal enmity 
and private vendetta. The intention of the accused 
party did not depict or manifest any act of 
terrorism as contemplated by the provisions of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, we are of 
the considered view that complainant has failed to 
produce any material before the Investigating 
Officer that at the time of occurrence sense of fear, 
panic, terror and insecurity spread in the area, 
nevertheless it was a simple case of murder due to 
previous enmity, thus, alleged offence does not fall 
within purview of any of the provisions of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997."  
 
4.  
We note that observation made by the High Court is based 
upon the record of the case and no misreading in this respect was 
pointed out before us.” 
 
Ch. Shaukat Ali v Haji Jan Muhammad and others  
(2016 SCMR 533)  
 
“In view of the discussion in Para 7 above and the report of police 
under section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, prima facie it 
appears that altercation between the parties occurred all of a 
sudden when the procession of the complainant side on winning 
the election was passing in front of house of Haji Jan Muhammad 
accused and there was no prior 'object/design.'  
 
10.  
During the course of arguments, we have observed that 
basic premise of the arguments of learned counsel for the 
petitioner pivots around the judgment of a Five Member Bench of 
this Court in Kashif Ali v. The Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court No.II, 
Lahore and others (PLD 2016 SC 951), wherein the issue of 
jurisdiction has been dealt with. It is appropriate to reproduce the 
relevant portion of Para 12 of the said judgment for ready 
reference: 
 
"12. ......... In order to determine whether an offence 
falls within the ambit of Section 6 of the Act, it 
would be essential to have a glance over the 
allegations levelled in the FIR, the material collected 
by the investigating agency and the surrounding 
circumstances, depicting the commission of offence. 
Whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, 
the motivation, object, design or purpose behind the 
said Act has to be seen ....."  
 
11.  
We have gone through the allegations leveled in the FIR, 
the material collected by the investigating agency during course of 
investigation and other surrounding circumstances as discussed 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
32
above and are of the considered view that present case is not 
triable by a Court established under the provisions of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997.”  
 
Waris Ali and 5 others v The State  
(2017 SCMR 1572)  
 
“Under the jurisprudence, "mens rea" is an essential ingredient of 
every crime, needs to be attended first by the Courts of law 
however, in cases of terrorism or terrorist activities the "mens rea" 
becomes twofold, i.e. the first object is to commit a crime, while 
the primary object of "mens rea" in the second fold speaks of 
terrorism related ideology, purpose and object, the most nefarious 
and detestable designs to commit crimes, creating sense of fear, 
insecurity and instability in the society and community with the 
ultimate object to destabilize the State as a whole. The true and 
perceivable object of this second "mens rea" is to create chaos, 
large scale disturbances, widespread sense of insecurity in the 
society/public and to intimidate and destabilize the State as a 
whole by means of terrorist activities. 
 
10.  
In cases of this nature, "mens rea" is essentially with an 
object to accomplish the act of terrorism and carrying out 
terrorist activities to overawe the State, the State Institutions, the 
public at large, destruction of public and private properties, make 
assault on the law enforcing agencies and even at the public at 
large. The ultimate object and purpose of such acts is to terrorize 
the society or to put it under constant fear while in ordinary 
crimes committed due to personal vengeance/blood feud or 
enmity, the element to create fear or sense of insecurity in the 
society, public by means of terrorism is always missing. 
 
11.  
True, that the offences contained in the Schedule to the 
Anti-Terrorism Act would fall within the definition of terrorism 
and terrorist activities but the crimes committed due to private 
revenge or to say traditional crimes, cannot be dragged into the 
fold of terrorism and terrorists activities. 
 
12.  
The mere fact that the crimes for personal motive are 
committed in a gruesome or detestable manner, by itself would 
not be sufficient to bring the acts within the meaning of terrorism 
or terrorist activities. The Courts of law should not lose sight of 
the fact that terrorism and terrorist activities are committed and 
are carried out by a person, group of persons and well equipped 
organizations, whose primary aim and object is to destabilize the 
society and the State as a whole through such activities. The 
object and "mens rea" behind such activities is clearly spelled out 
from the nature of the crime committed, which must be attended 
to by the Courts with a deep judicial thought, as in the latter 
category the sole object/purpose in committing different crimes is 
to cause alarm, dread, fright inducing sense of insecurity in the 
mind of the people. 
 
13.  
The acts of terrorism and terrorist activities are committed 
and carried out in a wolfish manner by terrorists and terrorist 
groups, to whom training and skills are imparted, their 
brainwash is made in a planned manner so that, while 
committing gruesome and sickening crimes, they have to act in 
cruel manner and in pursuance of creating terror, the prime and 
ultimate object to be accomplished. The suicidal attacks and 
blasts in busy markets/business places, hospitals, mosques, 
other religious and educational institutions where peoples are 
slaughtered/butchered and their limbs are blown apart through 
bomb blast, are some of the instances of such activities, 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
33
conveying dreadful message to the community/society at large of 
terror, for no motive other than the one to create fear and sense of 
insecurity. 
 
14.  
Albeit, murder, attempted murder, causing bodily harm or 
hurt and damage to property and some other offences have been 
included in the Third Schedule, appended to the Anti-Terrorism 
Act however, on plain reading, it becomes apparent that these 
offences are triable by the Special Courts, constituted under the 
Special Act but, there is no reference either expressed or implied 
in the Schedule that the Special Court shall award punishment 
under section 7 read with section 6 of the Act to accused persons 
charged for such crimes. There is another category of offences, 
which are squarely mentioned in the substantive provision of 
section 7 read with section 6 of the Special Act, which are 
specifically described to be acts of terrorism and shall fall within 
that definition however, the qualifying words, attached thereto, 
create a subtle distinction between the ordinary crimes, 
committed out of personal revenge, enmity or private motive and 
those committed for the object of creating terror. This aspect 
needs to be interpreted and construed in a meaningful and 
objective manner so that the two categories of crimes i.e. ordinary 
crimes and those related to terrorism, are neither mixed up nor 
intermingled because construction placed on it at random 
without judicial thoughts, the cardinal principle relating to 
construction of Statute, would be defeated and ordinary crimes 
having no nexus with terrorism or terrorist activities would be 
incorrectly or wrongly placed in the grey category of crimes, which 
is not the object and intent of the Legislature. If ordinary crimes 
committed due to personal revenge or motive are given the colour 
of terrorism or terrorist activities, hundreds and hundreds of 
Criminal Courts (Sessions Courts) and other Courts would be 
rendered inoperative and their vested jurisdiction would be taken 
away for no justifiable reason. The Prosecution and disgruntled 
complainants have been noticed making crude attempts to paint 
an ordinary crime as an act of terrorism so that the rival/opposite 
party is put to maximum mental agony. Here, it becomes the duty 
of the Court of law to draw a fine distinction between two kinds of 
crimes, which are definitely pole apart.” 
 
“19.  
Keeping in view the above narrative, it is thus essential to 
look at the legislation and the new enactments, as to how these 
were introduced and what was the purpose and object of the 
same. The conventional and ordinary crimes of murder, hurt, etc. 
were being committed due to personal motives however, in 
committing these crimes unlike in the past, where the same were 
being committed through clubs, sharp weapons, shotguns or 
non-automatic rifles, the old crime weapons were substituted by 
sophisticated weapons, fully or semi automatic which fell in the 
hands of the majority of the peoples. Now invariably these crimes 
are committed with modern weapons, which has no doubt a 
devastating effect. However, this category of crimes is committed 
due to longstanding blood feud and is the result of personal 
motive. There is no intention (mens rea) in committing these 
crimes to create fear, terrorize the society/community at large or 
to put it under constant fear and terror. In terrorism cases, evil 
elements are always persuasive factor and integral parts of it, 
therefore, due care and caution shall have to be observed by the 
Courts so that ordinary crimes might not be pushed to the grey 
area of terrorism or terrorist activities to be dealt with under the 
law, meant for a particular class of peoples, group of 
persons/organizations, which are to be treated altogether 
differently under the special law. The careful reading of all the 
relevant provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 would show that 
the sole and primary object of the same is to curb and eliminate 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
34
terrorism and terrorist activities and also the groups involved in 
the same, besides to eliminate the sectarian and factional violence 
committed with the same object therefore, ordinary crimes due to 
personal motive or revenge shall not be taken at par with acts of 
terrorism or terrorist activities, the sole object of which is nothing 
but to terrorize the society/community and the State as a whole. 
There is a sky high difference between the crimes of the old 
category and the new one, for which special law has been 
enacted.” 
 
