IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
 
 
(Appellate Jurisdiction) 
 
 
 
 
PRESENT: 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE MIAN SAQIB NISAR, CJ 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE SH. AZMAT SAEED 
 
 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ-UL-AHSAN 
 
 
CIVIL APPEAL NO.14-L OF 2013 
(On appeal from the order dated 
27.3.2012 of the Lahore High Court, 
Lahore, passed in W.P. No.4144 of 
2010) 
 
 
Saif-ur-Rehman 
 
… Appellant 
Versus 
Addl. District Judge, Toba Tek 
Singh and two others  
 
 
… Respondent (s) 
 
 
For the Appellant  
: Mr. Sarfraz Khan Gondal, ASC 
 
  
For Respondent No.3 : Mian Shah Abbas, ASC 
 
  
Date of Hearing 
: 17.04.2018 
  
 
 
 
JUDGMENT 
 
  
 
SH. AZMAT SAEED, J.- This Civil Appeal 
by leave of the Court is directed against the Order 
dated 27.03.2012, whereby a Constitutional Petition 
i.e. Writ Petition No.4144 of 2010, filed by the 
present Appellant, was partly accepted.  
2. 
 
The brief facts necessary for adjudication of 
the lis at hand are that the Appellant and 
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2 
Respondent No.3 were married but unfortunately, 
the matrimonial relationship between the parties 
collapsed, whereafter, Respondent No.3 filed a Suit 
for Dissolution of Marriage as well as the Suit for 
Return of Dowry Articles. The former Suit was 
decreed vide judgment and decree dated 01.02.2008 
and the marriage dissolved. No challenge was thrown 
to it and such decree attained finality.  
3. 
 
The Suit for Dowry Articles was also 
decreed by the learned Family Court for an amount 
of Rs.25,000/- vide judgment and decree dated 
29.09.2009. Respondent No.3 filed an appeal before 
the learned First Appellate Court, which was allowed 
vide judgment and decree dated 27.01.2010 and the 
decretal amount was enhanced to Rs.4,00,000/-. In 
the above backdrop, the present Appellant invoked 
the Constitutional jurisdiction of the learned Lahore 
High Court, Lahore by filing Writ Petition No.4144 of 
2010. After hearing the parties, vide impugned Order 
dated 27.03.2012, the Writ Petition filed by the 
present Appellant was partly accepted and the 
CA.14-L/2013 
3 
amount in lieu of dowry articles was reduced to 
Rs.3,00,000/-.  
4. 
 
The Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of 
this Court by filing Civil Petition bearing No.781-L of 
2012, in which Leave to Appeal was granted vide 
Order 
dated 
01.01.2013. 
The 
said 
Order 
is 
reproduced herein below for ease of reference: 
 
 
“States, that the judgment and 
decree of the Family Court pertaining 
to the return of dowry articles was to 
the tune of Rs.25,000/- (rupees 
twenty five thousand), thus as per the 
provisions of Section 14(2)(b) of the 
West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 
1964, no appeal was competent 
before the learned Additional District 
Judge, 
therefore, 
the 
appellate 
judgment which has been partly 
affirmed by the learned High Court is 
without jurisdiction. Besides, the list 
of dowry articles had not been proved 
by the respondent in terms of the law 
and there are many contradictions in 
those which are apparent on the face 
of the record. Leave is granted to 
consider the above.” 
 
5. 
 
We have heard the learned counsel for the 
parties and examined the available record.  
6. 
 
The 
learned 
Appellate 
Court, 
after 
examining the evidence available on the record, 
returned a finding that Respondent No.3 was entitled 
CA.14-L/2013 
4 
to return of dowry articles and in lieu thereof she 
was entitled to a sum of Rs.4,00,000/-. The learned 
High Court, after examining the evidence, more 
particularly, the statement of Respondent No.3 as 
PW-1 concurred with the findings of the learned First 
Appellate Court that the said Respondent was 
entitled to the value of the dowry articles but the 
quantum thereof was reduced from Rs.4,00,000/- to 
Rs.3,00,000/-. The findings of the learned High 
Court appeared to be based on a fair and reasonable 
appreciation of the evidence. No misreading or non-
reading of evidence has been pointed out at the bar. 
The reasoning does not appear to be perverse. Thus, 
no ground for interference, in this behalf, is made 
out. 
7. 
 
