In the Supreme Court of Pakistan 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
Present: 
Mr. Justice Anwar Zaheer Jamali 
Mr. Justice Dost Muhammad Khan 
Mr. Justice Umar Ata Bandial 
 
Civil Appeals No.861 to 863 of 2007. 
(on appeal from judgment of High Court of Sindh, Karachi, 
dated 19.4.2006, passed in Misc. Appeals No.2,3&4/1989) 
 
Wella Aktineesellschaft (in all cases) 
…Appellant 
Versus 
Shamim Akhtar & others (in all cases) 
… Respondents 
 
For the appellant:  
Mr. Anwar Mansoor Khan, Sr. ASC, 
assisted by Mrs. Umaima Khan, Advocate. 
 
For respondent No.1: 
Mr. Arshad Ali Chaudhry,  ASC/AOR. 
 
Respondent No.2:  
Ex parte. 
 
Date of hearing: 
 
24.4.2015 
  
JUDGMNET 
 
 
Anwar Zaheer Jamali, J.- These appeals, with leave of 
the Court in terms of the order dated 08.03.2007, arise out of the 
judgment passed in Miscellaneous Appeals No. 02/89, 03/89, 04/89, 
which were heard and disposed of together by the learned Single 
Judge in chambers of the High Court of Sindh at Karachi vide 
impugned judgment dated 19.04.2006, and consequently three 
orders dated 21.09.1988, passed by the Registrar of Trademarks, 
Karachi (Respondent No. 2), in rectification petitions bearings 
numbers 17/86, 18/86 and 19/86, were upheld. 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
2
2. 
The facts leading to the present litigation may be 
succinctly put forth as follows. The appellant M/s Wella 
Aktineesellschaft, is a company registered under the laws of the 
Federal Republic of Germany, who inter alia carries on the business 
of manufacturing and exporting cosmetic items etc. On 19.07.1971, 
the appellant got registered two marks, “WELLAFORM” (word) and 
“WELLAFLEX” (word), bearing registration numbers 55811 and 
55812, respectively. Additionally, the appellants already had the 
registered trademark in respect of “WELLA with Device”, bearing 
registration number 8376, dated 28.09.1949 (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as the “Trademarks”). The aforesaid Trademarks were all 
registered under Class – 3, as being “soap, perfumery, essential oils, 
cosmetics, products for cleaning, conditioning and embellishing the 
hair, including hair shampoos, dry shampoos, hair lotions, hair 
dressing creams, hair care products, hair sprays, permanent waving 
solutions, bleaching preparations, neutralizing agents, hair dyes, hair 
colouring products, hair fixing preparations, hair toning preparations, 
hair setting lotions”. The appellant also duly applied for the renewal 
of “WELLAFORM” and “WELLAFLEX” trademarks, which were 
renewed up till 19.07.1993.With respect to the trademark “WELLA 
with device”, their registration was also renewed from 28.09.1986 up 
till 28.09.2001.  
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
3
3. 
The appellant, however, could not freely sell their 
products in Pakistan, in relation to which these Trademarks were 
registered, from the year 1979 to 1985 due to ban on the import of 
these products as per the Import Policy Orders 1979-80, 1980-81, 
1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84 and 1984-85 issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce, Government of Pakistan.  
4. 
As it transpires from the record the Respondent No. 1, 
which is claimed to be a partnership concern carrying on the business 
of manufacturing and trading in cosmetics and allied products, as per 
their claim started using the trademark “WELLA” since  the year 1984 
and subsequently applied for its registration through T.M.A. No. 
87457 in Class-3, which application for registration met with an 
objection that the Trademarks of the appellant, bearing Nos. 8376 
(“Wella 
with 
Device”), 
55811 
(“WELLAFORM”) 
and 
55812 
(“WELLAFLEX”) conflicted with the trademark “WELLA” sought to be 
registered. Thus, on 09.08.1986, Respondent No. 1, filed rectification 
applications bearing numbers 17/86, 18/86 and 19/86, regarding 
“WELLAFORM”, “WELLAFLEX” and “WELLA with device”, respectively, 
before Respondent No. 2, seeking expunction of these registered 
Trademarks, as according to Respondent No. 1, the appellant had 
