IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PAKISTAN 
(APPELLATE JURISDICTION) 
 
 
PRESENT: 
MR. JUSTICE GULZAR AHMED, CJ 
MR. JUSTICE IJAZ UL AHSAN 
MR. JUSTICE SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI 
 
 
CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3604 AND 3605 OF 2018 
(On appeal against the judgment dated 27.07.2018 of the 
Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad passed in Appeals 
No.2198(R)CS/2015 and 2199(R)CS/2015) 
 
 
Saboor Khan 
In CP 3604/2018 
Kifiat Ullah 
In CP 3605/2018 
 
…Petitioner(s) 
VERSUS 
Chairman WAPDA, WAPDA House, Lahore and others 
 
…Respondent(s) 
(In both cases) 
 
For the Petitioner(s): 
Mr. Muhammad Aftab Alam Rana, ASC 
Syed Rifaqat Hussain Shah, AOR 
(In both cases) 
 
 
For the Respondent(s): 
Not represented 
(In both cases) 
 
 
Date of Hearing: 
27.01.2021 
… 
JUDGMENT 
 
SAYYED MAZAHAR ALI AKBAR NAQVI, J.- These petitions under 
Article 212(3) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
1973, have been filed calling in question the consolidated judgment 
dated 27.07.2018 passed by the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad 
whereby the Service Appeals filed by the petitioners were disposed of 
while converting the imposed penalty of ‘dismissal from service’ into 
‘removal from service’. 
2. 
 
Briefly stated the facts of the matter are that the 
petitioners were working as regular Security Guards in the 
respondent Department at Dasu Hydropower Project. On 03.07.2015, 
they while armed with sticks and rods, beaten the Security Inspector 
namely Arban Ali and caused several injuries to him. This led to 
issuance of explanation dated 07.07.2015 on the allegation of 
attempt to murder, which was replied by the petitioners and they 
denied the allegation leveled against them. Thereafter, a show cause 
CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3604 AND 3605 OF 2018 
-: 2 :-
notice was issued on 09.07.2015. An inquiry was also conducted 
wherein the petitioners were found guilty of the charge. Finally, the 
departmental authority imposed a major penalty of dismissal from 
service upon the petitioners on 27.08.2015. The petitioners preferred 
departmental appeals dated 29.08.2015 but even prior to final 
adjudication, they filed Service Appeals No. 2198(R)CS & 2199(R)CS 
of 2015 before the Federal Service Tribunal, Islamabad, which have 
been disposed of vide impugned judgment dated 27.07.2018 and the 
penalty of ‘dismissal from service’ has been converted into ‘removal 
from service’. Hence, these petitions seeking leave to appeal.  
3. 
 
Learned counsel for the petitioners inter alia contended 
that no regular inquiry was conducted by the Department before 
imposing major penalty of dismissal from service, which is against 
the settled principle of law; that instead of regular inquiry, only a fact 
finding/informal inquiry was conducted on the basis of which major 
penalty could not be awarded; that neither the injured appeared 
before the Inquiry Committee nor his medical report was produced 
before the Committee; that without recording of cogent and concrete 
evidence, the learned Tribunal could not pass the impugned judgment 
and the same being not tenable in law, may be set aside.  
4. 
 
We have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and 
have perused the available record.  
5. 
 
During the departmental proceedings, both the petitioners 
had submitted an affidavit on 27.07.2015 wherein they have 
admitted the incident. However, they took the stance that it was 
Arban Ali, who hurled abuses to them and pointed a rifle towards 
them, upon which they gave a punch to him. This story of the 
petitioners appears to be an afterthought, because, if this was the 
position, why they did not make a complaint against the said Arban 
Ali and kept mum for four days until the explanation was sought from 
them. During the course of arguments, the main emphasis of the 
learned counsel was that no regular inquiry was conducted and the 
inquiry which was conducted was the informal one. However, we do 
not agree with the learned counsel. The inquiry committee was duly 
constituted under Section 6 of the WAPDA (Efficiency & Discipline) 
Rules, 1978, whereby a procedure has been prescribed when an 
inquiry officer or an inquiry committee is to be appointed. It would be 
CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3604 AND 3605 OF 2018 
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in fitness of things to reproduce the said Section, which reads as 
under:- 
 
“6. Procedure to be observed when an Inquiry Officer or 
an Inquiry Committee is to be appointed  
 
Where an Inquiry Officer or an Inquiry Committee is to be 
appointed, the competent authority shall:-  
(1) Frame a charge and communicate it to the accused together 
with statement of the allegations explaining the charge and of 
any other relevant circumstances which are proposed to be 
taken into consideration.  
 
(2) Require the accused within a reasonable time, which shall 
not be less than seven days or more than fourteen days from 
the day of charge has been communicated to him, to put in a 
written defence and to state at the same time whether he 
desires to be heard in person.  
 
(3) The Inquiry Officer or the Committee, as the case may be, 
shall inquire into the charge/or circumstances and may 
examine such oral or documentary evidence in support of the 
charge/plea or in defence of the accused, as may be 
considered necessary, and the accused shall be entitled to 
cross-examine the witness evidence against him.  
 