The only other question, which floated to 
the  surface and was asserted by the learned counsel 
for the Appellant is that the learned Family Court 
had granted a decree for a sum of Rs.25,000/- upon 
the claim of dowry, hence, in view of Section 14(2) of 
the Family Courts Act, 1964 (Act of 1964), no appeal 
was maintainable against the said judgment and 
CA.14-L/2013 
5 
decree being less than the amount mentioned in the 
aforesaid provisions of law; hence, the judgment and 
decree of the learned First Appellate Court was 
wholly 
without 
jurisdiction. 
Consequently, 
the 
impugned Order of the learned High Court partly 
affirming the same was also liable to be set aside. 
Leave in the instant case has been granted to 
consider the aforesaid aspect of the matter. 
8. 
 
The aforesaid contentions of the learned 
counsel for the Appellant have been controverted by 
the learned counsel for Respondent No.3. It has been 
contended that the embargo placed on the right of 
appeal being pressed into service by the learned 
counsel for the Appellant applies to the husband 
only and not to a wife, dissatisfied with the quantum 
or denial of relief. 
9. 
 
It is Section 14 of the Act of 1964, more 
particularly, 
sub-section 
(2) 
thereof, 
which 
is 
required to be interpreted in order to adjudicate 
upon the divergent contentions, in this behalf, 
canvassed by the learned counsel for the parties at 
the bar.  
CA.14-L/2013 
6 
10.  
Before proceeding further, it may be 
appropriate to contextualize the Family Courts Act, 
1964 in general and Section 14(2), in particular. Out 
of the general canvass of the forum and procedure 
for adjudication of the claims and disputes, a 
jurisdiction has been carved out through the 
enactment of the Family Courts Act, 1964, creating a 
special forum i.e. the Family Court for adjudication 
of the family disputes in accordance with the special 
procedure as set forth in the aforesaid Act of 1964 
and the Rules framed thereunder i.e. The West 
Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965. The purpose of 
this exercise is evident from the preamble of the Act 
of 1964 i.e. “expeditious settlement and disposal of 
disputes relating to marriage and family affairs”. The 
nature of disputes which can be brought before the 
Family Court for adjudication have been set forth 
and enumerated in Part I of the Schedule referred to 
in Section 5 of the Act of 1964. It is now settled law 
that a purposive rather than a literal approach to 
interpretation is to be adopted while interpreting 
Statutes. An interpretation which advances the 
CA.14-L/2013 
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purpose of the Act is to be preferred rather than an 
interpretation which defeats its objects. Reference, in 
this behalf, may be made to the judgments reported 
as Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of 
Finance 
and 
others 
v. 
M/s. 
Noori 
Trading 
Corporation (Private) Limited and 14 others (1992 
SCMR 710) and Hudabiya Engineering (Pvt) Limited 
v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, 
Government of Pakistan and 6 others (PLD 1998 
Lahore 90). 
11.  
The second aspect of the Family Courts Act, 
1964 and the Rules framed thereunder as amended 
from time to time would reveal its gender sensitivity. 
A glance at Section 3 of the Act of 1964 reveals that 
women Judges are specifically catered for. The 
residence of the wife can be a determining factor for 
conferring territorial jurisdiction in certain Suits as 
is evident from the provisions of Rule 6 of the West 
Pakistan Family Courts Rules, 1965. There can be 
no escape from the fact that the tone and tenor of 
the Family Courts Act, 1964 and the Rules framed 
thereunder are beneficial in nature. It is an equally 
CA.14-L/2013 
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settled law that beneficial provisions in a Statute 
must be interpreted liberally in a manner so that the 
benefit conferred is advanced rather than frustrated 
or subverted. Reference, in this behalf, may be made 
to the judgments of this Court reported as Lahore 
Development Authority through D.G., Lahore and 
another v. Abdul Shafique and others (PLD 2000 SC 
207) and Pakistan Engineering Co. Limited, Lahore 
through Managing Director v. Fazal Beg and 2 others 
(1992 SCMR 2166).  
12.  
Section 14(2) of the Family Courts Act, 
1964, 
must 
necessarily 
be 
approached 
and 
interpreted in the above backdrop and in accordance 
with the aforesaid principles i.e. the purposive object 
thereof achieved and being beneficial in nature, the 
benefits so conferred are actualized.  
13.  
Sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act of 
1964, confers a right of appeal. However, by virtue of 
sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act of 1964, this 
right of appeal has been curtailed. The obvious 
purpose of curtailing the right of appeal is to avoid 
the benefits of any decree which may have been 
CA.14-L/2013 
9 
passed being tied up in an appeal before a higher 
forum. It has also been noticed that in only three 
eventualities that even the right of first appeal has 
been curtailed. In all three eventualities, the decree 
would be for the benefit of the wife for dissolution of 
marriage under Clause (a), for dower or dowry under 
Clause (b) and for maintenance under Clause (c). 
The last may also be for the benefit of a minor. Thus, 
the only logical and reasonable interpretation, which 
is in accordance with the purposive of the Act and in 
line with the beneficial nature thereof would be that 
a judgment-debtor of a decree envisages in Clauses 
(a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the 
Act of 1964, would not have a right of appeal so that 
the 
disputes 
mentioned 
therein 
are 
resolved 
expeditiously and the benefits conferred through 
such decree reach the decree-holder without being 
frustrated. However, the said provision cannot be 
interpreted so as to exclude a right of appeal to a 
wife whose claim of dower or dowry has been 
partially 
or 
entirely 
declined. 
For 
such 
an 
CA.14-L/2013 
10
interpretation, would defeat the purpose and object 
of the Act of 1964 and frustrate its beneficial nature.  
14.  
This Court while interpreting Section 14(2) 
of the Act of 1964, in its judgment reported as 
Tayyaba Yunus v. Muhammad Ehsan and others 
(2010 SCMR 1403) held that where a Suit for dower 
has been dismissed, the wife has a right of appeal 
under Section 14(2) of the above-said Act of 1964. 
15.  
In a case pertaining to dissolution of 
marriage, this Court in the judgment reported as 
Abid Hussain v. Additional District Judge, Alipur, 
District Muzaffargarh and another (2006 SCMR 100) 
held as follows: 
 