“30.  
In the present case, besides many infirmities highlighted 
in the earlier paras of the judgment, it appears that the noose 
was thrown wider, the act/acts, the crimes committed and 
executed were the consequence of personal motive and in the 
course of the transaction no element of terrorism defined by 
Legislature was involved, although it was gruesome in nature, 
however, the punishment provided under section 302(a) and (b), 
P.P.C. is also death sentence besides compensation too was 
awardable under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. Therefore, in the matter 
of punishment there is no marked distinction, if the penal 
provision of P.P.C. is applied. The parties are having a blood feud 
since long and the object to be achieved was to take revenge for 
the previous murder and attempted murder, therefore, in our 
considered view, both the Courts below have not taken due care 
by applying correct provision of law to the established facts of the 
case. The construction on the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act 
and the principle laid down in the cases cited at the bar i.e. 
Shahbaz Khan @ Tippu v. Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court (PLD 
2016 SC 1) and Kashif Ali v. The Judge Anti-Terrorism Court, No.II, 
Lahore (PLD 2016 SC 951) proceeds on different premises, both 
legal and factual and are not attracted to the facts and 
circumstances of the present case.” 
 
Sajid Rasheed Qureshi v Munawar Ahmad  
(2017 SCMR 162)  
 
 
 
Amjad Ali and others v The State  
(PLD 2017 SC 661)  
 
“The last aspect of this case highlighted in the leave granting 
order is as to whether the courts below were justified in 
convicting and sentencing the appellants for an offence under 
section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 or not. We note in 
that context that a mere firing at one's personal enemy in the 
backdrop of a private vendetta or design does not ipso facto bring 
the case within the purview of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 so as to brand the action as terrorism. There was no 'design' 
or 'object' contemplated by section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 involved in the case in hand. We further note that by virtue 
of item No. 4(ii) of the Third Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 a case becomes triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court if use of 
firearms or explosives, etc. in a mosque, imambargah, church, 
temple or any other place of worship is involved in the case. That 
entry in the Third Schedule only makes such a case triable by an 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
35
Anti-Terrorism Court but such a case does not ipso facto become 
a case of terrorism for the purposes of recording convictions and 
sentences under section 6 read with section 7 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997. The case in hand had, thus, rightly been 
tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court but the said Court could not 
have convicted and sentenced the appellants for an offence under 
section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as it had separately 
convicted and sentenced the appellants for the offences of 
murder, etc. committed as ordinary crimes.”  
 
Abdul Nabi v The State  
(2017 SCMR 335)  
 
“After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and going 
through the record we have observed that the case in hand was 
not a case of terrorism but was a case of a private offence 
committed in secrecy. The "design" or "purpose" provided for by 
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 were non-existent in the 
present case and apparently there was no intention on the part of 
the appellant to create a sense of fear or insecurity in the public 
at large. Apart from that in view of the conclusions which are to 
follow in the later part of this judgment the case in hand was not 
a case of a gang-rape and, thus, even from that angle the 
Schedule to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 did not stand attracted 
to the present case. In this view of the matter we are of the 
considered opinion that the courts below were not justified in 
convicting and sentencing the appellant for the offence under 
section 7(a) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.”  
 
Province 
of 
Punjab 
through 
Secretary 
Punjab 
Public 
Prosecution Department and another v The State  
(PLD 2018 SC 178)  
 
“The preamble of the Act, 1997 clearly indicates that the Act, 
1997 was promulgated for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian 
violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences. So, in the cases 
of the terrorism, the mens-rea should be with an object to 
accomplish the act of terrorism and carrying out terrorist 
activities to overawe the state, the state institutions, the public at 
large, destruction of public and private properties, make assault 
on the law enforcing agency and even at the public at large in 
sectarian matters. The ultimate object and purpose of such act is 
to terrorize the society but in ordinary crimes committed due to 
personal vendetta or enmity, such elements are always missing so 
the crime committed only due to personal revenge cannot be 
dragged into the fold of terrorism and terrorist activities. The 
same was the view in the case of Mehram Ali v. Federation of 
Pakistan (PLD 1998 SC 1445) passed by a full bench (five 
members bench) of this Court. 
 
After the amendment the term "design" was used in Section 6 of 
the Act, which has widened the scope of the Act. The word 
"design" was substituted to see that if the act is designed to 
create sense of fear or insecurity in the society then the Anti-
Terrorism Court will have the jurisdiction to try the same. The 
word "design" can be considered the scheme and object in the 
mind of accused for its subsequent execution. So the Courts 
while deciding the question of attraction of the provisions of the 
Act, has to see the manners in which the incident had taken 
place including the time and place and should also take note of 
the fact of the act as to create terror or insecurity in the general 
public where the action of the accused results in striking terror or 
creating fear, panic and sense of insecurity among the people in a 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
36
particular vicinity, it amount to terror within the ambit of Section 
6 of the Act. The Courts are required to see whether the terrorist 
act was such that it would have the tendency to create the sense 
of fear or insecurity in the mind of general public as well as 
psychological impact created in the mind of the society. The 
Courts can form opinion after going through the facts, 
circumstances and material so collected by the police in the case 
under discussion because the facts are varies from case to case.”  
 
Dilawar Mehmood alias Dulli and another v The State  
(2018 SCMR 593) 
 
“During the course of arguments, learned counsel for the 
petitioner vehemently contended that the learned Courts below 
have also convicted the petitioner under the provisions of Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 without adverting to the fact that the said 
provisions are not attracted in the circumstances of the present 
case. Therefore, we have undertaken a detailed scrutiny of the 
evidence available on record in order to see whether the 
provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are attracted to the 
present case or not. The occurrence in this case took place at 
cattle Market, Kundian. It is alleged by the prosecution that 
petitioner along with his co-accused Muhammad Arshad (P.O.) 
armed with Kalashnikovs came at the spot and made straight 
firing at deceased Muhammad Afzal, as a result whereof the latter 
succumbed to the injuries. The motive behind the occurrence as 
stated in the FIR was previous enmity. Having a look at the time 
of occurrence, place of occurrence, the mode and manner of the 
occurrence and the alleged motive between the parties coupled 
with other circumstances, we are of the considered view that 
provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are not attracted in this 
case and the learned Courts below have erred in law in 
convicting/sentencing the petitioner under the said provisions of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.”  
 
11. 
As against the above mentioned cases there are many other 
cases decided by this Court wherein the fallout, consequences or 
effect of an action were held to determine as to whether the action 
amounted to terrorism or not. The following cases may be referred 
to in this category of cases: 
 
Muhammad Ajmal v The State  
(2000 SCMR 1682)  
 
“On the face of it this seems to be an act of terrorism fully falling 
within the ambit of section 6 of the Act. Admittedly, the petitioner 
has behaved in an inhuman manner who while entering inside 
the Court-room made indiscriminate firing at the complainant 
party and the personnel of the Court staff and killed 
complainant's brother namely, Abdul Ghafoor and Muhammad 
Munir Naib Qasid and severely injured Reader of the Court 
namely, Umar Draz, thus created a sense of fear and insecurity 
among the people. All the witnesses examined at trial have fully 
supported the case of prosecution against the petitioner on the 
score that he fired indiscriminately in the Court-room on the 
abovementioned persons and that he was apprehended there and 
then alongwith his .30 bore pistol the crime weapon. Not only this 
but 5 crime empties with lead bullets were recovered from the 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
37
Courtroom which were sealed and sent for expert opinion 
alongwith crime weapon and the same were opined to have been 
fired from the said weapon.” 
 
Mumtaz Ali Khan Rajban and another v Federation of 
Pakistan and others  
(PLD 2001 SC 169)  
 
In this case a Professor was gunned down because he did not allow a candidate 
appearing in an examination to adopt unfair means and this Court held that the 
act of the accused “struck terror and also created sense of fear and insecurity 
amongst people in general and Teachers/Professors in particular” and, 
therefore, the case was adjudged as one of a terrorist act. It was observed by this 
Court as follows:  
 
“It is contended with reference to Petition No. 1675 that the act of 
the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of "Terrorism Act" as 
defined in above-quoted section. Precisely stated the contention is 
that Professor Abdul Latif, deceased only prevented the petitioner 
from copying in the examination hall and immediately thereafter 
nothing happened and that the threat, as contemplated in above 
section, shall precede before a public servant is prevented from 
discharging his lawful duties. Learned counsel argued that at the 
time of occurrence the deceased was not performing any official 
duty, as such, alleged threat in the examination hall did not bring 
the case within the purview of above-quoted section. The 
contention is devoid of any force. The threat was translated into 
reality, and the deceased was killed. It is not necessary that the 
force must have been used immediate after the threat. The act of 
the petitioner squarely fell within the scope of "terrorist act", for 
the reasons that as a consequences of said threat the deceased 
was killed. Besides in the examination hall, as well as, in the 
college every body knew about it. It struck terror and also created 
sense of fear and insecurity amongst people in general and 
Teachers/Professors in particular.”  
 