registered these Trademarks without any bona fide intention to use 
them in relation to the goods falling in class-3 and had in fact failed 
to use them since their registration.  
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
4
5. 
In the above background, further proceedings were held 
before the Registrar, Trademarks, Karachi (Respondent No. 2) and 
through orders dated 21.09.1988, the Trademarks issued in favour of 
the appellant were cancelled/removed on the ground that the 
appellant neither used, nor took any steps to use them, as even if 
import of such classified goods was banned, alternative measures, 
such as appointing a registered user or assigning their Trademarks, 
could have been adopted, as was being done by other foreign 
proprietors of trademarks under similar circumstances. It was held 
that in the light of extended period of non-use of these Trademarks 
for over five years, sufficient proof existed that the appellant had no 
intention of using them in Pakistan.  
6. 
Aggrieved by the aforementioned orders of Respondent 
No. 2, the appellant preferred three miscellaneous appeals, under 
section 76 of the Trade Marks Act, 1940, before the High Court of 
Sindh at Karachi, which were heard and dismissed through the 
impugned judgment dated 19.04.2006 and, thus, the orders of the 
Registrar, Trade Marks, Karachi, were upheld.  
7. 
We have heard the arguments of Mr. Anwar Mansoor 
Khan, learned Sr. ASC for the appellant and Mr. Arshad Ali Chaudhry, 
learned ASC for respondent No.1, while respondents No.2 has been 
proceeded ex-parte. The learned Sr. ASC for the appellant initially 
made reference to the leave granting order passed in these 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
5
connected appeals, wherein, for this purpose, reference was made to 
the case of Cooper’s Incorporated v. Pakistan General Stores & 
another (1981 SCMR 1039). On facts, his submission was twofold. 
Firstly, that the timeframe prescribed under section 37(1)(b) of the 
Trademarks Act 1940 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1940”) 
for deciding the issue of removal of some trademark from the 
Register of Trademarks on the ground of its continuous non-use for 
five years, was to be computed from the date within one month from 
the date of application, which in the instant case were submitted by 
the respondent No.1  on 09.8.1986, but against it, the respondent 
No.2 as well as the learned Single Judge in chambers of the High 
Court of Sindh in their respective orders/judgment computed this 
period from the year 1971, which is patently contrary to the spirit of 
the applicable law. Disputing the findings on non-use of Registered 
Trademarks, he made reference to a bunch of documents to show 
the active use of their Registered Trademarks by the appellant 
Company in Pakistan during the year 1984 to 1986, which fact, 
according to him, brought their case out of the purview of penal 
consequences provided under section 37(1)(b) (ibid). In the same 
context, he also laid stress upon the use of word “bonafide” and 
contended that unless the Registrar could find some ulterior or 
malafide motive of the appellant in the purported non-use of their 
trademarks during the requisite period of five years upto the date of 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
6
one month before the date of application, the said penal provision 
could not have been invoked against them. In support of his next 
submission that it was due to continued ban on the import of goods 
of the specified classification of Registered Trademark, under the 
Import Policy Orders for the year 1979-80 to 1984-85, imposed by 
the Ministry of Commerce, Government of Pakistan, that the 
appellant were helpless to carry on the business of their registered 
trademark goods in class-3 in Pakistan, he also made reference to the 
relevant import policy orders of this period. Further, in this context, 
he placed reliance upon the judgment in the case of Procter and 
Gamble Ltd. V. Registrar of Trade Marks (1988 CLC 252), which lays 
down as under:- 
 