(4) The Inquiry Officer or the Committee, as the case may be, 
shall hear the case from day to day and no adjournment shall 
be given except for reasons to be recorded in writing. However, 
every adjournment with reasons therefore shall be reported 
forthwith 
to 
the 
competent 
authority. 
Normally, 
no 
adjournment shall be for more than a week.  
 
(5) Where the Inquiry Officer or the Committee, as the case 
may be, is satisfied that the accused is hampering, or 
attempting to hamper the progress of the inquiry, he or it shall 
administer a warning and if thereafter he or it is satisfied that 
the accused is acting in disregard of the warning, he or it shall 
record a finding to that effect and proceed to complete the 
inquiry in such manner as he or it thinks best suited to do 
substantial justice.  
 
(6) The Inquiry Officer or the Committee, as the case may be, 
shall within ten days of the conclusion of the proceedings or 
such longer period as may be allowed by the competent 
authority submit his or its findings and the grounds thereof to 
the competent authority.”  
 
 
6. 
 
The inquiry was conducted by the Deputy Director 
Security of Dasu Hydropower Project wherein two Junior Engineers 
were also members. The report categorically shows that four 
witnesses appeared against the petitioners and while recording the 
statement of each witness, ample opportunity was given to the 
petitioners to cross-examine them but they declined to cross-examine 
CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3604 AND 3605 OF 2018 
-: 4 :-
the witnesses. The perusal of the record clearly reflects that following 
the procedure laid down in Section 6 of the aforesaid Rules, all the 
legal requirements were fulfilled. The petitioners were issued 
explanation on 07.07.2015 and thereafter show cause notice/charge 
sheet on 09.07.2015 to which they replied. During the inquiry 
proceedings, the requisite material was considered and the 
petitioners were given full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses 
deposing against them. Even otherwise, if the Competent Authority 
feels that there is no need of inquiry in a case, it is fully competent to 
dispense with the inquiry in terms of Rule 5(iv)(b) of the WAPDA 
(Efficiency & Discipline) Rules, 1978. Besides, there is another aspect 
of the matter. Admittedly, the petitioners had filed Service Appeals 
before the Federal Service Tribunal without awaiting for the 
prescribed period of 90 days period after filing of departmental 
appeals, which even without touching the merits of the case rendered 
their Service Appeals incompetent in view of the specific bar 
contained in Section 4(1)(a) of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973. The said 
Section reads as under:- 
 
“4(1)(a) where an appeal, review or representation to a 
departmental authority is provided under the Civil 
Servants Ordinance, 1973, or any rule against any such 
order, no appeal shall lie to a Tribunal unless the 
aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal or 
application 
for 
review 
or 
representation 
to 
such 
departmental authority and a period of ninety days has 
elapsed from the date on which such appeal, application or 
representation was so preferred.”  
 
7. 
 
This Court in an unreported judgment dated 06.02.2017 
passed in Civil Petition Nos. 3311 to 3313 of 2016 etc has held as 
under:- 
“…But what exposes the impugned judgments to serious 
comment is entertainment of the appeals by the Service 
Tribunal in violation of the proviso (a) to Section 4 of the 
Service Tribunals Act, 1973, which clearly and unambiguously 
provides that no appeal would lie to the Tribunal unless the 
aggrieved civil servant has preferred an appeal, application for 
review or representation to the departmental authority. The 
respondents according to the available record preferred 
representations to the departmental authority and then appeal 
before the Tribunal, but without waiting for an order on their 
representations or expiration of 90 days. Appeals in the 
circumstances being incompetent were liable to be dismissed 
on this score alone notwithstanding their merits if any.  
 
CIVIL PETITIONS NO.3604 AND 3605 OF 2018 
-: 5 :-
8. 
 
In view of the above, when the learned Tribunal itself 
had taken note of the afore-referred judgment of this Court in 
paragraph 11 of the impugned judgment, it ought not to have 
entertained the amended appeals. So far as the argument of learned 
counsel for the petitioners that neither the injured appeared before the 
Inquiry Committee nor his medical report was produced before the 
Committee is concerned, it is suffice to state that it is only in the 
criminal proceedings that the injured has to appear whereas in the 
present case disciplinary proceedings were being carried out against 
the petitioners which go side by side, therefore, there was no need to 
join the injured with the proceedings. The petitioners being security 
guards were supposed to perform duties in a disciplined manner. Due 
to their conduct, the trust and faith showed by the employer is 
shattered resulting in loss of confidence. The manner in which the 
petitioners, on whom confidence was reposed to give protection and to 
perform duty in a disciplined manner, attacked on their Supervisor 
repels any consideration of treating them leniently. Article 212(3) of 
the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan specifically mandates 
that “an appeal to the Supreme Court from a judgment, decree, order 
or sentence of an Administrative Court or Tribunal shall lie only if the 
Supreme Court, being satisfied that the case involves a substantial 
question of law of public importance, grants leave to appeal.” No such 
question of law of public importance within the meaning of aforesaid 
Article 212(3) of the Constitution has been raised by the learned 
counsel for the petitioners, calling for interference by this Court.  
9. 
 
For what has been discussed above, these petitions 
having no merit are accordingly dismissed and leave to appeal is 
refused.  
 
 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
 
 
 
JUDGE 
Islamabad, the 
27th of January, 2021 
Approved For Reporting 
Khurram 