Muhammad Mushtaq v Muhammad Ashiq and others  
(PLD 2002 SC 841)  
 
In this case four persons were murdered by their adversaries when they were 
proceeding to the premises of the District Courts, Lahore to attend a hearing of a 
case and this Court held that to be a terrorist act because: 
  
“The cumulative fall-out of the occurrence as to the time, place 
and manner of the act created a sense of the fear and insecurity 
in society. -------- The Lahore High Court fell in error by taking 
into consideration only the element of the alleged enmity existing 
between the parties. The High Court failed to advert to the 
terrorizing effect of the occurrence created on the minds of the 
people at large and of the concerned locality and passer-by who 
had no means to ascertain the background or motive for the 
crime or the enmity of the parties inter se.”  
 
Mst. Raheela Nasreen v The State and another  
(2002 SCMR 908)  
 
In the said case a Batman of a Major serving in the Pakistan Army had allegedly 
murdered the Major in connivance with the Major’s wife and this Court held that 
to be a case of terrorism by observing that:  
 
“From a bare reading of section 6(b) of the Act, it is manifest that 
it is not necessary that the offence as alleged had in fact, caused 
terror as the requirement of the said provision of law could be 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
38
adequately satisfied if the same was likely to strike terror or sense 
of fear and insecurity in the people. ------- The learned Judges of 
the High Court came to the conclusion that a Batman who was a 
trusted person of an army officer if he kills as alleged his master 
in connivance with his (master’s) wife, the same was likely to 
strike terror or feeling of insecurity among the army officers 
which reasonings in our view are based on relevant consideration 
having logical nexus with the relevant law and do not suffer from 
any legal infirmity.”  
 
Muhammad Amin v The State  
(2002 SCMR 1017)  
 
A person had been murdered in this case during a dacoity at a house and 
another person had been shot at and injured by the fleeing dacoits and this 
Court found the case to be of terrorism by observing that:  
 
“The accused entered in the Baithak of the house of complainant 
armed with pistol with the purposes to commit robbery and in 
consequence to the resistance put by the father of complainant he 
was killed by the petitioner and further the petitioner with a view 
to create terror also fired at Nasir Ahmed in the street when he 
alongwith others, made an attempt to apprehend the petitioner 
and thus, the manner in which the petitioner while committing 
robbery took the life of deceased and caused fire-arm injuries to 
Nasir Ahmed in the broad daylight would squarely bring the case 
with the ambit of “terrorism” in term of section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997.”  
 
Zia Ullah v Special Judge, Anti-Terrorist Court, Faisalabad 
and 7 others  
(2002 SCMR 1225)  
 
In this case an Advocate proceeding towards a court in his robes was done to 
death by his enemies and this Court decided that the case was one of terrorism. 
It was observed that:  
 
“The alleged murder was committed in wanton, reckless and 
brutal manner and resultantly learned Advocate who was in his 
robe was done to death in Court vicinity. The gravity of the 
offence could not be diminished or minimized merely on the 
ground that alleged murder was not committed exactly within the 
Court premises as pressed time and again by the learned counsel 
for the respondents. It is to be noted that one Assistant Sub-
Inspector of Police was seriously injured by means of fire-arms. 
We are not having the slightest doubt while holding that the 
alleged occurrence must have caused fear, panic and wave of 
sensation and thus the matter squarely falls within the ambit and 
jurisdiction of Special Court.”  
 
State through Advocate-General, N.-W.F.P., Peshawar v 
Muhammad Shafiq  
(PLD 2003 SC 224)  
 
A person was murdered in this case by firing at and sprinkling petrol on him 
and resultantly his body was charred and some of his bones were also burnt. 
The said murder had been committed at a deserted place and was a 
consequence of an on-going personal enmity. Apparently this Court was not 
properly assisted in that case and the newly introduced definition of ‘terrorism’ 
had not been brought to the notice of the Court and in that background, while 
reproducing and expressly referring to the deleted and inapplicable definition of 
a ‘terrorist act’ contained in the unamended section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997, this Court observed that:  
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
39
 
“A reading of the above provision of the Act demonstrates that it 
is not necessary that the commission of murder must have 
created panic and terror among the people. The Courts have only 
to see whether the terrorist act was such which would have the 
tendency to create sense of fear or insecurity in the minds of the 
people or any section of the society. We have to see the 
psychological impact created upon the minds of the people. ------- 
The moment such a charred dead body was brought for its 
funeral rites within the area of the deceased’s residence, it would 
had certainly caused shock, fear and insecurity among the people 
of the vicinity. The body was completely charred and the 
onlookers must have felt fear and insecurity on seeing the 
barbaric and callous manner in which the human body was 
mutilated.”  
 
Naeem Akhtar and others v The State and others  
(PLD 2003 SC 396)  
 
In this case an accused person’s mother was medically treated by a doctor for an 
accidental fracture of her leg but the accused party felt dissatisfied with her 
treatment by the doctor and with that motive the said doctor was abducted by 
the accused party and was murdered. This Court found the case to be of a 
terrorist act as:  
 
“The motive for the occurrence no doubt related to the personal 
grievance of the appellant who held the deceased responsible for 
imputation of leg of his mother but murder of the doctor after his 
abduction for such a motive would be an alarming situation for 
all doctors and would be a direct source of creating panic and 
terror in the medical profession.”  
 
“In general terms a fright, dread or an apprehension in the mind 
of a person induced by an horrible act of a person or causing fear 
and terror to the people is terrorism and if an act done by a 
person which is a source of terror in any section of people, which 
may cause damage to life or property of an individual, is a 
terrorist act and is an offence as defined in section 6 of A.T.A., 
1997 and punishable under section 7 of the said Act. The act of 
abduction of the deceased and Dr. Javed Umer from an open 
place on gun point and subsequent murder of Dr. Muhammad 
Aslam for the reason that patient could not get desired result by 
the treatment given by him, would create unrest, panic and terror 
against the doctors who are discharging very sacred duty in the 
medical field.”  
 
Sh. Muhammad Amjad v The State  
(PLD 2003 SC 704)  
 
A young Barrister was abducted for ransom and was killed in this case. This 
Court held the case to be one of terrorism by observing that:  
 
“Even if by act of terrorism actual terror is not created, yet, above 
quoted subsection (b) [of section 6(1) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997] will be applicable if it was likely to do any harm 
contemplated in the said subsection. It is the cumulative effect of 
all the attending circumstances which provide tangible guidelines 
to determine the applicability or otherwise of said subsection. It is 
noted that about 300/400 people gathered at the house of the 
complainant and they would have destroyed the house of the 
appellant, if the police would not have intervened. Lawyer 
community was also annoyed over the murder of a member of 
their community and had passed a resolution in this regard. 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
40
Under the circumstances, the case was rightly assigned to Anti-
Terrorism Court for trial.”  
 
Mst. Najam-un-Nisa v Judge, Special Court constituted under 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997  
(2003 SCMR 1323)  
 
In this case seven persons had been killed in a house at night in furtherance of 
a private enmity and this Court held the case to be one of terrorism. It was 
observed that:  
 
“The venue of the commission of a crime, the time of occurrence, 
the motive which had led to the commission of a crime and the 
fact whether the said crime had or had not been witnessed by the 
public at large are not the only factors determining the issue 
whether a case did or did not fall within the parameters of the 
ATA of 1997. The crucial question is whether the said crime had 
or had not the effect of striking terror or creating a sense of fear 
and insecurity in the people or any section of the people. Needless 
to mention here that a crime of the kind in hand committed even 
in a remote corner does not remain unnoticed in the area in 
which is committed or even in the country on account of the print 
and electronic media. Seven persons being butchered in a house 
at night is not the kind of occurrence which would not create 
terror and horror in the people or any section of the people.”  
 