“From the above discussion it is quite clear that whether "special 
circumstance" existed in a case which justified non-user of the mark by 
the registered proprietor within the meaning of section 37(3) of the Act is 
to be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. 
The important factor however, to be kept in mind while deciding the 
above fact is whether the actual non-user of the trade mark resulted on 
account of any intention on the part of the registered proprietor to 
abandon the mark or on account of certain other factor which would 
amount to special circumstances for such non-user. Here, again, while 
considering the other factors, it is not merely the attendant or attached 
circumstance to any particular individual business which is relevant but a 
special circumstances of the kind which affects or applies to all the 
traders in that particular trade. In other words if peculiar or abnormal 
circumstances exist which has resulted in the non-use of the trade mark 
and over which the registered proprietor had no control then the 
requirement of section 37(3) regarding existence of special circumstance 
for non-use of the mark shall be deemed to have been fulfilled. It will 
thus be seen that if there are circumstances which make ordinary uses of 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
7
international trade impracticable then such circumstance would amount 
to existence of a 'special circumstance' resulting in the non-user of the 
mark by the registered proprietor. In the case before me it is common 
case between the parties that there existed from the beginning a 
complete ban on the import of detergent in Pakistan. These restrictions 
on the import of detergent in Pakistan are not restricted to affect the 
business of any particular individual but all the traders dealing in the 
import of detergent are affected by these restrictions. I am, therefore, of 
the view that non-use of mark by the appellant on the goods is the result 
of import restriction on such goods, which constituted a special 
circumstance within the meaning of section 37 the Trade Marks Act, and, 
therefore, the Registrar was not justified in ordering removal of their 
mark from the register.” 
(also see AIR 1973 Bombay 191). 
8. 
Conversely, Mr. Arshad Ali Chaudhry, learned ASC for 
respondent No.1 contended that it is an admitted position from the 
case record that the three Registered Trademarks, regarding which 
respondent No.1 had moved applications under section 37(1)(b) 
(ibid) against the appellant, were registered in their favour on 
28.9.1949, 19.7.1971 and 19.7.1971, respectively, but in Pakistan 
there was no use of these trademarks by the appellant Company 
throughout the subsequent period. Thus, the conclusion recorded by 
the respondent No.2 in his order dated 21.9.1988, as upheld by the 
High Court in its impugned judgment dated 19.4.2006, is based on 
proper appreciation of facts and correct interpretation of law. As 
regards the import policy orders issued by the Ministry of Commerce, 
Government of Pakistan during the year 1979-80 to 1984-85, neither 
the learned ASC disputed its genuineness nor the fact that the 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
8
classified products of the appellant under their registered 
Trademarks squarely fell under class-3 in respect of soap, perfumery, 
essential oils, cosmetics, products for cleaning conditioning and 
embellishing the hair, including hair shampoos, dry shampoos, hair 
lotions, hair dressing creams, hair care products, hair sprays, 
permanent waving solutions, bleaching preparations, neutralizing 
agents, hair dyes, hair colouring products, hair fixing preparations, 
hair toning preparations, hair setting lotions etc, thus covered by the 
banned imposed under such import policies. The learned ASC when 
confronted with the documentary evidence showing the engagement 
of appellant company based in Germany in making sells and supply of 
their products in Pakistan under the registered trademarks soon after 
lifting of ban and also making correspondence with businessmen in 
Pakistan for manufacturing their products under a license etc, again 
he could not show anything from the record to rebut these 
documents or the contents of the affidavit of Mr. Helmut Stollreiter, 
Head of the Legal Department of the appellant company dated 
02.12.1986, filed by him alongwith the objections of the appellant to 
the applications under section 37(1)(b)(ibid), moved by respondent 
No.1 before respondent No.2 for removal of registered trademarks of 
the appellant, showing that genuine efforts were made by the 
appellant company during the years 1984 to 1986 for securing 
business for their products in Pakistan. He, however, argued that as a 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
9
bonafide businessman respondent No.1 after making honest search 
had started the use of the trademark “WELLA” on his products since 
the year 1984 and had spent substantial amount over the promotion 
of his business under such trademark, therefore, they being 
aggrieved person, no ulterior motive could be attributed to them in 
moving such applications before the respondent No.2, which were 
fully in conformity with relevant provisions of the Act of 1940. In 
support of his arguments, he referred various cases as also cited in 
the impugned judgment. 
9. 
Having considered the respective submissions of the 
learned ASCs and scanned the material placed on record, in the first 
place, we deem it appropriate to reproduce hereunder the provisions 
of section 37 (ibid), which read thus:- 
37. Removal from register and imposition of limitations on 
ground of non-use: (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 33, a 
registered trade mark may be taken off the register in respect of 
any of the goods in respect of which it is registered on application 
in the prescribed manner by any person aggrieved to a High Court 
or to the Registrar, on the ground either- 
(a) 
That the trade mark was registered without any 
bona fide intention on the part of the applicant for 
registration that it should be used in relation to 
those goods by him or, in a case to which the 
provisions of Section 36 apply, by the company 
concerned, and that there has in fact been no bona 
fide use of the trade mark in relation to those 
goods by any proprietor thereof for the time being 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
10
up to a date one month before the date of the 
application; or 
(b)  
that up to a date one month before the date of the 
application, a continuous period of five years or 
longer elapsed during which the trade mark was 
registered and during which there was no bona fide 
use thereof in relation to those goods by any 
proprietor thereof for the time being 
 