“The object behind non-provision of 
appeal in case of dissolution of 
marriage is to protect women, an 
under 
privileged 
and 
generally 
oppressed section of our society from 
prolonged and costly litigation. It 
aims to put a clog on the right of 
husband.” 
 
16.  
Thus, the only possible purposive beneficial 
and rational interpretation of Section 14(2) of the Act 
of 1964, is that the right of appeal of a husband 
against whom a decree has been passed is curtailed, 
CA.14-L/2013 
11
if the amount awarded is less than the amount, 
which is mentioned in the said provision. However, 
in no event the right of the wife to file an appeal is 
extinguished if she is dissatisfied with any decree in 
a Suit for dower or dowry.  
17.  
The aforesaid view incidentally has also 
been consistently enunciated by the learned Lahore 
High Court in the judgments reported as Ghulam 
Rasool v. Senior Civil Judge and 4 others (PLJ 2008 
Lahore 531), Saeeda Alia v. Syed Ghulam Mursalin 
Naqvi and another (2004 MLD 306) and Mst. Neelam 
Nosheen and others v. Raja Muhammad Khaqaan 
and others (2002 MLD 784).  
18.  
In this view of the matter, there is no denial 
of fact that the appeal of Respondent No.3 was 
validly filed and the learned First Appellate Court 
was vested with the jurisdiction to adjudicate 
thereupon and such jurisdiction was not barred 
under Section 14(2) of the Act of 1964. In view of the 
above, this Civil Appeal is totally devoid of merit and 
is liable to be dismissed. 
CA.14-L/2013 
12
19.  
These are the reasons of our short Order of 
even date, which is reproduced herein below: 
 
“For reasons to be recorded later, 
this appeal is dismissed.” 
 
 
 
 
Chief Justice  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Islamabad, the 
 
      Judge 
 
 
 
 
17th April, 2018 
 
      Judge 
‘Approved For Reporting’ 
 
Safdar & Mahtab 
 
 
 