Abdul Ghafoor Bhatti v Muhammad Saleem and others  
(2003 SCMR 1934)  
 
In this case after a dacoity in a house the dacoits kidnapped two minors for 
ransom who were subsequently retrieved after payment of the demanded 
ransom. This Court found the case to be that of terrorism and observed that:  
 
“The Courts have to see the impact of the act which the 
miscreants have perpetrated. In the case in hand two minors were 
abducted for ransom by the miscreants. Such-like act has 
certainly got the tendency to create sense of fear and insecurity in 
the minds of the people or any section of the society. The 
psychological effect created upon the minds of the people would 
be the guiding feature so as to see whether the act complained of 
has got nexus with sections 6 and 7 of the Act. It is not necessary 
that the said act must have created insecurity. As already stated 
the Courts have to see only the tendency whether nature of such 
act would create sense of insecurity. By no stretch of imagination, 
it can be said that the abduction of minors at gun points would 
not create terror among reasonable and prudent persons of the 
society.” 
 
Muhammad Farooq v Ibrar and 5 others  
(PLD 2004 SC 917) 
 
“8.  
The very object to promulgate Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
was to control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence and other 
heinous offences as defined in section 6 of the Act and their 
speedy trials. To bring an offence within the ambit of the Act, it is 
essential to examine that the said offence should have nexus with 
the object of the Act and the offences covered by its sections 6, 7 
and 8. On bare perusal of sub-clauses (b), (d), (h), and (i) of 
subsection (1) of section 6 of the Act, it is abundantly clear that 
the offence which creates a sense of fear or insecurity in society, 
causes death or endangers a person's life, involves firing on 
religious 
congregations, 
mosques, 
imambargahs, 
churches, 
temples and all other places of worship, or random firing to 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
41
spread panic, or involves any forcible takeover of mosques or 
other places of worships, falls within its ambit. 
 
9.  
In the case in the hand, though the motive is shown to be 
a previous enmity, yet paramount consideration to be taken note 
of is the culminative fall out of the occurrence. The incident 
having taken place in Mosque a public place particularly during 
Jumma prayer, where a large number of people usually assemble 
to offer prayer is sufficient to attract the provisions of section 6 of 
the Act. In such cases, the time, place and, manner of the act is 
of eminence importance.” 
 
Azizullah and another v The State and another  
(2005 SCMR 802)  
 
“The main object to promulgate the Act was to prevent and 
control the acts of terrorism, sectarian violence, hijacking, 
hostages taking and kidnapping or abduction for ransom. It was 
for this purpose that the offences falling within the ambit of the 
Act were to be disposed of expeditiously by way of speedy trial. In 
the instant case, it is alleged that wife and children of the 
complainant were called by the petitioners in their house on the 
pretext of Qura'n Khani and were made hostages and demand of 
ransom for their release was made. Not only this but also the 
brothers and grand-daughter of complainant who went to the 
house of petitioners to rescue the above mentioned detenus were 
also made hostages. It is revealed from the investigation that 
police in order to rescue the hostages when arrived at the house 
of petitioners, firing was made upon them and in retaliation police 
also fired at the abductors resulting in the death of one of the 
abductors namely Rahimullah. As discussed above, the material 
available with the prosecution prima facie shows that the 
abductees were kidnapped and ransom of Rs. 5 lacs was paid and 
further demand of ransom was also made and that the abductees 
were made hostages by the petitioners in their house. The above 
act created sense of fear or insecurity in the public as such the 
ingredients of sections 6 and 7 of the Act are attracted.” 
 
Mirza Shaukat Baig and others v Shahid Jamil and others  
(PLD 2005 SC 530)  
 
“The language as employed in the section is unambiguous, plain 
and simple which hardly requires any scholarly interpretation 
and is capable enough to meet all kinds of terrorism. It is an 
exhaustive section and does not revolve around the word 
“designed to” as used in section 6(1)(b) of the Act or mens rea but 
the key word, in our opinion is "action" on the basis whereof it 
can be adjudged as to whether the alleged offence falls within the 
scope of section 6 of the Act or otherwise? The significance and 
the import of word "action" cannot be minimized and requires 
interpretation in a broader prospective which aspect of the matter 
has been ignored by the learned High Court and the scholarly 
interpretation as made in the judgment impugned has no nexus 
with the provisions as contained in section 6 of the Act, the 
ground realities, objects and reasons, the dictums laid down by 
this Court and is also not inconsonance with the well-entrenched 
principles of interpretation of criminal statutes…” 
 
“Where a criminal act is designed to create a sense of fear or 
insecurity in the mind of the general public that can only be 
adjudged by keeping in view the impact of the alleged offence and 
manner of the commission of alleged offence. A farfetched 
interpretation of the words "designed to" as used in section 6 of 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
42
the Act has been made by the learned High Court which we are 
afraid is not correct as the impact of the alleged offence and the 
manner in which it is committed has been ignored on the basis 
whereof the design of the alleged offence can be unveiled. There is 
absolutely no doubt in our mind that the Act was brought into 
force for the prevention and elimination of terrorism, sectarian 
violence and for expeditious dispensation of justice in the heinous 
offences as stipulated in Act itself. We have also surveyed the 
case law on the subject. It is, however, to be noted here at this 
juncture that so far as the concept of "terrorism" is concerned 
there is no substantial change between the Suppression of 
Terrorism Activities (Special Courts) Act (XV of 1975) and the 
Anti-Terrorism Act (XXVII of 1997) except a few minor changes 
having no bearing on the meaning and scope of terrorism.” 
 
“After having gone through the entire law as enunciated by this 
Court in different cases the judicial consensus seems to be that 
striking of terror is sine qua non for the application of the 
provisions as contained in section 6 of the Act which cannot be 
determined 
without 
examining 
the 
nature, 
gravity 
and 
heinousness of the alleged offence, contents of F.I.R., its 
cumulative effects on the society or a group of persons and the 
evidence which has come on record. In so far as the factum of 
intention is concerned that cannot be evaluated without 
examining the entire evidence which aspect of the matter squarely 
falls within the jurisdictional domain of the Court constituted 
under the Act and such questions cannot be decided by 
invocation of Constitutional jurisdiction without scrutinizing all 
the circumstances in a broader prospect by keeping in view the 
ground realities in mind. There could be no second opinion that 
where the action of an accused results in striking terror or 
creating fear, panic, sensation, helplessness and sense of 
insecurity among the people in a particular vicinity it amounts to 
terror and such an action squarely falls within the ambit of 
section 6 of the Act and shall be triable by a Special Court 
constituted for such purpose. What was the real intention of the 
offender could only be adjudged on the basis of evidence which 
cannot be determined by invocation of Constitutional jurisdiction 
and learned Special Judge who is usually a Senior Sessions 
Judge can take care of the matter which can be transferred by 
him if it does not fall within his jurisdictional domain. There is no 
denying the fact that it was never the intention of legislature that 
every offender irrespective of the nature of the offence and its 
overall impact on the society or a section of society must be tried 
by the Anti-Terrorist Court but the question as to whether such 
trial shall be conducted or not initially falls within the 
jurisdictional domain of Anti-Terrorist Court which cannot be 
interfered with in the absence of sufficient lawful justification 
which appears to be lacking in these cases. It is, however, 
obligatory for such Courts to watch carefully the nature of 
accusation and examine the entire record with diligent 
application of mind to determine as to whether the provisions as 
contained in the Act would prima facie be attracted or otherwise? 
Where such Courts are of the view after taking cognizance of the 
offence that the alleged offence does not fall prima facie under the 
provisions of the Act it must transfer the same to regular Court 
without loss of time.”  
 
Zahid Imran and others v The State and others  
(PLD 2006 SC 109)  
 
“The language as employed in the section is unambiguous, plain 
and simple which hardly requires any scholarly interpretation 
and is capable enough to meet all kinds of terrorism. It is an 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
43
exhaustive section and does not revolve around the word 
"designed to" as used in section 6(1)(b) of the Act or mens rea but 
the key word, in our opinion, is "action" on the basis whereof it 
can be adjudged as to whether the alleged offence falls within the 
scope of section 6 of the Act or otherwise? After having gone 
through the provisions as contained in section 6 of the Act we are 
of the firm opinion that "terrorism" means the use or threat of 
"action" where the "action" falls within the meaning of subsection 
(2) of section 6 of the Act and creates a serious risk to safety of 
the public or a section of the public, or is designed to frighten the 
general public and thereby prevent them from coming out and 
carrying on their lawful trade and daily business, and disrupts 
civil life shall amount to terrorism as enumerated in section 6 of 
the Act.”  
 
“The judicial consensus seems to be that striking of terror is sine 
qua non for the application of the provisions as contained in 
section 6 of the Act 1997 which cannot be determined without 
examining the nature, gravity and heinousness of the alleged 
offence, contents of the F.I.R., its cumulative effects on the society 
and a class of persons and the evidence which has come on 
record. There could be no second opinion that where the action of 
an accused person results in striking terror or creating fear, 
panic, sensation, helplessness and sense of insecurity among the 
people in a particular vicinity it amounts to terror and such an 
action squarely falls within the ambit of section 6 of the Act 
1997.”  
 