Provided that, except where the applicant has been 
permitted under subsection (2) of Section 10 to register an 
identical or nearly resembling trade mark in respect of the goods 
in question or where the Tribunal is of opinion that he might 
properly be permitted so to register such a trade mark, the 
Tribunal may refuse an application made under clause (a) or 
clause (b) in relation to any goods, if it is shown that there has 
been, before the relevant date or during the relevant period, as 
the case may be, bona fide use of the trade mark by any 
proprietor thereof for the time being in relation to goods of the 
same description, being goods in respect of which the trade mark 
is registered. 
(2)  
Where in relation to any goods in respect of which a trade 
mark is registered: 
(a)  
the circumstances referred to in clause (b) of sub-
section (1) are shown to exist so far as regards non-
use of the trade mark in relation to goods to be 
sold, or otherwise traded in, in a particular place in 
Pakistan (otherwise than for export from Pakistan), 
or in relation to goods to be exported to a 
particular market outside Pakistan; and 
(b)  
a person has been permitted under sub-section (2) 
of Section 10 to register an identical or nearly 
resembling trade mark in respect of those goods 
under a registration extending to use in relation to 
goods to be so sold, or otherwise traded in, or in 
relation to goods to be so exported, or the Tribunal 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
11
is of opinion that he might properly be permitted 
so to register such a trade mark,  
on application by that person in the prescribed manner to a High 
Court or to the Registrar, the Tribunal may impose on the 
registration of the first mentioned trade mark such limitations as 
it thinks proper for securing that that registration shall cease to 
extend to such use. 
(3)  
An applicant shall not be entitled to rely for the purpose of 
clause (b) of sub-section (1) or of sub-section (2) on any non-use 
of a trade mark which is shown to have been due to special 
circumstances in the trade and not to any intention to abandon or 
not to use the trade mark in relation to the goods to which the 
application relates.” 
10. 
A careful reading of the above reproduced provision of 
law qua the scheme of the Act of 1940 reveals that it is a penal 
provision aimed to work as deterrent for those, seeking Registration 
of any trademark under the Act of 1940 with some ulterior motive, 
which they do not intend to use or there had been in fact no 
bonafide use of their trademark in relation to those goods for a 
specified period. But for seeking the relief of removal/revocation of a 
registered trademark under section 37(1)(b) (ibid), specific minimum 
timeframe of five years has been provided during which there had 
been no bonafide use of such trademark by its proprietor, which is to 
be computed from a date one month before the date of application 
submitted by any aggrieved person in this regard. In the present 
case, as mentioned earlier, the three identical applications under 
section 37, 38 and 46 of the Act of 1940 were submitted by 
respondent No.1 for seeking removal of registered trademarks of the 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
12
appellant on 09.8.1986, precisely, with the same assertions that 
there was no bonafide use thereof from the side of appellant for  a 
period of over five years by that time and since the year 1984, 
Trademark “WELLA” was honestly used by the respondent No.1, 
thus, the three registered trademarks No.8376, 55811 and 55812 in 
class-3 of the registered trademarks were prejudicial to their interest 
and liable to be removed/cancelled. 
11. 
As against the above claim of the respondent No.1, a 
detailed reply was submitted by the appellant company before the 
Registrar on 24.12.1986, duly supported with the affidavit of their 
Legal Advisor, wherein these allegations were strongly refuted both 
on law and facts on the basis of documentary evidence, which, on 
the one end furnished sufficient proof about the sincere efforts for 
use of Trademarks by the appellant company after lifting of ban on 
the imports of such classified goods by the Ministry of Commerce, 
Government of Pakistan, from the year 1984-85 and before that 
barring the import of their goods under class-3, on the basis of 
import policy for the years 1979-80 to 1984-85. The Registrar 
Trademark/respondent No.2, in his orders dated 29.8.1988 seems to 
have totally overlooked such documentary evidence furnished by the 
appellant in support of their claim, so also the effect of import policy 
orders, which, to say the least, show that non-use of these 
trademarks by the appellant during the crucial period within five 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
13
years was under special circumstances due to such legal bar and not 
malafide, thus, furnished presumption of bonafide non-use of 
trademarks by them during such period. If these documents which 
have remained unchallenged and un-rebutted, are taken into 
consideration then there remains no continuous period of non-use of 
trademarks for five years before the date of filing application by 
respondent No.1 for removal/revocation of trademarks of the 
appellant, which is a condition precedent under the relevant 
provision of law for pressing into service its penal consequences. As 
regards the other defence offered by the appellant to justify their 
non-use of trademarks during the period 1979-80 to 1984-85, i.e. the 
import policy orders issued by the Ministry of Commerce, 
Government of Pakistan, again, we find that the import policies for 
that period, copies whereof have been placed on record, 
substantiated the claim of the appellant in this regard, while the ratio 
of judgment in the case of Cooper’s Incorporated (supra) further lend 
full support to their case. In this matter the Court, dealing with a case 
under section 10 of the Act of 1940 qua plea of acquiescence, held as  
under:- 
 