Muhammad Idrees and others v The State  
(2008 SCMR 1544)  
 
“However, since it was not established on record that the acts 
done by the accused had created sense of fear or insecurity in 
public, nor any section of public or community or any sect was 
shown to have been affected, as the incident had taken place at 
night on a bank of canal which by no stretch of imagination could 
be termed as a public place, therefore, in our view, section 7 of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, was not attracted in the instant 
case.”  
 
Nazeer Ahmed and others v Nooruddin and another  
(2012 SCMR 517) 
 
“We have heard the learned Advocate Supreme Court and have 
perused the record. The learned High Court has examined the 
material at length and has rightly concluded that the act of the 
petitioners created sense of insecurity amongst the villagers and 
did destabilize the public at large and, therefore, attracts the 
provisions of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act. The learned 
Advocate Supreme Court in support of his contentions has relied 
upon the Judgments reported in the case of Mohabat Ali v. The 
State reported in 2007 SCMR 142 and the case of Bashir Ahmed 
v. Muhammad Siddiq, reported in PLD 2009 SC 11, which are 
distinguishable on facts. Neither the motive nor intent for 
commission of the offence is relevant for the purpose of conferring 
jurisdiction on the Anti-Terrorism Court. It is the act which is 
designed to create sense of insecurity and or to destabilize the 
public at large, which attract the provisions of section 6 of the AT 
Act, which in the case in hand was designed to create sense of 
insecurity amongst the co-villagers.”  
 
Shahid Zafar and 3 others v The State  
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
44
(PLD 2014 SC 809) 
 
“As to learned Advocate Supreme Court's contention that the 
incident could not be defined as an act of terrorism, we are quite 
clear in our minds that such a gruesome murder at the hands of 
a law enforcing agency would certainly create a sense of terror, 
insecurity and panic in the minds and hearts of those who were 
available at the scene and the entire public who had watched this 
DVD on air. In this regard a reference may be made to the 
definition of terrorism in Section 6(1)(b) of the Anti-Terrorism Act 
according to which this is the use or threat of action where the 
use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the 
Government or the public or a section of the public or community 
or sect or create a sense of fear or insecurity in society. In our 
opinion therefore such definition can be bifurcated into two i.e. 
where the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or 
overawe the Government or the public or a section of the public 
or community or sect or where it creates a sense of fear or 
insecurity in society. Although the offence under consideration 
may not have been designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe 
the Government or a section of the public or community or sect 
but it certainly created a sense of fear or insecurity in the society. 
What could be a more grievous and heinous crime then to shoot 
an unarmed young boy who was begging for his life and thereafter 
let him bleed to death despite his pleading that he should be 
taken to the hospital. This certainly did create a sense of fear and 
insecurity in the public at large and hence we are of the opinion 
that the appellants were correctly charged, tried, convicted and 
sentenced under Section 302(b), P.P.C. and section 7(a) of the 
Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.” 
 
Kashif Ali v The Judge, Anti-Terrorism, Court No.II, Lahore 
and others  
(PLD 2016 SC 591)  
 
“12.  
The term "design" now used in Section 6 of the Act has 
widened the scope of the Act and the terms "intention" and 
"motive" previously used have been substituted with the sole 
object that if the act is designed to create a sense of fear or 
insecurity in society, then the Anti-Terrorism Court will have the 
jurisdiction. From the above definition of the term "design" it is 
clear that it means a plan or scheme conceived in mind and 
intended for subsequent execution. In order to determine whether 
an offence falls within the ambit of Section 6 of the Act, it would 
be essential to have a glance over the allegations levelled in the 
F.I.R, the material collected by the investigating agency and the 
surrounding circumstances, depicting the commission of offence. 
Whether a particular act is an act of terrorism or not, the 
motivation, object, design or purpose behind the said Act has to 
be seen. The term "design", which has given a wider scope to the 
jurisdiction of the Anti-terrorism Courts excludes the intent or 
motive of the accused. In other words, the motive and intent have 
lost their relevance in a case under Section 6(2) of the Act. What 
is essential to attract the mischief of this Section is the object for 
which the act is designed.” 
 
“17.  
The judgment relied upon by the learned High Court in 
the case of Basharat Ali v. Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court-II, 
Gujranwala (PLD 2004 Lahore 199) was overruled by this Court 
in the case of Mirza Shaukat Baig and others v. Shahid Jamil and 
others (PLD 2005 SC 530), which is the correct law. It was held by 
this Court in the case of Mirza Shoukat Baig (supra) that there 
could be no second opinion that where the action of an accused 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
45
results in striking terror, or creating fear, panic sensation, 
helplessness and sense of insecurity among the people in a 
particular vicinity it amounts to terror and such an action 
squarely falls within the ambit of Section 6 of the Act and shall be 
tried by a Special Court constituted for such a purpose. Moreover, 
in State through Advocate General v. Muhammad Shafiq (PLD 
2003 SC 224) it was held by this Court that the Courts are only 
required to see whether the terrorist act was such that it would 
have the tendency to create sense of fear or insecurity in the 
minds of the people or any section of the society, as well as the 
psychological impact created on the minds of the society. 
Whereas a strictly narrow interpretation of the term "design" in 
Section 6 of the Act is undoubtedly one where a premeditated 
plan to create terror is the object behind the said act, we cannot 
simply rule out from the ambit of Section 6 an individual's action 
which is implemented in a setting where a creation of feeling of 
fear in the society was an inevitable consequence of the said act.” 
 
Shahbaz Khan alias Tippu and others v Special Judge, Anti-
Terrorism, Court No.3, Lahore and others   
(PLD 2016 SC 1)  
 
“7.  
It is clear from a textual reading of Section 6 of ATA that 
an action categorized in subsection (2) thereof constitutes the 
offence of terrorism when according to Section 6(1)(b) ibid it is 
"designed" to, inter alia, intimidate or overawe the public or to 
create a sense of fear or insecurity in society. Therefore, the three 
ingredients of the offence of terrorism under Section 6(1)(a) and 
(b) of ATA are firstly, taking of action specified in Section 6(2) of 
ATA; secondly, that action is committed with design, intention 
and mens rea; and thirdly, it has the impact of causing 
intimidation, awe, fear and insecurity in the public or society.” 
 
“8.  
There is no doubt that the brutal killing of five unarmed 
persons on a public street would have stricken panic, fear and 
insecurity among the residents in the locality. However, because 
of the motive of a family dispute given in the FIR, there is a 
challenge that the required third element of "design," intention or 
mens rea to commit terrorism is lacking in the present case. This 
element of the offence of terrorism has been treated as the pivotal 
criterion for ascertaining the jurisdiction of a learned ATC in the 
two judgments referred in the leave granting order: namely Bashir 
Ahmed v. Muhammad Siddique (PLD 2009 SC 11) and Ahmed Jan 
v. Nasrullah (2012 SCMR 59). The judgment in Ahmed Jan's case 
ibid endorses the law enunciated in Bashir Ahmed's case ibid to 
the effect that under Section 6(1)(b) of ATA a design that is 
intention or mens rea of an accused to cause the prescribed 
public or social reaction to an action specified in Section 6(2) of 
ATA is essential for the commission of the offence of terrorism.” 
 
“11.  
Primarily, the rule laid down in Bashir Ahmed's case ibid 
requiring the ascertainment of the design, intention and mens rea 
of an act for establishing the jurisdiction of a learned ATC rests 
on dicta given in Mehram Ali's case ibid. However, Bashir 
Ahmed's case ibid does not consider the ways and means by 
which the design, intention or mens rea, for an act of terrorism, 
requiring in essence the proof of an assailant's state of mind, 
should be ascertained by a Court of law. Whether the Court 
should 
mechanically 
consider 
the 
motive 
alleged 
by 
a 
complainant in the FIR to be decisive or should it also scrutinize 
other aspects of an occurrence to assess if the culprits had any 
design, intention or mens rea to commit a terrorist act? 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
46
12.  
In most cases, the nature of the offences, the manner of 
their 
commission 
and 
the 
surrounding 
circumstances 
demonstrate the motive given in the FIR. However, that is not 
always the case. When offences are committed by persons with 
impunity disregarding the consequence or impact of their overt 
action, the private motive or enmity disclosed in the FIR cannot 
be presumed to capture their true intent and purpose. In such 
cases, it is plain that action taken and offences committed are not 
instigated "solely" by the private motive alleged in the FIR. It is 
settled law that intention, motive or mens rea refer to the state of 
mind of an offender. It is equally well established that a state of 
mind cannot be proven by positive evidence or by direct proof. 
The intention of an accused for committing an offence is to be 
gathered from his overt acts and expression. It has been held in 
the case of State v. Ataullah Khan Mangal (PLD 1967 SC 78) that 
an accused person "must be deemed to have intended the natural 
and inevitable consequences of his action." Thus apart from the 
overt acts of the accused, the injuries caused by him or 
consequences ensuing from his actions and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case are all relevant to ascertain the design 
intention or mens rea that instigated the offences committed. 
These principles are enunciated in Zahid Imran v. The State (PLD 
2006 SC 109) and Pehlwan v. Crown (1969 SCMR 641). Intention 
is presumed when the nature of the act committed and the 
circumstances in which it is committed are reasonably 
susceptible to one interpretation. In such event, the rule of 
evidence that the natural and inevitable consequences of a 
person's act are deemed to have been intended by him is 
applicable: Jane Alam v. The State (PLD 1965 SC 640). In 
Muhammad Mushtaq v. The State (PLD 2002 SC 841) the 
inevitable consequence of an act was considered as its design. 
Four persons were killed to settle a blood feud while they were on 
their way for a Court hearing at the nearby District Courts, 
Lahore. This Court observed that the learned ATC was the 
competent trial forum in the case: 
 
"7.  
It would thus appear that ordinary crimes 
are not to be dealt with under the Act. A physical 
harm to the victim is not the sole criterion to 
determine the question of terrorism. What is to be 
seen is the psychological effect produced by the 
violent action or with the potential of producing 
such an effect on the society as a whole or a 
section thereof. There may be a death or injury 
caused in the process. Thus where a criminal act is 
designed to create a sense of fear or insecurity in 
the minds of the general public disturbing even 
tempo of life and tranquility of the society, the 
same may be treated to be a terrorist act. There 
may be just a few killings, random or targeted, 
resorted to with single-mindedness of purpose. But 
nevertheless the impact of the same may be to 
terrorize thousands of people by creating a panic or 
fear in their minds". 
 
8.  
In the present case, we, prima facie, find 
that the occurrence took place during the peak 
hours of the day on the busy Court Road near the 
District Courts, Lahore, wherein four persons while 
on their way to attend the Court were allegedly 
murdered by the use of kalashnikovs. The 
cumulative fall-out of the occurrence as to the 
time, place and manner of the act created a sense 
of the fear and insecurity in society. The case was, 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
47
therefore, triable by the Anti-Terrorism court 
established under the said Act ..." 
 
13.  
When wanton overt acts committed by an accused lead to 
horrendous consequences then the motive given in the FIR merely 
indicates the background. The presumption that the natural and 
inevitable consequences of the acts of an accused are deemed to 
be intended, provides a reliable touchstone for gathering the 
design, intention or mens rea of an assailant in the context of 
Section 6(1)(b) of ATA. 
 
14.  
Indeed neither Mehram Ali's case nor Bashir Ahmed's case 
ibid have confined judicial recourse solely to the motive disclosed 
in the FIR for ascertaining the mens rea for the offence of 
terrorism. For the existence or otherwise of mens rea of the said 
offence, a Court of law may rightfully interpret the different 
aspects of a prosecution case noted above in order to ascertain 
the design behind the acts committed by an assailant. In the 
present case the assailants who committed the brutal acts of 
causing the death of five persons had no personal grouse against 
their victims. Prima facie, they executed the instructions given by 
the other accused. This was done with impunity because doing 
the job was material and not the consequence and impact of their 
overt action. A dispute about the possession of a family house 
thus exploded disproportionately to a scale depicting wanton 
ruthlessness and impunity in the multiple killing of victims in a 
public place inhabited by public residents. To our minds, the 
motive of a domestic family property dispute is merely the spark 
that triggered the occurrence, or metaphorically, the fire. The rule 
that the accused in the present case are deemed to intend the 
natural and inevitable consequences of action taken is apt and 
accurate in depicting their design, intention and mens rea. The 
three ingredients under Section 6 of ATA that constitute the 
offence of terrorism are prima facie available in the present case. 
 
15.  
Therefore, the approach in the impugned judgment to 
interpret overt acts of the accused and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case in order to ascertain whether the case 
falls within the ambit of the ATA, is justified. Equally, the reliance 
placed by the learned ATC solely on the motive disclosed in the 
FIR No. 247 of 2014 lodged by the complainant in the case adopts 
a course meant for simple cases wherein the motive disclosed in 
the FIR is duly demonstrated by the other criteria for 
ascertainment of mens rea.” 
 
12.  One cannot help noticing that all the cases referred to in 
the last paragraph and falling in the second category 
pertained to offences committed for private purposes with no 
motivation to destabilize the State or the society at large but 
they were all adjudged to be cases of terrorist acts or terrorism 
on the basis of a presumptive and speculative quantification 
of the effect that the relevant actions could have created in the 
society. In all such cases, it is observed with great deference, 
the changed definition of ‘terrorism’ with its resultant shifting 
of focus from the effect of the action to the design or purpose 
behind the action had not been noticed and all those cases 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
48
had been decided on the basis and on the yardstick of the 
principles provided for by the earlier definition of a ‘terrorist 
act’. In the above mentioned cases the gravity of the offence 
with its resultant actual, intended or potential effect on the 
people at large was considered as the measure for determining 
whether the act constituted terrorism or not. We can 
appreciate that the mindset inherited by us in the background 
of the Summary Military Courts, Speedy Trial Courts and 
Special Courts for Suppression of Terrorist Activities, which 
were different courts constituted at different stages in the past 
for separate and special handling of offences of grave nature, 
may take some time to be dispelled and it may take us a while 
to appreciate and realize that an act of ‘terrorism’ is not just a 
grave offence but it is a class and species apart and this class 
or species has to be understood in its true and correct 
perception and perspective otherwise every serious offence 
may be found by one Judge or the other to involve terrorism 
depending upon a subjective assessment of the potential of 
the act to create some sense of fear or insecurity in some 
section of the society. Such an approach, it may be observed 
with great veneration, may not be wholesome as it may 
ultimately result in every case of a serious offence landing in a 
Special Court and thereby rendering the ordinary courts 
substantially redundant. It ought not to be lost sight of that 
the legislature’s repeal of the Suppression of Terrorist 
Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975, doing away with the 
Schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 at one stage and 
also its retraction from the ‘effect’ through the fresh definition 
of ‘terrorism’ cannot be without any significance or purpose. 
That drastic change of the definition manifestly indicated a 
change of meanings and of focus and such a change has to be 
given its proper effect. After all if the term ‘terrorism’ as 
defined today is still to be interpreted in the same manner as 
the erstwhile term ‘terrorist act’ then there was hardly any 
occasion or need for the legislature to amend the definition 
and to bring about any change in the existing law in that 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
49
regard. The legacy and interpretations pertaining to the 
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 
and of the original provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 
have now to be shaken or shrugged off so as to correctly 
understand the definition of ‘terrorism’ introduced through 
the later Act and its amendments. This Court had itself 
declared in the above mentioned case of Mumtaz Ali Khan 
Rajban and another v Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 
2001 SC 169) that the subject matters of the Suppression of 
Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 and the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 were “different” and their respective 
applicability was “governed by different criteria”.   
 
13. 
We understand, and we observe so with all the respect at our 
command, that in the above mentioned cases falling in the second 
category this Court had, wittingly or otherwise, detracted or moved 
away from the principle of nexus so painstakingly carved out by it 
in the case of Mehram Ali and others v Federation of Pakistan and 
others (PLD 1998 SC 1445). As already noticed above, one of the 
reasons for such drifting away from the principle of nexus was the 
effect-based definition of “terrorist act” provided in the repealed 
Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975. 
Another reason for the lack of clarity in this respect was an 
incorrect understanding of the words “speedy trial of heinous 
offences” contained in the Preamble to the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997. In many of the judgments referred to above those words 
appearing in the Preamble were mentioned and relied upon for 
holding that commission of heinous offences also amounted to 
terrorism even if the ‘design’ or ‘purpose’ mentioned in clauses (b) 
and (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 did not stand attracted to a case. For removal of any 
confusion in that respect the scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997 needs to be understood and appreciated in its correct 
perspective. The Preamble to the said Act reads as follows: 
  
“An act to provide for the prevention of terrorism, sectarian 
violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences; 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
50
 
Whereas it is expedient to provide for the prevention of terrorism, 
sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences and for 
matters connected therewith and incidental thereto; 
 
It is hereby enacted as follows:-------” 
 
Section 12 of that Act provides as under: 
 
12. Jurisdiction of Anti-terrorism Court.- (1) Notwithstanding 
anything contained in the Code or in any other law, a scheduled 
offence committed in an area in a Province or the Islamabad 
Capital Territory shall be triable only by the Anti-terrorism Court 
exercising territorial jurisdiction in relation to such area.”   
 