“As the respondent has deliberately copied the appellant's 
registered trade mark, it could have succeeded before the Deputy 
Registrar only if it had roved honest concurrent use, of the mark 
'Jockey' or "other special circumstances" within the meaning of 
this subsection. But, the Deputy Registrar has given a categorical 
finding that the respondent had dishonestly copied the 
appellant's trade mark. Therefore, the first question is whether 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
14
there is any error in this finding. 'The burden of proving an error 
in this finding was or: the respondent, but Mr. Thaker only relied 
on the fact that the appellant had not been able to sell its 
products in Pakistan, because of import restrictions. Now, 
although the appellant has not been selling it products in Pakistan 
because of import restrictions, this does not entitle the 
respondent to copy the appellant's trademark, because by doing 
so, it is deceiving the public into thinking that its products are the 
products of the appellant. And, on the other hand, it would 
appear that the respondent did not produce any evidence before 
the Deputy Registrar to show that its use of the mark `Jockey' was 
honest, therefore, as pointed out long by the Privy Council in 
Subbiah v. Kumeraval (1) the fact that the respondent has copied 
the appellant's mark cast on it a heavy burden' to show that its 
use of the appellant's mark was honest. But, as it has not 
produced any such evidence, it follows that it had dishonestly 
copied the appellant trade mark and, the High Court would not 
have been justified in interfering with Deputy Registrar's finding 
that the respondent had dishonestly copied the appellant's trade 
mark.” 
12. 
Looking to the case of respondent No.1 for grant of 
requisite relief, claimed by them in their applications under section 
37 of the Act of 1940, submitted before respondent No.2, it is also 
relevant to mention that in the year 1984 for the first time they had 
started using the trademark “WELLA” for their products under class-
3, when the three registered trademarks of the appellant were 
already in field for a considerable long period. In such circumstances, 
mere assertion of respondent No.1 that adoption of such trademark 
was after due search undertaken by them and bonafide, is not free 
from serious doubts. More so, in the circumstances when no material 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
15
in support of such plea was placed on record and the trademarks of 
the appellant were well known and recognized internationally. It may 
also be added here that the burden of proof regarding the two 
material facts, (a) whether there was no bonafide use of the 
Registered Trademarks by the appellant for a continuous period of 
five years upto a date one month before the date of the application 
without any lawful excuse or special circumstances as envisaged 
under section 37(3) ibid, and (b) whether the attempt of respondent 
No.1 for seeking registration of word “WELLA” as their trademark 
was bonafide, was squarely upon respondent No.1, which was to be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt, so as to invoke its penal 
consequences against the appellant, but, as discussed above, they 
failed to discharge. 
13. 
In addition to it, the observations of Respondent No.2, 
contained in his orders dated 21.9.1988, that in case of ban on goods 
in class-3 under the import policies issued by the Ministry of 
Commerce, government of Pakistan for the years 1981-82 to 1984-
85, the appellant could have appointed some registered user under 
section 39 of the Act of 1940, or they could have assigned their 
trademark by invoking section 28 of the Act of 1940, or granted 
license to some person to avoid the penal consequences of section 
37(1)(b) ibid, are equally without force as the Act of 1940 does not 
envisage any such compulsion to avoid the consequence of 
C.A No.861 of 2007, etc. 
16
Government ban, which could be justly and fairly considered as 
special circumstances in the trade within the meaning of section 
37(3) ibid and not to any intention of appellant to abandon or not to 
use their trademarks. 
14. 
The upshot of above discussion is that the High Court in 
its impugned judgment as well as the Registrar/respondent No.2, in 
his orders dated 21.9.1988, wrongly invoked the provisions of section 
37(1)(b) of the Act of 1940 for ordering removal of registered 
trademarks of the appellant. 
15. 
Foregoing are the reasons for our short order dated 
24.4.2015, passed in these appeals, which reads as under:- 
 
“Having heard the arguments of the learned ASCs for both 
the parties, for the reasons to follow separately, these appeals are 
allowed, the impugned judgment and the three orders dated 
21.9.1988, passed by Respondent No.2 are set aside. Resultantly, 
Rectification Cases No.17, 18 and 19 of 1986 are dismissed and 
the registered trademarks of the appellant are restored.” 
 
 
 
 
Islamabad, 
24th April, 2015. 
Approved for reporting. 
تﻗادﺻ 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
 
Judge 
 