Section 2(t) of the Act defines a scheduled offence in the following 
terms:  
 
“ “Scheduled offence” means an offence as set out in the Third 
Schedule.” 
 
The Third Schedule to the Act reads as under: 
 
THE THIRD SCHEDULE 
(Scheduled Offences) 
[See section 2(t)] 
 
1. 
Any act of terrorism within the meaning of this Act 
including those offences which may be added or amended in 
accordance with the provisions of section 34 of this Act. 
 
2. 
Any other offence punishable under this Act. 
 
3. 
Any attempt to commit, or aid or abetment of, or any 
conspiracy to commit, any of the aforesaid offences. 
 
4. 
Without prejudice to the generality of the above 
paragraphs, the Anti-terrorism Court to the exclusion of any 
other Court shall try the offences relating to the following, 
namely:- 
 
(i) 
Abduction or kidnapping for ransom; 
 
(ii) 
Use of firearms or explosives by any device, 
including bomb blast in a mosque, imambargah, 
church, temple or any other place of worship, 
whether or not any hurt or damage is caused 
thereby; or 
 
(iii) 
Firing or use of explosive by any device, including 
bomb blast in the court premises; or 
 
(iv) 
Hurt caused by corrosive substance or attempt to 
cause hurt by means of a corrosive substance; and 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
51
(v) 
Unlawful possession of an explosive substance or 
abetment for such an offence under the Explosive 
Substances Act, 1908 (VI of 1908). 
 
A careful reading of the Third Schedule shows that an Anti-
Terrorism Court has been conferred jurisdiction not only to try all 
those offences which attract the definition of terrorism provided by 
the Act but also some other specified cases involving heinous 
offences which do not fall in the said definition of terrorism. For 
such latter category of cases it was provided that although those 
offences may not constitute terrorism yet such offences may be 
tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court for speedy trial of such heinous 
offences. This distinction between cases of terrorism and cases of 
specified heinous offences not amounting to terrorism but triable 
by an Anti-Terrorism Court has already been recognized by this 
Court in the cases of Farooq Ahmed v State and another (PLJ 2017 
SC 408), Amjad Ali and others v The State (PLD 2017 SC 661) and 
Muhammad Bilal v The State and others (2019 SCMR 1362). It has 
been clarified by this Court in those cases that such specified 
heinous offences are only to be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court 
and that court can punish the person committing such specified 
heinous offences only for commission of those offences and not for 
committing terrorism because such offences do not constitute 
terrorism. For the purposes of further clarity on this issue it is 
explained for the benefit of all concerned that the cases of the 
offences specified in entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule to the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 are cases of those heinous offences which do 
not per se constitute the offence of terrorism but such cases are to 
be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court because of their inclusion in 
the Third Schedule. It is also clarified that in such cases of 
heinous offences mentioned in entry No. 4 of the said Schedule an 
Anti-Terrorism Court can pass a punishment for the said offence 
and not for committing the offence of terrorism. It may be pertinent 
to mention here that the offence of abduction or kidnapping for 
ransom under section 365-A, PPC is included in entry No. 4 of the 
Third Schedule and kidnapping for ransom is also one of the 
actions specified in section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
52
Abduction or kidnapping for ransom is a heinous offence but the 
scheme of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 shows that an ordinary 
case of abduction or kidnapping for ransom under section 365-A, 
PPC is merely triable by an Anti-Terrorism Court but if kidnapping 
for ransom is committed with the design or purpose mentioned in 
clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 then such offence amounts to terrorism attracting 
section 7(e) of that Act. In the former case the convicted person is 
to be convicted and sentenced only for the offence under section 
365-A, PPC whereas in the latter case the convicted person is to be 
convicted both for the offence under section 365-A, PPC as well as 
for the offence under section 7(e) of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. 
The same may also be said about the other offences mentioned in 
entry No. 4 of the Third Schedule to the Act pertaining to “Use of 
firearms or explosives by any device, including bomb blast in a 
mosque, imambargah, church, temple or any other place of 
worship, whether or not any hurt or damage is caused thereby”, 
“Firing or use of explosive by any device, including bomb blast in 
the court premises”, “Hurt caused by corrosive substance or 
attempt to cause hurt by means of a corrosive substance” and 
“Unlawful possession of an explosive substance or abetment for 
such an offence under the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (VI of 
1908)”. Such distinction between cases of terrorism and other 
heinous offences by itself explains and recognizes that all heinous 
offences, howsoever serious, grave, brutal, gruesome, macabre or 
shocking, do not ipso facto constitute terrorism which is a species 
apart. Through an amendment of the Third Schedule any heinous 
offence not constituting terrorism may be added to the list of 
offences which may be tried by an Anti-Terrorism Court and it was 
in this context that the Preamble to the Act had mentioned 
“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the prevention of terrorism, 
sectarian violence and for speedy trial of heinous offences”.   
 
14. 
Adverting now to the written submissions of the learned 
Attorney-General based upon the provisions of subsection (3) of 
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 we may straightaway 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
53
observe that we have felt nothing but sympathy for the learned 
Attorney-General because he had to make some effort to make 
some sense of the said provisions which, with respect, make no 
sense to us. He has urged that subsections (1), (2) and (3) of 
section 6 of the said Act are to be read in conjunction. The said 
provisions read as follows: 
 
6.  
Terrorism. – (1) 
In this Act, “terrorism” means the 
use or threat of action where: 
 
(a)  
the action falls within the meaning of subsection (2), and 
 
(b) 
the use or threat is designed to coerce and intimidate or 
overawe the Government or the public or a section of the 
public or community or sect or create a sense of fear or 
insecurity in society; or 
 
(c) 
the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a 
religious, sectarian or ethnic cause or intimidating and 
terrorizing the public, social sectors, media persons, 
business community or attacking the civilians, including 
damaging property by ransacking, looting, arson, or by 
any other means, government officials, installations, 
security forces or law enforcement agencies: 
 
Provided that nothing herein contained shall apply to a 
democratic and religious rally or a peaceful demonstration in 
accordance with law. 
 
(2)  
An “action” shall fall within the meaning of subsection (1), 
if it: ------- 
 
(3)  
The use or threat of any action falling within sub-section 
(2) which involves the use of firearms, explosive or any other 
weapon is terrorism, whether or not sub-section (1) (c) is satisfied.  
 
Reading of subsections (1) and (2) of the said section together 
makes good sense, i.e. all the actions specified in subsection (2) 
shall constitute terrorism if they are committed with the ‘design’ 
mentioned in clause (b) of subsection (1) or are committed for the 
‘purpose’ referred to in clause (c) of subsection (1) of that section. 
Subsection (3) of that section, however, provides that “The use or 
threat of any action falling within sub-section (2) which involves 
the use of firearms, explosive or any other weapon is terrorism, 
whether or not sub-section (1)(c) is satisfied” which means that if 
for commission of the actions mentioned in subsection (2) a 
firearm, an explosive substance or any other weapon is actually 
used or a threat regarding use of the same is extended then all 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
54
such actions are to constitute the offence of terrorism even if the 
other requirements of clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 are 
not satisfied or fulfilled. The requirements that need to be satisfied 
for invoking clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 are that the 
use or threat of action should be for “the purpose of advancing a 
religious, sectarian or ethnic cause” or for the purpose of 
“intimidating and terrorizing the public, social sectors, media 
persons, business community” or for the purpose of “attacking the 
civilians, including damaging property by ransacking, looting, 
arson, or by any other means, government officials, installations, 
security forces or law enforcement agencies”. If the said 
requirements and purposes mentioned in clause (c) of subsection 
(1) of section 6 do not need to be satisfied and if mere use or threat 
of use of a firearm, an explosive substance or any other weapon for 
commission of the actions mentioned in subsection (2) of section 6 
is to ipso facto constitute the offence of terrorism then every 
murder committed (action under clause (a) of subsection (2) of 
section 6), every grievous bodily injury or harm caused (action 
under clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 6), every grievous 
damage to private property (action under clause (c) of subsection 
(2) of section 6), doing anything that is likely to cause death or 
endangers a person’s life (action under clause (d) of subsection (2) 
of section 6) or creating a serious risk to safety of the public or a 
section of the public (action under clause (i) of subsection (2) of 
section 6) even if committed with an ordinary stick, a brickbat or a 
stone when used as a weapon would constitute the offence of 
terrorism! Such trivializing of the diabolical offence of terrorism 
surely could not be the intention of the legislature when framing a 
law for the offence of terrorism which is a class apart and a species 
different from any other ordinary crime. In this context we have 
found the learned Additional Prosecutor-General, Punjab to be 
quite justified in maintaining that the provisions of subsection (3) 
of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are quite problematic 
as they do not piece well with the remaining provisions of the said 
section as far as the matter of defining terrorism is concerned. He 
has also been found by us to be correct in submitting that if the 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
55
provisions of subsection (3) of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 
1997, as they are worded, are to be given effect then the distinction 
between the peculiar offence of terrorism and most of the run of 
the mill offences committed in the society in routine would be 
obliterated. In this backdrop his submission that the provisions of 
subsection (3) of section 6 may be read down in order to save the 
main Act and its purposes has been found by us to be meriting 
serious consideration. We may add here that the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 was introduced about twenty-two years ago but in all 
these years, to the best of our knowledge, the provisions of 
subsection (3) of section 6 of that Act have never before been 
pressed into service in any reported case in the country. It appears 
that the Judges and lawyers in the country have found the said 
provisions to be so confusing and incentive-incompatible that they 
have kept themselves away from the same so far. It is about time 
that the legislature may like to have another look at the said 
provisions and to consider deleting or suitably amending the same 
so as to bring them in harmony with the remaining provisions of 
the Act. 
 
15. 
The resume of our legislative developments in the field of 
terrorism shows, as already observed in the case of Basharat Ali 
(supra), that with different laws and definitions of terrorist act or 
terrorism the emphasis has been shifting from one criterion to 
another including the gravity of the act, lethal nature of the 
weapon used, plurality of culprits, number of victims, impact 
created by the act and effect of fear and insecurity brought about 
or likely to be created in the society by the action. The last 
definition of a ‘terrorist act’ contained in section 6 of the Anti-
Terrorism Act, 1997 squarely focused on the effect of fear and 
insecurity intended to be created by the act or actually created by 
the act or the act having the potential of creating such an effect of 
fear and insecurity in the society. It, however, appears that 
subsequently the legislature did not feel convinced of the aptness 
or correctness of that definition and resultantly the erstwhile 
definition of a ‘terrorist act’ contained in section 6 of the Anti-
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
56
Terrorism Act, 1997 was repealed and a totally fresh and new 
definition of ‘terrorism’ was introduced through an amended 
section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The legislature had 
probably realized by then that an effect of an act may not always 
be a correct indicator of the nature of such an act as every crime, 
especially of violence against person or property, does create some 
sense of fear and insecurity in some section of the society and a 
definition of terrorism based upon the magnitude or potential of an 
effect created or intended to be created or having a potential of 
creating would necessarily require a premature, speculative and 
imaginary quantification of the effect so as to determine the nature 
of the act in order to decide about the jurisdiction of a criminal 
court to try such an act. That surely was an unsure test and the 
result of such a premature, speculative and presumptive test could 
vary from court to court and from Judge to Judge reminding a 
legal scholar of the Star Chamber and the early days of a Court of 
Equity in England where equity was said to vary with the size of 
the Chancellor’s foot. The new definition of ‘terrorism’ introduced 
through the amended section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 as 
it stands today appears to be closer to the universally understood 
concept of terrorism besides being easier to understand and apply. 
The earlier emphasis on the speculative effect of the act has now 
given way to a clearly defined mens rea and actus reus. The 
amended clause (b) of subsection (1) of section 6 now specifies the 
‘design’ and clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 earmarks the 
‘purpose’ which should be the motivation for the act and the actus 
reus has been clearly mentioned in subsection (2) of section 6 and 
now it is only when the actus reus specified in subsection (2) of 
section 6 is accompanied by the requisite mens rea provided for in 
clause (b) or clause (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 that an action 
can be termed as ‘terrorism’. Thus, it is no longer the fear or 
insecurity actually created or intended to be created or likely to be 
created which would determine whether the action qualifies to be 
termed as terrorism or not but it is now the intent and motivation 
behind the action which would be determinative of the issue 
irrespective of the fact whether any fear and insecurity was 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
57
actually created or not. After this amendment in section 6 an 
action can now be termed as terrorism if the use or threat of that 
action is designed to coerce and intimidate or overawe the 
Government or the public or a section of the public or community 
or sect, etc. or if such action is designed to create a sense of fear or 
insecurity in the society or the use or threat is made for the 
purpose of advancing a religious, sectarian or ethnic cause, etc. 
Now creating fear or insecurity in the society is not by itself 
terrorism unless the motive itself is to create fear or insecurity in 
the society and not when fear or insecurity is just a byproduct, a 
fallout or an unintended consequence of a private crime. In the last 
definition the focus was on the action and its result whereas in the 
present definition the emphasis appears to be on the motivation 
and objective and not on the result. Through this amendment the 
legislature seems to have finally appreciated that mere shock, 
horror, dread or disgust created or likely to be created in the 
society does not transform a private crime into terrorism but 
terrorism as an ‘ism’ is a totally different concept which denotes 
commission of a crime with the design or purpose of destabilizing 
the government, disturbing the society or hurting a section of the 
society with a view to achieve objectives which are essentially 
political, ideological or religious. This approach also appears to be 
in harmony with the emerging international perspective and 
perception about terrorism. The international perception is also 
becoming clearer on the point that a violent activity against 
civilians that has no political, ideological or religious aims is just 
an act of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of 
insanity unrelated to terrorism. This metamorphosis in the anti-
terrorism law in our country has brought about a sea change in 
the whole concept as we have understood it in the past and it is, 
therefore, 
of 
paramount 
importance 
for 
all 
concerned 
to 
understand this conceptual modification and transformation in its 
true perspective.  
 
16. 
For what has been discussed above it is concluded and 
declared that for an action or threat of action to be accepted as 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
58
terrorism within the meanings of section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 the action must fall in subsection (2) of section 6 of the 
said Act and the use or threat of such action must be designed to 
achieve any of the objectives specified in clause (b) of subsection 
(1) of section 6 of that Act or the use or threat of such action must 
be to achieve any of the purposes mentioned in clause (c) of 
subsection (1) of section 6 of that Act. It is clarified that any action 
constituting an offence, howsoever grave, shocking, brutal, 
gruesome or horrifying, does not qualify to be termed as terrorism 
if it is not committed with the design or purpose specified or 
mentioned in clauses (b) or (c) of subsection (1) of section 6 of the 
said Act. It is further clarified that the actions specified in 
subsection (2) of section 6 of that Act do not qualify to be labeled 
or characterized as terrorism if such actions are taken in 
furtherance of personal enmity or private vendetta. 
 
17. 
Before parting with this judgment we may observe that the 
definition of ‘terrorism’ contained in section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism 
Act, 1997 as it stands at present is too wide and the same includes 
so many actions, designs and purposes which have no nexus with 
the generally recognized concept of what terrorism is. Apart from 
that including some other heinous offences in the Preamble and 
the Third Schedule to that Act for trial of such offences by an Anti-
Terrorism Court when such other offences do not qualify to be 
included in the definition of terrorism puts an extra and 
unnecessary burden on such courts and causes delay in trial of 
actual cases of terrorism. It is, therefore, recommended that the 
Parliament may consider substituting the present definition of 
‘terrorism’ by a more succinct definition bringing it in line with the 
international perspectives of that offence and focusing on violent 
activities aimed at achieving political, ideological or religious 
objectives. We further recommend that the Parliament may also 
consider suitably amending the Preamble to the Act and removing 
all those offences from the Third Schedule to the Act which 
offences have no nexus with the offence of terrorism. 
 
Criminal Appeal No. 95 of 2019, etc.  
 
59
18. 
The office is directed to fix the captioned appeals for hearing 
before appropriate Benches of this Court for their decision in terms 
of the legal position declared through the present judgment. 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
Judge  
 
Judge 
 
Judge  
 
Judge 
 
Judge  
 
Judge 
 
 
Announced in open Court at Islamabad on 30.10.2019. 
 
 
 
Chief Justice 
 
 
Islamabad 
30.10.2019 
Approved for reporting.  
Arif 
